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American Journal of Clinical

Hypnosis
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Hypnotic Involuntariness and

the Automaticity of Everyday
Life
a b
Irving Kirsch Ph.D. & Steven Jay Lynn
a
University of Connecticut , USA
b
SUNY Binghamton , USA
Published online: 21 Sep 2011.

To cite this article: Irving Kirsch Ph.D. & Steven Jay Lynn (1997) Hypnotic
Involuntariness and the Automaticity of Everyday Life, American Journal of Clinical
Hypnosis, 40:1, 329-348, DOI: 10.1080/00029157.1997.10403402

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 Hypnotic Involuntariness and the Automaticity
of Everyday Life
Irving Kirsch
University of Connecticut

Steven Jay Lynn

SUNY Binghamton
Downloaded by [Flinders University of South Australia] at 13:09 31 December 2014

We present a new theory of hypnotic involuntariness based on an integration

and extension of recent social and cognitive theories on the automaticity of
mundane, intentional behavior. According to this model, experiences of
volition and involuntariness - in and out of hypnosis - are constructions
or interpretations made possible by the high degree of automaticity that is a
characteristic of all complex behavior, including novel behavior. Suggested
non volitional behaviors are intentional acts that are triggered automatically
by situational cues (suggestions) and cue-related sensations. The triggering of
both the behaviors and the sensations are enabled by the formation of a
generalized response expectancy, which is a cognitive set to respond appro-
priately to suggestions. Response expectancies are functionally equivalent to
implementation intentions taking the form, "emit response x when situation
y is encountered." The classification of a response set as either an expectancy
or an intention and the experience of the response as volitional or nonvolitional
depend on interpretations derived from instructional cues and prior beliefs.

One of the most interesting phenom-
ena of hypnosis is an apparent alteration
in volitional control over behavior. In
response to suggestions, hypnotized in-
dividuals execute movements that they
report as having occurred without voli-
tional effort (ideomotor responses), and
they display a suggested inability to ex-
ecute simple motor acts (responses to
challenge suggestions). Early theorists
took these displays at face value and
assumed that hypnotic behavior was in
fact involuntary. More recently, the vo-
For reprints write to: Irving Kirsch, Ph.D.,
Department of Psychology, U-20, Univer-
sity of Connecticut, 406 Babbidge Road,
Storrs, CT 06269-1020.
litional status of suggested behavior has
become a source of intense controversy
(Kirsch & Lynn, 1995).
There are four conventional criteria of
automaticity (Bargh, 1994). A cognitive
process or behavioral action is automatic
ifit is 1.) outside of awareness, 2.) uncon-
trollable (i.e., it cannot be prevented or
stopped), 3.) unintentional (i.e., volitional
effort is not needed for its initiation), and
4.) efficient (i.e., it does not consume
attentional resources). At one time, be-
havior was thought to be either controlled
or automatic, the assumption being that
any instance of behavior met either all
four or none of these criteria. However, it
later became clear that few, if any, pro-
cesses satisfy all four criteria (Bargh,
1994). Thus, the question to be asked is:

