This report is confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose

of case studies in BTM, BRM, MRM exclusive for Höegh seafarers

Höegh Seoul collision with Condor Arrow in Singapore waters on 12-Oct-2016

The collision with MV Condor Arrow occurred at approximately 0103 (GMT+8) on 12

October 2016, in the precautionary area of the Singapore Strait Traffic Separation Scheme,
close to the Eastern Pilot Boarding Ground A.
At the time of the collision, Hoegh Seoul was proceeding towards Eastern Pilot Boarding
Ground A, and the Condor Arrow was proceeding towards Eastern Pilot Boarding Ground B.
Hoegh Seoul sustained damage to her port quarter and the Condor Arrow suffered damage to
her port side, in way of her accommodation ladder.

Weather & Environmental Data

Drafts Fwd/Aft : 6.80 m/7.60 m
Weather Conditions/Visibility: Cloudy/Good Visibility (estimated 10-12 miles)
Wind and Direction WNW, BF-3.
Sea and Swell: Slight
Tide: Low tide at 0143 hrs. LT with a height of 0.8 m above chart datum. The tidal stream

AL
direction off Batu Berhanti at 0100 was 058° with a rate of 2.3 knots.

Event leading to the collision

TI
 Hoegh Seoul departed Hambantota on 8-Oct-2016 for Singapore, ETA at 0100 (GMT+8)
on 12-Oct-2016.
 Hoegh Seoul was scheduled to embark a pilot at Eastern Pilot Boarding Ground A at
EN
0100 on 12-Oct-2016.
 At around 2255 LT 11-Oct-2016, Master took the conn of the vessel, and the Junior Third
Officer was assisted the Master in navigation. All the bridge navigational equipment was
in good operational condition.
D

 At 2300, Master first observed Condor Arrow on the S-band radar. Condor Arrow was
then astern, at a distance of around 4.5 nautical miles, and was in the Eastbound lane of
FI

the TSS making speed of 12 to 13 knots over the ground. Another vessel, NYK Triton,
was also astern of Hoegh Seoul, but much closer than the Condor Arrow. NYK Triton
was also in the eastbound lane of the TSS and was proceeding at a similar speed to Hoegh
N

Seoul.
 At 0000 on 12 October 2016, the Junior Third Officer handed over the watch to the
O

Second Officer and the AB’s changed over at the wheel. At this time, Hoegh Seoul was
on a heading of 054° and making speed of 7.1 knots over the ground. NYK Triton was at
a distance of around 1.5 NM astern; and Condor Arrow was at a distance of around 4.0
C

NM astern of Hoegh Seoul.

 At 0021, the pilot station called on VHF channels 14 and 20 and advised Hoegh Seoul
that the pilot boarding time had been pushed back to 0130 LT.
 At 0023, the Master started to reduce the vessel’s speed.
 At 0038 (collision minus 25 minutes or C-25) the Master instructed the Second Officer to
call NYK Triton and advise her that Hoegh Seoul had stopped the engine as the Pilot
boarding time had been put back to 0130 LT. NYK Triton was astern at range of 0.8 NM
and Condor Arrow was astern at a distance of around 2 NM. In addition to these two
vessels astern of Hoegh Seoul, there was a tug and tow approximately 1NM off the
starboard bow. The tug and tow was heading westbound, and was shaping to pass down
the starboard side of Hoegh Seoul at a range of around 0.3 NM.
 0043 LT (C-20): Condor Arrow was directly astern at a range of around 1.5NM. Second
Officer called Condor Arrow on VHF channel 14 to inform her that Hoegh Seoul had
stopped the engine and waiting for the pilot. Condor Arrow acknowledged this call and

This report is confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose
of case studies in BTM, BRM, MRM exclusive for Höegh seafarers
This report is confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose
of case studies in BTM, BRM, MRM exclusive for Höegh seafarers

advised Hoegh Seoul that she would be picking up a pilot at Eastern Pilot Boarding
Ground B at 0145 LT. The Master now visually observed Condor Arrow and saw that she
was displaying two masthead lights, port and starboard sidelights and that she had her
deck lights switched on
 0055 LT (C-8) NYK Triton had overtaken Hoegh Seoul and was clear; the tug and tow
was abeam to starboard, at a range of around 2 to 3 cables; and Condor Arrow was
directly astern at a distance of around 0.8 NM. At this time, the Second Officer called the
Condor Arrow again on VHF channel 14 and asked Condor Arrow how she intended to
overtake. Condor Arrow said she would overtake Hoegh Seoul to starboard, after the tug
and tow had passed clear.
 0058 LT (C-5):- When the two vessels were at a distance of around 0.5 NM, Condor
Arrow began to alter course to starboard to overtake Hoegh Seoul, and this was observed
by Hoegh Seoul.
 0101 LT(C-2): Condor Arrow had altered from a gyro heading of 074° to 128°, however,
she remained on a relatively steady bearing, off the port quarter, now at a distance of

AL
around 0.2 NM. Condor Arrow called Hoegh Seoul on VHF channel 14 and asked Hoegh
Seoul to “move ahead a little”. The Master of Hoegh Seoul acknowledged Condor Arrow
and put the engine from “stop” to “dead slow ahead”.
 0102 LT (C-1): Condor Arrow called Höegh Seoul again and asked Höegh Seoul to

