1

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
JUDICIAL POWER
Q: Andres Ang was born of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother in Sorsogon, Sorsogon on
JUDICIAL POWER is vested in the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be
January 20, 1973. In 1988, his father was naturalized as a Filipino citizen. On May 11, 1998,
established by law.Since the courts are given ‘judicial power’ and nothing more, courts
Andres Ang was elected Representative of the First District of Sorsogon. Juan Bonto who
may neither attempt to assume or be compelled to perform non-judicial functions. They
received the second highest number of votes, filed a petition for Quo Warranto against Ang.
may not be charged with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to
The petition was filed with the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Bonto
the fulfillment of their duties.
contends that Ang is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and therefore is disqualified to
be a member of the House. The HRET ruled in favor of Ang. Bonto filed a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court. The following issues are raised: Whether the case is justiciable
considering that Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution declares the HRET to be the ―sole
JUDICIAL POWER includes (MEMORIZE!):
Judge‖ of all contests relating to the election returns and disqualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. How should this case be decided? (1998 BAR)
a. The duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
A: The case is justiciable. As stated in Lazatin v. House of Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391,
are legally demandable and enforceable(ORDINARY Jurisdiction );
404, since judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
2022 notes:it focuses on justiciable questions or those pertaining to legality or
instrumentality of the Government, the Supreme Court has the power to review the decisions of
constitutionality of an act.
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in case of grave abuse of discretion on its part.

Q: What is the difference, if any, between the scope of judicial power under the 1987
b. To determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
Constitution on one hand, and the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions on the other? (1994 BAR)
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
A: The scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution is broader than its scope
instrumentality of the government (EXTRAORDINARY Jurisdiction).
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution because of the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states that it includes the duty to determine
4blue 95 notes: courts can determine questions of legality with respect to
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
governmental action, they cannot review government policy and the wisdom
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. As held in
thereof, for these questions have been vested by the Constitution in the
Marcos v. Manglapus (177 SCRA 668), this provision limits resort to the political
Executive and Legislative Departments.
question doctrine and broadens the scope of juridical inquiry into areas which the courts
under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions would normally have left to the political
Sec 1(b) focuses on political questions or those of beneficial convenience or
departments to decide.
issues not justifiable since it refers to wisdom so its better than congress would
resolve it rather than the courts.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, there was no
provision defining the scope of judicial power as vested in the judiciary. While these
2022 notes:Political questions becomes justiciable if it focuses on ―lawfulness‖
Constitutions, both provided for vesture of judicial power ―in one Supreme Court and in
or ―violations‖ of an act. In short, if it alleged specific provision in constitution
such inferior courts as may be established by law,‖ they were silent as to the scope of
that is being violated or it alleged grave abuse of discretion ,then ,it is now
such power. The 1987 Constitution on the other hand, re- wrote the provisions on the
transformed into justiciable question.
vesture of judicial powers originally appearing in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, as
follows: ―The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. ―Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
FOR courts TO exercise this power, the following MUST EXIST(JUDICIAL REVIEW):
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.‖ (Section 1, Article VIII) The second paragraph of the cited provision
a. An actual controversy with legally demandable and enforceable rights;
was not found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution. It contains a new definition of judicial
b. Involving real parties in interest;
power particularly the scope thereof. The first portion thereof represents the traditional
c. The exercise of such power will bind the parties by virtue of the court’s
concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as by law, which
application of existing laws.
presumably was implicit in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The second (latter) portion
of the definition represents a broadening of the scope of the judicial power or, in the
language of the Supreme Court, conferment of ―expanded jurisdiction‖ on the judiciary
(Daza v. Singson. 180 SCRA 496) to enable the courts to review the exercise of
discretion by the political departments of government. This new prerogative of the
judiciary as now recognized under the 1987 Constitution was not constitutionally
permissible under the 1935 and 1973 Charters.