329

To what extent does a particular type of
behavior meet these four criteria of auto-
maticity?
Hypnotic responses occur within
awareness, and most data indicate that
they can be controlled (Lynn, Rhue, &
Weekes, 1990). The problem, then, is to
account for the self-reported feelings of
involuntariness that accompany the ex-
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ecution or inhibition of movements that
are normally under voluntary control.
Solutions to this problem can begin with
one of two premises. First, it is possible
that early theorists were right, that par-
ticipants have managed to cede control to
the hypnotist and that their responses are
directly activated by external suggestions.
From this perspective, suggested re-
sponses are viewed as genuinely unin-
tentional and therefore efficient (Bowers,
1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994). Alter-
nately, one could suppose that suggested
responses are initiated intentionally, but
that the person is unaware of that inten-
tion (Kihlstrom, 1992; Spanos, 1986a,
1986b).
Each of these premises poses a differ-
ent subsidiary problem. If suggested re-
sponses are in fact unintentional, how is
it that these normally voluntary behav-
iors come to be activated directly by the
hypnotist's suggestions? Conversely, if
the responses are initiated intentionally,
how is it that the participant is unaware of
those intentions? Answers to these ques-
tions are at the core of three current theo-
ries of hypnosis. These are the theory of
dissociated control (Bowers, 1992;
Woody & Bowers, 1994), Hilgard' s (1986,
1994) neodissociation theory, and
Spanos's (l986a, 1986b) social-psycho-
logical theory (see Kirsch & Lynn, 1995,
for a more detailed description of these
theories).
According to dissociated control
330
KIRSCH AND LYNN
theory, hypnotic inductions release
"lower-level functions from the integra-
tion that is normally imposed on them by
consciousness" (Woody & Bowers, 1994,
p. 57), resulting in a condition that is
functionally similar to that of patients
with frontal lobe disorders. Because of
this weakening of frontal lobe control,
"subsystems of control can be directly
and automatically activated, instead of
being governed by high level executive
control" (Bowers, 1992, p. 267). There are
two major problems with the dissociated
control model. First, by postulating a
weakening of frontal control, it requires
that the suggestions be externally admin-
istered. Thus, it cannot explain self-hyp-
nosis, during which participants adminis-
ter suggestions to themselves. Second, it
requires the induction of a special state or
condition as a prerequisite for the occur-
rence of simple ideomotor responses.
However, hypnotic and non hypnotic sug-
gestibility are very highly correlated, and
the effect of hypnotic inductions on sug-
gestibility is surprisingly small (Hull, 1933;
Hilgard & Tart, 1966). This suggests that
responses to hypnotic and nonhypnotic
suggestions are brought about by the
same causal mechanisms and that the
induction of a hypnotic state is not one of
those mechanisms (Barber, 1969; Hilgard,
1969; Kihlstrom, 1985; Kirsch & Lynn,
1995; Sarbin & Coe, 1972). Although typi-
cally studied in the context of hypnosis,
the responses with which we are con-
cerned can more accurately be character-
ized as suggested, than as hypnotic.
According to neodissociation theory
(Hilgard, 1986; Kihlstrom, 1992), hypno-
tized participants are unaware of inten-
tions and other cognitive contents be-
cause they have erected an amnesic-like
barrier that divides consciousness into
two parts. The hidden part of conscious-
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
 HYPNOTICINVOLUNTARINESS
ness can initiate and inhibit movements
and monitor stimuli of which the remain-
der of consciousness is unaware. Woody
and Bowers (1994) have identified the
central problem with the neodissociation
explanation of ideomotor and challenge
responses - it requires the occurrence of
unsuggested, arbitrarily selective amne-
sia. This is problematic because sug-
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gested amnesia is a relatively difficult
response, of which most hypnotized
people seem incapable (Kirsch, Silva,
Corney, & Reed, 1995), and spontaneous
amnesia is even less common (Hilgard &
Cooper, 1965). In contrast, many simple
ideomotor responses can be experienced
easily by most people (Kirsch et aI., 1995).
"Hence, we have the unappealing pros-
pect of attempting to explain routine hyp-
notic behaviors in terms of a very rare
one" (Woody & Bowers, 1994, p. 55).
Spanos's (1986a, 1986b) social-psy-
chological account of involuntariness
begins with the same premise as
neodissociation theory: Hypnotized
people intentionally produce behavioral
responses, but are not aware of that in-
tention. Instead of postulating a division
of consciousness, Spanos (1986b) char-
acterizes reports of involuntariness as
mistaken attributions about the causes of
hypnotic behavior. The problem with the
social-psychological alternative is that it
does not provide a convincing explana-
tion of how hypnotized individuals are
able to misattribute the cause of their
responses (cf. Laurence & Gendron,
1995). Characterizations of hypnotic re-
sponding as involuntary do not just oc-
cur after the fact; they are also made
during the act. Ansfield and Wegner
(1996) note that "We all know what it is
like to do something...when we do it, we
feel we are doing it" (p. 482, emphasis
in the original). Similarly, Bowers (1992)
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
referred to the idea of an unconscious in-
tention as an oxymoron.
The purpose of this article is to intro-
duce a new socio-cognitive account of
suggested involuntariness. In common
with neodissociation and socio-psycho-
logical theories, we contend that hyp-
notic responding is voluntary. In com-
mon with dissociated control theory, how-
ever, we also endorse the seemingly con-
tradictory proposition that behavioral
responses to suggestion are triggered
automatically. Finally, in common with
social-psychological theory, we regard
reports of involuntariness as attributions
or interpretations, rather than introspec-
tions (Kirsch & Lynn, 1995; Lynn et aI.,
1990). In contrast to neodissociation and
dissociated control theories, we do not
postulate the creation of an amnestic
barrier or the induction of a state of weak-
ened frontal control as a prerequisite for
responding. In contrast to previous socio-
cognitive formulations, we contend that
people's interpretations of their re-
sponses as automatic are not entirely
mistaken.
In this article, we first provide an over-
view and extension of the burgeoning
literature on automaticity in the produc-
tion of mundane, intentional behavior
(e.g., Bargh & Barndollar, in press;
Gollwitzer, 1993; Norman & Shallice, 1986;
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), in which we
argue that all behavior is instigated auto-
matically at the moment of activation. We
then draw on these theories and on re-
sponse expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985,
1990) to formulate answers to the follow-
ing questions: I.) How can voluntary
actions be interpreted as involuntary
reactions? 2.) How can novel responses
that are normally under voluntary con-
trol be triggered directly by sugges-
tion?
331

