Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 65 (2020) 104139

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

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Key airborne concentrations of chemicals for emergency response planning

in HAZMAT road transportation- margin of safety or survival
Mousa Jabbari a, b, *, Farideh Atabi c, Roghayeh Ghorbani c
a
Workplace Health Promotion Research Center (WHPRC), Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran
b
Department of Occupational Health and Safety, School of Public Health and Safety, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran
c
Department of Environmental Engineering, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The release of chemicals due to road transportation accidents could have adverse consequences such as fatality,
Toxic gas release physical and financial loss and environmental damage. The purpose of this study was to determine the suitable
Road transport margin of safety/survival of individuals in HAZMAT road transportation accidents for use in Emergency
Lethal concentration
Response Planning (ERP). In this study, at first, the safety margin and survival margin were defined and pro­
Chemical exposure index
Consequence modeling
posed. Then, as a case study, the chemical tanker trucks in Iran’s road transport fleet were investigated and the
full bore rupture of the tanker trucks was considered as the selective scenario. Eventually, safety margin and
survival margin were determined using ALOHA and PHAST software and the Chemical Exposure Index (CEI). The
results showed that using the CEI, among the selected chemicals, ammonia, chlorine and 1,3-butadiene had the
highest chemical release potential with the exposure indices of 597, 548 and 284, respectively, and need further
investigation. The possible safety margin obtained in this study was distances over 5100 m (using ALOHA
software for ammonia) and 10,983 m (using PHAST software for chlorine). On the other hand, the survival
margin was distances over 980 m away from the accident area (using ALOHA software for ammonia) and 620 m
away from the accident area (using the PHAST software for chlorine). The results of this study indicate that
determining the safety and survival margins surrounding the tanker trucks and containers of chemicals is a
critical issue for the emergency response planning and determining the standards of road’s safety and survival
margins. On the other hand, due to the obtainment of different results by various methods and software, in road
accidents, the highest hazard distance is suggested to be considered to determine the safety margin (distances
longer than 10,983 m) and survival margin (distances longer than 980 m) for ERP, regardless of the type of used
material and software.

1. Introduction Therefore, it is necessary to take appropriate measures in order to reduce

Road transport is the most common type of transportation in various
countries of the world. Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) truck accidents
are among the most important problems in the road transportation
(Ghaleh et al., 2019). Risk assessment and management of HAZMAT
road transportation has long been a concern because of the potential
hazards it poses (Li et al., 2019). According to statistical data, approx­
imately 6000 kinds of HAZMAT exist, and more than 2000 kinds of
commonly used HAZMAT are transported on roads in China (Yang et al.,
2018). Due to the release of hazardous substances, transportation in­
cidents can cause a significant damage to the affected communities.
their impact and risk of occurrence (Ditta et al., 2019).
With the increase in transportation of hazardous materials, the ac­
cidents and financial losses are also rising. In this regard, the US Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) clearly shows
this increasing trend. For example, the number of transportation acci­
dents increased from 4752 in 1985–15,111 in 2015 (Fig. 1), and the
financial losses increased from $7324 in 1975 to $113103 in 2011 and
$61252 in 2015 (Fig. 2) (US DOT, 2017).
Iran has many chemical process industries, such as 53 petrochemical
complexes, 58 developmental petrochemical plants, 22 oil and gas re­
fineries, and more than 100 other chemical manufacturing plants (Jafari