Q: SDO was elected Congressman. Before the end of his first year in office, he inflicted
physical injuries on a colleague, ETI. In the course of a heated debate, charges were filed in
court against him as well as in the House Ethics Committee. Later, the House of
Representatives, dividing along party lines, voted to expel him. Claiming that his expulsion was
ROLE OF CONGRESS
railroaded and tainted by bribery, he filed a petition seeking a declaration by the Supreme Court
that the House gravely abused its discretion and violated the Constitution. He prayed that his
expulsion be annulled and that he should be restored by the Speaker to his position as
Defining enforceable and demandable rights and prescribing remedies for violations of
Congressman. Is SDO’s petition before the Supreme Court justiciable? (2004 BAR)
such rights; and
A: While under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the Supreme Court may inquire
Determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies or disputes
whether or not the decision to expel SDO is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
arising from legal rights.
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition should be dismissed. In Alejandrino v. Quezon (46
Phil. 83 [1924J), the Supreme Court held that it could not compel the Senate to reinstate a
Senator who assaulted another Senator and was suspended for disorderly behavior, because it
Thus, Congress has the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of
could not compel a separate and coequal department to take any particular action. In Osmena v.
various courts.
Pendatun (109Phil. 863 [1960]), it was held that the Supreme Court could not interfere with the
BUT, Congress cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases provided
suspension of a Congressman for disorderly behavior, because the House of Representatives is
for in the Constitution.
the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The assault of a fellow Senator constitutes
disorderly behavior.
Creation and abolition of courts:
Q: The President alone without the concurrence of the Senate abrogated a treaty. Assume that
a. The power to create courts implies the power to abolish and even
the other country-party to the treaty is agreeable to the abrogation provided it complies with the
re-organize courts.
Philippine Constitution. If a case involving the validity of the treaty abrogation is brought to the
b. BUT this power cannot be exercised in a manner which would
Supreme Court, how should it be resolved? (2008 BAR)
undermine the security of tenure of the judiciary.
A: The Supreme Court should dismiss the case. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over a
c. If the abolition/re-organization is done in good faith and not for
treaty is only with respect to questions of its constitutionality or validity. In other words, the
political or personal reasons, then it is VALID. (same rule
question should involve the constitutionality of a treaty or its validity in relation to a statute
applies for civil servants)
(Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230). It does not pertain to the termination of a treaty. The
authority of the Senate over treaties is limited to concurrence. (Art. VIII, Sec. 21 of the 1987
Constitution) There being no express constitutional provision regulating the termination of
2022notes:Judicial power cannot be exercised in vacuum. Without any laws from which rights
treaties, it is presumed that the power of the President over treaty agreements and over foreign
arise and which are violated, there can be no recourse to the courts.
relations includes the authority to ―abrogate‖ treaties. The termination of the treaty by the
President without the concurrence of the Senate is not subject to constitutional attack, there
2022notes:The courts cannot be asked for advisory opinions.
being no Senate authority to that effect. The Philippines is a party to the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. Hence, the said Convention this becoming part of Philippine Law governs
2022 notes: Under section 4: whenever there is vacancy, then 90 days from vacancy in the
the act of the President in terminating the treaty. Article 54 of this Convention provides that a
Justice position the President SHALL appoint. It is in line with this that the framers of
treaty may be terminated ―At any time by consent of all the parties‖. Apparently, the treaty in
the Constitution exclude the Appointment of a Justice from the Ban on Midnight
question is a bilateral treaty in which the other state is agreeable to its termination. Article 67 of
Appointment of the President.
the Convention adds the formal requirement that the termination must be in an instrument
communicated to the other party signed by the Head of State or of Government or by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Q: Mr. Yellow and Mr. Orange were the leading candidates in the vice-presidential elections.
After elections, Yellow emerged as the winner by a slim margin of 100,000 votes. Undaunted,
Orange filed a protest with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). After due consideration
of the facts and the issues, the PET ruled that Orange was the real winner of the elections and
ordered his immediate proclamation. a. Aggrieved, Yellow filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Certiorari challenging the decision of the PET alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction? Explain. b. Would the answer in (a.) be the same if
Yellow and Orange were contending for a senatorial slot and it was the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) who issued the challenged ruling? c. What is the composition of the PET? d.
What is judicial power? Explain Briefly. (2012 BAR)
A:
a. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the petition. The Presidential Electoral
Tribunal is not simply an agency to which the Members of the Senate Court were
assigned. It is not separate from the Supreme Court. (Macalintal v. Presidential Tribunal
Electoral Tribunal, 631 SCRA 239)
b. The Supreme Court would have jurisdiction if it were the Senate Electoral Tribunal
who issued the challenged ruling. The Supreme Court can review its decision if it acted
with grave abuse of discretion. (Lerias v. HRET, 202 SCRA 808)
c. The presidential Electoral Tribunal is composed of the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court en banc. (Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution) d.
Judicial power - Section 1(1) Art. 8 is the authority to settle justifiable controversies or
dispute involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice
or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights (Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756). It
includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government. (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution)
Q: In keeping with the modern age of instant and incessant information and transformation,
Congress passed Cybercrime Prevention Act to regulate access and use of the amenities of the
cyberspace. While ostensibly the law is intended to protect the interests of society, some if its
provisions were also seen as impermissibly invading and impairing widely cherished liberties
of the people particularly the freedom of expression. Before the law could even be
implemented, petitions were filed in the Supreme Court questioning said provisions by people
who felt threatened, for themselves, as well as for the benefit of others who may be similarly
affected nut not minded enough to challenge the law. The Solicitor General countered that there
is no basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review since there has yet been no violation
of the law, and that the petitioners have no locus standi since they do not claim to be in
imminent danger of being prosecuted under the law. Can the Court proceed to decide the case
even if the law has not yet become effective? (2014 BAR)
A: The Supreme Court can proceed to decide the case even if the law has not yet become
effective. Since the petitions filed sought to nullify the Cybercrime Prevention Act, because it
violated several provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court became duty-bound to
settle the dispute (Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18). Since it is alleged that the Cybercrime
Prevention Act violates various provisions of the Bill of Rights, including freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the issues raised
are of paramount public interest, of transcendental importance and with far- reaching
constitutional implications, that justify dispensation with locus standi and exercise of the power
of judicial review by the Supreme Court (Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441). Jurisprudence
provides that locus standi is not required when the ction was filed to prevent a chilling effect on
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and overbreadth.
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Procedural rule-making
Q: Ascertain the constitutionality of the following acts: A law prohibiting any court, other than
the Supreme Court, from issuing a writ of injunction against an investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman. (2018 BAR)
A: The law is unconstitutional. The power to issue injunctive writs is part of judicial power.
The rules governing the exercise of this power are within the powers of the Supreme Court to
promulgate. The law therefore is an encroachment of the Court's rulemaking power (Carpio-
Morales v CA, GR 217126- 27, 10 Nov 2015)
Q: Under Section 6 of Article V (on Criminal Jurisdiction) of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA), the custody of a United States (US) personnel who becomes subject to criminal
prosecution before a Philippine court shall be with the US military authorities, if the latter so
requests. The custody shall begin from the commission of the offense until the completion of
all judicial proceedings. However, when requested, the US military authorities shall make the
US personnel available to Philippine authorities for any investigative or judicial proceeding
relating to the offense with which the person has been charged. In the event that the Philippine
judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the US shall be relieved of any
obligation under Section 6. The constitutionality of Section 6, Article V of the VFA is
challenged on two grounds: (1) it nullifies the exclusive power of the Supreme Court to adopt
rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines; Rule on the challenge. (2018 BAR)
A: The challenge is without merit. The rule in international law is that foreign armed forces
allowed to enter one’s territory are immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed
upon. As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of the Supreme Court to
adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, rather, it is one in which, as is normally
encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not
extend or Apply, except to the extent agreed upon, to subjects of another State due to the
recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction
or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of
such immunity, like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of
a foreign State allowed to enter another State’s territory. The Constitution, on the contrary,
states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land (Art. II, Sec. 2).
Q: Section 9 of P.O. No. 1606, as amended, provides that the Sandiganbayan may adopt
internal rules governing the allotment of cases among its divisions, the rotation of justices
among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court. Section 6 of
Article IX-A of the Constitution allows each of the Constitutional Commissions "en banc [to]
promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." Section
16(3) of Article VI of the Constitution states that "Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings." Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution further provides that "The Senate or
the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries... in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." Finally, Section 3(8) of Article XI of
the Constitution declares that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purposes of this section."
Are the rules promulgated pursuant to these provisions subject to review and disapproval
by the Supreme Court?
A: Section 5[5] of Article VIII of the Constitution clearly provides that the ―[R]ules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court;‖ accordingly, it is clear that the Supreme Court may
review and reverse the rules of procedure of the Sandiganbayan and the Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the rules of procedure of Congress in its proceedings,
legislative inquiries and on impeachment, while these rules may be generally considered
as political questions, when questioned before the courts in a proper case, they would
nevertheless be subject to the power of judicial review under the second paragraph of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which authorizes it to review and annul all
acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government which may be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Although the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan are
covered by the disapproval authority of the Supreme Court as stated in Section 5(5) of
Article VIII of the Constitution, the same thing cannot be said for the Rules of Procedure
promulgated by Congress by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, unless these
rules are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Rules of Procedure of Constitutional
Commissions are likewise outside the disapproval authority of the Supreme Court as
these commissions are deliberately placed in the Constitution to be independent, unless
these are tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Q: Congress enacted a law providing for trial by jury for those charged with crimes or offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The law provides for the qualifications
of members of the jury, the guidelines for the bar and bench for their selection, the manner a
trial by jury shall operate, and the procedures to be followed. Is the law constitutional? (2008,
2013BAR)
A: The law providing for trial by jury is unconstitutional, because of the omission in Article
VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Article X, Section 5(5) 1973 Constitution,
which authorizes the Legislature to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of procedure
promulgated by the Supreme Court. Congress can no longer enact a law governing rules of
procedure for the courts. (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96)
Q: Congress enacted R.A. No. 14344 creating the City of Masuwerte which took effect on
September 25, 2014. Section 23 of the law specifically exempts the City of Masuwerte from the
payment of legal fees in the cases that it would file and/or prosecute in the courts of law. In two
(2) cases that it filed, the City of Masuwerte was assessed legal fees by the clerk of court
pursuant to Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The City of Masuwerte questions the
assessment claiming that it is exempt from paying legal fees under Section 23 of its charter. Is
the claim of exemption tenable? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A: The exemption from payment of legal fees is not valid. The rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court for the payment of legal fees were in the exercise of its rule-making power and
cannot be modified by a law granting an exemption from payment (In Re Exemption from
Payment of Court and Sheriff’s Fees of Duly Registered Cooperatives, A.M. No. 12-2-03-0,
Political Law 42 March 3, 2012)

