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For :5!I!c b,1),e

S!lp~l;'i!lc,endll',[u Q(Doi;'ume.rLu;'t U~S~GO''!'~fnml!1U W liI..!ihi,p,101:1 2 D. C. Price 30 cent!:

,! Offi~

The 1..: uited tntes Stl"lltegic Bombina Survey wu estublished by the Secretary of Will' on 3 November 1944,purSlltlut to a directive from the lute President Roo sevelt. Its mission was to conduct an impartial and expert stu ely of the effect of 0111' aerial attack Oil Germa uy, to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating the rmportance and pot ntialities of nil' power as an Instrument of military trntegy for planning the future development of the United States armed forces and lOI determining future economic policies with respect to the national defen e. .A snmmary report Ilmdsome 200 supportin" reports containing the findings of the Survey in Germany have bean published. On 15 August 19 5, Pl'esident' Truman requested that ttle Survey conduct II similar- study of the effects of all types of air attack in the war against Japan, submi ting reports ill duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the Surv y during its ,J!tpaue. e phas wen): Franklin D'Olier, Chairman, Panl H. Nitze, Fleury C. Alexander, Vice Chairrneu. ILUTY L. Bowman. J. Kenneth Galbraith, Rensis Likert, Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,
Fred earls J,'., :Mollroe E. Spaght, D,·. Lewis R. Thompson

This report was written primarily £01' the 1I e of the U. S. Strategic Bombing ux'vey in ths preparation "Of further reports of a more comprehensive natUre. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be eonsidered a limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further in erpretation in the ligh of further tudi - conducted by the 'm·vey.

Theodoi- P. 'Wright, Directors, Walter Wilds. Secretary.

The Survey's complement provided for 300 civilians, 350 officer, and 500 enlisted men. 'fhe military segment of the onranlxntion was drawn from the Army to the extent of 60 percent end from the Navy to jhe extent of 40 percent. Both the Army and the ,;Tavy gnve the llrvey all possibl assistance in furnishing men, suppli transport, and information. The urv y operut d from headquarter establi hed in Tokyo early in eptember 11)45,with ubheadquartars ill Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki and with mobile teams operating in other parts of J apnn, the islands of the Pacific, and the A intic mainland. It wns possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planuing and execution, ngagement by ngageme.nt and campaign by earnpaign, and to secure reasonably ac urate statistics Oil J npan's economy and war production, plant by plant, and industry by industry. In addition, studi were conducted on Japan's over-all strat gic plans nnd the background of her ntry into tbe war, tha internal diseu ion und negotiations Ieading to her acceptance of un onditionnl surrender, t.h COUJ'se of health :1. nd moral e amorur the ei\'ilh~. population, the effectiveness of the apanese civilian defense orgn nizatiun, and the elIl'Cts of the atomic bombs, Separate reports wil! be issued covering each phase of the tudy, The urvey iuterrogated more than 700 JIlPanese military government, [mel industrial omcials, It also recovered and tranalated muny documents which not only have b n useful to the urvey, but also will furni h data valuable for other studies. Arrangements have b en made 0 turn 01' r th Survey's files to the Central Inte.lligellce Group, through which they will be. uvnilabla for further exarnination and distribution.






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PUt 1




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III ordur to Ilmlre I< com preheusi ve report 011 the reduction of 'f1'111, it wus necessary to a emhle infOl'Il'Hltioll on (1) the hi l:ol"Y and mseiturions of 'I'ruk, (2) the mission and planned employment of the military facilities and armed


111lY high Japanese oflieinls delibel'nle]y ceive question I'~ or to witholtl inforrnation.

to rle-

forces based there lJ) the part of this base actulilly playe I in carrying out the Imperial General 'tuffs over-all st,l'Utegy (4) Allied and Japfl,ne~e reports and infomiutinn of attack und defen ~ measure , ami (5) P. tudy of th island installatiOI1S-)lOt only to record bomb damage, bu also to catalog the installations theil' valne to the Japanese This information
Iion of Japanese

This report consists of two major pal s : (1) J..\. narrative covering tbehistory, strategic importance, and d valopment of Truk prior to III F bruarv 1944 an account of Allied operations ',,jfecl"ing ], reduction of 'I'ruk, und the urv ... of y ~ll·e.n. da.tTInge. (2) Enclosure, Contain d also


elc .. which

conbn in

the sour 'e mat rial

til primary narrative. this se .t.ion are numerous inter-

on 'I'ruk and to assess war ell'ort, by (waln;)ting written

estinrr details on other combat action lind milch information rega,r,(ling general strategy of the Imperial General ta If obtained durinc I;he many interrogation and discu aons with the senior Japanese Army and :fa,'), officers, Till informntion is not incorporated in the narrative because of its negative value as regardsth reduction ')£ Truk, but it is, ubmitted supplementary report. Early because under sepnrutecovar ns " lackine prewar

was obtained by an a.xaminnrecords,

I'~[)lies to specific que, tions asked of importunt Jnp:me~e Army, N,wy, and civil govemment officials, and by the findinzs of a Survey team whi ·h personally toured Truk's hrgel' j lands and tndlad the hi tory and. condition of Jnpauese nirfielrls, 'buildings, installations, and facilities Iocated thereon, At ali times he Japllllese were

history of Truk i almost entirely th r eems to have been little

t coop ern ive

in complying with the many demands; the meager records ramair. ing afterthe bombings were readily given 1lp' th~y diligently worked nigh and duy to prepare all written information requested; and tiley answered <l.very question a ked them during orul interrogations. Th y behaved in !1. fort~u'ight arul honest manner ut all times, although admittedly they did not have mnny records available for reference and as u result found it difficult at time to recall axaet dates or incidents, When records were not availabl t.h y readily gave their

stronghold. and no informed ,individuals remain' whose knowledg« extends back to thnt period, El'lm the history of the early duy of til WIll" is vague and wa obtained in a IIJJ:ge measure from the hearsay knowledge of the JU'punese statioued Oil Truk ut the war's end, The story ,I In-e ented in this report
represents the most accurnt IlI'niJnhle account the subject and is sub tuntin lly COITect. of

activity ut this supposed

Truk's Ill; ion, while conceded to be 1\ rlefenaive one is too intimately a sociated with the chauzine fortunes of th orgnniaatious w lrich O}> I'll (1 Itt

own personal opinions. All ill n11, it is believed that thsl'o were few .if any attempts on the part

from Truk to permit the expre and fast opinion 011the ubject,

ion of a hard





General Descripuou and History
TI'uk, known as the Jupunese Pen rl Harbor, came under Japanese conrrcl in lOl.J" shortly n [tel' World War I begun. Aftel' the J~pnllru;e Nll"Y seized I). U of the C~lItrnl Pac ifie islunds exee pi Guam, J npnn insiste(l, ut the Vel'"'' illes Conferenee ·OJf 192'2, that !l\(\Sl! islands be bel' right f\1I1'O>" sessi ens ns 'if as agreed in a S!'C ret t reo ty \\1' th FI'Dncc and. Englnnd, Howlwer. Jnpan 'HIS 00111palled to accept rhe islunds under a mnndnte I'ather than us an outright. possession. Tnder terms of the !IlnndntJl.Jnp"ll was required to I'C-' part !'Ilgul:trl,r- to Lenglle Df X .. nons concernillg th eire is lands and to l't'fl'U in froru fa l'ti"fying them, Fo!' OJ. time Japenobserved tbese resu-ictions and e"llllnpon withdrawing from the League apparently made no nttampt to fortily Truk alfhough at the same lime she mnde everv effort to develop ,1large Na"y which would use Tl.'uk ns its advanced base. At the orrtbrenk of hosriljties, nn \"111man estimated 'I'ruk to be the sh'ongest ]1;1\'111 base ill tlle Pacific with the !'.:xcaption of Pearl Harbor, H this is true, natural defense~ and not rnan-made iortifieatiolLS made it so, The T1'1Ik grou p is a cluster of U~ islands lyiJl:;! within" lagoon upproximntely 40 miles in diameter. This lagoon is formed by a coral red roughly 140 mill'S in circurnference, Encom passed by t hi s reef is 011 e of tha best natural :mr:hQ!"gesin tbe world. Actnally, man-made fortifications could have improved Little on the work of natll~e. TheJ'e is no need for conorete fortiIietltiolls where alre:"dy stolle cliffs ri~elnmdr ... ls of foot inl.o ll'e n;r:!:'" < is no llB<ld for n ~a wnll wilen Il "oral reef. with only live n a v-igable pllS5eS, will serve the' same purpose, especially \~nel1 1'igh islands guard each of the passes, When tbe reef does brl.'nk the sudnce to fo tn! 11 is IIIn ds its l1l!fl po l'U; nl'e 15 feet high along the 0 IItel' edge. an d po It 11(1 ing swell~ would dl'h,c inl'",lirll!: nssnnlt bottls to de. stt ucti OD uga.iJl st its 1."11i f~·li1;:e C (}l-U I. rill;-i rle the lagoon Truk's perfect "alllnI anchorage could nccommodute tlle ellt i re ,J"rail""" Jile"t, nlthOlwh even SlIllIU-boat nuvigutioD. without accurate ~d complete ch"rts, is hn7.llnlolt.s bel:au.!'e of eorul beels, Thus, it mny be seen that wit.hout uny im. 2

provement, whether to the nu t tJ rnl defenses or, to the nuehomgc, Tmk was un excellent find formiduble naval bose, Naval Importance AlthollgI, 'I'rnk was potentiullj' one of [he grel1t· est naval buses in tIle Paci fie, Allied avaluntion Inl'gt'ly overmted its strength and hcilities. Vice Admiml Harn, the last commllmler in chiot of tho Fourth Fleet. staled thHt Japun's policy was to put its limi led budget into a Inrge mobile Ileet, 1I11l1 Dot into defensil'e instullafions. To build Truk into a first-clnss nnrnl bnso wotlld have involved /-''''CI't eX}lllnSe in tile construction of piers, a r}' docks, power plu uts, r" shops of suita hIe size, and alm'l1ge space for the mau.)' requirements of" lnrge, modern (teet, Ordy to a Jim ited degree was this accomplished and, Sllrprising1y enongh, it was not unt il long' after the wur started that 'I'ruk's peak of development was reached. The Fourth Fleet WIIS ol'gnnizccl on 15 Noveinber 19S!), and was chmgsd with the mission of pl-01e<<ting the mandated ,~In:llds area, To do this " fleet. base was necessary nnd 'I'ruk, located ill the center of the mandated uren WId contairring its exrellent.nll.tllt'lll [m(o]lol'llge, was the logical location for Fourth Fle,-t lieudquurters, Und<ll' command of the Fuurth Fleet W!lS the Fourth Bnsa Foree' tlt Truk, controll LUg n aval gnl'l'isous and instnllntions in a11 the Caroline Islands, the Fift.11 Base Furce. "t Slli pun controlling till the j\,{n:t'imllls Is. lauds, and the Sixth Base Force at Kwajnleill con. trolli ng the 71·ial'slm Ils, A ft.n' the Gilbert Islands we!'c oC()t!pie<l by tJw Jnp91!eSe (lnl'ly ill 1942 the Third SpecinI Buse Foree, under tIll, Foul'll. Fleet, wus set "I' at TurnWIl and "lSI) gflrrillOllcti -Wnke. Naul'u, aJld OePIlH Islmu:k A.ft!!], tIn" FOOllth Fleet W[IE orglUli~ed at Trll.k; thc Hnl',.,l con"tnmtiol1 dlll'nrtm,mt commellcl)d Imilding with plans fOl' a sealJInll(l base und beili. li~s til rel'l~l1i~h n rlppt at a.nC]lOl', Th~\'e \Vel'llonly '1,000 lliell III the construction depllttmen t Itt the be,!!:iJning of il s opern tions, bllt ut Ihe outbrelll, o <If Ihe Will" tbe fm'Cc.was i.ncreased to 10,000, This departmellt handled all of the !>cmst:l'lIctioll ot fortificutions, bllildings, lind engin!lllring facilities for the Na"y,

The fneiliti(lS of the llIL1'n.1 base were very Iimited up to Lbe bBgim:ring o-f the Will', As fur !IS eau be determined, Truk WM only an anchorage ill which the .fiellt could obtain limited replenishment. The supply deparunent was not in operation unril December 11)40, and did not reach its peak until th@ lntter purt of 1943. Since there wet'll no piel's which would accommodate hn-ge ships, nor enough cranes to handle stores in quantity, goods were slll,lttled between ship nnd shore ill manually loaded sumpuns and barges. Fueling pi'esented t.hs same problem. Although thet.·e were about GC.l'lindl'lcal fuel stomge tanks totaling roughly 49,000 tons cnpacity on Dublon Islund, there was only 0. single pier equipped "for loading the bel barges which serviced tile ships at anchor, Before the first United Stdtes carrier strike 0)1 'l'ruk in February 19M, there was a tot.'],l of about 50 sampllJlS, ten 15·ton tugs, three BOOton tugs, one 600·to.n tug, 3 water lighters, 3 fuel barges of 500"(:.0 eapnci ty Q)' less and abo IIt 17 n small yard craft, At this period 'I'ruk had reached i.ts peak of ubi lity to service a full grown

find 'l'ruk

keep thut fleet operating

lacking in the necessary facilities at full streagth,


Naval Defense
Until the end 011940 tl.1ere were no actual fortifications at. 'I'ruk, In November 1940 a dafsnse unit o·f 850 men, under command of the Fourth Fleet,. was astublished to man the fell' guns then being installed, Among the ikst guns insta.lled on Truk were five or six 1895 Sino-Japanese 5·1neh to G·inch guns, which were Iocated for coast. defanse on the islande of 'Pol, Moen,a.nd Uman. There were four twin-mount, dual purpose, anti-

