Journal of Military Ethics (2003) 2(2): 160 /167

Editor’s note: The aim of these Book Discussions is to examine contemporary works in the
field of military ethics and highlight how their authors are contributing (knowingly or not) to
on-going discourse or debates on issues that may be of interest to our readers. Some
discussions will direct the reader’s attention to a single book or article, presented in a context
in which it may not have been previously considered, while others will attempt to reveal
connections among a cluster of works that are worthy of further exploration.

BOOK DISCUSSION

Jonathan Shay’s Achilles in Vietnam and Odysseus in

America
Richard Blucher, Department of International Studies, The Norwegian Military Academy, PO Box 42
Linderud, 0517 Oslo, Norway.
Tel:
/47 23 09 93 78, Fax:
/47 23 09 93 00, E-mail: richard.blucher@ks.mil.no

Jonathan Shay’s books about the traumas of Vietnam veterans make for painful
reading. He gives voice and image to the experiences of thousands of service
members whom America wished to forget about after the war ended in 1975. He
convincingly shows how, for the combat veteran, the experience of war does not
end when the fighting is over. The horror and shock of war damages all who are
involved in it. Whether or not they experience healing and ‘homecoming’ depends
on how they are led by those who wield power over them, from the political leaders
down to platoon commanders, and how they are received by the society which sent
them into harm’s way. Here, the moral and ethical dimensions play a decisive role.
Narrative is a key concept in Shay’s therapeutic work and in his writings. Part
of the healing process has involved helping the vets to construct a personal
narrative of their experiences and to grieve for their fallen comrades and for their
own lost youth. As Shay listened to these stories, he began to have associations with
the stories of the classical warriors in Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey . This led him to
read these epics as expressions of the universal experience of human beings at war.
He even postulates that they may have originally been written by a veteran or
veterans for veterans as a way of processing and communalizing their grief and
trauma. The more he compared his clinical material with the behavior described in
the Iliad and Odyssey , the more he found parallels: the narratives of Homer rang
true with the experience of real-life combat vets. But the insights ran both ways: his
combat vets helped him to interpret these epics in a new way, and at the same time
the epics gave form and image to the many common traits in the traumas of his
patients. Shay’s use of the epics demonstrates literature’s enduring role in
interpreting and communicating human experience.

ª 2003 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/1502750310000153

 Book Discussion 161

In the story of the rage of Achilles in the Iliad, he found a description of the
factors that contribute to complex post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)1 and the
berserk state. In the Odyssey ’s narrative of Odysseus’ harrowing 11-year voyage
back to Ithaca, Shay found images and even an allegory of the trials of homecoming
for the combat veteran. While the images from the Odyssey are powerful and
unquestionably meaningful for the vets, his allegorical interpretation seems forced
in places. On the whole, however, the classical insights forming the basic premises
of his books Achilles in Vietnam and Odysseus in America are credible and relevant.
Shay’s books resonate on many levels. They speak to different audiences and
‘popularize’ the field of combat trauma studies in a positive sense. In the present
discussion, we will focus on the betrayal of trust and the destruction of character, as
well as preventative measures and their moral and ethical implications for military
training and leadership, themes that are central in Shay’s work.
Social trust is the glue that holds a community together, whether it is a nation,
a business organization or a military unit. In the armed forces, soldiers must learn
to trust their peers and their leaders if they are to carry out their mission
successfully. As General Patton played by George C. Scott in the film of the same title
puts it: ‘An army is a team. It lives, eats, and sleeps, fights, as a team.’ Shay
maintains that all activities and actions that contribute to building and strengthen-
ing trust in a military unit multiply its combat strength, and he points to results that
support this claim (2002: 216). The problems start when trust is violated. Group
cohesion is affected, and if the leaders are the source of the violation, confidence in
their leadership soon disappears. The result is damage to the soldiers’ character, or
thumos in classical Greek. Thumos */character */as Shay defines it, is the will and
the emotions that inspire the individual to engage in his/her social group, to
contribute positively, to interact vigorously with others, to even willingly perform a
self-sacrificing act on behalf of the community. It depends strongly on a sense of
being treated justly as a valued member of the group, and is strengthened by trust
that it both bestows on those deemed worthy and receives from the same. As Shay
explains:

Character exists in dynamic relation to the ecology of social power, modeled

and remodeled throughout life by how well or badly those who hold power
fulfill the culture’s moral order (ibid.: 157).

