Psychology Themes and Variations 9th

Edition Wayne Weiten Solutions Manual

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CHAPTER EIGHT:
LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

Chapter Outline

Resources Necessary for Chapter 8 ...................................................................................................................... 152

Reflecting on the Chapter’s Themes ..................................................................................................................... 152
Psyk.trek Modules and Simulation ...................................................................................................................... 153
Demonstration/Activity: The Power of Framing ................................................................................................. 153
Demonstration/Activity: Defining Language ....................................................................................................... 153
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Animal Communication ............................................................................................ 154
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Cognition in Animal Learning .................................................................................. 155
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Language Acquisition ............................................................................................... 155
Demonstration/Activity: “Learning to Read” ...................................................................................................... 156
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Understanding the Meaning of Text ......................................................................... 157
Demonstration/Activity: Ambiguity and Levels of Sentence Structure ............................................................... 158
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Overview of the Problem-Solving Process ............................................................... 159
Demonstration/Activity: Scientific Thinking and Problem Solving in Riddles ................................................... 160
Demonstration/Activity: Functional Fixedness ................................................................................................... 161
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Solving Problems Through Algorithms and Heuristics ............................................ 161
Demonstration/Activity: Illustrating the Drawbacks of Algorithmic Problem Solving ...................................... 163
Demonstration/Activity: Incubation in Problem Solving .................................................................................... 163
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Errors in Decision Making ........................................................................................ 164
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Concept Learning ...................................................................................................... 165
Demonstration/Activity: Concept Learning in Class ........................................................................................... 166
Lecture/Discussion Topic: Culture and Concepts ................................................................................................ 167
Demonstration/Activity: Practice in Problem Solving ......................................................................................... 167
Answer Keys ........................................................................................................................................................ 168
References for Additional Demonstrations/Activities ......................................................................................... 168
Suggested Readings for Chapter 8 ....................................................................................................................... 170

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RESOURCES NECESSARY FOR CHAPTER 8
Psyk.trek Modules and Simulation
Psyk.trek
Demonstration/Activity: Functional Fixedness
Small sewing kit, several sheets of 8½  11 paper, roll of tape, sharpened pencil, phonograph record (33 1/3
rpm); various items that will serve as distractors (e.g., tennis ball, tool kit, apple)
Demonstration/Activity: Illustrating the Drawbacks of Algorithmic Problem Solving
Optional: Rubik’s cube
Demonstration/Activity: Concept Learning in Class
Greek letter trigrams, answer sheet

REFLECTING ON THE CHAPTER’S THEMES

Theme 1 (Psychology is empirical) is an important topic in Chapter 8. In fact, Theme 1 almost prevented thought from
being a viable subject matter in psychology. Behaviorists held almost absolute sway over experimental psychology in
the early part of this century. Because of their strong belief that only observable phenomena could be studied, cognitive
aspects of behavior were not considered legitimate fields of inquiry. However, as Weiten points out, the 1950s and
1960s ushered in a new era in psychology, and cognitive topics became acceptable. Interestingly, the development of
the computer seemed to provide some of the impetus for this change. As machines became capable of dealing with
information in ways similar to humans, it seemed more acceptable to talk about human thought processes. However,
empirical methodology was still seen as a must in dealing with cognition. Cognitive scientists have had to work at
developing “scientific” and rigorous techniques. Today, cognition is a field of major interest, probably in part because
of the development of empirical techniques for dealing with its subject matter.
Theme 5 (Our behavior is shaped by cultural heritage) is demonstrated in Chapter 8. Students may react to the
notion of cultural differences in thought in somewhat the same fashion that they reacted to the idea of cultural
differences in perception. When we refer to culture influencing thought, we are not referring to the biology of thought
but rather to the style of thought. One’s culture can influence the way that people interpret information from their
environment or the way that they approach various problems. Thus, students are again reminded that their way of
viewing the world is not the only way nor necessarily the correct way.
Theme 6 (Heredity and environment jointly influence behavior) is also important to Chapter 8. We could debate the
source of all cognitive skills, but the topic of particular interest in this chapter is language and its acquisition.
Historically, we have been faced with opposing theories of language acquisition, one of which is rooted in environment
(Skinner) and one in heredity (Chomsky). As is often the case, evidence exists to support both claims. Skinnerians can
point to the fact that various sounds (phonemes) drop out of usage because they are not reinforced and to the powerful
role of reinforcement through imitation and praise. Advocates of Chomsky’s theory can counter with examples of
unique utterances that have not been heard or reinforced previously and of the speed and universality with which
language is acquired. It appears likely, as in controversial areas like color vision, that both theoretical viewpoints have
some truth to them. It seems difficult to account for all that happens in language development through either
reinforcement or innate language acquisition devices. To further complicate matters, other theories of language
acquisition are being developed. For example, the text examines cognitive theories, and there is evidence that social
factors are important in developing language (see “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Language Acquisition”). Thus, there is
evidence that not only are heredity and environment involved in language but other factors as well.
Theme 7 (People’s experience of the world is highly subjective) plays a small role in Chapter 8. Our decision
processes when faced with risky decisions are particularly subjective. Also, research shows us that the way a particular
question is asked can affect the way it is answered—thus, the same question asked in different ways may result in
different answers. Finally, it may also be appropriate to highlight Theme 4 (Behavior is determined by multiple causes),
although Weiten does not highlight it in Chapter 8. Language is clearly a complex and involved topic.

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PSYK.TREK MODULES AND SIMULATION
You can use 2 Unit 7 modules and a simulation from the Psyk.trek CD-ROM to help illustrate concepts from Chapter 8.
Module 7e (Problem Solving) illustrates different types of problems and barriers to problem solving. Students will
review text concepts about problem solving and get some practice at solving problems and avoiding roadblocks to
solutions.
Module 7f (Decision Making) illustrates the text material toward the end of the chapter (“Decision Making: Choices
and Chances” and “Personal Application: Understanding Pitfalls in Reasoning About Decisions”). Students have several
chances to see these pitfalls in operation.
Simulation 7 (Problem Solving) confronts students with the hobbits and orcs problem from Weiten’s Figure 8.6C.
Students attempt to solve the problem with 3 hobbits and 3 orcs, then have a chance to solve the problem with 5 hobbits
and 5 orcs. If they have learned from the first attempt, the second problem may take fewer steps although it is a more
complex problem. There is one drawback to this simulation: The answer to the 3hobbit/3 orc problem appears in Figure
8.7 of the text.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: THE POWER OF FRAMING

Windschitl and Wells (1998) examined people’s ability to make judgments about the likelihood of various events
depending on the distribution of probabilities of other outcomes that framed the likelihood of the event in question.
Windschitl and Wells found that people had differing degrees of confidence in the likelihood of a particular event based
on the context of the other possibilities. In the simplest decision, participants felt more confident in the likelihood of
getting a chocolate chip cookie (2 cookies in the jar) when 7 other types of cookies were distributed with 1 cookie each
in the jar than when there were 7 other cookies of the same type in the jar.
Morrow (2002) provided a classroom demonstration of a similar effect—the anchoring-adjustment heuristic—that
you could use in class. The anchoring-adjustment heuristic shows that people’s judgments about an event are affected
by an “anchor,” which is an irrelevant number a participant encounters before being asked to make a judgment about the
likelihood of some event. In Morrow’s demonstration, she had students draw a number (either 340 or 340,627) from a
hat that she passed around class—she even announced that the number was uninformative and meaningless. Afterward,
she asked students to estimate the number of people in the United States who die from strokes each year. Students who
had drawn the low number estimated that fewer than 1000 people die from strokes each year, whereas the students who
had drawn the high number estimated almost 6000 people per year die from strokes. You can find another account of a
classroom exercise illustrating the anchoring-adjustment heuristic (based on starting salary for a job) on the Web
(http://kelley.iupui.edu/dsjie/Tips/kopelman.htm). Using one of these demonstrations in class should help your students
better understand the Windschitl and Wells (1998) study.

Morrow, J. (2002). Demonstrating the anchoring-adjustment heuristic and the power of the situation. Teaching of Psychology, 29,
129–132.
Windschitl, P. D., & Wells, G. L. (1998). The alternative outcomes effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,
1411–1423.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: DEFINING LANGUAGE

Weiten defines language as “symbols that convey meaning, plus rules for combining those symbols, that can be used to
generate an infinite variety of messages.” Nowhere does it mention that language must be vocal. In fact, attempts to
train animals to learn language have used nonvocal languages.
Hunter (1981) recommended a demonstration that will challenge your class to think about defining language.
Introductory psychology students typically bring a very narrow definition of language with them, so anything to
challenge that narrowness can be fruitful. Hunter suggested that you enter the classroom a little late to ensure that there
is a noisy background. Without speaking, try to get the class to become quiet. You could use hand signals, clap your
hands, or use some other gesture. If absolutely necessary, you could write quiet on the board, but preferably you would
not. After you have gotten a quiet room, give some simple nonverbal directions: “For example, indicate that students in

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one row should move their desks over, or gesture that a student (or students) should stand, turn around, or clap three
times” (p. 103). Again, without speaking, have the students divide into discussion groups. Hunter suggested that you
then perform a short mime routine. If you would prefer not to engage in this act, your point has probably been made
already anyway.
You will need to speak or use the board at this point. Have the discussion groups address three questions:
• What is communication?
• What is speech?
• What is language?
You can generate different or additional questions if you desire. After the groups talk, have them report to the class.
You can end the demonstration with a lecture centered on a definition of language or a question-and-answer session
dealing with language. Hunter suggested having students resolve certain questions to gain closure. For example, is
mime language? Is mime communication? Is sign language truly a language? If you wish to lead into the text’s
discussion of chimpanzees, you can ask whether animals can communicate and whether they have language.
Hunter noted that a teacher who does not speak is so alien to students that the demonstration can become quite
humorous. However, he also noted that it leads to productive discussion and serves as a good lead-in to discussing
language, animal studies of language, and cognitive topics.

Hunter, W. J. (1981). Language and communication: Defining language can leave you speechless. In L. T. Benjamin, Jr., &
K. D. Lowman (Eds.), Activities handbook for the teaching of psychology (pp. 103–104). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: ANIMAL COMMUNICATION

This topic can be an interesting follow-up to “Demonstration/Activity: Defining Language.” Weiten tackles the tough
question about animal language through the ape-language studies. On the surface, these studies seem to show evidence
of apes using language, but many have disputed this claim. Even Terrace changed his mind about Nim’s ability to use
language after looking more closely at the evidence. Perhaps we might gain more insight into such studies of animals if
we think in terms of communication abilities rather than language. In studying and defining animal language, our focus
seems to have been on forcing animals into our image rather than allowing them their natural differences. On the other
hand, looking at animal communication gives us the freedom to focus more on the activity and not the manner of the
activity.
Glass and Holyoak (1986) listed several features of human language and compared them to animal communication
systems to determine commonalities. You may note for the students that there are some similarities between the
information in the text and Glass and Holyoak’s list.
• Use of speech: Although animals may vocalize, they do not use any distinctly human speech sounds. However, not
all forms of human language use vocalization either. This should be clear from “Demonstration/Activity:
Defining Language.”
• Arbitrary associations: As the text points out, “no built-in relationship exists between the look or sound of words
and the objects they stand for.” Glass and Holyoak noted that similar arbitrariness exists in some animal
systems of communication and cited the song a bird uses to signal readiness to its mate as an example.
• Naming: We use a large collection of words to name objects in our environment. Glass and Holyoak suggested
that animals may be capable of using a similar notation system, but on a smaller and perhaps less universal
scale. They gave the example of monkey warning cries and noted that monkeys can signal different predators
(snakes, leopards, eagles) with different-sounding cries.
• Generativeness: Glass and Holyoak believed that “generativeness is the strongest candidate for a property that
distinguishes human languages from animal systems” (p. 447). They found no evidence for an animal system
that rearranges a finite set of symbols into many new messages on a regular basis, as humans do. Although
birds may rearrange basic melodic structures, there seems to be no attached change in meaning.
• Expressive power: Because of the generativeness principle, we can express a wide range of thoughts, even about
narrow topics. Although a monkey might be able to name a snake through a warning cry, it cannot
communicate about large versus small snakes, black versus red snakes, live versus dead snakes, snakes it has
seen in the past, or snakes it might see in the future, or even ask questions about snakes.