LIMITATIONS OF JUDICIAL POWER
1. Political Questions: A question, the resolution of which has been vested by the Constitution
exclusively In the people, in the exercise of their sovereign capacity, or In which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to a co-equal branch of the Government (Tanada v.
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957).
Under this EXPANDED JURISDICTION conferred to the Supreme Court, the
political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. G.R.
No. 101083, July 30, 1993) ONCE THERE EXIST GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
The determination of what constitutes ―betrayal of public trust‖ or ―other high
crimes‖ is a political question. A determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense is a purely political question, which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislature (Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, Feb. 15, 2011).
Examples of cases in jurisprudence where the Court held that there was no
political question involved.
a. Apportionment of representative districts (because there are
constitutional rules governing apportionment) (Bagabuyo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 176970, Dec. 8, 2008).
b. Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus because the
Constitution sets limits to executive discretion on the matter
(Montenegro v. Castañeda, G.R. No. L-4221, Aug. 30, 1952).
c. Manner of forming the Commission on Appointments
2. Separation of Powers: The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to
or connected with the administering of judicial functions. (Manila Electric Co. v Pasay
Transportation, G.R. No. 37878, Nov. 25, 1932)
3. Not the function of the judiciary to give advisory opinion: The function of the courts is to
determine controversies between litigants. They do not give advisory opinions. (Director of
Prisons v Ang Cho Kio, G.R. No. 30001, June 23, 1970)
An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or hypothetical. (LEONEN,
PBOAP v. DOLE, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018)
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. Checking — invalidating a law or executive act that is found to be contrary to the
Constitution
2. Legitimating — upholding the validity of the law that results from a mere dismissal of a case
challenging the validity of the law
3. Symbolic — to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on
matters of grave public importance for the guidance of and restraint upon the future (Salonga v.
Cruz Paño, G.R. No. 59524, Feb. 18, 1985)
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
When the judiciary allocates constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts superiority nor
nullifies an act of the Legislature. It only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.
3
Q: What is the concept of expanded judicial review under the 1987 Constitution? (2015 BAR)
A: The 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the
power of judicial review of the court not only ―to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable‖ but also ―to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government‖ as stated in the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. The new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly, the
Supreme Court, the power to review even the political decisions of the executive and the
legislature and declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. (Cruz, 2014)
Q: In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 582 SCRA 254 (2009), the Supreme Court
declared as violative of the Equal Protection Clause the 5th paragraph of §10 R.A. No. 8042
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) for discriminating against illegally
dismissed OFWs who still had more than a year to their contract compared to those who only
had less than a year remaining. The next year, Congress enacted R.A. No 10222, an amendment
to the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act, which practically reinstated the provision
struck down in Serrano. Seamacho, an overseas seafarer who still had two years remaining on
his contract when he was illegally terminated, and who would only be entitled to a maximum of
six-month’s pay under the reinstated provision, engages you as his counsel. How are you to
argue that the new law is invalid insofar as it brings back to the statute books a provision that
has already been struck down by the Court?
A: I will argue that since Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 has already been declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, its nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. Once a law has been declared
unconstitutional, it remains unconstitutional unless circumstances have changed as to warrant a
reverse conclusion (Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August
5, 2014).
Operative fact doctrine
Q: Define/explain: Doctrine of operative facts (2009 BAR)
A:The doctrine of operative facts means that before a law was declared unconstitutional, its
actual existence must be taken into account and whatever Political Law 38 was done while the
law was in operation should be recognized as valid. (Rieta v. People, 436 SCRA 273, 2004)
Political question doctrine
Q: Judicial power as defined in Sec. 1, 2nd par., Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, now ―included
the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. This definition is said to have expanded the power of the
judiciary to in include political questions formerly beyond its jurisdiction. a. Do you agree with
such as interpretation of the constitutional definition of judicial power that would authorize the
courts to review and, if warranted, reverse the exercise of discretion by the political
departments (executive and legislative) of the government including the Constitutional
Commissions? Discuss fully. b. In your opinion, how should such definition be construed so as
not to erode considerably or disregard entirely the existing ―political question‖ doctrine?
Discuss fully. (1995 BAR)
A:
a. Yes, the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution has expanded
the power of the Judiciary to include political questions. This was not found in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitution. Precisely, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to widen the scope
of judicial review.
b. As pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus (177 SCRA 668) so as not to disregard entirely the
political question doctrine, the extent of judicial review when political questions are involved
should be limited to a determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose act is
being questioned. If grave abuse of discretion is not shown, the courts should not substitute
their questioned for that of the official; concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by
law is for the latter alone to decide.
Q: To what extent, if at all, has the 1987 Constitution affected the ―political question doctrine‖?
(1997 BAR)
A: Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution has expanded the scope of judicial power by
including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. In Marcos vs. Manglapus (177 SCRA 668), the Supreme
Court stated that because ofthis courts of justice may decide political questions if there was
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official
whose action is being questioned.
Q: The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions commonly provide that ―Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.‖ What is
the effect of the addition in the 1987 Constitution of the following provision: ―Judicial power
includes the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government‖? Discuss briefly, citing at least one illustrative case. (2004
BAR)
A: The effect of the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is to
limit resort to the political question doctrine and to broaden the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Judiciary, under the previous Constitutions, would have left to the political
departments to decide. If a political question is involved, the Judiciary can determine whether
or not the official whose action is being questioned acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668; Daza v.
Singson, 180 SCRA 496). Thus, although the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has
exclusive jurisdiction to decide election contests involving members of the House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court nullified the removal of one of its members for voting in
favor of the protestant, who belonged to a different party. (Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792)

REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OR INQUIRY:
Exception: The Court can waive the procedural rule on standing in cases that raise issues
of TRANSCENDENTAL importance.
1. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
a.The controversy must be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal
relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse
legal interests (JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY)
2022 notes: a request for an advisory opinion is not an actual case
or controversy. But an action for declaratory relief is proper for
judicial determination.
Requirements for Justiciability
1. That there be an actual controversy between or among the
parties to the dispute;
2. That the interests of the parties be adverse;
3. That the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated
by judicial power; and
4. That the determination of the controversy will result in
practical relief to the complainant.
b.Issue raised must not be moot and academic ,or because of subsequent
developments have become moot and academic.
THE QUESTION INVOLVED MUST BE RIPE FOR
ADJUDICATION
As a rule ,as long as there exist actual case or controversy, the
court will rule on it--- however, if it is not ripe for judicial
determination (since it creates no rights and imposes no duties
enforceable by the courts),then such question will not be tackled
by the court.
In some books, these rule constitute part of the requisites of
Judicial Review.
In Enrile v SET (May 19,2004): because the term of the contested
position expired on June 30,1998, the electoral contest had
become moot and academic and thus there was no occasion for
judicial review.
In Lacson v Perez, where cases filed questioning the declaration
by Pres.GMA of a ―state of rebellion‖ in Metro Manila ,the
Supreme Court dismissed the petitions because on May 6,2001,
the President ordered the lifting of the state of rebellion and thus
the issue raised in the petitions had become moot and academic.
HOWEVER, even if issue raised is Moot and Academic, the
Courts will still decide on the following grounds:
a. if the question is CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET
EVADING REVIEW , whereby, there is a reasonable expectation
that the plaintiff will again be subjected to the same problem
OR
b. when the court feels that it is called upon to exercise its
SYMBOLIC FUNCTION.
Where it had the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules and the
symbolic function to educate the bench and the bar on the extent
of protection given by the constitutional guarantees.
2. RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY
Question must be raised in the pleadings, however,
in CRIMINAL CASES, the question can be raised at any time at the discretion of the court.
in CIVIL CASES, the question can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for the
determination of the case itself
and in every case, except where there is estoppel, it can be raised at any stage if it involves the
jurisdiction of the court.
In Umali v Guingona, the question of constitutionality of PCAGC was not entertained because
the issue was raised by the petitioner only in his motion for reconsideration before the RTC of
Makati. It was too late to raise the issue for the first time at that stage of the proceedings.
3.DECISION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION MUST BE DETERMINATIVE
OF THE CASE ITSELF.
Resolution of the issue of constitutionality is unavoidable or is the very lis mota.
4
4. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION MUST BE RAISED BY THE PROPER PARTY OR
ONE WHO HAS LEGAL STANDING
COURTS will not touch an issue involving validity of a law , UNLESS, there has been a
governmental act accomplished which has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the
person contesting its legality.
The established rule is that a party can question the validity of a statute only if
,as applied to him, is unconstitutional.
The exception is the so-called ―FACIAL CHALLENGE‖ --- BUT the only time
a Facial Challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of
freedom of expression.
In such instance, the ―overbreadth doctrine‖ permits a party to challenge the
validity of a statute even though ,as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional ,
but it might be if applied to others not before the court whose activities are
constitutionally protected.
Invalidation of the statute ―on its face‖ ,rather than ―as applied‖ is permitted in
the interest of preventing a ―chilling effect‖ on freedom of expression.
2008 notes: A F acial challenge to a legitimate act is the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully since the challenge must establish that no set of
circumstance exist under which the act would be valid (Estrada v
Sandiganbayan)
LEGAL STANDING – a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act.
Elements
a. The petitioner must have personally suffered some actual or threatened Injury
which can be legal, economic, or environmental;
b. The injury is fairly Traceable to the challenged action; and
c. The injury is likely to be Redressed by a favorable action
Requisites for Third Party Standing (jus tertii)
1. The litigant must have suffered an injuryin-fact, thus giving him or her a "sufficiently
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute;
2. The litigant must have a close Relation to the third party; and
3. There must exist some Hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own
interests. (White Light v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, Jan. 20, 2009)
2006 BAR: The President issued Proclamation 1018 placing the Philippines under Martial
Law. Robert dela Cruz, a citizen, filed with the Supreme Court ,a petition questioning the
validity of Proclamation !018.
1.Does Robert have a standing to challenge?YES. Under Article VIII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, the Supreme Court may review ,in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen
,the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law.
BAR TIP: MEMORIZE ABOVE, COZ IT S A FAVORITIE BAR TOPIC
2.in the same suit, the SOLGEN contends that under the Constitution ,the President as
Commander-in-Chief,determines whether the exigency has arisen requiring the exercise
of his power to declare Martial Law and that his determination is conclusive upon the
courts. How should the Supreme Court rule?SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE THAT
HIS (SOLGEN) DETERMINATION IS NOT CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
The 1987 Constitution allows a citizen, in an appropriate proceedings,to file a petition
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation.
Moreover, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and power to impose
martial law involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitate safeguards by Congress and review by the Supreme Court.
BAR TIP: if there’s 2 connecting ideas, use ―MOREOVER‖
3.the SOLGEN argues that, in any event, the determination of whether the rebellion poses
danger to public safety involves question of fact and the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. What should be the ruling of the Court?Art VIII,Sec 1, Par 2 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that Judicial Power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
As such, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations—the
findings that such conditions have been met or the limitations respected is Justiciable—the
problem being one of legality or validity and not its wisdom.
4.finally, the SOLGEN maintains that the President reported to Congress such
proclamation of Martial Law but Congress did not revoke the proclamation. What is the
effect of the inaction of Congress on the suit brought by Robert to the Supreme Court?
The inaction of Congress has no effect on the suit brought by Rober t to the Supreme Court.
Sec 18,Art VIII provides for checks on the President’s power to declare martial law to be
exercised separately by Congress and the Supreme Court.
Under said provision, the Supreme Court has the power to review the said proclamation and
promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing
 5
DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
PROPER PARTY

