Collins Microfoundations of Macrosociology 1984

On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology
Author(s): Randall Collins

Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 5 (Mar., 1981), pp. 984-1014
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology'
Randall Collins
Universityof Virginia
Detailed microsociological studiesof everydaylifeactivityraise the

challengeof makingmacrosociological conceptsfullyempiricalby
translating themintoaggregates of micro-events.Micro-evidence and
theoretical critiquesindicatethathumancognitive capacityis limited.
Hence actors facingcomplexcontingencies rely largelyupon tacit
assumptions and routine.The routinesof physicalproperty and or-
ganizationalauthority are upheldby actors'tacitmonitoring of social
coalitions.Individualscontinuously negotiatesuchcoalitionsin chains
of interaction ritualsin whichconversations createsymbolsof group
membership. Everyencounteris a marketplace in whichindividuals
tacitlymatchconversational and emotionalresourcesacquiredfrom
previousencounters. Individualsare motivatedto movetowardthose
ritualencounters in whichtheirmicroresources pay thegreatestemo-
tionalreturnsuntiltheyreachpersonalequilibrium pointsat which
theiremotionalreturnsstabilizeor decline.Large-scalechangesin
socialstructure are producedby aggregatechangesin thethreetypes
of microresources: increasesin generalizedculturedue to new com-
municationsmedia or specializedculture-producing activities;new
"technologies" of emotionalproduction;and newparticularized cul-
tures (individualreputations)due to dramatic,usuallyconflictual,
events.A methodof macrosampling thedistributionofmicroresources
is proposed.
Microsociology is the detailedanalysisof whatpeopledo, say, and think

in the actual flowof momentary experience.Macrosociology is the analy-
sis of large-scaleand long-term social processes,oftentreatedas self-sub-
sistententitiessuch as "state," "organization,""class," "economy,""cul-
ture,"and "society."In recentyearstherehas been an upsurgeof "radi-
cal" microsociology, that is to say, empiricallydetailedand/orphenom-
enologicallysophisticated microsociology. Radical microsociology (Garfin-
kel 1967; Cicourel1973), as thedetailedstudyof everydaylife,emerged
partlyfromtheinfluxof phenomenology intoempiricalsociologyand part-
ly fromthe applicationof new researchtechniques-audioand video re-
cordings-whichhave made it possible to study real-lifeinteractionin
second-by-second detail.This has led to theclose analysisof conversation
(Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson1974), of nonverbalinteractions (Goffman
1971,pp. 3-61), and of theconstruction and use of organizationalrecords
1 I am indebted to Aaron Cicourel,Paul DiMaggio, Arlie Hochschild,Charles Perrow,
and Norbert Wiley for commentson earlier versionsof this paper.
(? 1981 by The Universityof Chicago. 0002-9602/81/8605-0002$01.50
984 AJS Volume86 Number5

The Microfoundations
of Macrosociology
(Cicourel1968; Clegg 1975) and henceto a viewof howlargersocialpat-

ternsare constructed out of micromaterials.
This radicalmicrosociology, undersuch labels as "ethnomethodology,"
"cognitivesociology,""social phenomenology," and others,cuts in a num-
ber of differentdirections.
The directionthatI wouldargueis mostprom-
isingforthe advanceof sociologyas an empiricalscienceis not the phe-
nomenological analysisof conceptsbut the emphasisupon ultradetailed
empiricalresearch.This detailedmicro-analysis offers severalcontributions
to thefieldof sociologyin general.One is to givea strongimpetustoward
translatingall macrophenomena intocombinations ofmicro-events. A micro-
translationstrategyrevealsthe empiricalrealitiesof social structures as
patternsof repetitivemicro-interaction. Microtranslation thus gives us a
pictureof thecomplexlevelsof abstraction involvedin causal explanations.
Anothercontribution of radicalmicrosociology is itsdiscoverythatactual
everyday-life microbehavior does notfollowrationalist modelsof cognition
and decisionmaking.Instead,social interaction dependsupon tacitunder-
standingsand agreementsnot to attemptto explicatewhat is taken for
granted.This impliesthatexplanationsin termsof norms,rules,and role
takingshouldbe abandonedand thatanymodelof socialexchangemustbe
considerably modified. These are largedeparturesfromacceptedsociologi-
cal traditions.But thesetraditionshave not been verysuccessfulin ad-
vancingexplanatory principles.I wouldcontendthat thisis because they
have an incorrect modelof the actor.What we need,instead,is a micro-
mechanismthat can explain the repetitiveactions that make up social
structuresuch that interactions and theiraccompanying cognitionsrest
uponnoncognitive bases.
Such a mechanism, I will attemptto show,is providedby interaction
ritualchains.Such chainsof micro-encounters generatethecentralfeatures
of social organization-authority, property,and group membership-by
creatingand recreating "mythical"culturalsymbolsand emotionalener-
gies.The resultof microtranslating all socialstructure intosuchinteraction
ritualchainsshouldbe to make microsociology an importanttool in ex-
plainingboththeinertiaand thedynamicsof macrostructure.
THE TIME-SPACE TABLE
It is usefulto visualizethe empiricalbasis of microand macrocategories

by a time-spacetable (see table 1). On one dimensionare laid out the
amountsof timeconsideredby thesociologist, rangingfroma fewseconds
throughminutes,hours,days, weeks,months,and up to years and cen-
turies.On the otheraxis are the numbersof peoplein physicalspace one
mightfocuson: beginning withone personin a local bodilyspace,through
small groups,largegroups,and aggregates, and up to an overviewof all
985

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of Macrosociology
the people across a large territory. I have filledin the cells of the table
withthekindsof analysesthatsociologists makeof thatparticularsliceof
timeand space.
It is clearthatthedistinction betweenmicroand macrois one of degree
and admitsof at least twodimensions. All levelsof analysisin thistable
are moremicrothanthosebelowand to therightof them,and all levelsare
moremacrothanthoseabove and to theleft.Microand macroare relative
termsin both timeand space, and the distinction itselfmay be regarded
as a pairof continuous variables.Moreover,one can see thatmicroanalysis
in sociologyhas recentlyshiftedits level: symbolicinteractionism, forex-
ample,has traditionally been concernedwithsituations(althoughsome-
times with more long-termprocesses-e.g., Becker 1963; Bucher and
Strauss 1961; Dalton 1959) located generallyon the minutes-to-hours
level.Radical microsociologies suchas ethnomethodological analysisof con-
versationor micro-ethological studiesof eye movements have shiftedthe
focusto the secondslevel (e.g., Schegloff1967); and phenomenological
sociology,in its extremeformulations, vergesuponPlatonismor mysticism
because of its focuson the instantaneous "now" at the leftedge of the
table.
The strictmeaningof "empirical"refersto theupperleft-hand cornerof
the table.You, thereader,sittingat yourdeskor in yourcar, or standing
by yourmailbox,etc.,are in thatmicrosituation (or possiblyalso slightly
further downthe left-handcolumn),and it is impossibleforanyoneever
to be in any empiricalsituationotherthanthissort.All macro-evidence,
then,is aggregatedfromsuch micro-experiences. Moreover,althoughone
can say thatall theverticalcellsin thefarleft-hand columnare empirical
in the (slightlydifferent) sensethattheyall existin thephysicalworldof
the present,the cells horizontally to the rightmustbe regardedas ana-
lysts'constructs. In the fewsecondsit takesto read thispassage,you the
readerare constructing the realityof all thosemacrocategories insofaras
you thinkof them.This is not to say thattheydo notalso have someem-
piricalreferent, but it is a morecomplexand inferential one than direct
micro-experience.
and the
is a sequenceof microsituations,
Everyone'slife,experientially,
sumof all sequencesof individualexperience in theworldwouldconstitute
of audio-
all the possiblesociologicaldata. Thus the recentintroduction
and videotapesby radicalmicrosociologistsis a movetowardtheseprimary
data.
MICROTRANSLATION AS A STRATEGY
all sociologicalconceptsinto
There are severaladvantagesin translating
aggregatesof microphenomena.The firstpointis epistemological.Strictly
987

AmericanJournalof Sociology
speaking,thereis no such thingas a "state,"an "economy,"a "culture,"

a "social class." There are onlycollectionsof individualpeopleactingin
particularkinds of microsituations-collections which are characterized
thusby a kindof shorthand. This can easilybe seen if one examinesem-
piricallyhow researchersgo about studyingmacrosubjects.Researchers
themselves neverleave theirownmicrosituations; whattheydo is compile
summaries by a seriesof codingand translating proceduresuntila textis
producedwhichis takenas representing a macroreality, standingabove all
themicrosituations thatproducedit (Garfinkel1967; Cicourel1975). This
is truewhethertheresearcher is relyingon conversation withinformants or
on closed-item questionnaires,or even on directpersonalobservation.In
each case thereare a seriesof tacitsummaries betweenthe actual lifeex-
periencesand theway in whichtheyare finallyreported. The sameis true
to an evenlargerdegreewhenhistoricalmaterialsare used; suchmaterials
are usuallyconstructed frompreviouswritten accounts,whichevenin their
originalformcontainnumerousglossesupontheactual flowof minute-by-
minuteexperience.
It is strategically impossibleforsociologyto do withoutthis kind of
macrosummary.It would take too muchtimeto recountall the micro-
eventsthatmakeup any large-scalesocial pattern,and a totalrecounting
in any case wouldbe tediousand unrewarding. Nevertheless, we need not
reconcileourselvesto thecompleteloss of information of the trulyempiri-
cal level,satisfying ourselveswithremoteabstractions.For if macrophe-
nomenaare madeup of aggregations and repetitions of manysimilarmicro-
events,we can sampletheseessentialmicrocomponents and use themas the
empiricalbasis of all othersociologicalconstructions.
The significance of thefirstpoint,then,is: Sociologicalconceptscan be
made fullyempiricalonly by grounding themin a sampleof the typical
micro-events thatmake themup. The implication is thattheultimateem-
piricalvalidationof sociologicalstatements dependsupontheirmicrotrans-
lation.By thisstandard,virtuallyall sociologicalevidenceas yetpresented
is tentativeonly.This of coursedoes notmeanthatit maynotbe a useful
approximation, althoughthisis not always the case. Successat some de-
greeof microtranslation, I wouldsuggest,is thetestof whetherthemacro
statement is a goodapproximation or a niisleadingreification.2
2 To cite a recentexample: the controversyover the reputationaland decision-making

