EXCLUSIVITY OF GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION: the children.
the children. The husband appealed to the Supreme Court, which consolidated the
1. Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson
G.R. No.: L-23482, L-23767, L-24259
Date: August 30, 1968
Ponente: Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
Facts:
The spouses Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married in 1953 and
had four children. The wife left the conjugal home in Bacolod City and filed a
complaint for custody and support of the children in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila in 1963.
The spouses later agreed to file a joint petition for separation of property and
dissolution of conjugal partnership in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros
Occidental, where they also stipulated the custody and support of the children. The
CFI approved the joint petition and rendered a compromise judgment, awarding the
custody of the two older children to the husband and the two younger children to
the wife, with a monthly allowance of P150.00 for each child.
The wife moved to reconsider the compromise judgment and sought relief from the
JDRC and the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that she signed the joint petition only
to have immediate custody of the children and that the agreement violated Article
363 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the separation of a mother and her child
under seven years of age.
The JDRC dismissed the wife’s complaint on the grounds of res judicata and lis
pendens, while the CA annulled the compromise judgment and the order of
execution issued by the CFI in so far as they relate to the custody and visitation of
three cases.
Issues:
Whether the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI are valid with
respect to the separation of property and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership.
Whether the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI are valid with
respect to the custody and support of the children.
Ruling with Rationale:
The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the compromise agreement and the
judgment of the CFI with respect to the separation of property and the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership. As they complied with the requirements of Articles 190
and 191 of the Civil Code and did not prejudice any creditors or third persons.
The Supreme Court also affirmed the invalidity of the compromise agreement and
the judgment of the CFI with respect to the custody and support of the children, as
they contravene Article 363 of the Civil Code, which mandates that no mother shall
be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such a measure. The Supreme Court held that the CFI erred
in relying merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses without determining the
fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children and the best interest of the
children. The Supreme Court also held that the CFI erred in depriving the eldest
child, who was then over ten years of age, of his right to choose which parent he
prefers to live with, as provided by Section 6 and Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. The
Supreme Court further held that the CFI erred in fixing the monthly support of
P150.00 for each child, as it was insufficient considering the devaluation of the peso
and the rising cost of living. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the CFI for
further proceedings in accordance with its decision.
SEXUAL INFIDELITY OR PERVERSION:
2. Pastor Tenchavez vs. Vicenta Escaño, et al.
G.R. No.: L-19671
Date: November 29, 1965
Ponente: J.B.L. Reyes, J.
Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño, both Filipino citizens, secretly married in 1948
without the knowledge of Vicenta’s parents.
Vicenta’s parents opposed the marriage and persuaded her to file a petition for
annulment, which was dismissed for non-prosecution.
Vicenta left for the United States and obtained a divorce decree from a Nevada court
in 1950, on the grounds of “extreme cruelty” by Pastor.
Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in 1954 and acquired American
citizenship in 1958.
Pastor filed a complaint in 1955 against Vicenta, her parents, and the Roman
Catholic Church, seeking legal separation and damages.
Issues:
Whether the divorce decree obtained by Vicenta is valid and binding in the
Philippines.
Whether Vicenta’s remarriage and cohabitation with another man constitute sexual
infidelity or perversion that entitles Pastor to legal separation.
Whether Vicenta and her parents are liable for damages to Pastor.
Ruling with Rationale:
The Supreme Court held that the divorce decree obtained by Vicenta is not valid and
binding in the Philippines, because at the time of the divorce, Vicenta was still a
Filipino citizen and subject to Philippine law, which does not admit absolute divorce.
To recognize such foreign divorce decree would violate the public policy and good
customs of the state.
The Supreme Court also held that Vicenta’s remarriage and cohabitation with
another man constitute sexual infidelity or perversion that entitle Pastor to legal
separation, because her previous marriage to Pastor was valid and subsisting under
Philippine law. Vicenta’s refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of
consortium and desertion of her husband constitute a wrong caused by her fault, for
which Pastor is entitled to damages. Her marriage and cohabitation with Moran is
technically adultery, which is a ground for legal separation under the Family Code
(Art. 55).
The Supreme Court further held that Vicenta is liable for damages to Pastor, but her
parents are not. Vicenta’s parents did not alienate her affections or influence her
conduct toward her husband, but acted in good faith and respected her decisions.