aircraft 12,7-cm, ship guns mounted Dublon and Eten. Eleven S·cm, surfaes guns were placed
around the reef islands near tile ohannelentrences. These, with two B·em, nntial1'Crnit and 'various 25·mm, and 13-mrn, machine guns on Fafan and Ete.llcom p rised the defensive fortifications of Truk before the WILl', and although construction of these gun emplacements was started in 1940 i~ is doubtful if 1m)' were ready for use before the end of 19U, When Rabaul was taken by the Japanese, the guns then nt 'I'ruk were moved to Rabaul, but these were Inter replnced! by gun£ intended for Rabnnl, In November 1941, six naval patrol craft arrived and were attached to the defense unit, During 1942, mine layers and mine sweepers came in, aut! in April of that year the personnel of the defense force WIlS increased to 1,460 men. In preparation for an expected A.llie.d invasion the army moved into Truk for tile first time in January 1941, It iminediataly started the construelion of pillboxes and beach defeuses, and set up Wiles of defense and n plan to repel any lrulding assault; however, the lIn.vy mll.lllled £lIld wain· tained the large coas.t-def(ll'ls!I bntteries and nll.anti. a iI'CI'U gnlls, it At this time a In.l'ge i=re liSe in the n\tmber of coast de:feu&e guns was made when in· stallations WeI'e stm·te(l on 12·cw, 15,5 em, !IUd four 20·mm bat.Lel'ies, These WEll'll located on the' wuin hlullrls of Tl'ltk, and dllring the spring of that yen I' all of the red islnl1d butteries were moved into mor·a protected positions on the m'ain islands, Between December 19!1:3and the end of Lhe Will', auti,rUl'cl'aft emp lacements. weI'll installed! in qmlJltil-y, Thill'll were 80 positioll5of 25-= rn!lchine gl1l1Sand twlITlty 12-clll guns. Other guns of smaller caliber wm'e b.stulled during the same pel'iod, but ill lesser numbers,


intended to use Truk the [teet, since the cost heruvy repair instn 1Iagrea t for J "'Pan '.s Iimited budget. This was especially true because the shallow t'oof surroundingeach island ill the atoll created all expensive engineering problem ill the eonsn-uction of adequate piers and docks. In the early d:J.Y5 of the wu I·, mpa i r CII,P aci ty was t-w 0 destroyers und abe IIt fh'e subch n ser type vessels Qt!l.lly one time, Repair work was augmentedby repnir shills and te:nc1!1rsstntioned in tbe hm'bor, but they never were ablo to handle !TInjor c1a.moge, Repairs beyoml Tl'uk's cnpnbilities Wel'e sent to yards in the home islllllds, At. the height of its acti"ity there were. 70 l'epail.11OpS ill oPlll'rution en Tl.'llk, with attendant fa·cili· ties sllch liS small rnnri.tle rail ways UI) to 35 tons; one 2,500-ton floating dl'ydock whiClh was impO,l."ted f,-o-m J apnll ill 1941; 0 1,000 -kw, ger,erQtOI'; a l'6pnll' ship with Cl'1tilej amI a generator ship which aI'l'ivec1 ill Trull: in 1943. Only 1,000 pel'Sonllel were omployed in the r~pfiil' Ylll-ds. Though llllllletOu8 cliscrepa.ncies ha ve been 101md in the coml,i1ation of duhl on t1,e tepn i.. fu.cilities, it can b~ Blll'mised tlmt a lo.l'gc -fleet nt "'Ill' wOlllcl The Jnllam,se never llittl ItS a major repair base for ofdl'ydock 'facilities and tions would have been too

Durin g this period the nll<1>'y~sta to prepa re rtsd home-made be rub Launch ers nn d_ installed rocket launchers imported from J n.PILIl. Torpedo boars were nnothar ~iI~ment in the defemse ·of Truk, Stations wara placed on lfooL1, Uman, Udot (not completed), and Tol Islunds, The boats were slow lnnding craft with OM tor-pedo urtaehed to each side, In conjunction with tllClS0 Were eight s.tations for "one-mull torpedoes" which were mtended fur lim in surprise night Ilttack on enemy ships, which might I\J1.chGl"Cd in the lagoon. _ Detectorc oils nn d ruines gll.fLtxl.e,t t be reel pusses. (A d escri Ptiou of ilie one-man torpedo ..nd its operation and the detection devices is contained in the Physical Damage and Area Study in All!! ex I to EDclOro"lIDl. and in Interrogation B No. 13----Anue" I Enclos nre ..:1..). Truk, as may be seen from the foregoing, actnally "'lIS not strongly Iortifiad until19ibl, TIt~ situation at Trull: was- well described by Vice A.dmirnl Ha rot whom he said that he would listen to the Americrrn radio proclaim Truk the impregnable bastion of the Pacific" and then he would become II pprehensi ve thn t the ITni ted Stat6!! migh t learn the .real truth.

Naval Operations
The operations of the Jap!lIlese Fleet in and around Tr-uk ware quite extensi va COnside ring the lack of favorabla facilities in the harbor, The combined fleet operated outo! Truk from July 1942 until Febrllllry 19ibl. This fieet was composed ·of ships of the First, Second, and Thh..:l. Fleets and the Sixth Subwilrin.e Fleet, and contained ap prom atel y :I or 4 b attleshi ps, 4001"l"iern, 12c.l'uisers, and destr:oyers 'of the Second Escort Force, The combined fleet, undercommand of Admiral Yamilmoto whose Jln.gsJtip was the MWiashi, operated between Truk and Babaul, returning to J ap!lll .for drydoclring, overhaul, Dud personnel replacement. In Trnk the fleet replenished and rested at unehor. After Admiral Yamamoto was killed, Adminl Koga took command of the combined fleet, retaining the Y'IL$rJI;kj, as flagship. During the American invasion of the Gilbert Islmuls 11 part of the combilled fleet steamed to Kwajnlein., but fearing Americiln Cil.rder (Lir power l'eturnedlllmost immediateJyl:o Thuk. United St..'ltes submarine activity betwwHI Truk 4

and the Empire bad been increasing and soriously hindering the flow of fuel and ~l1ppli~ to Tl"uk. By the end of 1943, when 'I'ruk s ~Jh)'S.l. cal d\!NelopIllWlt wus at its 'IClI'lO, lJle resrockiag of supplies n"Om the Empire had become a serious problem, On 4 February 1944, u.- single AmericILn PB4Y (Marino) flew high over 'I'.l'uk on 0. photographic mission; his event W!lS recognizlld by the J!tpanese as It- warning not to be ignored. It motivated Admiral Kogu.'s dooision to move his fleet a wily from the threut, of Atullrican uir power and intidentally to <1 better so urce of supply, In the m ean time, tho AmeriC!lllS had moved into the lI.frll'Slmll Islands with II gtent carrier striking foree, Truk "-IlS stronger thall it hnd ever been, but still this W:lS not enough to puotect the J apanese fleet, On 10 Febru!!'ry the combined fleet st~"'mOO:out of Truk for Palau, and from there it split up; part of it W6Ut to the Philippines, part to Singapore, and the M'I4rJ1;hi proceeded to Y okosuka, Japan. A eonsidereble number of merchant ships were forced to remain at Truk because of [L shorta,,"1! of fuel and wl1t!>,r, and because of high winds which delayed tlleir unloading. Naval activity from Truk almost entirely cea:sed !IS of that date, with the exception of operations by Hie Sixth Submarine Fleet. Tn order to complete the picture of naval operatiollS lip to the time of the first ail' attack on Trull: it is necessary, at this point, to daseriba briefly J apllllllsII submarine activities in the 'I'mk area. Before the war Tl'uk was nota submarine billie; in fact tilll only submarine base in the mandated jsl~lldE area was located at KwajaJ.eiu, although jllst prior to 16 June 1944 the Seventh Submarine Flotilla, which hod headqnarters at Rabaul, operated a submarine tender, the Jingei, in Truk. This tender serviced hut a. few old shol't.-rl1nga cmft used only f01' obseevl1tion.TI·uk's submarine activity did not begin until the Sixth Submarine Fleet, organized in Japan on 15 M!l.y 1942 arrived at Truk on 16 ,June 1942, Tr~ equipped merely to service eubmarines but not to rep?ir. them j :wd e from tbi s only a torpedo replenishing st~tlOn and two torpedo Ildjus.ting shops wern provided, CrelVli could l'eLo.xn C fl l·e.~t camp on Dubion IsID.ud between Will' patrols. The Sixtb Fleet inaillded subma.l"iJ-les of 2000 and .3,000 tons n.nd possibly a larger tYlle: whlch CIlI"I'letl ubservatlon senp1anes. Operations were

conducted from Au.strdia to Hawaiian waters and possibly between Hawaii Imel the west coast of thn United Sl;.ates, Th.e su bmnr in e ,sel'\'icing base on Du blon Island employed 130 'per-sons, arid handled only 22 torpedoes a week. There were two adjusting 8hOl)S fo~ torpedoes, and submarines could replenish to cl1pni::-i~y hom these shops without unloading IIny of their remaining torpedoes to be adjusted on s110r6, SiIlGB submarine pens were provided no on Truk, submnrines weI'!! expected to submerge and Jie on the bottom fo\" protection during air attacka, Aite!' the cartier attack in Fehrul):ry 1944,although the torpedo shops were not hit, excava.tion was started with the view 1:,0 plrHlhlg them undel'ground, but this project. was not cornpleted until July 11)45. In Apl'il1944 carrier attack, 40 percent of the buildings ll..nel25 percent of the torpedoes wel"e destroyed, Submarine operations wel'e greatly reduced at 'I'ruk by the fuel shortage caused by United States submarine activity and by the destruction of tlie supplies during carrie" strikes. and subseq ueut haavy bomber raids, Long range patrols were stopped, and ill the spring 0']' 1944 tbe Sixth Submarine Fleet moved to Saipan, The Seventh Submarine FlotilJlt moved. from Rabaul to 'I'ruk when the old Sixth Fleet was liquidated I1t the frtll of Saipan and a new Sixth Fleet was organized in .JapllJl. Thera were only ubont six ships in the Seventh Submarine Flotilla and they carried out observations on Uhthi until the fiotill!L W!'IS dissolved in S~ptember 1944. The dates of these operations were confused in. the minds of those in terrogated, bu tone J apanese claimed that submarines of the Seventh Flotilla, carriedout attacks on United States ships during the landing at Saipan. This would indicate that this squadron was moved from Rabaul to Truk very shortly Il;fter the Sixth Fleet moved out.


Air Bases and Installations Since Truk was a na vill base, its air iustallntions
and facilities were constructed and operated by the

Japanese Navy, The history of their development, and of the vurious organi :!lations of the na val u,il' force which operated fro.m them., is limited by
the lcss of I'Ilaords and by the nonavaUabiIity of in. formed perron1l61. The entire island group 11toto.! of tbree ILirstl'j ps, one se !tplu:ne bo se". an d OUB combined iiI'strip and seaplane The

airstrips were Eten Field, on Eten Island; Moen No, 1 on the northwest tip of Moen 'Island j end Parnm Fieldon Pnram Island. Moen No.2, the combined seaplane. base and stri p, WIlS located Oil tho southern end of ~loen Island, and the main seaplane base on Dublon Island. Work had been started Oil cleu,t'ing trees for a lighter strip on MesagOIl, one of the outer I'eel islands, and soma work accomplished in converting the apron at Dublon seaplane base into an airstrip, On Dublon, adjacent to the seaplane base, was an aviation repair and supply installation known iIS the One Hundred and Fourth Naval Air Arsenal. Descriptions of these air facilities are contained in Annex II to Enclosure (A) and in Physical Damage and Area. Study Reports in Annex I to Enclosure (B). The latter also de-scribes the damage sustained from bombing, The Dublon seaplane base WIiS the ouly air facility on Truk in use befcrs the war. Construction on this base was con tinued until the spring of 1944. Moen No.1, a 1,200-meter strip, was started in November 1941 and essentially completed by December 1942. The seaplane base at Moen No, 2; was started in Novembc.\· 1941 and finished in Apl'i11943, and the 1,000-meter airstrip WIIS built iV the spring of 1944. The date of the initial work on Eten Field, the principal fighter base, is uncertain, but it was substantially completed in December 1943_ Param Field, primarily a bomber base, was started in Jnne 1943 and was completed _as 0. 1,200-meter strip in Januruy 1944,.. Shortly thereafter it was extended to 1,430 meters. Construction of the major facillties on the One Hundred and FOllrth Naval Air A.rsellll>l was begun in J Illy 1942, and this IUUtwas operating in Novembm' of that yeaf, Additions were mads in thefall of 1(143 and again in the summer and fall of 1944 .. Its functions were roughly equivalent to those of a combined assembly and repair department and all a:viation supply acti-vity, and nt one time it W!LS capable of overhauling 15 (literaft engines per month, TIlls organization 'VIIS originally {l. branch of fhe Southeast Area Naval lUI' Al-senn1, the headquarters of which ware in Rabaul until March 1944 when it wns transferred to Sfripan. Truk becllllii/. the hendquo,l'tllrs in August 1944" after the lnss of the Marinnas, n.nd Itt that tin1.e it came un.del' the (lonU'ol 0:£ the commllndBI'm ahief, FOllrth Fleet. The personnel strength of the One Hun5

dred and Fourth Na"n] Air .ttl'S&nllj rose from 100 men at the of the war to It peak of 1,100 in ISiS, However, at no time wns thlll'6 more than a. lu'l1 dful of properly trained nirornIt teclmici oms in this complement, The Truk-Imsed nnyn! ail' organizatiou, known as the ERst GIll'OLines NU'\'al Air Corps, hendqual't<!l'S at MO\ill No, 1, was acti'l"nted in the :fill of 1944 as n reslllt of tile teorganization of Nine Hundred and Second Naval Ail' Corps, which had been established at Truk in December 19U, Various other organizations were based, at Truk during tbe war, These included, the Twenty-si~th Ail' Flotilla, which came in fl'om Babnul in December 1943 und moved to Palsliu in MU1'ch19M, and the Twenty-second Ah Flotilla which was transferred in February 1944 froln Tminn lind then was deactivated in November 1944, Unfortunately" almost all records hav,e been dest.royed, and there were no well-informed naval air force personnel on Truk, at the rune the !illITeywus made, '1'1'110 Wlll'll. present duLing the early pP.:rt of the Will', Consequently, the story o·f the opera ti onsof these uni ts is not avnilabla 01 the 1,982 officers and men of the East Caroliues Navul Air Col'PS who wel'll. oa.Truk at the end of the war, only two were pilots who were pmslU)t during the first cn.rri:er attacks, and they were enlisted seaplnne pilots with little accurate knowledge of landplane operations, The best single source of information on air operations is probably Rllar Admirol Sumikawa f01'merly chief of staff to commander in chief, Fourtb Fleet, and prior to that time commande~ of the Twenty-second Air Flotilla, However,.h.iE knowl'edge of 'I'ruk is for the most part limited to the period Il,ftor his arri val in J anunry 1944, The Mission of Truk- Based Air Power The mission of the Truk .AiJ:, Force was to pro. teet the Truk Nuval Base, As far lIS can be de" terminad no purely ofi!!Ill;ive flights ever took DiE from Truk, It is not definitely ee rta in tha t tlie aircraft COilIlW'llttn.cli:ing Our carziar task force 011 tho n.ightof 113-17 February ilnd the morning of 30 April 1944 took oIr from Trnk Jields, Renr Admiral SU,mikawa stated ehv.t about six plancs took off from Parltm Field on the night of HI February to attack the. Americlln Fleet Ilnd did -Dot remrn, However, OfliooT'S who wel'e stH.tloned nt the vlJ,riollSfield at tbe time knew notl,jJlg .of the attack :md suggested tbe p(}!!sibiJity thnlit came