* Corresponding author. School of Public Health and Safety, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Daneshjo Blvd, Shahid Shahriari Square, Velenjac,
Tehran, Iran.
E-mail address: Jabbarim@sbmu.ac.ir (M. Jabbari).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2020.104139
Received 11 August 2019; Received in revised form 4 March 2020; Accepted 11 April 2020
Available online 17 April 2020
0950-4230/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M. Jabbari et al.
Fig. 1. Number of accidents related to hazardous materials in the US according
to PHMSA statistic (US DOT, 2017).
Fig. 2. Financial losses due to hazardous material transportation accidents in
the US according to PHMSA (US DOT, 2017).
et al., 2018). In these industries production of hazardous materials or
use of them as raw materials is quite common (Khatabakhsh et al.,
2019). A fraction of these chemicals is transported by roads. According
to the Statistical Yearbook of the Road Maintenance and Transportation
Organization, the amount of goods transported by road increased from
1.166 million tons in 1998 to 6.430 million tons in 2008; i.e. an increase
of 5.3 million tons in 10 years (Roshandeli, 2017). Accidents related to
the road transportation of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) are among
the most important road hazards. Due to their pressurized storage in
tanks, hazardous gases and chemicals are often considered as the
greatest risk to individuals and property along the road. They may
induce severe consequences such as fatality, injuries, evacuation,
financial loss and environmental damage (Chakrabarti and Parikh,
2011). According to the studies done by Yang et al. the most common
type of road accidents is the release of hazardous materials in environ­
ment which is responsible for 84.5% of the accidents (Yang et al., 2010).
Along with the increase in the transportation of hazardous materials,
public concern over road accidents has increased due to transportation
through densely populated and enclosed areas. Accidental leakage of
toxic and flammable materials from road tanker trucks is considered as
the trigger for these accidents (Jabbari et al., 2011). Numerous studies
have been done on chemical transportation accidents. Most of these
studies have been conducted in fire and explosion or environmental
2
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 65 (2020) 104139
effects of chemicals field. For example, Inanloo and Tensel have studied
the effects of explosions while carrying hazardous materials. The aim of
the study was investigating accidental release of ammonia and finding a
way to predict the consequences of transportation of hazardous mate­
rials. In this study, for different scenarios, ALOHA software, along with
GIS, were used to determine the flammable and over-pressured areas.
The researchers suggested that this study could serve as guidance for
decision-makers in transportation of hazardous materials in order to
change the route or time, or limit the amount of hazardous materials and
decrease the possible effects after the accident (Inanloo and Tansel,
2015). Sakamoto et al. examined the effect of pool fire of gasoline on the
liquid hydrogen storage tank at the hybrid hydrogen-gasoline fueling
station. They concluded that the emissivity of the outer material of the
tank and the safety distance between the liquid hydrogen storage tanks
and the gasoline dispensers should be less than 0.2 and more than 8.5 m,
respectively, in order to protect the storage tank from the gasoline pool
fire. In order to reduce the safety distance, safety measures such as
installing additional thermal shields, protective painting systems, water
sprinkler systems, and an appropriate slope for conducting gasoline to a
safe container from the storage tank should be taken (Sakamoto et al.,
2016). Bonvicini et al. made a quantitative analysis of the environ­
mental risk due to accidental leakage of onshore pipelines and stated
that although the pipeline is considered as the safest means of trans­
portation for hazardous materials, the records of past accidents confirms
the serious consequences of potential hazards (Bonvicini et al., 2015).
Risk of death due to the release of toxic substances has also been studied
in some articles, such as the study done by Brzozowska. In his study,
Brzozowska simulated the effect of accidents for chlorine tanker trucks
using computer and introduced a modeling program for pollutant
emissions in urban environments. Brzozowska showed that in the event
of an accident and leakage of 10 tons of chlorine, an area of more than 2
square kilometers will be exposed to pollution cloud with concentrations
above the threshold levels and about 5000 people will be at lethal risk
