BRAIN CAROUSEL

(Round 2 Writeup)

Q1] Using the minimax principle, which of the following options is correct for the following payoff
table?

Statements:
A. Best strategy for player A is II
B. Best strategy for player A is I
C. Best strategy for player B is III
D. Value of the game for A is 4
Options:
a. Only A is correct
b. A,C and D are correct
c. A and B are correct
d. All of them are correct

Explanation:
We shall solve the given pay-off matrix by finding the saddle point,

Player A Player B

Strategies I II III IV V Row Minimum

I 9 3 1 8 0 0

II 6 5 4 6 7 4 Max.

III 2 4 3 3 8 2

IV 5 6 2 2 1 1

Column Maximum 9 6 4 Min. 8 8

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The solution for the game:
(i) Best strategy for player A is II
(ii) Best strategy for player B is III
(iii) Value of the game for A is 4 and for B is –4

Q2] Below is a map of 2 countries separated by a river with an uninhabited island sitting in the middle
of the river. Two bridges connect the two countries to the island (one from each country to the island),
and these bridges are the only path from either country to the island and thus the other country. These
countries would like to control the island; it is worth something.

Country 1 decides to invade the island for control of it. They have two choices: they can either burn
the bridge between Country 1 and the island, cutting themselves off from their homeland and
eliminating their ability to retreat, or leaving the bridge as is.

Country 2 then gets to decide whether it wants to attack Country 1’s troops for control of the island or
if it wants to concede the island. The game ends in a battle or a concession by Country 2, unless
Country 1 chooses not to burn the bridge down and Country 2 chooses to attack: in that case, Country
1 then chooses either to fight Country 2 for the island or to retreat back to its own territory.

What choice should Country 1 make?

Answer:
Explanation:
https://blogs.cornell.edu/info2040/2016/10/21/why-you-should-burn-the-bridge-behind-you/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxIrKkGRpBY&list=PLKI1h_nAkaQoDzI4xDIXzx6U2ergFmed
o&index=22

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Q3] Two bank robbers, Elizabeth and Henry, have been arrested and are being interrogated in separate
rooms. The authorities have no other witnesses, and can only prove the case against them if they can
convince at least one of the robbers to betray their accomplice and testify to the crime.
Each bank robber is faced with the choice to cooperate with their accomplice and remain silent or to
defect from the gang and testify for the prosecution. If they both co-operate and remain silent, then the
authorities will only be able to convict them on a lesser charge resulting in one year in jail for each (1
year for Elizabeth + 1 year for Henry = 2 years total jail time). If one testifies and the other does not,
then the one who testifies will go free and the other will get five years (0 years for the one who
defects + 5 for the one convicted = 5 years total). However, if both testify against the other, each will
get three years in jail for being partly responsible for the robbery (3 years for Elizabeth + 3 years for
Henry = 6 years total jail time).
Will they defect or cooperate?
Answer:
Explanation:
We can solve this question with the help of payoff matrix.

Henry
Keep Quiet Confess

Keep Quite (-1,-1) (-5,0)

Elizabeth
(-5,0) (-3,-3)
Confess

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To solve this payoff matrix, we will be using strict dominance rule.

Confess strictly dominates keep quite for Elizabeth because confess gives Elizabeth better payoff than
keep quite regardless of what Henry do.
Same logic applies for Henry also, so the most optimal solution will be for both Henry and Elizabeth
to confess.

Q4] Select any number between 1 to 100. The average of all the numbers written by every team on the
paper is taken and the person whose guess is closest to 2/3 of the average is the winner while the
person farthest is the loser.

Teams have to bid a certain amount of their points. The winning team gets back 2.5X the points
bidded while the loser team loses 1.5X the points bidded.

Ans:

Integer between 1 to 100:

Bidding points:

Explanation /Rough Work:

Game can be formally represented as follows:

• N={1,…., n} where n>2 is the number of
players
• A = {1,2,…,100}
i

• Let m(a) = Σ a /n be the average action

i i

• u (a)=1 if |a – 2m(a)/3| < |a – 2m(a)/3| for all j≠i

i i j

• u (a)=0 if |a – 2m(a)/3| > |a – 2m(a)/3| for some j≠i

i i j

• u (a)=1/K if i is among K players all closest to 2m(a)/3

i

• Best reply of any player is below the mean of others’ actions if that mean is above
1.Everybody wanting to announce a number below the average, leads all to announce 1.

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