models of communitypower is a debate over the meritsof a more macro and a more
micro model. The decision-makingmodel focuses on particular micro-eventsand
claims greater empirical realism. Its advocates criticize the reputational model for
taking the hypostatizationsand illusions of commonsensediscourse as if they were
reliable picturesof social realities.Advocates of the reputationalmethod,on the other
hand, criticizethe decision-makingmodel for missingthe largerpattern,and especially
that part of it which is hidden by focusingonly on actual decisions,ignoringdecisions
that are never raised,includinginstitutionalarrangementswhich are never challenged
988

of Macrosociology
A secondimplication is thatthe activeagentsin any sociologicalexpla-

nationmustbe microsituational. Social patterns,institutions,
and organi-
zationsare only abstractionsfromthe behaviorof individualsand sum-
mariesof the distribution of differentmicrobehaviors in timeand space.
These abstractions and summaries do notdo anything;if theyseemto indi-
cate a continuousrealityit is because the individualsthatmake themup
repeattheirmicrobehaviors many times,and if the "structures"change
it is because theindividualswho enact themchangetheirmicrobehaviors.
This is not to say thata causal explanationis totallymicrosituational.
In anotherpaper (Collins,in press), I have attemptedto show that the
microtranslation of a largebodyof causal principlesleaves,in additionto
a numberof puremicroprinciples, a residueof severaltypesof macrorefer-
ences. Individualswithinmicrosituations make macroreferences to other
situations,as well as to abstractor reifiedsocial entities;the effectsof
microsituations uponindividualsare oftencumulative, resultingfromrepe-
titionof micro-experiences; outsideanalystscannotestablishmicroprinci-
ples withoutcomparingacrossmicrosituations. There are also threepure
macrovariables: thedispersion of individualsin physicalspace; theamount
of timethatsocialprocessestake (includingtemporalpatternsof intermit-
tentand repeatedbehaviors);and thenumbersof individualsinvolved.In
otherwords,thereare some irreduciblemacrofactors, but thereis only a
limitedset of them.All varietiesof macro structuresor eventscan be
translatedinto thesekindsof aggregations of micro-events.
If causalityinvolvesstatingtheconditionsunderwhichparticularsocial
processeshappen,it is apparentthatboth theindependent and dependent
variables,"the conditions"and "the social processeswhichhappen,"are
compositeterms.Both, at a minimum, referto an analyst'sselectionof
repetitivemicro-events. Both independent and dependentvariablesmaybe
furthercompositesin the sense of includinga spatial-temporal arrange-
mentof a numberof different micro-actors. In addition,moremacrosam-
ples-"control variables"-mustbe comparedby the analystto establish
any givencausal statement.
In any empiricalinstance,then,to accountfullyforthe behaviorob-
servedinvolvestheanalystin comparisons witha widerangeof nonpresent
situationsand withstatements linkingbehaviorin one situationwithbe-
but are implicitlydefendedby being taken for granted (Backrach and Baratz 1962).
The macro theoryherepromisesa greaterrangeof explanatorypower but is empirically
weaker. Yet it is salvageable by translatingit into an aggregate of micro terms.A
move in this directionhas been accomplishedby Laumann, Marsden,and Galaskiewicz
(1977), who show a key link between the crude macrosummaryof actions involved
in reputationalpower and the actual exerciseof that power by demonstratingthat
there are networksof reputed influentialswho actually discuss political mattersin-
formallyamong themselvesand thus tend to arriveat a generalline of behaviorwhich
presumablyincludes taken-for-granted routinesas well as explicitdecisions.
989

haviorin othersituations.For example,an individual'ssituationalbehavior

is conditionalupontheoveralldistribution of behaviorsin othertimesand
places that can be referred to metaphorically as an organizational "net-
work."But to showsucha pattern(and I believewe have showna number
of suchpatterns,cryptically summarized undersuchstatements as "social
class backgroundaffectsattitudesabout x" [e.g., Collins 1975, pp. 73-
75]) is not yet to showits dynamics;it is only to referto an observed
correlationbetweenbehaviorin certainkindsof repeatedsituationsand
behaviorin othersituations.We still need to producethe mechanismby
whichconditions-certainarrangements of microsituations-motivate hu-
manactorsto behavein certainways.This mechanism shouldexplainboth
whytheybehaveas theydo in specificsituationsand whytheymaintain
certaindispersionsof microbehaviors amongthemselves, across timeand
space, therebymakingup the macropatterns of social structure.Such a
mechanism, moreover, shouldbe able to produce,by different statesof its
variables,both repetitivebehaviors-staticor regularlyreproducedsocial
structure-andstructural changes.
The secondimplication, then,comesdownto this: thedynamicsas well
as theinertiain any causal explanationof social structuremustbe micro-
situational;all macroconditions
have theireffectsbyimpinging uponactors'
situationalmotivations.Macro-aggregates of microsituations can provide
thecontextand makeup theresultsofsuchprocesses,but theactualenergy
mustbe microsituational.
It remainsto producesucha micromechanism. Here,thesubstantive re-
searchof radicalmicrosociology providesfurther leads.
THE MICROCRITIQUE OF RATIONALISTIC COGNITIVE AND

EXCHANGE MODELS
Much of the classic ethnomethodological researchwas orientedtoward

showingthat the basic everydaylifestanceis to take it forgrantedthat
meaningful activitiesare goingon. Garfinkel's(1967) breachingexperi-
mentsindicatethatto questionor violatethe usuallytacitaspectsof be-
haviorupsetspeople. They assume thereare aspects of life whichthey
shouldnothave to explain.Thereis also a deeperreasonforthisreaction:
it is in factimpossibleto explicateall thetacitlyunderstoodgroundsof any
social convention, and the effort to do so quicklyshowspeople the pros-
pectsof an infinite regressof discussion.Cicourel(1973) has shownsome
of thebases of the"indexicality" of socialcommunications.Manyelements
of communication involvenonverbalmodeswhichcannotbe completely
translatedintowords,and the activityof talkingitself(as opposedto the
contentof talk) has a structurethat resultsin verbalizations but is not
itselfverbalizable.These resultsimplythatmeaningful cognitionsdo not
990

of Macrosociology
ultimately guidesocialbehavior;rather,cognitivemeaningis usuallygiven

to eventsretrospectively, whensome difficulty has arisenwhichis to be
remediedby offering an "account" (Scottand Lyman 1968).
This perspective undercutsa numberof conventional explanationsof so-
cial behavior.Values and normsbecome dubious constructions. Ethno-
methodological researchindicatesthatpeople are rarelyable to verbalize
many social rules guidingtheirbehavior.This is especiallytrue at the
deeperlevelsof tacitunderstanding, suchas thecircumstances underwhich
particularkindsof surfacerulesare appropriate(Cicourel1973). Norma-
tiveconceptsare observedmainlyin retrospective accountsor as analysts'
constructs;thereis no first-hand evidencethattheyguideactors'sponta-
neousbehavior(see Deutscher1973; Cancian 1975). Nor is it possiblefor
individualsto operatecognitively simplyby matchingexternalsituations
to mentallyformulated rules.3
Similarconsiderations cast doubton theadequacyof assumingthatbe-
havioris guidedby thedefinition of thesituationor by roletaking.These
conceptsimplythatbehavioris determined cognitivelyby well-definedver-
bal ideas. But if the mostcommonstanceis to assumenormalcyas much
as possible,evenin theabsenceof discernible meaning,and ifmeaningsare
mainlyimputedretrospectively as part of someotherconversational situ-
ation,thenimmediatesituationsdo not have to be explicitlydefinedin
orderforpeople to act in them.Moreover,if thereis an irreducibly tacit
elementin cognitionand communication, situationsand rolesnevercan be
fullydefined.What guides interaction, then,must be foundon another
level.
These difficultiesarise again in the case of exchangetheories.For the
micro-evidence doesnotshowthattheusualcognitive stanceis onein which
actorscalculatepossiblereturns;on thecontrary, mostpeoplemostof the
timeoperateon thebasis of an assumednormalcywhichis not subjectto
consciousreflection. Comprehensive samplingsof conversations in work
settings,forexample,show that the prevailingtone of mostinteractions
is to take organizationalroutineforgranted;bargainingrelationsare con-
finedlargelyto externalcontacts,as betweenbusinessheads and clients
(Clegg 1975). More fundamentally, the ethnomethodological findingsim-
ply that,even whereexchangesdo take place, theymustoccuragainsta
background of tacitunderstandings whichare notchallengedor evenraised
3 Of course,one may rescue the normsor rules as nonverbalizableor unconsciouspat-
ternswhich people manifestin theirbehavior. But such "norms" are simplyobserver's
constructs.It is a common, but erroneous,sleight-of-handthen to assume that the
actors also know and orienttheirbehavior to these"rules." The reason that normative
sociologies have made so little progressin the past half centuryis that they assume
that a descriptionof behavior is an explanationof it, whereas in fact the explanatory
mechanismis still to be found. It is because of the potential for this kind of abuse
that I believe that the terminologyof norms ought to be dropped fromsociological
theory.
991