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 Despite the fact that animal communication and human language may have similarities, the two are not the same.
Animal communication is not as rich, fully developed, or wide-ranging as human language. Will it ever be thus? It
would seem that either smarter animals or more ingenious trainers will be required for animals to learn something that
truly is a language.

Glass, A. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1986). Cognition (2nd ed.). New York: Random House.

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: COGNITION IN ANIMAL LEARNING

Many researchers and theorists have successfully broken away from the earlier reliance on behavioristic theories to
explain all types of learning. Weiten details the rise of cognitive psychology, which helps to set the stage for this
chapter.
One piece of information that may surprise students is the application of cognitive theories to animal learning, an
area that has traditionally been dominated by behavioristic approaches. Remind them of the relevant information from
Chapter 6 concerning this topic (“Lecture/Discussion Topic: Cognitive Interpretations of Classical Conditioning”) such
as taste aversions, contingency theory, and blocking. Cognition has been applied even more broadly within animal
learning. Herrnstein has worked extensively with pigeons, which have the capacity to learn concepts. For example,
Herrnstein, Loveland, and Cable (1976) trained pigeons to discriminate among pictures of trees, bodies of water, or
certain people. The pigeons readily learned the discriminations at a high level and could generalize these concepts to
new pictures. The text does not cover concept learning per se, but it is a topic typically considered to be cognitive in
nature.
Also, parallels to the Atkinson and Shiffrin model of human memory exist for animals. Some research seems to
support the possibility of differing memory stores in animals, similar to Atkinson and Shiffrin’s findings. For example,
much research has shown that administering electroconvulsive shock (ECS) to animals may disrupt their memory
(Gordon, 1989). The greatest disruption occurs if the ECS is administered shortly after learning; memory disruptions
decrease as the interval between learning and ECS administration grows longer. Also, research has shown that
administering stimulants shortly after learning increases memory but that this effect decreases as the time since learning
lengthens. Both lines of research appear to show that animals may have short-term and long-term memory storage
systems.
For further information concerning this topic, see Roitblat (1987).

Gordon, W. C. (1989). Learning and memory. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Herrnstein, R. J., Loveland, D. H., & Cable, C. (1976). Natural concepts in pigeons. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal
Behavior Processes, 2, 285–302.
Roitblat, H. L. (1987). Introduction to comparative cognition. New York: W. H. Freeman.

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: LANGUAGE ACQUISITION

The process of acquiring language is a complex one, marked by many milestones and transitions. Despite the fact that
language is such a complex behavior, most children’s language development follows such a consistent pattern that a
table of norms like the one in Weiten’s Table 8.2 can be derived.
Students may wonder why babies don’t start to talk earlier than they do. Hoffman, Paris, Hall, and Schell (1988)
pointed out that speech requires a certain level of maturational readiness. Until the child has reached this state, speech is
physically impossible. For example, babies cannot control the flow of air over their larynxes or manipulate their tongues
well. Also, they have no teeth to help with making sounds. According to Hoffman et al., the vocal tract of a baby is
more similar to an adult chimpanzee’s than to an adult human’s. As the child matures physically, the vocal cords
become more changeable, muscular control increases, and the oral cavity becomes larger. All of these physical changes
are necessary before the child can produce language sounds on demand. Also, brain development, such as more
neuronal connections in the sensorimotor cortex, is vital to the development of speech capability.
Another important component of language is the ability to perceive speech. Research shows that infants have some
remarkable abilities in this area very early in life (Hoffman et al., 1988). For example, 3-day-old infants prefer their
mother’s voice reading a story over that of another female. Infants become emotionally sensitive to adult patterns of

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speech very early. At a month to 6 weeks of age, babies can distinguish between different speech sounds. However, if
the child does not continue to be exposed to such differences in the environment, the ability to discriminate between
speech patterns is lost. Similarly, the ability to produce some phonemes is lost if they are not heard in the language.
Social factors also play an important role in the development of language. For example, interaction seems to be a
particularly important event for normal language development. Many studies, across cultures, have confirmed the
existence of “motherese,” or child-directed speech in adults interacting with children: “The pitch of parents’ voices
becomes higher; the rise and fall of intonation is exaggerated; parents say only a few words at a time, pausing between
utterances; and they often repeat words and phrases” (Hoffman et al., 1988, p. 163). Exposure to this type of interaction
pattern seems to be important: It fosters early language acquisition, vocabulary, and even linguistic functioning in
adolescence. Another social aspect of language development is the idea of taking turns. Although parents typically
begin interacting with their babies by supplying all the conversation, they gradually begin to leave gaps for the child to
respond, visually or verbally. Thus, the infant learns important patterns in communication—taking turns, not
interrupting, paying attention, and making eye contact.
Finally, Hoffman et al. (1988) pointed out that there are cognitive precursors to language. Object permanence is
necessary for attaching labels to objects and being able to use labels to represent them. Development of concepts is
important for organizing the world into categories so that thought is more streamlined and efficient. Imitation shows
evidence of the use of internal images that have been stored. Symbolic play refers to play that centers on pretending; the
child can call on previous experience and translate that experience into symbols for use. Intention is necessary so the
child will attempt to use communication for a specific purpose. Up to the age of around 9 months, infants’ sounds and
signals are more a reaction to events than an attempt to communicate meaning. At this age, children develop the intent
to communicate and begin to use gestures and grunts in an attempt to get their meaning across to others.
Many important factors take place in language development and acquisition before those mentioned in the text. It
appears that we begin to prime ourselves to use language from birth—or earlier. Hoffman et al. (1988) reported a study
in which mothers read a certain children’s story twice daily during the last months of pregnancy. Three days after birth,
babies heard recordings of the same story and of a different story. Babies sucked more consistently to the familiar story,
thus seeming to prefer it. Clearly, language development can take place under interesting conditions.

Hoffman, L., Paris, S., Hall, E., & Schell, R. (1988). Developmental psychology today. New York: Random House.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: “LEARNING TO READ”

Reading is a behavior we take for granted, yet it is an integral and important aspect of language. Being able to speak but
not read would leave us lacking a significant skill that is vital in everyday life. Students probably have been readers so
long that they have forgotten their own struggle to read. This lack of understanding creates at least two problems. First,
in class it is somewhat difficult for students to comprehend theories of language acquisition. Second, in real life the
failure to understand may lead to a lack of empathy for adult nonreaders or one’s own children.
When teaching this chapter, I use a customized version of a first-grade reader, passed along to me by Ludy
Benjamin, to combat students’ lack of understanding about the difficulty of learning to read. This reader appears to be
based on (or derived from) a set of similar readers developed for Houghton Mifflin (McKee, 1971, 1972). Houghton
Mifflin produced at least two primers aimed at helping parents understand what their children would be going through
as they learned to read. This reader substitutes unfamiliar symbols for letters of the alphabet. Thus, the task is similar to
learning to read.
To use this demonstration in class, project the pages of the “book,” and ask the class to read aloud in unison so that
no one student will become overly embarrassed. Usually, their reading is clumsy and halting. After the demonstration,
the students will be able to discuss the difficulty of reading with new understanding.
Students enjoy this exercise and appear to learn from it. A sizable number of my students also report that it
rekindles early memories of learning to read. Thus, it appears that this activity is well worth a few minutes of your class
time.

McKee, P. (1971). A primer for parents (rev. ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
McKee, P. (1972). Primer for parents (rev. ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

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LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF TEXT
Walter Kintsch developed a model of text comprehension that is very much related to data gathered in experiments
dealing with memory and that grew out of a verbal learning background and tradition. We saw in Chapter 7 that the
memory of text information is not stored verbatim but instead is actively processed so that the gist or main idea can be
stored. Even a main idea may be further broken down for memory storage into propositions (Gordon, 1989). For
example, the sentence “The little girl rode the red tricycle” contains three propositions:
• The girl was little.
• The girl rode the tricycle.
• The tricycle was red.
Evidence indicates that each proposition is stored separately in memory. For example, Kintsch and Glass (Kintsch,
1974) found that participants asked to recall a sentence verbatim performed better when the sentence contained only one
proposition, even when sentence length was constant. Also, Kintsch and Keenan (1973) found that participants could
learn the meaning of a paragraph with fewer propositions more quickly than one with more propositions, even if they
contained the same number of words.
Although the notion that meaning is represented by propositions seems to be fairly well accepted, there is
controversy over the structure of propositional codes (Gordon, 1989). The debate seems to center on the issue of
whether the subject and predicate of the sentence are equal elements or whether the predicate is the central element of
the proposition. The structure of the proposition, however, seems to be less important than the means by which
propositions are used to understand text, particularly for students in introductory psychology.
Kintsch has theorized that we combine propositions in a text base, which is a coherent hierarchy dealing with all the
propositions in a block of text. This text base is much like an outline, with main points (propositions) given higher
positions within the hierarchy. Secondary propositions are relegated to lower positions in the text base, but they may
help clarify the main proposition. The clarifying or expanding phrases that are often found under each proposition
basically exist to make the meaning of the higher-level proposition more comprehensible. Each proposition is presumed
to consist of a subject and verb. For example, consider the sentence “The waves crash heavily onto the beach and wash
away the sand on the surface, causing erosion along the shore” (Gordon, 1989, p. 240). This complex sentence contains
three propositions: the main proposition of “waves crash” and two secondary propositions of “waves wash away sand”
and “waves cause erosion.” The text base might look something like this:
1. Waves crash (proposition based on main verb)
a. heavily (how)
b. onto the beach (where)
2. Waves wash away sand (proposition based on secondary verb)
a. on the surface (where)
3. Waves cause erosion (proposition based on secondary verb)
a. along the shore (where) (Gordon, 1989, p. 240)
If we can retrieve this text base from memory, we can recall the meaning of the text block. Note that no exact copy
of the text exists; instead, meaning is recovered by looking at the main proposition and reading downward to expand on
that proposition. My own observations of memory performance indicate that it may be easier to store or retrieve
propositions than to deal with the clarifying phrases. For example, on exams, students will often produce the general
sense of the correct answer to an essay item but will fail to produce the details that expand on or clarify the main
idea(s). The research of Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) is consistent with this anecdotal view of memory. They gave
participants a report and asked for recall immediately, 1 month later, or 3 months later. They found that participants
could produce several lower level propositions immediately but were likely to produce only high-level propositions
after a delay.
Finally, Kintsch’s position helps explain the fact that we typically draw inferences from a block of text. A text base
exists as a “logical, coherent structure” (Gordon, 1989, p. 241), meaning that the propositions should be interrelated into
a whole unit of meaning. Again, exact copies of the original propositions are unlikely to be available. If the text base’s
structure is not logical and coherent, we may draw an inference that allows us to make a logical, coherent whole. For
example, Kintsch (1976) presented his subjects with text bases like “A burning cigarette was carelessly discarded. The

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fire destroyed many acres of virgin forest.” Afterward, subjects were given a set of true/false statements about the
meaning of the sentences they saw. Subjects tested immediately after the original presentation were slow in responding
to statements like “A discarded cigarette started a fire,” which require an inference to be drawn. However, after 15
minutes had passed, the same subjects responded quickly to those items on the test. Immediately, the original sentences
may still have been available in memory. But after 15 minutes, the inferences had been drawn and only the gist was left.
Bransford and Franks (1971) used sentences that contained only one proposition. These sentences were also
combined into sentences that contained two or three propositions. After hearing a series of these sentences, participants
were given a surprise recognition test. Interestingly, the participants were most likely to judge a four-proposition
sentence as having been seen before, despite the fact that none were ever shown. Again, it seems that participants drew
inferences and memory was affected.
Kintsch’s work has been influential in notions of comprehension and recall. Although it is based on a traditional
verbal learning paradigm, the conclusions show that an active, cognitive process is involved in the process of extracting
meaning from text.