(Brzozowska, 2016).
Concentrations of exposure to chemicals are used with different titles
in industries and emergency response planning, including these:
- Lethal Dose 50 (LD50)
- Immediately Dangerous for Life and Health (IDLH)
- Protective Action Criteria (PAC)
- Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs)
- Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)
- Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEELs)
- Threshold Limit Values (TLVs)
- Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs)
- Recommended Exposure Limits (RELs)
These values are intended for long-term health protection or short-
term exposure and can be used to determine the level of exposure of
individuals or safety margins in emergencies. LD50 also determines le­
thal concentrations for 50% of animals or individuals at risk. Analysis
shows that none of the exposure levels above have been set for pro­
tecting individuals in the event of an accident or emergencies, in which
there is not enough time or opportunity to escape from the hazardous
area and save lives. In the event of an accident and leakage of chemicals,
one has to distance himself from the incident point so that there is no risk
of death for him, although he may still be at some risks. For this purpose,
in the present study, first the safety margin and survival margin were
defined, using which, not only individuals’ health is protected, but also
there would be no risk of death. Then, possible incidents caused by the
accidental release of chemicals from Iran’s road transport chemical
tanker trucks were investigated and safety and survival margins were
determined for them by PHAST and ALOHA software and the chemical
exposure index (CEI). Analyzing previous studies shows that numerous
researches have been performed using PHAST and ALOHA software and
CEI to investigate accidents in process units (Sharma et al., 2013;
M. Jabbari et al.
Rashtchian and Lak, 2007), pipelines (McGillivraya et al., 2014; Jabbari
and Kavousi, 2011; Jabbari et al., 2012) and road transportation (Bariha
et al., 2016; Chakrabarti and Parikh, 2011; Inanloo and Tansel, 2015;
Atabi et al., 2017).
The present study intends to investigate the tanker trucks of haz­
ardous materials in order to find out, which toxic chemicals are
commonly carried on Iran’s roads and determine what their safety
margin and survival margin are, using PHAST and ALOHA software and
CEI. On the other hand, the relationship between the results obtained by
the software and the index above is determined to allow emergency
response planning for the individuals near the accident point and the
resident population in order to decrease potential hazards.
2. Methodology
In this study, two margins were initially defined for the trans­
portation of chemicals: safety margin and survival margin. In the area
outside the safety margin, everyone could be exposed to chemicals for
up to 1 h and still experience no significant or irreversible health effects
that can hinder taking the appropriate safety measures. This distance
could be determined by using ERPG-2. This concentration value is
important to ensure the safety of people living adjacent to the road
against chemical tanker trucks accidents.
Since people adjacent to the tanker trucks carrying hazardous ma­
terials do not have the necessary 1-h time to get out of the accident
point, the most important issue for them is survival. Therefore, it is
necessary to define another margin for these people, which is called the
survival margin. In other words, survival margin means distances
beyond the lethal distance based on lethal concentration 1 (LC1) at
which, there is no risk of death for the individuals, but can lead to life-
threatening health effects.
2.1. Chemicals and road transportation tankers of hazardous materials
In order to determine the safety and survival margins in this study,
Iran’s road transportation fleet was investigated. After reviewing the
most commonly carried hazardous chemicals, chlorine, ammonia, ben­
zene, toluene and 1,3-butadiene were selected because of high toxicity,
and the full bore rupture of the tanker (the worst case) was studied as the
selective scenario. “Full bore rupture” of the tanker is the sudden
rupture of the tanker causing complete release of all its content. Then,
hazard rating was performed using CEI. Finally, modeling of the release
pattern of materials was done using ALOHA and PHAST software and
safety and survival margins were determined in order to create emer­
gency response plans. Companies transporting hazardous chemicals in
Iran’s road transportation fleet transport these materials in accordance
with the ADR standard and by using special cylinders and tankers in the