to consciousness. Durkheim([1893] 1947) made a similarpointin criti-

cizingsocial contracttheories:any contract,he pointedout,involvesone
in further obligationsnot bargainedfor,such as an implicitobligationto
upholdthecontract.
Analogousdifficulties have arisenwithinexchangetheoryitself(Heath
1976). There are certainkindsof calculationswhichactorscannotmake
on a purelyrationalbasis. They cannotchooserationallyamongamounts
of twoor morealternative goodsif thereis no commonmetric;and thisis
frequently thecase in everydaylife,as in dealingwithsuchgoodsas status,
comfort, or affection, whichhave no simplemonetary equivalent.The prob-
lemis evenmoreacutewhenone mustcalculatetheexpectedvalue of dif-
ferentcoursesof action,whichinvolvesmultiplying theprobability of at-
taininga good timesits relativedesirability;here thereare two incom-
mensurable scales to be combined.Yet anotherdifficulty is thattheprob-
abilitiesof attainingone's endsare impossibleto calculatefora particular
situationin theabsenceof knowledgeof the objectivedistribution of out-
comes.There are further limitationson the applicabilityof an exchange
model: manyexchanges,such as thoseamongmembersof organizational
positions,or amongpersonswho have establisheda bond of repeatedgift
exchanges, leave no roomforbargaining, havingexcludedalternative part-
nersaftera once-and-for-all agreement.The applicabilityof a modelof
exchange,then,seemsveryrestricted.
The findingsof empiricalmicrosociology and the self-critiques of ex-
changetheoriesare equivalentand pointto thesameunderlying conditions.
If cognition is limitedto a fewrelatively uncomplex operations,thenpeople
cannotfollowa chain of thoughtverymanysteps,eitherforwardto its
consequences or back to its premises.Most coursesof actionmustbe taken
forgranted.In March and Simon's (1958) neorationalist reformulation,
the only feasiblestrategyforan actor monitoring a numberof complex
actions (as in managingan organization)is to "satisfice"in mostareas,
thatis, to ignoremostchainsof actions,as longas theymeeta certainrou-
tinelevel of satisfaction, and concentrate insteadon the mostunpredict-
able and irregular area. This is essentiallythesame procedurethatethno-
methodologists findin people'sconversational practices.Peopledo notques-
tionthe truthfulness or pursuethe fullmeaningof mostutterances unless
severemisunderstandings or conflictsoccur, and then they "troubleshoot"
by offering retrospective accounts.
Williamson(1975) has drawnsome of the consequencesforeconomic
theory.Like the ethnomethodologists, he proposesthathumanrationality
is limitedand hencethatanycomplexorpotentially conflictualnegotiations
can becomeexceedingly longand costly-conceivablyeveninterminable-
unlessthereis some tacitor nonnegotiable basis foragreement. Hence,in
manycircumstances open markets for labor and for goodsgiveway to or-
992

of Macrosociology
ganizations,that is, to repeatedexchangesat conditionsnegotiatedon a

once-onlybasis. These are economically moreefficient thancontinually re-
negotiatingrelationsamongworkers,or among suppliersand manufac-
turers,whenthereare tasksof any degreeof complexity to be carriedout.
This argumentis tantamount to claimingthat the structural consequence
of the cognitivefeaturesdocumentedby microsociologists is to replace
open-market exchangeswith taken-for-granted routinesin organizational
networks.
Nevertheless, substitutingorganizations formarketsdoes not eliminate
theproblemof showingthe microfoundations of social structure.Granted
thatlimitedrationality makespeople relyon routineratherthanon bar-
gainingin manyareas of life,the questionstill remains:Why does any
particularformof organizational routineexist,and to what extentwill it
be stable?Anyorganization involvesauthority, thepowerof certainpeople
to give and enforceorderswhichotherscarryout. The basis of authority
is a chainof communications. The ultimatesanctionof a lower-level man-
ager over a workeris to communicate to othersin the management hier-
archyto withholdtheworker'spay; thesanctionin a military organization
is to communicate ordersto applycoercionagainstany disobedient soldier.
The civiliancase is foundedon the militaryone; controlchainsbased on
pay or otheraccess to propertyare ultimately backedup by the coercive
powerof the state.Thus the microbehaviors thatmake up any organiza-
tionalroutinemustinvolvesomesenseof thechainsof commandthatcan
bringsanctionsto bear forviolatingtheroutine.
Carryingout a routine,then,cannotbe a matterof completeoblivious-
ness to possiblecontingencies. Moreover,thereis a good deal of evidence
fromobservationalstudiesof organizationsthat strugglesto exerciseor
evade controlgo on amongworkersand managers,customersand sales-
persons;that managersnegotiatecoalitionsamongthemselves;that staff
and line officials struggleoverinfluence;thatpromotions and careerlines
are subjectto considerablemaneuver(Roy 1952; Lombard1955; Dalton
1959; Glaser 1968). Given the natureof power,this is not surprising.
Sanctionstendto be remoteand take timeto apply,and the verycondi-
tionsof limitedcognitivecapacitiesin situationscallingforcomplexcoordi-
nationor involvinguncertainty leave roomin the routinefornegotiation.
Routinemay be cognitively desirable,but it is not always forthcoming.
When breakdownsoccur,priorroutinecannotpreventindividualactors
fromnegotiating whichfurther routinesare to be established.
Even whensanctionsare applied,the negotiablenatureof poweritself
again becomesapparent.The ultimatebasis of property and of privateau-
thority is politicalauthority,backedup by thepowerof themilitary.Po-
liticaland militaryauthority, however,are based upon a self-reinforcing
processof producing A politicalleader,evenof dicta-
loyaltyor disloyalty.
993

torialpower,reliesupon othersto carryout orders; this includesusing

subordinates to enforcedisciplineoverothersubordinates. Hence a leader
is powerfulto theextentthathe or she is widelybelievedto be powerful,
mostessentiallyamongthosewithintheorganizational chainof command
(see Schelling1963,pp. 58-118). For less dictatorialleadersand forin-
formalnegotiations at lowerlevelswithinorganizations, poweris evenmore
obviouslydependentupon the accumulatedconfidence of others(Banfield
1961).
Organizationalauthority, then,is based on sharedorientations among
themembersof a group,directedtowardthe extentof sharedorientation
itself.Organizationalmembersmonitorwhat each is feelingtowardthe
otherand especiallytowardthosein authority. The ultimatebasis of rou-
tineis anotherlevelof implicitnegotiation.
Here we cometo thecruxof theissue.Bothneorationalist self-criticisms
and microsociological evidenceagreethatcomplexcontingencies cannotbe
calculatedrationally, and hencethatactorsmustrelylargelyon tacitas-
sumptionsand organizational routine.But the actual structures of the so-
cial world,especiallyas centeredon the networksupholdingproperty
and authority, involvecontinuous monitoring by individualsof each other's
grouployalties.Since thesocial worldcan involvequite a fewlinesof au-
thority and setsof coalitions,thetaskofmonitoring themcan be extremely
complex.How is thispossible,givenpeople's inherently limitedcognitive
capacities?
The solutionmustbe thatnegotiations are carriedout implicitly,on a
different level than the use of consciouslymanipulatedverbal symbols.
I proposethatthe mechanism is emotionalratherthancognitive.Individ-
uals monitorothers'attitudestowardsocial coalitions,and hence toward
thedegreeof supportforroutines, by feelingtheamountof confidence and
enthusiasm thereis towardcertainleadersand activities,or theamountof
fearof beingattackedby a strongcoalition,or the amountof contempt
for a weak one. These emotionalenergiesare transmitted by contagion
amongmembersof a group, flowswhichoperateverymuchlike theset
in
of negotiations whichproducepriceswithina market.In thissense,I will
attemptto showthat the strengths of a marketmodelforlinkingmicro-
interactions intomacrostructures can be salvagedwithoutincorporating the
weaknessesof traditional exchangetheories.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AS MICROREPETITION IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD
Froma microviewpoint, whatis the"socialstructure"? In microtranslation,

it refersto people'srepeatedbehaviorin particularplaces,usingparticular
physicalobjects,and communicating by usingmanyof thesame symbolic
expressions repeatedlywithcertainotherpeople.The mosteasilyidentifi-
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of Macrosociology
able partof thisrepetition,

moreover, is physical:themostenduring repeti-
tionsare thosearoundparticularplaces and objects.Most of therepetitive
structureof economicorganization takesplace in particularfactories,office
buildings,trucks,etc.The mostrepetitive behaviorsthatmakeup thefam-
ily structureare the factsthat certainpeople inhabitthe same dwelling
placesday afterday,thatthesamemenand womensleepin thesamebeds
and touchthesamebodies,thatthesamechildrenare kissed,spanked,and
fed.The "state" existsby virtueof therebeingcourtrooms wherejudges
repeatedlysit, headquartersfromwhichpolice leave to ride in the same
squad cars, barrackswheretroopsare repeatedlyhoused,and assembly
hallswherecongresses of politiciansrepeatedly gather.
Of course,thereis also symboliccommunication whichgoes on among
thesepeople,and thisbears some relationto the "structuredness" of so-
ciety.But whatI am contending is thattherepetitiveness is not to be ex-
plainedprimarily by the contentof thissymboliccommunication. The so-
cial structureis not a set of meaningsthat people carryin theirheads.
I believethatthisis borneout by thefindings of theempiricalmicrosoci-
ologyof cognition.The structure is in the repeatedactionsof communi-
cating,not in the contentsof what is said; thosecontentsare frequently
ambiguousor erroneous,not always mutuallyunderstoodor fullyexpli-
cated. People do not always (or even usually) have a veryaccurateidea
of thepoliticalstate to whichtheydefer,the organizationin whichthey
work,or the familyor circleof friendswithwhomtheyassociate.But if
the structuredness of societyis physical,not cognitive,thesedisabilities
do notpreventus fromcarrying out a greatdeal of orderlyrepetition. No
one needs to have a cognitivemap of the wholesocial structure, or even
of any organization;all one needs is to negotiatea fairlylimitedroutine
in a fewphysicalplacesand withtheparticularpeopleusuallyencountered
there.
The limitations uponhumancognitiondocumented by theethnomethod-
ologistsshowwhysocialordermustnecessarily be physicaland local forall
participants.Althoughthismayseemparadoxicalin viewof thephilosoph-
ical and antimaterialist themesassociatedwiththisintellectualtradition,
it is consonantwith the main examplesof "indexical"statements which
ethnomethodologists have cited (Garfinkel1967): such termsas "you,"
"me," "here,"'and "this" are irremediably bound to the specificcontext,
because people's activitiesalways occur at a particularphysicallocation
and at a particulartime.The inexpressible contextuponwhicheverybody
depends,and upon which all tacit understandings rest,is the physical
world,includingeveryone'sown body, as seen froma particularplace
withinit.4
4 A phenomenologistwould object that individual persons and particular situations
cannot be seen simplyas physicalmomentsin timeand space, because theyare always
995

