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Labor Relations Striking a Balance 5th
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Chapter 07 - Bargaining
CHAPTER 7
Bargaining
Chapter Overview
Bargaining between unions and employers is one of the three very important processes of U.S.
labor relations. The goal of this chapter is for students to understand the behavioral, strategic, and
legal aspects of collectively bargaining contracts in U.S. labor relations. The chapter also
includes discussions of the important practical elements of bargaining, including preparation,
costing, and the timeline of the negotiation process.
The bargaining process starts with labor and management negotiators preparing to bargain.
Bargaining committees, the bargaining time line, and important issues such as identification of
interests and alternatives are thus presented.
Two additional topics further set the stage for understanding what happens at the bargaining table
so they are covered next. First, types of bargaining structures are explored. Second, the grocery
industry is used as real life example to illustrate the various elements of bargaining power and
the bargaining environment.
In following the bargaining time line, the chapter next turns to the bargaining table. After
discussing contract costing, the boundaries of labor negotiations created by labor law are
reviewed. Turning to the conduct of negotiations, the chapter follows Walton and McKersie’s
four subprocesses of bargaining:
 Distributive bargaining
 Integrative bargaining
 Attitudinal structuring
 Intraorganizational bargaining
Although distributive bargaining is the type familiar to most people, all four are discussed in
detail, including examples and the overall strategy for using each one.
The chapter also discusses issues relating to reaching agreement, and private sector v. public
sector differences, and concludes with a discussion of the pressures to change from adversarial to
interest-based bargaining.
Note: This chapter follows the negotiating process from preparation to agreement, and for each
step of the process explores the major concepts that negotiators should understand about labor–
management bargaining. To complement this analytical approach (or what some might call the
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Budd, Labor Relations: Striking a Balance, 5e
“science of bargaining”) The Zinnia bargaining simulation provides the opportunity for students
to experience the dynamism of bargaining firsthand—that is, to practice the “art of bargaining.”
Teaching notes for The Zinnia bargaining simulation can be found in the introduction to this
instructor’s manual or in separate document in the instructor’s section of the textbook’s website.
Use of this bargaining simulation is strongly encouraged.
Lecture Tips
The various elements of this chapter can be covered in a relatively straightforward fashion by
following the time line of the bargaining process (that is, start with issues relating to preparing to
bargain, then turn to the actual negotiating process, and then conclude with trying to reach
agreement). To break up a traditional lecture-based approach to this material, I have done three
things.
1. When discussing the legal parameters of the bargaining process (“in good faith” over
mandatory terms and conditions of employment”), I use the labor law discussion case
included in this chapter as a discussion tool. Teaching Notes are at the end of this
document.
2. I use a simple bargaining exercise titled “Hey Buddy, Can you Spare a Computer?” This
is a role playing exercise involving a 10-minute one-on-one negotiation between two
people who probably start fighting over a set of used computers without realizing that
they can share because one only needs them during the day and the other only during the
night. This is similar to the classic orange example from Mary Parker Follett in which
two sisters are fighting over an orange without recognizing that one only needs the juice
and the other only needs the rind. Role sheets for each participant and teaching notes for
this exercise are available for printing in the “Instructor Resources” section of the
textbook’s site in Connect (http://connect.mheducation.com).
This exercise motivates a more careful discussion of bargaining strategies, maybe as part
of a slightly broader discussion of Walton and McKersie’s four subprocesses of
bargaining. Namely, when discussing distributive and integrative bargaining, integrate
examples of what happened during the “Hey Buddy” bargaining exercise.
3. Third, instead of lecturing on the bargaining environment, I take an active learning

approach by having small teams of students create a Mind Map of the bargaining
environment for a specific negotiation (e.g., see reflection question 5). More details on
this exercise can be found in the article “Mind Maps as Classroom Exercises” in the
Winter 2004 issue of the Journal of Economic Education. This article and some example
Mind Maps are available on my website at http://www.legacy-
irc.csom.umn.edu/faculty/jbudd/mindmaps/. A few PowerPoint slides that can be used to
provide instructions and examples are available in the instructor’s section of the
textbook’s website.
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The Mind Maps exercise is time intensive (perhaps 1.5 hours) so discussion of Chapter 7
might spill over into the following week, but there is usually time to make it up when
covering Chapter 8. Alternatively, the newspaper articles that accompany reflection
question 5 can be used as a discussion tool to illustrate dimensions of the bargaining
environment.
The issue of what happens when bargaining fails is the closing question that leads into the next
chapter.
Lecture Outline
Learning Objectives
1. Sketch the steps of the bargaining time line.

2. Define the different types of bargaining structures.
3. Discuss the determinants and importance of bargaining power.
4. Explain the legal parameters of the U.S. bargaining process.
5. Outline the four subprocesses of bargaining (distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining,
attitudinal structuring, and intraorganizational bargaining), their purposes, and their tactics.
6. Understand the pressures for changing from traditional to integrative bargaining, and why this
is difficult.
Through the process of collective bargaining, employers and unions negotiate terms and
conditions of employment, and put these terms into written contracts, also called collective
bargaining agreements. In the United States these contracts are legally binding and typically last
one to five years, with a three-year duration being the most common.
U.S. union contracts usually include the following subjects:
 Compensation: wages, benefits, vacations and holidays, shift premiums, profit sharing
 Personnel policies and procedures: layoff, promotion, and transfer policies, overtime and
vacation rules
 Employee rights and responsibilities: seniority rights, job standards, workplace rules
 Employer rights and responsibilities: management rights, just cause discipline and
discharge, subcontracting, safety standards
 Union rights and responsibilities: recognition as bargaining agent, bulletin board, union
security, dues checkoff, shop stewards, no strike clauses
 Dispute resolution and ongoing decision making: grievance procedures, committees,
consultation, renegotiation procedures
Compensation items might also be referred to as economic issues, and the other areas are called
administrative or language issues.
All labor negotiators do four key things: prepare-explore-agree-implement
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I. Preparing to Bargain
A. The longest portion of the time line of a negotiation process is the preparation stage.
B. The preparation stage usually begins at least several months before bargaining begins,
or even 18 months before the start of a particularly large, complex, or pattern-setting
negotiation; it usually involves the following stages:
1. Assembling a team—for the employer team, managerial roles typically determine
bargaining team responsibilities, whereas union bargaining committees are
usually elected by the rank and file.
2. Collecting information— Managers might collect external benchmarking data on
labor costs and other items, and should also review the organization’s financial
performance and strategic plans. The union negotiating committee will likely
survey the rank and file to identify common concerns and goals, and also consult
with its national union. Both sides should also conduct thorough reviews of how
the expiring collective bargaining agreement has performed. Areas of the
contract that have created problems, such as high levels of grievances, should be
noted. These pieces of information form the basis for each side to determine the
following five essential things, from which, both bargaining teams develop
targets, priorities, and strategies:
 Their interests (what they are really concerned about)
 Options for achieving their interests
 External benchmarks of fairness
 The other side’s interests
 Their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)
3. From these, both bargaining teams develop targets, priorities, and strategies.
Extensive checklists for both employer and union negotiators are available to
help guide preparation activities.
4. Creating a strike contingency plan is another important aspect of bargaining
preparations.
5. Sixty days before the existing contract expires, or 90 days in the health care
industry, the parties provide official notification to each other and to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service that they intend to negotiate a new contract.
The bargaining teams then Establish a schedule of bargaining sessions and set
ground rules.
II. Bargaining Structure
A. An appropriate bargaining unit is defined during the representation process. This unit
is the minimal unit for collective bargaining.
B. Once certified, multiple units can be combined into a single larger bargaining unit for
the purposes of negotiating a contract if the parties agree. The resulting organizational
structure for the collective bargaining process is called the bargaining structure.
C. Bargaining structures range from decentralized to centralized; a decentralized
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bargaining structure involves a limited group of employees in a single workplace; a

centralized bargaining structure involves numerous occupations, locations, and
companies (Figure 7.2).
D. The conventional wisdom is that in many situations, employers prefer decentralized
bargaining structures to have local unions compete against one another for jobs (this is
called “whipsawing”) and to tailor contracts to local situations.
E. Unions are generally believed to prefer more centralized structures because they can
consolidate their power and prevent whipsawing by negotiating uniform contracts (this
is called “taking wages out of competition”).
F. The bargaining structure in the United States is typically decentralized; the leading
explanations for this appears to be that employers have been able to use their greater
bargaining leverage to force more decentralization and also that both firms and
workers like the flexibility and opportunities for employee involvement in decision
making allowed by decentralized bargaining structures.
G. Another type of bargaining structure is pattern bargaining in which the union
bargains exclusively with a target company until an agreement is reached. The target
settlement is then used by the union as a pattern for subsequent negotiations in the
industry; this sequential bargaining process is an informal way of achieving a more
centralized bargaining structure.
H. Pattern bargaining can help unions take wages out of competition, but there are also
intraorganizational bargaining reasons.
I. When determining the desired bargaining structure, labor and management negotiators
face a trade-off between power and responsiveness.
J. Compared to a centralized bargaining structure, decentralized bargaining can be more
responsive to local needs because the issues are often more homogeneous and the
negotiators are close to their constituents; however, decentralized bargaining can also
reduce labor’s bargaining power.
K. As negotiations become more centralized, the number of issues increases, labor and
management negotiators become further removed from their constituents, and it is
more difficult to tailor local solutions for specific problems.
III. Bargaining Power and the Bargaining Environment
A. What happens at the bargaining table reflects differences in relative bargaining power
between labor and management. Bargaining power is “the ability to secure another’s
agreement on one’s own terms.” This ability depends on the relative costs of agreeing
and disagreeing; the side that can impose greater disagreement costs on the other will
be in a more powerful position.
B. A critical reason that U.S. labor law protects workers’ efforts at forming unions and
engaging in collective bargaining is to balance bargaining power between a company
and a group of employees.
C. Strikes are the most important way for unions to impose disagreement costs on
employers, so relative bargaining power is closely related to a union’s strike leverage;
a union with strong strike leverage can impose significant costs on management
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through a strike, and labor in this situation has strong bargaining power relative to the
employer, resulting in contract terms favoring the employees; the reverse is true if a
union has weak strike leverage.
D. Analyzing relative bargaining power—or strike leverage—consists of identifying the
important elements of the bargaining environment. The bargaining environment is
the diverse set of external influences on labor and management as they sit at a
bargaining table negotiating a contract.
E. The dimensions of the bargaining environment apply equally well to the private and
public sectors.
F. There are at least two key differences between the public and private sectors:
1. Although some services can be privatized or outsourced, essential services must
still be provided. Public sector management does not have the option of moving
to a different location in search of lower labor costs. This places an important
constraint on the business strategies available to public sector managers.
2. Public services are not bought and sold in economic markets; instead the levels
of services are ultimately determined by voters, taxpayers, and elected officials
in the political arena. This heightens the importance of the sociopolitical
dimension of the bargaining environment.
G. These differences lead some to argue that public sector collective bargaining should be
prohibited because public sector unions are too powerful. The evidence, however, does
not support the contention that public sector unions have unlimited bargaining power.
IV. At the Bargaining Table
A. Once at the bargaining table, negotiators need to use their communication,