following six groups:
2.1.1. Gas tankers (pressurized tankers)
These tankers are used for carrying pressurized liquids (gases),
including LPG, butane, propane, propylene, 1,3-butadiene and the like.
The most common type of these tankers has a capacity of 37,100 L.
Among the substances in this group, 1,3-butadiene was used for conse­
quence modeling due to its high toxicity.
2.1.2. Special tankers for the transportation of ammonia
Due to the sensitivity and high risks of carrying ammonia, it is
important to take high level safety measures for this chemical. Tanker
trucks carrying this type of materials have a capacity of 32,000 L and in
the present study, their consequence analysis was done due to their
heavy traffic on the country roads.
2.1.3. Four material tanks
These tanker trucks are used for the transportation of oil, gas and
petrochemical liquid products. The most common freights carried by
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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 65 (2020) 104139
this group of tanker trucks are: oil, diesel, benzene, toluene, gasoline,
hexanol, styrene monomer, vinyl acetate, and the like. The capacity of
these tanks is often 6000, 9000, 12,000 and 32,000 L. Since we consider
to assess the toxicity of the materials in this study, benzene and toluene
were taken into account due to their higher toxicity. In this research,
tanks with capacity of 32,000 L, which are the most commonly used
tanks, were considered for consequence analyzing. The consequence
modeling was performed by PHAST and ALOHA software and CEI for
these two chemicals.
2.1.4. Caustic soda and acid tankers
This group of tankers are used because of their special properties to
carry a variety of liquid acids and caustic soda. In the present study, the
chemicals in this group were not studied due to their low airborne
potential.
2.1.5. Steel tankers
The sensitivity, importance and durability of some of the chemicals
during transportation is very important. These types of tankers are used
to carry mono-ethylene glycol and di-ethylene glycol. The chemical
compounds in this group were not studied in this research because of
their very low risk (NH ¼ 1).
2.1.6. Chlorine gas transportation cylinders
Chlorine gas- Due to its high toxicity (NH ¼ 4) and fatality caused by
inhalation-is usually transported by cylinders and it is rarely carried by
tankers. The chlorine cylinders have capacities of 45, 68 and 907 kg or 1
ton. In this research, 1-ton chlorine gas cylinders, which are the most
common type of cylinders, were considered for consequence analysis.
2.2. Studied scenarios in road transportation accidents
Various consequences are encountered in road transportation acci­
dents involving hazardous materials (Jabbari and Kavousi, 2011).
Among the considered outcomes, according to the research subject, the
status of “non-flammable - exposure to toxic fumes” was taken into ac­
count in order to determine the safety and survival margins for the
investigation of road transportation accidents involving chemical tanks.
The literature review shows that hazardous materials transportation
tankers have various failure modes due to road accidents. Some re­
sources identified leakage scenarios with leakage dimension of 10 mm,
35 mm, 50 mm, 100 mm, and full bore rupture (ARAMIS et al., 2004).
Some others divided the scenarios into small leakage and large leakage
ones and considered releases of 3.785–3785 L as small leakages and
releases greater than 3785 L as large ones. Since the hazard domain of
large leakage scenarios also covers small-leakage scenarios, in the pre­
sent study, incidents with large leakage or full bore rupture of the
tankers were considered as the selective scenario for the modeling of
toxic releases.
2.3. Concentrations of Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs)
The fatalities and complications caused by the release of chemicals
depend on the concentration of the toxic material and exposure dura­
tion. To assess the toxicity effects of chemicals, there are various criteria
and parameters. One of the criteria used in this regard is ERPGs. The
values listed in the Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPGs)
have been set out by the American Industrial Hygiene Association
(AIHA). The ERPG values of the chemicals under study are presented in
Table 1 (AIHA, 2008).
2.4. Lethal concentrations (LC)
Lethal concentrations, which are usually expressed as percentages,
are concentrations of toxic substances that kill a proportion of in­
dividuals or animals at risk. In this study, the lethal concentrations of the
M. Jabbari et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 65 (2020) 104139