The Syntax of Action
The revolution in psycholinguistics
inaugurated by Chomsky's (1957) theory
of generative grammar is one of the cor-
nerstones of contemporary cognitive
psychology. It was propelled by the in-
sights that human beings are able to pro-
duce and comprehend an infinite number
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of linguistic utterances, that these utter-
ances are formed in compliance with a
complex set of implicit linguistic rules,
and that this infinite variety of highly
structured utterances cannot be explained
by stimulus-response habit mechanisms.
The rules are implicit in that they need not
be consciously known. The use of these
syntactic rules is an automatic process, in
that it occurs effortlessly, without aware-
ness, and unintentionally. Although
many aspects of Chomsky's explanation
of linguistic competence are controver-
sial (Lieberman, 1991), the insights and
resulting questions on which the theory
is based have been widely accepted.
A number of theorists have empha-
sized the degree to which intentional be-
havior may be controlled automatically
(e.g., Bargh, 1994; Bargh & Gollwitzer,
1994; Norman & Shallice, 1986), but it is
generally assumed that for this to occur,
the actions must have become routinized
or habitual. In this section, we argue that
there is considerable automaticity in the
production of novel behavior and that
nonlinguistic, mundane, intentional be-
havior shares many ofthe characteristics
of language learning and production (see
Lewicki, 1986 for a similar extension of
psycholinguistic assumptions to
nonconscious social information process-
ing). What we acquire is not a series of
stereotypical habits, but rather, a series
of competencies to produce an infinite
variety of highly structured actions with
332
KIRSCH AND LYNN
a speed and fluency that would not be
possible were each ofthese actions delib-
erately chosen. We propose that the au-
tomaticity that is inherent in all behavior
can be understood within a framework
derived from a synthesis of prior hierar-
chical schema theories.
Hierarchical Control
of Habitual Behavior
A frequent assumption in cognitive
theories of planned and unplanned be-
havior is that actions are controlled by
hierarchically organized, interactive, sen-
sorimotor schemas (e.g., Bargh &
Bamdollar, 1996; Hilgard, 1986; Miller,
Galanter, & Pribrim, 1960; Norman, 1981;
Norman & Shallice, 1986). At the top of
this hierarchy is a central control struc-
ture (Hilgard, 1986) or supervisory
attentional system (Norman & Shallice,
1986) that selects or biases the selection
of the act that is to be performed. It is this
highest level ofthe hierarchy that is iden-
tified with consciousness and intention-
ality. At its most molar level, the selected
act is represented by a parent (Norman,
1981) or source (Norman & Shallice, 1986)
schema. The task of a source schema,
such as driving to a familiar location, is to
activate and monitor the activity of com-
ponent schemas, such as turning left or
right at specific locations. In turn, each of
the component schemas acts as a source
schema for even lower level, subordinate
schemas, such as the minor adjustments
in speed and steering that are required
while driving. Once activated, each of
these component schemas is capable of
being triggered by particular environmen-
tal stimuli.
One consequence of the hierarchical
control of action is that much of behavior
is performed automatically. Because con-
sciousness is required only in the initial
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
 HYPNOTICINVOLUNTARINESS
selection of the highest level source
schema, in the absence of unexpected
complications, complex acts can be per-
formed with little or no awareness, little
drain on attentional resources, and with-
out intentional activation of the compo-
nent behaviors. This is adaptive, in that
by freeing attentional resources, it in-
creases our capacity to engage in simul-
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taneous tasks, such as eating a candy bar
and holding a conversation, while driving
a car. The cost, however, is that automa-
ticity increases the probability of
parapraxes or action slips (Reason, 1983).
Deviating from a habitual route, for ex-
ample, may require attention at a critical
juncture.
In Norman and Shallice' s (1986) model,
the role of consciousness is even less
than that indicated above. Not only are
component movements selected directly
by environmental triggers, but so too are
source schemas. The role of the supervi-
sory attentional system is merely to bias
the selection of source schemas by in-
creasing or decreasing their activation
values. The degree of conscious atten-
tion required to initiate an act varies con-
siderably, according to this model, and
some acts require no attention at all. Thus,
"getting out of bed in the morning is at
times an automatic act and at other times
requires great exertion of will" (p. 15).
A second account of the way in which
molar acts could be triggered directly by
the environment is provided by
Gollwitzer's (1993) notion of implementa-
tion intentions. An implementation inten-
tion is a conscious decision to execute an
act in specified environmental circum-
stance (e.g., "I will turn right, rather than
left, when I get to Broad Street"). Accord-
ing to Gollwitzer, these intentions "create
a heightened accessibility of the mental
representation of the specified situational
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
cues and induce direct (automatic) con-
trol of the intended behavior through
these cues" (Gollwitzer, 1993,p. 141).Thus,
the intention is formed in advance, rather
than at the time the response is executed.
Bargh and Gollwitzer (1994) summarized
data from a series of studies supporting
the hypothesis that when a prior imple-
mentation intention has been formed, "at
the time of behaving, the effect of the
triggering environmental features is di-
rect and immediate and requires no inter-
vening conscious choice, intention, or
awareness" (p. 73). Nevertheless, the
behavior is classified as intended, be-
cause it is goal directed and was preceded
by the formation of a conscious intention.
Gollwitzer's model is consistent with
Norman and Shallice' s (1986) hypothesis
that source schemas are triggered directly
by environmental stimuli. From the
Norman and Shall ice perspective, the role
of implementation intentions would be to
bias the selection of intended acts by
increasing their activation values.
In Gollwitzer' s (1993) model, intentions
prepare behavioral schemas for automatic
activation, but what about behavior that
is not activated by a particular cue? Evi-
dence for automatic activation of uncued
behavior can be drawn from two studies
of the relation between intentional move-
ments and cortical function. Grey Walter
(as cited in Dennett, 1991) asked patients
with electrodes implanted in the motor
cortex to look at slides from a projector
and to advance to the next slide whenever
they liked. Unknown to the patients, the
slides were actually advanced by an am-
plified signal from the implanted elec-
trodes. The reported experience of the
patients was that the slides moved just as
they were about to push the button, but
before they had actually decided to do so.
Although they worried that the slide
333