from Rnbuul 01' Tiniun. N,othingcolLld be learned regal'ding tho utt,llck on the rnol'lu:lg of 30 April eNcept tImt one aviation stll1I?lliool', who "',as newly arrived at .Tl'uk at the time of the raid, stated thltt four attack bombers, hall tuken oJl on the evening of 29 April, and about 0100 Oil the 30th two or three more attack bombers had til-ken o:ff. Not all of these planes returned, and hodid not know what their mission had been, Late in the war, in June 1945, an oJi'onsive operation was plauued but 1Ie,'e1' carried out, Orders w&'e received from Tokyo to prllpf~re Param Field for use in launching suicide attacks ng)Unst United Stales ships u.LUlithi, but the field was bombed so continuously tbu.t it could not be used; in fact, the JIl-jl'tIlese wondered if Unted Stutes intelligeuce hurl learned of the plan, and had CO!ICBntmted the attoelrs on Parnm for that reason, Routine seurch missions were Ilewn from Truk until June 1944, after which time there were not sufficient nircraft uvnilable, Both Iand-bassd aircnLit and seaplanes were employed in search operations, Laud-based planes concentrated lJlostly on the area from !!'O"to 2nD" (this may huve been true only during the late SPl'ing of 1944) ; bombers and recommissance pl!mes searching to 600 miles and fighters to 300 miles, At dawn each duy v. 12-plane search flight WIlS l!LU11chedfrom the seaplan e base. Six sec ut sea planes (Jakes) each coverad (J. sector of abouj 150 miles radius with a 30"mile cross leg. These sectors were varied daily, SL>; observaticn seaplanes (Petes) Ilew an antisubmnl'iull patrol to a distance of 90 miles, All search planes carried a light bomb load in case of submarine contact. It was stated thll-t several attacks wm~ ~nllde on 01U' submacmes, hut 1\0 details could be obtained. Dlldllg the last year of the war, SIlVB!'111 long-range reconnaissanea missoins were flown from Trulr, to Ulithi, Guam" and Eniwetok, Truk was also a 'Staging point fOl' aircraft ferried from Japan to the South Pacific. A majority of the planes WllI'll.brought to Truk by auxiliary aircraft carners Ilnd were miloa.dlld thore to await t.he ud-vtJl of pilots fl'Om other bases, chiefly R~bOl:uI,wllo flew them to thell' filll.l destil~fI,tions. Ail'CI'llft wore also flown fiom JUl)fln via Truk to Rab[L1l1 md othel' bases, Va,riolls' routes w~l'e used ~n these fel'l'y flights, although bombel's and other 10ng-r'1Ulge plnnes sometimes flew dil'ect from TiJ1inn CIl· Saipun to Rabaul. ReCOl'Cls of fel';'Y

opero,i;ions were dostroyed, and the :l'oHowillg approJ1imate figures UJ'O the result of recolleebious of persons new I1.t Truk, Statistics prim' 1:0 December 1943 ura completely lacking,

Num M!f nnd l:!r'fIiII'

In mid-.J.a1t'llaI'Y 11144two carriers unloaded about 120 planes of several types,l1l1(l ill February 1944 one canier unloadedabout 30 J'ills, There is some indication that squadrons from Rabaul occasiounlly bused n;t TrW( for training purposes, nlthough this impression may have l'ltsult.ed only from the :fact that the Twenty-sixth Ail' F]otilla, which was temporarily stationed at Trulr in eady 1!).j_4, ad no dnties thHe other than h t.,ra:inin grocti vi ties, 0 ther aviation traini ng acti vities ut TJ:lJk consisted only of routine combat training flights, familiarization in new ,drcl'(tft,. and minor ground school mstruetion conducted within the squadrons,

Air Defense
The ail' defense of Truk W1l.S not considered adequate by the Japanese stationed there. At the time of OIU' fh:st attack, 16,Febl'llary 1944 (west. IOllgj:tude date), Rear Admiral Sumikawa was in Tokyo attampting to get assistauea to strengtben his defenses, Throughs, blunder or oversight by h:igher hendquartars, the TWlllltyosjl>-"th Ail' Flo- , tilla had not been made subject to orders from the Tr uk ccrnman d. This p artiom nr shortcoming cost the JI1PIlll6Sl) dearly on the morning of Febru111'Y 16, The commander of the 'I'wenty-sizth All, Flotilln, who was the only officer ut 'I'ruk with the authority to order these plnnes into thsail', \VIIS not at the field with his planes and because of comDlllnlOation difficulties could not get word to them to take off. Even if he hn.d beon uble to get his order through, ,'e1'Y few of tl"Ulplanes could have taken ofl' since hi§ airplanes were r:1l1 Eten Field and most of his pilots wero on Dubloll Island. Actually, there wero t~w fighter ail'cl':.,ft available for defense,

- The entire atoll could boast about only 40 antiaircraft guns, and these were not equipped with fire-ccn trol rnd It r, been use this squi prnen thad bean aboard a ship which, while enroute to Truk, was sunk by one of OU_i' submarinaa Radar coverage was genernily gcod, although tll!! J apanesasaid that unsatisfactory locations of thea.ntennae caused all stations except O)1e to be entirely unrellabl e ill detecting raj ds ,n'om th 10 ~fa,riaJlll as, whereas severa I stations could track planes up" preaching from the Marshulla mlfective radar ranges of as much as 150 miles were reported to be customary, but this figure is. believed to beexaggerated. In this connection an interesting statement was made concerning the detect jon of B--24s, by R,enr Admiral Sumilrawa who said that B-24s evidently firm nt considerable altitude, descending to tho surface at a distance which they apparently considered to be fur enough outside enemy radar I'lllIge to allow them to complete tbeir> approach undetected, Usually tlley were dot-Beted prior to thair descent and conseq uently the Jupaness had considerable warning of their approach, Voice communication with fight-01's was maintained by one of the stations nt Moen, but Information supplied to the flight leader consisted only of range and bearing of enemy uircraft, The flight leader made his own decisions us to action to be tnken, and fighter direction as the &meriC(Lll Air Forces knew it apparently wns not employed by the Japanese, There is some doubt as to the condition otrell.mness normally maintained at 'I'ruk, One officer stated that a flight of 4 lnnd-basad fightel'S' was airborne at down daily, with all ndditional 20 fightersalerted for instant, take-off. Pilots who d idnot to ke 01I promptly were likely to be beaten when they returned, The seaplane unit maintaiued no spscinl condition of readiness until ai,er the February 19i14 attack. From than on three fighters were kept on inlmedinte alert. Wh.en fighters were urmed with machine guns only, they would attempt to intercept ll.ppronchin.,. raids (Lt some distance from t.he base, Many of Lbe fightru'S were armed with me>:hanical timefuzed bombs for air-to-air bombing., These pImes found it neCCSS!ll.'y~o wait uutil the bomb~I'SlVel'e making their final nppl'onchOll a steady course before they Gou]d mllke an attack with nriS chance

6 1

of lIC ess, Air-to-air bomhin ... wa con idered to 00 somewhat successful against B-24s, bnt the B-29s flew SO high that tho 'I'ruk fighter plUMS, which fur the most part ware old patched-lip craft which had been damaged in previous rai ,could not ClUTY bomb to the altitude flown by the lIperfortresses, '1'he Japanese attempted, UUSUCCI15 • fully to install SO-mm. gun in place of 2.Q-IlI.lll. guns in their fighters for use against tile B-29s. Actually there w [a few attacks made on B-29s because the J apanese were bowing what few airctn.ft rema ined to them. A few Irvings were nvuilable for use as night fizhtees, They were not equipped wth radar IIl1d were dependent solely on non-radar-controlled searchligh t cocpera tion. These planes had a fixed machine gun mounted aft of the pilo set at -au elevation of 30·. As the pilot approached the ttu:get from below and astern, the gunner:, in the rear: seat, fired the gun when his sighe came on the target. Although this method appears to 00 extremely crude, the J apanese claimed fair success until the B-24s began to e.mploy evasive action lIS soon as they were picked up by a searchlight. Japanese estimates of United States planes shot down could not be obtained. If there were NCT,'IlLE

ords they had been de troyed, and Rear .A.dmiml Sumikawa considered the claims of his pilots, as well as of ours, to hn ve been absurd and Dot worth considering. Estimates of numbers of Japunese aircraft p.resentat the times of the two nited States carrier IltblClal, numbers participat,i:ng ill ,engagements, and numbers dl'lStl'oyed were obtained from several sources, 1I0ne of which, unfortllllotely, lire considfl'od to be reliable. The figures given by Rear AdmirRl Sumikswa shown in table A, are probably the most accurate, Tll,b16 B is a compilation of statements made by various individuals W]lO had some knowledge of events when they occurred, but W11Q {orgut the exact details ILDd figures as time passed, Table C is an ever-all estimate by Rear Admil'lll Sumiknwa of uireraft present at Truk during various periods from February 1944 to the end of the war. Part of it is a duplication of informacion included in table.A.. Considerable disparity between tables A and B is apparent, It is obvious, too, that in many cases individual columns could not be reconciled to their totals so that it was necessary to insert approximate figures in the totals to make the statistics agree as much as possible.
Pebruary 1944



F.bM14ry 1944

~~t:~~~:; l~:~~¥~:~!::~~~
TA1J ..1ll .-Truk's·"ir
.!tengti. at ~iunifi<IJ"! 1,.riad. during can'l'aign-A. se cotui Air FlotiUa
Fd"r '" Fob. 1,1H<to r:arr'J(lr ! HJ-

r!;]JoTted Rear Ad,,,;,al Sumikawa by

CinC Tw

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17 Feb.

2.Kll.t6. JI Zei:e.

o Jud:y






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. Aircraft

b.Wngill~ 10 7'rukc/Ju! slatirmw

at oth",. baa ..

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Army Forces
19-50 April 1944
Dublan ScoPl!ulfi Eten._ ~~_~ __ ~_.~~. 1IIJoenNo.



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The Ar:my's mission 011 'I'ruk was purely defensive, und its work would begin only o.t such time as a landing actually WI1S uttempted by enemy troops. It had no other l' ponsibility. No offensive operations were launched from Truk nor were aJ1Y planned. Truk was not even u ed as a troop staging area, nor as u training center. Since. no Allied invasion was ever made it would a.ppear I'hat the value of Itl"llly forces at Truk WtlSnot only negligible hut actnally llcglLtive, since they con-

sumed much needed upplies and in no way were able to ju tify theil' existence on Truk. In September 1943, tha Fifty·second Division was mobilized at Kauuzawa, Japan, for duty in the ElL tern Carotin . The fir t major ecb. Ion of this divi aon nnived. at Truk enrly in January 19±i and was stationed OIl Dublon, M.o 11, and Tol Islands, wi th headq ua l"tCl'S on Du blon, Prior to this time there were no lU'rny forces on Truk other than an advan 'e party of 300 officer and mel) of this arne division which had arrived ill I 0\' moor



Hl!3. The Fifty· econd Division was under the command of ilia Eastern At'my, with headquartel'S in Jnpan, and nlso under llll~ command of the combined fleet. The .exact command delineation is not entirely c1eaL' hut tl111 inference is lh:)t ilia commander of. the combined fiee ,\"ItS the immediate operational senior and the commander of the eastern atJny ex-Ilrcised administrati ve command. Locally, neither' the filmy nor the navy eserci ed jurisdiction, over the other. Coordination was obtained by coopemtion. Major deci ions affecting both services w re made in joint conference, In the latter part of February (after the 16-1'1 February carrier attack} a second Jarge echelon of 1;]10 .Fifty-second Division stnged from Ujina, Japan, and arrived at Truk after surviving with ome 10 , a torp do attack en route. At this time a redistribution of forces placed gnrrisons on Dublon, Moen, Fefnn, and Uman, with a very small unit on Toland a few members of the control, or warning oraanization on each .island. On 8 March 194<1,another detachment arrived from Ujina, and the islands ill the western part of the atoll were garrisoned, At this time the scope of the Truk command was broadened to include raponsibility for all glllTisl)n in the Carolines from Ponape to Enderby. Toward the end of :llll'eh an antiaircraft unit reported find was distJ:ibuted throughout the previously garrisoned islands and Parum, This unit WIIS shortly thereafter transferred to the 'a;vy for control in order to keep all antiaircraft defense units under Navy command. On 1 J"l1I1ea detachment of troops from Mortlock Island was spread through the smaller 'I'mk Islands. Anothel' detachment from MortlQCk in November 1944, and 9. battallion from Enderby in J"lIDuary 19{5, completed the Truk gareison a it existed at be end of the war, In Angust 1944 the Commander of the Fiftyeeond Division, Lieutenant General Mugikuri, assumed the title of Commander, Thirty-firs Army. This army, whose headqumters was on aipan had been wiped out in the MarillIlllS CD.mpllign, with its commanding general killed on Gnnm. Actually the new title made no di:fl'erenee to the commander of the Trukforce ince it placed no new forces under his command, nor did it alter his duties. At the time the army arriv din Truk, no fortifications had been built other than those which re-

