Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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7. 24-hour rule. Peerless Plywood Case no campaign speeches 24 hours before an
election. Employer cannot distribute propaganda regarding possible loss of
benefits within 24 hours of an election
B. Domination of and Assistance to Labor Organization
1. Must establish labor organization exists and that it is the focal point of
domination, interference, or assistance.
2. Domination—actual control.
a. Remedy—disestablish union.
3. Support—if it has no effect on employees’ rights and is trivial, it may not be a
violation.
a. If violation—union recognition is withdrawn until support is eliminated
and new certification election is held.
4. “Tips from the Experts” discusses most common employer unfair labor practices.
5. Employee Teams
a. Under Electromation case, court ruled that employee action committees,
which were established by the employer and which would make
recommendations regarding the workplace, were “labor organizations”
and the employer had engaged in an unfair labor practice by creating
them.
b. In the DuPont case, employer–employee committees created to deal with
safety and recreation issues also violated the unfair labor practices
section of NLRA by bypassing the established union.
c. In 1994, 32 percent of companies had teams that hurt union election
chances.
C. Discrimination in Employment
1. Employee is required to present prima facie case that employer’s antiunion
animus played a substantial role in action taken.
D. Concerted Activities
1. Protected concerted activity
a. Issue is work related.
b. Goal is to further group interest.
c. Specific remedy sought.
d. Act not unlawful.
e. Case 10.2 discusses employer retaliation for employees exercising their
protected activity.
2. Unprotected concerted activity
a. Violent acts
b. Acts in breach of contract
c. Secondary boycotts
3. Primary Strike. Protected if called for economic reasons or to protest an unfair
labor practice.
a. Economic Strike—employer only required to reinstate workers if vacant
positions available.
b. Unfair labor strike—workers entitled to reinstatement plus back pay.
4. Weingarten rule. Protected concerted activity includes insistence by employee
for union representation at an investigatory interview that could lead to
disciplinary action. Had been expanded to nonunion employees by NLRB in
2001, but reversed that decision in 2004.
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B. Restraint or Coercion of Employees
1. Employee has right to refrain from union activities.
2. Pattern Makers League v. NLRB. Union guilty of unfair labor practice when it
attempted to fine members for resigning from union and returning to work during
a strike.
C. Union Interference with Elections
1. 24-hour electioneering at polls.
2. Threat of violence (Sec. 8, NLRA).
3. NLRB may overturn election.
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5. Union demand to negotiate
a. NLRB view on union’s demand for bargaining on a new item during
contract term—if item is not contained in contract or was not discussed
during negotiations, the employer has a duty to bargain on that item.
6. Employer’s Unilateral Action
a. If employer takes unilateral action that changes a stated term of the
contract, employer has committed an unfair labor practice.
C. Prohibited Economic Activity
1. Secondary Boycotts
a. In DeBartola Corp v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, the Supreme
Court held that union members may hand out leaflets in a secondary
boycott action.
b. “Shop–ins”: a new form of secondary boycott used to pressure retailers.
2. Hot Cargo Agreements
3. Jurisdictional Disputes
4. Featherbedding—“services not performed”
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arbitration unless the award is ambiguous; the court should
enforce the decision even if it wouldn’t have reached the same
decision. (Case 10-3, Misco, Inc.)
iii. Collyer decision. Defers jurisdiction if: stable CB relationship,
party defending is willing to arbitrate, and dispute is centered on
the contract.
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CHAPTER 10: CASE DISCUSSION
1. Explain why you agree or disagree with the decision of the court.
Agree: There is no doubt that the goal of the inquiry was to find a way to keep the union from
being brought into this workplace. The supervisor obviously knew that the employee being
questioned was an employee who would be eligible to be a part of a bargaining unit, or else why
would he think she had information on the union? And, suggesting that the employer would make
changes to keep the union out is a promise that violates the Act.
Disagree: The employee was not being “interrogated” in any coercive manner. If the supervisor
statement was true, and the union did not contradict it, then this supervisor had talked to this
employee in the past and there would be no reason to think she would be intimidated.
Furthermore, suggesting that an employee who may be causing problems in the workforce could
be removed is not the type of promise or threat contemplated by the Act. Such a threat or promise
should be something that will directly affect the employees.
2. Do you think the supervisor in this example had a realistic expectation that replacing one
supervisor would so satisfy the employees that they would reject the union?
Probably not. The problem supervisor was probably not high up enough in the organization that
just removing him would improve the workplace to the point that employees, who for their own
reasons were looking to a union for help, would make a difference.
1. Explain why you agree or disagree with the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Agree: The courts have always protected a citizen’s right to bring a lawsuit. Winning a lawsuit is
not the right test to apply to determine if the case had merit. Many cases based upon an untested
legal theory make new law. If plaintiffs are prevented from bringing such cases out of fear, the
court system would not be open to citizens. Certainly labor unions would not want that result.
Disagree: The National Labor Relations Act is one law with a very specific goal: industrial peace.
It promotes peace by making certain that employees and employers are on a level playing field.