Trust is violated when there is a betrayal of what’s right, and the most
dramatic consequences occur when this betrayal is committed by those who hold
power over or on behalf of the group. In the military context, this is both the
political and military leadership. It is a basic right of soldiers to be able to depend on
the trustworthiness of the country’s leaders who send them into battle. When

1
Shay lists the key symptoms of PTSD as follows: 1. Loss of authority over mental function */particularly
memory and trustworthy perception. 2. Persistent mobilization of the body and the mind for lethal
danger, with the potential for explosive violence. 3. Persistence and activization of combat survival skills
in civilian life. 4. Chronic health problems stemming from chronic mobilization of the body for danger.
5. Persistent expectation of betrayal and exploitation; destruction of the capacity for social trust. 6.
Persistent preoccupation with both the enemy and the veteran’s own military/government authorities.
7. Alcohol and drug abuse. 8. Suicidality, despair, isolation, and meaninglessness.
162 R. Blucher

politicians send soldiers into harm’s way without giving them the best possible
equipment, moral support and belief in the rightness of their cause, they are sowing
the seeds of betrayal and character damage. It is a basic right of soldiers to be able to
depend on the professionalism of their officers and the conviction that their lives will
not be wasted. When officers do not strive for professional competence for the sake
of the soldiers placed in their charge, or when they treat their soldiers meanly or
unjustly, a betrayal of trust is committed that slowly erodes character, and its
relative, morale, in the unit. This professional competence also involves clear ethical
leadership. Violations of the laws of war also lead to character damage and
psychological injury in those who commit them.
Shay illustrates these important points with examples both from the Iliad and
Odyssey and from soldiers’ experiences during the Vietnam War. In the Iliad,
Achilles has his war prize, the captive woman Brisêis, stolen from him by his
Commander-in-Chief, King Agmémnon. Shay explains:

We must understand the cultural context to see that this episode is more than
a personal squabble between two soldiers over a woman [. . .] The prize of
honor was voted by the troops for Achilles’ valor in combat. A modern
equivalent might be a commander telling a soldier, ‘I’ll take that Congressional
Medal of Honor of yours, because I don’t have one’ (1994: 5 /6).

The result of this direct affront to Achilles’ sense of fairness is that he indignantly
withdraws from the battle. He loses his sense of responsibility for his men and allows
his character to be consumed by wrath against his commander. The relationship of
trust between combat leader and combat soldier is shattered, and the warrior’s
combat effectiveness is crippled.
In the Odyssey , Shay sees in Odysseus himself a commander who betrays the
confidence of his men, leading them into one misadventure after another, and in the
end getting them all killed (2002: 231 /241).
Shay moves back and forth between the story of Achilles and the experiences
of the Vietnam vets to describe the stages that begin with the betrayal of trust and
end with the total destruction of character and the berserk state. Grief at the loss of
close comrades in arms and overwhelming guilt are stark contributing factors.
Shay is passionate about prevention. He firmly believes that there are ways to
avoid psychological and moral injury in military service, and he offers concrete
suggestions concerning three components: cohesion, training and leadership. Some
of these things have already been tried, with positive results. The willingness to
change the system on the part of the institutional powers that be in the military is
another matter, however.
The presence and cultivation of trust among the members of a fighting unit
creates cohesion. Shay quotes Ardant du Picq as an example of military experts who
have long seen cohesion as a combat multiplier:

Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion.
Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and
consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely (ibid.: 208).
 Book Discussion 163

Cohesion creates a basic structure of security among fighting soldiers. They know
that they will work as a team and watch out for one another. They do not fear
betrayal by those with whom they share mutual care and concern */or the mystical
quality which Stephen Crane called ‘the battle brotherhood’ ([1895]1983: 33).
Cohesion is an essential element for good morale among troops and inspires courage
in moments of incredible danger. Shay emphasizes

[that s]ocial cohesion */from having trained together and traveled to the war
zone together */is what keeps people physically alive and mentally sane when
faced with a human enemy who really is trying to kill them (2002: 210).

Cohesion in fighting units in Vietnam was not cultivated; in fact it was destroyed by
the training system and by the individual replacement system.
Shay argues for a system which emphasizes the development of trust and
cohesion from the first day of basic training through the entire period of military
system: namely, the unit training and unit rotational system. Whatever soldiers do,
they do by units, not by individual soldiers. In this system, service personnel are
seen as organic members of the community of their military units, and not as
interchangeable parts. One of the greatest disservices done to the fighting cohesion
and morale of American forces, according to Shay, was to use the industrial model
in military personnel management (ibid.: 209). A fighting unit is made up of flesh-
and-blood people, who need time to get to know each other, to bond and build trust,
and to develop a common identity and spirit. It is not an impersonal machine.
Military leaders ignore this truth to their cost. The effectiveness of German, and later
Israeli, forces was due in large measure to the cohesion fostered by the unit
rotational system (ibid.: 212 /213).
Shay describes how experiments were made with the unit system in the US
Army during the 1980s. Called the COHORT program,2 ‘[it] kept soldiers together in
their squads, platoons, companies, from the beginning of recruit training, right
through to the end of their first term of enlistment’ (ibid.: 214). COHORT units
clearly outperformed their conventionally composed opposing units in field
exercises, but the program was eventually terminated because it threatened the
traditional officer advancement and personnel administration systems (ibid.: 216 /
217).
On the ethical dimension of cohesion vs. individual replacement practices,
Shay is clear:

You don’t have to be Saint Thomas Aquinas or Immanuel Kant to see that
there is an ethical side to what I have presented [. . .] as matters of policy. If you
are in the position to set policy on how other people are ordered into danger,
and you know that sending them into harm’s way with strangers greatly
increases their chances of dying, you have an ethical duty not to make
personnel policies that have that result. Better alternatives are available. It’s
simple ‘do unto others’ (ibid.: 220).

2
‘Cohesion, Operational Readiness, Training’.
164 R. Blucher

He also emphasizes the importance of tough and realistic training, to prepare

soldiers for the reality of war. This too, is a professional and ethical imperative:

The particular content of training experience to which ‘toughness’ applies

varies with the technical content and military role the trainees are being
prepared for and with rank. All roles need training to perform effectively in the face
of physical danger and to perform ethically in the face of moral danger [my
emphasis] (ibid.: 223).

Shay does give some credit to the US military for improvements in the training
system since the Vietnam War (ibid.: 222 /223).
The importance of competent combat leadership cannot be overemphasized. It
is the basic foundation for the building of trust in a military unit. Shay quotes
Reuven Gal and Col. Franklin Jones who have studied and written about combat
stress:

The soldier’s confidence the commander is also critical in protecting him from
overwhelming battle stress [. . .] [This confidence derives from] (1) belief in the
professional competence of the commander, (2) belief in his credibility, and (3)
the perception that he cares about his troops. While in garrison all three
components are equally important; in combat trust in the commander’s
professional competence becomes primary (ibid.: 225 /226).

Professional competence therefore includes a vital ethical dimension. Striving

for excellence in the military profession has, ultimately, life and death consequences
for the personnel in the officer’s charge.
Others have also pointed out this important truth. Retired Colonel Chris
Keeble, who served in the British Parachute Regiment and fought in the Falklands,
stresses the inherent moral aspect of any form of leadership, but especially military
leadership. In his lectures on ethics and military leadership, he poses the question to
officers: What is your moral claim to lead? Put in another way: Why would soldiers
take you so seriously, that they would be willing to give their lives for the mission
which you command them to perform? (Keeble 2001). Keeble speaks with the
authority of his combat leadership achievements at Goose Green and in the later
stages of the Falklands campaign, and confirms the importance of both competent
and moral battle command. The commanding officer must be a moral compass for
his troops, showing honest care for them and leading them safely through the moral
minefields that war creates. In moments of physical danger and moral crisis, they
will look to him for professional and moral direction. Failures of leadership in either
of these areas result in physical and psychological casualties.
Shay agrees with this assessment of leadership’s moral compass:

What service members need at every level is moral knowledge, as well as

technical knowledge. Every atrocity strengthens the enemy and potentially
disables the service member who commits it. The distinction between lawful
combatant (who may thus be legally and morally attacked) and protected
person is the bright line between soldier and murderer. The overwhelming
majority of people who volunteer for our armed services are not psychopaths;
 Book Discussion 165

they are good people who will be seared by knowing themselves to be

murderers (2002: 224 /225).

Thus there is a clear link between psychology and ethics. Shay again:

I regard the ethical use of power to be one key to prevention of psychological

injury, particularly of complex PTSD and deformed thumos . Simply, ethics and
justice are preventative psychiatry (ibid.: 242).

The moral and ethical imperative of military leadership has not diminished
with the increasingly complex nature of conflicts today, in which the distinction
between combatant and non-combatant is often blurred.
Shay summarizes his thoughts about prevention with a call for changing the
US military culture:

I propose that we make creation and preservation of trust across all ranks and
between the armed services and the nation as the ‘vision statement’ [. . .] with
cohesion, leadership, and training as its embodiments. We have known for
more than a century that cohesion, leadership, and training are combat
strength multipliers. In contrast, personnel turbulence, individual-based
(rather than unit-based) manning, replacement, and rotation policies, training
to check all the boxes and looking good rather than robust military
competence, a climate of fear among officers, making them adverse to
decision, responsibility, and truthfulness */these are combat strength hemor-
rhages (ibid.: 229).