mained under navy control. Further, there were no barracks avnilable for nrmy use. Trol)ps were quartered in civilian buildings (sch~ls lind houses) in n few navy buildings, and ill a tent camp. Con tl'udioll of field fortificntions W!lS begun immediately, After the cardel' trikes of 1617 February 11)4.1troops were mov d into small, crudely constructed, partially underground houses. These were of inferior quality since no building materials were available except from scllllty Ioenl resourees. Because the navy was charged with supplying the army wi h mnterials, including nll types of supplis , ammunition and clothing, the army had not brought building materials with them. Since Japanese supply lines were severed completely about this time they were never able to receive supplies from JapllJl. Construction of air-raid shelters wasalso begun at this time; these consisted of one or more large, bombardmentproof tunnels on each island, each capable of sheltaring a large number of men. In August 1914" as n result of Ie ons learned in the MnrillDllS campaign, the army decided to make everything bombardment proof. Troops worked dill' and night placing all heavy weapons, including heavy machine guns, in caves, and d_iggin interconnecting tunnels between gun positions with as many ILS .6."e alternate emplacements con tructad for each gun. Emphasis was also placed on the construction of tank traps lind barriers Il11d the planting of beach mines. From this time until the end of the Will' the troops lived in or near the eaves and tunnels which were also , their battle stationa inee no amphibious assault ever materialized the army' only operations consisted of preparing the defense of the islands, and growing food which was woefully scarce. The only notable exception to tills was that aImy personnel manned soma of the hea-vy machine guns which were employed against low-.flying'o,ircraft. mall scale training exercises were co!lducted o~ly occasionally, since ammunition was not plentifnl, They had only the ammunition which they hlld brought with them from Japan, and some o'f that was destroyed by air a,ttacks. Tb~ plan envisioned for the defense against . nmphiblO~ assault included nwnerous factors. Coast artillery, emplaced on main islands and manned and controlled by the navy, was charged


with the task of .engaging" ships at.tempting to operate close outside the atoll reef or trying to enter any of the passuges. Naval mines lllid in the po es !I,ll,dchunn Is, provided udditionnl protection, and nntisubmarim, and l\ntitorpIOdo nets were placed, by the navy, around docks and certain nncb.oro,gll to guard agains tbe forms o'f attnck. As landing craft nppeoacaed to within 1,000 to 2,000 meters of (Lny island, n.rmy Ill'tille1"J' wonld open fire but its volume was restricted by shortage of ummumtion, 'I'.he nn.vy 11Ml some rockets with a rullge 1)£ 800 meters. The indi vidual reefs IV hieh surtound each: isl and were planted with about 4,000 nntiboat mines, some put there by i;he army and some by th e. navy, lIIO tly to protect the best landing b aches. As landlnzr craft appronched these reefs...-w hich averag d a ill tnnca of 200 to 300 meters 0:11 shore-mortal's, machine guns, antiboat guns, and small arms were eo open lip with a heavy crossfire from w ll-established positions. Tl'OOPS were to be dug ill along the beaches of the main islands and could fall buck to preconstructed secondary positionsui case of necessity. MllclUne guns, light mobile artillery, and 37-mm. hand-drawn antitank guns had about five alternate and supplementary positions prepared, and l'e!!ulm' shifting of these zuns was planned, A.nllU1IDitioll shortage required sparing

use of these guns, Most gun .poaitions were intercted by tunnels. Barbed wire WIIS used mostly in a protective capa ity around the gun emplacement ; however, use of tactical wire with Iuues fol' machine gun fire was also planned to some extent. There were 110 tanks on 'I'ruk, nlthough the pet· onnel of a tank nuit were. there, servi ng as infatl tty. The plan of defense accepted temporary withdrawal to reform and countercharge but the primary plan, in case of Iack of orders to the contrary, was to fight from caves nnd reaches with the same tactics a were employed a Iwo Jimll. and Okinawa. There was no plan for moving troops from island to island and Jack of water craft for transportation would have prevented this ill [my case. There wer no special precautions against air-horne landings since. it lVIIS collsidBred that the nature of the terrain. offered sufficient, protection ngain this form of attack. A summary of Ilrmy trength at Truk follows:

End of Februnry End of Mn.reh Elnd of April

1944 ll.l'l4 lil'JG

1.541 12. 356 14,2!JS

This last fieure is the total final number of Ill'my personnel on 'I'ruk, as there were no further receipts or transfers, Total army casualties from air attacks wet'!! 234 killed and 19 wounded.

III. ALLIED Photographic Mission



them til m


4 February 1944, an American PB4y (Mltl;ine) flew over Truk at approximately 20,000 feet. ACCOl'diJlg to one source this airplane was first observed visually, and fired upon, by a battleship in the harbor, 0 Japan e fighter planes WB~1l nir-borna when this photo plane was Ihst sighted but several took off in pursuit. The Japanese failed 1;0intercept, although one float plane was reported to have come almo t within firing range, but the PBiy escaped by diving away. The Japanese correctly interpreted the significanoe of the reconnaissance plane as u, forerunner of attack, as evidenced by the withdrawal, 6 days later, of the Japanese Fleet to Palau, and the depnrture of A.dmirals Koga and umikawa to Japan. Kogn left in his flagship, MU<Jaahi vin Palau. For some undetermin (1 rea SOli the Jataness concluded that they should expect an attack


about 21 February, and the one that greeted in the early morning of 16 February caught totally unprepared. Carrier

Attack, 16-17 February


Two days before the first carri r attack one of four Bettys failed 0 raturn to its base from 11 routine search fli",ht. The Japanese "feured that enemy aircraft were responsible and to add to their apprehension, the Japnne...<e radio .intereept group picked tIP voice transmi ions 'which were identified as concerning United Stat aircraft carrier operations, becau e they COli ained "color base' 01,119. Chamcter of the transmission indicated that the cm-riars miaht be close by. On the strength of these two incidents !Jle island group wen on the alert . Ent'lyon the morninc of 15 Febl1.lIU1' a special arch flight of G aircraft cover d an area 30" to each side of north for a distancs of 300 miles. The 11


search resulted in it nl!(rntivc report, and this, coupled with the I alarming result of radio direction fin din IT hearings on the prev ious calls, made the J It panese decide that tJ11l t rnnsruissions origumtllcl somewhere between Kwajnlein and Eniw~ ok, Wblll "110U 1111 hands relaxed vigilnnce, Due to conflicting reports. exact chronology of these foregoing events ~re not known. bllt occurlWOO have boon SlltisfllctodJy v rifled. Tho lIi F brunrv dnwn-fizhter sweep Iuuuched from five Americ.;n .Cll.l'ri,:U;caugh t the J apilll)Se unprepared, As fur IlS can be de ermined 110 clefen lve fighter were air-borne when the Jap nnesa first became aware of the impending attack .LUthough the attacking; onrrier plane were , picked up by r.1nar almos a minu prior to their arrival overhead, there appeal'S to have been some delay in spreading the alarm to an arens. By querying personnel tationed at the fields it was found that altbough Po ram had 30 minutes notice Eten had only 10 minutes wnrl1ing and at I110enNo.1 the first 1ight-eJ"wave arrived simulta.neously with the sounding of the alarm, Further causes for the lack of readiness lie in the fucts t:hnt I1J dar 'Il"1lS not proper Iy manned, pilots were on Dublon Island while their aircraft were on Moen IUId :Eten Islands, and the telephone system 'l'l'll not functioning properly. According to the tactical-plan of attack, the fir t American objective was to attain air supremacy over the target, to be accomplished by total destruction of the J apanesa air component at 'I'ruk, Five American carriers launched a total of 70 fighters at 06iiO 1 hour and 20 minutes before sunrise on 16 February. Curriers and numbers of planes participating were: Bunk-er Hin (22), Y orktollm (12), En terp rille (12) I n/lrepid (12), and Ess8:/;(11). In addition, the Bunker Hill furnish.ed one aircrraft with its fighters as air target observer. Planes of the 8 task groups nrrived in the target area approximately at sunrise. nited States medium- and low-altitude planes were attacked by enemy fighters, and during the attnck more enemy planes were observed to bo taking off. In all, it is estimated that the enemy llad as mllny Ill! 80 planes air-borne during the attack, Japanese reports concerning the number of Japanese planes aiJ'-borne during the operation vary between 25 and O. iz

During this nttnck 0\11' fighters divided their efforts between st.rafing uiL-craft on the ground at euemv fields and buses, and fig1lting the eneml' s air-borne planes. .Aircraft on the ground were oft 11 parked nose to till) outside revetments milking excellent targets. In t.he ui r, the enemy's efforts lucked coordinatiou and many of their pi lots appeared to be inexperienced. Immediately following the fighter strike at planes on the gi'Qllnd, attacks were made on dispersal areas at Moen, Et~, and Puram air bases, by 18 torpedo bombers, 6 from each task group, loaded with fr·rtgmeutation clusters and incendiaries. This attack was designed to render fields and in tulln tion un ervicsable lind thus prevent attack on our task force dnrillg the night. As a 1'1lS1lILof these vents and nditions the fighter sweep was entu:ely successful. In the air, 56 enemy planes (51 of them fighters) were claimed to be destroyed, and by American estimate strafing attacks destroyed an additional 72 enemy planes on the ground. Thls figure is the more impressive when it is compared with our own losses, in this weep, of only 4 fighters from all causes, 11.. total of 125 operational wing aircraft and 110 air arsenal aircraJt were burned or seriously damaged on the ground, Therefore, of the 365 aircraft on Truk lit the time of the raid, less than 100 reo mained unscathed. Tbe Japanese were able, howel'er to rebuild 80 ZElkes from parts of the damaged aircraft and bring to approximately 80 the ultimate po t-ruid total of flyable aircrnft, The eff~tiveness of the air arsenal WItS reduced by an estimated 80 percent, and the Param strip was out of commission for 20 days. The American forceshad accomplished their initial mission of knocking out enemy ail' opposition. Shipping was the primary target immediately after the early-morning fighter sweep was completed. Carriel' ffights were staggered to keep a continuou flow of hips to the target. Approx]. mately 30 separate flights of 1 to 30 aircraft each. including torpedo planes, dive bombers, IUId escort fightru were lhl'OWD at sDemy shipping during the cngagemenc, Bomb Ioadings varied throughout he day. The usual loads were 500.pcund hom US, of which 498 Wel'e dropped, ol'l,OOO-pound bombs, of which 369 were l'elensed. A few 250-, ] .(100- and 2,000-llOUDd bombs were dropped, Only 66 torpedoes were expended,

The. urikes against. shipping completely wiped out all Japanese naval ships ill anchorag at the time of the uttaclc, lind in addition sank 31 merchnnt ships, for n, total of approximately 200000 ton, Nllvn.! ahips destroyed included three lirrht b cruisers, Naka, Ag(l,no, and Eatori; tlll'Cll des royers YttbtlJre Oikcse, and Nagatlluhij th seaplane tender, AlrJitsu41/i,ima,. and the submarine tender, H eian M aru. On 1'7 Fabruury, lnck of suitubl targets made further attacks en sllipping unprofitable. Although air-borne opposition had ceased the American force withdrew extensive attacks 011 thehore insta.l1atians. Damarrs to installations, rJthough relatively light, included the following: d truetiO!l of OI,e or two hangars on Moen, destruction of three fuel-storuge tanks 01 Dublon ~11(1others on Eten, and the destruction of ammunition dumps all Dublon. During the night of 16-17 February six or seven Kates uttaeked tbe carrier force, Only one of these penetrated the radar screen and launched J). torpedo which struck he starboard quarter of the carrier InfJrepid. Conflicting evidence makes it difficult to ascertain whether or not radar was used by these attacking planes. Re;tr Admiral Sumikawa, who" is accepted as tIle final authority for the purpose' of this report, Insists that these planes took off from Param field, although other sources maintain that no aireraft, took off from Trull: during that night and that the nttn.ckmg airoraft must have be n from another island .. American losses for the raid totalled four air craft. The consensus of Japanese flying personnel as to the reasons for the disproportionate J apanesa losses is: (1). inferiority in numbers, (2) surprise (3) the tactical disadvantage of takin ir off in the face of astaclciug aircraft. 'I IVO .hundred aircraft present at Eten Field were awaitinz either fatTy pil ts to fly them to their final destination or t.ransier to the air I1l"S6nU I to b readied for service. According to Rear .Adrniml Sumikawa only 41 s rvicenble airplanes were available to the Truk command to rep I the attack. At Truk were 12!J,aircraft, used for ta-ainmg p urposes and belonei ng to the Rn bn ul cOJ'!1maud but authorifisd to be used to defend the atoll shonld it be attacked. Tb 200 uircl"nft at Eten were parked nose to tail outside the revetimlluts, which made it possible f l' flam to spread from

one aircraft to the other thus accounting for the great loss of aircraft on the gronnd. Cause of poor rlispersal i traceable to three factors: insufli.cient space on the airfield, lack of ferry pilots from Rabaul, an d the fact that the two auxiliary aircraft carder captains who brought the nircraft . fooling the <lelay at Trull: to be dangercn , discharged their' cargoes haphazardly and hurriedly departed. Tbe Unit d lntes timate of total damage to enemy aircraft during this 1"1I1d as apparently not w much in error, Howev~r, the destruo ion of airborne planes was much less than. claimed and the on-the-ground losses were considerably higher. United States e tim ate : 129 shot down 152 destroye-d and damaged on the ground ..) This well-executed, 2-day attack by the American currier task force left Truk practically defenseless. Supplies had not boon put underground and were extremely susceptible to air attack, and radio and radar instillations al 0 were damaged materially. The Japanese were surprised and relieved when the attack ceased on the second day. Following the trike the Japanese e.ffected such repairs to their fields and installations as were easily made, and began a belated but intensive effort to place everything po iSle underground .. Carrier