Bransford, J. D., & Franks, J. J. (1971). The abstraction of linguistic ideas. Cognitive Psychology, 2, 331–350.
Gordon, W. C. (1989). Learning and memory. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Kintsch, W. (1974). The representation of meaning in memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Kintsch, W. (1976). Memory for prose. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of human memory (pp. 90–113). San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman.
Kintsch, W., & Keenan, J. M. (1973). Reading rate and retention as a function of the number of propositions in the base structure of
sentences. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 257–274.
Kintsch, W., & van Dijk, T. A. (1978). Toward a model of text comprehension and production. Psychological Review, 85, 363–394.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: AMBIGUITY AND LEVELS OF SENTENCE STRUCTURE

Chomsky developed phrase-structure rules and transformational rules of grammar. Phrase-structure rules specify how
we can combine words into phrases and sentences and thus may be helpful in deciphering the meaning of sentences
(Reed, 2010). Much interesting work has been done with ambiguous sentences; phrase-structure rules can sometimes be
used to distinguish the meanings. For example, consider “They are flying planes.” One interpretation refers to some
people who are engaged in the act of flying planes; flying is part of the verb phrase. The second interpretation refers to
some planes that are currently being flown; flying is now an adjective describing the planes. Phrase-structure rules can
clarify the two meanings because of the verb-adjective distinction.
On the other hand, Chomsky’s transformational rules specify how simple declarative sentences can be rearranged
into questions, negatives, and other types of sentences. These rules may also be necessary to distinguish between
different meanings of an ambiguous sentence (Reed, 2010). For example, consider “Flying planes can be dangerous.”
Does this sentence refer to the act of flying being dangerous or to planes that pose a threat to someone? Phrase-structure
rules are not helpful in this case because “flying planes” serves as the subject of either interpretation. Chomsky designed
his transformational grammar to consist of two levels: “the surface structure, directly related to the sentence as it is
heard, and the deep structure, directly related to the meaning of the sentence” (Reed, 2010, p. 254). The only way to
resolve the ambiguity of the “flying planes” sentence is to know which of the two deep levels is intended.
Moates and Schumacher (1980) provided a long list of ambiguous sentences that you can present to your class. By
doing so, you can accomplish several objectives. First, you can demonstrate the importance of Chomsky’s
transformational rules. Second, you can demonstrate the importance of context. Many sentences we hear are potentially
ambiguous, but the meaning is made clear because of the context surrounding the sentence (Reed, 2010). Third, you
may be able to alert students to think about things that they say and write. Learning to express oneself clearly and
unambiguously is a treasured skill. Students are often careless about crafting unambiguous sentences. Finally, the class
can have a great deal of fun interpreting some of the sentences. Challenge students to derive as many different meanings
for each sentence as possible. Also, ask for examples of sentences that could clarify the meaning of each ambiguous
sentence. Moates and Schumacher’s sentences and explanations follow:
The simplest kind of ambiguity is lexical ambiguity. This occurs when one word in a sentence yields two or more
meanings and hence two or more underlying representations. For example,
1. California is a great state to live in despite its faults.
2. There is a fork in the road ahead.

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The two meanings of fault and fork lead to two different interpretations of these sentences. If you keep your mind
limber, you will find similar examples almost daily. Consider these:
3. To a waiter: “Do you have frog legs?”
4. Newspaper name: The Chattanooga News-Free Press
5. One of the more gruesome examples, “He shot off his mouth,” is so grisly you can hardly bear it.
The pun is a popular form of lexical ambiguity, though the surface structure for the pun often differs slightly for the two
meanings, as shown in these examples by Bennett Cerf (1968):
6. And then there was the fellow who inherited 392 clocks and is now winding up the estate.
7. A Texan down on the range is suing for a divorce. He found his dear and an interloper playing.
8. Then there was the seashore eccentric who spent all his time throwing rocks at gulls. He left no tern unstoned.
A second level of ambiguity embraces units larger than the word and permits two or more entirely different
interpretations of the same surface structure. For example,
9. The car was stopped by the tree can mean The tree blocked the movement of the car or The car was parked
alongside the tree. Similarly, there are two very different underlying representations for
10. The magician made the prince a frog.
Students of ours have found at least eight meanings for
11. Jane reports that her neighbor had her second car stolen.
Two of these are
a. Jane’s neighbor was the victim of car theft for a second time.
b. Jane’s neighbor arranged the theft of Jane’s old family jalopy.
How many meanings do you find for the following sentences?
12. The police were ordered to stop drinking at midnight.
13. She missed the boat.
14. Norman Rockwell painted me on his front porch. (Moates & Schumacher, 1980, pp. 139–140)
After presenting these examples to the class, you might have volunteers relate humorous incidents they have
experienced that arose through misinterpreting ambiguous sentences. It will help if you prime your audience by sharing
a personal story first.

Cerf, B. (1968). Bennett Cerf’s treasury of atrocious puns. New York: Dell.
Moates, D. R., & Schumacher, G. M. (1980). An introduction to cognitive psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Reed, S. K. (2010). Cognition: Theory and applications (8th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS

The text provides much information about different types of problems and various approaches to solving problems but
never gives an overview of the entire process. Providing some structure for the activity of problem solving before
covering this material might give students a better context for encoding the material in the text.
Glass and Holyoak (1986) developed a flowchart representation of the problem-solving process. Each step is
important for achieving a specific goal that aids in solving the problem. Problem representation is a critical step
because the manner in which a problem is represented may well determine whether it is solved. Many times a solution
cannot be found because the problem is poorly defined or poorly understood. Also, information may be presented that is
irrelevant to solving the problem but that becomes the focus in seeking a solution (see the problems under Weiten’s
“Problem Solving” In Search of Solutions” heading).
The second step in problem solving, planning a potential solution, allows you to evaluate your problem
representation. If it is poor, then the problem must be reformulated. If the problem was represented well, then you can
plan a possible solution and then proceed to test it. This step is the heart of problem solving and probably has the most
variations to it (see “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Solving Problems Through Algorithms and Heuristics”).
Next, if the initial problem representation was inadequate, the solver must reformulate the problem. Often the
initial representation was inadequate because of a common block or hindrance. Weiten mentions functional fixedness,
the search for analogies, and unnecessary constraints on the problem. Glass and Holyoak (1986) included the process of
noticing and applying analogies in this stage of problem solving. Gestaltist Karl Duncker used the following problem:

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 Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant tumor in his stomach. It is impossible to
operate on the patient, but unless the tumor is destroyed the patient will die. There is a kind of ray that can be used
to destroy the tumor. If the rays reach the tumor all at once at a sufficiently high intensity, the tumor will be
destroyed. Unfortunately, at this intensity the healthy tissue that the rays pass through on the way to the tumor will
also be destroyed. At lower intensities the rays are harmless to healthy tissue, but they will not affect the tumor
either. What type of procedure might be used to destroy the tumor with the rays, and at the same time avoid
destroying the healthy tissue? (Gick & Holyoak, 1980, p. 308)
Gick and Holyoak (1980) wanted to determine whether people could be aided in problem solving by working on
analogous problems. They first gave their participants a story about a general who wanted to capture a fortress in the
center of a country. The fortress was surrounded by many roads, but the roads had been mined so that only small
numbers of troops could safely traverse any road. However, the general had to have all of his forces to successfully
capture the fortress. Gick and Holynak gave different solutions to different groups of participants. Of primary interest
was the group who was told that the general sent small numbers of troops down each road to the fortress so they could
converge on the fortress. Gick and Holyoak found that 76% of the people receiving this story could solve the tumor
problem compared with 8% of the control group who received no analogy. The solution to the tumor problem is similar
to the solution of the general’s problem: Irradiate the tumor from several angles simultaneously with lower-intensity
rays. The convergence of the rays at the tumor will provide high enough intensity to destroy the tumor, but the
low-intensity radiation passing through healthy tissue will cause no damage.
Finally, the problem solver must execute the plan and check the results. Obviously, this step is critical in
determining whether the solution is correct. If the solution does not work, this step provides feedback about why the
solution failed, which can be used to plan a new solution or to reformulate the problem.

Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1980). Analogical problem solving. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 306–355.
Glass, A. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1986). Cognition (2nd ed.). New York: Random House.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: SCIENTIFIC THINKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING IN RIDDLES

Hatcher (1990) endorsed solving riddles to illustrate the stages in problem solving and scientific thinking. The entire
class receives the following information:
You are walking in the desert and find a man lying face down with a pack on his back, dead.
How did he die? (p. 123)
After reading this statement, tell students that you will respond to any yes/no question but will provide no further
information. After asking questions for a few minutes, the class should arrive at the solution: The man’s parachute
failed to open after he jumped from an airplane.
Hatcher divided the class into several small groups and gave each group several more riddles. One person in the
group, serving as the moderator, got the answer in order to answer the yes/no questions. You may want to rotate this
role so that everyone participates in the problem-solving process.
After the groups have solved the riddles, Hatcher pointed out to the class the similarity between solving riddles or
other problems and the scientific process. In particular, he emphasized the following points:
1. It is often important to view a problem from more than one perspective.
2. Prior assumptions concerning data are dangerous.
3. Yes/no questions, properly formed, yield highly useful data.
4. Details that do not fit expected patterns are often of crucial importance.
5. Persistence is a key quality in problem solving.
6. By expecting complicated answers, simple ones may be overlooked.
7. Science is an enterprise that is frustrating, exciting, and requires considerable courage. (p. 123)

An interesting variation on this technique would be to have the groups solve one or two riddles and then give the
talk about the important points in solving problems. Afterward, the groups could be given another riddle or two to see

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whether the information helped them solve riddles more easily.
Be sure that you are open to creative answers that also fit the situation. One hallmark of productive problem solving
is arriving at novel solutions.

Hatcher, J. W., Jr. (1990). Using riddles to introduce the process and experience of scientific thinking. Teaching of Psychology, 17,
123–124.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS

Weiten defines functional fixedness as “the tendency to perceive an item only in terms of its most common use.”
Someone who thinks to use a dime as a screwdriver is overcoming functional fixedness.
Weiten presents two of the most famous experimental studies of functional fixedness in the text: the string problem
in Figure 8.6B and the candle problem in Concept Check 8.2. Reed (2010) reported that functional fixedness is even
stronger when an item is presented in the context of its typical function. For example, the candle problem is made more
difficult if the box that must be used as a platform for the candles is filled with tacks. It is then seen as a tack container
rather than as a potential part of the solution. Reed also noted that a good example of overcoming functional fixedness
in real life is found in the attempts of prisoners to break out of jail. Because prisoners do not have access to tools to help
them escape, they must use items that are around them in unique ways.
Bernstein (1991) presented a good example that you can use in class to demonstrate how functional fixedness may
hinder problem solving. Display an array of items to your class: a small sewing kit like those from hotel rooms, several
sheets of 8½  11 paper, a roll of tape, a sharpened pencil, and a phonograph record (33 1/3 rpm). To these, add various
items that will serve as distractors; Bernstein suggested a tennis ball, a tool kit, an apple, and the like. The problem
presented to students is to play the phonograph record so that the class can hear it, using only these items. We often find
ourselves under pressure when we try to solve problems. You may wish to illustrate the effect of stress on problem
solving by setting a strict time limit for devising a solution or by dividing students into groups that compete against one
another, with a reward for the group that solves the problem first.
In coming years (if not already), you may encounter a new cognitive problem with this task. Future generations of
students may ask you, “What’s a record player?” The psychological world awaits someone figuring out how to play a
CD in class without a CD player!