one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of. EFFECT OF A DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY:

In Agan Jr. v PIATCO: the petitioners, the NAIA concessioners and service
contractors were declared proper parties because they stood to lose their source
of livelihood by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO contracts. The
financial prejudice brought about by the said PIATCO contracts on them are
legitimate interests sufficient to confer on them the requisite standing to file the
instant petitions.
In Ople v Torres: SC held that Senator Ople was a proper party to question the
constitutionality of AO 38 in his capacity as Senator, Taxpayer and Member of
the GSIS.
As Senator, he had requisite standing to bring suit assailing the issuance of the
AO as a usurpation of legislative power
As Taxpayer and GSIS member, he could impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of the GSIS to implement the AO.
A taxpayer or a group of taxpayers is a proper party to question the validity of a
law a ppropriating public funds.
To constitute a taxpayer’s suit, 2 requisites must concur:
1. public funds are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality
2. a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and the petitioner is
directly affected by the allegedly ultra vires act.
However, the Court has discretion on whether a taxpayer suit may be given due
course or not.
1. Prior to the declaration that a particular law is unconstitutional, it is considered as an
‘operative fact’ which at that time had to be complied with.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. (Film
Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corp., G.R. Nos. 203754 &
204418, Oct. 15, 2019)
The exception is the DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT, which applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. (Id.)
• This doctrine nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act
by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot
always be ignored. (Id.)
• Hence, it legitimizes otherwise invalid acts done pursuant thereto because of
considerations of practicality and fairness. In this regard, certain acts done
pursuant to a legal provision which was just recently declared as
unconstitutional cannot be anymore undone because not only would it be highly
impractical to do so, but more so, unfair to those who have, in good faith, relied
on the said legal provision prior to the time it was struck down. (Id.)
• It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, AND only
when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will
permit its application. (Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

THE FOLLOWING HAS STANDING OR PROPER PARTIES:
1.any citizen- question martial law or habeas corpus
2.concerned citizen-question of transcendental importance (important to life of
nation) so it allows suits even to people with no standing.
2. Thus, vested rights may have been acquired under such law before it was declared
unconstitutional.
3. These rights are not prejudiced by the subsequent declaration that the law is
unconstitutional.

3.voters-with regard validity of election laws (except telebap case)

4.taxpayer-proper party to question the validity of a law appropriating public
funds for government projects.(Sanidad v Comelec) However, if it is a private
fund of private company, then ,taxpayer cannot question it.
5.legislator-act which infringes on his prerogative as legislator
6.environmentalist- even minors can sue if issue is with regard environment.
Orthodox view(GENERAL RULE): unconstitutional act is not a law,it confers no right, no
duty hence inoperative as if it had not been passed at all.
Modern view(EXEMPTION): courts simply refused to recognize rights of parties as if statute
had no existence, however ,certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized

7.and the Government of the Philippines is a proper party to question the

validity of its own laws since more than any one, it should be concerned with
the constitutionality of its own acts (Pp v Vera)

4blue95. Petitioners Sanlakas and Partido are juridical persons and are not
subject to arrest and even if they are ―people’s organization‖ still they have no PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY REQUISITES:
personality or standing. (Sanlakas v Exec)
Neither do SJS officers in their capacity as taxpayers ,citizens since the dispute 1.Legislature must be willing to retain valid portion usually shown by the presence of a
has no actual or imminent violation of their rights,as such the courts will not separability clause in law
touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a
governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on 2.Valid portion can stand independently as law
the legal right of the person contesting its legality.

Guidelines in determining whether or not a matter is of TRANSCENDENTAL

importance:

• The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;

• The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
• The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010).
 6
SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court is the only constitutional court, all the lower courts being of statutory SUPREME COURT POWERS
creation.
The President cannot appoint a temporary member of the Supreme Court. Thus, a law which
authorizes the President to designate any judge of the lower court or cadastral judge to act as
member of the Supreme Court is void (Vargas vs. Rillaroza, G.R. No. L-1612, Feb. 26, 1948). JURISDICTIONAL POWERS:

Primus Inter Pares

Literally, first among equals; the maxim indicates that a person is the most senior of a group of ORIGINAL jurisdiction over
people sharing the same rank or office. The phrase has been used to describe the status, a. cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
condition or role of the Chief Justice in many supreme courts around the world. b. petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto
c. habeas corpus, writ of amparo & habeas data

Members of the SC and judges of the lower courts hold office during good behavior until 4blue95: Injunction is NOT INCLUDED
a. The age of 70 years old; or
b. They become incapacitated to discharge their duties.
(ANY vacancy should be filed w/in 90days from occurrence) APPELLATE jurisdiction over cases of

constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,

QUALIFICATIONS: presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto
jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher (REPEALED! It is now w/ the CA)
only an error or question of law is involved.

ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS:

Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of
whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary. (Ampong v
CSC, G.R. No. 167916, Aug. 26, 2008)
It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof.

Thus:
• The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers
granted to it by the Constitution. It cannot compel the Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify
on this matter. (Id.)
• The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal
complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter.
The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court
personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to
whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. (Caoibes, Jr. v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001)
• The CSC must likewise bring its complaint against a judicial employee before
the OCA. However, such employee may be estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CSC under specific circumstances. (Ampong v CSC, G.R. No.
167916, Aug. 26, 2008)

a. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed 6 months without the consent of the
judge concerned.

b. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

c. Promulgate rules concerning

a. the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights

b. pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
c. the admission to the practice of law
d. the Integrated Bar, and
e. legal assistance to the underprivileged
COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME COURT

1. Chief Justice and d. Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
2. 14 Associate Justices Law.

Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
Note: Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions(sec 12).
modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
2022notes: in CONSTITUTIONAL positions there’s NO HOLDOVER, so the moment your
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
term expire,then immediately vacate your seat.
2022 notes: The limitation to the rule making power of the SC is that the rules must be uniform
for all courts of the same grade and that they shall not diminish,increase or modify substantive
4BLUE95:To be of proven integrity means that the applicant must have established steadfast
rights (1987 Constitution).
adherence to moral and ethical principles. One who chronically fails to file his or her SALN
violates the Constitution and the laws; and one who violates the Constitution and the laws
cannot rightfully claim to be person of integrity and may thus be removed through a quo
warranto petition. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018)

JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE
SALARIES
Judicial privilege insulates the Judiciary from an improper intrusion into the functions of the
judicial branch and shields justices, judges, and court officials and employees from public
1. Salaries of SC Justices and judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
scrutiny or the pressure of public opinion that would impair a judge’s ability to render impartial
2. Cannot be decreased during their continuance in office, but can be increased.
decisions
3. Members of the Judiciary are NOT exempt from payment of income tax.

DISCIPLINARY POWERS OF SUPREME COURT
Decisions of the SC on disciplinary cases en banc is needed only when the penalty imposed is
dismissal of a judge, disbarment of a lawyer, suspension of either for more than 1 year or a fine
exceeding 10,000 pesos. Otherwise, the case may be decided by a division. (People v. Gacott,
G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995)
The rule prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against an impeachable officer
applies only during his or her tenure and does not create immunity from liability for possibly
criminal acts or for alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other supposed
violations.
1. Disciplinary action against judges of lower courts:
a. Only the SC en banc has jurisdiction to discipline or dismiss judges of lower
courts.
b. Disciplinary action/dismissal: Majority vote of SC Justices who took part in
the deliberations and voted therein.
2. Removal of SC Justices:
a. Only by IMPEACHMENT.
b. Cannot be disbarred while they hold office.
4BLUE95. The Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis -à-vis its Divisions,
and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is
considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably as the Court en banc
itself. It bears to stress further that a resolution of the Division denying a party’s motion for
referral to the Court en banc of any Division case, shall be final and not appealable to the Court
en banc. (Apo Fruits v. CA, G.R. No. 164195, 2008)
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
This privilege guards against the disclosure of information/communication involving as it does
the deliberative process of reaching a decision. This enables the Members of the Court to freely
discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions or fear of
humiliation for one's comments.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show
that the document is both predecisional and deliberative.
• Predecisional – if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it
relates i.e. if they were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion.
• Deliberative – if it reflects the give-andtake of the consultative process. The
key question in determining whether the material is deliberative in nature is
whether disclosure of the information would discourage candid discussion
within the agency.
Summary of privileged documents or communications not subject to disclosure:
• Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by
the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session on acts
done material to pending cases, except where a party litigant requests
information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3
of the Rules of Court of the Supreme Court (IRSC);
• Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members of the court sessions
on cases and matters pending before the Court; • Court records which are ―pre-
decisional‖ and ―deliberative‖ in nature;
• Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and
employees in the course of their official functions mentioned in the 2 preceding
enumerations, are privileged even after their term of office;
• Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that
cannot be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have
been made available by court to the general public.
• The principle of comity or interdepartmental courtesy demands that the highest
officials of each department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the
other departments;
• These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any
justice or judge in his or her individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than
the individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice or judge, not even
the Chief Justice, may claim exception without the consent of the Court.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the disclosure of:
1. Result of the raffle of cases;
2. Actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session;
3. Deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it;
4. The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of information/communication is known as
deliberative process privilege
7
DECISION
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. (PHIL. CONST., art. VIII, § 14.) –
REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
Minute resolutions
issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court. While they are the results of the
deliberations by the Justices of the Court, they are promulgated by the CLERK OF COURT or
his assistants whose duty is to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by quoting
verbatim the resolutions adopted by the Court. Neither the Clerk of Court nor his assistants take
part in the deliberations of the case. They merely transmit the Court's action in the form
prescribed by its Internal Rules.
When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and
substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal
conclusions, are deemed sustained. (Philippine Health Care Providers v. CIR, G.R. No. 167330,
June 12, 2009)
With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it
constitutes res judicata.
However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is
involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent.
There are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a
decision. The constitutional requirement that the facts and the law on which the judgment is
based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute
resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices,
unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike
decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports
Memorandum Decisions
Memorandum decisions, where the appellate court adopts the findings of fact and law of the
lower court, are allowed as long as the decision adopted by reference is attached to the
Memorandum for easy reference. (Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. CA, G.R. No. 114323,
July 23, 1998)
Sin Perjuico Judgments
One that is rendered without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusions, to be later
supplemented by the final judgment. The Supreme Courted expressed its disapproval of the
practice of rendering of sin perjuico judgments
TimeFrame for Deciding:
A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the Court itself.
Upon expiration of the period without decision or resolution, a certification stating why no
decision or resolution has been rendered shall be issued and signed by the Chief Justice or
presiding judge. A copy of the certification shall be attached to the record of the case or matter,
and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not
been rendered or issued within said period.
The expiration of the period notwithstanding, the court shall decide or resolve the case or
matter without further delay.
4blue95. Being the court of last resort, the Supreme Court should be given an ample amount of
time to deliberate on cases pending before it. While the 24-month period provided under the
1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not summarily bind this Court to the disposition of
cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this Court's prompt resolution of cases,
and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule. (Re: Elvira N. Enalbes, A.M. No. 18-11-09-
SC (Resolution, Jan. 22, 2019)
The Sandiganbayan falls under the 3-month rule because it is a trial-court, not a collegiate court
(Re: Problems of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00- 8-05-SC, Jan. 31,
2002).
4BLUE95. A judge who fails to resolve cases within the period prescribed may be held liable
for gross inefficiency, unless he explains his predicament and asked for extensions of time from
the Supreme Court
4BLUE95. The Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis -à-vis its Divisions,
and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is
considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably as the Court en banc
itself. It bears to stress further that a resolution of the Division denying a party’s motion for
referral to the Court en banc of any Division case, shall be final and not appealable to the Court
en banc. (Apo Fruits v. CA, G.R. No. 164195, 2008)