Because the control of “capital” is in the employers’ hands, the NLRB is tilted in favor of
employees. The Supreme Court dealt employees a terrible blow by allowing this company to
retaliate against the union for exercising its rights under NLRA. It isn’t necessary for the courts to
allow any lawsuit in order to preserve the “courts are open” theory upon which the United States
jurisprudence is based. The courts exercise discretion in dismissing harassing lawsuits, but
sometimes, as in this case, more is needed to preserve the employees’ rights. The unfair labor
practice charge against the company should have been upheld.
2. The union’s aggressive behavior in this case led to the claims and cross claims that finally
reached the U.S. Supreme Court where the union lost. Do you think this was a good use of union
resources?
Yes: The union’s aggressive behavior was necessary to counteract the overall decline in
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unionization. There was no way for the union to know that the company would bring the lawsuit
that it did. Certainly when the suit was summarily dismissed, the union would have had cause to
believe it would win its case against the company for an unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court
ruling was not one that would have been easy to predict.
No: The union made its point when it won the case brought against it by the company. There was
really no reason to pursue the NLRB charge of an unfair labor practice.
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CHAPTER 10: END CASE DISCUSSION
Decision:
The court ruled that the following actions did violate the standards for an employer’s actions during a
certification campaign and called for another election:
• Moving the manufacturing item from the plant without an explanation AFTER distributing
the news article. (2 and 3)
• Not telling the employees that the contract renegotiations with a customer involved more than
concerns on the union vote. (4)
• Having the representatives of a customer do a walk-through inspection while distributing
warnings about customers concerns over the union vote. (6 and 7)
• However, information about the closing of union plants by letter and putting up displays of
closed plants were not found to have violated the Act. (1 and 5)
1. Which, if any, of the employer’s actions might the court find violated the Act which would cause
the election to be set aside?
a. The Human Resource Director distributed a letter to employees asserting that two-thirds
of the 600 plants that had closed in their state over the past 20 years had been unionized.
b. The employer distributed an article concerning Ford’s decision to move a parts contract
from a supplier whose workforce had gone out on strike, emphasizing that the striking
union was the UAW.
By itself, not grounds because it is also an objective fact but with #3 and without
explanation, it becomes linked and it was the employer’s choice to move the work, the
employer could not claim it was out of his control.
c. Around Christmas, the employer relocated production of a Ford part to another one of its
plants at a location not subject to the pending election petition. The employer offered no
explanation for the move.
See above.
d. The employer told the employees that negotiations on a renewal contract with a customer
was being held in abeyance until the outcome of the union election, although the
customer also had issues of quality and delivery to discuss.
The employer misled the employees by failure to mention the other items of concern to
the customer.
e. The employer displayed large photo posters of closed manufacturing plants and
distributed a letter noting that all of the plants had been unionized.
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Not grounds because the photos being displayed were true.
f. On January 9, 1985, the President of the company sent a letter to employees telling of his
concern that its manufacturing partners would become nervous and go elsewhere if the
company developed “... a reputation for not being dependable because of labor problems,
a UAW–led strike, or even the possibility of a strike every time the contract comes up for
renewal....”
By itself, it was probably OK—as merely a prediction involving consequences out of the
employer’s control.
g. On January 10, 1985, the Division Manager told employees that the employer was
concerned about the impact of the union vote on its manufacturing customers. On January
9 and 10, one such customer did a very visible “walk-through” inspection of the facility
accompanied by numerous managers.
Linked with #6, this action gave the impression that the customer was getting “nervous.”
This was a misleading impression within the control of the employer.
2. Recognizing that this election took place in 1985, do you think the employees would see through
the employer’s tactics and vote the way they wanted in spite of the employer’s actions?
Yes: In 1995, one would expect the employees of a small manufacturing firm such as this not to
be naive or unsophisticated. Most of the employer’s actions were transparently antiunion and
would be so perceived by the employees.
No: Although the employees are neither naive nor unsophisticated, the court could not let such
blatant antiunion tactics go unchallenged.
3. Would you have been swayed by the employer’s actions to the point where you could not have
voted with “freedom of choice”?
Decision:
The hearing officer found that the kinds of acts outlined in the case established a pattern and practice of
coercive conduct on the part of the union. The hearing officer found the statement “Sometimes it takes
this kind of thing to get the point across” as an admission on the union’s part that it intended to capitalize
on, if not to exacerbate the fear of, an infected environment in the plant. The hearing officer found that the
intimidating and threatening activities, if not sponsored by the union, were encouraged by the union’s
attitude. In addition, the racial references alone were enough to taint the conduct of the decertification
election. The decertification election that had been won by the incumbent union was set aside and a new
election ordered.
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1. Would you set aside the election results and order another election? Explain your answer.
Yes. The pattern of intimidation would certainly taint the results. It didn’t matter whether the
union directed the activities; the atmosphere caused by it meant an employee could be afraid to
vote “no” on the union.
2. How could the union have stopped individuals from the intimidating actions that allegedly went
on in this case?