Bernstein, D. A. (1991, January). Functional fixedness in problem solving. Presented at the 13th National Institute for the Teaching
of Psychology, St. Petersburg Beach, FL.
Reed, S. K. (2010). Cognition: Theory and applications (8th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: SOLVING PROBLEMS THROUGH ALGORITHMS AND HEURISTICS

An important consideration in problem solving is choosing an approach that will lead to a solution. Two general types
of approaches are algorithms and heuristics. The information provided here will enable you to enlarge your coverage of
these topics.
According to Reed (2010), an algorithm is “a set of rules that will solve a problem if correctly followed” (p. 311).
This definition immediately gives rise to an image of an exhaustive test of every possible solution by a trial-and-error
process, but this approach is not absolutely necessary. For example, if we know the principles of multiplication and
division, we can solve a totally new, complex division problem. We would approach it with an algorithm for solving
division problems. This algorithm guarantees a solution to the problem but is not exhaustive.
In some cases, an exhaustive search may be required. For example, I used to have a briefcase with a combination
lock. The lock had three dials, each with the numbers 0 through 9. If I forgot my combination, I could open the
briefcase by applying the algorithm of trying each possible 3-digit number combination, all 1000 of them. Eventually I
would get the briefcase open. However, if the problem is complex or has many potential answers, an exhaustive search
may be too costly in terms of time or effort. My old mailbox had a combination lock with 50 digits on the dial. I knew
that the combination had 3 numbers and required turning the dial in different directions each time. But the number of
possible combinations is astronomical. An algorithm is not a good strategy for opening this lock, although it would
eventually work if I had the time. If you think the mailbox combination represents a challenging problem, consider a
more complicated one, such as moving a piece in a game of checkers. Moates and Schumacher (1980) noted that

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“Samuel has calculated that such an approach to checkers would involve about 10 40 possible moves, which at 3 choices
per millisecond would still take 1021 centuries to consider” (p. 257). For chess, the estimate is that there are about 10 120
possible moves to consider. Previously, experts thought that even computers could not cope with algorithmic strategies
in such complex situations because of the massive amount of time involved in considering every possible move. With
the success of Deep Blue in defeating Kasparov in 1997, that day may be gone!
Because of the drawbacks in using algorithms, heuristics are more likely to be used in problem solving. Weiten
defines heuristic as “a guiding principle or ‘rule of thumb’ used in solving problems or making decisions.” However,
because a heuristic is only a selective search of possible solutions, it does not guarantee a solution. As Moates and
Schumacher pointed out, “heuristics thus reduce the cost of search at the risk of not solving the problem” (1980, p. 257).
Weiten provides a good account of four different heuristics used in problem solving: forming subgoals, working
backward, searching for analogies, and changing the representation of the problem. In addition, Glass and Holyoak
(1986) listed five judgment heuristics, “strategies that can be applied easily in a wide variety of situations and that often
lead to reasonable decisions” (p. 346):
• Similarity judgments: In categorization situations where the resemblance of an item to a category is judged,
similarity judgments are often used. For example, a robin and a bluejay are similar because they belong to the
category bird. However, robins, penguins, and chickens are all birds, and they share little similarity.
• Representativeness: Closely related to similarity, representativeness refers to how well a given item epitomizes the
larger item or category or how good an exemplar of a concept the given item is. Robins may be more representative
of birds than penguins or chickens because robins have more features of birds.
• Availability: The availability heuristic involves “basing judgments on the ease with which relevant instances can be
retrieved from memory” (Glass & Holyoak, 1986, p. 355). There will be more information about this heuristic in
“Lecture/Discussion Topic: Errors in Decision Making.”
• Analogical reasoning: When we are faced with a novel situation, we may think of a similar situation and use it as
an analogy to develop potential solutions for the novel situation. The success of this heuristic depends on whether
the similarities are important or superficial.
• Simulation: Rather than basing a decision on information stored in memory (availability), the simulation heuristic
bases decision making on examples constructed by the reasoner. For example, Glass and Holyoak (1986) presented
two hypothetical scenarios: (1) If Hitler had had the atomic bomb in 1943, Germany would have won World War
II; (2) If Hitler had had one more airplane in 1943, Germany would have won World War II. When presented with
these statements, people find the first much more plausible than the second, despite the fact that neither involves
facts and both require supposition. Simulation allows us to evaluate each situation for its potential impact and to
draw a logical conclusion.
There are many ways to approach problem solving. The heuristics Weiten presents in the text provide only part of
the picture.

Glass, A. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1986). Cognition (2nd ed.). New York: Random House.
Moates, D. R., & Schumacher, G. M. (1980). An introduction to cognitive psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Reed, S. K. (2010). Cognition: Theory and applications (8th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

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DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY:
ILLUSTRATING THE DRAWBACKS OF ALGORITHMIC PROBLEM SOLVING
As noted in “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Solving Problems Through Algorithms and Heuristics,” using an algorithm
guarantees a solution to a problem. If the particular algorithm to be used is known, as in solving mathematical problems,
this approach is quite effective. However, if the correct algorithm is unknown or consists of trying all possible solutions,
solving the problem may seem almost impossible.
Scoville (1990) illustrated this dilemma well in a problem-solving activity using a checkerboard pattern. He
provided students with pieces of the pattern and asked them to assemble the pieces. This puzzle could be solved with the
use of an algorithm: trying all possible combinations. If you have an old Rubik’s cube sitting around the house, you
could bring that to class as another example of the same type of problem.
However, in both cases there are thousands of possible combinations, and it is not easy to avoid the error of
attempting combinations that have been tried before.

Scoville, W. E. (1990). Brute force in problem solving. In V. P. Makosky, C. C. Sileo, L. G. Whittemore, C. P. Landry, &
M. L. Skutley (Eds.), Activities handbook for the teaching of psychology: Vol. 3 (pp. 87–89). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: INCUBATION IN PROBLEM SOLVING

Wallas (1926) identified four stages of problem solving:
1. Preparation: Information is gathered, and initial attempts to solve the problem are made.
2. Incubation: The problem is put aside for some time.
3. Illumination: A sudden insight into the solution occurs.
4. Verification: The solution is checked to make sure it is correct.
This list of stages is similar to Glass and Holyoak’s flowchart of the problem-solving process (described in
“Lecture/Discussion Topic: Overview of the Problem-Solving Process”). However, Wallas included the stage of
incubation, which Glass and Holyoak did not. In numerous anecdotal accounts, people set aside problems that seem
unsolvable and, coming back to the problems later, suddenly discover solutions (illumination occurs).
Moates and Schumacher (1980) cited an unpublished study by Silveira concerning incubation. Silveira gave her
participants a problem to work on and varied their approaches to the work. One group worked continuously on the task
for about half an hour and achieved a 50% success rate. A second group worked on the problem, took a half-hour break,
and returned to work on the problem; 64% solved the problem. A third group worked on the problem and took a 4-hour
break before returning to work; they solved the problem at an 85% rate. In opposition to Wallas’s theory, the
participants did not experience illumination during the incubation time nor immediately upon returning to the problem,
but they were nevertheless more likely to solve the problem.
Moates and Schumacher (1980) gave Silveira’s original problem, which you can use to demonstrate the incubation
process. You could give it to students at the beginning of the class, set it aside, and give it to them again toward the end
of class. Her problem:
A man had 4 chains, each 3 links long. He wanted to join the 4 chains into a single closed chain. Having a link
opened cost 2¢ and having a link closed cost 3¢. The man had his chains joined into a closed chain for 15¢. How
did he do it? (p. 245)
The second problem’s source is unknown; it appeared in my department after being passed around. Subsequently, I
have found numerous such puzzles on the Internet (search for “26 L of the A”). Note that the description of the test
refers to the incubation process. I can personally attest that incubation does work on this test. This set of puzzles may
work better with a longer incubation period. You might hand out this page one day, take it up the same day, and give it
back at the next class meeting. You will probably see many glimpses of insight among the students.

Moates, D. R., & Schumacher, G. M. (1980). An introduction to cognitive psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Wallas, G. (1926). The art of thought. New York: Harcourt.

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LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: ERRORS IN DECISION MAKING

Weiten refers to Simon’s work showing that we often make decisions based on less than adequate information. The
result, of course, may be less than adequate decisions. Myers (2007) summarized many distortions in social thinking
that may lead to poor decisions. These will add considerably to the list of problems covered in the text.
• We often do not know why we do what we do: Research shows that people whose attitudes have been altered
often claim that they have always believed the same thing. We often err in explaining our behavior; we may
ignore or minimize important factors and credit unimportant factors for having big effects on us. Also, we are
notoriously poor at predicting our future behavior, as Milgram’s research indicates.
• We often construct memories: We are often guilty of reconstructing our memories of past attitudes and behaviors.
Also, remember the work on memory construction—people’s memories can be altered based on leading
questions and expectations they hold.
• Our preconceptions control our interpretations: We perceive and interpret events in line with our expectations.
Notice how easy it is to catch others’ typos and how difficult it is to find ours. It often seems that officials at a
game seem to make bad calls against your team and calls that help your opponent. Research shows evidence of
belief perseverance: It is difficult to discredit a belief if you have already generated a plausible explanation for it.
• We overestimate the accuracy of our judgments: When asked to answer factual questions with a range that gives
us 98% confidence, we end up being accurate only about 60% to 70% of the time (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
We are prone to the confirmation bias, in which we seek information that confirms our preconceived notions.
Engineers at NASA and private companies may have been guilty of this bias when they approved the 1986
launch of the Challenger shuttle, despite faulty O-rings.
• We often are swayed more by anecdotes than by statistical facts: We tend to rely on anecdotal information even
in the face of statistical information that would be a more accurate prediction of the true state of affairs. The
availability heuristic, mentioned in “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Solving Problems Through Algorithms and
Heuristics,” is relevant here. This heuristic would explain, for example, why people often rate flying as more
dangerous than traveling by automobile, despite statistics that indicate just the opposite. Plane crashes are
spectacular events that get much attention in the news and thus are easily available in memory.
• We misperceive correlation and control: We have difficulty recognizing random events as being random and are
likely to perceive order or correlation when there is none. For example, despite the fact that there is no evidence
to support the notion, many people believe there is a relationship between adopting a child and then conceiving a
child shortly afterward. If we expect a relationship between events, we probably pay more attention to
confirming
rather than disconfirming events. We are prone to the illusion of control when we believe that random events are
somehow under our control. Gamblers and superstitious people are especially prone to the illusion of control.
• Our beliefs can generate their own confirmation: The best example of this error is the self-fulfilling prophecy.
Rosenthal and Jacobson’s (1968) classic research showed that teachers’ expectations of their students had an
effect on how well the students actually performed.
Unfortunately, we are prone to many biases and errors in our thought processes. However, being made aware of
these biases may help us avoid such problems in the future.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures. Management Science, 12, 313–327.
Myers, D. G. (2007). Exploring social psychology (4th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. (1968). Pygmalion in the classroom: Teacher expectation and pupils’ intellectual development. New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: CONCEPT LEARNING

Concept learning is a topic often included in discussions of cognition, but Weiten does not cover it. Concepts may be
learned in similar ways as factual information, but concepts are much more broadly applied. As Moates and