Table 1 exposure of individuals to chemicals and to determine the hazard dis­

ERPG values of the studied chemicals. tance. According to the chemical exposure index, chemicals with a CEI
Chemicals ERPG – 1 (ppm) ERPG – 2 (ppm) ERPG -3 (ppm) higher than 200 require further risk review. Therefore, in the present
study, chemicals with CEI greater than 200 were selected for more
Chlorine 1 3 20
Benzene 50 150 1000 investigation (DOW’S Company, 1994).
Ammonia 25 150 750
Toluene 50 300 1000 2.6. Modeling the release of toxic chemicals using ALOHA and PHAST
1,3-Butadiene 10 200 5000 software

chemicals were calculated to determine until what distance from the
incident point there still is a risk of death. Therefore, by determining
fatal distances, identification of survival margin is done, and emergency
response planning becomes more practical and reasonable.
The value of lethal concentrations for some chemicals is achievable
using the probit equations. Probit method is the most common method
for determining the probability or percentage of death due to exposure
to toxic materials. The equation for converting the probit value, Pr, to
the percentage of death, P, is as follows (Jabbari and Kavousi, 2011):
� � ��
Pr 5
p ​ ¼ ​ 0:5 ​ � ​ 1 ​ þ ​ erf pffiffi (1)
2 2.6.2. Atmospheric data
Where
2
Z x
erf ​ ðxÞ ​ ¼ ​ pffiffiffi e t2
dt
π 0
The probit value is a number between zero and eight, and the higher
the number is the higher the probability of death will be. After deter­
mining the probit value, the lethal concentration is calculated according
to the probit equation as follows (Orozco et al., 2019):
Y ¼ K1þ K2. ln (Cn. t)
Where Y is the probit value, C (ppm) is the concentration of the toxic
material, t (min) is the duration of exposure to the toxic material and K1,
K2 and n are constants which depend on the type of chemicals (Table 2).
In the present study, duration of exposure to the toxic material was
assumed to be 10 min. Based on purple book, the averaging time for
toxics should be comparable to the exposure time. The averaging time
for toxics is based on an exposure time of 10 min (Purple Book, 2005).
In the present study, for comparing the results in different concen­
trations and observing hazard distance’s changing patterns based on
different LCs, lethal concentrations were determined for five states: le­
thal concentration of 1% (LC1), lethal concentration of 10% (LC10),
lethal concentration of 50% (LC50), lethal concentration of 90% (LC90)
and lethal concentration of 99% (LC99). Finally, toxic emissions in
considered concentrations were modeled using ALOHA and PHAST
software in order to determine the lethal distance and survival margin in
road accidents involving chemical tankers.
In this study, due to the non-availability of probit coefficients for 1,3-
butadiene, no lethal concentrations were calculated for this material.
Modeling of toxic chemicals dispersion was performed in the F-sta­
bility class by ALOHA 5.4.7 and PHAST 7.2. The four factors required for
modeling in this method include the geographical condition of the re­
gion, atmospheric data, chemical’s data, and characteristics of the
dispersion source:
2.6.1. Geographical condition of the region
The studied area in this research was the Karaj Highway, which is
located in the longitude of 50� 590 E and latitude of 35� 50’ N and altitude
of 1369 m above sea level.
Meteorological data of Karaj was studied from 1985 to 2015. Based
on these data, the average air temperature in this region was 15.16 � C,
relative humidity was 48%, average wind speed was 4.8 mph (2.15 m/
(2) s), and the wind direction was 315� (NW). In this study, consequence
modeling was performed based on the F-stability (completely stable) in
order to investigate the worst weather conditions in terms of dispersion
of toxic chemicals for emergency response planning.
2.6.3. Chemical data
(3) In this study, in order to investigate chemicals’ emission pattern, the
data of the chemicals studied– i.e. ammonia, benzene, 1,3-butadiene,
toluene and chlorine-such as ERPG concentrations, boiling point,
vapor pressure, temperature, operating pressure and volume of material
inside the tanker were entered into the relevant parts of the software.
2.6.4. Characteristics of the emission source
Characteristics of the emission source, such as the capacity of
chemical tankers and their length and diameter, were determined ac­
cording to the scenario defined in the present study, i.e. full bore rupture
of the tanker. Furthermore, the emission’s pattern (instantly or contin­
uous) as well as the characteristics of the location under study, such as
the distance from the leakage point, concentration of the chemical at the
set distances, and the evaluation criteria, such as ERPG concentration
and lethal concentrations (LC1, LC10, LC50, LC90 and LC99) were
entered into their relevant parts of the software.
After entering data into ALOHA and PHAST software and calculating
CEI, the results were compared and the probable hazard distance and
safety and survival margins were determined and, finally, suggestions
were made for emergency response planning.

3. Results
2.5. Chemical exposure index (CEI)
In this section, the results of the investigation of probable incidents
Chemical Exposure Index is one of the valid indexes for ranking the of road transportation of hazardous materials, their ranking using the
chemical hazards that was published in 1994 by the American Institute
CEI, and modeling of the emission pattern of these materials using
of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). This index is used to calculate the ALOHA and PHAST software will be presented and safety and survival
margins will be determined.
Table 2
Constant numbers of probit equation for the studied chemicals in the present 3.1. Determination of lethal concentrations
research.
Chemicals K1 K2 n The probit equation was used to determine the lethal concentrations.
Ammonia 35.9 1.85 2 The results are presented in Table 3:
Chlorine 8.29 0.92 2 As observed, lethal concentrations were calculated in five modes
Benzene 109.78 5.3 2 (LC1, LC10, LC50, LC90 and LC99) and for four materials (ammonia,
Toluene 6.794 0.408 2.5
chlorine, benzene and toluene). After determining the lethal

4
M. Jabbari et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 65 (2020) 104139

concentrations, the determined hazard distances -by ALOHA and PHAST Table 4
software-were proposed as the maximum lethal distance around the CEI index and toxicity hazard distance from the incident point based on the CEI.
incidence point to determine the fatal hazard area and the survival hazard distance (m)
margin.
Row Chemicals CEI HD1 (ERPG-1) HD2 (ERPG-2) HD3 (ERPG-3)