relationship-building, and problem-solving skills to reach an agreement that both sides
find acceptable.
B. Most labor negotiations involve the renegotiation of an expiring contract, and this
contract anchors the negotiations. For starters, the side that wants to change the
contract traditionally makes the opening proposals that mark the beginning of
bargaining. From there, proposals are considered and counterproposals are made until
an agreement is reached.
C. Labor Negotiations as Theater
1. The dramatic structure of labor negotiations closely parallels a theatrical play.
The negotiators are actors and have roles, especially the lead negotiators with the
leading parts. The audience for the actors’ performances is other negotiators and
the negotiators’ constituents (upper management for management negotiators,
union members for the union negotiators).
2. The audience has certain expectations of how the performance should proceed—
that is, the constituents demand that their interests be strongly represented.
3. The lead negotiators need to put on a show. Table pounding and other aggressive
tactics demonstrate the strength of the negotiators not to each other but to their
constituents.
4. This theater takes place on the front stage of negotiations (the bargaining table)
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for the other members of the bargaining committee to see.

5. There is also a backstage: experienced lead negotiators often meet with each
other in private with no other bargaining team members present. In these
meetings the negotiators can step out of their public roles, share information, and
explore wide-ranging options.
6. In contrast with the conflictual bargaining of the front stage, backstage
interactions can have a problem-solving flavor.
7. The dramatic structure of labor negotiations makes negotiations more complex
than they appear because of the following reasons:
 Negotiators have to decipher whether the other negotiators are putting on a
show or trying to communicate a legitimate point.
 Novice labor relations practitioners need to make sure they do not get
swept up in the performance or get emotionally involved.
 Participants need to know their roles, understand the nature of the entire
performance, and wait for their opportunities out of the spotlight
backstage.
8. This dramatic structure applies equally well to the grievance procedure. Novices
should be prepared for public performances during meetings and hearings to
resolve grievances, and should not take the process personally.
D. Negotiating Tools
1. Contract costing is one of the essential negotiating tools that participants use to
evaluate proposals by estimating their monetary costs; a lump-sum bonus is
perhaps the easiest proposal to cost—simply multiply the amount of the bonus
by the number of employees who will receive it.
2. Most proposals are more complex, and their costs might depend on employee
seniority, future staffing levels, and other complicating factors; contract costing
therefore often requires making projections of complex issues and negotiators
might disagree over these projections.
3. A bargaining book is another common tool for negotiators; each side uses three-
ring binders to create a complete record of the negotiation, including their
agenda, proposals, supporting documents, proposals and materials received from
the other side, and the minutes of each bargaining session.
4. It can also be useful for the bargaining book to include a summary sheet that
shows the status of each section (pending, agreed, or withdrawn) at the end of
each bargaining session; negotiators might also receive assistance from neutral
mediators.
E. Bargaining in Good Faith
1. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) requires negotiators to bargain “in
good faith” [Section 8(d)]. The dividing line between good faith and illegal bad
faith bargaining, however, is not always clear.
2. Following are some of the illegal bad faith bargaining:
 Unilateral change—occurs when an employer changes wages, benefits, or
other terms and conditions of employment without first bargaining with the
union; this includes both during contract negotiations and when a contract
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is in force; an employer can make unilateral changes in mandatory

bargaining items only after it has fulfilled its bargaining obligation by
bargaining to an impasse.
 Direct dealing—occurs when an employer illegally tries to circumvent and
undermine a union by interacting directly with the employees with respect
to bargaining issues.
 Refusing to provide information in certain situations—upon request, an
employer has an obligation to provide information to the union that is
necessary for representing the workers effectively.
 Surface bargaining—occurs when an employer or a union goes through
the motions of bargaining but does not sincerely try to reach an agreement;
it is a multifaceted concept, and in each case the NLRB looks at the
specific facts and the totality of conduct, including delaying tactics,
unreasonable bargaining demands, failure to designate an agent with
sufficient bargaining authority, withdrawal of already agreed-upon
provisions, making “take it or leave it” offers, refusing to make
counterproposals, and arbitrary scheduling of meetings.
3. Good faith bargaining requires that the parties must make “a serious attempt to
resolve differences and reach a common ground.”
4. A company can use its bargaining power to achieve a favorable settlement (hard
bargaining) but not to undermine the sincere pursuit of an agreement (surface
bargaining).
F. Mandatory Bargaining Items
1. Labor law also affects what is discussed at the bargaining table; specifically, the
NLRA requires good faith bargaining over “wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment” [Section 8(d)].
2. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is empowered by the U.S. Supreme
Court to classify bargaining issues into the following three categories of
bargaining items (called the Borg-Warner doctrine after the name of the Court’s
decision):
 Mandatory bargaining items—wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment; employers and unions have an obligation to bargain over
these.
 Illegal bargaining items—bargaining items that would violate the law, such
as closed shop provisions, policies that involve racial discrimination, or
payment of wages below the legal minimum; employers and unions are
prohibited from bargaining over such items.
 Permissive bargaining item—it is the middle category that includes
everything not in the other two (mandatory bargaining items and illegal
bargaining items); employers and unions can bargain over permissive
items if they choose; but because they are outside the boundaries of the
NLRA, the NLRB cannot order bargaining on these issues, and employees
are not protected if they go on strike over these issues.
3. When there are disputes between negotiators about whether something is a
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mandatory bargaining item, the NLRB issues a ruling indicating whether the
specific issue is included in their interpretation of “wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment.” Some prominent examples of mandatory and
permissive bargaining items are listed in Table 7.4.
V. Bargaining Subprocesses and Strategies
A. Richard Walton and Robert McKersie decomposed the overall labor negotiations
process into four types of bargaining (Table 7.4):
1. Distributive bargaining
2. Integrative bargaining
3. Attitudinal structuring
4. Intraorganizational bargaining
B. In Walton and McKersie’s terminology, these are the four subprocesses of
negotiations—the four types of bargaining that take place in collective bargaining to
negotiate a union contract.
C. The first two subprocesses—distributive and integrative bargaining—are the major
alternatives for negotiating terms and conditions of employment: adversarial
bargaining over conflicts of interest, and collaborative problem solving for issues of
mutual gain.
D. Collective bargaining in both the private and public sectors is a mixture of all four
subprocesses for three reasons:
1. Mainstream industrial relations views employment relationship conflict as a
mixed motive—a mixture of conflicts of interests and shared opportunities for
mutual gain—so both distributive and integrative bargaining are important.
2. The employer–employee–union relationship is a long-term, ongoing affair, so
attitudinal structuring is significant.
3. Both employers and unions have constituencies with diverse interests, so
intraorganizational bargaining is present.
E. Distributive Bargaining.
1. Distributive bargaining is the familiar type of negotiation used to resolve
conflicts of interests—in other words, to distribute the shares of the fixed pie. In
distributive bargaining, the more one side receives, the less the other side
receives, so this type of bargaining is also referred to as zero-sum bargaining.
2. Distributive bargaining is the classic vision of collective bargaining.
3. Wages, benefits, working conditions, and work rules are all viewed as conflictual
issues—improvements benefit the workers and harm the company’s bottom
line(and vice versa).
4. Employers need workers to produce goods and services, and workers need to
work to earn a living—but not at any cost.
5. Parties will pursue and enter a negotiated agreement when the terms of the
agreement are better than their alternatives; for workers, their alternatives
include going on strike and looking for work elsewhere; for employers, the
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alternatives are taking a strike, trying to hire new employees, outsourcing, and
moving.
6. The best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) determines what terms
are minimally acceptable to either side.
7. In distributive bargaining, each side’s BATNA can be thought of as their threat
point or resistance point—they will resist accepting terms less favorable than
their BATNA and will threaten to quit the negotiations and walk away if they
cannot obtain terms at least equal to their BATNA.
 It is important to be realistic when assessing your BATNA. Indeed, at least
one mediator prefers the term “most likely alternative to a negotiated
agreement” (MLATNA) to prevent the parties from being anchored by
unachievable alternatives.
8. The major distributive bargaining strategies and tactics are rooted in power—
trying to strengthen the image of your own resistance point while seeking out and
weakening the other side’s impression of their own resistance point.
9. Some of the distributive bargaining tactics may include the following:
 Carefully controlling and selectively presenting the information shared
with the other side (typically only the chief negotiator gets to speak at the
bargaining table).
 Reacting emotionally to statements made by the other side (or not reacting
at all).
 “Educating” the other side about the implications of their proposals, and
staking out strong positions.
10. Pressure tactics might include increasing the other side’s costs of not making an
agreement, such as through union rallies that disrupt production and bring
negative publicity to the employer.
11. The careful sequencing of offers, counteroffers, and concessions lies at the heart
of the distributive bargaining process, and these tactics are designed to quicken
the pace and generosity of the other side’s concessions while reducing the need
to make your own concessions.
12. Hardball tactics such as lies, bluffs, threats, and intimidation are also sometimes
used to achieve these ends, but they may do more harm than good.
13. Conflicts of interests over wages, benefits, working conditions, and work rules
are a central component of collective bargaining in U.S. labor relations.
F. Integrative Bargaining
1. Integrative bargaining seeks to unify (integrate) the common interests of the
parties to a negotiation so that all can become better off; rather than trying to
split a fixed pie as in distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining seeks to
expand the size of the pie.
2. It is joint problem solving that relies heavily on trust and full communication.
3. It is also referred to as:
 win–win bargaining because both sides win by expanding the pie.
 mutual gains bargaining because of the focus on creating mutual gains
rather than resolving zero-sum conflicts.
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 interest-based bargaining because of the focus on interests.