Attack, 29-30 April 1944

Early on thB morning of 29 Apri11944 (west longitude time) an American fast carrier task force battered Truk for the second time. The primary objective ill thi sweep was ground installations and buildings. The American planes were picked up by radar when still 30 minutes out and this interval proved sufficient for the Japanese to launch a considerable number of fighters. Five Japan planes, out on their normal routine sBorch I1Jld patrol mission failed to contact the American fleet ill time to warn the home base, although hortly after the radar warning Wll received one of them attempted to make radio contact. Communication with this plane was lost before the report was received intelligibly and none of the five pabrol planes returned to the base, 'I'he first wave of attnclring Ame:r:iCIlIl aircraft arrived at 0450 and the SO-minute warning enabled th .Japanese to throw 57 intercepting aircraft at this firsta rmlt wave, Moen No.1 contributed 20 Zekes, Eten 29 ~es. and Parnm Kates, in


addition to the 5 Ko tes on pn t1001. Altogether, 2 200 sorties were flown by American aircraft, dnring the _-dllY operation. Of these 467 W re by fighter-bomber aircraft, Bombs dropped totaled 748 tons, The Jnpnnese had 1 uircraft dispersed at four island fields at the time of the raid. These were deployed ns follows: Moon No.1, six Bettys and 20 Zekes' Eten 10It'Ving (night fight 1'8), and 35 Zekcs' Param 12 Jud'ys (carrier reconnaissnnce}, lind 13 Kates ; Dublon, 8 (obsen.ation and reconnaissanee}. Fifty-nine Japanese aircraft were de h-oyed in the mid (including the 5 Kat on patrol) itnd 34 were destroyed on the gr0U11d for II. totcl of 93. h'tLlmel'ous other aircraft were damaged by strafing. From photo interpretations AmeriCllllS estimnted 16T enemy aircrait present of w Well 63 we re d trnyed In the ail' II ud 60 on the ground. In the entire island group, !23 buildings and 6 hangars wefe desb'6yed and 44 buildings were damaged, These figures were obtained from interpretations of photographs made at the time of the raid. The pereen t.age o:f damage to installa tions 011 principal 'islands ¢er the raid wa estimated to be as follows: Duhlon,,w percent; Eten, 80 percent; !foen,75 percent; Fdan, 20 percent; Param, 15 percen ; and Illalu 0 percent: These figures were al c made from photographie 'interpretations and do not incl ude damage enused by prior a ttacks. hipping losses included the Hino M al'U, 11.1,500ton patrol craft; the Sapporo 1J[ aru. a 6oo-ton cargo ship; the Minaei jllaro a 300-t{ln 001'''0 ship ; lind Ilpprorin:tately 20 other small craft." , Amw:iClln carrier losses amounted to 22 aircraft, Two were lost on the inital figllter sweep while 20 were lost to antinu-cruft fil1l. Thirty-three uircraft were damaged. This carrier attack virtulllly nullified 'I'ruk's value as a supply and air base, As n navul ba e it had been untenable since the first carrier strike and its value to the J.pane..o.e W'lr effort after 30 A.pril was negligible., 'I'hi does not mean that the mmung B-24 and B-29 raids were value! for without, theil' harrassing effect Truk undoubt edly would bavs been able to replaoo its aircraft losses to some extent.. In :fu.ct.,despite. the B-2! raids its nil' strength was b_uilt up materially in

of T~uk's deolining val LIB WIIS admitted when lo,w m May the Trnk command was ordered to send 71 planes, including 59 fighters, to Yap and Guam-e-ngain reducing Truk to a low level. This order was explnined 11 II·measure to rectify strategic misoaleulntion by the Japauese high command, At first, on the 8. umption that Allied major effort would be through the South Pacific, they distributed their ail' strength in tIle Central and South Pacific in a 40 and 80 percent proportion respectively. When they decided that the next major effort would be farther north they stripped Trnk to reinforce Guam and YaIJ. No Allied reports are available concerning this attack and information is derived solely from Japanese sources; opinions are J apanese ns well. One or possibly two British carriers formed the atta.cki:og force. The attack was divided into two waves=one cominrr in the late morning and the other in the early afternoon, In the first wave, 18 to 2,j, Spitfires circled the atoll at a very high altitude and then returned to the carrier, but 15 TBFs and SBDs escorted by 6 to 9 Spitfires arrived as the first flight departed. The second wave comprissd 15 FBFs and SBDs escorted by 6 to I) Spitfires. . The attacking waves broke formation outside the reef and circled the main islands a.t 9,000 feet. They gradually descended to 3,000 feet and begUll their attacks at this altitude, Unlike .American aircraft they did not approach the target rapidly, but stayed at high altitudes for a considerable length of lime surveying the area. Then they bombed und Lrafed insignificant targets. The SBDs und TBFs bombed from a 30° dive releasing 'their bombs at 1,500 feet. The, ,\Ctmg as top covel' while the bombing was' in progress, dropped down when the TBFs and BDs were IDI ished, and strafed at very low ultitudes. The attack, principally against Dublon, Eten, and Moen, caused practically no damage. The bombiog, however, did plU'tinlly destroy records nnd the Japanese, fearing that the attacks were a prelude to an amphibious a sault burned their remaining files. Tlris fear was enilanced when on 17 June, a Bingle cruiser bombarded the isla:lds although no invasion a tempt f~JJowed. ' British Carrier Attack, 16 June 1945

Ollr!y May. J apuuese realization

No. Japanese fighters met the attack ItS it was IJ, complete surprise, t is doubtful if the attaci[ ~vould.h.av~ b. en o~posed alert be n given m suffiCIent tame smell only SIX 01' seven ahcrnft wel'a eperatiollal on 'I'ruk at the time. The BI·il;ish lost; from one to foul' Spitfires.

8-24 Attacks Against Truk Attacks on 'I'ruk by llLud-based American B-24c aircrnft were made 01' the first time in March
1944 and continued collsistently until October 1944 when B-29s began their experimental raids, These] Inn were both 'elltC!1L Pacific and outh Pacific based, Because of the distances from KwajnJei:1l nnd Empress Augusta Bay to Truk (900 to 950 miles) the bombers had to carry extra gasoline ut the expense of their pity bomb load, During that period more than 4,000 tons o:f bombs were dropped on Truk installations. Size of the attackinrr forces varied between 15 and 30 aircraft, and bomb loads consisted primarily of 500 and 1,OOO-pounclhigh explosiva bombs and incsndiary clusters. Althongh (It.dy warning radar usually picked up t,he attacking formations 75 to 100 miles out and tracked them all the way ill on occasion the B-24s evaded detection and encountered little or no intarcepsiou. As an antidetection measurn the attacking :force sometimes descended to minimum altitude at a distanca of 150 miles out. This deception was not rLlways successful inca under favorable conditions J apanese radar could pick up the bombers before they began their descent. At the time of the first B-24 rnids 101 nircraft were based at Truk, more than 100 of which were fighters. During April losses from combat and constant bombings reduced this force to 10<1total aircra:ft including 65 first-line fighters, By May, this number wa cut to 11 aircraft of which only 3 were operational, The carrie. raid of 29-30 A.pril aided m ateri It11 in briugin g this figUl'e to y its low level. By 13 June immediately prior to the Mariannas campaign, Truk's strenath WI!.'; increa ed to 25 fighters and 34 of other t.ypes, but when the ~1nl'iannas campaign b gnn, all all' raft, with the exception 01 less thun one-half dozen observation plunas, were detailed £01' pnrtioipn MOll in that campaign. None of these returned, Followi\lg the Mariannas enmpaigu, 35 ,w:cl'lIft were I1lust\Jred Itt Truk ; 8 were fighters acquired

from Palau and the remainder were patched-up craft which had been damaged on previous raids, Of the latter, only six or seven were operational at anyone time, Figures on losses on either side are unavailable. Japan e verbal sources are iJldefutite and probably 1lJI reli able, No B-24s were seen to fall within the atoll during the day but the Japane su pect that some fell outside the reef because flak crippled many over the islands. At night "five or six" were seen to explode and burn over the . lands and pilot report shooting d wn five to seven B-24 outside the atoll. Fighter interception dropped of!' perceptibly in enrly J1ll16 because all available Japnnese fighter aircraft; were committed to the Mari1I.Il.Il1lS cnmpaign, Japanese fighters utilized two principal attack techniques for daylight operations: (a) air-toair bombing and (0) orthodox machine gun attaeks, 1Vhan 20 or more fighters were air-borne to oppose the bomber formations approximately two-fifths of these carried air-to-air bombs. In fighter forces of less than seven, all plane carried, these bombs, By Japanese estimnt 30 percent of B-24 losses were due to air-to-air bombing and 70 percent to nghtel' plane machine !!UJlS. LOsses due to fink were negligible, they state. By the end of ~Iay the B-24 attacks, with tit uddition of the two carrier attacks had neutralized Truk, However', the proximity of Truk to Guam made advisable, if not necessary, heavy attacks during June, to eliminate what minor value Truk might retain and materially to assis in preventine Truk from rendering worth while aid to the Japanese forces in the M:adanns. For harassing pm'poses, Central Pacific bomber'S dropped 569 tons of bombs 011 Truk during JUlIe. These were augmented by an additional 900 tons of bombs from the Admitalty-bnsed 'I'hirteanth Air Fol'OO bomber'S. Raids were made almo t every day, mo tJy during dnyligh until 19 JUlle. Attacks after J\ule obviated the possibility of rehabilitating airfields and facilities sufficiently to use them as base for reconnaissance Bights.

8-29 Experimental

Raids on Truk

In October 1944, Truk was selected as the target £01' a series of asperim ntal bombing attacks by B-~W's newly bused in the Mariunas, These at15

tacks later becaml> routine tralning' missions nnd outinued until the end of the war with size of attacking forces varying between one .ll.Ild 30 aircraft, On 32 missions throughout this 10-month period approxuJl9.tely 1.727 ton of bombs were Uropp.:cr. A few attacks were made using bl~d bombing methods. Exact figures on these trainjn" missions ,U"Il not avn.ilnble aud only approxid.tions can be made from available stat! tics. From July 1944 IJ1Itil th\) war's end only 35 operational aircraft were ba d on 'I'ruk, 1 of which fighters. Of the totnl, never morn than six or seven were Rj"able nt anyone time. Many of these were rebuilt- 0]" patched up after damage from previous raids, which in quality and numhers, made the Truk-based fighter plane complsment a decidedly inferior force. Truk's ground defense included only 40 antinireraft gnn of poor quillity and without radar control. Japanese report only one B-29 dtllllftg d by flak and none lost to anti aircraft fire 01" to fighter . bombing WIIS attempted during the first few B-29 attacks but was quickly di arded sine against this type aireruft the inferior Japanese lighters could not climb to altitude quickly enough nor maneuver with enough facility to make the ILttam eifooti ve. No statistics ure available 011 J apunese losses. It i believed tha few planes were lost in aerial combat for two I"IlD.SOllS: (a) .Tapanese pilots were reluctant to attack and (b) all flyable aircraft were ordered to take off and disperse IJ1Itll the attacks were over. ..l.ctnnlly these bombing nttacks had little muteria 1 effect on Truk beca use there were no longer (lilY worth-while targets. However, they prevented reconsrruetion of above-grouud installation , and the J apanese officer consensus was that Truk could have made a grndual, small-scale comeback were it not for the ince sant, aCCUTItte atLltCJ..."S of the B-29's. Tokyo bad planned to use Param Field n a ba e for suicide attacks on Dlithi but the B-29 attacks kept the field in 11 state of disrepair and th" pInn WIlS finally abandoned. Japanese described t.lle accuracy of the B-29's a "e.xoollent" aud they expressed admirution over the effective coordlnution between photoreconnaissance and the B-:29 attacks,

Su.mmary of Effectiveness of Allied Operations .

Against Truk During the entire 'I'I·uk campaign more than 416 ai:rcraft were destroyed. Naval and merchu,nt shipping destroyed mcluded three Jight cruisers, four d troyers, one !;(!itpl!llle tender, one sub~rille tender one patrol vessel, 33 merchant ships, nnd numerous small craft and fishing boats. Air.6eld facilities were completely destroyed early in th campaign. Well-constructed original buildings were replaced with Rimsy wooden structures in in ranees where replneements were made lit all: Wheuever possible, supplies and equipment Wille moved into bombproof caves. All airfields were intermittent! y in alit! out of commission after the-first carrier raid. "Post-holing" the oJrfields with 100- and 250-pollucl bombs \Vl),S the best tactic to neutralize all the airfields except Param, where, the heavier bombs proved to be more effective, for due to the fields insufficient elev"tion above sea lev 1 the deeper craters would 611 with seeping water. Moen No.2 airstrip was ulmost entirely abandoned after the ]6-17 February 1944 mid, Eten was ellti rely abandoned after tile raid of 29...aO April, and Pararn WItS abandoned in July 1944. Island Installatlons were roughly 90-95 percent destroyed except for a few which were underground In bomb-proof caves,' Rationing of fuel provi ions, and ummunition began early in 1944. Although bombing attacks wer responsible, in part, for acute shortage, sub. marine warfare wa said to be the primary cause. After Ju Iy 1D44, "II officers, enlisted men, and civilJans were formed into groups und given a small area of land on which each group was responsible for planting. culti vuting, and harvesting its own food. AS {L navul base Truk lost its effectiveness on 4, February 1944 when the 'I'ruk-based fleet evucuntsd following the an-ivnl of the B-24 photoreconnaissance ship. 'I'he first carrier mid of 16-17 February 1944. minimized Truk's value lIS a supply bass. The Fourth Fleet; Supply Base (which served both urmy and navy) W(lS unable to complete its mission after the initial raid in which. losses included provisions, 7!i percent; fuel, 70 pereent ; aviation stores, 65 percent; clothing, 60 perceut; and am-

Inunition, 35 percent. As I~ defense measure the ~'Ilmllining ru:nrol~tion.wus stored in damp C(LVeS, and 40 petC0I!t of this was destroyed tlu·ough detcriorn.tion. As It fa1"1"Y depot aud nil ba Truk 10sL lts vulue niter the Febl"lmry 1944 cllrrier attaek. Only a

handful of were flown througll Trtlk from the Bmpire. a defensive fighter base, it became inefi'ecti ve in surly May 1944, and its value otally disappeared in June 1944. Aiter July ]944, only 35 ,.ircruft were based on Truk llJl~ of rhasa only (I 0[· 7 were opemtional at !lny one tOO!!.