Again,it is plain thatthisphysicalsocial worldis not static.People do

comeand go; homesare formedand dissolved;workersmoveto new fac-
toriesand offices;politiciansare replaced;new friendsmeetwhileothers
cease to see one another.Nor are thepatternshistorically constant;indeed,
muchof whatwe meanby "structuralchange"in historyis shifting pat-
ternsof physicalorganization:separationof workplacesand armaments
places fromhomes,shifting numbersand shifting ratesof turnover of peo-
ple in politicalplaces,and so on. My pointhereis simplythatthe micro-
realityof any "social structure"is somepatternof repetitive associations
amongpeoplein relationto particularphysicalobjectsand places,and that
thismustbe so becausehumancognitivecapacitiesdo not allowpeopleto
organizein any otherway.
Thesecognitive capacitiesdo notpreventindividualsfromsystematically
misperceiving the natureof theirsocial orderby makingclaimsabout it
on a symbolicplane. How thisis donewillbe suggestedbelow.
The questionnow arises: Why is it thatpeople repeatedlyinhabitthe
same buildings,use the same tools,talk to the same people? Part of the
answerhas alreadybeen given: routineoccursbecause the worldis too
complexforus to have to renegotiate all of it (or even verymuchof it)
all thetime.Most of thetimeit is easierto staywhereone is familiar.But
thisis onlythe beginning of an answer.We stillneed to knowwhythose
particularpeople occupy thoseparticularplaces. And since theydo not
stay thereforever, we need to knowwhy theymovewhen theydo and
wheretheywillgo. Moreover,themechanism thatexplainswhentheywill
move (and by the same token,when theywill stay) shouldalso be the
mechanism thatexplainsjust whattheywilldo, bothin actionand in com-
munication, withthepeopletheyrepeatedly encounter in theirusualplaces.
From a macroviewpoint, one way to gloss thesemicrorepetitions is to
referto themas propertyor authority.This bringsin the notionof pos-
siblesanctionsagainstviolatinga particularpatternof repetitive behavior.
The personwho goes into someoneelse's factoryor takes someoneelse's
car standsthe riskof beingarrestedand jailed; the personwho fails to
carryout a boss's ordersrisksbeing fired.Nevertheless, fromthe view-
definedby a cognitive structure whichtranscendsthe immediate situation.In other

words,we do not knowwho theindividualis or whatthesituationis withoutusing
some situation-transcending concept.Here again (as in n. 2 above) I believewe
encounter a confusionof the theorist-observer's
viewpoint and theactor'sviewpoint.
It is the outsidetheoristwho wantsto characterize theindividualas a "citizen"or
a "husband,"or thesituationas a "home"or a "workplace." WhatI am contending
is thatmostof the timeactorsdo not thinkabout suchconceptsat all; theysimply
are physically in certainplaces,carrying
out certainactions,includingtheactionof
talkingto otherpeople.It is onlywhenthisphysicaland emotionalroutineis dis-
ruptedthatpeoplerise to the levelimputedto themby phenomenological theorists
and beginto offer macroconceptual"accounts"of themselvesand theirsettings.
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of Macrosociology
pointof strictmicrotranslation, we mustask: To what extentdo people

actuallythinkof thesecontingencies frommomentto momentin theirlives
as theyact eitherto respectpropertyand authorityor to violatethem?
The realityof sanctionsupholdingpropertyand authoritycannot be
doubted,as micro-events thatsometimes occur; but theydo notoccurvery
oftenin relationto the sheernumberof micro-events that actuallytake
place. Moreover,thegeneralmodelof humancognitionsuggestedabove is
thatpeopledo not calculatecontingencies or referto explicitrulesmostof
the time; theyact tacitly,and onlyconsciouslythinkof theseformalities
whenan issue arises.Not thatpeople cannotformulate rulesor calculate
contingencies,but thereis no consciousruleaboutwhenpeoplemustbring
up therulesand no consciouscalculationof whenone shouldcalculateand
whennot (see Cicourel1973).
Whatwe have instead,I suggest,is a patternin whichpeopleact toward
physicalobjectsand towardeach otherin waysthatmostlyconstitute rou-
tines.They do notordinarily thinkof theseroutinesas upholdingproperty
and authority, althoughan analyticallymindedoutsideobservercouldde-
scribethemas fitting thatpattern.People followroutinesbecausetheyfeel
naturalor appropriate.Moreover,routinesmay be quite variablewithre-
spectto whatan observermaydescribeas property and authority;people
can rigidlyavoid steppingon someoneelse's frontlawn or theymay take
theoffice stationeryhome,in bothcases withoutconsciously thinking about
it; theymaynervously jump to a boss's requestor sloughit offbehindthe
boss's back, again withoutconsciouslyinvokingany generalformulations
of rulesor roles.This variationmay,of course,also extendto instances
wherepeople do become property-conscious, rules-conscious,authority-
conscious;whatI am arguingis thatwe need an explanationof whythis
symbolicconsciousness occurswhenit does. That explanationis again in
the realmof feeling:people invokeconscioussocial conceptsat particular
timesbecausetheemotionaldynamicsoftheirlivesmotivatesthemto do so.
The underlying emotionaldynamics,I propose,centerson feelingsof
membership in coalitions.Brieflyput: property(access to and exclusions
fromparticularphysicalplaces and things)is based upon a senseof what
kindsof personsdo and do not belongwhere.This is based in turnupon
a sense of what groupsare powerfulenoughto punishviolatorsof their
claims.Authorityis similarlyorganized:it restsupon a sense of which
people are connectedto whichgroups,to coalitionsof what extensiveness
and ofwhatcapacityto enforcethedemandsof theirmembers uponothers.
Both of theseare variables: thereis no inherent, objectiveentitycalled
"property"or "authority," onlythevaryingsensesthatpeoplefeelat par-
ticularplaces and timesofhowstrongtheseenforcing coalitionsare. There
may also be membership groupsthat make fewor no claimsto property
or authority-purely"informal"or "horizontal"groups,like friendsand
997

acquaintances,whosesolidarity is an end in itselfas faras its membersare

concerned.
The mostgeneralexplanationof humansocial behaviorencompassesall
of thesevariations.It shouldspecify:What makessomeonea memberof
a coalition?What determines the extensiveness of a coalitionand the in-
tensityof bondswithinit? How do peoplejudge the powerof coalitions?
The answersto thesequestions,I am suggesting, determinethe way in
whichgroupsof friendsand otherstatusgroupsare formed, thedegreeto
whichauthorityand propertyroutinesare upheld,and who will dominate
otherswithinthesepatterns.The basic mechanismis a processof emo-
tionalgroupidentification that may be describedas a set of interaction
ritualchains.
A THEORY OF INTERACTION RITUAL CHAINS
From a microtranslation viewpoint,all processesof forming and judging

coalitionmemberships in
musttake place interaction situations.The main
activityin such situationsis conversation.But no one situationstands
alone.Everyindividualgoes through manysituations:indeed,a lifetime is,
strictlyspeaking,a chainof interaction situations.(One mightalso call it
a chainof conversations.) The peopleone talksto have also talkedto other
people in the past and will talk to othersin the future.Hence an appro-
priateimageof the social worldis a bundleof individualchainsof inter-
actionalexperience,crisscrossing each otherin space as theyflowalong
in time.The dynamicsof coalitionmembership are producedby the emo-
tionalsenseindividualshave at any one time,due to the toneof thesitu-
ationtheyare currently in (or last remember, or shortlyanticipate),which
in turnis influencedby thepreviouschainsof situationsof all participants.
The manifestcontentof an interaction is usuallynot theemotionsit in-
volves.Anyconversation, to theextentthatit is takenseriouslyby itspar-
ticipants,focusestheirattentionon the realityof its contents,the things
that are talkedabout (Goffman1967, pp. 113-16). This may includea
focuson practicalworkthatis beingdone. What is significant about any
conversation fromthepointof viewof social membership, however,is not
thecontentbut theextentto whichtheparticipants can actuallymaintain
a commonactivityof focusingon thatcontent.The contentis a vehiclefor
establishingmembership. From this viewpoint,any conversation may be
lookedupon as a ritual.It invokesa commonreality,whichfroma ritual
viewpoint maybe calleda "myth":in thiscase,whethertheconversational
myth trueor not is irrelevant.
is The myth,or content,is a Durkheimian
It
sacredobject. signifiesmembership in a commongroupforthosewho
trulyrespect it. The person who can become successfully engrossedin a
conversational realitybecomesacceptedas a memberof thegroupof those
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of Macrosociology
who believein that conversational entity.In termsof the Durkheimian

modelof religiousritual(Durkheim[1912] 1954; see also Goffman 1967),
a conversation is a cult in whichall believerssharea moralsolidarity. In
fact,it createsthe reference pointof moralsolidarity:thosewho believe
are thegood; defenseof thebeliefand henceof thegroupis righteousness;
evil is disbeliefin, and even moreso attackupon,the cognitivesymbols
thathold the grouptogether. The cognitivesymbols,howeverbanal, par-
ticularized,or esotericthe conversational contentmay be, are important
to thegroupand defendedby it because theyare thevehicleby meansof
whichthegroupis able to unifyitself.
Not all conversations, however,are equallysuccessfulrituals.Somebind
individualstogether morepermanently and tightlythanothers;somecon-
versationsdo not comeoffat all. Amongthoseconversations thatdo suc-
ceed in evokinga commonreality,some producea feelingof egalitarian
membership amongthe conversationalists, whileothersproducefeelingsof
rankdifferences, includingfeelingsof authorityand subordination. These
typesof variabilityare, in fact,essentialforproducingand reproducing
stratifiedsocial order.Conversational interactionritual,then,is a mech-
anismproducingvaryingamountsof solidarity, varyingdegreesofpersonal
identification withcoalitionsof varyingdegreesof impressiveness.
What,then,makesa conversational ritualsucceedor not,and whatkinds
of coalitionsdoes it invoke?I suggestthe following ingredients.(1) Par-
ticipantsin a successfulconversational ritualmustbe able to invokea
commoncognitivereality.Hence theymusthave similarconversational or
culturalresources.5 A successfulconversation in
may also be inegalitarian,
thatonepersondoes mostof theculturalrealityinvoking, theothersacting
as an audience;in thiscase we have a domination-and-subordination-pro-
ducingritual.(2) Participants mustalso be able to sustaina commonemo-
tionaltone.At a minimum, theymustall wantto produceat least momen-
tarysolidarity.Again,the emotionalparticipationmay be stratified, di-
vidingthegroupintoemotionalleadersand followers.
These twoingredients-cultural resourcesand emotionalenergies-come
fromindividuals'chainsof previousinteractional experienceand serveto
reproduce or changethepatternofinterpersonal relations.Amongthemost
important of thepatternsreproduced or changedare feelings aboutpersons'
relationships to physicalpropertyand to thecoercivecoalitionsof author-
ity.How individualsare tied to thesecoalitionsis the crucialdeterminant
ofwhichare dominantor subordinate.
Conversational resources.-Particularstylesand topicsof conversation
implymemberships in differentgroups.At any time,thepreviouschainof
5 Bourdieu (1977; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) proposes a similar concept,"cultural