4.
A key principle of integrative bargaining is focusing on interests rather than
positions.
5. Once an issue is identified, the key second step in the integrative bargaining
process is trying to understand each side’s fundamental interests. Once the true
interests are uncovered, the next step is generating options for satisfying these
interests using basic problem-solving strategies such as brainstorming.
6. The brainstorming approach of integrative bargaining requires high levels of
trust and extensive sharing of information; all members of each side’s bargaining
committee—not just the lead negotiators—are expected to participate and
contribute ideas because during the brainstorming phase, the parties should be
trying to generate multiple options rather than worrying about which is the best
one; armed with multiple options and a set of agreed-upon standards, the
negotiators then determine the best solution by applying the standards to the
options.
G. Distributive versus Integrative Bargaining in Labor Relations
1. Many academics and consultants advocate replacing distributive with integrative
bargaining in labor negotiations to create more cooperative partnerships and
healthy workplaces and organizations in a competitive environment; although, in
practice it is exceptionally difficult.
2. If the employment relationship is characterized by mixed motive conflict, a
mixture of distributive and integrative bargaining is appropriate for collective
bargaining.
3. Dividing the fruits of integrative bargaining is a task for distributive bargaining,
so successful integrative bargaining ultimately creates a distributive bargaining
situation later.
4. It is common for people generally to assume that a negotiating situation involves
a conflict of interest—this is a mythical fixed-pie bias; because of this labor
negotiators default to distributive bargaining tactics and miss opportunities for
mutual gains through integrative bargaining.
5. Labor negotiators should start with integrative bargaining and then turn to
distributive bargaining when the mutual gains are exhausted; sometimes this is
called modified integrative bargaining.
 However, it is possible to negotiate wages and other economic items in an
integrative fashion using a process developed by the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service in 2015 called the Affinity Method of Collaborative
Economic Bargaining.
 In this approach, negotiations jointly identify the issues before making
proposals, create a costing methodology, brainstorm options, and jointly
build an agreement that both sides find acceptable using open
communication.
6. Negotiators need to overcome not only the mythical fixed-pie bias but also their
old habits and strategies.
7. Joint labor–management training in preparation for integrative bargaining is
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therefore often emphasized.

8. If collective bargaining is going to mix distributive and integrative tactics, it is
important that distributive bargaining over some issues does not poison the
relationship and prevent the successful pursuit of integrative bargaining on other
issues.
9. Seeing labor negotiations as theater also reveals the difficulty of switching from
traditional adversarial bargaining to more integrative approaches; traditional
distributive bargaining fulfills the social roles that negotiators must play.
H. Attitudinal Structuring
1. The difficulties of trying to increase the amount of integrative bargaining in the
collective bargaining process underscore the importance of Walton and
McKersie’s third subprocess: attitudinal structuring.
2. Integrative bargaining produces joint gains, distributive bargaining divides these
gains, and attitudinal structuring that establishes the broad quality of the
relationship between labor and management. Distributive and integrative
bargaining produce a written contract; attitudinal structuring creates a social
contract. Distributive and integrative bargaining are negotiation subprocesses for
managing transactions; attitudinal structuring is a negotiation subprocess for
managing relationships.
3. The close personal interaction between labor and management negotiators during
the bargaining process provides the opportunity for the parties to build trust and
respect and therefore move toward a more cooperative and less conflict-laden
relationship.
I. Intraorganizational Bargaining
1. Intraorganizational bargaining is the bargaining subprocess that takes place
within an organization—within the union and within the ranks of management; it
results from the presence of diverse interests within the constituency of a
negotiator.
2. A diversity of interests is typically most visible on the union side; employees
with varying demographic characteristics may have different priorities—older
employees might be particularly interested in retirement benefits, younger
workers in vacation, female and minority employees in equal opportunity
policies, and workers with children in health insurance benefits.
3. Union leaders and rank-and-file workers also have different priorities; local
union leaders might be more concerned with institutional issues such as union
security, the number of union stewards, and access to employees at work; rank-
and-file workers might be more concerned with bread-and-butter employment
issues—compensation, benefits, and working conditions.
4. National union leaders need to balance the good of a specific bargaining unit and
the greater good of all the union’s members.
5. Intraorganizational bargaining is more visible on the union side of the collective
bargaining process because unions are political institutions—bargaining agendas
are determined with rank-and-file input, leaders are elected, and contracts are
approved by ratification votes.
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6. Intraorganizational bargaining also occurs within the ranks of management. In

the bargaining process:
 Top management is particularly concerned with the bottom-line financial
impact
 Human resource professionals worry about the principles that are affected
or established
 Supervisors are interested in how work gets done
 Negotiators want an agreement
7. Intraorganizational bargaining occurs in varying ways including both distributive
and integrative bargaining tactics.
VI. Reaching Agreement
A. Even if it requires going right up to the bargaining deadline, successful negotiations

conclude with a tentative agreement; an agreement is only tentative at this stage
because union negotiators, and maybe the management side as well, must obtain
formal approval before the settlement becomes official.
B. On the union side, the approval process typically involves a contract ratification vote
by the rank and file, though some union constitutions provide for approval by an
elected executive committee; before a ratification vote, unions will usually have a
membership meeting in which the terms of the agreement are presented to the rank and
file and intraorganizational bargaining occurs as the leaders try to convince the
members that the agreement is a good one; union members then have the final say by
voting to accept or reject the agreement.
C. On the employer side, management negotiators typically have the authority to agree to
a final settlement, and intraorganizational bargaining takes place before the final
agreement. However, if the union is told in advance, it is legal for management
negotiators to agree to a tentative settlement subject to upper management approval.
D. If the contract is not ratified or approved, the negotiators might return to the bargaining
table to negotiate a revised contract, or a strike or lockout might occur.
E. Once contract settlement is approved, it is signed by the employer and the union and it
is binding on both parties for the length specified in the contract (often three years).
F. Bargaining in the Public Sector
1. The process of collective bargaining in the public sector is similar to that in the
private sector—the need for thorough preparation is equally great, the
environment determines bargaining power, bargaining structures range from very
decentralized to centralized, and negotiations involve dynamic mixtures of
distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, attitudinal structuring, and
intraorganizational bargaining.
2. Public sector bargaining includes additional complexities:
 The diversity of legal jurisdictions governing public sector labor relations
results in varying legal standards for bargaining across these jurisdictions.
Some states, for example, have sunshine laws that require public sector
negotiations to take place in the public (that is, out in the sunshine).
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 While the mandatory/permissive distinction for bargaining items is