Pastor’s charge against them was reckless and unfounded, and caused them anxiety
and moral injury, for which they are entitled to recover damages from Pastor.
3. Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc. vs. Trinidad Teodoro and The Court of
Appeals
G.R. No.: L-20530
Date: June 29, 1967
Ponente: Justice Makalintal
Facts:
Jose Corominas, Jr. was married to Sonia Lizares in 1935, but they obtained a divorce
in Nevada in 1954, which was not valid in the Philippines. Their conjugal partnership
was dissolved in 1957 by a Philippine court.
Corominas married Trinidad Teodoro in Hongkong in 1956, and again in Nevada in
1961. Both marriages were bigamous and void.
Manila Surety obtained a judgment against Corominas and his company for money
in 1952, which became final in 1961. It sought to execute the judgment by levying on
the properties found in Teodoro’s residence, which she claimed to be hers
exclusively.
Teodoro filed a complaint with injunction in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to
stop the sale of her properties, but the court dismissed her complaint and dissolved
the injunction, holding that the properties were co-owned by her and Corominas
under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Teodoro appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted her petition for injunction
and permanently enjoined the sheriff from selling her properties, ruling that Article
144 did not apply because of the subsisting marriage of Corominas to Lizares and
because the funds used by Teodoro to acquire the properties were fruits of her
paraphernal investments before her void marriage to Corominas.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties claimed by Teodoro are subject to execution to satisfy
the judgment debt of Corominas.
Ruling with Rationale:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the
properties claimed by Teodoro are not subject to execution.
The Court ruled that Article 144 of the Civil Code, which governs the co-ownership
of properties acquired by a man and a woman who live together as husband and
wife but are not married or their marriage is void, does not apply to the situation of
Teodoro and Corominas, because:
The subsisting marriage of Corominas to Lizares constitutes an impediment to a valid
marriage between him and Teodoro, which impediment, according to previous
decisions of the Court, precludes the establishment of a co-ownership under said
article.
The funds used by Teodoro in acquiring the properties were fruits of her paraphernal
investments which accrued before her void marriage to Corominas, and hence they
were not acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries, as required by said article.
The Court also rejected the procedural objections raised by Manila Surety and found
no reversible error in the issuance of the injunction by the Court of Appeals in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.
UNJUSTIFIED ABANDONMENT:
4. Tipton vs. Tipton, 169 Ia. 182, 151 N.W. 90; (no available full case text and case
digest)
5. Ong Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong vs. Lucita G. Ong
G.R. No.: 153206
Date: October 23, 2006
Ponente: Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez
Facts:
William and Lucita were married on July 13, 1975 and had three children.
Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation on March 21, 1996, alleging repeated
physical violence and grossly abusive conduct by William against her and their
children.
Lucita claimed that William would often slap, kick, pull her hair, bang her head
against the wall, and throw objects at her. He would also scold and beat the children
using the buckle of his belt. He would also utter insulting words at her like “putang
ina mo”, “gago”, “tanga”, etc.
Lucita left the conjugal dwelling on December 14, 1995, after a violent quarrel with
William, who hit her on various parts of her body and pointed a gun at her. She went
to her sister’s house in Binondo and then to her parents’ house in Dagupan. She also
sought medical treatment for her injuries from her parents’ doctor, Dr. Vicente
Elinzano.
William denied the allegations and claimed that Lucita filed the case to remove him
from the control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer them to
her family. He also argued that Lucita abandoned the family and thus should not be
granted legal separation.
The RTC granted the legal separation and dissolved the conjugal partnership of
properties. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucita is entitled to legal separation on the ground of repeated
physical violence and grossly abusive conduct by William.
Ruling with Rationale:
Yes, Lucita is entitled to legal separation. The Supreme Court denied the petition of
William and affirmed the findings of the RTC and the CA.
The Court held that Lucita was able to prove the presence of a ground for legal
separation under Article 55, par. (1) of the Family Code, which is repeated physical
violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner.
The Court gave weight to the detailed and straightforward testimonies of Lucita, her
sister, and their doctor, who corroborated the incidents of physical violence and
grossly abusive conduct by William. The Court also noted the assessment of the RTC
on the credibility of the witnesses, which is entitled to great respect and weight.