capital," although this refersmore specificallyto the culture legitimatedby the dom-
inant class in a society.
999

interaction ritualswhichhave been successfully negotiatedhas made cer-

tain conversationalcontentsintosymbolsof solidarity. The rangeof these
contentshas beendiscussedelsewhere(Collins 1975,pp. 114-31). For ex-
ample,shoptalk invokesmembership in occupationalgroups,politicaland
otherideologicaltalkinvokescontending politicalcoalitions,entertainment
talkinvokesgroupswithvarioustastes,generaldiscussioninvokesdifferent
intellectualand nonintellectualstrata,whilegossipand personaltalkinvoke
specificand sometimes quiteintimatememberships. Again,it is notimpor-
tantwhetherwhat is said is trueor not,but whetherit can be said and
acceptedas a commonrealityforthatmoment-thatis whatmakesit an
emblemofgroupmembership.
Conversational topicshave twodifferent implications forreproducing the
social structure.Some conversational topicsare generalized:theyreferto
eventsand entitieson some level of abstractionfromthe immediateand
local situation.Talk about techniques, politics,religion,and entertainment
is of thissort.The social effect,I would suggest,is to reproducea sense
of whatmaybe called status-group mem~bership: commonparticipation in
a horizontally organizedculturalcommunity whichsharestheseoutlooks
and a beliefin theirimportance. Ethnicgroups,classesto the extentthat
theyare culturalcommunities, and manymorespecializedculturalgroups
are of thistype.Successfulconversation on suchtopicsbringsabouta gen-
eralizedsense of commonmembership, althoughit invokesno specificor
personaltiesto particularorganizations, authority, or property.
Otherconversational topicsare particularized:theyreferto specificper-
sons,places,and things.Such talk can includepracticalinstructions (ask-
ing someoneto do something forsomeoneat a specifictimeand place),
as wellas politicalplanningabout specificstrategies(as in organizational
politics)and gossipand personalnarration. Someof thisparticularized talk
servesto produceand reproduceinformalrelationsamongpeople (friend-
ships). But particularizedtalk,paradoxicallyenough,is also crucialin re-
producing property and authority,and henceorganizations.6 For,as I have
arguedabove,propertyand authority structures existas physicalroutines
whosemicroreality consistsof peopletakingforgrantedparticularpeople's
rightsto be in particularbuildings,givingordersto particularpeople,and
so on. In thissense,property and authority are reenactedwhenever people
referto someone'shouse,someone'soffice, someone'scar, as wellas when-
eversomeonegivesan orderto do a particularthing,and the listenerac-
6 This is contraryto the emphasisin Bernstein's(1971-75) theoryof linguisticcodes,
in which restricted(particularized) codes are seen as the communicationmode of the
lower classes, while the middle and upper classes use primarilyan elaborated (gen-
eralized) code. Bernstein'stheory focuses only on class culturesand misses the role
that particularizedtalk plays in enactingspecificorganizations.The higherclasses do
engage in more generalizedtalk than the lower classes, but they also engage in par-
ticularizedtalk that is, in fact, crucial for enactingthe organizationsthey control.
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of Macrosociology
knowledges thereality,at least forthatmoment, of thatorder.Again,it is

worthpointingout thatordersare notalwayscarriedout,butit is thesitu-
ation in whichthe communicative ritualoccursthat is crucialformain-
tainingthestructure as a realsocialpattern,nottheconsequences forprac-
ticalaction.7
Of course,as indicated,eventhedegreeofritualcompliance is a variable,
and we mustinquireinto the conditionswhichmake people respectand
enactorganizational communications less or moreenthusiastically or even
rebelagainstthem.This bringsus to thesecondingredient of rituals,emo-
tionalenergies.
Emotionalenergies.8-Emotions affect ritualmembership in severalways.
There mustbe at least a minimaldegreeof commonmood amonginter-
actantsif a conversational ritualis to succeedin invokinga sharedreality.
The stronger the commonemotionaltone,themorereal theinvokedtopic
will seem to be and the greaterthe solidarityin the group (see Collins
1975,pp. 94-95, 153-54). Emotionalpropensities are thusa prerequisite
fora successfulinteraction. But the interaction also servesas a machine
forintensifying emotionand forgenerating new emotionaltonesand soli-
darities.Thus emotionalenergiesare importantresultsof interactions at
any pointin theritualchain.Emotionalsolidarity, I wouldsuggest,is the
payoff thatfavorableconversational resources can produceforan individual.
If successfulinteractional rituals (IRs) producefeelingsof solidarity,
stratificationbothwithinand amongcoalitionsis a further outcomeof emo-
tionalflowsalongIR chains.As noted,conversational ritualscan be either
egalitarian or asymmetrical. Bothtypeshavestratifying implications. Egali-
tarianritualsare stratifying in thatinsidersare acceptedand outsidersre-
jected; herestratification existsin theformof a coalitionagainstexcluded
individuals, or possiblythedomination ofone coalitionoveranother.Asym-
metricalconversations, in whichone individualsets theenergytones(and
invokesthe culturalreality)whilethe othersare an audience,are inter-
nallystratified.
The mostbasic emotionalingredient in interactions,I wouldsuggest,is
a minimaltoneofpositivesentiment towardtheother.The solidarity senti-
mentsrangefroma minimaldisplayof nonhostility to warmmutualliking
and enthusiasticcommonactivity.Wheredo such emotionscome from?
They originatein previousexperiences in IR chains.An individualwhois
successfully acceptedintoan interaction acquiresan increment of positive
7 This, I believe,is the significance
of Goffman's(1959) conceptof frontstagebehavior
in organizations.Enunciationof rules,then,is a special type of frontstageenactment;
its significanceis not that the organizationalrules directlycause behavior but that
rules are conversationaltopics that are sometimesinvoked as crucial tests of feelings
of memberstoward authoritycoalitions in organizations.
8 Some alternativetheoriesof emotion are given in Kemper (1978), Schott (1979),
and Hochschild (1979).
1001

emotionalenergy.This energyis manifestedas what we commonlycall

confidence, warmth,and enthusiasm.Acquiringthis in one situation,an
individualhas moreemotionalresourcesforsuccessfully negotiatingsoli-
darityin thenextinteraction. Such chains,bothpositiveand negative,ex-
tendthroughout everyperson'slifetime.9
Let us considerthevariationspossiblewithinthisbasic model,The main
conditions whichproduceemotionalenergyare these:
a) Increasedemotionalconfidence is producedby everyexperienceof
successfully negotiatinga membership ritual.Decreased emotionalconfi-
denceresultsfromrejectionor lack of success.
b) The morepowerfulthe groupwithinwhichone successfully negoti-
ates ritualsolidarity,the greaterthe emotionalconfidenceone receives
fromit. The powerof a groupheremeanstheamountof physicalproperty
it successfullyclaimsaccess to, thesheernumberof its adherents, and the
amountof physicalforce(numbersof fighters, instruments of violence)it
has accessto.
c) The moreintensetheemotionalarousalwithinan IR, themoreemo-
tionalenergyan individualreceivesfromparticipating in it. A groupsitu-
ationwitha highdegreeof enthusiasm thusgenerateslargeemotionalin-
crements forindividuals.High degreesof emotionalarousalare createdes-
peciallyby IRs thatincludean elementof conflict againstoutsiders:either
an actual fight,a ritualpunishment of offenders, or, on a lowerlevel of
intensity,symbolicdenunciation of enemies(includingconversational grip-
ing).
d) Taking a dominantpositionwithinan IR increasesone's emotional
energies.Taking a subordinatepositionreducesone's emotionalenergies;
themoreextremethesubordination, thegreatertheenergyreduction.
INTERACTIONS AS MARKETPLACES FOR CULTURAL AND