Although the individuals possibly could not have been stopped, a statement by union officials
disowning such activities and pledging to guarantee that employees could vote free from fear of
retaliation, might have helped.
3. Does the racial nature of the rhetoric involved in this case put a heavier burden on the union than
does the usual rhetoric about the employer? Explain your answer.
Yes: Usually “employee rhetoric” is about the particular facts at the place being organized. In this
case, the reference to Pearl Harbor was to focus workers on the Japanese as enemies in World
War II and not this work situation.
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CHAPTER 10: REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. What might the NLRB consider to be a breach of the good faith bargaining principle?
2. How does the NLRB review an unfair labor practice charge of surface bargaining?
The board reviews a charge of surface bargaining by use of a “totality test” which analyzes:
a. Prior bargaining history of parties
b. Parties’ willingness to make concessions
c. Character of exchanged proposals and demands
d. Any dilatory tactics employed
e. Conditions imposed on either party
f. Unilateral changes made during negotiations
g. Unfair labor practices committed during bargaining
The Weingarten Rule is that employees are entitled to have a union representative present
during an investigatory interview where the employee fears the interview may result in their
receiving discipline. The role of the union representative is to protect the employees without
interfering with the legitimate rights of the employer.
For what purpose did the Supreme Court adopt the rule?
The basis for the rule was that employee representation is appropriate due to the NLRA’s
purpose of eliminating the inequality of power between the employer and the employee.
4. What are the “rules” employers and union organizers must follow during an organizational
campaign?
a. Employees may solicit union support on the employer’s property during off-work time.
b. Nonemployees may not solicit union support on employer’s property if there are other
ways to reach employees.
c. Employees may not solicit public areas of an employer’s property.
d. Union buttons or insignia may not be worn if it would incite a disturbance.
e. Bulletin boards and meeting halls can be used by employees for union activities if the
employer allows access for other employee programs.
5. When is an employer illegally discriminating against employees based upon their union
activities?
Discrimination occurs when a union member is treated differently from a nonunion worker or is
treated in a different manner than he would have been had he not been involved in union activity.
6. What union activities are prohibited under the Taft-Hartley unfair labor practices provision?
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Taft-Hartley amendments prohibit a union from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise
of their rights by (a) violent, threatening, and nonpeaceful behavior; (b) threats of economic
reprisals; (c) mass picketing which bars lawful entry or exits from work site; (d) causing an
employer to discriminate against an employee; (e) discriminating provisions in collective
bargaining agreements.
There are three methods by which collective bargaining agreements are enforced:
8. How did the “Steelworkers Trilogy” help clarify the role of arbitration and court enforcement of
contracts?
These cases held that the function of the court is limited to a review of whether or not the issue to
be arbitrated is governed by the contract. Any doubt as to the coverage should be resolved in
favor of arbitration. In addition, unless the arbitrator’s award is ambiguous, the courts should
enforce it even if the court would not have decided the substantive issues in the same way.
9. What individual rights do employees have within the collective bargaining process?
10. Why does management often desire to add a zipper clause to a CBA?
A zipper clause waives the right of either party to require the other to bargain on any matter not
covered in an agreement during the life of the contract, thus limiting the terms and conditions of
employment to those set forth in the contract. Employers want such a clause to avoid having to
open negotiations during a contract term.
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CHAPTER 10: YOU BE THE ARBITRATOR!
Refusing to Arbitrate
I would have ruled for the Employer that the grievances did not fit within the arbitration clause.
The collective bargaining agreement contained a very narrow arbitration clause, expressly
excluding, inter alia, “[d]isputes concerning contract interpretation.” As to the four
grievances at issue, the Union itself initially took the position that the grievance involved contract
interpretation. Thus, in the Union’s letters requesting the arbitration of those grievances, the
Union’s attorney stated that the “matter is a labor dispute involving interpretation and application
of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Given the Union’s own characterization of the grievances
as involving contract interpretation and the express exclusion of such disputes from arbitration,
the Employer was under no obligation to arbitrate these grievances.
2. Explain why the relevant provisions of the CBA as applied to the facts of this case dictate the
award.
The Arbitration clause was very narrowly drawn so that the usual kind of issues to be arbitrated,
“matters which involve management decisions or business judgment” are not covered. The
performance of an employee, paying employees from a piece work pool of funds and employees
violating work rules, are definitely management decisions or business judgment or an
interpretation of the application of the contract to piecework employees.
3. What actions might the employer and/or the union have taken to avoid this conflict?
The union should try to revise the arbitration process in the next negotiations.
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CHAPTER 10: EXTRA CASES
Facts:
For 20 years, the experienced and apprentice wire weavers of the company had been represented by a
union. But after a 13-week strike, the relationship ended. For almost 13 years thereafter, the employees
were not represented by any union. A new union began organizing employees, and having reached
majority status, requested that it meet with the company. The company refused to recognize the union. An
election was held, and the union lost by a vote of seven to six. The union petitioned the NLRB to set aside
the election because the pre-election conduct of the company’s president was an unfair labor practice. The
Board agreed, set aside the election, and entered an unfair labor practice charge. The company appealed.