common in the public sector, some public sector jurisdictions place greater
restrictions on the allowable bargaining subjects.
 The management structures of public sector agencies are not as
hierarchical as in the private sector, and often elected officials and
professional managers share or compete for decision-making authority.
 Collective bargaining in the public sector is sometimes characterized by
multilateral bargaining—negotiations between more than two parties.
 Unions can appeal for support directly to the other groups, who in turn can
pressure the management officials at the bargaining table.
VII. The Contemporary Bargaining Process: Continuity and Change
A. With the more challenging competitive environment that started in the 1970s and
continues today, collective bargaining has become increasingly divergent.
B. A number of employers have tried to tackle labor cost issues through a forcing
strategy—aggressive distributive bargaining tactics to force weakened labor unions to
grant significant wage, benefit, and work rule concessions.
C. Other bargainers have tried to develop a more cooperative relationship through
attitudinal structuring.
D. Attempts to change the bargaining relationship between an employer and union from
adversarial to integrative highlight important issues of change management and
leadership for both corporate and labor leaders.
E. Attempts to move away from an adversarial bargaining relationship are often
intimately related to broader desires to change the entire labor relations climate. But
such changes often run into sharp opposition.
F. Resistance to many types of organizational changes often stems from the following
factors:
1. Inertia
2. Self-interest
3. Peer pressure
4. Misunderstanding
G. These same elements underlie resistance to changing a bargaining relationship from
adversarial to more integrative.
H. Joint training programs to overcome resistance are important because of the following
reasons:
1. They help address misperceptions of integrative bargaining.
2. They can involve negotiators from both sides to reduce the impression that a
change is serving one side’s hidden agenda.
3. They can develop the participants’ skills so they are comfortable with the
process.
4. They can dispel the simplistic illusion of an all-or-nothing choice between
distributive or integrative bargaining.
I. The four subprocesses of labor negotiations might be present in any negotiation. Many
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of the other ideas presented in this chapter, such as the importance of preparation,
diagnosing bargaining power and the bargaining environment, avoiding the fixed pie
bias, and depersonalizing others’ front stage performances, are also equally relevant to
negotiations outside of labor relations.
1. Prepare-explore-agree-implement are the key steps in any successful negotiation.
Active Learning Ideas
1. Use the “Hey Buddy, Can you Spare a Computer?” exercise described in the lecture tips
section. Role sheets for each participant and teaching notes for this exercise are available for
printing in the “Instructor Resources” section of the textbook’s site in Connect
(http://connect.mheducation.com).
2. Have students form small groups and complete the reflection questions from “Labor Law
Discussion: Case 6: Does the Duty to Bargain Preclude Unilateral Wage Increases?” Discuss
the outcomes in class. Teaching Notes are at the end of this document.
3. Use the fictitious newspaper article entitled, “PD, Miners Set to Bargain…Again,” to have
students create Mind Maps (see the lecture tips section above) or a traditional outline of the
bargaining environment.
4. Use the accompanying bargaining simulation (The Zinnia, available at www.thezinnia.com)

to have teams of students negotiate a new contract. This is an ambitious exercise and is
probably done mostly or entirely outside of the classroom. Teaching notes for The Zinnia
bargaining simulation can be found in the introduction to this instructor’s manual or in
separate document in the instructor’s section of the textbook’s website. As a shorter, in-class
alternative, use the situations described in “PD, Miners Set to Bargain...Again” or provide a
situation to students reflecting a nearby company, and ask them to simulate bargaining
negotiations. Set a time limit, then let the class evaluate who they thought “won” and why.
Reflection Questions
1. In a concise paragraph, paraphrase what you have learned about bargaining strategies
to inform a friend about the options for negotiating his or her starting salary and other
items for a new job.
Students’ answers will vary, but should contain references to doing research to find out what
similar jobs are paying, what the candidate has to offer the company, what he/she must have
and what is negotiable, and trying to come up with a win-win result. It might also be helpful
to practice the discussion before actually meeting with the hiring company.
2. Distributive bargaining is sometimes referred to as “win-lose bargaining.” Where does

this label come from? How can it be misleading? Also, some people casually
characterize any negotiated settlement as “a win-win.” Why is this accurate in
layperson’s terms but inaccurate in light of how negotiation experts use the term win-
win?
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In distributive bargaining, there are only a limited number of pieces to the “pie,”so the more
that one side receives (wins), the less the other side receives (loses). The label can be
misleading because neither sides “loses” to the extent that if they reach agreement, this
agreement must be better than the alternative of no agreement (striking, looking for work
elsewhere, etc.). In layperson’s terms, this is why all negotiations are “win-win”—an
agreement that is better than both sides’ alternatives is beneficial for both sides. But
academics specifically use the term “win-win bargaining” to refer to integrative bargaining
situations in which the focus is on increasing the size of a pie, not distributing it.
3. Choose one of the scenarios from the “HR Strategy: Responding to a Union Organizing
Drive” box at the end of Chapter 6, and assume that the union wins recognition. As an
HR manager, how would you prepare for negotiations? What type of information
would be important for you? What type of bargaining priorities and strategies would
you develop? How would your answers change if you were a union representative?
Students’ answers will vary. Following are the possible responses:
Acme Auto Parts: Contact the other small companies to see how they have been dealing with
the situation. It would be important to know where workers were willing to make
concessions and if the other companies have come up with any creative strategies to satisfy
workers and yet keep a healthy bottom line. My priorities would be to satisfy workers while
keeping a healthy bottom line. My strategy would be to keep financials secret and come up
with alternatives that would not directly affect company profits, such as a longer lunch hour
or additional time off. I would research how to have a decertification election! If I
represented the union, it would be important to know where the company might be willing to
make concessions and if the union has come up with any creative strategies to pressure the
company into getting workers what they want. My priorities would be to satisfy workers
while keeping a healthy bottom line. My strategy would be to have solid reasons for worker
requests, but also come up with alternatives that would not directly affect company profits,
such as a longer lunch hour or additional time off.
The Zinnia: I would prepare a list of all the ways in which Zinnia matches current union
bargaining items. I would research ways to cut benefit costs in case Zinnia is forced to match
more generous union benefit packages. My priorities would be to satisfy workers while
keeping a healthy bottom line. My strategy would be to meet with the unionized hotel HR
people to learn from their experience and formulate ways to increase our bargaining power
in the future. If I represented the union it would be very important to know the types of items
the union had gained in other hotels. My priority would be to equal or surpass this level by
using the other hotels as a precedent.
School District 273: I would prepare by being aware of the current processes and benefits
available to the teachers, anticipate what additional items they may ask for, and compile a
list of reasons why or why not the district would be able to provide those items. It would be
important for me to know what the teachers want, and what the board is willing to give. My
priorities would be to reasonably satisfy the teachers and prevent them from going on strike.
My strategy would be to avoid an “us versus them” atmosphere and to again have solid
information to back up any items I knew the school board might be forced to deny. If I
represented the union, I would need to know what the teachers were asking for and why. I
would need to know what the board was actually capable of providing. I would meet with
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the teachers to thoroughly understand their demands, and compile a list of ramifications if
the board did not meet with the teacher requests. I would start off using persuasion, but
would not hesitate to use a strike.
Woodville Health care: I would prepare by trying to anticipate what the doctors will ask for
and compile a list of solid reasons why the company may not be able to comply. I would
research past union successes and failures to understand what their “weak points” might be. I
would need a thorough understanding of where the provider might be willing to bend. My
priorities would be to satisfy the doctors while keeping a healthy bottom line and happy
executives. My strategy would be to gather hard evidence of the inappropriate union
campaigning and use that as a tool, i.e. the information they present may not be true, so how
can the company negotiate? If I represented the union I would portray the provider as the big
bad wolf and the doctors as abused pillars of social society. I would gather all evidence
possible to show that the unreasonable restrictions were placed on the doctors out of greed,
and not in the best interests of the patient.
4. Why is it difficult for labor negotiators to switch from traditional to integrative

bargaining? What recommendations would you make for negotiators trying to make
this switch? Why is it more difficult for union negotiators to make this change
compared to company negotiators?
Students’ answers will vary. Following are the possible responses:
Seeing labor negotiations as theater reveals the difficulty of switching from traditional
adversarial bargaining to more integrative approaches. Traditional distributive bargaining
fulfills the social roles that negotiators must play: “The traditional process is stable because
the public rituals that are so common to it—displays of opposition, representation, and
control—help negotiators achieve their personal and strategic goals and to manage the many
political pressures that they face.”
One of the leading issues for labor–management relationships is what type of bargaining to
use. Many academics and consultants advocate replacing distributive with integrative
bargaining in labor negotiations to create more cooperative partnerships and healthy
workplaces and organizations in a competitive environment. But achieving this change in
practice is exceptionally difficult. The trouble stems partly from the overly simplistic illusion
of a forced choice between distributive or integrative bargaining. If the employment
relationship is characterized by mixed motive conflict, a mixture of distributive and
integrative bargaining is appropriate for collective bargaining. Dividing the fruits of
integrative bargaining is a task for distributive bargaining, so successful integrative
bargaining ultimately creates a distributive bargaining situation later.
5. Use the three fictitious newspaper articles that follow this question to analyze the
bargaining environment for contract negotiations between copper producer Phelps
Dodge and Morenci Miners Local 616. Create a traditional outline or a mind map (a
radial outline) for one of the years. Use the major dimensions of the bargaining
environment as your major categories. Note that the newspaper articles are based on
fact but have been embellished for educational use.
Student answers will vary. Following are the possible responses based on the article
published in 1983:
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Legal—The Supreme Court is poised to rule whether or not management has the right to
replace striking workers during a labor dispute, overturning the 1938 Mackay ruling. In the
past, MML616 has had to strike to get Phelps Dodge to agree to their demands. This could
put Phelps Dodge in an excellent position and take away some of the union’s power if they
become afraid to strike and be replaced.
Economic—The economic situation is also in favor of Phelps Dodge in regards to contract
negotiations. The recession has shut down some of coppers biggest customers and Phelps
Dodge is currently losing 10 cents on every pound of copper it produces. While economic
times are probably bad for workers, you can’t get blood from a stone. Also, while Phelps
Dodge needs skilled workers in some parts of their operations, there are recently laid off
workers waiting on the sidelines and no doubt many of them possess the skills to step in. The
question is whether or not they would cross the picket line. Without a paycheck for six
months, it is quite likely Phelps Dodge could find a number of takers.
Technical—One aspect of this dimension that favors Phelps Dodge is that new technology is
emerging that will allow the company to extract usable copper from its piles of previously
unusable waste. This provides Phelps Dodge will a low cost source of revenue.
Political—In this particular year, politics are on the side of Phelps Dodge. The firing of the
air traffic controllers is still fresh in everyone’s minds, and President Reagan, believed to be
unsympathetic to unions, is the one making appointments to the National Labor Relations
Board. Labor’s bargaining power is weakened by the current “hostile” climate regarding
labor relations.
Social—Unions only represent a small fraction of the workforce so it’s difficult for labor to
rally support, especially when there are lots of laid off workers in a concessionary
environment.
Business—Phelps’ current business strategy is most likely to make a profit rather than
continuing to lose money on the copper that they produce. Moreover, Phelps Dodge
essentially has a low-cost strategy so an adversarial approach might not be as costly as for a
company with a high-quality approach that needs loyal workers.
Institutional—Labor has been even or the underdog in the last six categories; however their
advantage in this category swings some major weight. Copper unions have traditionally
followed a practice of pattern bargaining, and in a recent settlement wage rates were
preserved and benefits, including COLA, only suffered minor benefit concessions.
Suggested Class Discussion or Short Essay Topics
1. Contracts typically last one to five years, with three years being quite common. What are the
advantages and disadvantages to the company and labor regarding a one year, three year, and
five year contract?
2. Give an everyday example of distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining not cited in
the text.
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Internet Exploration
Additional suggestions beyond the two internet exploration exercises that appear in the text:
1. Search the Internet for descriptions of integrative bargaining in practice (for example, search
for “teachers and interest-based bargaining,” or some other occupation). What types of
benefits are described? Are the areas of resistance consistent with Table 7.7 in the textbook?
2. Explore the Labor Project for Working Families site (www.working-families.org). Why
might labor negotiators need particular help in the area of work-family issues? In what
concrete ways is this a useful site for labor negotiators? Can you find lessons that apply to
other subjects of bargaining in addition to work-family issues?
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Labor Law Discussion: Teaching Notes
Case 6: Does the Duty to Bargain Preclude Unilateral Wage Increases?
Teaching Notes
The Issue
The union was arguing that Winn-Dixie was failing to bargain in good faith by unilaterally
implementing the wage increase.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (SECTION 8)