AND AREA STUDY Dublon Island
The original Fourth Communication~ Corp tee consisted of several frame buildings on concrete foundations, two concrete shelters for radio receivers and rerno e-control transmitting' positicns, and two 30-metsl· steel antenna towers. Fir t damage occurred on 15 March 19H:, when attacking B-24s jnflicted about 10 percent damnge--pal"tially destroying 2 buildings. Additional bomber attacks occurred In June and August 1944 and by the end of the latter month all buildings were destroyed. Fourth Fleet Headq uarters consisted originally of three wooden buildings with concrete fotll"ld(l.. ti ns. The fir t attack to administer rious damnge OCCUlTedon 1 April 1944. B-24:s using 500pound G. P. bomb destroyed. about 40 percent 0 the buildings, although about 25 percent restoration was accomplished by 1 May. At che ime of this attack, Fourth Fleet Headquarters was evacuating tile building so damage was not seriou . The accounting section took over the buildings and during its tenancy a s cond attack occurred on 12 J une 1944. Although. buildings were partially restored even after this uttack, the greatest blow wa to records and offi.ce equipment. New Fourth Fleet. Headquarters was housed in 0PIlIl air buildings .10 by 30 meters with frame construction, concrete foundation, wooden floors, and corrugated iron roofs, Although the carrier raid of 29 apl"il effected about 50 percent damage, repair wus made ill 5 days. A.gain, 110We1i'er, records were destroyed and communications disrupted. :J!:ight frame barracks and three food storehouses made IIp th fourth construction department headq unrters and bnrracks, Buildings were frnm e wi th concrete fo undati ons and galvanized iron roofs, Located in the open, the unit was

This study was made OIl the eight lal"O"est and most strategically important islands in the Truk group-.Dublon, Moen, Etell, Purum, dot, Fefnn, Ulalu, and Um,m. "tudy group members, accomplluied by Jltpullese liaison officers (1I1dinterprsters, visited both dnmaged and undamaged in tallations. At each instnllation tl1e J apanese officerill-charge had prepared, ItS previously requested u plan showing the origiunl installation and bomb damage incurred. Unfortuna ely, in. some Cl1SCS the better-infol"moo p arsonnel had J., . n evacuated, end only henrsay information was available; however, descriptions of raids, num hers of aircraft, and damage resulting from al.tacks are Japanese "ou the scene" "!D. ions. Japun se wer extremely COUTteoUS und coopsrutive in answering questions. Island l·O:1-dS were narrow and in extremely poor condition. Almost !,U important buildings had been deseroyed 01' extensively damaged, and all available lana Wl1 under ultivatiou .0 grow vegetables for food. A.ccording to Survey team observations nod J apanese information it uppears that: (a) The currier raid of 16-17 February, for the most part, neutmlized 'I'ruk us a major enemy rUr and naval base. (b) The second carrier raid destroyecl the impor taut shore inatallurions and completed the. destruction of Truk as a major air base. (c) bomber maintained, to. a marked degree, the nautrnlization of T'ruk's U1rfields. (d) The defeu as of fink, both [!Dtiuil"Cl;trl~ and coastal were highly ovenuted and consisted mostly' of outmoded equipment. (e) After the 16-17 February carrier raid, the Japanese had until 29 Apr·il to move underground. It appears tl1at they utilized this time to gt"llat o.a vantllge.



au easy bu.·get and 0 Iate .Ul1reh l!l,bl, B-2J raid caused 80 percent d truetion to the bnrrnck . Warehouses were d troyed in May 19M. Following the :March raid personnel relocated barra I.5 areas in the bills and coustru ted shacks from salvaged material, The mid on the warehouse destroyed 1000 tons of rice, 15 percent of the i IlIJ1d grou p s total store. Ol-iginally, the naval base=Forty-fu (; Navul Guard one headquarters buildine l'.ig11tbnrrncks five !!lU"age~ and one sick btLy. Cruhj'lg blows to this in tallaticn were ndministered on 29 April 11)# (20 percent damage) and in mid-July 1 ~ (60 percent damage). Bepau were not attempted II1ld personnel were driven to the hill where they constructed shacks from salvaged material, On 30 Octo bill', 60 percent of the remllining buildings were destroyed or damaged. The finaJ attack made by B-29s on T August destroyed 11 buildings and partially destroyed This orgarrizarion' water supply system wa eliminated by the latter raid. Fresh water had been obtllined by a system of gutters and piping which collected min water from the roofs and stored it in concrete tanks. With the destruction of the buildin it became necessary to pipe fresh water from another source, and installation of pipiag for till purpose took 3 months, The transportation department, charged with the r ponsibility of unloudins supplies for storagE! and redistribution, WIIS located in the dock urea and WIIS housed in light frame buildings with concrete foundations used lIS both wurehousas and Iiving quarters. Although fire bomb , which were used exclusively a ai nst thi 5 install uti on, destroyed only seven buildings the most crippling damage was against the water craft used for unloading supplies. Of 50 sampans, 20 were destroyed I\11d 20 were rendered unserviceabla Three 10- to 15-ton Diesel tugs IIJ1d six gasoline launches were de. strayed. As mentioned previously in this report lack of piel'S or wharfs prevented direct nuJoadin~ of large vemels Ddld the loss of tlle sampans, the best means of shuttling upplies £Z'om ship to shore, was a critical one. The Trnk fuel supply bnse consisted of four 10,OOO-ton k'lnks, one 7,OOO-ton tank, one 2 OOO-ton tank, ~d On 5~0-ton btnk. All underground sys_ tem plped gusoline to !l fuel-pumping stiltion on a


nearby pier where it was loaded on fuel barges which refueled both surface erll£!; lind submarines, The barg Ileet consisted origin~y of one 50?ton craft one 200-tol1, and one 50-ton. Pre-mid transfer of the largest to Palau and destruction of the 200-toll barge in the 30 April carrier raid left only th mallar barge for all refueling. The 17 February carrier raid wiped out 60 percen of the lank instnllntion and 90 percent, or 16,000 tons, of Truk'a entire fuel oil upply, Two 10,OOO-ton tanks were destroyed lind several others damaged by frng111lmt 1101e. AlIOt!JOI'lO,OOO-ton tank and the two mallest tanks were badly damaged in April 194-1. Th pier fuel-pumping station WIIS destroyed by a heavy bomber mid late ill 19\14, although the IT February raid already had knocked out Truk comple aly as a fueling station, One hangar, approximately 12 barracks buildill!!S several small radio trallsmitting buildings, and n field control tower made up the seaplane bnsa, The first carrier raid reduced the field operating value to 30 percent of the originul capacity. A direct hit on the control towel' by incendiary bombs completely eliminated that fllcility and it was never rebuilt. Raids of 30 April and 1 May 1941 totally destroyed the hangar lind 12 barracks buildings, The airfield operating capacity, even with repairs, never rose above 50 percent of its original figure. All major engine overhaul wa dons at the air supply and repair department lind for that purpose a number of hops compri ed the pre-raid mstalla tion. These included strnctueal repair, pl"op~er repair, enzine l:epll;ir, instrurnant repair, welding, carpenter service, forging, electric repall', oxygen generating and refilling, smeJtillg, expl i,'e torage, three aircraft pare parts buildings, IL power plant, and five barracks. Currier raids of 16-17 Febrnnry reduced the usefulness of the repair department by 80 percent when the structural, propeller, engine, and instru> ment repair shops !lnd two supply buildin!!S were completely destroyed. '" The carrier raid of 29-30 Apt'il completely neutraliz",d the value of all remaining buildings ex~ cept the power plant 8JJd the oxygen gllnerllting plll;nt. The ship repnil' ba , also known as the fourth llnval dockyard, mnde emergency repairs on destl'Oyers lind small \·essels. It wa kept b.usy prior

to I,he raids by.repairing ships damaged by nited Stlltes suhmarines 8n~ n;fter the mids by repairing bomb dnmaae. ~t tlll.s IIlstl1.llation was a drydoek en,pable of dock1l1g ships of 2,500 tons nlthougll in prnciJ '8 2,?DO ton wa the limit set by the Jnpanes: Until J.O Febl'Illll'Y 1944 u repair ship was Itl'uLlable but It departed with t.he fleet for Palau OJl that date, TIllS urea wu not attacked in the raids of 16-]7 FelmHlrY,bllt· it, did fore . the Japan e to move the ship repair fa 'ilil.y underground, In 3 months II well-cnmonflnged underground shop resulted. D spite this precaution howev r, ill 2f)-30 April nttack caused n dall1!tge of upproxima ,ely 25 percent and tl dive-bomber direct hit 011 the mnchins shop de troyed 30 perc nt of the equipment nnd knock d out the repair buse fOl' a month. The submarino bu e consi ted of II torpedo replenishing; adju,ting, and upply tation and prncticallj' no overhaul or repair work was done. This area was no hit in the Februaty 19M raids und, [is with the ship repair ba e, the Jupunese immediately began construction of an underground tution for adjusting torpedoes, The submarine base was first hit in the 2n-30 Api-il raid nnd sutfered 10' es of 40 percen 0 buildings find 25 percent to torpedoes, In JUly the surface sta ion for torpedo udjusting was hit und damaged. Subsequent rn ids wiped it out completely bu the underground 8tnt; Oil was still iutuct when the tudy


Moen Island
Moen No.2 airfield which wus [I. aplune base prior to the 16-17 February 'o;rrilll' raid hnd a single llhstrip 1,000 meters long-Ql1e-thil',l W!lS concr te and two-third wns crush (1 rock. Illstallution included 2 hungers several mull udjucent l'IUlJPS, 2 control tntiOHS 10 bnrmcks and miscellan ous structures. Tni tin 1 dumuge wus sust« ined by this field elming the 10 FebnllH'Y lIN4 'aITjerrnid. Fourteen p!ttnes, the entire field complement nt the illl, were ,set onrB by stl"llnng nml the field control I'ower WII completely de tr·oyed .. One hanger was t...ullJ' destroyed filld t,)10 other recal"eel 0 percent t damage. Followilla the fir t attllck the Jopllllesemude no attelllpl; to ~hl1bjlitate the field as a seaplane base but contiuued wOl"k on the lUI' trip with the idea

IL .fighter &trip and elDe!'gency fielrl. The raid of 29-30 April finished off almost nil of the reruaining usable in tallations. III Ihi uttack the bnrracks power plant lind torehouse were completely d troyed. Repairs to the dam'(ga were never made Rlthough a new control staIion lind '1 Jl w billet were con tructed, The control tuticn WAS partly damaged und th new billet corn pletely demolished in nn attuck of 1 Fehru'lry 1fI45. Th ail·liel ~ proper WIIS damaged III on lhn.t date and could operate at only 60 percent elliciency thereafter. Moen ~o. 1 airfield, one of th most important in the area, included ,1 1 200 meter runway COIlstructed of 4- to 6-inch thick r inforced concrete and II total of mol' than 0 buildings uch as hang .•I"S, control station, t barracks, and mi cellnneous mall tru 'tures. Moen o, 1 was first attacked on 16 February 19i4, when cnrrim- planes mad It sh'aling attack on the parked planes, The attack, which cam as n complete surpri e, destroyed 111 most all of IL 50· plane contingent on the ground, about one-half of which were shipboard-type plan 1 ft by a carrisr' which had departed "ball a week before. A B-24 hirrh altitude Itt ack, on 29 March If),),4, destroyed 10 frame bur-rack and fill uncompleted hangul'. Of the barracks, six were burned unci four were demolished. ix B tys were burned 011 the ground j n tli 29-30 April 19,),4 mid and oue B tty and two fighter were des royed during II raid ill :Mayor June 19-14. ubsaqu nt raids were so numerous that the Japanese made 110further e:!iOl·t to k p track of thei Ie number nnd elf ct. The longe t interval dw.·illg which tI,e field was 1l0~ operational was a 20·day paciod followina a high nlritu Ie heavy bombardment in pril 19!5. All 1"U ids uecounted for It total destrnctiou of 33 barracks, -wnrdroorus, '2 con 1"01 ration , '2 ready 1" am ,1 hnnear and 4 temr orarybnrrncks. Dumuged but not destroyed were 26 temllOral"Y barracks.

of using it as

Eren Island TllC uirst:ri p on Etcn I land

"'11 one f he be t cOllsb'ucted ill the Truk I lund group. Its dimeJ1sion were 1 000 by 0 weters with a eU'culal' tlL'\U loop COllDe ting t.he ends of the trill. Tbe stril) was sudnccd with a 5·oontimeter thlckness of Ilsphult-cemeut-l'ock mix on a olid. rock fill.

18 19

El II's smull ize nllow d {Ot' few parking revetmeuts, Old ell rib-filled fuel drums, cnruoutlnged wil h growing 1'3S-<;eS and vines provided some prot etion for the disper ed planes, TIle administration building, adjac nt to the nirstri] . was of modern desirru and of !lXtrn he9.VY reinforced concrete eonstruericn. TIm raids of 16 Febrnurv 1!)44 came with onlv 10 minutes' Wlll'lling to tl1!1 Jupa[wse on Et",;, Although damage to instnllutions wa only minor the .Iupanese air force; in that sector of the theater wn dealt 9.crushing blow when 110 out of 200 VO 1'iou types air l"aft, awaiting ferry pilot nt Eten, were trafed and burned. The attack on Eten on 17 Febl'tllllj wn negligible. since these forl\ys were prirruu-ily against shipping, Although the airsrrip, which had undernone only minor damage, \\"11 repaired in 2 days the taxi-loop wa 0 heavily pock-marked that it repair never was attempted especially in view of the fact that repair work was hampered by water seepage caused by the small differe.nce between the field elevation and the sea at high tide, The next important mid took place on 1" March 194!, when hmvy bombers using 500 1,000· pound genernl purpose bomb , caused the following dnmaga : even plunes destroyed, 19 plan dlllDnged, and 1 hangul' damaged. Eight more planes were d troyed and damaged by u B-24 raid on 28 Mo..reh. Th currier mid of 29-30 April "vir ually unllilied this field for further operations when 11 fighter pl uues wen destroyed "II barracks destrayed. 2 h'Lllgllt'S d cstroyed, 50 1I.i rcra it engines de troyed and the admini tration building damaged. Param Island , Aside frOID nntinircraft defenses, Param airIi Id. was the only im;t.allulion of importnnce 011 the )~nnd. Its runway, originally 1,200 1DC er~ long III January 19!!, WIlS lengthened to 1,430 meters by Api'll of thnt yenr to uccommodate Iaruer ~hcrn1t. A taxiway wa compJeled:lt the same time and by July 19!! 17 rev tments fOI" small planes and 3 for medium-sized planes ~"Ilr~ constructed, Only small bnrracks were bu ilt due to luck of tir,ne and maoorio,ls,