The Court rejected the arguments of William that Lucita filed the case for ulterior
motives, that the witnesses of Lucita were biased, and that Lucita abandoned the
family. The Court found these arguments to be baseless, absurd, and self-serving.
The Court also ruled that the abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year, which is not the case
of Lucita who left William due to his abusive conduct.
6. Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz
G.R. No.: L-19565
Date: January 30, 1968
Ponente: Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
Facts:
The plaintiff and the defendant were married in 1938 and had six children. They
acquired several properties and businesses during their marriage.
The defendant started living in Manila in 1955 to manage their expanding business,
but occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office instead of the
conjugal home.
The plaintiff accused the defendant of having a concubine named Nenita Hernandez
and presented a letter allegedly written by her as evidence.
The plaintiff filed a complaint for separation of property, monthly support, and
attorney’s fees, alleging that the defendant had abandoned her and mismanaged the
conjugal partnership property.
The trial court granted the plaintiff’s prayer and ordered separation and division of
the conjugal assets, monthly support of P2,000, and attorney’s fees of P20,000 with
interest.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the
Supreme Court for review.
Issues:
Whether the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in the legal sense that would justify
separation of property under Article 178 of the New Civil Code.
Whether the defendant abused his powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership property under Article 167 of the New Civil Code.
Ruling with Rationale:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the trial court’s judgment and denied the
plaintiff’s petition for separation of property.
The Court held that the defendant did not abandon the plaintiff, as he continued to
give support to his wife and children despite his absence from the conjugal home,
which negated any intent of perpetual separation.
The Court also held that the defendant did not abuse his powers of administration,
as he proved that he had increased the value and income of the conjugal assets
through his industry and diligence, and that there was no evidence of waste or
dissipation of the partnership property.
The Court reminded the parties of the policy of the law to promote healthy family
life and to preserve the union of the spouses, and exhorted them to reconcile their
differences. The Court, however, increased the monthly support to P3,000 and
reduced the attorney’s fees to P10,000, without interest.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE:
7. Ocampo vs Florenciano
No. L-13553, 23 February 1960
FACTS: Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938.
They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March
1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose
Arcalas. Havingfound out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture where she stayed for one year.Again
plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several
other men other than Arcalas. In 1952,when the wife finished
her studies, she left the plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. In June 1955,plaintiff surprised his wife in the act
of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his
intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which the defendant
manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal
separation in 1955.
ISSUE:Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the
confession of judgment disallowed by the FamilyCode.
RULING:Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that he
committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other
than such confession, is not the confession of judgment
disallowed by Article 48 of theFamily Code. What is prohibited is
a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or
through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery
independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal
separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would
not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by
the plaintiff. What The law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively on the defendant's confession. The petition should be
granted based on the second adultery, which has not been
prescribed.
8. Almacen vs Baltazar; GR No. 10028, 23 May 1958
Facts:
Hipolita Almacen and Teodoro Baltazar were legally married. Hipolita
committed adultery with one named Jose Navarro who was the cousin
of his husband, however it was alleged that that prior to the infidelity
of the wife, Teodoro himself has not been loyal to her, he having been
once confined at the hospital suffering from venereal disease. The
spouses have been separared and Teodoro lived maritally with another
woman. However, there has been a reconciliation between them or at
least a condonation by defendant as he was sending Hipolita money for
support, and that they were in pari delicto. And hence, the trial court
held that the husband shall support his wife since he also has been
unfaithful to her. In the case, the appellant contends that because of his
wife’s adulterous act that he shall be exempt from his obligation to give
support.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses in pari delicto shall require the
husband to support his wife as he had been unfaithful to the latter.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the defendant be pay his wire a
monthly support of 50 pesos. In the present case, the defendant is still
bound to support his wife, firstly, because they were both guilty of
infidelity and before the filing of the action they had a reconciliation or,
at least, defendant had pardoned plaintiff's unfaithfulness. There is the
general principle that when two persons acted in bad faith, they should
be considered as having acted in good faith, which principle may be
applied to the instant case to the effect that plaintiff and defendant
being in pari delicto, the latter cannot claim the adultery of the former
as defense to evade the obligation to give her support.