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Schumacher (1980) pointed out, “a concept is abstract; it represents a class of things, not any particular member of the
class”
(p. 208). Concepts are similar to mathematical sets; they are defined by a list of properties. Items can be categorized as
belonging to a particular concept on the basis of those properties. The advantage of using concepts rather than specific
members is that concepts allow us to generalize from a known instance to an unknown event. Thus, we can use concepts
to solve the problem of novelty. We have an idea of what to expect when we go to a new grocery store because we have
been to other such stores and formed a concept of grocery store that leads us to expect certain things in this new store.
“A concept is defined by one or more attributes related by a rule” (Moates & Schumacher, 1980, p. 209). Attributes
are features of concepts that can vary from instance to instance. For example, automobiles can vary in shape, size, color,
number of doors, name, and so on. The fact that attributes can vary does not imply that they are important in defining a
concept. Relevant attributes help define concepts, but irrelevant attributes are not actually related to the concept. Color,
for example, is an irrelevant attribute for defining car. The rule defines the concept in terms of how the attributes are
combined. We are able to distinguish cars from trucks because they are defined by differing sets of attributes. However,
we are able to lump a Rolls Royce and a Volkswagen into a common concept of car because they are defined by a
common set of attributes.
As with many behaviors, the laboratory analogy does not always seem to mimic real life. Although we may learn
concepts as diverse and broad as car, dog, and job as we grow up, the laboratory situation is often simplistic and
artificial. For example, a participant may be faced with the task of learning what a GAX is from a set of simple stimuli
that vary along three attributes—shape, size, and position. The concept’s definition could revolve around any or all of
those attributes. For example, a GAX could be a circular object, a large circular object, or a large circular object
pictured in the middle. Moates and Schumacher (1980) identified three processes that research subjects typically use in
learning a concept:
• Discovering the relevant attributes: The learner must attend to the defining attributes and ignore the irrelevant
ones. This process is influenced by the salience of the attributes. Salient attributes are those that are noticed
easily and quickly in a concept-learning task. If the relevant attributes are also salient, learning will take place
quickly. However, when salient features are irrelevant, learning is much more difficult. Moates and
Schumacher noted that aircraft spotters during wartime have a difficult job when wing shapes of friendly and
enemy aircraft are similar because wing shape is a salient attribute for airplane identification. Evidence
indicates that subjects in concept-learning experiments use a hypothesis-testing strategy in learning the correct
attributes (see below).
• Discovering the rule relating the attributes: Concepts are defined not only by relevant attributes, but also by a
rule that relates those attributes. Thus, concept learning requires that both steps take place. In general, the
simpler the rule, the easier the concept is to learn. Affirmation and negation rules are fairly simple to learn,
whereas conditional and biconditional rules present difficulties to research participants.
• Testing hypotheses: In concept learning, the participant is seen as generating hypotheses about the attributes
and the rule and then testing those hypotheses. This view stresses the role of cognition in the process rather
than assuming a mechanistic behavioristic process. A difficulty in concluding that hypothesis testing goes on is
the fact that generating and testing hypotheses is unobservable, and verbal reports may be unreliable. Levine
(1966) devised the blank trial approach to assess whether subjects actually used hypotheses. Levine gave his
participants a regular concept-learning trial with feedback, followed by four trials with no feedback. By
observing the participants’ choices during the blank trials, Levine was able to conclude that participants used a
hypothesis about 92% of the time, that they stayed with a correct hypothesis about 95% of the time, and that
they chose a new hypothesis after an incorrect response about 98% of the time (the “win stay, lose shift”
strategy).

Levine, M. (1966). Hypothesis behavior by humans during discrimination learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71,
331–336.
Moates, D. R., & Schumacher, G. M. (1980). An introduction to cognitive psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: CONCEPT LEARNING IN CLASS

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Benjamin (1981) provided an example of concept learning for use in the classroom. In much the same way that students
learned about such concepts as dog, car, and ball as children, they can learn a new concept in class.
This exercise requires a set of stimulus materials and a scoring sheet. Benjamin suggested using about 36 slides of
Greek-letter trigrams (transparencies would work equally well), such as ΠΒΔ and ΠΦΛ. Greek letters are low in
meaningfulness and association value (if you avoid fraternity and sorority names) and are not particularly
pronounceable. In constructing the trigrams, choose two letters that will define your concept. For example, let Λ be the
positive indicator of the concept and Δ the negative indicator. When constructing your trigrams, do not let these two
letters appear together in the same trigram. Every trigram with Λ will be an example of the concept, and every trigram
with Δ will not be an example of the concept. Benjamin also suggested preparing slides with the word true or false on
them to use for feedback to your students, although you could provide oral feedback.
Read the following instructions to the class:
You are going to participate in a concept-learning task. In a moment I will show you some slides that contain three
Greek letters forming a trigram. Some of these trigrams are true, while others are false. Your task is to learn which
ones are true and which ones are false, by learning what characteristic of the trigrams determines their truth or
falseness. That is the concept you are to learn. I will present the trigrams in blocks of 12, showing them to you one
at a time. Each trigram will be followed by an answer slide indicating whether the previous slide was true or false.
Look at the answer sheet I have given you. Begin with Column 1, marking your answers down the column. The task
will proceed as follows: A Greek-letter trigram will appear on the screen very briefly, for approximately 5 seconds.
As soon as you see it, you are to decide whether it is true or false and then mark either the letter T or F in the first
box under Column 1. The next slide is an answer slide and will tell you if you were correct. If the answer slide
indicates you were not correct, circle that box on your answer sheet and be ready for the next trigram. Note that
the task will proceed very rapidly. All slides, both trigrams and answers, will appear on the screen for
approximately 5 seconds each. Thus you must work very rapidly.
When you have learned the concept, you should keep that knowledge to yourself. Let your neighbors learn on
their own. I will define learning in this task as two successive trial blocks without an error (that is, 24 correct
responses in a row). When you reach that criterion you should sit quietly at your desk until the completion of this
demonstration. We are ready to begin. (Benjamin, 1981, p. 101)
At the end of each block, ask for a show of hands from everyone who got all slides correct. If you have time, run seven
or eight trial blocks so that a sizable portion of the class will have gotten one trial block correct.
After completing the last trial block, ask students not to talk to one another yet because the exercise is not
completed. Write a very long number on the board and point out that, despite the fact that none of the students have ever
seen this number, they can all classify it as being odd or even. They can do so because they have learned the concept of
odd and even numbers. Then write the trigram ΦΛΔ on the board. Tell them that they have never seen this trigram in
the experiment and you want those who think they learned the concept to vote on this trigram. Is it true, false, or
ambiguous? Count hands for votes in each category and record them. You can then point out that they actually were in a
double concept-learning task. There were actually two concepts that could be learned—namely, that Λ was true and Δ
was false. Students who learned both concepts should have voted for ambiguous. Those who voted true learned only
that trigrams with Λ were true; those who voted false learned only that trigrams with Δ were false. Do you find a
difference in your class between the number of people who learn from positive examples and those who learn from
negative examples?
This exercise will engage the class in an active learning experience and should create some interest and, perhaps,
competition among class members. Those who learned only one of the concepts may be chagrined but have still learned
something of the concept. Even those who did not master the concept in the exercise will learn about concept learning.

Benjamin, L. T., Jr. (1981). Concept learning. In L. T. Benjamin, Jr. & K. D. Lowman (Eds.), Activities handbook for the teaching of
psychology (pp. 100–102). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

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LECTURE/DISCUSSION TOPIC: CULTURE AND CONCEPTS
An area of cultural influence not covered in the text is the topic of concepts or categories. As with many of the cultural
topics, it appears not that the process itself is different but that the outcome of the process may be culturally influenced.
In other words, there is no reason to suspect that the processes summarized in “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Concept
Learning” differ from culture to culture. However, the concepts or categories that are formed do, in some cases, differ.
Matsumoto (1994) related a humorous story to provide a good example. He attended a party at an American’s house
with a Persian guest present. When they went to the living room, the Persian became visibly embarrassed. When the
host left the room, the Persian explained that the beautiful brass pitcher gracing the living room table served an
important function in the Middle East. In that culture, toilet paper is scarce and people use brass pitchers full of water to
clean themselves after using the bathroom. Clearly the categorizations of the pitcher differed widely in this example.
Matsumoto (2000) listed some categories that seem to be relatively universal. One of these categories was covered
in Chapter 4 (“Lecture/Discussion Topic: Culture and Color Perception”). Remember that research tends to show that
color perception is invariant among cultures, despite large differences in language terms dealing with color. If you did
not cover this topic in Chapter 4, you may wish to do so in this chapter. Another category that varies little with culture is
facial expression of emotion. You will recall that people of different cultures are able to accurately identify basic
emotions from pictures of faces alone. Weiten covers Ekman’s work on this topic in Chapter 10. Matsumoto also noted
that shape categorization tends to be invariant across cultures. When asked to provide the best examples of basic forms,
people tend to respond with perfect circles, equilateral triangles, and squares rather than more irregular shapes.
On the other hand, there are examples of categorizations that do not appear to be universal. In studying
categorization, researchers often use a sorting task (Matsumoto, 2000). Here, the subject is presented with a variety of
items and asked to sort them into groups. Of course, there are a variety of ways that the items can be grouped. With
Western subjects, this task appears to be developmentally linked. Given items that can be sorted by color, shape, or
function, young children tend to sort by color. As they get older, they begin to sort by shape and finally by function.
Therefore, Western adults can be expected to sort objects primarily by function. However, Suchman (1966) found that
African adults were more likely to sort by color. This different result implies that the original finding is not related to
simple maturation.
Evans and Segall (1969) tested the hypothesis that color versus function grouping reflected educational differences
by comparing Ugandan children and adults on a sorting task. Some of their subjects had attended school and some had
not. Indeed, they found that participants with little or no education showed a preference for color grouping. Thus,
culture in this instance may be a misleading term to students. However, you should remind your students that culture
does not necessarily refer to different racial groups or to persons from different countries (see “Operational Definitions
of Culture” within Chapter 2 “Lecture/Discussion Topic: Cultural Perspectives and Research”).

Evans, J. L., & Segall, M. H. (1969). Learning to classify by color and function: A study of concept discovery by Ganda children.
Journal of Social Psychology, 77, 35–55.
Matsumoto, D. (1994). People: Psychology from a cultural perspective. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Matsumoto, D. (2000). Culture and psychology: People around the world (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Suchman, R. G. (1966). Cultural differences in children’s color and form perception. Journal of Social Psychology, 70, 3–10.

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: PRACTICE IN PROBLEM SOLVING

After students have learned about various barriers (and solutions) to problem solving in Chapter 8, you may wish to
give them a chance to apply their knowledge to problems that are similar to those described in the text. HM 8-6 gives
several problems that illustrate the common barriers people encounter in trying to solve problems. You could give
students the HM and ask them to list the relevant barrier to each problem and why that barrier makes an incorrect
answer to that question particularly likely for most people. Detecting the barriers and knowing how the barriers operate
is more important than giving an answer to a particular question.

8: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

167
ANSWER KEYS

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS

SOLUTION: Take a sheet of paper, roll it from one corner to form a cone, and tape the edge to hold that shape.
Then tape a needle from the sewing kit to the outside surface of the narrow end of the paper cone so that its
sharp point extends an inch or so beyond the cone. Now push the pencil firmly into the hole in the record so
that, by resting the eraser end on a firm surface, the record can be turned clockwise in a level plane. Now,
while turning the record in this way, grasp the edge of the large end of the paper cone between thumb and
forefinger and let the needle rest on the turning record. It won’t be high fidelity or stereo, but the sound will be
amplified enough for everyone to hear. (Bernstein, 1991)

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: INCUBATION IN PROBLEM SOLVING

Answer to Chain Problem
One set of 3 links must be used for connecting links. Each link in the set is opened (3  2¢ = 6¢) and then used
to connect 2 links from two other sets (3  3¢ = 9¢). Thus, the total spent to create a single closed chain is 15¢.