3.2. Results of calculation of chemical exposure index and determining 1 Ammonia 597 10,000 5974 2672
2 Chlorine 548 9485 5476 2121
the hazard distance 3 1,3- 284 10,000 2842 569
Butadiene
The calculation of the CEI index showed that out of the 5 studied 4 Benzene 30 1192 689 267
chemicals, ammonia, chlorine and 1, 3-butadiene had a CEI above 200. 5 Toluene 27 654 267 146
Assessment of the results showed that the ammonia tank had the highest
exposure index, i.e. 597, followed by the chlorine gas cylinder with 548
3.4. Results obtained using PHAST software for modeling the release of
and the 1,3-butadiene tank with 284, which need further evaluation.
toxic materials
The CEI index and the toxicity hazard distance of the studied
chemicals are provided in Table 4 based on the ERPGs. It should be
3.4.1. Determination of safety margin
noted that based on the CEI Guide, hazard distances higher than 10,000
The results of PHAST software have been presented in Fig. 5 for
m were rounded down to 10,000 m.
determining the toxicity hazard distance from the incident point at the
The results of determination of the hazard distance based on ERPG-2
ERPGs concentrations.
showed that ammonia had the longest hazard distance with the distance
The results presented in this graph show that based on the ERPG-3
of 5974 m. The hazard distances for the ammonia based on ERPG-1 and
and ERPG-2 indices, chlorine has the longest and toluene the shortest
ERPG-3 are 10,000 and 2672 m, respectively.
toxicity hazard distance among all the studied materials. Hazard dis­
Since there is the risk of serious or irreversible health effects or
tances determined based on ERPG-1, by PHAST software, are very long
symptoms at the incident point, especially in the early moments of
and emergency response planning based on ERPG-1 is nearly impossible.
exposure, ERPG-2 was considered as the main index for assessing and
So, in this study, ERPG-2 –that in concentrations below it, nearly all of
comparing hazard distances and establishing safety margin especially
the individuals could remain exposed for up to 1 h without experiencing
for nearby residents to avoid potential hazards.
or developing irreversible and serious health effect or symptoms that
could impair their abilities to take protective action-was used for
3.3. Results obtained using ALOHA software for modeling the release of
determination of Safety margin.
toxic materials
3.4.2. Determination of survival margin
3.3.1. Determination of safety margin
The hazard distances from the incident point are provided in Fig. 6
The obtained toxicity hazard distance of the five studied materials
based on the lethal concentrations of LC1-99 for the chemicals studied
from the incident point based on the concentrations of the ERPGs using
using PHAST software.
ALOHA software are presented in Fig. 3.
As shown in Fig. 6, using PHAST software, the lethal distances of
As it can be seen, according to the ALOHA software, ammonia has the
chlorine, ammonia, benzene and toluene based on the LC1 for 1% of the
highest toxicity hazard distance.
exposed individuals, are 620, 129, 23 and 22 m, respectively. Therefore,
based on the PHAST software, chlorine has the highest toxicity hazard
3.3.2. Determination of survival margin
distance which should be taken into account in order to prevent the risk
By using the ALOHA software, the results of the hazard distance from
of death in road accidents and determine the survival margin.
the incident point are provided in Fig. 4 for the lethal concentration of
the chemicals studied. It should be noted that ALOHA did not determine
3.5. Comparison of the results of CEI and the ALOHA and PHAST
the hazard distance of benzene and toluene due to their low toxicity.
software in order to determine the safety margin
As observed, the ammonia can cause fatality of about 99 percent of
the exposed individuals at the distance of 545 m and chlorine gas at the
The hazard distances determined for chemicals studied by the CEI
distance of 333 m. Regarding the lethal concentration of LC1, ammonia
index and the ALOHA and PHAST software reveal huge differences.
and chlorine gas can result in fatal consequences for about 1% of the
These distances have been compared in Fig. 7 based on the concentra­
exposed individuals at the distance of 980 m and 932 m, respectively.
tion of ERPG-2 for the chemicals studied.
Since, based on the lethal concentration of LC1, ammonia has the
As shown in the comparison figure above, ALOHA shows the longest
longest lethal toxicity risk at 980 m, it is necessary to consider this
hazard distance in one case (toluene), PHAST in three cases (ammonia,
distance as the survival margin to prevent the risk of death in road
chlorine and benzene) and CEI in one case (1,3-butadiene).
accidents.
3.6. Comparison between the results obtained using ALOHA and PHAST
software to determine the survival margin