9. GARCIA v. DRILON G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013 699 SCRA 352
JURISPRUDENCE: The non-identical treatment of women and men
under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give
substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and
culturally endowed differences between men and women.
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with
a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent
which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded.
Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann. The
private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But
she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of
financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she
would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of
his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to
full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent
danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a
series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.
Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners.Petitioner hence, challenged
the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based
classification.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative
of the equal protection clause.
RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not
guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The
non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified
to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and
aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of
the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences
between men and women. RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive
protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and
empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special
remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are
substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such
objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or
middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender based classification therein is
therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the
1987 Constitution.
10. SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN v. SPS. PERFECTO C. TAN, GR No.
168852, 2008-09-30
Facts:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated March 7, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q-05-54536... and the RTC Resolution dated July 11, 2005 which denied
petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan
(Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children were
born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005,... barely
six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and
her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged... that Steven, in conspiracy
with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4),
(h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as... the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice granting
petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad
Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, contending that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as... parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition to
respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered
by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at
promoting the protection and safety of victims of... violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case as to
respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A.
No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law.
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration contending that the doctrine of necessary implication
should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due
process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that petitioner's liberal
construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since
the relationship between the offender and the alleged... victim was an
essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262. On July 11,
2005, the RTC issued a Resolution Idenying petitioner's. Verified Motion
for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents
under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation
of the provisions of the law.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262
Ruling:
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their
children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with...
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,... assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." While the said
provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship,
it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the RPC. Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the
suppletory application of the RPC.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied
in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws,
such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular
matter. With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262
because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which
by their... nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily. It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another.
11. SABALONES vs CA
GR 106169
Facts:
Petitioner Samson Sabalones being a diplomat was assigned in
different countries and left to his wife the administration of some
of their conjugal properties for 15years. After his retirement he
returned to the Philippines but not to his wife and children. After
4 years he filed an action for juridical authorization to sell their
property in San Juan which belongs to the conjugal partnership
and would use the proceeds of the sale for his hospital and
medical treatments. Respondent (wife) opposed the authorization
and filed an action for legal separation. Respondent alleges that
that the house in San Juan was being occupied by her and their
children and the lot in Forbes Park is being leased to Nobimichi
Izumi, and that her husband never returned to them being the
legitimate family and lived in a separate house in Fairview with
Thelma Curameng and their children. Judge Umali found that
petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma
Curameng. Court granted the decree of legal separation and the
petitioner is not entitled to share in the conjugal properties and
he is not entitled to support from his respondent wife. Decision of
lower court was appealed and was granted the writ of preliminary
injunction filed by the respondent to enjoin the petitioner from
interfering in the administration of their properties.
Petitioner argues that the law provides for joint administration of
conjugal properties and no injunctive relief can be issued against
the other because no right will be violated.
Issue:
Whether or not article124 is applicable as regards to joint
administration of conjugal properties
Held:
Grant for preliminary injunction is valid; it is necessary to protect
the interest of the respondent and her children and prevent the
dissipation of the conjugal assets. Injunction has not permanently
installed the respondent as the administrator of the whole
conjugal assets
Presence of 2 requirements of valid injunction:
○Existence of rights of the respondents to a share of the conjugal
estate
○There is evidence that entrusting the estate to the petitioner
may result to the irresponsible disposition of assets that would
cause injury to his wife and children Primary purpose of the
provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of
the subject of the action of the relations between the parties and
thus protect the rights of the plaintiffs respecting these matters
during the pendency of the suit.
Twin requirements of valid injunction:
○Existence of a right
○Actual or threatened violation
○Article 61: after further petition for legal separation has been
filed, the trial court shall in the absence of a written agreement
between the couple would appoint either one of the spouses or a
3rd person to act as the administrator.
12. Lapuz-Sy vs. EufemioG.R. No. L-30977. January 31, 1972
Facts: Carmen O. Lapuz-Sy (Carmen) and Eufemio S.
Eufemio(Eufemio) got married civilly on September 21,
1934 and subsequently canonically on September 30 of the same
year and has been living together until 1943 when Eufemio
abandoned her.That on August 18, 1953, Carmen filed an
action for Legal Separation alleging that they did not have a
child, had acquired properties during their marriage and that
Eufemio cohabited with one Go Hiok. Carmen prayed that Eufemio
be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership.