Decision:
The court examined the pre-election conduct of the president. He had on numerous occasions, orally and
in writing, urged the 14 employees to reject the union. He claimed that the union’s only weapon was a
strike, and that the last strike had nearly ruined the company. He also warned that the company was still
not financially secure and that a strike could close the plant. He denounced the particular union and its top
officials as corrupt and strike-happy. He added that the wire weavers’ age and lack of education would
make it difficult for them to find other jobs. The company defended the pre-election remarks on the
grounds that the remarks were true. The court pointed out that an employer’s predictions of economic
consequences must be demonstrable and not just based on the feelings of the employer. It also stated that
the test of the coercive effect of such statements includes the total circumstances surrounding them.
The court affirmed the Board’s finding that the president’s conduct interfered with the
employees’ exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in the election.1
1. Do you think the fact that there were only 14 employees involved influenced the finding of the
Board and the Court?
Yes: With so few employees, references to age and experience by the President would be very
personal and threatening. If it were a plant with 300 employees, however, they would not feel as
if the President knew each worker personally and was referring to him.
No: The conduct of the President was objectively a violation of law even if no employee was
found to have been influenced.
2. If the President truly feared economic hardship because of unionization, how could he
communicate that without violating the employee’s right to a free choice?
Perhaps the company’s financial records could have been distributed without editorial comment.
Theoretically, the information, even if it showed a nonsecure company, would not discourage
unionization but merely limit the expectations of the employees as to how much better off they
would be with a union.
1 Adapted from National Labor Relations Board v. Sinclair Company, 397 F.2d 157 (1968).
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Domination
Facts:
The professional employees of a medium-size architectural firm voted to be represented by a union. More
than a year later, after months of unsuccessful negotiations, an employee petitioned for a decertification
election.
The union lost the election. Immediately after the election, a partner in the firm called a meeting
of partners and professional personnel to ask for suggestions on ensuring management–employee
dialogue.
An employee suggested a committee system whereby five in-house committees, composed of five
employees and one management representative, would examine a different area of employee concern,
such as wages. Two employees seconded his idea, and the plan was overwhelmingly approved. An
employee suggested that the partners vote on the proposal, too. They did, and it passed unanimously. The
committees met on company time without loss of pay. On some committees the managers voted; on some
they did not.
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the employer for supporting and
dominating a labor organization. The National Labor Relations Board agreed and ordered the employer to
withdraw its recognition and support, and to disestablish the employees’ committees. The employer
appealed.
Decision:
The Supreme Court pointed out that there is a line between employer cooperation, which the act
encourages, and employer domination, which the act condemns. That line is crossed when, from the
standpoint of the employee, freedom of choice has been stifled.
The court found that the totality of circumstances in this case did not show such domination.
Allowing the committees to meet on company time alone is not unlawful support. The court noted that the
idea for the committee system came from an employee and was supported and approved by other
employees. Placing a management representative on the committees was also an employee’s idea. The
court noted that the manager’s vote, when he has a vote at all, is just one of six.
Under these facts, the court reversed the Board’s finding.2
1. Do you think the court was influenced by the fact that the employees in question were
professional employees in an architectural firm? Why?
Yes: Because the type of interaction between the partners and professional staff on a regular basis
would enable the employees to allow employer participation in the committee system without
being intimidated.
No: The fact of employer involvement in and of itself decided the court’s decision.
2. Was the Board’s finding of employer domination more of a reaction to the unusual nature of the
employee committee than to the facts of the alleged interference?
The NLRB probably felt that the line the court drew between cooperation and domination was
harder to discern with this unconventional “collective” arrangement.
2 Adapted from Hertzka & Knowles v. National Labor Relations Board, 46 L.Ed. 2d 106 (1975).
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3. The union had failed to reach an agreement with the employer after more than a year of
bargaining. Was the employees’ freedom of choice stifled by that fact, so that the selection of the
alternative system did represent employer domination?
No, the alternative system obviously addressed the needs of this particular group of employees
better than a formal union—collective bargaining situation.
Facts:
A union decided to try to organize employees of four direct mail companies. A plan was devised whereby
a union organizer, accompanied by a group of persons acting on behalf of the union, would descend upon
the four companies without permission and distribute union literature during working hours.
The nature of the union’s conduct is illustrated by the following:
1. In the first incident, 25 men and women swarmed into the plant, moved to where
employees were working, and began talking to employees about the union. All
production stopped as a result of the commotion. When asked to leave, a union member
suggested they call the police.
2. Two days later at another plant, 25 men and women entered by the front entrance and
began talking to employees in the same manner as just described. At the same time, 12
men entered the plant from the rear and pushed by a manager who attempted to stop
them. Again work came to a halt.
3. One company, fearing it would be next, hired a uniformed guard. 25 union members
found the door unlocked, pushed past the armed guard, threatened to kill him with his
own gun, and created a commotion.
The Board found that the union had violated the National Labor Relations Act section prohibiting
unfair labor practices by labor organizations. The union appealed.