A comparison of the distances calculated by ALOHA and PHAST

software based on the lethal concentration of LC1 for the studied
chemicals is presented in Fig. 8.
Table 3 As observed, among the chemicals studied, based on LC1, the most
Lethal concentrations of the studied chemicals. hazardous chemical is ammonia with a hazard distance of 980 m ac­
Lethal concentrations (ppm) cording to the ALOHA software, and chlorine with a hazard distance of
620 m by the PHAST software (Fig. 9).
Chemicals LC1 LC10 LC50 LC90 LC99
Therefore, based on Fig. 9, ALOHA’s results for ammonia should be
Ammonia 10,647 14,159 20,011 28,283 37,514 used for determining survival margin in the vicinity of roads.
Chlorine 122 216 432 869 1537
Benzene 12,817 14,151 15,967 18,017 19,867
Toluene 4262 11,968 41,888 146,921 410,867

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M. Jabbari et al. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 65 (2020) 104139

Fig. 3. Prediction of toxicity hazard distances of different chemicals based on the concentrations of ERPGs using ALOHA software.

4. Discussion and conclusion

In this study, first the safety margin and survival margin were
defined and suggested. Then, various chemicals such as ammonia,
chlorine, 1,3-butadiene, benzene and toluene were selected from
different chemicals transported in Iran’s road transportation fleet, and
dispersion modeling was carried out based on the mean air temperature
and wind speed in F – stability class. Ever since emergency response
planning for every different chemicals and scenario is nearly impossible,
the most dangerous scenario - full bore rupture of the tanker - was
chosen for consequence analysis.
Assessment of the results obtained using ALOHA and PHAST soft­
ware as well as the CEI show that there is no matching between the
results, although in most cases the ALOHA results are closer to CEI. Each
software has some default assumptions based on the experimental and
mathematical studies done by the provider organizations or companies.
Therefore, the results are different in some cases.
The results show that, using the CEI, ammonia has the longest hazard
distance equal to 5974 m based on the ERPG-2 (it is not possible to
measure lethal concentrations using CEI). Based on the lethal concen­
Fig. 4. Hazard distance for ammonia and chlorine in road accidents according
tration of LC1, the most hazardous chemical obtained by ALOHA is
to the LC concentrations using ALOHA.
ammonia (with hazard distance of 980 m), and by PHAST it is chlorine
(with hazard distance of 620 m).
Comparison of this study with the study by Jahangiri and Parsarad

Fig. 5. Prediction of hazard distance in full bore rupture of the toxic chemical tankers based on ERPG concentrations by PHAST software.