would advance a second time as they
pushed the button, they did not have
sufficient time to inhibit the act.
Libet (1985) asked research partici-
pants to perform a simple, voluntary,
motor act, at will, and to note the position
of a spot on a revolving disk at the exact
moment at which they formed the inten-
tion to execute the act. At the same time,
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readiness potentials were recorded via
electrodes placed on the scalp. Libet re-
ported that the awareness of an intention
lagged behind the onset of the readiness
potentials by 350 to 400 msec. Taken
together, these two studies suggest that
cerebral initiation of supposedly sponta-
neous, voluntary acts begins prior to
awareness of a triggering intention. Thus,
even with mundane, intentional acts, the
experience of intentionally initiating the
response may be an illusion. Although
this conclusion may seem startling, it is
consistent with the assumption of deter-
minism that characterizes all scientific
endeavors, an assumption that is relin-
quished only in the face of compelling
data. It is for this reason that Kirsch
(1985) defined non volitional responses
in terms of self-reported experience (also
see Lynn et al., 1990).
The automaticity of ongoing behavior
can lead to interesting or even disturbing
consequences, when attention is directed
to it. Attention directed to the execution
of skilled acts (i.e., the movement of fin-
gers while typing or playing a musical
instrument) can impede performance
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), and atten-
tion directed toward any automatic be-
havior can produce a sense of
depersonalization - a feeling of detach-
ment from one's own actions. This may
be experienced as pleasurable (during
hypnosis, for example) or as distressing
(in a clinical depersonalization disorder).
334
KIRSCH AND LYNN
In fact, one can conjecture that extreme or
chronic self-consciousness might playa
role in the development of this disorder.
The Novelty of Routine Habits
The term habit denotes a "mechanical,
semi-automatic series of movements in-
volved in routine actions such as dress-
ing oneself' (Eysenck, Arnold, & Meili,
1979, p. 436). In contrast, consider the
following description of the performance
of a well-learned skill: "The professional
tennis player does not consciously de-
cide to run to a certain spot on the court,
but moves there 'instinctively' based on
the relevant cues: the speed of the ball,
the angle of the opponent's racket, ex-
pectancies of where the return shot will
land based on considerable experience in
that same situation" (Bargh & Barndollar,
1996, p. 460). Similarly, the movements
required for navigating a familiar route
are different each time. The car waiting
at an intersection on one day will proba-
bly not be there the next. A light that was
green on the last occasion may now be
red. New pot holes appear from time to
time, and old ones are filled in. Bargh and
Bamdollar (1996) note that when a sen-
sorimotor schema is activated, "what is
running off autonomously and without
conscious guidance here is not a static be-
havioral response, but an automated strat-
egy for dealing with the environment to
affect a desired goal" (p. 460). One can
add that given the complexity of the en-
vironment and the responses it demands,
the "running off' of highly skilled be-
havioral schemas (e.g., playing profes-
sional tennis or sight reading music)
requires the capacity to produce an infi-
nite number of sequences of specific
movements, not unlike the infinite num-
ber of verbal sequences required for nor-
mal conversation.
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
 HYPNOTIC INVOLUNTARINESS
Still, one might suppose that each of
the component movements is well learned,
even if they are being sequenced differ-
ently on each occasion in response to
changing environmental circumstances.
But even this is not quite right. Typists
can type fluidly on a miniature keyboard,
as long as it is large enough to accommo-
date their fingers. Violinists can pick up
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a viola and play the same tunes on it that
they do on a violin. Full size cellists can
playa half size cello without too much
difficulty. In these cases, the sequencing
of the movements are the same, but the
movements themselves are different (cf.
Tolman, 1932).
Finally, consider the frequent occa-
sions in which two or more acts involving
the same musculature are performed si-
multaneously. Returning to a prior ex-
ample, a person can steer a car, gesticu-
late (as part of holding a conversation),
and eat a candy bar at the same time. Each
of these are well practiced automatic acts,
but once they have been routinized, they
can easily be combined without further
practice. What makes this interesting, is
that combining them disrupts the compo-
nent movements without disrupting the
flow of behavior. The hand holding the
candy might rest lightly on the steering
wheel, with the fingers curling around the
candy instead of the wheel; the move-
ment of the candy toward the mouth might
be momentarily diverted to add emphasis
to a particular word and then continue its
journey; the words might then be paused
for a bite and then spoken in a way that
accommodates the candy that still has
not been swallowed; and so on.
Automaticity in the Production
of Novel Acts
There is general agreement that routin-
ized behavior can be - and usually is-
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
performed with a high degree of automa-
ticity. Although the behaviors elicited by
ideomotor suggestions are certainly rou-
tine, the responses as performed by most
participants are far from routine. Raising
an arm as a well-learned response, for
example, is usually performed fluidly and
relatively quickly. Responses to arm
leviation suggestions, however, often are
slow and halting. First one finger may
begin to move, than another. Eventually
the arm is suspended without support.
Then it moves a little higher, stops, bobs
a little, moves higher again, and then
stops again, suspended in mid air. This
could hardly be described as a routine
action.
As shown earlier, routinized skills are
performed automatically in a very flexible
manner. But what of creative behavior?
Unless one is prone to repetition, the
content of a normal conversation is likely
to be new. But unless one is painfully shy,
it may flow too fluidly to be deliberately
controlled. One might be conscious of
choosing a meaning to communicate (al-
though even here, consciousness may
come after the act), but the words them-
selves and the order in which they are
produced (i.e., their syntactic structure)
flow effortlessly. At an even lower level,
the movements involved in the formation
of words occur without deliberation and
cannot even be well specified by the
speaker. Similarly, typing is automatic,
even when that which is being typed is
novel and not cued by external stimuli.
Thus, most of the components of creative
behavior are well-learned, routinized re-
sponses that are run off automatically.
Extending the psycholinguistic model
to behavior in general leads to the follow-
ing conclusions: Human beings are able
to produce an infinite number of acts.
These acts are formed in compliance with
335