Answers to Number Puzzles

26 Letters of the Alphabet
7 Wonders of the World
1001 Arabian Nights
12 Signs of the Zodiac
54 Cards in the Deck (with the Jokers)
9 Planets in the Solar System
88 Piano Keys
13 Stripes on the American Flag
18 Holes on a Golf Course
3 Blind Mice (See How They Run)
4 Quarts in a Gallon
24 Hours in a Day
57 Heinz Varieties
11 Players on a Football Team
1000 Words That a Picture Is Worth
29 Days in February in a Leap Year

DEMONSTRATION/ACTIVITY: PRACTICE IN PROBLEM SOLVING

1. availability heuristic 4. representativeness heuristic
2. availability heuristic 5. representativeness heuristic
3. availability heuristic

REFERENCES FOR ADDITIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS/ACTIVITIES

• From Teaching of Psychology:

Cognition and memory: A bibliographic essay on the history and issues, by M. S. Chodorow & S. K. Manning (1983), 10, 163–167
Köhler’s insight revisited, by G. Windholz & P. A. Lamal (1985), 12, 165–167
Prisoner’s dilemma as a model for understanding decisions, by J. D. Larsen (1987), 14, 230–231
Self-scoring: A self-monitoring procedure, by L. C. Light, W. J. McKeachie, & Y. Lin (1988), 15, 145–147

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A decision tree for psychology majors: Supplying questions as well as answers, by R. E. Poe (1988), 15, 210–213
Demonstrating the influence of cognition on emotion and behavior, by J. L. Deffenbacher (1990), 17, 182–185
Learning about individual and collective decisions: All for one and none for all, by B. F. Peden & A. H. Keniston (1990), 17,
235–238
Tracing the cognitive revolution through a literature search, by F. Hassebrock (1990), 17, 251–252
The self-reference effect: Demonstrating schematic processing in the classroom, by D. R. Forsyth & K. H. Wibberly (1993), 20,
237–238
An interactive classroom demonstration of propositional and analogical representation, by J. K. Kruschke (1996), 23, 162–165
Demonstration of research methodologies used in psycholinguistics, by W. Langson (1998), 25, 61–63
Intelligence as a unifying theme for teaching cognitive psychology, by R. J. Sternberg & J. Pardo (1988), 25, 293–296
Computerized cognition laboratory, by M. A. Motes & D. A. Wiegmann (1999), 26, 62–65
Using daily horoscopes to demonstrate expectancy confirmation, by G. D. Munro & J. E. Munro (2000), 27, 114–116
Classroom demonstrations in perception and cognition using presentation software, by J. Neuhoff (2000), 27, 142–144
Is a bee bigger than a flea? A classroom mental imagery activity, by W. B. Thompson (2000), 27, 212–214
Using ignorance questions to promote thinking skills, by D. W. Carroll (2001), 28, 98–100
Ten cooperative learning activities for the cognitive psychology course, by W. B. Thompson, P. J. Vermette, & S. A. Wisniewski
(2004), 31, 134–136
Demonstrating the Monty Hall dilemma, by M. R. Kelley (2004), 31, 193–195
Web-based assignments in the Psychology of Language class, by D. W. Carroll (2004), 31, 204–206
Pitfalls in teaching judgment heuristics, by J. A. Shepperd & E. J. Koch (2005), 32, 43–46
An activity to teach students about schematic processing, by L. M. Isbell, J. M. Tyler, & K. C. Burns (2007), 34, 241-244
Evaluation of a digital learning object for the Monty Hall dilemma, by D. DiBattista (2011), 38, 53-59
Tools for teaching cognitive psychology: Using public service announcements for education on environmental sustainability, by
L. D. Hager (2011), 38, 162-165

• From Activities Handbook for the Teaching of Psychology, by L. T. Benjamin, Jr., & K. D. Lowman (Eds.), 1981,
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association:
Problem solving: Groups versus individuals, by W. J. McKeachie, C. Doyle, & M. M. Moffett, pp. 92–94
Problems of set, by L. Snellgrove, pp. 95–96
The Zeigarnick effect: Suffering to serve the psyche, by A. L. LaVoie, pp. 97–99
Suggestibility and susceptibility to set, by M. Wertheimer, pp. 180–181

• From Activities Handbook for the Teaching of Psychology: Vol. 2, by V. P. Makosky, L. G. Whittemore, &
A. M. Rogers (Eds.), 1987, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association:
The role of expectancies in the perception of language, by G. M. Diekhoff, pp. 57–59

• From Activities Handbook for the Teaching of Psychology: Vol. 3, by V. P. Makosky, C. C. Sileo, L. G. Whittemore,
C. P. Landry, & M. L. Skutley (Eds.), 1990, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association:
Psychological set and the solution of anagrams, by J. R. Corey, pp. 90–91
A problem-solving workshop: The Middle East comes to class, by G. Banziger, pp. 133–135
Cognitive maps of the history of psychology, by G. S. Howard, pp. 209–213

• From Activities Handbook for the Teaching of Psychology: Vol. 4, by L. T. Benjamin, Jr., B. F. Nodine, R. M. Ernst,
& C. Blair-Broeker (Eds.), 1999, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association:
An experimental demonstration of place schema, by M. G. Hartlaub, pp. 211–215
Functional fixedness in problem solving, by D. A. Bernstein & S. S. Goss, pp. 216–217
Reorganization and productive thinking, by M. Wertheimer, pp. 218–224
Set and information processing, by M. Wertheimer, pp. 225–227

SUGGESTED READINGS FOR CHAPTER 8

8: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT
169
Anderson, J. (2009). Cognitive psychology and its implications (7th ed.). New York: Worth. A concise, readable introduction to a
diverse array of topics in cognitive psychology.
Baars, B. J. (1986). The cognitive revolution in psychology. New York: Guilford Press. A lively review of the trends that led to the
paradigm shift from behaviorism to the cognitive perspective. The book is built around interviews with 17 key figures in the
cognitive revolution.
Bell, D. E., Raiffa, H., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1988). Decision making: Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. An edited volume that serves as an excellent update on research on decision
making.
Best, J. B. (1999). Cognitive psychology (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. An excellent overview of cognitive research, with
strong coverage of artificial intelligence, language, and reading.
Carroll, D. W. (2008). Psychology of language (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. A lucid, understandable text on
psycholinguistics, intended for advanced undergraduates.
Gardner, H. (1985). The mind’s new science: A history of the cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. Another absorbing
account of how the field of cognitive psychology has evolved.
Gleason, J. B. (Ed.). (1985). The development of language. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill. A collection of well-crafted chapters
that summarize recent research and theory on language development.
Halpern, D. F. (2003). Thought and knowledge: An introduction to critical thinking (4th ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. A superb book
on critical thinking that is loaded with practical advice, which is nicely integrated with discussions of cognitive research.
Klahr, D., & Kotovsky, K. (Eds.). (1989). Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert A. Simon. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
A collection of chapters written by students and colleagues of Herbert Simon. Anecdotes of the cognitive revolution are
interspersed with state-of-the-art reviews of cognitive topics.
Reed, S. K. (2010). Cognition: Theory and applications (8th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. A very readable undergraduate text on
cognition, with strong chapters on attention, levels of processing, problem solving, and decision making.

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Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Abb. 13 Die Hoflößnitz Eingang zum
Festsaal
Aufnahme von J. Ostermaier, Dresden-Blasewitz

Der beiden prächtigen, vasengekrönten Majolikaöfen in den

beiden Wohnzimmern sei noch besonders gedacht. Der weiß-grüne
im Zimmer der Kurfürstin zeigt als Verzierung der (weißen) Kacheln
Blumen und Fruchtgehänge, der blau-weiße des Kurfürsten (s.
Abbildung 14) Feuersalamander und Ignis (Feuer) in höchst
eigenartiger Darstellung.
 Abb. 14 Die Hoflößnitz Ofen im
Wohnzimmer des Kurfürsten
Aufnahme von J. Ostermaier, Dresden-Blasewitz

Müde vom vielen Schauen gönnen wir uns eine kurze Rast unter
den alten Kastanien der geräumigen Aussichtsterrasse, die
zwischen dem Hoflößnitzer Herrenhause und dem gemütlichen
Weinschanke liegt, der sich in einem der alten Hofgebäude
eingenistet hat. Zu einem Fläschchen Wein oder wenigstens
Schoppen wäre schon der Durst vorhanden. Ob aber auch die
nötigen Billionen, ohne die heutzutage niemand an so etwas denken
darf? Mag die durstige Kehle dursten! Dafür trinkt das durstige Auge
die Schönheit, die der Blick auf die liebliche Lößnitz zu unsern
Füßen bietet, in vollen Zügen. Ein andrer Blick wieder, als vom
Jakobstein über Wackerbarths Ruhe, die aus der Ferne noch einmal
zu uns freundlich herübergrüßt, aber auch bezaubernd schön in
seiner Art. Der um die Vervollkommnung des Lößnitzer Weinbaus
hochverdiente Johann Paul Knoll, der »erste Winzer der Lößnitz«,
dessen Bild in der Schankstube nebenan von der Wand
herablächelt, durfte schon mit Recht singen:

»Hier steht das Helden-Hauß, das um und um mit Reben

Sehr lieblich ist umschrenckt. Die überschöne Flur,
Die selbsten angelegt die gütige Natur,
Kann keinem Lande nicht im wenigsten nachgeben.

Churfürst Johann Georg der Erste ließ es heben;

Der andre Churfürst drauff, des Reiches Cynosur,
Macht es zur Hofe-Stadt, damit auch hier die Spur
Zu sehen möchte seyn, wie Er vergnügt kann leben.

Ein Landes-Vater muß nicht stets in Sorgen stehn;

Drum hat er es zur Lust gantz fürstlich ausgezieret;
Die schönste Schilderey hat Er da auffgeführet,
Daß mit den Frembden es mög in die Wette gehn.