(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a).
SECTION 8
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any questions arising thereunder, and the execution
of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession...
REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTIONS (SECTION 9)

(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment...
So in essence, the issue is whether unilateral changes, even after the union has had a chance to
make counterproposals, satisfy the requirement of bargaining in “good faith.”
Discussion
Does the unilateral change fulfill Winn-Dixie’s obligation to collectively bargain with the union?
The employer seemed determined to implement the wage increase whether or not the union
agreed (note how the company wanted to put it into effect “immediately”). Further, the company
stated it was proceeding even after the union disagreed--is this real bargaining? This seems more
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like “take it or else,” not good faith bargaining. The Union did not really have a chance to
bargain; rather it had a chance to agree to management’s previously-decided actions. That is not
bargaining.
If this was bargaining, the employer could essentially make any changes it wanted by simply
notifying the union. This violates the principle of collective bargaining.
The lack of impasse is quite important. Remember, the NLRA requires bargaining in good faith,
it does not require agreement. After an impasse is reached, the firm can make unilateral changes
(bargaining to an impasse fulfills the duty to bargain obligation).
Rulings
The NLRB ruled that the company was in violation of Sections 8(a) (5) and 8(a) (1) of the NLRA
by making unilateral changes before bargaining to an impasse.
Remedies
The NLRB issued a cease and desist order requiring Winn-Dixie to bargain collectively with the
union. Additionally, Winn-Dixie was required to post a notice regarding the NLRB order. The
NLRB’s order also stated that “nothing herein shall require Respondent to vary such minimum
salary schedules as are already established.” Note that the NLRB’s decision was issued five years
after the wage increase was implemented.
What is an Impasse?
This case raises the issue of what is an ‘impasse’? An employer (and a union) must bargain to an
impasse, but this doesn’t tell us when an impasse occurs. Unfortunately, “impasse” is another
aspect of labor law that is fairly ambiguous and often requires NLRB interpretation of the
specific facts of a case to make a ruling. For example, in North Star Steel Co., 305 NLRB No. 7
[139 LRRM 1089] (1991), the administrative law judge found that an impasse existed because
“the parties had met for a number of bargaining sessions, failed to reach agreement, and did not
schedule any negotiating sessions after July 18.” In North Star Steel, the board quotes Taft
Broadcasting, 163 NLRB 475, 478 (1967) for guidance in the determination of an impasse:
Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. The bargaining history, the good
faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance of the issue or
issues as to which there is disagreement, the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to
the state of negotiations are all relevant factors.
These are all vague and situation-specific, so NLRB interpretation is required. In North Star
Steel, the NLRB did not find an impasse because “the record fails to show how many negotiating
sessions were held; the substance of many of those sessions; the importance of the issue, or
issues, separating the parties; and the understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations.”
Note that impasse is a defense to charges of a unilateral change and thus, the burden of proof is
on the company.
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For an example of a union as an employer being charged with failing to reach an impasse before
unilaterally implementing changes, see International Association of Fire Fighters, 304 NLRB No.
47 [139 LRRM 1208] (1991), in which the union representing International Association of Fire
Fighters staff (OPEIU) cancelled one bargaining session and the employer (the Fire Fighters
Union) declared an impasse and unilaterally implemented changes.
What is ‘Good Faith’ Bargaining?
This case also raises the issues of what “good faith” bargaining is. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents,
361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960), the Supreme Court stated that “collective bargaining...is not simply an
occasion for purely formal meetings between management and labor, while each maintains an
attitude of take it or leave it; it presupposes a desire to reach ultimate agreement, to enter into a
collective bargaining contract,” and that the parties must deal with each other in a serious attempt
to adjust differences and reach common ground. But what is “serious?” Various cases give
negotiators the following guidance:
 Counterproposals must be presented when another party’s proposal is rejected (Majure
Transport Company v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952))
 Evasive behavior not permitted (Na-Mac Product Corp., 70 NLRB 298 (1946))
 A position with regard to contract terms may not be constantly changed (NLRB v. Norfolk
Shipping & Drydock Corp., 172 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1949))
 Must be a willingness to incorporate oral agreements into a written contract (Southern
Saddlery Co., 90 NLRB 1205 (1950))
The opposite of these behaviors is surface bargaining (refusing to respond to union proposals,
maintaining predetermined and inflexible positions, using delay tactics to prompt an impasse,
etc.). Other examples of bad-faith bargaining include:
 Refusing to furnish info pertaining to a wage increase for non-bargaining unit employees
(Brazos Electric Power Co-Op, 241 NLRB 1016 (1979))
 Refusing to grant members of the union’s negotiating committee unpaid leave so they could
bargain while also refusing to bargain during nonworking hours (Indiana & Michigan
Electric Co., 229 NLRB 576 (1977))
Citation
This case is Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. and United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO (243 NLRB 972 (1979).
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Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
its administration. To those who know only the trading Jew of our
commercial centres, the modern Sadducees, it reveals a new aspect
of the race—that of the Jew turning aside from all enterprise, content
to live in pious mendicancy, his sole business the observance of the
minutiae of the ceremonial law; the Jew who binds on his phylactery,
wears long ringlets brought down in front of the ears in obedience to
a Levitical precept, and shuns the carrying of a pocket-handkerchief
on the Sabbath, save as a bracelet or a garter. Haluka is a mistake
and a stumbling-block in the path of Zionism. To turn Palestine into a
vast almshouse is not the way to lay the foundation of a Jewish
State. It attracts swarms of slothful bigots whose religion begins and
ends with externals, a salient example of ‘the letter that killeth,’
whose Pharisaic piety has no influence on their conduct in life. It has
established an unproductive population of inefficients, drawn from
the least desirable element of the race. Its evil effect is patent, and
the better sort of Jews themselves condemn it or advise its
restriction to the aged and infirm. It is depressing to move among
crowds of burly men, contributing nothing to the commonweal, puffed
up with self-satisfied bigotry and proud of their useless existence.
Left to his own devices the Jew gives the land a wide berth and
sticks to the town. But Western philanthropy has expended much
money and energy in putting him on to the land, rightly judging that
the foundations of a nation cannot be laid on the hawking of lead-
pencils among the Bedawin who do not want them.
“An agricultural college has been established near Jaffa, but it
was found that the youths availed themselves of the excellent
general education it afforded in order, not to till the land, but to
engage in more congenial and more profitable pursuits. Agricultural
colonies were founded, and the colonists, in addition to free land,
seed, and implements, were endowed by M. Edmund de Rothschild
with 3 francs a day for every man, 2 francs for every woman, and 1
franc for every child. This enabled the recipients to sit down and
employ Arabs to do the work, and has been stopped, to the great
chagrin of the colonists. As a matter of fact, the best of the farms to-
day depend on native labour. The mattock and the hoe are
repugnant to the Jewish colonists, who all seek for places in the
administration. The financial result is not cheering. The most
prosperous concern, perhaps, is the wine-growing establishment of
Rishon le Sion. Wine-making is the one industry the Jews take to.
They practise it individually on a small scale. The Western tourist in
Hebron is invariably accosted by some ringleted Israelite, who
proffers him his ‘guter Wein,’ and his thoughts go back to childhood
and that Brobdingnagian cluster of grapes which the spies bore
between them from the neighbouring valley of Eschol. The attitude of
the Jew with respect to agriculture is not to be wondered at. His
hereditary tendencies are against it. Centuries of urban life and
urban pursuits lie behind him. Inured to no exercise save that of his
wits, poor in physique, unused to the climate, can it be expected that
this child of the ghetto should turn to and compete with the strong
brown-lined Judaean peasant on the burning hillside? The one
exception is to be found in the Bulgarian Jews of Sephardim stock.
Hardy, stalwart, accustomed to tillage, these have made efficient
farmers, and next to them come the Jews from Roumania. But with
every inducement to settle on the land, and all sorts of props and
aids, the agricultural Jews in Palestine number only about 1000 out
318
of an ever-augmenting population. The fact is significant.”
Another point worth serious consideration is the political situation
created by Jewish immigration into Palestine. The colonists, the
majority of whom come from Russia, are a bone of contention
between the rival foreign propagandas in the country. The Russians,
as has been seen, while massacring the Jews in Bessarabia, court
their favour in Syria. The German Emperor, while tolerating anti-
Semitism in the Fatherland, earns the thanks of the Zionists by his
affability towards the exiles. The French, through the educational
efforts of the Alliance Israélite, whose pupils were hitherto mainly
drawn from the Spanish Jews, seek to turn the Jews of Palestine, as
of other parts of the Near East, into apostles of Gallic preponderance
and into instruments for the promotion of Gallic interests. The
Zionists are regarded by the French supporters of the Alliance as its
adversaries, and that for the reason that, while the mission of the
Alliance, as it is understood by the French, is the extension of the
Republic’s influence, and, therefore, very remotely connected with
the religious and national aspirations of the Jewish people, these
aspirations are precisely the point on which the Zionists lay the
319
greatest stress.
Lastly, the poverty of Palestine is a source of infinite difficulties
which can only be overcome by proportionate labour. Mr. Zangwill
has very eloquently described these conditions in one of his