TI
“move ahead”. Höegh Seoul responded and confirmed that she was “moving ahead now”.
After this call, VTIS Central called Condor Arrow on VHF channel 14 and instructed
Condor Arrow to keep clear of the Höegh Seoul. Condor Arrow told VTIS Central that
EN
they would overtake Hoegh Seoul to starboard. Shortly thereafter, the Master of Höegh
Seoul instructed the duty AB to put the wheel “hard to port”. This was to attempt to move
the stern clear of the approaching Condor Arrow.
 0103 LT (C): the rudder was put to “amidships” and then back to “hard to port”. Despite
D

putting the engine to “dead slow ahead” and the rudder “hard to port” at 0103:22, the port
side of Condor Arrow collided with the port quarter of Höegh Seoul in approximate
FI

position 01°11.817’N 103°53.097’E. At the time of the collision Condor Arrow was on a
heading of around 188° and making good a speed of 4.3 knots; and Hoegh Seoul was on a
heading of around 050° and making good a speed of 1.3 knots. The vessels remained
N

alongside one another for around a minute, after which they moved clear of one another.
O

Post collision:
- 0107 LT: Hoegh Seoul quickly reported the collision to VTIS Central and conducted a full
damage assessment. There was no pollution or injuries as a result of the collision. As there
C

was no pollution, vessel was granted permission to cross the westbound lane of the TSS.
DPA was also called up during that time and briefed about the incident. The Pilot boarded
Hoegh Seoul at 0200 LT at Eastern Pilot Boarding Ground A, and at 0235LT the vessel
dropped anchor at Singapore Eastern Holding B anchorage.

Consequences:
There was no breach of hull and no ingress of water into own vessel. Both vessels suffered
hull damage.
Own vessel suffered indentations and damages in no.5 deck and no.4 steering deck (steering
gear compartment) port side lower corner. Deck plate, transom plate and shell plating were
found buckled and a crack was found on the transom plate corner.

This report is confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose
of case studies in BTM, BRM, MRM exclusive for Höegh seafarers
This report is confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose
of case studies in BTM, BRM, MRM exclusive for Höegh seafarers

Conclusions:
 Condor Arrow, had she been maintaining a proper lookout [Rule 5], should now also have
been aware that Höegh Seoul had stopped her engine at this time and Condor Arrow
should have taken steps to ascertain the risk of collision [Rule 7]
 Even if we presume that Condor Arrow did not hear the above VHF exchange, she should
have been aware that Höegh Seoul had stopped her engine, and that risk of collision now
existed [Rule 7] by no later than 0043 (C-20), as this was when Höegh Seoul called on the
VHF and advised Condor Arrow that Höegh Seoul had stopped her engine.
 We believe it is therefore likely that Condor Arrow only put her wheel significantly over
to starboard at 0058 (C-5); that she did not take any substantial action to overtake Höegh
Seoul until this time (C-5) when she began to significantly alter course to starboard. At
this time, the vessels were only 0.5 NM apart, and we believe Condor Arrow was at fault
therefore, for not taking earlier and substantial action to avoid collision [Rule 8 and Rule
16].
 Condor Arrow delayed taking substantial avoiding action until 0058 (C-5) in order to pass

AL
Höegh Seoul to starboard. There was no reason however, why Condor Arrow could not
have taken earlier action to significantly reduce her speed so as to maintain a safe
distance from Höegh Seoul until the tug and tow had passed clear, and Condor Arrow
could safely overtake Höegh Seoul to starboard.

TI
 Condor Arrow and Hoegh Seoul were also found at fault for not sounding or making the
appropriate light signals prior to the collision [Rule 34].
 The two vessels were at a distance of less than 0.2 NM and it was clear from the VHF call
EN
of Condor Arrow at this time, that the collision could no longer be avoided by the actions
of Condor Arrow alone. As such, Höegh Seoul was obliged at this time to take such
action as would best aid to avoid collision [Rule 17(b)]. She responded by putting her
engine to “dead slow ahead”, and then a minute later, at C-1, by also putting her rudder
D

hard to port. The circumstances however, were such that immediate and more positive
action was called for at C-2, and that these actions taken were not such as would best aid
FI

avoid collision.
 Höegh Seoul was also at fault however, for not taking earlier avoiding action as permitted
under Rule 17 (a) (ii). Höegh Seoul first became concerned that Condor Arrow was not
N

taking sufficient action to avoid collision at 0055 (C-8) when the vessels were at a
distance of around 0.8 NM. At this time, Condor Arrow advised Höegh Seoul that she
O

would overtake Höegh Seoul to starboard once the tug and tow had passed clear. We
believe that it should have been clear, had Höegh Seoul been closely monitoring the
C

situation, that Condor Arrow would not be altering her course to starboard for a couple of
minutes, by which time the distance between the two vessels would have reduced further.
In these circumstances, Höegh Seoul should have taken avoiding action at C-8, in
accordance with Rule 17 ((ii), by making judicious use of her engines, bow thruster, and
rudder, so as to move to port out of the path of Condor Arrow so as to facilitate her
intended overtaking manoeuvre.
 In summary, Höegh Seoul did take action to avoid collision at C-8 in accordance with
Rule 17 (a) (ii) and Rule 17 (b) when she first became concerned that Condor Arrow was
taking insufficient action. But the action was insufficient to propel her out of the way of
the Condor Arrow.

This report is confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose
of case studies in BTM, BRM, MRM exclusive for Höegh seafarers
This report is confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose
of case studies in BTM, BRM, MRM exclusive for Höegh seafarers

Tracks of Hoegh Seoul and Condor Arrow leading up to the collision (times are in local time
GMT+8 hours)

AL
TI
EN
X-band Radar screenshot at 0038
D
FI
N
O
C

This report is confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose
of case studies in BTM, BRM, MRM exclusive for Höegh seafarers