Q: Enumerate the cases required by the Constitution to be heard en banc by the Supreme
Court? (1999 BAR)
A: The following are the cases required by the Constitution to be heard en banc by the Supreme
Court: 1. Cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement,
or law; 2. Cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc 3. Cases
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations; 4. Cases heard by a division when the
required majority is not obtained; 5. Cases where a doctrine or principle of law previously laid
down will be modified or reversed; 6. Administrative cases against judges when the penalty is
dismissal; 7. Election contests for president or vicepresident.
Q: The Court had adopted the practice of announcing its decision in important, controversial or
interesting cases the moment the votes had been taken among the justices, even as the final
printed decision and separate opinions are not yet available to the public. In a greatly
anticipated decision in a case of wideranging ramifications, the voting was close – 8 for the
majority, while 7 were for the other side. After the Court had thus voted, it issued a press
release announcing the result, with the advice that the printed copy of the decision, together
with the separate opinions, were to be issued subsequently. The following day, however, one of
the members of the Court died. The Court then announced that it would deliberate anew on the
case since apparently the one who died belonged to the majority. Citizens for Transparency, a
group of civicspirited professionals and ordinary citizens dedicated to transparency and
accountability in the government, questioned the act of the Court. The petitioners claimed the
decision had already been validly adopted and promulgated. Therefore, it could no longer be
recalled by the Court. At the same time, the group also asked the Court to disclose to the public
the original decision and the separate opinions of the magistrates, together with what they had
deliberated on just before they came up with the press release about the 8-7 decision. a. Was
the announced 8-7 decision already validly promulgated and thus not subject to recall? b. If the
decision was not yet finalized at the time when the justice died, could it still be promulgated? c.
If the decision was still being finalized, should the Court release to the public the majority
decision and the separate opinions as originally announced, together with their deliberations on
the issues? (2014 BAR)
A:
a. The decision cannot be deemed to have been promulgated simply because of the
announcement of the voting in a press release, because the decision has not yet been
issued and filled with the Clerk of Court. Until the decision is filed with the Clerk of
Court, the Justices still have control over the decision and they can still change their votes
(Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 594 SCRA 434 (2009).
b. The decision can no longer be promulgated if the Justice who belonged to the majority
died, for lack of majority vote. The vote he cast is no longer valid, as he was no longer an
incumbent member of the Supreme Court (Lao v. To-Chip, 158 SCRA 243(1988)).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The decision can be promulgated even if the Supreme Court
en banc is equally divided, if after the case was again deliberated upon, no majority
decision was reached. If the case is an original action, it should be dismissed. If it is an
appealed case, the decision appealed from should be affirmed if it is a civil case. If it is a
criminal case, the accused should be acquitted (Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court;
Section 3, Rule 125 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure)
c. The Supreme Court should not release to the public the majority opinion and the
separate opinions, as well as its deliberations. They are part of its confidential internal
deliberations (Limkaichong v. COMELEC, supra.)
Q: TRUE or FALSE. A law fixing the passing grade in the Bar examinations at 70%, with no
grade lower than 40% in any subject, is constitutional. (2009 BAR)
A: FALSE. Such a law entails amendment of the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court. The present Constitution has taken away the power of Congress to alter
the Rules of Court (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96 [1999]). The law
will violate the principle of separation of powers.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: True. Deliberations in the ConCon reveal that Congress
retains the power to amend or alter the rules because the power to promulgate rules is
essentially legislative even though the power has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution. If
the law, however, is retroactive, it is unconstitutional because it is prejudicial.
Q: Congress enacted a law exempting certain government institutions providing social services
from the payment of court fees. Atty. Kristopher Timoteo challenged the constitutionality of
the said law on the ground that only the Supreme Court has the power to fix and exempt said
entities from the payment of court fees. Congress, on the other hand, argues that the law is
constitutional as it has the power to enact said law for it was through legislative fiat that the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for Judges and Justices (SAJJ),
the funding of which are sourced from the fees collected by the courts, were created. Thus,
Congress further argues that if it can enact a law utilizing court fees to fund the JDF and SAJJ,
a fortiori it can enact a law exempting the payment of court fees. Discuss the constitutionality
of the said law, taking into account the arguments of both parties? (2014 BAR)
A: The law is constitutional. The Constitution has taken away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement the Rules of Court. The fiscal autonomy guaranteed the Judiciary by
Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution recognized the authority of the Supreme Court to
levy, assess and collect fees. Congress cannot amend the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court for the payment of legal fees by granting exemptions (In re: Petition for Recognition of
Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, 612
SCRA 193); In re: Exemption of National Power Corporation from Payment of Filling/Docket
Fees, 615 SCRA 1]; In re Exemption from Payment of Court and Sheriff’s Fees of Duly
Registered Cooperatives, 668, SCRA 1).
8
Q: Congress passed a law, R.A. No. 15005, creating an administrative Board principally tasked
with the supervision and regulation of legal education. The Board was attached to the
Department of Education. It was empowered, among others, to prescribe minimum standards
for law admission and minimum qualifications of faculty members, the basic curricula for the
course of study aligned to the requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social
consciousness, as well as to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the
Bar which a law student shall undergo anytime during the law course, and to adopt a system of
continuing legal education. Professor Boombastick, a long- time law practitioner and lecturer in
several prestigious law schools, assails the constitutionality of the law arguing that it
encroached on the prerogatives of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules relative to admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. If you
were Professor Boombastick’s understudy, how may you help him develop clear, concise and
cogent arguments in support of his position based on the present Constitution and the decisions
of the Supreme Court on judicial independence and fiscal autonomy? (2014 BAR)
A: The statutory authority granted to the administrative Board to promulgate rules and
regulations cannot encroach upon the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court to regulate the
admission to the practice of law (Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution) Thus, The
Administrative Board cannot prescribe additional standards for admission to the practice of
law, adopt a course study which is inconsistent with the requirements to take the bar
examinations (Philippine Lawyer’s Association v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173). Since Congress has
no power to repeal, alter or supplement the Rules of Court, it cannot delegate such power to the
Administrative Board.
Q: Under Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have thepower to
―promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts x x x.‖ Section 23 of RA No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 provides that ―any person charged under any provision of this
Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
pleabargaining.‖ Patricio, a user who was charged with alleged sale of shabu but who wants to
enter into a plea of guilty to a charge of possession, questions the constitutionality of Sec. 23 on
the ground that Congress encroached on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under
Sec. 5, Art. VIII. He argues that plea- bargaining is procedural in nature and is within the
exclusive constitutional power of the Court. Is Patricio correct? Explain your answer. (2016
BAR)
A: Patricio is correct. It is unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of
the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now in exclusive domain of the
Judiciary and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. Plea bargaining
is essentially a rule of procedure. It is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was
introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining
is considered to be an "important,""essential,""highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of
the administration of justice. (Estipona Jr v. Abrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017)
Q: Differentiate the rule-making power or the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and judicial legislation. (2015 BAR)
A: The rule-making power of the Supreme Court is the power of the Court to ―promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged.‖ On the other hand, judicial legislation is a breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers. Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the
law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the
course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under
the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give
the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its
intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the
primary function of a coequal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation
 9
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