EMOTIONAL RESOURCES
Whywill a particularperson,in any giveninteractional situation,achieve

or failto achieveritualmembership? Andwhywillparticularpersonsdomi-
nateor be subordinated in an IR? The answerslie in a combination of the
emotionaland culturalresourcesof all the participants in any encounter.
These in turnresultfromtheIR chainsthateach individualhas previously
experienced. Each encounter in whichtheseresources
is like a marketplace
are implicitlycomparedand conversational ritualsof variousdegreesof
solidarityand stratification
are negotiated.Each individual's"market"po-
9 This does not implyan infinite in thepast; it pointsto theimportant

regress fact
thathumanchildren are bornintoan emotional interactionand thatsuccessive
emo-
tionalstatesbuildupon theinitialone.
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of Macrosociology
sitiondependsupon the emotionaland culturalresourcesacquiredfrom

previousinteractions.
The severalkinds of emotionaland culturalresourcesinteract.Since
emotionalenergiesresultfromsuccessor failurein previousIRs, having
highor low culturalresourcesalso contributes to highor low emotional
energies.To a lesserextentthereis an effectin theoppositedirection:the
moreemotionalenergy(confidence, social warmth)one has, themoreone
is able to gainnewculturalresourcesby successfully enteringintonewcon-
versations, whereasa personwithlowemotionalconfidence maybe "tongue-
tied,"unableto use evenwhatculturalresources he or she has.
Bothculturaland emotionalresources changeovertime.But theychange
in different rhythms. Generallyspeaking,I wouldsuggestthatemotional
energiesare muchmorevolatilethanculturalresourcesand thattheycan
changein bothpositiveand negativedirections. If one encounters a series
of situationsin whichone is highlyacceptedor even dominating, or in
whichthe emotionsare veryintense,one's emotionalenergycan build up
veryrapidly.The rhythms of mass politicaland religiousmovements are
based upon just such dynamics.On the otherhand,if one goes through
a seriesof ritualrejectionsor subordinations, one's energiescan dropfairly
rapidly.
Culturalresources,however,are fairlystable,and theychangelargely
in a positivedirection.But herewe mustpay attentionto the distinction
betweengeneralizedand particularized culturalresources.Generalizedre-
sourcesusuallygrowovertimeand at a slow rate.Individualsmay forget
someof the generalizedinformation theypossess,but sinceit is oftenre-
producedas commonconversational topicsin theirusual encounters with
otherpeople,loss of generalizedculturalcapital is probablyconfinedto
thoseoccasionsin whichsomeoneleavesa habitualmilieuofconversational
partnersfora longtime.Andevenso, thereis a considerable lag; thepower
of memory makesgeneralizedculturalresourcesa stabilizingforcein social
relations.
Particularized culturalresources,on theotherhand,are potentially more
discontinuous. Particularizedconversational actions (givinga specificor-
der,askingpracticaladvice,negotiating a strategyregarding a particular
issue in organizational politics,jokingwithfriends,etc.) are evanescent.
The bondstheyenactare permanent onlyto theextentthatthoseactions
are frequently reproduced.Particularizedculturalresourcesare especially
importantas the microbasisof property, authority,and organization, as
wellas of closepersonalties.The relationship of peopleto particularphys-
ical objectsthatconstitute property is enactedoverand overagainin ordi-
naryand taken-for-granted encounters, in IRs whichhave a particularized
content.The same is trueof the microreproduction of authorityand of
organizations.
1003

Particularizedconversational resourcesdiffer fromgeneralizedconversa-

tionalresources, and fromemotionalresources as well,in thattheynotonly
are acquiredin one's ownconversations but also circulateindependently of
oneself.Whenotherpeople talk particularistically about some individual,
theyare constituting heror his reputation.One's reputation, then,is a par-
ticularizedconversational resourcethatcirculatesin otherpeople'sconver-
sations.For the microtranslation of macrostructures, the mostimportant
kindofreputations thatcirculatearesimplythepartsof talkwhichidentify
someoneby a particulartitle ("the chairman,""his wife") or organiza-
tionalmembership ("he is withG.E."), or whichtacitlygive someonea
reputationfor certainpropertyand authority("I went into his office,"
"She sentout a memodirectingthemto . . . "). Particularizedconversa-
tion,bothas enactedand as circulatedsecondarily as reputations of other
people,is whatprincipally constitutesthe social structure of property and
authority.
Comparedwithgeneralizedconversation, particularized conversation is
potentially quite volatile,althoughmuchof the timeit simplyreproduces
itselfand hence reproducessocial routines.Most of the time,the same
peopleare placedintoorganizational and property-maintaining routinesby
boththeparticularized conversational ritualsin whichtheytake part and
thosein whichtheyare conversational subjects.But thisflowof particu-
laristicculturalresourcescan shiftquite abruptly,especiallyon the repu-
tationalside. On a small and local scale, thishappensfrequently:a new
personentersa job, a familiarone leaves a place-the old roundof par-
ticularizedconversational enactments and reputations suddenlystopsand
a newparticularsocial realityis promulgated. Most of thetimethesepar-
ticularizeditemsof conversation reinforcethebedrockof physicalroutine,
whichhumancognitivecapacitiesrequireus to relyupon to such a great
extent.But by the same token,the particularstructure of organizational
behavior,includingverylargeorganizational aggregatessuch as the state,
is potentiallyveryvolatile:it is notupheldby generalizedrulesor general-
ized cultureof any kind, but by short-term, particularizedinteraction
rituals,and thesecan abruptlytake on a new content.This microbasisof
propertyand authority impliesthat theseroutinesalternatebetweenlong
periodsof relativelystable microreproduction and dramaticepisodesof
upheavalor revolution.
If we ask, then,what causes the variationsin thispattern-whenwill
particularindividualsmovein or out,and whenwill thewholepatternof
property and authority be stableor shift-we finda market-like dynamic.
and
Particularindividualsenact the property authority structure because
theirpreviousIR chainsgive themcertainemotionalenergies and cultural
resources,includingtheresourceof the reputation forbelongingin certain
authority ritualsand particularphysical places.The relativevalue of these
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of Macrosociology
resourcesmay shiftfromencounterto encounter, as the combinations of

individualsvary.If one beginsto encounter personswhoseemotionaland
cultural(includingreputational)resourcesare greateror less than what
one is used to, one's owncapacityto generateritualmembership and con-
versationaldominancewill shiftup or down.Hence one's emotionalener-
gies will undergoan increaseor decrease.If theseenergyshiftsreachthe
pointat whichone is motivatedand able to shiftphysicaland ritualpo-
sitionin thepatternof propertyand organizational authority, one's repu-
tationand otherparticularized conversational resourceswillabruptlyshift.
Generalizedculturalresources, finally,
maybuildup acrossa longseriesof
interactions,but thisoccursrelativelyslowly.
AlthoughIR situationsare market-like, it is worthstressingthat the
mechanismby whichindividualsare motivatedby theirmarketpositions
is notone of rationalcalculation.As notedabove,a fundamental difficulty
in rationalist
social exchangemodelsis thatthereis no way forindividuals
to comparedisparategoodshavingno commonmetric,noris it possibleto
multiplythesevalues by the different metricof a scale of probabilities of
attainingvariousgoods. But if individualsare motivatedby theiremo-
tionalenergiesas theseshiftfromsituationto situation,thesheeramount
of emotionalenergyis thecommondenominator decidingtheattractiveness
of variousalternatives, as well as a predictorof whetheran individualwill
actuallyattainanyof them.Individualsthusdo nothave to calculateprob-
abilitiesin orderto feelvaryingdegreesofconfidence in different
outcomes.
Disparategoodsdo not have to be directlycompared,onlythe emotional
toneof situationsin whichtheyare available.'0Nor do actorshave to cal-
culate the value of theirvariousculturalresources(generalizedand par-
ticularized)in each situation.These resourceshave an automaticeffect
upon the conversational interaction, and the outcomesare automatically
transformed intoincrements or decrements of emotionalenergy.
The fundamental mechanism, then,is not a consciousone. Rather,con-
sciousness,in the formof culturalresources, is a seriesof inputsintoeach
situationwhichaffects one's senseof availablegroupmemberships of vary-
ingdegreesof attractiveness. It is possible,of course,forindividualssome-
timesto reflectconsciouslyupon theirsocial choices,perhapseven to be-
comeawareof theirownculturaland emotionalresourcesvis-'a-vis thoseof
theirfellows.But choicesconsciously made,I wouldcontend,wouldbe the
10There may be occasions, of course, in which individuals find themselvesamong

disparate sources of attractionor repulsionwhich are evenly balanced. In those cases,
the IR chain theorypredicts that their behavior will in fact be immobilized-they
will remain in whatever physical routine they are in at that time, until the flow of
IR energycombinationswith other actors motivates them to leave that routine.
1005

sameas choicesmadewithoutreflection.1" One's senseof "choice"or "will"

restsupontheaccretionof energies-one'sdegreeofself-confidence-which
is theproductof a largerdynamic.
Anotherlong-standing difficulty
of social exchangetheoriesis solvedby
theIR chainmodel:Whydo peoplerepaya gift?Self-interest is nota suf-
ficientexplanation,as an exchangeis rewardingonly to the extentthat
individualsalreadyknow therewill be reciprocity. Hence theoristshave
feltit necessaryto fall back upon such claimsas "whatis customary be-
comesobligatory"(Blau 1964) or to invokean alleged"normof reciproc-
ity" (Gouldner1960; see also Heath 1976). Both formulations beg the
explanatoryquestion:in bothcases, the customariness of the behavioris
just whatremainsto be explained,and to call thiscustomariness a "norm"
is merelyto describeit. The IR chainmodelproposesthatfeelingsof soli-
daritywithina social coalitionare fundamental. If twoindividualsfeela
commonmembership, theywill feel a desireto reciprocategifts,because
the giftand its reciprocation are emblemsof continuingtheircommon
membership. This modelhas theadvantageof makinggiftgivingand reci-
procationintoa variableinsteadof a constant:individualswillreciprocate
to the extentthat the emotionaldynamicsof a particularcoalitionmem-
bershipis attractiveto them.Similarly, theywillfeellikegivinggiftsornot
becauseof thesame rangeof circumstances. Hence thevariablesdescribed
above shouldaccountforthe degreeto whichreciprocity is actuallyprac-
ticed.
The aggregateof IRs, then,maybe describedas market-like. Whathap-
pensin each encounter by whathas happenedin therecentseries
is affected
of encounters in each participant'sIR chain,and whathappenedin those
encounters in turnwas affected by the recentexperiences of theirpartici-
pants,and so on. This largeraggregateof encounters produceswhatmay
be describedas a seriesof culturaland emotional"prices"at whichindi-
vidualscan negotiateIRs of different degreesof solidarityand domination
withone another.I say a seriesofpricesbecauseonlycertaincombinations
of individualscan successfully createa ritual,and different combinations
willsettleupondeals at different prices.
Thereare severaldifferent marketsof thiskindoperatingsimultaneously.
At one level, thereis a relativelyslow-moving marketfororganizational
11 Hochschild (1979) shows that people do sometimesreflectupon theiremotionsand

try to make themselvesfeel in particularways that are appropriate to the situation.
The fact that they do not automaticallyfeel the "right" way is explainable,I would
argue, by the marketattractionor repulsionof various alternativesituationsin their
IR chains. What Hochschildis describing,then,may be situationsin which individuals
are torn between two differentformsof resourcesor are gettingvery mixed payoffs
from their immediate interactions.Such situations may arise when an individual's
market position is shiftingaway from a previous equilibriumpoint and a new equi-
libriumhas not been established(see discussionbelow).
1006