speeches: “My friends,” he said, “you cannot buy Palestine. If you
had a hundred millions you could only buy the place where Palestine
once stood. Palestine itself you must re-create by labour, till it flows
again with milk and honey. The country is a good country. But it
needs a great irrigation scheme. To return there needs no miracle—
already a third of the population are Jews. If the Almighty Himself
carried the rest of us to Palestine by a miracle, what should we gain
except a free passage? In the sweat of our brow we must earn our
Palestine. And, therefore, the day we get Palestine, if the most
320
joyous, will also be the most terrible day of our movement.”
It was the consideration of the various obstacles enumerated
above, and others of a similar nature, coupled with the urgent need
to find a home for those wretched outcasts whose refuge in England
was menaced by the anti-alien agitation, that induced Dr. Herzl, in
321
July 1903, acting on Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion, to propose
that an agreement should be entered into between the British
Government and the Jewish Colonial Trust for the establishment of a
Jewish settlement in British East Africa. The British Government,
anxious to find a way out of the “Alien Invasion” difficulty, welcomed
the proposal, and Lord Lansdowne expressed his readiness to afford
every facility to the Commission which, it was suggested, should be
sent by the Zionists to East Africa for purposes of investigation. If a
suitable site could be found, the Foreign Secretary professed himself
willing “to entertain favourably proposals for the establishment of a
Jewish colony on conditions which will enable the members to
observe their national customs. For this purpose he would be
prepared to discuss the details of a scheme comprising as its main
features the grant of a considerable area of land, the appointment of
a Jewish official as the chief of the local administration, and
permission to the colony to have a free hand in regard to municipal
legislation, and the management of religious and purely domestic
matters; such local autonomy being conditional on the right of His
322
Majesty’s Government to exercise general control.” This project
was announced at one of the meetings of the Zionist Congress at
Basel in August, 1903, and the motion submitted to the Congress for
the appointment of a committee, who should send an expedition to
East Africa in order to make investigations on the spot, was adopted.
But, though 295 voted in its favour, it was opposed by a great
minority of 177 votes, and the Russian delegates left the hall as a
protest. In a mass meeting of Zionists held in the following May in
London Mr. Israel Zangwill spoke warmly in favour of the proposal,
urging on his fellow-Zionists to take advantage of the offer made by
the British Government. But he added, “The Jewish Colonisation
Association, the one body that should have welcomed this offer of
323
territory with both hands, stood aloof.” Indeed, it cannot be said
that this new departure of Zionism has commanded universal
approval.
Nor did opposition to the scheme confine itself to platonic
protests. In the following December, Dr. Max Nordau, one of the
most distinguished men of letters among Dr. Herzl’s followers, who
had declared himself at the Basel Congress of the previous August
in favour of the proposal, was fired at in Paris by a Russian Jew, who
in his cross-examination before the Magistrate confessed that, in
making that attempt on Dr. Nordau’s life, he aimed at the enemy of
the Jewish race—the supporter of a scheme which involved the
abandonment by Zionists of Palestine as the object of the
324
movement. The incident afforded a painful proof of want of
concord, not only among the Jews generally, not only among the
supporters of various movements all theoretically recognising the
necessity of emigration, but even among the partisans themselves of
the Zionist cause. Dr. Herzl, anxious to allay the ill-feeling aroused
by his alleged abandonment of the Zionist idea, wrote a letter to Sir
Francis Montefiore, the president of the English Zionist Federation,
repudiating any desire to divert the movement away from the Holy
Land and to direct it to East Africa. Nothing, he protested, could be
further from the truth. He felt convinced that the solution of the
Jewish problem could only be effected in that country, Palestine, with
which are indelibly associated the historic and sentimental bias of
the Jewish people. But as the British Government had been
generous enough to offer territory for an autonomous settlement, it
would have been impossible and unreasonable to do otherwise than
325
give the offer careful consideration.
The clouds of misconception of which Dr. Herzl complained were
not dissipated by this declaration. If the attachment to Palestine is to
be the central idea of Zionism, it is hard to see how its realisation
could be promoted by the adoption of East Africa as a home. East
Africa, as a shrewd diplomatist has wittily observed, is not in
Palestine nor on the road to it. Its name awakens no memories or
hopes in the Jewish heart. Its soil is not hallowed by the temples and
the tombs of Israel. Its hills and vales are not haunted by the spirits
of the old martyrs and heroes of the nation. Neither the victories of
the past nor the prophetic visions for the future are in any way
associated with East Africa. In the circumstances, it is not to be
wondered at that the proposal, as Dr. Herzl admitted, did not meet
with the enthusiasm required for success, and that the strongest
opposition to the scheme came from those very Jews in the Russian
“pale” who stand in most need of a refuge from persecution. It must
be borne in mind that those very Jews who suffer most severely from
persecution are the most sincerely and wholeheartedly attached to
the ancient ideals of the race, and, owing partly to this psychological
cause, partly to their less advanced stage of development, they were
the least able to appreciate the practical advantages of the scheme
—the least disposed to submit to the dictates of prosaic expediency.
They firmly believe that, sooner or later, the beautiful dream is
destined to cohere into substance; and, like all dreamers, they abhor
compromise.
The proposal, however, met with opposition in other quarters
than the Russian Ghetto. Sir Charles Eliot, H.M.’s Commissioner for
the East Africa Protectorate, did not approve of it. While disclaiming
all anti-Semitic feeling, he said that his hesitation arose from doubt
as to whether any beneficial result would be obtained from the
scheme. The proposed colony, he pointed out, would not be
sufficiently large to relieve appreciably the congested and suffering
Jewish population of some parts of Eastern Europe, and he
expressed the fear that the climate and agricultural life would in no
way be suitable to Israelites. Moreover, when the country began to
attract British immigrants who showed an inclination to settle all
round the proposed Jewish colony, he considered that the scheme
became dangerous and deprecated its execution. It was, Sir Charles
declared, tantamount to reproducing in East Africa the very
conditions which have caused so much distress in Eastern Europe:
that is to say, the existence of a compact mass of Jews, differing in
language and customs from the surrounding population, to whom
they are likely to be superior in business capacity but inferior in
fighting power. To his mind, it is best to recognise frankly that such
326
conditions can never exist without danger to the public peace.
Sir Harry Johnston also was at first opposed to the scheme, but,
influenced partly by the development of the idea into a less crude
plan, and by the opening up of the country by the Uganda Railway,
partly, perhaps, by the intimate connection between the proposal and
the solution of our own overcrowding problem, he was ultimately
327
converted into a warm supporter of it. Soon afterwards a
Commission was despatched to East Africa to report on the tract of
land offered by the British Government for the proposed Zionist
328
settlement, —a proof that official opposition was abandoned.
But the opposition on the part of the Jews remained, as was
shown by the comments of the Jewish press of America on Mr. Israel
Zangwill’s visit to that country with a view to interesting American
Jews in the project, by his own “absolute and profound disgust” at
their cold irresponsiveness, and even more clearly by the
establishment of the London Zionist League. The President of this
association, Mr. Herbert Bentwich, in his inaugural address,
commenting on the matter, said that the British East Africa scheme
had never touched Zionism in the slightest degree; that it was a
mere accident in Jewish history to which Zionists could not devote
their energies; that the offer of territory had been made as a practical
expression of sympathy “by those who would exclude the alien
immigrant from Great Britain and as such was gratefully to be
received, but it could never be dealt with seriously,” and that the
Zionists hoped not to amend but to end the Jewish distress; that
329
being the object for which the league had been formed in London.
The Commission’s report, published in English and German, was
partly unfavourable and partly inconclusive; but even if it had been
favourable it is doubtful whether it would have met with approval. At
all events, when the scheme was definitely submitted to the Zionist
Congress at Basel, towards the end of July, 1905, it gave rise to
scenes of an unexampled character in the history of Zionism. The
Congress was divided into “Palestinians,” who were opposed to any
Jewish national settlement outside Palestine, and into
“Territorialists,” who maintained that the true aim of Zionism is to
obtain an autonomous settlement anywhere. The latter party, led by
Mr. Zangwill, was strongly in favour of the British offer; the former
was as strongly against it. After a stormy discussion the scheme was
rejected, and a resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority,
in which the Seventh Zionist Congress reaffirmed the principle of the
creation of a legally secured home for the Jewish people in
Palestine, repudiating, both as object and as means, all colonising
activity outside Palestine, and adjacent lands, and, while thanking
the British Government for its kindness, it expressed the hope that
the latter will continue to aid the Zionists in their efforts to attain their
true aim. Thus this episode in the history of Zionism came to an end.
While the East Africa scheme was the subject of so much
discord both among the Jews and elsewhere, the leader of the
Zionists passed away. Dr. Herzl died at Edlach, in Austria, on the 3rd
of July, 1904, denied the happiness of seeing the mission to which
he had consecrated his life fulfilled. Among his adherents he has left
the reputation of a fervent apostle of emancipation, an inspired
idealist, a Messiah burning with the desire to rescue his people from
persecution and to lead them back to the Land of Promise. But even
those least inclined to follow his lead, could not but admire in him
that single-minded devotion to an ideal and that steadfastness in its
pursuit, which, whether success crowns their possessor or not,
proclaim the great man. Among the masses of his suffering co-
religionists the claims of Dr. Herzl to gratitude are less liable to
qualification. His personality produced a deep impression on their
imagination, and his efforts to realise the dream of eighteen