a complex set of implicit rules governing
the way in which component actions are
linked together. The production of this
infinite variety of highly structured acts
cannot be explained by stimulus-response
habit mechanisms. The rules are implicit
in that they are used without conscious
awareness and need not be consciously
known. The use of these rules is also an
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automatic process, in that it occurs effort-
lessly, without awareness, and uninten-
tionally.
Summary
The data in this section indicate con-
siderable behavioral automaticity in a
wide range of situations. Automatic pro-
cesses are involved in the instigation of
the component movements of planned
behavior, the selection of behavioral
schemas for activation, the activation of
behavioral responses to situational cues,
and the initiation of uncued behaviors.
The variety of circumstances in which
automatic activation seems to occur sug-
gests the radical hypothesis that all be-
havior is initiated automatically. The role
of attentional processes may be to bias
the selection of behavioral schemas
(Norman & Shallice, 1986) and to monitor
behavior and the environment so that
performances can be adjusted to meet
one's goals (Hyland, 1988).
Hypnotic Involuntariness
Intentionality as an Attribution
It is generally assumed that we are
aware of the voluntariness of our actions
and that the volitional status of an action
is easily and accurately introspectable
(Ansfield & Wegner, 1996). However,
the feeling of will is actually quite subtle,
if there really is such a feeling. It is easy
336
KIRSCH AND LYNN
to identify introspectively where a pain is
felt. But where exactly does one feel a
volition? A century ago, psychologists
attempting to examine volition through
introspection failed miserably (e.g.,
Ogden, 1911), and current cognitive psy-
chologists note that introspection fails in
such a seemingly simple task as determin-
ing whether the lifting of an arm is inten-
tional (Norman & Shallice, 1986).
In everyday life, perceptions of
voluntariness are more often post-hoc
attributions than products of introspec-
tion. Ordinarily, we do not experience
most of the component acts of planned
behavior as either voluntary or involun-
tary. In fact, we generally do not experi-
ence them at all. If asked whether the
actions were intentional, our answer is
not based on introspection of how the act
felt; instead our criterion is likely to be
whether the component acts were consis-
tent with the plan we initiated. For ex-
ample, when we intentionally go some-
place, if going there required a right turn
and in fact we turned right, we are likely to
conclude (if asked) that the right turn was
voluntary, even if it occurred with little or
no effort, executive level control, or moni-
toring. Conversely, if we have made the
mistake of turning left, as a result of which
we arrive a more usual, but unintended
destination, we are likely to conclude that
the turn was nonvolitional. But was there
really any difference in the two instances
at the time at which the turn was made?
Probably not. The subsequent report of
volition or non volition was a post-hoc
attribution based on whether the behav-
ior was consistent with an intended out-
come.
Action slips, like driving to the wrong
destination or dialing a unintended but
frequently dialed telephone number are
often used as examples of dissociation in
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
 HYPNOTICINVOLUNTARINESS
everyday life. The reasoning is as fol-
lows: Acts like going places and tele-
phoning people are normally under vol-
untary control. Going to an unintended
place and dialing a wrong number are
clearly involuntary. Therefore, they must
be due to a dissociation of the control that
executive functions normally exert over
behavior. The problem with this syllo-
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gism is the that the major premise is wrong.
Making an intended turn and dialing the
right number are every bit as automatic
as the behaviors that lead to unintended
outcomes. Parapraxes are important, not
because they are examples of infrequently
occurring dissociations, but rather be-
cause they reveal the degree to which
intentional behavior is carried out auto-
matically. Similarly, hypnotic involuntari-
ness may be important because it illumi-
nates the unnoticed automaticity of ev-
eryday life. In short, as with other cogni-
tive processes that appear to mediate the
effects of stimuli on behavior, self-reports
of intentionality may not be based on
introspection. Instead, they may be attri-
butions or interpretations based on a
priori, implicit theories of behavior and
on perceptions of the stimulus situation
(cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Spanos,
1986b; Wilson, 1985).
The Construction of Subjective
Experience
/
We do not usually attend to the move-
ments of which our acts are composed,
and that lack of attention contributes to
the parapraxes that are so often cited as
analogues of hypnotic involuntariness.
In this respect, parapraxes and other au-
tomatic behaviors are different from
ideomotor responses. When given an
ideomotor suggestion, we attend quite
closely to the suggested behavior. Invol-
untariness is reported not only as a post
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
facto interpretation, but also as a concur-
rent experience. To what extent can our
interpretation of unnoticed behavior (i.e.,
behavior that is not centrally monitored)
be applied to noticed behavior?
Human experience is constructive. It
is influenced by expectations concerning
what should occur, as well as by what
actually happens. Despite the care with
which scientific observations are made,
the constructive nature of experience is
strikingly clear in the history of science.
Astronomers believing in the immutabil-
ity of the heavens failed to detect the
appearance of comets; early microsco-
pists, holding the Aristotelian belief that
mammalian offspring are solely the prod-
uct of the impregnating male, drew
homunculi that they saw in human and
animal sperm; and Renaissance physi-
cians saw supposedly possessed patients
vomit objects that were too large to have
been swallowed (Hanson, 1958; Kirsch,
1980; Kuhn, 1970). These data point to the
conclusion that the old adage needs to be
reversed. It's not that seeing is believing,
but rather that believing is seeing.
Kirsch (1985, 1990) has identified re-
sponse expectancy as a determinant of
subjective experience. Response expect-
ancies are anticipations of automatic re-
actions in response to particular stimuli.
The most important feature of these ex-
pectancies is that they tend to be self-
confirming, in that they tend to generate
the expected subjective response, along
with its physiological substrate. The pla-
cebo effect is the prototype of a self-
confirming response expectancy.
Placebo-induced expectancies have been
shown to produce changes in asthma,
anxiety, depression, panic, sexual arousal,
tension, heart rate, blood pressure,
dermatitis, and bronchial constriction
(Kirsch, in press).
337