DllI·illg the J6 February ruirl •• \.mel'ic.m plau~s, lL"uHnglind bombing, eli posed of 17 J(lP'UI(!SCuircrnft OIl the gL"OlU\d,1 mess hull, and ;\ trucks, 0111y "nil minor intervening T~-24 mid oc nirred before the currier mid of 2:1-30 April, the effects of which dealt Il crushing blow to the island ta· d] ities, Six planes were destroyed 011 tJIG ground by $tnlfu,lg, 4 (Oil of provision" 15,000 liters of '" inrion !!llsolillll, lind 1 ton of engines and p'". p,u't were rendered useless. In addition. divs bum bel'S rnnti luted the !'lLn\I·I1)' and taxi Wlty, 1I'1u(,h do. magll wns anhauced by the dilliculty to make runway repair 011 the i81"",1. In ."ddition to the fact flUlt low elevutiou caused the bomb craters Lo lill with wntpr t he only I111'nnS o'E L'epl\ir I\"~S to lilt ill ilie holes with crushed rock, todiou 1)' transported from another island, TO stock pile ()r crushed rock had been established for 6JIJer:rellcy und this oversight, too, added to slowness of repair. Consistent hurassi I1g high altitude bombardnwn.~ rnir.lJ. kept the lipid ill a state. of disrepair whi 'h ultimately caused the J"'i'ilJlese 10 abnndon t heir plan to use this field as a buse for gil icide uttueks on ships nt Ulithi. Felan Island eomplerueut of F fun was 2,700 and l,50() navy personnel (Including some Jnpucnese and Korean civilian workers}. sed principally us a SUIJply point, the island was equipped with one of the best piers in the atoll for unlonding SI\\Il.U OORt and insl"llittions included 10 provision wurahousas, 10 large ammunition dumps and Ii tamporm-y ill dium sized umnnnrition dumps. ,F fan obviously was not a main target for any raid although concentrated attack on the Ih'St raid !Duy ItILl'G wiped out, extensive supplies: especially ammunition. since niter th initial raid ammunition ws moved from open topped dumps and tored in tunnels lind caves 01" transferred to allother island. Sight-l'uitli11g B-24s truck the initial blow against the i ~an(~ during the latter part of M9.rch 1?44. ~ll ammunition dump was destroyed by th~ direct hit, of the only bomb to strike the island. On a second B-24 night t'll id in April another

laue 100mb set alire a provi tons IVII,l· house and deStroyed ([,\1 ammunition dump. 'rile Mt'l"ie"l· mi d of 29-30 Apri! dsmolished two open-type provi ion warehouses, and .lUO her pro. visions w!ll'eh?u ', In addition, dllmage W[lS i11flicted ~o an raid shelter !t11c1 a torpedo dump. IuterJl]lttent 1'111(16between May 1944 nne] July 1945 nceountcd £01' tInea opell-I'J'pe ummunieiou dUl11ps, It sawmill, Ami a civiliun barrack .

several warehouses. The :.,9-30 April. ClUTier mi.l destroyed all lnrrrueks unrl wllrehollsell, and Ivhilll tlm I'Cmainulg RDF unit wus not knocked out its VIII u e H Ireu tly h n d been d estroyed i 11 th e first attack, a !though the one remaining unit could till be used for lloming pUl·pOS S nnd I' certain conditions,

Uman Island
Mi1itm'y personnel 011 this island was composed of 1,330 navy nnd 50 army. Principal in tallutious of sh'jJ.tRgic i mportnnce were he radio trtlllSr lTD tting station, II rndur station, coest defense guns, and a watch tow r for ubmarine loop", Although the raid of 16-17 Fehrmll'. . truck near Umun. und sunk seven ships eli I' rserl 1H;!U'by, I be island itself was not attacked until the carrier raid of 30 April. LI this raid 011 transmitter building was bum done demolished and nine transmitter were destroye I. 'I'his effected virtual total alimination of the tmnsmitting facilities since the radio station was not rsparable and was navel' replaced.

UWu Island A.JIY strategic value that mi"'h~ be attributed to I;bis island Jay in th presence of its radio dire tiou-finder station. This equipment WIlS used solely £01' homing ail' ·raft, and a continuou watch
was J10t kept-nor Wl\S monitorILlg attempted, AItbot1gh the equipment \VIIS en y to maintain iI was not considered dependable or nCCUl'ate und its succe ful operation depended 010 tly on the a bility and experience of the operator. Fi l'St nttack on this i Ilsto 11 ILti011 WIlS a strafing wave follow d by clive bombers 011 17 February 1044 which wiped out rhr e RDF units and burned


lu',ny troops


Ab.ushes Branch
M .'i2 Tho 0 crml>n Ab,,,,,; ve Indu sky ,,'I a_ve, and SchmIdt, OlTcnbllch An tl- Fd elion Brnneh r,3 Tllo acrm,," Antl-,FtlcWnn Maehiue Toot. Bearings Branch j"'!UBI 'y on Ml>in" G."",,"y 92 93 94 95 96 07 98 99 I 00


Branch A G,

German Bubmarinc Industry Boport, Mns"bin"n[~brik A"g.bu-g-Numherg bll"g', C"'-!l1any Blohm amIVo611Shll'),arda, Hamburg, O. utscbcwerkc A G, Kid, G. rrnn "Y Deutsche S.I!.iIJ \I Old Meachlnenbnu,


COrmAny Bremen,

The following ;._~ biblio,gn>l'_hy of reports resulting from Ihe Su.~.y'.stu dies of th e Europesn "",0' Paetbc wars Cortain 01 these repor-ts may be purchased [rom the, Ul>"r: Into"~":"t"f Doeuments etrbe Gevernrnent Printing Office, WJlsbil1gtOll., D,. C. Perm.¥oll to eaemlne the remaining "'ports may be fu>d by wrttmg to theHl!lld~IlArI"m of lhe SUIVey, the p,,"togo" , W"elLlngton 25, D. C. 21 22 Z3

64 55 ,;6 57 (Jer58



lIe!;I!.tti,~·,c.rkj), Iltldcshcim,

lI'lll"h~lle Tool. & M~Qhio'"r)' II.'! Cnpitnl Eqllillmc"t l\'fllch;"" Tcol Incl\l"try tu Germ~oy H"rwal\ Kolh ce, Cologne, Cerroa,,), Collet .. nd. El1g~lhn,d, OlJclI"<lCh, Germtllly Nfl:'-i:O:S Unlcn, 'Frllnkr.orL ou :vrnin.J Germany MlLlTAItY ANAI.YSIS DIVIS10N

Fri.edric.h Krupp Gerrn.aniO\wern, Kiel, Germany Howaldtswerke A G, Hamburg G.ronn"y Submarir,e A",e",bl~· ShelLer, )~Ilrge, Germnny Bremer Vol k no, VegCSllc It, C erma ny Grdnence 'Brp,nc:h

,\letangu",,~Il';Qlta.rt. _~Ium.i"il!m,,-crk G

GIn b 11, '",II'.IK, Germany b H, Plnnt ).l". 2. llj~t"rlald,



2 3

The United Stat ee S[.",tq,ic Bombing Survee- Sum" m"l)' Report lElltOpe8D 'IV at) Th". United St.atil'S 81ml"';0 BomtliDg urvev: 0,"","U RepOTt (E=pean \\-ar) . The EHoom of Stratogio Bombing "" lhe Gmman W n, r E<ooomy AlRCR.~.PT Dr.'lSION

2~, Gcbnie!l<;r· Ginti,,; G m b II, Ludwlgshnfun Ocrn:mnr L"ft""h.ilfb~u Zo_ppelln G m b 11" ~'tlcclri.h.h"ren all Bodensee, Geno:ii.:n,· 28 Wlemod Wer!.:e A G, Ufm, Oer",',,1Y 27 R "dol ph Ra utanbach I ",tcltmelJ\n!ll~_ role n, Sol! n_ gen, Germany ZS Lippuwerke Vereinig:te Alumi1'JiuHl\"'crk!,.l A 0, Lnnon, Germ.&IlY 29 Vereinlgte Deutsche ~["tatlw"tke, Heddernholm, GormruLj· 30 DU""D~r Motall\!""rke A G, Duren Wi~\elm"-.B,,tli" ",f.: '~.tulen~ Germany AREA STUDIES 31 32 DIVISION

oll 60 61 62

'I'll" ller.,il.~ of ~bc G."nuTI Air Force V-Wcapo!J" (Crossbow) Campaign Nr For"e lin[.(l of Operation Well ther Factors in Com bat, Born bardm Of! I' 0 pnrntiolls ill the Europeau TheaLnl a3 Bombing Accuraoy, USAAF IIea"y and Medj"", Bombers in the ETO M Descrlptlon o[ ItAF Bombing Mil The Ilnpsot tho Allied Air Elfotl on Gorman Logi'stic;s Mo.RALE DIVISION

tOI \02

o rdnance

IO~ 105 106 107



Industry Report Friedrioh Krupp 0 -usonwerke J\ Magdeburg, Cermany Bochumer Vcreln fucr GUS8t"hlfnbrik"Uon A G, Bncliurn Oe)"]]la_n_y Hellllc._hOlI &< Soho, K"",oJ, Germany Rhelnmetalt-Borsig, Du sse ldorf, Germany Hermann Goerlng \Verke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf. Gerrnnny Hlln.fioveriscbe: Mesehfuenbau, Hanover, Germany Gusstahlfebrtk Friedrich KrOlPP, Essen. Germ.nn)'


OIL 'DIVISION 109 011 0\ viel Oil , l~innl Report Oil Divfsion., Final Report, Appendix Po.",der, EXP1".S'V<liI' lSpeciol Rockets 8ndJet Pre>pall ~D ts, War Oases 6 nd Smok e Anid (Mi Dis lew I Report #1) Underground and Dlspersnl PI",,! .. In Greater Ger'1'h~a6~rlDnn Oil Industry, "'linisteri~1 Repor'~ Team 78 ~.Jin lsterial Repor t on Chemicnls Oil Brano.h ~Ie"",burg G m b H, Leuna, Ger115 Ammonlukwerke m&ll)'-2 AppendioC$ Braunkohle Bensiu II G, Zeltz und Bohlen, O.rmnnr H6 W'"le:rs.hail A G, LUIltt.kend.orf, Germany ~fen-Oppa u -Wurks or r G Farbc"j,.,d us Lrie 117 Lud A C, Ludwiglihafen, Plant, Bottrcp-Boy, Ger118 Ruhroel HyO'rogenntioLl many, V01 I, Vol. II RlleMrus ussng MUI"",loeiwerh A 0, Harburg 119 Refinery, Hamburg, Germany l~O Rhaun uia Ossag. Mineraloel werk. A 0, Gr(ljjbro<! k ReBDer), Hamburg, Germany .12! Rheoania Ossag Miu ..raloolwe,ke A G, Wllh"lmabL"g Refill.ry, H.atuburg Germany . • Gcrlll&DY, Vul. 122 Ce,,"erk..ohnft Victor, Clliltrop-Ra.llxel., I &: VoL II )2-3 Ell ",paei"oha To" kl.age r llnd Tr:o.ospo ..t II G, R"m. bnrg.t G-ermnny 12~. EbsLlO A"I,unlt Wcrke A G, lI.arburg ReGnery, HambUl"g, Germany 125 M"""rbeok RheiDpto<W3QIl Syohhatic Oil Plnot-Vol.l &: Vol. n

Mil The Eff""_,,, of Strategi" -Vol. I & II. M.d!."1 65

Bombing on Ger"'"" Branch


Divtoi<m and Branoil) Ind ustey Report to \'snolL'l Targnll; (Special' R.opo,c) B:ra.Dc_b

4 5

Ai •• mr~ DM.lon 1ll9[>OOliol1 Visit>


B Junk"", Alr.raft and Aero E1lgine Work>! Desssu Germanv 7 Eda~"1 ",-e hin c.",.. ".ke C m to H Hel to,bH ek, Oerman s 8 "T C )1o.sehinen!mu, G m b 'H, J"';pzig (Mool;au) Gmn!lnv 00 Gcthaer \Vaggon.rnbrlk A COoth.. Oo,=y 1 Foeke lYulf Air~rn.ft Ffunt, B~amcnJ GermanyOV"'"81J Report II l>I""""",.hmltt Jl. 0, Part, A "u!l"burg, CCrutl!JlT { Part, B _,, '.. "-"peDdio"" I, n, J II 12 DCormor \-l-_~ru, Frtcdneluthaf<m & ~'hmich, Oem,,,,,y ]3 ~r!mtd Flescler Wer k" C m b H, Kn.sscl, Ge rman v I oJ. W reuer .Neustaedt or Flugaeugweekc, Wi one, N .lJId 1" A ""Iria


A.... Studi .. Division Report II Q"!8i1ec:1 Studl' of the ElI •• ", of Arell Bombing on Hamburg 33 A Detailed Study of t.ho ElIoel~ or Aren Bomhing on WuppetUlI 3'1 A Detailed Stu<l.v of ~h" Em"cls of A_roll Bombing on Dueseldorf . 35 II Detailed Stud)" of the mfe.ts Qr Arn" Bombing on&Ii"So" 30 A Detailed Stu<!r of the EIf ec I, of Aro<>Bombing on Rernsobeid .37 II Do Wiled BLUdy of rhe 11:ff cts of Ar"a B om bill g a on DSTm!i!ndt 3S A Detailed Study Qf th..E;ff"ol~ of Area Bombing on Lubeck ~ ag A I!ri~1 S~udy QI the EIJ""t,,. of Area Bo,niJing on Berlln, Au~gsl:IlI.rg! DOU~UIl:U., r~ipz.igr Hagen, DortIII 11 nd Dberhnu BCD, Sell "VCI nfu rt, ill] d BOO.ma11

The Effect o[ Bombing on Health in Oenllil-ny MUN1TfONS Heavy DIVISION

and Medlcul Ca re

111 112 113 114


66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 70


CIVl].JAN JO 41 ~2 48 44



Aero Eng] neo Branch 15 16

B"~Dg NAG. Ph,g"wi.orenwerk~ "., ek, Gennnny M~~,;,~)~\!ta.hQ l\Iolorcnw.,ke BI1~a:.rjun ~rotor



llrllDS, m b H, '1'U"ohn,
. -,

" 41


Ch'iliao Detense Division-Finn) Reporl, Cologn. Field R"pe r\ Bon', Field ]lepnrt HilO)ovI>rFjold-RaporL Hn":l'Obllrg F;cld.R"J><'rt-Voll, Text· Vol IT E"hibllJ8 n.u. ld .. loe FIeld Report ' , Augsburg Field Uope, ~ llcoopt.Ji01l if.! B.[I:,varia., Ce.rmn.ny • EQUIPMENT HI c clrl.oJ DIVISION Branoh

Tile Cak.lng Industry Report 00 Go.rmanl' Coking Plnn\ fuiport No.1, Soe~ion" A, II, C, & D GU\choffnll"!l'Ilmelto, Q'be.rh""O<lll, Germa",,· Prledr'ich~AI[tcd Huette, Rh~in.btn~se.nj Germany Naunklrehen .EiS(!:lHv'larke A G, Ncunkirchen, Ge.r~ mauy Reiehswerke Hermann Goering A G Hnllendorf, G-ernlnny Augw.t Thyss"1I Hueute A G, H"",born, Germany Friodrich Krupp A G, Burback PI~n~, Esson, dermoan}! Dortmund Hoerdor HIl.tlc,werei.n, II C, Dcrhnund, German)' Roesch A G Dortmund, Gerrueny Boehumer "Olrein ruer CusstnhlJa:br;kaUon A G: Bochil,m, Germany


Molor 17 78 79 80 81 82


and Tanks



T:nc, E.L:m1l8clt &. Du:rr~r}mr

IS 19

Bny"riocbe Mo(uronw".ka A G (13~I W) M "nioll _ G4Jrltl.n:ov fl <m'OI101 1'1" gmtI\Oren work., }(_ol, G"rmtl.ny Ugh! M "tal' B.r.. n<b


Optic.] 50


G "rm a" Mo!.or V"l1iclcs lnd "s "')' II e I,,,rl, Tank Indu"(,,' R~rt Dairolor DO,Dz· A G. Untcrturk.bei~u~ Gorr1.lan_y, . T\on""lt Motor V"b.;clesl'IImt., BUI""L",,,,t, Pu". Adam Opel,. T\usselsna;"" q"nnaJ1\' _ ~_ DIlj",l.r Banz-OnU""au \\t.or1;;5, GIIIl,onall, ~i<)rmuoy MnsohiMIl[abrik ,,-ugsb"'l!·NuJ'llbo,g, NtlI'nbc"'g, Co.rmany
Aut.o Uuiol:L A G! Ch,emni~:;r,; a:nd


b~~Kr..~;'b }!r~_llt"p_ort ~i~~~! 'Germ_Pony


Light Io-Iotal. InduBt,y{PlIrt I Aluminum or Germany Pnrt It, Mn!!ll""luru

and ho"'81on


Bra~ch l-n d u.s"ry R epoFL "

Opli"",l and Proei$ioll l!