Consequently, Eufemiocounterclaimed for the declaration of
nullity of marriage void abinitio for the reason of his
previous marriage with Go Hiokcelebrated thru Chinese
Traditions and alleged affirmative and special defenses, and,
along with several other claims involving money and other
properties. Unfortunately, before trial could be completed,
Carmen got involved in a vehicular accident which led to her death
and the court was informed thereof by her Counsel.June 1969,
respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the"petition for legal
separation" on two (2) grounds, namely:that the petition for legal
separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in
Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen
abated the action for legal separation. Counsel for
deceased petitioner moved tosubstitute the deceased Carmen
by her father, Macario Lapuz.Counsel for Eufemio opposed the
motion.
Issue:
Whether or not , 1) the death of the plaintiff (Carmen) before final
decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?
2) If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves
property rights? note: the governing law in this case is the New
Civil Code
Ruling:
1) Yes. Death of ONE party to the action for legal separation also
causes the death or abatement of the action.
2) Yes. A review of the resulting changes in property relations
between spouses shows that they are solely the effect
of the decree of legal separation; hence, they cannot survive the
death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.Ratio: 1) The
Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes that an action for legal
separation is a personal in character and that is made
evident in its Article 100 allowing only the innocent spouse (and
no one else) to claim legal separation and in Article 108 that the
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. It follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself. 2) As for
the property relations, A further reason why an action for legal
separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a
decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself;without the decree such rights do not come into existence,
so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely
rights in expectation.If death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more
radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
13. Ramirez Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 12 SCRA 505;
LOURDES RAMIREZ-CUADERNO,petitioner, vs.ANGEL CUADERNO,respondent.
G.R. No. L-20043
November 28, 1964
FACTS:
1. Angel and Lourdes have been living separately since November 17, 1956, when
Angel inflicted bodily injuries on Lourdes in the course of a quarrel.
2. Angel brought Lourdes to her mother’s house and left her there. She filed for a
claim for support (her claims: maltreatment and abandonment by Angel; his claims:
Lourdes was the one who left the family home, hence not entitled to support).
3. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granted Lourdes’ petition a monthly
support of P150.00.
4. Court of Appeals reversed and set aside JDRC’s decision, saying that (in the
language of the court) appellant and appellee may again resume cohabitation, which
they are hereby admonished to do as their duty as husband and wife."
5. Lourdes filed a petition for review.
ISSUE: WON the court can compel Lourdes and Angel to resume cohabitation.
HELD: No. SC revived JDRC’s decision.
RATIO:
We recognize the wisdom of the exhortation that, in the interest of society and
perhaps of the parties, courts should move with caution in providing separate
maintenance for the wife, a situation that would be an acknowledgement of the de
facto separation of the spouses. However, it would be taking an unrealistic view for
us to compel or urge them to live together when, at least for the present, they,
especially the husband, are speaking of the impossibility of cohabitation. For while
marriage titles both parties to cohabitation or consortium, the sanction therefor is
the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order. This is due to the inherent characteristics and nature of
marriage in this jurisdiction.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the infliction of physical injuries on the
wife by the husband gave rise to their separation. It is likewise shown that it was the
husband who took his wife to her parents home, where he left her. The fact that the
wife allegedly accepted money from her husband and desisted from accepting any
later, because according to the latter, she was demanding more,only indicates that
even before the filing of the present case, the defendant-husband was already
providing something for the separate maintenance. Considering that the wife has no
income of her own while the husband has employment, the sum of P150.00 fixed by
the trial court for the wife's monthly support does not seem unreasonable. It is
necessary to state that, as the separation has been brought about by the husband
and under the circumstances established during the trial, the same shall subsist until
a different situation between the parties shall take place.
14. Potenciano vs. CA, G.R. Nos., 139780, 139808, July 19, 2011;
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is
about 86 years old and possesses extensive property valued at millions of pesos.
They contracted their matrimony on July 11, 1942, and lived together for a period of
30 years, blessed with six children, but eventually separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the US, he then stayed
at Erlinda’s place for about 5 months, and during this time, their children alleged
that their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of an antidepressant, which resulted
in Potenciano’s health deteriorating. Due to Potenciano’s condition, Erlinda filed a
petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano in RTC
Antipolo, which was then elevated to CA, and filed a petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of Potenciano. CA rendered a decision of visitation rights to
Potenciano’s wife, and the children dismissed the writ of habeas corpus for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention of the petition.