The effect of theory on the observa-
tion of data is an example of how a stimu-
lus expectancy can affect perceptual ex-
perience. The considerably greater effect
of response expectancies on the percep-
tion of subjective experience led to the
downfall of the first paradigm of experi-
mental psychology, when experimenters
came to realize that the contents of their
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introspective observations were artifacts
oftheir prior beliefs (Dodge, 1912). More
recently, response expectancies have
been implicated in the etiology and treat-
ment of anxiety disorders, depression,
sexual dysfunction, and drug use
(Goldman, Brown, & Christiansen, 1987;
Ilardi & Craighead, 1994; Palace, 1995;
Reiss & McNally, 1985; Teasdale, 1983,
1985). In nonclinical contexts, response
expectancy appears to have a top-down
influence on both positive and negative
mood states (Kirsch, Mearns, & Catanzaro,
1990;Wilson, Lisle, Kraft, & Wetzel, 1989).
Response expectancy has also been
shown to be related substantially to hyp-
notic experience and behavior. Hypnotic
inductions have no specific procedural
components other than the hypnotic la-
bel (Kirsch et aI., 1995; Sheehan & Perry,
1976), and hypnotic experiences and re-
sponses are exquisitely sensitive to cul-
turally-induced and instructionally-ma-
nipulated expectancies (See reviews by
Kirsch, 1990; Lynn et aI., 1990). More
specific to the issue of involuntariness,
Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman, and Sweeney
(1984) reported that voluntary control
over hypnotic responses - as gaged by
the ability of highly responsive partici-
pants to resist suggestions - could be
influenced strongly by expectancy-alter-
ing information. Similarly, measured ex-
pectancies are highly correlated with be-
havioral and subjective response to sug-
gestion, and expectancy manipulations
338
KIRSCH AND LYNN
can increase responsiveness greatly
(Gearan, Schoenberger, & Kirsch, 1994;
Kirsch et al., 1995; Wickless & Kirsch,
1989). These data suggest that the sub-
jective experience of hypnosis, including
the experience of involuntariness, may be
shaped by expectancy (cf. Lynn et aI.,
1990; Spanos, 1986b).
The fact that subjective states are of-
ten ambiguous is one reason why expect-
ancies readily shape perceptions of in-
voluntariness. The vocabulary for bodily
feelings and sensations is meager, so-
matic feelings often are nebulous and
defy adequate explanation (Sarbin & Coe,
1979), and access to mental and body
states is often imperfect (Wilson, 1985).
As Trope (1986) has noted, if sensations
or bodily cues are ambiguous, the context
in which the cues are embedded can affect
the labeling and understanding of their
meaning. Compounding this ambiguity of
sensation is the ambiguity of language
(Lynn et al., 1990). Our lexicon provides
rich opportunities for construing experi-
ence along a voluntary-involuntary di-
mension. Terms like voluntary and
involuntary have multiple meanings.
Involuntary, for example, can mean spon-
taneous, effortless, unconscious, forced,
uncontrollable, or not involving delibera-
tion, choice or purpose.
The hypnotic context provides an ex-
planatory framework for disambiguating
mental states and bodily feelings. Hyp-
nosis is a unique, culturally defined, so-
cial context, in which behavior is scripted
to occur without voluntary effort (Lynn &
Rhue, 1991; Spanos, Salas, Bertrand, &
Johnson, 1989). Experimental, correla-
tional, and historical data indicate that
hypnotic behavior and attributions of
involuntariness are almost invariably
consistent with participants' role percep-
tions (Kirsch & Council, 1989; Lynn,
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
 HYPNOTIC INVOLUNTARINESS
Snodgrass, Hardaway, & Lenz, 1984;
Lynn, Snodgrass, Rhue, Nash, & Frauman,
1987). In addition to the shaping influ-
ence of culturally based response expect-
ancies or schemas about hypnosis, scripts
contained within suggestions inform par-
ticipants that responses are happening to
them without volition. Thus, studies in
Lynn's laboratory (Lynn, Neufeld, &
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Matyi, 1987; Lynn, Weekes, Matyi, &
Neufeld, 1988; Weekes & Lynn, 1990)
indicate that participants receiving au-
thoritatively worded suggestions (e.g.,
"Your hand is rising by itself') rate their
responses as more involuntary than do
those given permissive suggestions. This
increases the likelihood that participants
will attribute their responses to sugges-
tions and perceive their actions as invol-
untary (see Lynn & Sivec, 1993). Also,
research reviewed by Lynn et al. (1990)
has shown that participants are more
likely to rate their responses to sugges-
tions as more involuntary than their re-
sponses to direct instructions for move-
ments.
In summary, the experience of hyp-
notic involuntariness can be explained by
the degree to which voluntary behavior is
executed automatically (Bargh &
Gollwitzer, 1994), the resulting subjective
ambiguity of volition (Norman & Shallice,
1986), and the degree to which experi-
ence, especially of ambiguous events, is
shaped by expectancies (Kirsch, 1985,
1990; Lynn, Weekes, & Rhue, 1989; Lynn
et al., 1990).
Response Sets and Environmentally
Triggered Behavior
In the previous section, we presented
a model of how the ambiguity of intro-
spected experience combines with cultur-
ally-shaped and stimulus-cued response
expectancies to produce hypnotic experi-
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
ences, including the experience of invol-
untariness that characterizes many hyp-
notic responses. In this section, we con-
sider the degree to which interpretations
of involuntariness are accurate. The view
presented here is that behaviors follow-
ing ideomotor and challenge suggestions
are cognitively prepared, intentional re-
sponses that are triggered efficiently by
suggestion and subjective cues.
There are two ways in which responses
could be triggered directly by sugges-
tion. First, responses could be initiated
automatically as components of an inten-
tionally adopted plan. Responsive par-
ticipants enter into the hypnotic context
with the intent of experiencing hypnosis,
as shown by correlations between re-
sponsiveness and attitudes toward hyp-
nosis (Kirsch, et al., 1995), by the influ-
ence of rapport on hypnotic responding
(Lynn, Nashetal., 1984; Lynn et al., 1987;
Lynn, Snodgrass et al., 1984), by the ea-
gerness with which students volunteer
for hypnosis experiments, and by their
compliance with the various instructions
that precede suggestions, such as clos-
ing their eyes, extending their arms, and
so forth.
There is general agreement that at this
level, hypnotic responses are intended;
automaticity is claimed only for the sub-
sidiary level of the motor responses called
for by the suggestions. According to
Vallacher and Wegner (1987), people tend
to identify their actions at as high a level
as possible, moving to lower levels of
identification only when the action is
difficult to maintain at the higher level.
Thus, successful hypnotic respondents
are likely to identify their behavior as
being hypnotized or responding to sug-
gestion, rather than lifting an arm or keep-
ing it stiff. These are automatically ex-
ecuted components of the hypnotic plan.
339