85 H"m;:.hel ,.."SOhll,. .Kassol, O()rmun), . SO Muybnch ;V[oi.or WorkS, ])',iedrlob.hafen, Germany 87 VoiI\Ma.nd"t, lI'III£Ohi"elliflb,lk A G, Plonell, Germany sa Volk.w,,~enw<:J"ke, Pnllc,sleboll, Germany 80 BLl~[ng NAG Brun."3;wiGk~ aerL~.ilny .~ 90",,, Ind,,"t1:,e A G (M,ugl B,""f\S",ck, Ger-


Rubb .. , Brauch 126 127 12S J29 D~utscho DUl110P GUll.l.Iili Co .• H_s.mlu on. ~[.o.iu. Cermany Couulnentio.l Gummiwerk<>. gnnov,,-r, Gel"mm,y H ne I. SynthetiQ Ru bber Plant Nli"l.L"rbl R"por~ on O"r=n Rubber Industry


0. I

P'r?r;d~~h rupp K




Propullunts Braneh

130 EI"k trochcm lsehewerke, III" n lch Go rum"'"
lal 132 133

Soho"",cb.ok E."Plosh·~ Plnn I. ligtl.,a.. Sp ronl!"toff Work" G on b H, Bad So.l,emon Go rtn"ny Pla"t:o of Ilyn"mit A G Vo=l, Alfred Nor'ol &; Co, Trolsdonr ClfLllsthnC, Dmrumel !Uld Dunaberg, GorLllan)' Do" tse bo SPrill, gchernle G on b II, K ""Ihn.g, G .,,,,,,oy EGON01l'IIC EFPECTS DIVISION


L8~ IS5 186 [57 ISS [159 J 00 191 192 193 104

Over-nil Economic EIf.cts Dlvlslcn Report, Gross Natlounl ..Prod,,«t ,,}SPO?Ci"" 1'''1'.''' Krieg"""ilb.ri~It\. __ • _ __ . _ whio:h together E CI ean Goe.rlng W orks n •_ com prise the Food fill d Ag-r:icultu re ' OJ be ve oopOrL In dustrlal & los au tput an d P·rod" .til'i~)'

Dl!. ltnler-Bcn Zi A G, ~'lilnu houn, Genna uy Sy!1!hatio Oil Plaut, Me.rb<tok·Bamburg, O.""al'y Cowor'"oIulIt Viator, Cn:ltrop:Rauxel, G""ffia!lY Kleckner :a:"",bohlt Ulm,. Gormany· Hydrogenation Plant, Bottr?p-Boy Gormnny Nauklrehen EiS<!n\verke A G, Nuuktrchen, Geron .. "y ruil,. .. y Viaduct at Altenb"~k.n, Germ ..."y Railw .. y Viaduct a.t Am.lmrg, Garmany De" Ilefineries, Mlsburg, Germany Fi"" Raids on C erruan CiUco 1 -G Faroonindustrie, LudwigshM.", Germa"Y, Vol I "" Vol U !O5 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yam. Ulm, Germany 196. I G Farbcndustrie, Leverkusen, Germnn)' 197 Ch.mi.oh ....W.rkn, Heuls Corman), IgS Gromb<:rg M!>J'i;lmlling Yard, Gremoo,g, Germany 199 Loccmotive Shops and Bridge. at U",mm, Ge,man)'

ECONOM1C Aircraft 15 IG



Ni .... n Auto~obil"



TRANSPORTATION 200 201 202 203 20·)


'Iho Jal'n~""" Airoraft Jndustry Mit",,,b,,,l,, U.a"l:.lud"stries, L!<I. eor p or/l!ion ft"l,o,t No: I (Mitsub'.·Bhi.r"KOgyo KK) (Ai,frames & EngiM") 17 N<lkuj.lma Airernf, CompMy, Ltd. Carporafiml Ihl""1 No. II (N"knjinlll HikoH. KK) (ALr(,a:m .. &. Engin",,) 1S 1(a",,1O;.hi Aircralt Company CDrpo,ul"i<m Re,,",! No. III (Kl1wn"i.9hi Kokuki Kabushlk; Rai.lon) ( Airframes) 10 Kllw"",ak', Aircmft In<iuJ;tti", Compnny, Cor'Pora!ian 11,.PQr~ No .. I 17 (I(,,'" usa I<i Iro kuk i Kog)'o Ka,b" ,hi k!

34 35

N;.sa,, Jldosun KK) Engln .. j A,,,,y.A1r Arsenal &. Navl Air, Depot" C.'fTo'alil;n RepQFI'};o. X I X (Airf,ames und Engin es) .lapau Airo,af\, Underground

Corpura !.o" II 6'M,j No. X '" II





Coni and Me!.aIB in Jap""'o Equiptnenl.nd

War "Economy Co~.!rueli .. n· Dlvisicn

CapilalGoods, 37 3S 39


The Jnpnnese Construction In d ustry Japanese Electrical E'luipmerot Th".J npnn ese Mac hip e Buildln s In dustry Electric Power Oivi-",on




The Effe"!" or SLrategic Bombing o:n Gnrmnn T'81l'pcrtation RliiI Op"",UOIlB OOQT tho Branner POSlI EJJcots of Bomhmg on 1l:ailiQa.d Install a tions in Regensburg, N~rDb"rl! and. Mun!oh Di-vision. German Lcoomottva Industry During the War German M.l1l tru"y RailrolKl Trn-ffi e UTlLITlES .DIVISION




205 206


C",man EI."t,io UtlUlloslndustry Repor." to 10 ill Vol I "UtilitiCll< Divlsicn PI8nt Reports" U to 20 in Vol n ''U Lilltles Division Plant RepOlts" 21 Rhelni ••"lische El.kt,hil ...etswerk A G


(AMramo8 &. "Engiyc~) Alchi AJro,,,,rt Comp'''''Y CO'l,.rfl!im,_n.'pork No. r' (Ai.hi ltoHuki I{I{) (Aic['''mos &. EnginCl<) Sumltnmc M~te.l Industrlea, Propeller j);"i:Sion CarpnratM1l Roporj N». VI (Smn:itonJ 0 1(1nsoku I{ogyo JOe, P uroporn Sai.o.hol ' (I'ropoll"",,) Hitnch.i A.irarflft Compnny CIIitO-ahi hokuld KK) (.Airfrom,," & EllgiP".l Intern .. ~ioDlll .Atr Industries, Ltd, Corporat'(m Rep.rl No. ]FIll (N.ippon Kokusni J{okto 1(0gyo KK) (Ai,.r,,,,,ncs) Japan MUI<jcal Instrument Manufaoturing Company Co rpotation Rc port N o, IX (N ;PPOll o.,:k ki &i"o ICK) (P,,,pclln,;;) Taohikawa Air"r!l.r~ Comp"")' CQr poru!; on Report. 1\10. X ('Iacbibwf> Hil<oki I, KJ (AIrframes) Fllj i Airl>l<mc Com pun y CorporoiiQ" r'.pvrl No. Xl (Fuji Rlkokf _[(1{) (Airfr"'ffies)
Bho\\IH .AirphJ.lle Compullj' Corpcralio" 'R"p'0rt .No.


40 H

'_rll~ 'Rl ec <ric Pow. r 1" dustry of Jail'" n The E1e"~rio Pow", 10dustry of "1'0.0 (Pin n t Mports)



Corpo,."tio" l~.l'.rlNo.

v If

The J8P~nc"" Warticrn" Standa,d za:t:io u of !'V1.anpc wer Mililary

of Living and UtiU-

Supplies Dlvlaien

Pacific Wllr
OFFICE OF 'THE CllAIRIIUN I Summa,y Mport (Pa.ific War) 2· Ja pun '". Struggle to End The Wa r 3 Tho Effeots of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshim .. and NnS)lMld CIVIL.IAN STUDIES Clvilia_1l Defense Division




43 44 .:15 46 47 48

.J "panes" Japan ese Japanese Jnpnnese Japanese J B pan ese

W" r Prnd uetion In d ustries N""al Ordnance Army Ordna" .. N a, val Sbip bu Ud'o.g :Vlowr 'vehicle Industry Marehnn t Sb ipb uhdin g


a ll
40 SO 51 52

and Cbe mleal D i "'lsi On


5 6 7 8


Field ~"p(lrt Covering Air Raid "rotocHOll un d Allkd .Su bJ eets, To kyo, Japao Fwld Report CO'·.ring Air Raid Protecuon and Allied Subia" ..., Nagasaki, .rapatl Field'ort Covering Air ROlid P.,o!""tioTI and Alli!ill .sublects, ~o,to,. Japan F,el d ~~"poFt Covering Air Raid Pro lectlon and AlUed _s "-0Jcc\s, Kobe, Jnpan l/,eld.l_l.cport Covering Alr Raid Protectiou and Allied SubJeot., Os .. ko., Jupau Field l_l.cpo,' qov".ing A'ir RaId Protectien aud Allied SubJccts. Jl>pnll-No. 1 S"~ry Rcport .Covering Air Raid p·"'~".tioll and .Allied Sublcots III .1npmn Fmal Ml"'" Covering Air Raid Protootio" und IIIIied 8\1bj M.ts Ito Japan

Chemicals in Jupau's \,Vn; Cl,emio.als in J'M'uJ)'. War-Appendix Oil in Japan's \1 ae Oil ln Jap""'. War-Appendi"
Over ..all



!If. d ieal DlvMo n 12 13 T~e Elfe,ots of Boml)il!g "10 RoalOh lind Mildiom! S",,' _ '""" tn J.ap(ln .v The Effccu.. of }~tomk. Bombs 00 BoalLh and Mediool Sa,vlo08 U1 R,roshhna and N"I!(l68~i . Mo.ale 14 Dlvlaion

The Elf"" .. of Slr",tegic Bombing Qn J"IIU"""" MQml"

XII (Shown Ibkok, !<ogy<> KK) (A-"frallles) 28 Tshl:ku.wn.jilna. Aircraft Industrles Company, Ltd, C"'lIor"t~Qn l?op'or! No. JlllJ, ,.' . 18111 wallin" ka K 0 I", I, ogyo h"b""lu k, Kalsha) Engines) 2g. Nippou Airplo.:ne Conipnny Corpor!';!ian E,,;ppr! No. XII' (1'111'1'0", Hillok RK) (AirrrlUll0tl) 30 l\:y".\1" Ai" Comp'll1S CO"~o,"tio" 1I01'0rt 11' o~ X r (Ky".hu Hikok KJ() (AirfraDl<lll) .1\ rllooda Etiglroeerinp; Compo,,),!im' lial'"Fr No. X 1'1 (SI><,da Sc,"aklljoj (Compo,,""t;,) :12 ').oIl~B.k.u. AitCi.r!).n III d Ufl~l''iC~ COI'1JrJ("aNm~ RtlU)rt N(J, Xl~!l PJl' ....k.a I<oku T{og),o l{nbu.bik; J{nistn) (O,}ll1 I'one" \-"l






Tho Elfec;'" of Strategic Bombing all J"Il;"n'. ,I'"ar Economy (Ineludlng Appendix A: U. 1:>. Economic Infelllgeuce on JnpoD-Annlysi • and Comparison: ,IPl"'lldh: B: Gross National Prcduet on Japan and J]s Cornponents: Appendix C, St .. tistical SO" rces),


The 11'" r 1945


Tru.ns p 01; la ti 0 n Divislon gn in.t J"I"ll.\OSC Trnllspoctatio,.\, t94J-

Urbn:n Areas Di visio!l 55 Eli",,!" or Air Atlack On Japo"""" Urb<m ECODOID.!' (SUlnma r}' R,oport) 55 BiTnet!! of AIr A~tnck On Urea" Coo'pl"" Tokyo. Knw ...... ki- Yokuhama 57 Effects of .t\_irAt"""" on Ibe 01"', of NBgDl''' 58 Bffoots of Air Ac""e" 0!1 O""ka-Kobc-Kyoto .5\1 Etfcol1< of i,-" Attack on th.e Ct~l' o[ Nagasaki ~O ElJe"w or Air Attn.k On tlon Clt~·QI Eire.hi",,,









:So C·

..... ·



.:::::~:::::: :~.~.'.:.. ~~:=-.~~: ..,: .~~~ :.~''': t.t~.

,,", '::~\:,
l~ ..




---~ -_o




'O.... I'NI SUlnl'