Issue:
Whether a wife can secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live
with her in conjugal bliss
Ruling:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or (Ty vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000)
by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ of ancient origin, the great object of which
is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is
issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising Facts:
legal custody over another person. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint
of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The In 1977, private respondent Edgardo married Ana Maria. However, the juvenile and
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. domestic relatives declared their marriage null and void ab initio because of a lack of
a valid marriage license. In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his
marriage to Anna Maria, Edgardo married petitioner Ofelia. In 1991, Edgardo filed a
civil case with the RTC, praying that his marriage to Ofelia be declared null and void
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation on the ground that there was no marriage license when they got married. He also
of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The averred that at the time he married Ofelia, he was still married to Anna Maria since
fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age or under medication the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4,
does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. The soundness of the mind 1980.
does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to
discern his actions. Ofelia, in defending her marriage, submitted their marriage license. However, the
fact that the civil marriage of Edgardo and Ofelia took place in 1979 before the
The CA correctly concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty, and it judgment declared his prior marriage null and void is undisputed.
observed that he was of sound mind and alert mind, having answered all the
relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. With his full mental capacity The trial court ruled in favor of Edgardo and declared his marriage to Ofelia void.
coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to
privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
Issues:
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his
1. Is a decree of nullity of the first marriage required before a subsequent marriage
wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by the compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
can be entered into validly?
carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
2. May the Family Code be given retroactive effect in the instant case?

3. Is Ofelia entitled to moral damages as indemnity for Edgardo’s filing of a baseless

complaint?

15. Ty vs. CA, GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000;

Held:
1.Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required (Art.
40, FC). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage. The sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
2. The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979. At that time,
the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, wherein there was
no need for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and
consent before such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of
private respondent was void for lack of license and consent; there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage.
Edgardo’s second marriage to Ofelia Ty is therefore valid. Moreover, the provisions of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied; to do so would prejudice the vested
rights of a party and her children. The Family Code has retroactive effect unless
there is impairment of vested rights. In the present case, the impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
3 No damages should be awarded in the present case. The petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain
her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her
husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage, which
caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation, and
alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation
where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do
so would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense,
militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action
for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation. There are other remedies, such as legal separation or prosecution for
adultery or concubinage.
16. State vs. Bell, 560 2d 925;(no available full case text and
case digest)
17. Ayala Investment vs. CA, GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998;
AYALA INVESTMENT, et al., petitioners, v. CA, respondents. G.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from the petitioner,
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the
creditline extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of
PBM,executed security agreements, making himself jointly and severally
answerable for PBM's indebtedness to AIDC. However, PBM failed to pay the loan.
Thus, AIDC filed a case for a sum of money against PBM and the
respondent-husband.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husbandAlfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests. Petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy
Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon
respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal
properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties.
Private respondents filed a case of injunction against the petitioners. Upon
application of private respondents, the lower court issued a restraining order to
prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ
of execution and with the sale of the said properties at a public auction. Then, AIDC appellee-husband only signed as surety thereof. The debt is clearly a
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. CA granted the petition, so corporate debt, and the respondent-appellant's right of recourse against the
the auction sale took place. appellee-husband as surety is only to the extent of his corporate
stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of
Subsequently, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction, but the petitioners-appellees.
lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, a trial on the merits proceeded. It
promulgated its decision, declaring the sale on execution null and void. Petitioners
appealed to the respondent court, but the respondent court affirmed the decision of
the RTC. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the respondent court. Thus, this petition is for review.

ISSUE

WON the obligation incurred by respondent husband redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of the private respondent

HELD/RULING

The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of the petitioners-appellees. Philippine Blooming Mills has a
personality distinct and separate from the family of petitioners-appellees — this
despite the fact that the members of the said family happen to be stockholders of
said corporate entity.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case
at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was
contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains. What is apparent from the facts of the case is that the judgment debt was
contracted by or in the name of the Corporation Philippine Blooming Mills, and the