Conversely, ratings of involuntariness
may depend on the nature of the queries
(Lynn et al., 1990). Participants asked
about specific movements (e.g., "Did you
intend to move your arm?") might report
little volitional control, because the ac-
tion is consciously represented at a higher
level. The same person might report a
great deal of voluntariness, however, if
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the act is defined in more global terms that
match the person's conscious represen-
tation at the time of the enactment (e.g.,
"Did you intend to respond to sugges-
tions?").
A second, but not incompatible, way
in which behavioral responses could be
triggered directly by suggestion is af-
forded by Gollwitzer's (1993) notion of
implementation intentions. According to
Gollwitzer, prior formation of an imple-
mentation intention can lead to automatic
initiation of the intended behavior when
the appropriate situational cues are en-
countered. Thus, hypnosis can be under-
stood as the adoption of an intention to
respond to hypnotic suggestions, which
then allows for automatic activation of
the suggested response.
An important feature of the hypnotic
situation that may seem at variance with
Gollwitzer's model is that the responses
and their triggers are not generally speci-
fied in advance. If the person is not told
what hypnotic suggestions will be given,
how can an implementation intention be
formed? Instead of forming intentions for
specific actions, hypnotized individuals
appear to cede or delegate some control
of their experience and behavior to the
hypnotist (Hilgard, 1986). However, the
phenomenon of delegating control and
carrying out suggestions supplied by
another person is not unique to hypnosis
and does not require dissociation. It oc-
curs, for example, when a person driving
340
KIRSCH AND LYNN
an unfamiliar route cedes some control to
a navigator. The implementation inten-
tion in these cases are to execute the
behavior requested by the other person.
This might be termed a generalized
implementation intention. The hypno-
tized person's intention can be character-
ized as a motivated cognitive commitment
to respond (Lynn, Weekes, Brentar,
Neufeld, Zivney, & Weiss, 1991; Sheehan,
1991) or an experiential set marked by the
willingness to experience suggested
events as occurring effortlessly and
nonvolitionally (Tellegen, 1981).
In generalized implementation inten-
tions, the situational cues and intended
responses are specified structurally,
rather than semantically. In this sense
they are similar to scripts that allow com-
plex social interactions to be performed
without conscious attention (Langer,
Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). Langeret al.
demonstrated instances in which sense-
less instructions were carried out mind-
lessly, if the form of the instruction was
consistent with previously acquired
scripts.
Lynn et al. (1990) described a particu-
larly compelling example of the automatic
triggering of an action schema by a gen-
eralized implementation intention. In the
game Simon Says, players adopt the in-
tention of responding quickly to what-
ever the designated leader commands,
but only if the command is preceded by
the words "Simon Says." Enjoyment of
the game comes from the frequent failure
to inhibit responses to commands that
have not been preceded by "Simon Says."
These action slips clearly demonstrate
that the responses are triggered auto-
matically by the stimulus command. A
particularly important feature of this ex-
ample is that prior awareness of the par-
ticular response to be performed is not
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
 HYPNOTICINVOLUNTARINESS
needed. Instead, the response set in-
vol ves responding to whatever command
is given. In this respect, the Simon Says
phenomena is similar to hypnosis, in
which people adopt a response set that
prepares them to respond to whatever is
suggested by the hypnotist.
Finally, although responses may be
triggered automatically, suggestion alone
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is not sufficient to trigger them. Instead,
suggested physical movements are pre-
ceded by altered subjective experiences
(Silva & Kirsch, 1992). In response to an
arm levitation suggestion, for example,
the expectation is not only that the arm
will lift, but that it will feel light enough to
move upward automatically. Most people
lift their arms only if they succeed in
generating a sensation oflightness suffi-
cient to allow them to interpret their be-
havior as nonvolitional. Their experience
is not that they are intentionally moving,
but rather that they are not inhibiting a
movement that is consistent with their
subjective experience. The subjective
experiences of both lightness and invol-
untariness are generated, at least in part,
by the expectancies of their occurrence,
and the feeling of lightness is one of the
situational cues that must be present for
the response to be triggered.
Support for the contention that experi-
enced sensations are triggering cues for
behavioral responses is provided by re-
cent studies in which correlations of re-
sponsiveness with expectancies were
examined. Measures of hypnotic response
expectancy usually focus on predicting
behavioral responses (e.g., Council,
Kirsch, Vickery, & Carlson, 1983). In the
more recent studies, measures of expected
subjective experiences were added
(Gearan, et al., 1994; Kirsch et aI., 1995).
Consistent with our hypothesis, these
two measures were very highly corre-
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997
lated. More impressively, despite the very
high proportion of shared variance (70%),
subjective response expectancies pre-
dicted hypnotic behavior and experience
significantly, even with behavioral ex-
pectancies controlled (Gearan etaI., 1994).
Conversely, with subjective response
expectancies controlled, behavioral ex-
pectancies fail to predict responding.
Intentions and Expectancies as
Response Sets
Most people who enter hypnotic situ-
ations want to be hypnotized, and they
intend to do their best to fulfill the re-
quirements of the hypnotic role. One of
the requirements ofthat role is to respond
to suggestions for automatic movements.
Thus, participants intend to emit the sug-
gested movements. What is intended,
however, is not merely to execute the
movements, but also to experience them
as non volitional. This is what makes re-
sponding to suggestion more difficult
than responding to comparable requests
for voluntary movements. Data indicate
that participants do not intend to make
suggested movements voluntarily; in-
stead, they expect those movements to
occur without voluntary effort (Lynn, et
aI., 1990; Silva & Kirsch, 1992). Their
expectancy is that behavior x (the sug-
gested response) will occur whenever
stimulus condition y (the suggestion) is
encountered, which is identical in form to
an implementation intention (Gollwitzer,
1993), but differs from an intention in that
the response is to occur without direct
volitional effort.'
Kirsch (1985, 1990) has noted the par-
allel between intentions and response
expectancies. Both are predictions of the
occurrence of a behavior. They differ in
the person's perception about the voli-
tional status of the behavior. One intends
341
 KIRSCH AND LYNN

to emit a voluntary response, but expects The ability of response expectancies

to emit an automatic response. Thus,
implementation intentions and response
expectancies can be thought of as two
subtypes of response sets. Expectancies
and intentions are temporary states of
readiness to respond in particular ways to
particular stimuli. The distinction between
them rests on the person's understand-
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to generate movements derives from the
characteristics they share with intentions.
Both are response sets that prepare the
person to automatically emit the appro-
priate response when the appropriate trig-
gering conditions are encountered. Strong
support for the importance of response
expectancies in generating and shaping

ing of the voluntariness of the response.
If the response is interpreted to be voli-
tional, the set is an intention; if it is
interpreted to be nonvolitional, the set is
an expectancy.'
For example, in the game Simon Says,
players are directed to make movements,
whereas in hypnosis, involuntary move-
ments are suggested. In both cases the
person has adopted a response set to
carry out the suggested actions. But, in
the first case, the interpretation is that the
action is carried out intentionally, and
even though the prepared response may
occur automatically, the mediating re-
sponse set can be categorized as an in-
tention. Conversely, in the second case,
the expectation is that the response will
play itselfout, and the mediating set would
be characterized as an expectancy. Thus,
the distinction is one of interpretation;
the difference between an intention and
an expectancy is in the person's interpre-
tation of the causality of the behavior.
hypnotic behavior was described earlier
in this article and has been reviewed in
greater detail by Kirsch and Council (1989)
and Lynn et al. (1990).
Two features of the way in which re-
sponse sets activate behavioral schemas
are worth noting. First, once established,
they can fade from awareness, yet con-
tinue to determine behavior (Ach' s stud-
ies as cited in Titchener, 1909). To suc-
cessfully execute the task of adding pairs
of numbers, for example, one need not
remain consciously focused on the fact
that one is engaging in the act of addition.
Second, once a response set is in place,
conscious intervention may be needed to
inhibit the response, rather than to acti-
vate it.
Summary and Conclusions
Our new theory of suggested involun-
tariness is able to accommodate a wide
variety of observations and experimental

"The qualification "direct" is included because the person might intentionally engage in
various imaginative strategies in an effort to generate the non volitional response (Spanos,
1971 ).
2This does not mean that expectancies and intentions are identical. For example, a person
might intend to emit a suggested non volitional response, but expect to be unable to do so.
Conversely, one might expect to emit a response that is inconsistent with one's goals. In
nonhypnotic situations, sexual dysfunction would be an instance of the first case (Palace,
1995) and anxiety disorders would be an instance of the second (Reiss & McNally, 1985).
In both cases, intentions and expectancies are in conflict, and the resulting behavior may
depend on both the strength of each and the person's belief about the degree to which the
behavior can be controlled voluntarily. Note that this allows the possibility of uncontrollable
hypnotic responses in exceptional cases.