Changing military culture is a daunting challenge. But Shay speaks with the
authority of one who has seen the negative effects of the present culture and also as
a spokesman for those whose lives have been ravaged by war and by a flawed
system. His voice deserves to be heard.
Shay also addresses the soldiers’ need for ‘purification’ after the shedding of
blood (ibid.: 244 /245). He argues that it is the responsibility of society to provide
some kind of non-sectarian ritual which would provide this service. While I see his
point, I also caution that this kind of ceremony might easily be misunderstood as an
approbation of what the soldiers have done in the name of the state. In addition, in
America and many Western countries, there must first be a break with the
glorification of violence in the popular culture, before such a ritual can have
meaning.3
There have been critics of the Vietnam vet psychiatrists and the burgeoning
‘trauma studies’ field in general.4 The British historian Ben Shepherd, author of a
monumental history of 20th-century military psychiatry entitled A War of Nerves
(2000), even goes so far as to maintain that there is no such thing as PTSD, and
that creating such terms (also ‘shell-shock’, ‘battle fatigue’, etc.) simply encourages

3
See the work done by David Grossman concerning the affect of violence in popular culture on youthful
audiences. It can be accessed at www.killology.com
4
See for example Baxter & Rogers (2003).
166 R. Blucher

individuals to focus on the negative effects of their war experiences, instead of

getting on with their lives (2001). He also believes it promotes a ‘compensation
culture’ which is damaging to the military service ethos (2000: 397 /398). Here we
see an interesting conflict in viewpoints between the historian and the clinician.
Shepherd has studied documents and Shay has studied dysfunctional human
beings. It seems a bit presumptuous of someone who has never done clinical work
with psychiatric casualties to conclude that their suffering does not exist or is
greatly exaggerated. It would be interesting to listen to a discussion between
Shepherd and some of Shay’s veterans.
Shay has been lauded both by classics scholars and military professionals for
his work. He has brought fresh insights in the reading of Homer, and has
demonstrated how trauma studies can inform other disciplines, just as psycho-
analysis was influential in other fields between 50 and 100 years ago (Shay 2002:
246). When Achilles in Vietnam was published in 1994, a reviewer in Parameters ,
the journal of the US Army War College, stated: ‘Were it in the reviewer’s power, no
officer would be allowed to swear the oath of commission until he had read this
book’ (Johnson 1995: 133). Shay described the process by which combat soldiers
become traumatized, and the important lessons for combat leadership. This gained
the attention of several Marine Corps Commandants, an Air Force Chief of Staff and
other high-ranking officials at the Pentagon. Odysseus in America , published in the
fall of 2002, is likely to experience a similar reception from the military, as well as
from those who are responsible for veterans’ affairs.
War is never something that should be decided upon simply for political
expedience. It must always be the last resort. And those who decided for war must
be prepared and take responsibility for the human costs which others */the soldiers,
their families, their friends */will have to pay.

References
Baxter, Sarah & Lois Rogers, 2003. ‘Stiff upper lip beats stress counselling’, The Sunday Times
March 2, 2003: News 12.
Crane, Stephen, [1895]1983. The Red Badge of Courage . New York: Bantam Books.
du Picq, Ardant, 1987. Battle Studies , trans. J. N. Greely & R. C. Cotton, in Roots of Strategy ,
Book 2. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole. Quoted in Shay, Odysseus in America : 208.
Gal, Reuven & Franklin D. Jones, 1995. ‘A Psychological Model of Combat Stress’, in Jones et
al ., eds, War Psychiatry . Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, Borden Institute,
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Quoted in Shay, Odysseus in America : 225 /226.
Homer, 1990. The Iliad , trans. Robert Fagles. New York: Penguin Books.
Homer, 1996. The Odyssey , trans. Robert Fagles. New York: Penguin Books.
Johnson, Douglas V., 1995. ‘Review of Achilles in Vietnan ’, Military Review 25(3): 133 /135.
Keeble, Chris, 2001. ‘The Moral Element in Leadership’. Lecture at the Norwegian Military
Academy, Oslo, Norway, 20 April.
Shay, Jonathan, 1994. Achilles in Vietnam. Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character . New
York: Touchstone/Simon & Schuster.
Shay, Jonathan, 2002. Odysseus in America. Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming . New
York: Scribner.
Shepherd, Ben, 2000. A War of Nerves . London: Jonathan Cape.
 Book Discussion 167

Shepherd, Ben, 2001. ‘History PTSD’. Lecture at the ESTSS Seventh European Conference on
Traumatic Stress, Edinburgh, Scotland, 27 May.

Biography
Richard Blucher (Cand. Philol. University of Oslo) is a lecturer in English at
the Norwegian Military Academy, and Managing Editor of Journal of Military
Ethics .