centuries, aided by the magic of his eloquence and the grace of his
manner, stirred their hearts to their inmost depths. Parents named
their children after Dr. Herzl, and his death aroused universal grief.
Ten thousand mourners, men and women, accompanied the funeral
to the Vienna cemetery, where the remains of the leader were laid to
rest amid the lamentations of his followers. The latter subsequently
gave a tangible proof of their gratitude by providing for their leader’s
orphaned family, and by resolving to perpetuate his memory in a
manner that would have pleased him. The memorial is to take the
form of a forest of ten thousand olive trees planted in some historic
spot in Palestine, and to be known as the Herzl Forest.
It would be rash to affirm that Zionism has died with Dr. Herzl.
Since his death, however, the movement has suffered a certain
transformation. Although his East Africa project has been rejected by
the majority of the party, and though both those who favoured it and
those who opposed it are now persuaded of the hopelessness of a
chartered home in Palestine, yet the plan of a return to the Land of
Promise still is enthusiastically adhered to, especially by the
sufferers of the Russian Ghetto: with the only difference that
repatriation is no longer looked for from the Sultan, or from the
European Powers, but from individual effort. Side by side with
political and diplomatic activity abroad, the Congress of 1905
resolved upon practical work in Palestine itself. This will take the
form of general investigation into the country’s resources and its
economic possibilities, and attempts at amelioration of its
administrative conditions. In other words, the colonisation of
Palestine is to be encouraged and its autonomy postponed until the
Jews are established in sufficient numbers to obtain their ultimate
object. “Creep into Palestine anyway. Colonise, redeem the land,
populate it, establish factories, stimulate trade; in a word, rebuild
Palestine and then see what the Sultan will say.” This is the advice
330
given by a prominent Jew to his co-religionists. Whether these
endeavours will yield the desired fruit or not is a matter on which it
would be more prudent to express an opinion after the event. It is
equally difficult to forecast the outcome of Mr. Zangwill’s “Jewish
Territorial Organisation,” which, abandoning Zion at all events for the
moment, seeks to found a Jewish Colony elsewhere. This variation
of the Zionist programme has attracted the sympathy of many of
those who stood completely aloof from the Herzl scheme. At the
same time it has driven a wedge into Zionism proper.
Meanwhile, it would be idle to deny that, viewed as a whole, the
Jewish Question at the present moment stands pretty much where it
has been at any time during the last eighteen hundred years. A few
Jews have solved the problem for themselves by assimilation to their
surroundings. Some more dwell among the Gentiles in a state of
benevolent neutrality: one with them on the surface, but at heart
distinct; performing all the duties of citizenship conscientiously and
sharing in the intellectual and political life of their adopted countries
brilliantly; yet, by their avoidance of intermarriage, implying the
existence of an insuperable barrier between themselves and those
who have not the good fortune to be descended from Abraham. But
the bulk of the race still is a people of wanderers; and their hope of
restoration little more than a beautiful, melancholy dream. There are
at the present hour upwards of ten million Jews, scattered to the four
corners of the earth. Nine of these millions live in Europe: two-thirds
of them in Russia, Roumania and Poland. In the Middle Ages
persecution in the West had driven them Eastwards. Lately
persecution in the East has turned the tide Westwards. There is no
rest for Israel. If the past and the present are any guides regarding
the future, it is safe to predict that for many centuries to come the
world will continue to witness the unique and mournful spectacle of a
great people roaming to and fro on the highways of the earth in
search of a home.
APPROXIMATE DENSITY OF THE JEWISH POPULATION.
London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd.
FOOTNOTES
1
The oldest Greek author in whose works the term occurs is the
orator Isaeus who flourished b.c. 364; the earliest Latin writer
is Plautus who died b.c. 184. Of course, the word, though very
good Hebrew, may have been imported into Europe by the
Phoenicians. But it would be a bold man who would attempt to
distinguish between Jewish and Phoenician merchants at this
time of day.
2
I. Macc. xiii. 51.
3
On the other hand, a famous Palestinian authority, Abbahu (c.
279–320 a.d.), was a noted friend of Greek. He taught it to his
daughters as “an ornament.” Of Abbahu it was said that he
was the living illustration of Ecclesiastes vii. 18 “It is good that
thou shouldst take hold of this (i.e. the Jewish Law), yet also
from that (i.e. Gentile culture) withdraw not thy hand: for he
that feareth God shall come forth of them all.” Hellenism might
appeal sometimes to the Jew’s head, though it never thrilled
his heart. Cf. p. 39 below.
4
Hdt. i. 1–5.
5
Justin Mart. Dial. i.–vii.
6
I am referring here to what seems to me characteristic of
Hebraism in the earlier periods when it came into contact and
conflict with Hellenism. In its subsequent development
Pharisaism (which gradually absorbed the whole of the Jewish
people) avoided undue asceticism and laid stress on the joy of
living. “Joyous service” became the keynote of Judaism and
Jewish life in the Middle-ages, as it was the keynote of many
Pharisees in the first centuries of the Christian era. The
Essenes, though highly important in the history of primitive
Christianity, had less influence on the main development of
Rabbinic Judaism.
7
Bk. i. ch. vi. 5–7.
8
Mac. xiv.–xv.
9
Pro L. Flacco, 28. All the references made to the Jews and
Judaism in Greek and Latin literature have been well collected
and interpreted by T. Reinach in his Textes d’auteurs grecs et
romains relatifs au Judaisme (Paris, 1895).
10
Suetonius, Julius, 84.
11
Id. Augustus, 93.
12
Suetonius, Tiberius, 36.
13
Tacitus, Historia, v. 9.
14
Suetonius, Claudius, 25. Cp. Acts, xviii. 2.
15
Sat. i. 9, 69, etc.
16
Ant. 18. 3 (4).
17
Sat. v. 184.
18
Fgm. ap. Augustin., Civ. D. 6, 11.
19
Sat. xiv. 96–99, etc.
20
Isaiah iii. 26.
21
Deuter. vii. 3; Nehem. xiii. 25.
22
Juvenal, Sat. xiv. 97.
23
Tacitus, Hist. v. 9.
24
Hist. v. 4.
25
Hist. v. 8.
26
Ib. 5. Cp. Juv. Sat. xiv. 103–4.
27
Annales, xv. 44.
28
Juv. Sat. iii. 12–14.
29
Hist. i. 1.
30
It is, however, only fair to add that the Jewish records know
nothing of these atrocities, and, as M. Reinach justly
comments, the above details (for which Dion Cassius is our
sole authority) “inspirent la méfiance.” The numbers of the
victims, as reported by Dion, are in themselves sufficient to
throw doubt upon the story.
31
H. Graetz, History of the Jews, Eng. tr. vol. ii. p. 405.
32
Mommsen, History of Rome, Eng. tr. vol. iv. p. 642.
33
Just. Mart. Dial. xvii.
34
c Cels. vi. 27.
35
This account of the fervid response of the Jews to Julian’s call,
based on the authority of Christian writers, is pronounced by
the Jewish historian Graetz “purely fictitious” (History of the
Jews, Eng. tr. vol. ii. p. 606). At any rate, it seems to be a
fiction that bears upon it a clearer mark of verisimilitude than
many a “historical” document relating to this period.
36
That the ‘Haman’ so burned was only an effigy is now clearly
shown by an original Geonic Responsum on the subject
discovered in the Cairo Geniza and published in the Jewish
Quarterly Review, xvi. pp. 651 fol.
37
The exact date of the “Tour” is disputed. It probably occupied
the thirteen years between 1160 and 1173.
38
Benjamin of Tudela’s Itinerary, p. 24 (ed. Asher). A new critical
edition (by M. N. Adler) has recently appeared in the Jewish
Quarterly Review. For the passage in the text see ibid. xvi.
730.
39
H. Graetz, History of the Jews, vol. iii. p. 31.
40
41
With regard to the legal relations between the Jews and the
various mediaeval states see J. E. Scherer’s Beiträge zur
Geschichte des Judenrechtes im Mittelalter (1901), a work
unhappily left incomplete by the death of the author.
42
Joseph Jacobs, “The God of Israel” in the Nineteenth Century,
September 1879.
43
J. E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, pp. 539 fol.
44
H. Graetz, History of the Jews, vol. iii. p. 349. For some fine
translations of Jehuda Halevi’s poems the reader may turn to
Mrs. H. Lucas’ The Jewish Year (Macmillan, 1898) and to Mrs.
R. N. Salaman’s Songs of Exile (Macmillan, 1905). Jehuda
Halevi’s philosophical dialogue the Khazari has recently been
translated into English by Dr. H. Hirschfeld (Routledge, 1905).
45
Joseph Jacobs, “The God of Israel,” The Nineteenth Century,
September, 1879. The Guide has been translated into English
by Dr. M. Friedländer (1885; new edition, Routledge, 1904).
46
47
For Maimonides see the volume on the subject by D. Yellin and
I. Abrahams in the Jewish Worthies Series, Vol. I. (Macmillan,
1903).
48
Vogelstein and Rieger, Geschichte der Juden in Rom, i, pp.
136 fol. In general this work should be consulted for all points
of contact between the Papacy and Judaism in the middle
ages.
49
Ibn Verga, Shebet Yehuda (ed. Wiener), p. 50.
50
Statutes of Avignon quoted by Israel Abrahams, Jewish Life in
the Middle Ages, p. 408.
51
In the first century of our era Aristo of Pella is said to have
been the author of an attempt to prove from the Prophets that
Jesus was the Messiah. Justin Martyr followed in his path, and
the latter writer’s arguments subsequently reappear in the
works of Tertullian and other Fathers. See W. Trollope’s edition
of S. Justini Dialogus, p. 4.
52
Heine’s famous satire “Disputation” well characterises the
futility of these public controversies; “der Jude wird verbrannt”
was Lessing’s grim summary in Nathan der Weise. See also
Schechter, Studies in Judaism, pp. 125 fol.
53
Lord Curzon, Problems of the Far East, p. 298.
54
Israel Abrahams, Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, p. 407.
55
Lord Curzon, Problems of the Far East, p. 303.
56
Inferno, xi. 49–50.
57
Deuter. xxiii. 19.
58
Ps. xv. 1, 5.
59
Koran (Sale’s tr.) ch. ii.
60
Rep. 555 E.
61
Laws, 742 c.
62
Pol. i. 3, 23.
63
Fifth Homily.
64
We hear, for example, that early in the thirteenth century
interest was fixed by law at 12½ per cent. at Verona, while at
Modena towards the end of the same century it seems to have
been as high as 20 per cent. The Republic of Genoa, a
hundred years later, despite Italy’s commercial prosperity, paid
from 7 to 10 per cent. to her creditors. Much more oppressive
were the conditions of the money market in France and
England. Instances occur of 50 per cent., and there is an edict
of Philip Augustus limiting the Jews in France to 48 per cent. At
the beginning of the fourteenth century an ordinance of Philip
the Fair allows 20 per cent. after the first year of a loan, while
in England under Henry III. there are cases on record of 10 per
cent. for two months.
65
The notorious legend of Hugh of Lincoln is placed by the
chronicler, Matthew Paris, in the year 1255. The prolific nature
of monkish imagination on this subject is shown by the
subjoined facts due to Tyrwhitt’s researches: “In the first four
months of the Acta Sanctorum by Bollandus, I find the
following names of children canonized, as having been
murdered by Jews:
XXV.Mart.Willielmus Norvicensis, 1144;