342 Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997

 HYPNOTICINVOLUNTARINESS
findings in the hypnosis literature that
are not addressed by neodissociation or
dissociated control theories. We have
reviewed many studies that document the
influence of culturally based expectan-
cies and response sets, and we have con-
sidered the potential influence of other
variables that affect the evaluation and
interpretation of hypnotic action and ex-
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perience. These include the motivation to
experience suggested effects, the way
suggestions are worded and questions
are posed to participants, rapport with
the hypnotist, performance standards,
and the degree to which bodily states are
ambiguous.
Additionally, our theory implies that
ability factors, such as imaginative ability
and fantasy proneness, bolster percep-
tions of involuntariness in two ways.
First, they do so by strengthening posi-
tive response expectancies. Second, par-
ticipants for whom hypnotic responding
is relatively easy are likely to identify
their actions at relatively high levels (e.g.,
responding to hypnosis), thereby facili-
tating the experience of automaticity and
the attribution of their responses to the
influence of the hypnotist's suggestions.
In contrast, those participants who are
unable to experience suggested effects
and have difficulty in responding are likely
to identify their responses at the level of
molecular components (e.g., getting their
arm to rise), which disrupts performance
and hinders the interpretation of involun-
tariness.
Although our theory parallels the
theory of dissociated control (Bowers,
1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994) in its con-
tention that responses can be triggered
efficiently, it does so without postulating
a special condition resembling frontal lobe
dysfunction. This allows for self-hypnosis
as well as hetero-hypnosis. The differ-
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1. July 1997
ence between the two is in the specifica-
tion of the triggering conditions. In
hetero-hypnosis, the response set links
responding to the hypnotist's words; in
self-hypnosis, responding is linked to the
person's own intentionally generated
thoughts. Also, in our model, suggested
experiences are triggering conditions for
behavioral responses.
Granting that hypnotic responses are
experienced as involuntary, what are they
really? Are they intentional or automatic?
Our answer to this question is that they
are both. More importantly, this is not the
important question to ask. Finding mean-
ingful answers presupposes asking ap-
propriate questions, and the appropriate
question in this case may be whether the
response is produced attentionally,
rather than whether it is initiated inten-
tionally. In other words, how efficient are
suggested responses? Do they require
more or less attentional resources than
corresponding, simple actions (e.g., rais-
ing one's hand in response to a request to
do so). Data pertaining to this question
are mixed (reviewed by Kirsch & Lynn,
in press) and have largely been confined
to more complex responses, often ones
that do not require an involuntary motor
response. Data on Chevruel pendulum re-
sponses in nonhypnotic contexts indi-
cate that expending attentional resources
by engaging in competing tasks inhibits
responding when participants are in-
structed to imagine a movement (Easton
& Shor, 1976), but enhances it when they
are instructed to prevent the movement
(Ansfield & Wegner, 1996). In the latter
case, the competing task may divert at-
tention from the effort to inhibit a move-
ment that is produced by the idea or
expectancy of the response.
Although the issue remains to be re-
solved, we anticipate finding that re-
343

sponding to suggestion requires
attentional resources. The reason for this
is not the initiation of the motor move-
ments, which in themselves may be quite
simple and require little attention. In-
stead, attention may be required for the
generation and monitoring ofthe subjec-
tive experiences that are among the trig-
gering conditions required for emitting
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the response. I The response expectancy
for arm levitation, for example, is that the
arm will rise by itself. This means that a
sufficiently convincing experience of
lightness must be perceived for upward
movements to be triggered. The required
degree oflightness may vary from person
to person, as shown by research on the
effects of performance standards on hyp-
notic responding (Lynn, Green, &
Jacquith, 1995).
In closing, we have proposed that most
people enter hypnotic situations with a
conscious intention to respond to sug-
gestions. Because of this intention, they
do their best to fulfill the requirements of
the hypnotic role, one of which is to
experience suggested movements as au-
tomatic. People differ in the degree to
which they expect to succeed in generat-
ing the required sensations and move-
ments, and differences in the strength of
their expectations are among the determi-
nants of their subsequent responses
(Kirsch et aI., 1995; Wickless & Kirsch,
1989). Subjective expectancies contrib-
ute to the production of suggested sub-
jective experiences (Gearan et aI., 1994),
but these experiences may also be contin-
gent on the presence of particular apti-
tudes or attributes that have not yet been
well established.
Behavioral expectancies function as
response sets that allow behavior to be
triggered automatically, in the same way
that implementation intentions trigger
344
KIRSCH AND LYNN
ordinary, voluntary acts (Bargh &
Gollwitzer, 1994). Thus normal, voluntary
behavior and ideomotor responses dur-
ing hypnosis are triggered in the same
way, but are experienced differently be-
cause of situationally and culturally pro-
duced interpretations.
Our theory underlines the construc-
tive nature of human experience. Experi-
ences of volition and involuntariness -
in and out of hypnosis - are construc-
tions or interpretations made possible by
the high degree of automaticity that is
characteristic of all complex behavior.
Hypnosis is special, not because it in-
volves any unique mechanisms, but rather
because it illuminates normal human pro-
pensities that are not as readily apparent
in most nonhypnotic situations.
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Footnote 1: Note, however, that the
attempt to resist that is requested in
a challenge suggestion (i.e., "Try to
remember") may also require atten-
tional effort. Also, although the di-
version of attention should diminish
responding to most suggestions, it
might facilitate responding to sug-
gestions for alalgesia or amnesia.
Distraction is a method of pain con-
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trieval as well.
Amer J Clin Hypn 40:1, July 1997