Decision:
The act forbids a union from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights. The
court noted that one right is to refrain from collective bargaining activities. The union’s conduct, which
included threats and physical violence, constituted illegal coercion.3
1. The defiant attitude of the union organizers was primarily directed at the employer’s
representatives who asked them to leave. Why would this have any affect on the employee’s
exercise of their rights?
Certainly, such a display could intimidate employees who fear not supporting a union whose
members so obviously ignore the law.
3Adapted from National Labor Relations Board v. District 65, Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, 375
F.2d 745 (1967).
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2. If the union activity had been limited to one location, would the finding have been the same?
Probably, although the conduct at all four locations indicated a willingness to undertake such
activities. That willingness is what could intimidate the workers.
3. Why did the union think such a plan might succeed in encouraging union membership?
Theoretically, a majority of the workers at the direct mail companies could be expected to support
a union if they had information about it. In addition, the union may have believed this macho
approach would convince the workers that the union could do a good job of representing them to
the employer.
Good Faith
Facts:
An employer manufactures oil field pumping equipment that it delivers by its own transportation
department throughout the United States and Canada. Because of previous violations of the Interstate
Commerce Act, the company notified its employees in all future trucking activity it would comply with
ICC regulations. The employees, fearing such compliance would affect their earnings, began a union
drive. The union requested recognition to which the employer did not respond directly. However, the
employer, over the next three months, did three things: 1) replaced the trucking foreman with someone
obviously antiunion, 2) announced significant alterations of wages, working, and trucking conditions,
apparently to be in compliance with the ICC, and 3) subcontracted the work. The union charged the
employer with unfair labor practice for failure to bargain in good faith.
The Board found that the new foreman questioned the employees about the union, urged them to
withdraw, and promised pay raises if they complied. He also threatened that the employer would sell the
trucks before accepting a union. He suggested a counter petition to the one pending before the National
Labor Relations Board requesting union recognition.
All of these activities violated the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith. In addition, the
unilateral change of wages and working conditions clearly violated the good faith duty to bargain. The
Board also found the decision to contract out the transportation work to be antiunion motivated and thus
an unfair labor practice. The employer appealed.
Decision:
The court had no trouble finding the foreman’s activities and the unilateral change of wages and benefits
as a breach of the good faith duty. Nevertheless, it examined the decision to subcontract more closely
because of the employer’s contention that it was motivated by a genuine desire to alleviate its ICC
problems. The court upheld the Board, however, because the facts justified a finding that the employer
believed it could solve both its ICC problem and its union problem by eliminating the trucks. Such an
action becomes, therefore, a violation of the employer’s good faith duty to bargain.4
4 Adapted from National Labor Relations Board v. American Manufacturing Company of Texas, 351 F. 2d 74 (1965).
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1. Was the foreman’s “prediction” that the employer would sell the trucks before accepting the
union, a good indication of the employer’s dual goal, that is, of satisfying the ICC and busting the
union?
Yes, because the desired result was to kill the union movement; therefore the hint was given.
2. How could the employer have eliminated the trucking department without violating its good faith
obligation?
3. Although the court upheld the Board’s decision, it reversed the Board’s order requiring the
employer to resume its trucking operation. The court noted that all the trucks were sold already
and such a remedy may well frustrate the union’s future ability to bargain. Can you speculate as
to the court’s reasons?
If the court allowed the NLRB to make such a management decision, the employer could have
used its financial situation against the union in future negotiations. Perhaps the start-up costs for
resuming the trucking operation would have reduced the money available for wage increases.
Discrimination
Facts:
The employee in this case was reportedly under the influence of liquor while on duty. He helped other
employees obtain liquor while on the job and would punch their time cards for them. His supervisor had
tried to fire him, but his superiors always prevented it because the employee was a representative of the
company-dominated union. Circumstances changed, however, after it was rumored that he had joined a
union that was trying to organize the plant. The day after he was seen talking to a union official, he was
fired. The Board found that the employee was fired because of his activities on behalf of the union and
ordered him reinstated. The company appealed.
Decision:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Board. It pointed out that although an employer can hire or fire an
employee for a good, bad, or no reason, the employer couldn’t do so to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. The facts of this case showed that although the employer had
legitimate reasons to fire the employee, the employee was let go when he became active on behalf of the
union. This clearly violates the Act.5
1. If the employer has a good reason for firing an employee (absenteeism) and a bad reason (union
activity), should the employer be allowed to prove the weight given to both before being found
guilty of “discrimination” under the Act?
No: Under the Act, discriminating against an employee because of union activity—regardless of
degree—is a violation.
5 Adapted from Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 88 L. Ed. 1071 (1943).
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Yes: Union activists could be fired for good and sufficient reasons. Other employees can discern
the reasons and not be afraid to pursue unionization because a bad employee was fired.
2. The Act assumes that discrimination of one employee will discourage union activity. Is that
assumption valid?
Yes: It creates an atmosphere of fear and employees would wait to let another employee try to
unionize to see if he was also fired or disciplined.
No: Discrimination against one employee can be seen as a desperate attempt of the employer to
stop unionization. If enough employees band together, they believe that not all of them could be
fired.