6
M. Jabbari et al.
Fig. 6. Hazard distance for full bore rupture of tankers carrying toxic chemicals based on LC concentrations by PHAST software.
Fig. 7. Comparison of the hazard distances determined by ALOHA and PHAST software and the CEI based on the ERPG-2 concentration for the studied chemicals in
HAZMAT road transportation fleet.
(2010), which was performed using the CEI to determine the hazard
margin of the release of toxic chemicals in a petrochemical industry,
shows that in both of these studies the full bore rupture scenario has
been taken into account (Jahangiri and Parsarad, 2010).
Comparison of the methodology and results of the study by Chak­
rabarti and Parikh with the present study shows that they considered
exposure times of 1 and 0.5 h for analyzing the outcome of the full bore
rupture scenario of the chlorine and ammonia tankers, while in the
present study, it was 10 min for both. Considering the fact that the in­
dividuals at the incident point try to escape from the hazardous area,
choosing the 10-min period seems more reasonable. Of course, taking a
longer period into account is correct for the emission of chemicals
around the incident point in places such as residential areas. Usually,
individuals involved in the incident, or those who are present at the
incident point, can quickly evacuate the site due to being quickly
informed. They will be exposed to the hazardous materials for a shorter
amount of time. However, due to the delays in being informed, residents
7
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 65 (2020) 104139
of the surrounding areas may require up to 1 h to escape from the risk of
death. Therefore, the values presented in Chakrabarti research are
appropriate for residents surrounding the incident area (Chakrabarti
and Parikh, 2011). The results of the study by Yousefi and Rashtchian on
ammonia vessels of Kermanshah’s Petrochemical Complex show that
these researchers, again consistent with the present study, considered
the duration of the leakage scenario to be 10 min, but in terms of the
leakage hole’s diameter and the output discharge mass, their results
were different from the present study. The leakage hole in Yousefi’s
study was 125 mm (Yousefi and Rashtchian, 2011), while in the present
study, the worst possible scenario which is the full bore rupture of the
tanker is considered. It should be noted that the full bore rupture of the
tanker can cover the risks of all possible scenarios because it has the
longest hazard distance.
Comparing the results of this study with the results of the study by
Hanna et al. (2008) shows that the hazard distances obtained by
different software differ significantly, sometimes. In the research, Hanna
M. Jabbari et al.
Fig. 8. Comparison of hazard distances obtained by ALOHA and PHAST software based on the lethal concentration of LC1 for the studied chemicals in HAZMAT road
transportation fleet.
Fig. 9. Hazard distance for full bore rupture of the most hazardous chemicals based on LC1 using PHAST (Left) and ALOHA (Right).
compared the accidents of chlorine-containing rail tankers for 10-min
release periods by various software (Hanna et al., 2008).
Reviewing the studies shows that researchers have used various
methods, scenarios and concentrations (ERPG, LC and so on) for deter­
mining hazard distances, and there is no single methodology for
obtaining the hazard distance. Because of the differences in the results
obtained with different methods, it is recommended to determine the
following safety and survival margins for all roads and even chemical
processes for emergency response planning:
4.1. Survival margin
In the event of an accident, individuals such as drivers and passen­
gers of other vehicles are at a close distance and there is a risk of death
for them, so, the most important thing is to take them away from the
incident point. This margin indicates distances farther than those of the
LC1 values. Therefore, the maximum hazard distance should be deter­
mined based on LC1 regardless of the type of chemicals and software
used in the emergency response planning. According to the present
study, this distance is 980 m, which is determined by the ALOHA soft­
ware for ammonia. Therefore, in the event of possible road accidents
involving hazardous materials, people at risk should be at a distance of
about 1 km from the incident point. Relief forces should attend the
incident point for evacuation of the individuals to a safe area with am­
bulances or appropriate relief vehicles, using breathing apparatus.
8
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 65 (2020) 104139
4.2. Safety margin
Since there are always factories and residential areas along the roads
and emergency response planning is essential for them, it is recom­
mended to perform the emergency response planning based on ERPG-2
for the individuals living along the roads and determine the specified
hazard distances as safety margin based on this value. Of course, it
should be noted that all the estimated concentrations and distances have
been obtained for exposure of individuals who are outdoor; indoor
concentrations are considerably lower. Therefore public education of
drivers and people along the roads using public media is necessary for
informing emergency rescue team and people at risk. Accordingly, the
hazard distance obtained by PHAST for chlorine gas, i.e. 10983 m, is the
best distance to prevent irreversible and serious health effects or
symptoms in a 1-h exposure duration in the vicinity of chemicals.
The results show that in high concentrations (LC1), ALOHA software
estimates longer hazard distances compared to PHAST and CEI. How­
ever, in low concentrations (ERPG-2), in most cases (ammonia, chlorine
and benzene) PHAST estimates longer hazard distances. Therefore, due
to the difference in results, based on different concentrations and soft­
ware, it is necessary to use the worst conditions, regardless of the
chemical or software, for proposal of safety margin and survival margin,
to ensure every individual’s safety.
Finally, comprehensive studies are recommended to determine the
safety and survival margins for roads and process plants, and to
formulate a standard for these margins.
The strengths of the present study are practicality and
M. Jabbari et al.
reasonableness of the results. The limitation of this study was impossi­
bility of comparing the results with real values. Therefore, it is recom­
mended that future researchers compare the results with other existing
software and also with actual concentrations. Furthermore, it is rec­
ommended to do the same study to investigate the risk of death from
explosion or fire caused by chemicals transported on the road, rail or sea.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgement
The authors thank the staff of the Iranian Petrochemical Trans­
portation Engineering Company for their assistance and cooperation.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jlp.2020.104139.
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