Viel schöner noch als schön ist es vor Menschen Sinnen,

Ist aber hier sein Wirth, so ist nichts Schöners drinnen.«
 Die Lößnitz und die Dresdner Heide
Von Oskar Merker, Dresden
Wir sind gewöhnt, die Lößnitz stolz das Sächsische Nizza zu
nennen – wir können es mit berechtigtem Stolze! Herrliche Bilder
des sonnigen Südens werden durch dieses eine Wort lebendig; wir
sehen den Blütenreichtum dieses gesegneten Gebietes, seine schier
unerschöpfliche Fruchtbarkeit, seine Weinberge, seine Obstgärten,
die jedem, der sie einmal in vollem Blütenschmucke gesehen hat,
unvergeßlich sein werden. Über diesem glanzvollen Bilde haben wir
aber ganz verlernt, gleichzeitig der bescheideneren Bilder der
Dresdner Heide zu gedenken. Und doch ist die stolze Lößnitz sehr
wohl von der Heide abhängig gewesen – bis in die Gegenwart
herein! Daß das vergessen werden konnte, hat seinen Grund wohl
vor allem darin, daß die jetzt üblichen »Heidekarten« nur um ein
weniges westwärts über die Prießnitz herübergreifen. Die
»Grundkarte von Deutschland« dagegen gibt auf Blatt 417, 443 die
tatsächlichen Verhältnisse: bis weit nach Westen ist hier das Gebiet
der Dresdner Heide zu erkennen, die »Junge Heide« ist mit umfaßt!
Ein im Dresdner Hauptstaatsarchiv aufbewahrtes Forstzeichenbuch
vom Jahre 1571 umgrenzt durch Nennung der Orte, »so umb die
Heyde gelegen,« deren Gebiet: »Nawendorff, Bieschen, Dracha,
Rödebeul, Serckewitz, Ketzschenbroda, Wansdorff, Reichenberg,
Bocksdorff, Wilschdorff, Renes (Rähnitz), Klotzschen, Lausnitz,
Langenbrück« usw. Mathias Oeder hat, etwa im Jahre 1600, ein
entsprechendes Kartenbild gezeichnet.
Eine Wechselwirkung zwischen der Lößnitz und der Dresdner
Heide ist also wohl ohne weiteres anzunehmen. Einige Streiflichter
hierzu!
Bekannt ist, daß die Dresdner Heide eins der Jagdgebiete der
sächsischen Fürsten von jeher gewesen ist. Die Wettiner waren
bemüht, dieses Gebiet immer mehr abzurunden, seinen Wildbestand
auf unvergleichlicher Höhe zu halten. Verzeichnisse der
Jagdergebnisse geben überraschende Einblicke, ebenso Berichte,
wie der von 1687, in dem wir lesen, daß »bey der Hirschfeist 609
Mann … aus 17 Ämbtern … aufgewarttet« haben, die 19 Mann des
Amtes Moritzburg z. B. »vom 13. Julii bis mit den 1. Sept. zusammen
51 Tage …« Die Dörfer, die der Wildbahn angrenzten, waren nicht zu
beneiden! Immer und immer wieder klagen sie über entstandenen
Wildschaden und bitten um Entschädigung. Oft erreichen sie erst
nach langer Zeit, oft nicht einmal ganz ihr Ziel!
Das sind Dinge, die genug bekannt, die aber oft geflissentlich
einseitig scharf beleuchtet worden sind! Haben die Bauern der
Lößnitzdörfer nicht auch um anderes gebeten, als um Ersatz für
erlittenen Wildschaden? Haben sie nicht oft auch Gesuche
eingereicht, sich aus der Heide Holz für ihren Hausbau, für Planken
um ihre Weinberge, Holz für Weinpfähle holen zu dürfen? Haben sie
dies nicht ebenso erhalten, wie die Erlaubnis zum Streurechen, zur
Hutung in der Heide? Aber gleich bringt man den Hinweis auf die
bäuerlichen Gegenleistungen, die bestanden haben in »Sensen- und
Sicheltagen zum Vorwerk Ostra und in Jagddiensten auf Dresdner
Heide«. Warum fragt man nicht danach, was jenen im Winter das
mangelnde Stroh hätte ersetzen können, wenn sie das Laub der
Heide nicht gehabt hätten?! Warum weist man nicht darauf hin, wie
unentbehrlich ihrem Vieh vom Frühjahre bis zum späten Herbste
diese Hutung in der Heide gewesen ist?!
Ich habe durch eine starke Linie auf der eingangs erwähnten
»Grundkarte« (s. Abb. 1) all die Gemeinden – ohne Dresden –
umschlossen, die in der Heide von jenen Rechten Gebrauch
gemacht haben. Oft zum Schaden des Waldes, zum Schmerze der
Oberförster, die sehr wohl erkannten, wie schädlich ihrem Walde
diese Nutzung war!
Eine Bittschrift vom Jahre 1580 möchte ich hier einfügen – nicht,
um Nörglern Stoff zu bieten! Sie betrifft »die Sieben Dorffschafften
Kaditz, Serckwitz, Radebeull, Trachau, Pischenn, Muckten vnd
V̈ bigen«, die, wollten sie ihren Holzbedarf decken, nicht etwa in die
nahe Heide, sondern »in den Tarandischen Waldt« ziehen mußten,
während »etzliche Dorffschafften vber der Elbe In die Dreßdnische
Heide« gewiesen wurden! Noch 1593 ist die Angelegenheit nicht
endgültig geregelt, weil »der her Jegermeister durch den Zeitlichen
thot von dieser welt abgefordert worden«.

Abb. 1 Grundkarte
Details
Geldknappheit ist durchaus keine neuzeitliche Erfindung! Anno
1675 hat ein »Wohlverordtneter Cammer-Juncker, auch Ober Forst
u. Wildtmeister … vor eingelieferte Hirsch Wildts und andere Heuthe
auch Rehe felle und anders (Wölfe sind mehrfach noch genannt!)
noch 496 fl 2 gr an Jägerrechte zu fordern«. Er bittet, wenigstens die
Hälfte ihm zu gewähren – die Forderung betraf die Jahre 1670–
1675!! Treue Dienste müssen aber doch belohnt werden! Ist kein
Geld da, dann eben auf andre Weise! Und so war denn der Kurfürst
auf den Gedanken verfallen, sein Waldgebiet dort zu opfern, wo es
der Wildbahn nicht schädlich war: er verlieh an Stelle vielleicht sehr
dringlicher Gehaltszulagen ein Stück derartigen Heidebodens – als
Weinbergsgelände! Die Karte (Abb. 2) nennt Namen und Stand der
Bedachten: Forstleute und Amtsschreiber, Bürgermeister und
Kammerdiener, alle werden fast gleichmäßig bedacht: zwischen vier
und sechs Ackern schwankt die Größe der »Neuen Weinbergstede«.
Die Karte zeigt übrigens auch, wie der Kurfürst gleichzeitig die
Gelegenheit benutzt hat, sein Heidegebiet abzurunden: »Diesen
Feldwinkl treten die Zwantzig Personen von Rädebeil vnderthenigst
ab! Zu ergäntzung dieser heyden ecken!« lesen wir unter anderem
im nordöstlichen Teile der Karte – sie ist umgekehrt orientiert wie
unsere Karten! Seit 1627 hat sie geruht – zum ersten Male wird sie
hier abgedruckt – im Dresdner Hauptstaatsarchiv fand ich sie (Loc.
38525, Rep. XVIIIa, Dresden 185), eine Zeichnung des Balthasar
Zimmermann, des kursächsischen Markscheiders, des Vetters jenes
berühmteren Mathias Oeder, dessen Heidekarte von 1600 bereits
Erwähnung fand.

Abb. 2 Karte von Balthasar Zimmermann 1627

Zimmermann besaß übrigens auch einen Weinberg in unserem

Gebiete – er hatte ja »dem Hause Sachsen langwierige, treue
Dienste« genug geleistet! »Mit großen vncosten hatte er den Platz
gerodet, mit weinstöcken bestecket vnd eine Mauer von Stein vnd
Plancken darumb geführet. Die Soldaten hatten aber (noch dazu im
Winter!) die Plancken wegkgeholet vnd verbrandt«. In der Nähe
befand sich ein Fleck, den seine Erben 1634 gern gehabt hätten.
Des Vaters Haus hatten sie »schulden halber verkauffen müssen,
vnd des Weinberges aus ermangelung Tüngers konnten sie nicht
mechtig werden«. Auf jenem Heideflecke sollten nun »einbaar Kühe
des Sommers über ihre trifft vndt weyde haben«. Der Fleck lag aber
innerhalb »der allgemeinen huttung«, der er auch verbleiben soll,
das Gesuch muß also abgelehnt werden – 1638 haben es die Erben
noch einmal versucht. Jener Heidefleck reichte »bis an die
Bohmwiese«, so berichtet der Oberforstmeister Bernstein; Balzer
Zimmermanns Erben schreiben: »bis an die Bahnwiese« – und
Oeder? Auf seiner Karte steht: »Am Baum«. Ob nun die
»Bahnwiese« endlich verschwindet und der »Baumwiese« Platz
macht?!
Zimmermanns Karte zeigt noch ein anderes sprachlich so
lehrreiches Beispiel: an der »Meisnischen stras« – der alten! – liegt
»Schneeweisens Bres«, also die Weinpresse des Schneeweiß! In
dem erwähnten Schriftstücke von 1627 wird sie oft zur genaueren
Ortsbestimmung benutzt. Das Gelände muß Hofbedienten zugesagt
haben; sie bewerben sich darum, »damit den Armen Gesellen zu
fortstellung der geringen Heußlichen nahrung vnd beßerer erhaltung
der Kleinen Kinderlein solcher vonn den trotzigen Bauern
außgeschlagener vbriger Platz (er hatte den Serkowitzern zunächst
nicht zugesagt!), der doch sonsten von andernn leuten ausgebeten
werden dürffte, gleich andern Dienern vnd Rentherey Schreiben
gnedigst bewilliget vnd Erblich eingereumt werden möge. Die Zinß
vnd Landsteuer wollen sie Jedesmahl gehorsamblich abstatten …«
Für sie, die Ortsfremden, wird nun auf einmal jene Presse zur
»Weißen Preße im Zippell genant«! Wozu auch »schneeweiß« –
weiß genügt! So mag mancher Name entstanden sein, den wir uns
heute nicht mehr erklären können! –
Streiflichter in Verhältnisse, die jahrhundertelang das Leben der
Bewohner der Lößnitz ganz wesentlich beeinflußt haben!
 Der Untergang des Weinbaus
Von Prof. Dr. A. Naumann
O du weinfrohe Lößnitz! Vor vier Jahrzehnten noch grünten
allüberall deine Rebenhöhen, mostvergnügte Menschen jubelten auf
deinen gartengeschmückten Straßen, und manch »graue« Züge
führten wackere Zecher heimwärts.
Winzerfeste wurden gefeiert, die Tausende natur- und
weinbegeisterter Städter in deine gesegneten Gefilde führten. Das
berühmteste Winzerfest fand statt am 25. Oktober des Jahres 1840.
Es war ein vaterländisches Fest »in Verbindung mit einer Wein- und
Traubenausstellung und Musterung,« wie es in der Denkschrift heißt.
Das Bild des Winzerzuges ist von Prof. Moritz Retzsch entworfen,
und dieses figurenreiche Erinnerungsblatt (Abbildung 1) ist noch in
gar mancher Weinstube, sogar in farbiger Ausführung[2], als
Wandschmuck zu finden.