Employer Retaliation
Facts:
The company operates about 700 convenience stores. A sales assistant at one of the company’s stores was
murdered while on duty. The murder was widely publicized, and employees complained of inadequate
security measures. As a result of the murder, 15 sales assistants telephoned the union requesting a union
organization effort. The union sent representatives to 60 stores in the area where the murder had occurred
and left union authorization cards. Two days later, the company notified the union that an injunction had
been issued during a prior union campaign prohibiting solicitation on company property.
The next workday, the company had a meeting with the store managers in the area and talked
about the need to improve security. The company officials also discussed the union’s organization
activities and reminded the managers of the “no solicitation” policy and stated that a union would not
necessarily do the employees any good. Later that week, the company had an unprecedented meeting for
all sales assistants. Approximately 200 sales assistants attended and were paid for their time. The
company officials told the employees that they did not need a union and that the employees from the
union could retrieve their authorization cards. The employees were asked to voice their complaints and
the employees listed the following: getting less than 40 hours work per week, not having breaks, not
being paid for overtime work, working alone at night, and poor lighting at the stores.
The next day, the company sent a memo to all regional personnel directing that sales assistants
should work a 40-hour workweek; canopy lights were installed at all the stores; a policy was adopted that
no one would be required to work alone at night; and sales assistants began receiving wages for after-
hours overtime work. The company posted “no solicitation” signs in all stores and directed that those
signs be enforced; if the employees did not enforce the signs, they would lose their jobs. Later that month
the company held further meetings with sales assistants, who again were paid for their time. They were
asked to select committee representatives to meet with management to discuss their complaints.
Management officials left the room while the employees selected their representatives. The company
made a list of the 10 most frequently mentioned items from the employees’ recommended subjects for the
committee to discuss.
Meanwhile, the union filed a representation petition with the NLRB seeking an election in a unit
of all Summitt, Ohio, sales assistants. The company president told the managers to tell the sales assistants
that if they joined the union, the company would close those stores. The first meeting of the Employee
Management Committee was held and the 10 priority items were listed, granting employees a new
vacation policy, improved health-care benefits, sick days, change in holiday hours for pay, recognition of
seniority ranks, and improved security systems. Not long after that, the company sent an additional memo
231
around announcing other improvements in life, major medical, and accident insurance plans, in addition
to death and family benefits and a revised disciplinary appeal system.
The union charged the company with unfair labor practice for granting benefits to prevent a fair
election and for creating an employer-dominated labor union. The company denied that the motivation for
the benefits was to prevent a union, and furthermore that the employee organization was a “labor
organization” under the NLRA. Even if it was a “labor organization,” the company denied that it was a
company-dominated organization.6
Decision:
The hearing officer found clear patterns of antiunion animus in the company’s activities and thereby
rejected the company’s contention that motivation was other than antiunion. In addition, the hearing
officer found that the employee committee created by the employer was, indeed, a labor organization in
that it was “an employee representation committee … for the purpose in whole or in part of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work.”
Also, the hearing officer felt that the record clearly showed an unlawful domination or
interference by the employer with the employee committee. The company formed the committee in direct
response to the organizational campaign. The committee had no meetings apart from its discussions with
management; formed no independent program or plan of action, and discussed only those subjects that the
company determined was of the greatest concern to the employees. The meetings with management were
held on company premises and the company paid the employees for their time. The agenda was as
prepared by management, and management took the minutes and controlled all the communications
concerning the committee’s work.
1. Did the company’s actions in forming an Employee Management Committee interfere with the
union’s organizational efforts? Explain your answer.
Yes: Clearly, the committee was intended to prove to the employees that they didn’t need a union.
By allowing the employees to meet on company time, the union would have little if any
opportunity to organize.
No: The union still had the ability to attract the workers if they indeed wanted to organize.
2. Should a company be prevented from instituting necessary employee benefits because of union
organizing?
Yes: If the purpose is to prevent unionization. The workers may find those benefits withdrawn
after the union is discouraged and gone.
No: Workers will still benefit regardless of why the improved conditions are instituted.
3. Explain why the Employee Management Committee could be considered a “company union.”
The company requested the formation of the committee; the committee only met when it met with
management; it had no independent program but discussed only company determined items; all
support was through management; and the employees were on work time during their meetings.
232
CHAPTER 10: EXERCISE AND EXERCISE GUIDANCE
What Do You Really Know About Organizational Campaign Unfair Labor Practices?
Purpose:
Task:
Managers often have a great deal of influence with their employees. Thus, knowing what managers
lawfully may and may not tell employees during a union organizing campaign is very important. They
should be certain their actions do not unintentionally cause an unfair labor practice. You must determine
if managers are generally allowed or prohibited from each of the following. Place an X in the most
appropriate column:
Allowed Prohibited
1. _____ _____ Managers can ask employees how they intend to vote.
2. _____ _____ Managers can promise employees a pay increase if the union is
defeated.
3. _____ _____ Managers can tell employees that the law allows the employer to
permanently replace them if they strike.