of Macrosociology
ritualrepetitions("positions")and forotherpropertyenactments. There

is a greatdeal of repetitionin themicrorituals thatmakeup thereproduc-
tionof such structures;yet individualsdo tryto move in or out of po-
sitions.Theirmotivations to stayput or to move,and thechancesof being
acceptedwhentheyattempttheseactions,are determined by theaggregate
of IR chains withwhichtheirlives physicallyintersect.Informalshifts
withinorganizationalrelationsare similarlydetermined-shifts in which
bosses gain or lose influence, informalallies win or lose, workersshow
greateror less enthusiasmand compliance.At anotherlevel, thereare
marketsforpersonalfriendships, forhorizontalcoalitionsamongdifferent
organizational executives,etc.,whichare not tied to the directenactment
of propertyand authorityrelationsbetweentheparticipants. These mar-
ketsare capableof movingmuchmorequicklyand continuously thanthose
in whichorganizational "structures" are enacted,becauseinformal conver-
sationalpartners do nothave to changethemorecomplexand particularity-
embeddedtiesofproperty and organizational position.
Bothtypesof markets, however,operateby a similarmechanism. In the
"organizational positionmarket,"individualswillbe motivatedto pressfor
moredomination withintheorganizational routineor to leave thatroutine
to finda betterone to theextentthattheiraggregateof experiences in IR
chainsis emotionally positive.Similarly, in marketsforhorizontalalliances
(whetherpersonalor business/political), individualswho experiencerela-
tivesurplusof emotionalenergyover thosein theirusual encounters will
be motivatedeitherto seek moredomination or to moveto a different set
of encounters. But suchindividualswilleventuallytendto reachthelimit-
ing situationsto whichtheirresourceswill take them:situationsin which
theirpartnersare equal or higherin resources,hence stabilizingor re-
versingtheiremotionalsurplus.
Froma veryabstractviewpoint, one can imaginean equilibriumpoint
in such marketsat whichall individualshave settledon the particular
peopleto interactwithritually,so thatall emotionaland culturalresources
are staticallyreproduced.Such an equilibriumpoint may be a useful
concept,but onlyif we see it as merelyone tendencyof aggregateinter-
actionalmarketswhichis modifiedby a numberof otherprocesses.The
situationis constantlybeingdestabilized,wheneverany individualsany-
whereexperience newincrements (or decrements) of culturalresources and
emotionalenergies.A particularboss who is losing emotionalenergies
(throughill health,let us say, or a shiftin familyinteractions) willbring
about smallincrements in energiesamongthe workershe or she routinely
dominates, whichin turnmay increasetheirinfluence in otherencounters.
Such effects will cause at least local destabilization of the micro-interac-
tionalequilibrium. The equilibrium pointis a patterntowardwhichinter-
actionswilltendagain and again,subjectto thesedisturbances.
1007

Many of thesedisturbances willbe local and temporary;theiroutcomes

do not changethepatternof macroorganization. Others,however,may be
large-scaleand pervasivein theirconsequences.In the following section,
I considerwhat kindsof aggregatemicroprocesses can cause eithergross
reproduction or grosschangein macrostructures.
MACROSTRUCTURAL EFFECTS
The precedingmodelsuggeststhatlarge-scalesocial changesare based on

micromechanisms ofone or moreof thefollowing kinds:large-scalechanges
in the amountor distribution of (a) generalizedculturalresources,(b)
particularizedculturalresources,or (c) emotionalenergies.
a) The generalizedculturalresourcesacrossa largepopulationcan shift
because of the introduction of new technologies of communication or be-
cause moreindividualsspecializein the productionand dissemination of
generalizedculture.Writingimplements, mass media,and educationaland
religiousorganizationsof varyingsize have introducednew culturalre-
sources,or increasedtheirdistribution, in societiesat varioustimesin his-
tory.One can pictureat leasttwokindsofresultant structural First,
effects.
thedistribution of theexpandedculturemaybe concentrated in particular
populations;hencethesewill be able to raise theirlevelof successin IRs
at theexpenseofothers,forming neworganizational tiesand therebyeven-
tuallydevelopingemotionaland reputational advantages.A secondkindof
effectoccurswhenthewholepopulationuniformly receivesan increasein
generalized culturalresources;thesheerdegreeofmobilization, ofeffortsto
negotiatenew IR connections, shouldincreasethroughout the society.Al-
thoughno one gains relativeto others,theoverallprocessshouldincrease
the amountof organizationbuildinggenerallyin that society.It can be
suggestedthatearlyphases of thisprocesscontribute to economicbooms
and to the growthof politicaland/orreligiousmovements;later phases,
however,if generalizedculturalcurrencycontinuously expands,may in-
volve a devaluationof the culturalcurrency, withensuingcontraction of
politicaland economicactivity(Collins 1979).
b) Particularized culturalresourcesdefineindividualsrelativeto particu-
lar physicalproperties and authority coalitions.Whatcan changethewhole
structure of theseresources?The volatileaspectof particularized culture,
I wouldsuggest,is especiallyimportant forthereputations of theindivid-
uals who rituallyenact the most powerfulcoalitions.Most reputational
talk,as indicated,is local and repetitive.But rapidupheavalsin personal
reputations characterizeimportant shiftsin politicaland religiouspower.
Personsbecomepowerful(or "charismatic")whena dramaticevent,usu-
ally involving makeslargenumbersof peoplefocuson
successin a conflict,
them.The widespreadand rapidcirculationof theirnew reputationgives
1008

of Macrosociology
themthe self-reinforcing powerof commanding the largest,and therefore

dominant,coalitionin that society.Conversely, powerfulpersonsusually
fall because of dramaticevents-scandals or defeatsin conflicts-which
suddenlycirculatetheirnegativereputation.
The movement of such particularizedculturalresourceshas severalim-
plicationsforthe dynamicsof social change.Such changesare discontinu-
ous and alternatewithperiodsof routine.They dependupon dramatic
eventsthatare highlyvisibleto manypeople.The mostdramaticevents,
I would contend,are conflicts, and especiallyviolentones. It is forthis
reasonthatwarsare so important in mobilizing revolutions and otherrapid
social changes(see Skocpol 1979). Politicsitselfis a masterdeterminant
of the propertysystem,and so manyotherroutineaspectsof social life,
becausepoliticsconsistsof continuously organizedcoalitionsmobilizedto
engagein conflicts.These coalitionsgain theirpowerfrombroadcasting
the dramaticsof theirconflictsin ways favorableto themselves, thereby
creatingparticularized reputationsforvariousindividualsas powerful, vil-
lainous,or impotent.Politics,as the struggleover reputation, restsupon
controlof themeansof reputation management.
c) Emotionalenergiesformthe mostcrucialmechanism in all of these
processes.Shiftsin bothgeneralizedand particularized culturalresources
have effectsupon people's actionsin microsituations because theyaffect
theiremotionalenergies.The reputationshiftof a politicalleader,forex-
ample,is trulyeffective onlywhenthe rumorscarryan emotionalimpact,
a contagionoffeelingsthroughout thesocietyaboutwhichis nowthedomi-
nantcoalition.Hence themarketattractiveness of thatcoalitionincreases,
all the moreso to the extentthat it spreadsfearof its threatto those
peoplewho remainoutsideit. Conflict,war, and politicscan be regarded
as quintessentiallyemotion-producing situations.The stronger theconflict,
themoreemotionalenergyflowsthroughthenetworks of micro-interaction
constituting the macrostructure. Periodsof rapidlychangingreputational
resourcesbecomeparticularly important fortheorganization of social net-
worksto the extentthat such networksare vehiclesforstrongemotional
contagion.
Thereare also conditions thatchangetheentirelevelofemotionalenergy
in a society.Parallelto theintroduction of newcommunications technology
and generalized-culture-producing specialists,one can thinkof thehistori-
cal introductionof new emotion-producing "technologies," includingshifts
in the numberof emotion-producing specialists.From this viewpoint,
changesin materialconditions are mostimportant becausetheychangethe
numberof people who can assembleforritualpurposesor because they
changepeople's capacitiesfor impressionmanagementor dramatization
(Collins 1975,pp. 161-216,364-80). Such technologies of dramatization
have rangedfromthe massivearchitecture and lavishreligiousand politi-
1009

cal ceremony of thepharaohsthrough thevariousstylesofpoliticaldisplay

of today.Similarly,the historyof religionscan be seen as a seriesof in-
ventionsof new social devicesforgenerating emotions,rangingfromthe
shaman'smagicritual,to congregational worship,to individualmeditation
and prayer.In thisperspective, shiftsamongtribal,patrimonial-feudal,and
bureaucratic formsoforganization are shiftsamongdiversesourcesofemo-
tional impressionmanagement. The variouscombinations of these emo-
tionaltechnologies availableat any giventime,and theirdegreeof concen-
trationor dispersion amongthepopulace,are crucialfactorsin thestruggle
forpowerin anyparticularhistoricalsociety.
An overall picture of the statics and dynamicsof macrostructures
emerges,at least in generaloutline.There are relativelyslowprocessesof
macrochange, fueledby new emotional"technologies"or by stepped-up
productionof eithergeneralizedculturalcurrencyor emotionalenergies.
There are also episodicshiftsin particularizedculturalresources-espe-
ciallythe reputations of personswho rituallyenactthemostpowerful po-
and religiouscoalitions-whichoccurat timesof dramatic
litical,military,
conflict.The slowprocesses,whichmay spreadeitherto certainprivileged
groupsor moreuniformly throughout thesociety,bringaboutlongperiods
of organizationbuildingand personalmobilizationwhichalter both the
structure of the societyand its degreeof fluidity The rapid,
and conflict.
episodicprocessesbringabout revolutionary shiftsin whichdramaticcon-
flictsfocusingattentionon a newdominantcoalitioncan bringaboutmas-
sive changesin thepatternsof propertyand organization and in thepar-
ticulardistributionof personsin them.
CONCLUSION
The precedingmodelhas beenpresentedin veryabstractform.It doesnot