1
2

4
5

7
 8
Gez. v. M. Retzsch Lith. v. E. Otte. Gedr. v. E. Böhme.
Abb. 1 Winzerzug

Kein Mensch ahnte in den achtziger Jahren des vorigen

Jahrhunderts den Feind, der, an den Wurzeln der Reben saugend,
all dieser Rebenherrlichkeit und Weinfröhlichkeit ein Ende bereiten
sollte. Ein winziger Schnabelkerf »die Reblaus« war unter der
sommerdurchwärmten Erde an der Arbeit; jahrzehntelang hatte sie
sich unbemerkt in das Wurzelwerk des europäischen Weinstockes,
unserer Vitis vinifera eingenistet.
Sie senkte ihre Stechborsten tief hinein in das weiche Gewebe der
Wurzelspitzen und saugte die Bildungssäfte auf (Abb. 2f). Wohl
wehrte sich das Wurzelende und suchte durch Anschwellungen und
hakige Krümmungen (Abb. 2h) den Feind zu überwuchern und zu
erdrücken; aber die Vermehrungskraft der Reblaus war zu gewaltig!
Die Altläuse (Abb. 2d) legten unbefruchtet, als sogenannte Ammen,
mehr denn vierzig Eier, denen nach zehn Tagen schon Jungläuse
(Abb. 2c) entschlüpften, die nach kurzer Saugtätigkeit wiederum
unbefruchtet zur Eiablage fähig waren. Bis zu fünf Generationen
wuchsen in einem Jahre heran, so daß eine einzige Wurzellaus die
Stammutter von etwa dreiundsiebzig Millionen Nachkommen sein
konnte. Da eine so ungeheuere Nachkommenschaft am
Geburtsstocke nicht genügend Nahrung fand, mußte die jugendliche,
ziemlich bewegliche Reblaus neue Nahrungsquellen aufsuchen und
dabei unterirdisch einen mühsamen Weg von Rebstock zu Rebstock
zurücklegen. Im sächsischen Weinbau war zur Vermehrung der
Weinstöcke das sogenannte Senkverfahren üblich: von einem
Mutterstock wurden die Reben niedergebogen und in die Erde
eingegraben, damit die Zweigspitzen, über der Erde hervorragend,
zu neuen Rebstöcken heranwuchsen. Hierdurch wurden für die
wandernden Jungläuse von Stock zu Stock bequeme unterirdische
Brücken geboten, und wir dürfen in den meisten Fällen die rasche
Verheerung der sächsischen Berge auf dieses Senkverfahren
zurückführen. – Mit jedem Karstschlag, mit jedem vom Winzerfuße
weitergetragenen Erdklümpchen verbreitete sich der tückische Feind
über alle Weingelände der Lößnitz, und bald konnte ein Kundiger an
dem Gilben des Stockes, an der nachlassenden Wuchskraft der
Reben, an dem jährlich geringer werdenden Ertrag herausfühlen,
daß dem Weinbau der Lößnitz, ja dem sächsischen Weinbau, eine
Katastrophe drohte. Im Jahre 1885 wurde durch einen Gärtner der
Lößnitz in den Königlichen Weinbergen daselbst die Reblaus
aufgefunden und der sächsischen Regierung darüber pflichtgemäß
Bericht erstattet.
Der damalige Garteninspektor Lämmerhirt, als Vertreter des
Landes-Obstbauvereins wurde mit Feststellung und Untersuchung
des Schädlings betraut, und als die Verseuchung größerer Flächen
durch die Reblaus erwiesen war, wurde der Reichsregierung
Mitteilung gemacht.
Dieselbe ordnete für Sachsen als Reichskommissar den
Oberförster Koch aus Trier ab und verfügte die durch die
internationale Konferenz der weinbautreibenden Staaten
festgesetzten Bekämpfungsmaßregeln. Es zeigte sich nun, daß die
Ausdehnung der Reblausschädigungen in Sachsen bereits einen
großen Umfang angenommen hatte; zumal die königlichen
Weinberge durften infolge ihres starken Befalles als die Herde der
Kalamität betrachtet werden.
Es erregte schon damals großes Erstaunen, daß die
Weinbergsinspektoren nicht vorher auf den schon lange bekannten
furchtbaren Rebfeind aufmerksam geworden waren. Inwieweit einer
oder der andern Behörde, beziehentlich deren Vertretern,
entsprechende Vorhalte zu machen wären, ist jetzt eine müßige
Frage.
 Tatsache war, daß die von Oberförster Koch mit zahlreichen
Hilfskräften und kostspieligen Bekämpfungsmitteln (Petroleum,
Schwefelkohlenstoff) organisierte Abwehr des Schädlings kaum
genügte, um die verseuchten Weinkulturflächen rechts der Elbe
einigermaßen gründlich zu untersuchen, geschweige denn zu retten.
Bereits im Jahre 1886 wurde mit dem Kampf gegen den
übermächtigen Schädling begonnen.
Woher aber war der Feind zu uns gekommen? War er schon seit
Jahrhunderten bei uns heimisch? Fast mußte es so scheinen, wenn
wir die Größe der Verheerung ermessen, welche die Reblaus nicht
bloß bei uns, nein auch in allen Weinbau treibenden Gebieten
Europas[3] angerichtet hatte. Nach allem, was wir bis jetzt
nachprüfen konnten, ist dieser Schädling aus Nord-Amerika zu uns
gelangt. Im Jahre 1865 wurde in der Provence die Reblaus zuerst
auf dem europäischen Kontinent aufgefunden. Sie soll von Amerika
aus in Englands große Weintreibereien gelangt und auf diesem
Umweg auch in die Freilandkulturen des europäischen Festlandes
gekommen sein. Nachdem sie ihren Vernichtungszug in den
südlichen Ländern Europas begonnen, gelangte sie in den achtziger
Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts auch zu uns nach Deutschland.
Zum Verständnis der zu schildernden Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen
diene eine kurze Betrachtung der Lebensweise unseres Schädlings.
 Abb. 2 Die Vernichterin des Lößnitzer Weinbaues: die Reblaus (Phylloxera
vastatrix) in ihrer Entwicklung

Im Laufe der bereits erwähnten ungeschlechtlich erzeugten

Generationen traten, vielleicht infolge besonderer Ernährung, mit
Flügelstumpfen begabte Läuse auf, die man auf den schönen
Namen »Nymphen« getauft hat (Abb. 2a). Aus dieser schon mit
einer Art Taille versehenen Form entwickelt sich in warmen
Sommern eine geflügelte Laus: Die Reblausfliege (Abb. 2b). Diese
fliegt bei ruhigem Wetter auf benachbarte Berge und kann, vom
Winde getrieben, Kilometerstrecken zurücklegen. Sie landet
schließlich auf einem Weinblatt und legt dort wenige Eier von teils
runder, teils ovaler Form. Aus diesen erst schlüpfen die eigentlichen
»Geschlechtstiere« (Abb. 2e); aus den kleinen runden die
Männchen, aus den größeren ovalen die Weibchen. Beide
entbehren der Saugorgane, sind also bloße Geschlechtsmaschinen,
die nur dem Geschäfte der Begattung obliegen. Das befruchtete
Weibchen legt ein einziges, etwas dickschaligeres dunkles Winterei.
 Aufnahme von P. Georg Schäfer, Dresden
Abb. 3 Nußbaum in der Hoflößnitz

Es ist kaum anzunehmen, daß es in unseren Breiten oft zur

Ablage dieses Eies kommt, da um diese Zeit die bereits herbstlich
kühlen Nächte das Aufkommen der Geschlechtstiere in Frage
stellen. Wir müssen vielmehr annehmen, daß bei uns eine
Verbreitung nur durch Wanderung oder Verschleppung der
Wurzelreblaus möglich war[4]. Wir wußten nicht einmal mit Sicherheit,
wohin diese Wintereier abgelegt werden, ob an Weinstöcke, an
Rebpfähle oder an die Bäume, welche im Weinberge gepflanzt sind.
In der Lößnitz waren es meist Pfirsiche und Nußbäume. Ist doch das
gute Gedeihen des Nußbaumes (Abb. 3) u. a. ein besonderes
Kennzeichen guter und warmer Weinlagen; auch die Edelkastanie
(Abb. 4) deutet auf solche hin.
Ich mußte trotz allen Dunkels, welches über die Ablage des
Wintereies herrscht, diese Frage berühren, damit gewisse
drakonische Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen, nämlich das Abhauen und
Verbrennen der auf infizierten Bergen stehenden Bäume ihre
Erklärung finden. Haben doch gerade diese Maßregeln unter der
weinbautreibenden Bevölkerung der Lößnitz besonders böses Blut
gemacht, und ich erinnere mich noch mancher Tränen und Flüche,
die gerade der Vernichtung besonders geliebter Bäume galten. Auch
mir hat ebendiese Forderung gar oft meine Pflicht besonders schwer
gemacht.
Die Bekämpfungsmaßnahmen haben im Laufe der Jahrzehnte
manche Wandlung erfahren, eins aber ist sicher, daß sie eine völlige
Vernichtung der Reblaus nicht erreichen konnten!
Es war im Jahre 1886 als ich, an der Dresdner technischen
Hochschule Chemie studierend, durch Zeitungsnotizen darauf
aufmerksam wurde, daß für die Untersuchung reblaus-verseuchter
Gelände Hilfssachverständige gesucht wurden, welche mit der
Handhabung der Lupe vertraut und insektenkundig waren. Da ich
zum Weiterstudium auf Gelderwerb angewiesen war, machte ich
mich eines Tages auf den Weg, mich beim Reichskommissar um die
Stellung eines Hilfssachverständigen zu bewerben. Ich kam damals
zum erstenmal in die herrlichen Gefilde der Lößnitz und war
geradezu entzückt über die harmonische Vereinigung einer
jahrhundertealten, anheimelnden, vornehmen Siedlungskultur mit
einer herrlichen, durch die grünen Höhen der Weingelände
verschönten Natur. In dem Bad-Hotel zu Kötzschenbroda wollte ich
mich bei einem Schoppen Schieler nach dem Aufenthalt des
Reichskommissar Koch erkundigen. Da sah ich – es war
Frühstückszeit – am Nebentisch eine fröhliche Runde, zu welcher,
stürmisch begrüßt, ein jovialer alter Herr trat, eben der gesuchte
Herr Kommissar. Ich stellte mich ihm vor, brachte dreist meinen
Wunsch an, wurde an die frohe Tafelrunde gebeten, und nach etwa
einer Viertelstunde nicht allzu strenger Prüfung ward ich unter
frohem Gläserklingen wohlbestallter Hilfssachverständiger für
Reblausuntersuchungen in der Lößnitz; wohlgemerkt! mit sechs
Mark Tagegeld, für mich eine wertvolle Studienbeihilfe. Meine
Kollegen waren teils Forststudenten, teils Männer mit
landwirtschaftlicher Hochschulbildung, teils Gärtner. Ich habe meine
Stellung als Hilfssachverständiger genügend lange bekleidet, um
aus eigener Erfahrung erzählen zu können, wie sich Untersuchung
und Vernichtung der Weinberge damals vollzog – leider muß ich
sagen »Vernichtung der Weinberge«, denn die Bekämpfung des
Schädlings gelang bei der in der Lößnitz übermächtig auftretenden
und überall verbreiteten Reblaus nicht mehr. Nur wenige Berge
waren damals beinahe reblausfrei; es waren die vortrefflich
gehaltenen von Nacke und Böhme, die auch noch heute einen
Bestand aus jener Zeit – natürlich verjüngt – besitzen.
Die Untersuchung der Weinberge auf Reblaus wurde
folgendermaßen vorgenommen.

Aufnahme von Preusch, Dresden

Abb. 4 Edelkastanie im Grundstück des Herrn
Geheimrat Hilger in Zitzschewig: Haus Kynast
 Die Hilfssachverständigen, geführt von einem Sachverständigen,
etwa vier bis fünf Herren, begaben sich mit je zwei bis drei Arbeitern
(meist Winzern und gelernten Weinbergsarbeitern) in den zu
untersuchendem Weinberg, unter Vorzeigen eines vom Ministerium
des Innern ausgestellten Ausweises.
Ein allgemeiner Überblick über den Rebbestand ließ schon durch
die muldenförmige Abnahme der Wuchskraft und durch
Gelbstichigkeit der sonst tiefgrünen Stöcke einen Schluß auf die
reblausbefallenen Bergteile zu. Der Beweis des Befalls konnte aber
erst dadurch erbracht werden, daß die flach unter der
Bodenoberfläche verlaufenden sogenannten Tauwurzeln durch uns
mit der Lupe auf Anwesenheit von Reblaus geprüft wurden. Die
Arbeiter »schlugen die Stöcke an«, das heißt sie entfernten am
Wurzelhals die Erde bis zum Erscheinen der Wurzeln, schnitten
letztere ab und reichten sie dem Untersuchenden zu. (Abb. 5.)
 Aufnahme von Joh. Hartmann
Abb. 5 Untersuchung der Weinberge auf Reblaus

Dabei wurde reihenweise vorgerückt und möglichst jeder dritte

Stock angeschlagen. Fand sich der Schädling an den hakenförmigen
Krümmungen der Wurzeln, den Nodositäten, vor, was leider nur zu
oft eintrat – so wurde das von uns durch ein kräftig gerufenes
»Laus« verkündet, und ein Arbeiter kalkte den Rebpfahl des
befallenen Stockes oben ausgiebig an. Im Umkreis eines infizierten
Stockes wurde alsdann jeder Stock untersucht, und bald zeigte eine
ganze Anzahl weißer Pfahlspitzen den aufgefundenen Reblausherd
an. In diesen Herd wurden noch die scheinbar gesunden Reben im
Zwanzigmeter-Umkreis einbezirkt, und das Ganze wurde von einer
besonderen Kolonne, die mit pfahl- und drahtbeladenem Wagen
ankam, eingedrahtet und mit einer Verbotstafel versehen, welche
das Betreten des Herdes, auch den Besitzern, versagte. Die