4. _____ _____ Managers can tell employees about the bad personal experiences they
have had with unions.
5. _____ _____ Managers can say, “If the union wins, there will be a strike.”
6. _____ _____ Managers can visit the employees at home to discuss the campaign with
their families.
7. _____ _____ Managers can tell employees they can vote against the union even if
they signed an authorization card.
8. _____ _____ Managers can tell employees that management does not think the
employees need a union to represent them.
9. _____ _____ Managers can tell employees the plant will be closed if the union wins
the election.
10. _____ _____ Managers can tell employees that if a union is victorious, all current
wages and benefits must be negotiated and could be reduced.
Allowed: 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10
Prohibited: 1, 2, 5, 6, and 9
After students individually score their exercises, it would be helpful to discuss each and emphasize that
past practice and intent would be closely examined in a case involving one or more of the prohibited
activities.
233
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no skin off my tail if you don't accept." Lyf half turned toward the T.V.
set.
"I haven't said I wouldn't," Miss Twilley said.
"Nor have you said you would. Now speak up. My time's valuable."
"Oh—very well," Miss Twilley said sulkily. "I accept."
Lyf smiled, reached under his cloak and produced a long sheet of
paper covered with writing. "You're a hard bargainer, Miss Twilley," he
said. "You extracted every condition you could possibly get on a deal
of this kind. My congratulations. This is a personal contract I had
drawn up. It's in English so you can understand it. All you do is sign
both copies. In transactions like this no witnesses are necessary."
"You don't mind if I read it first?" Miss Twilley said. "Not that I don't
trust you—but this is business."
"Not at all," Lyf said "and please note the escape clause which allows
you a peremptory withdraw if you are not satisfied with the basic
services."
Miss Twilley eyed the paper, skipping over the legal jargon, but
carefully reading the specific provisions. It was deceptively simple
and completely binding. But it didn't vary from Lyf's proposals. She
would have ten years of health, wealth and beauty, in return for which
she would surrender her body to Lyf, mardak of Gnoth, to employ as
he saw fit—within certain limits provided by the exceptions. She
sighed. It was fair enough, she supposed. There were a few
exceptions like the suicide clause that allowed Lyf to take immediate
possession if she tried to kill herself, and the war clause which
permitted him to remove her to a safe place for the duration of the
conflict. She shrugged. There didn't seem to be anything wrong with it
except the tone. Somehow it managed to convey the impression of a
property rather than a personal transaction.
"It's always best to keep these things impersonal," the Devi said. "You
sign on the bottom line underneath my cartouche."
Miss Twilley signed.
"And now," Lyf said briskly "there are a few formalities. Not that I don't
trust you, of course, but business is business. Will you please
disrobe?"
"Must I?"
Lyf nodded. "You must. I realize that this is embarrassing for you, but
it would be infinitely more embarrassing if I placed my mark upon you
while you were clothed."
Miss Twilley shivered a little as she reached for the zipper of her skirt.
But she had expected something like this.
Lyf looked at her critically. "You're worse than I thought," he said.
"However, your skeleton seems structurally sound and well
proportioned. Now please turn around."
Miss Twilley had hardly turned her back when a lance of numbing
cold struck her in the base of the spine. She jumped involuntarily as
Lyf's voice came to her ears.
"There—that does it." He walked past her and turned off the T.V. The
black hole winked out, leaving a shattered picture tube where it had
been. "Now that you're a sixth order focal point we can dispense with
this monstrosity," he said. "The automatics on Hel will generate a new
gateway shortly."
"Now what?" Miss Twilley asked. She wasn't sure that she liked the
idea of being a sixth order focus.
"The mark leaves a small red lesion," Lyf said, "but it won't bother
you. However, I should warn you not to attempt to have it removed.
That could be quite painful and perhaps fatal." He moved in front of
her. "I expect that we'd better start therapy right away. That tumor
isn't going to be easy to remove." His eyes were level with her own,
twin pools of clear bottomless green with the darker spots of his
pupils sharply demarcated from the surrounding iris. With mild
surprise she realized that they were oval rather than round, and that
their ellipses were growing—and encompassing her in their inner
darkness.
Lyf eyed her solicitously from a chair next to her bed. There was a
faint proprietory glint in his eyes but his voice was as soft as ever. "It's
all done Enid," he said. "How do you like it?"
Miss Twilley didn't like the use of her first name. It sounded entirely
too familiar, but she supposed that there was little she could do about
it. After all he did have certain rights, even though their full exercise
was some years hence. She stirred sleepily. She was in her own
bedroom and the bed that she had slept in these past eighteen years
was familiar and comforting. Except for the Devi sitting beside her
everything was normal down to the last fold of the flannel nightgown
that covered her.
She felt oddly alive, and somehow different. There was a fullness to
her body and a heaviness to her chest. She looked down and gasped
with surprise and pleasure at the jutting rise of the nightgown. She
had changed!
"That was the biggest part of the specifications," Lyf said with the
faintest hint of amusement in his voice. "Your mental patterns were
extraordinarily precise about some things. About others I had to use
my own judgment. I hope the overall effect meets with your approval."