attemptto describethe detailedvariantsof ritualinteraction or the com-
negotiations
plexitiesof conversational and emotionalenergies.Integrating
thesevariantsintothegeneralmodelshouldgreatlyincreaseitsexplanatory
power.On the macrolevel, as well, thereare many ramifications to be
workedout in translating all macropatterns "mar-
intomicro-interactional
kets" of generalizedand particularizedculturalresourcesand emotional
energies.
Even at thisdegreeof imprecision, I hope thatthemodelconveyssome
of theadvantagesof integrating microand macrodescriptions intoa com-
monexplanatory framework. It suggests,forexample,that"entities"that
have been locatedin individuals,such as "personality"or "attitudes,"are
insteadsituationalways of actingin conversational encounters, and that
"personalities"and "attitudes"are stableonlyto the extentthatindivid-
uals undergothesame kindsof repeatedinteractions. Charismatic person-
1010

of Macrosociology
alities,by thisaccount,are simplyindividualswho have becomethe focal

pointof an emotion-producing ritualthatlinkstogether a largecoalition;
theircharismawaxes and wanes accordingto the degreeto whichthe ag-
gregateconditions forthedramaticpredomination of thatcoalitionare met.
On a smallerscale,one mayhypothesize thatupwardlymobileindividuals
are thosewhose culturalresourceslead themthrougha sequenceof IR
experiencesthat build up theiremotionalenergies,hencetheirconfidence
and drive; whentheyreachIR matchupsthatno longergive a favorable
emotionalbalance,thisadvantagedisappears,and theycease to risefurther.
To mentionone morearea of application,thegrowthof a productive econ-
omyas wellas its cyclesof boomand depressionshouldbe to an important
degreedetermined by shiftsin emotionalenergiesthroughout theworking
populationin general,or possiblyamongentrepreneurs in particular.
Suchexplanations ofspecificphenomenaneedto be elaboratedfromboth
the microand the macrosides. I would also suggestthat the connection
betweenthe twolevelscan be made empiricalby a new formof research.
Generalizedand particularizedconversationalresourcesexist simplyas
thingspeoplesay in conversations; emotionalenergiesexistin therhythms
and toneswithwhichpeoplesay them.Accordingly, one maytakea macro-
sample of the distribution of microresources by samplingconversations
acrossa largenumberof different social groupsand takingrepeatedsam-
ples overtime.Such a methodmovesaway fromthepredominant emphasis
of contemporary conversational research,whichperforms detailedanalyses
of singleconversations in isolation.The proposedmethodresembles sample
surveys,but instead of tappingattitudesof self-reports by interviewer
questions,it wouldsamplenaturalconversations by audio or videorecord-
ings.Technicaldevicesmaymakeit possibleto characterize theemotional
energiesof conversational toneand rhythm fromtape recordings or by ex-
pressiveposturesin video recordings. Generalizedand particularized con-
versationalresourcesmaybe characterized by thesamedata, by classifying
verbalcontents.Withthesekindsof data, it shouldbe possibleto showthe
actualoperationof IR chains,theireffects uponindividuals'situationalbe-
havior,and theiraggregateeffects uponsocialstabilityand social change.
SUMMARY
The following principleshave been suggestedto constructan explanatory

theoryof macrostructures as aggregatesof microsituations:
1. Sociologicalconceptscan be made fullyempiricalonlyby translating
themintoa sampleof thetypicalmicro-events thatmakethemup.
2. The dynamicsas well as theinertiain any causal explanationof so-
cial structuremust be microsituational; all macroconditionshave their
effectsby impinging uponactors'situationalmotivations.
1011

3. Humancognitivecapacityis limited, henceactorsfacingcomplexcon-

tingenciesof social coordination relylargelyupon tacit assumptionsand
routine.
4. Anyindividual'sroutineis organizedaroundparticularphysicalplaces
and objects,includingthe physicalbodies of otherpersons.The sum of
thesephysicalroutines, at any moment, makesup themicroreality ofprop-
erty.
5. Authority is a typeof routinein whichparticularindividualsdomi-
natemicro-interactions withotherindividuals.
6. Whatparticularroutinesare to be adheredto is subjectto self-inter-
ested maneuverand conflict.Both adherenceto routinesand changesin
themare determined by individuals'tacitmonitoring of thepowerof social
coalitions.
7. Conversations are ritualscreatingbeliefsin commonrealitiesthatbe-
come symbolsof groupsolidarity.Individualchainsof conversational ex-
periencesover time (IR chains) thus re-createboth social coalitions and
people'scognitivebeliefsaboutsocialstructure.
8. Conversational topicsimplygroupmembership. Generalizedconver-
sational resources (impersonal topics) reproduce horizontal status-group
ties.Particularized conversation enactsindividuals'property and organiza-
tionalpositionsand further reinforcesthisconcretesocial structure by cir-
culatingbeliefsaboutit,includingthereputations ofparticularindividuals.
9. An encounteris a "marketplace"in whichindividualstacitlymatch
conversational and emotionalresourcesacquiredfrompreviousencounters.
Individualsare motivatedto enactor rejectconversational ritualswithpar-
ticularpersonsto theextentthattheyexperiencefavorableor unfavorable
emotionalenergiesfromthatinteraction, as comparedwithotherIRs they
remember in theirrecentexperiences.
10. Individuals'acceptanceor rejectionin an IR respectively raisesor
lowerstheiremotionalenergies(social confidence).Similareffects are pro-
duced by experiencing dominationor subordination withinan IR. These
emotionalresultsareweightedby theintensity of emotionalarousalin each
IR and by the power of the membership coalition it invokes(its control
overproperty and force).
11. Severaldifferent ritualmarketsoperatesimultaneously: a slow-mov-
ingmarketofpersonsshifting in and out ofparticularproperty and organi-
zationalpositions,morerapidlychanging markets for informal solidarity
withinorganizationsand among individualsoutsideorganizationalrela-
tions,and verylong-term marketsforthegrowthand declineof organiza-
tionsas a whole.
12. In each market,individualssense theirpersonalopportunities via
theirdegreeof emotionalenergy.They move towardmoreadvantageous
ritualexchangesuntiltheyreachpersonalequilibrium pointsat whichtheir
1012

of Macrosociology
culturaland emotionalresourcesare matchedby equal or greaterresources

of theirpartners.
13. Social structureis constantlychangingon the microlevel,but it
tendsto an aggregatestabilityif individualfluctuations of emotionaland
culturalresourcesare local and temporary.
14. Large-scalechangesof socialstructure occurthrough changesin any
of the threetypesof microresources: (a) Increasesin generalizedcultural
resources, producedby newcommunications mediaor increasedactivityof
religiousand educationalspecialists,increasethe size of groupcoalitions
that can be formedand hencethe scope of organizationalstructure.(b)
Particularizedculturalresourceschange,for a whole society,when dra-
matic (usually conflictual)eventsfocusmanypeople's attentionon par-
ticularindividuals,therebycreatingrapid shiftsin theirreputationsand
shiftingtheorganizational centerofpowercoalitions.(c) New "ritualtech-
nologies,"includingshiftsin the materialsof impression management and
in the typicaldensityand focusof encounters, changethe qualityof emo-
tionsthroughout a society.Such shiftsbringabout changesin the nature
of social movements and in thedynamicsof politicaland economicaction.
15. Conversationalresourcesand emotionalenergiesmay be directly
measuredby samplingconversation throughtimeand acrosspopulations;
the culturalresourcesare foundin conversational topicsand the energy
levelsin the toneand rhythm of talk.
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1014


Collins Microfoundations of Macrosociology 1984

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On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology

Author(s): Randall Collins

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Detailed microsociological studiesof everydaylifeactivityraise the

Microsociology is the detailedanalysisof whatpeopledo, say, and think

984 AJS Volume86 Number5

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(Cicourel1968; Clegg 1975) and henceto a viewof howlargersocialpat-

THE TIME-SPACE TABLE

It is usefulto visualizethe empiricalbasis of microand macrocategories

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This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM

This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM

speaking,thereis no such thingas a "state,"an "economy,"a "culture,"

2 To cite a recentexample: the controversyover the reputationaland decision-making

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A secondimplication is thatthe activeagentsin any sociologicalexpla-

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haviorin othersituations.For example,an individual'ssituationalbehavior

THE MICROCRITIQUE OF RATIONALISTIC COGNITIVE AND

Much of the classic ethnomethodological researchwas orientedtoward

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ultimately guidesocialbehavior;rather,cognitivemeaningis usuallygiven

This content downloaded on Thu, 7 Mar 2013 09:30:24 AM

to consciousness. Durkheim([1893] 1947) made a similarpointin criti-

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ganizations,that is, to repeatedexchangesat conditionsnegotiatedon a

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torialpower,reliesupon othersto carryout orders; this includesusing

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AS MICROREPETITION IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD

Froma microviewpoint, whatis the"socialstructure"? In microtranslation,

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able partof thisrepetition,

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Again,it is plain thatthisphysicalsocial worldis not static.People do

definedby a cognitive structure whichtranscendsthe immediate situation.In other

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pointof strictmicrotranslation, we mustask: To what extentdo people

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acquaintances,whosesolidarity is an end in itselfas faras its membersare

A THEORY OF INTERACTION RITUAL CHAINS

From a microtranslation viewpoint,all processesof forming and judging

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who believein that conversational entity.In termsof the Durkheimian

5 Bourdieu (1977; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) proposes a similar concept,"cultural

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interaction ritualswhichhave been successfully negotiatedhas made cer-

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knowledges thereality,at least forthatmoment, of thatorder.Again,it is

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emotionalenergy.This energyis manifestedas what we commonlycall

INTERACTIONS AS MARKETPLACES FOR CULTURAL AND

Whywill a particularperson,in any giveninteractional situation,achieve

9 This does not implyan infinite in thepast; it pointsto theimportant

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sitiondependsupon the emotionaland culturalresourcesacquiredfrom

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Particularizedconversational resourcesdiffer fromgeneralizedconversa-

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resourcesmay shiftfromencounterto encounter, as the combinations of

10There may be occasions, of course, in which individuals find themselvesamong

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sameas choicesmadewithoutreflection.1" One's senseof "choice"or "will"

11 Hochschild (1979) shows that people do sometimesreflectupon theiremotionsand