Richardus, Parisiis, 1179;
XVII.Apr. Rudolphus, Bernae, 1287;
Wernerus, Wesaliae, anno eodem;
Albertus, Poloniae, 1598.
I suppose the remaining eight months would furnish at least

as many more.” Quoted by Dr. W. W. Skeat, Chaucer, Intr., p.
xxiii.
66
A contemporary historian pathetically states that in 1248 “no
foreigner, let alone an Englishman, could look at an English
coin with dry eyes and unbroken heart.” Henry III. issued a
new coin; but it was not long ere it reached the condition of the
older one. In England the penalty for the crime was loss of life
or limbs.
67
W. Cunningham, The Growth of English Industry and
Commerce, p. 187.
68
The original charter of expulsion has recently been discovered;
it was, by a gracious irony of history, found at Leicester at a
time when a Jew had been thrice mayor of the town.
69
See above, p. 98.
70
Alami, quoted by H. Graetz, History of the Jews, vol. iv. p. 220.
71
A History of the Inquisition of Spain, by H. C. Lea (Macmillan,
Vols. I., II. and III. of which have now appeared, 1906), is a
monumental work on its subject.
72
Apologia pro vita sua, p. 29.
73
This attachment of Jews to countries with which they have long
been identified recurs at the present day. Jewish emigration
associations are constantly faced by the reluctance of very
many Russian Jews to tear themselves from Russia.
74
As a matter of fact, Celestine V. hardly deserves this sentence.
It was not cowardice but native humility, the consciousness of
the temptations of power, physical weakness, and the hermit’s
longing for tranquillity that impelled the Pope to resign after five
months and eight days’ pontificate. Commentators had hitherto
agreed in applying the above passage to Celestine V., but
recent opinion rejects the traditional interpretation. However
that may be, the point which concerns us is that Dante
censures a pope.
75
See Berliner, Persönliche Beziehungen zwischen Christen und
Juden. Reference should also be made to the same author’s
Geschichte der Juden in Rom.
76
Paradiso, xii.
77
Praef. ad Librum de Serm. Lat., quoted by Tyrwhitt in Dr. W. W.
Skeat’s Chaucer, Intr., p. xxiii.
78
See above, p. 170.
79
A good account of the Roman Ghetto may be found in E.
Rodocanachi’s Le Saint-Siège et les Juifs: Le Ghetto à Rome
(Paris, 1891).
80
Browning in his Holy-Cross Day has depicted the farcical
grotesqueness of these efforts at conversion as unsparingly as
Heine satirised the compulsory controversies. Cp. above, p. 98
n.
81
Diary, March 23, 1646.
82
I. Abrahams, Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, pp. 409–410.
83
S. Schechter, Studies in Judaism, p. 15.
84
William Hazlitt’s Translation, ch. 857.
85
Ch. 853.
86
Ch. 852.
87
Ch. 700.
88
Ch. 859.
89
Ch. 852.
90
Ch. 864.
91
Ibid.
92
H. Graetz, History of the Jews, vol. iv. p. 502.
93
Ch. 857.
94
Ch. 864.
95
Ch. 866.
96
Ch. 852.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Ch. 856.
101
Ch. 861.
102
Ch. 864.
103
Ch. 852.
104
Ch. 855.
105
Ch. 867.
106
Ch. 862.
107
Ch. 858.
108
Ch. 852.
109
Ch. 854.
110
Ch. 860.
111
Ch. 854.
112
Ch. 855.
113
Ch. 854.
114
Ch. 861.
115
Ch. 865.
116
Ch. 869.
117
Ch. 355. O Martin, Martin! What of the “circumcision of the
heart,” to say nothing about Christian charity? But this was in
1541.
118
Ch. 861.
119
Ch. 865.
120
Ch. 866.
121
Von den Juden und Ihren Luegen (1544) is the title of one of
these pamphlets. See H. Graetz, History of the Jews, vol. iv.
pp. 583 fol.
122
For the history of the Hamburg Jews, see M. Grunwald’s
Hamburg’s Deutsche Juden, 1904.
123
On Pfefferkorn and Reuchlin see two papers by S. A. Hirsch in
A Book of Essays (Macmillan, 1905).
124
See above, p. 175.
125
Perhaps the most lucid and impartial estimate of Spinoza’s
place in the world of thought, accessible to the English reader,
is to be found in Sir Frederick Pollock’s Spinoza: His Life and
Philosophy. This work also contains in an appendix a reprint of
the English translation (1706) of the Dutch biography of
Spinoza by his friend the Lutheran minister Johannes Colerus,
published in 1705. The latest biography of Spinoza, based on
new materials, is J. Freudenthal’s Spinoza, sein Leben und
seine Lehre, Erster Band, Das Leben Spinozas (Stuttgart,
1904).
126
Confessio Amantis, bk. vii.
127
See above, p. 199.

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3. Third, instead of lecturing on the bargaining environment, I take an active learning

1. Sketch the steps of the bargaining time line.

All labor negotiators do four key things: prepare-explore-agree-implement

II. Bargaining Structure

bargaining structure involves a limited group of employees in a single workplace; a

III. Bargaining Power and the Bargaining Environment

IV. At the Bargaining Table

A. Once at the bargaining table, negotiators need to use their communication,

for the other members of the bargaining committee to see.

is in force; an employer can make unilateral changes in mandatory

V. Bargaining Subprocesses and Strategies

 interest-based bargaining because of the focus on interests.

therefore often emphasized.

6. Intraorganizational bargaining also occurs within the ranks of management. In

VI. Reaching Agreement

A. Even if it requires going right up to the bargaining deadline, successful negotiations

 While the mandatory/permissive distinction for bargaining items is

VII. The Contemporary Bargaining Process: Continuity and Change

Active Learning Ideas

4. Use the accompanying bargaining simulation (The Zinnia, available at www.thezinnia.com)

2. Distributive bargaining is sometimes referred to as “win-lose bargaining.” Where does

4. Why is it difficult for labor negotiators to switch from traditional to integrative

Suggested Class Discussion or Short Essay Topics

Labor Law Discussion: Teaching Notes

Case 6: Does the Duty to Bargain Preclude Unilateral Wage Increases?

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (SECTION 8)

REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTIONS (SECTION 9)

What is ‘Good Faith’ Bargaining?

XXV.Mart.Willielmus Norvicensis, 1144;

I suppose the remaining eight months would furnish at least

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