The Judicial and Bar Council is under the supervision of the SC.
SAFEGUARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
A. Is under the supervision of the Supreme Court and is composed of:
Q: Name at least three constitutional safeguards to maintain judicial independence. (2000
1. Chief Justice, as EX-OFFICIO chairman BAR)
2. Secretary of Justice, as an EX-OFFICIO member A: The following are the constitutional safeguards to maintain judicial independence:
3. Representative of Congress, as an EX-OFFICIO member 1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body and cannot be abolished by mere
4. Representative of the Integrated Bar legislation.
5. A professor of law 2. The members of the Supreme Court cannot be removed except by Impeachment.
6. A retired member of the SC; and 3. The Supreme Court cannot be deprived of its minimum Jurisdiction prescribed in
7. Private sector representative Section 5, Article X of the Constitution.
4. Cannot be increased by law without its advice and concurrence.
The last four re the regular members of the JBC. Regular members are 5. Appointees to the Judiciary are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and are not
appointed by the President with Commission of Appointment approval. Regular subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
members serve for 4 years, with staggered terms 6. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all lower courts and their
personnel.
Clerk of the Supreme Court – serves as the secretary ex officio of the Council 7. The Supreme Court has exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts.
and shall keep a record of its proceedings. 8. The Members of the Judiciary have security of tenure, which cannot be undermined by
a law reorganizing the Judiciary.
9. Members of the Judiciary cannot be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial
B. Functions of JBC or administrative functions.
10. The salaries of Members of the Judiciary cannot be decreased during their
Principal function: recommend appointees to the Judiciary continuance in office.
Exercise such other functions as the SC may assign to it. 11. The Judiciary has fiscal autonomy.
12. The Supreme Court has exclusive power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure.
C. Appointments to the Judiciary 13. Only the Supreme Court can temporarily assign judges to other stations.
14. It is the Supreme Court who appoints all officials and employees of the Judiciary
1. The President shall appoint Members of the Supreme Court and judges of (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., pp. 229-31)
lower courts from a list of at least three (3) nominees for each vacancy, as
prepared by the JBC.

2. No CA confirmation is needed for appointments to the Judiciary.

3. Vacancies in SC should be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the

vacancy.

4. Vacancies in lower courts should be filled within 90 days from submission to

the President of the JBC list.

5. Midnight Appointments – Explicit prohibition against midnight appointments

is already unnecessary due to the intervention of and screening made by Judicial
Bar Council (JBC) (De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010)

4BLUE95. The Supreme Court has supervision over the JBC, and this authority covers the
overseeing of the JBC’s compliance with its own rules. (Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181,
Aug. 19, 2014)

4BLUE 95. Mandamus will not lie to compel the JBC to select and recommend nominees for
vacant judicial positions, which is a discretionary function.

Q: What is the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council and the term of office of its regular
members? (1988, 1999 BAR)
A: The Judicial and Bar Council is composed of the following: a. The Chief Justice as ex
officio chairman; b. The Secretary of Justice as ex officio member; c. A representative of
Congress as ex officio member; d. A representative of the Integrated Bar; e. A professor of law;
f. A retired Justice of the Supreme Court; and g. A representative of the private sector. [Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution] The term of office of the regular members is 4 years.
[Section 8(2), Article VIII of the Constitution]

Q State whether or not the following acts are constitutional: A law prescribing as qualifications
for appointment to any court lower than the Supreme Court, Philippine citizenship, whether
naturalborn or naturalized, 35 years of age on the date of appointment, and at least eight years
as a member of the Philippine Bar (2018 BAR)
A: The law prescribing as a qualification for appointment to any lower court mere Philippine
citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized, would be unconstitutional with respect to
appointments to collegiate courts (CA, CTA, Sandiganbayan) because all appointees to these
courts must be natural-born citizens. (Article VIII, Section 7)

Q: According to Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution, the Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
What does the term fiscal autonomy signify? Explain your answer (2017 BAR)
A: The power of approporiation is limited by Sec 3 Art. VIII or the Judiciary’s enjoyment of
fiscal autonomy, which is intended to strengthen the independence of the judiciari (Cruz, 2014).
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. It contemplates a guarantee on full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. (Bengzon v.Drilon) The
fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary means that the appropriation for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by Congress below the amount appropriated for the previous year, and after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released. (Article VII, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution)
Fiscal autonomy authorizes the Supreme Court to levy, assess and collect fees, and to
determine how its funds should be utilized. (Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No.103524, April 15,
1992, 208 SCRA 133)