Miss Twilley felt as excited as an adolescent on her first date. She
slipped out of bed and padded on bare feet over to the vanity in the
corner. Eagerly she eyed herself in the big mirror. Even in the
nightgown she looked good. Her face was still her own but it had
been subtly changed, the features smoothed and rearranged. Her
pale blue eyes were now a smoky gray, and her plain mouse-brown
hair had reddish glints in it and was much thicker than before. It was
a very satisfactory face, smooth and beautiful, and years younger.
Why—she looked barely twenty five!
With a quick movement she bent, grasped the hem of her gown, and
pulled it over her head.
And gasped!
She had never dreamed of looking like this, even in her wildest flights
of fancy!
"Like it?" Lyf asked from his seat in the corner.
"Like it!" she chortled. "I adore it! How on Earth did you do it? You've
not only made me beautiful, you've made me young!"
"I didn't do it on Earth," Lyf admitted. "I took you to Hel where there's
some decent equipment. It wasn't much," he added vaguely, "merely
the application of some rather simple cellular biology—mostly a
rearrangement of DNA molecules and a bit of sarcoplasty. Actually it
wasn't too difficult. The removal of your tumor was much harder.
You'll find that two weeks have gone from your life, but they've been
well spent."
"I should say they have!" Miss Twilley said as she pirouetted slowly
before the glass. Her brows knit in a tiny frown as she saw her only
blemish, a bright red spot at the base of her spine.
"The mark can't be helped," Lyf said, "but it doesn't detract at all. And
it won't show even in a bikini."
"Forty, twenty-four, thirty-six." Miss Twilley breathed. "Lyf—I could
kiss you!"
"I'd rather you wouldn't," Lyf said. "There is, after all, a certain species
incompatibility between yours and mine. Incidentally, you have
perfect health. You'll never know a sick day for the rest of your life
which should be quite long. And I gave you a fine singing voice, and a
mental attitude that will let you use it."
"Thank you," Miss Twilley murmured as she stared at her reflection.
"I've left instructions for your financial operations on your dresser.
Follow them and you'll be financially independent. I think that does it.
Everything is satisfactory, I trust."
"Completely," Miss Twilley breathed, never removing her eyes from
the mirror.
"Then I shall be leaving."
Miss Twilley drew in a deep breath and observed the results with utter
fascination. "Don't you think I'm beautiful?" she asked.
Lyf smiled. "Different worlds, different standards," he said. "Beautiful
isn't quite the word I would use."
"What word would you use?"
"Useful," Lyf said.
"Useful? Hmm. What do you mean?"
"It should be obvious," Lyf said. "But I suppose it isn't. You humans
are a strange lot. You assume. You don't reason. And it always
shocks you to find that your assumptions are wrong."
Miss Twilley looked at him with wide eyes. A cold chill ran down her
spine and poked tingling rootlets of ice into her viscera. "What have I
assumed?"
"Do I have to answer that?"
Miss Twilley blushed. The effect was far more startling this time.
Lyf smiled with an air that would have been infuriating in a human but
was somehow appropriate for a Devi. Miss Twilley sighed. At least
that worry was removed.
"Perhaps I should give you a short synopsis of Devian society," Lyf
said. "It's not like yours. Millennia ago our culture and technology
evolved to the point where individual needs could be satisfied
effortlessly. As a result we were compelled to consider group desires.
Modern society on Hel is composed of enclaves with a community of
interest plus certain ancillary groups that support them. The task of
satisfying the desires of an enclave is infinitely more complex than
satisfying an individual, which gives our civilization the necessary
stimulus to progress.
"One of the reasons we deal with your world is to provide us with
things impractical to produce upon our own. Another reason is
amusement. If only you humans were not so savage we could
perhaps arrange tours of Earth to observe you in your native haunts."
"Is that why—" Miss Twilley began.
He shook his head. "No—the importation of humans for ethnological
studies has long since become a matter of interest only to highly
specialized enclaves. That subject has been exhausted for popular
satisfaction. We have tried to import other species, but they do not
thrive on Hel, and it takes a great deal of trouble merely to keep them
alive. However, your race adapts so readily that even your cultural
variations disappear in a few decades.
"It was this early importation and your ability to survive that has
placed your race in such demand. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that your
species cannot reproduce on our world, but the inhibitors we use to
regulate our numbers also affect yours. Naturally, we can't risk a
population explosion merely to reproduce your race. So we obtain
more of you when necessary."
"Why?"
"Consider for a moment what might be valuable in a civilization that
has no basic needs."
"Luxuries?"
"Precisely. As an ancillary system operator, I supply a luxury item to
my fellow citizens. One that cannot be readily produced by our
techniques. I said I was a mardak, but you never asked what it
meant. You assumed it was a title. It is, but it's professional, not
social. There are no classes on Hel, merely occupations."
"All right," Miss Twilley said reluctantly, "What is a mardak?"
"The closest analogy in your society," Lyf said, "is a dairyman."
THE END
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