Kulayan v. Tan G.R. No. 187298, [July 3, 2012] PONENTE:
Subsequently, a
SERENO, J.
DOCTRINE: The Local Government Code does not
involve the diminution of central powers inherently
vested in the National Government, especially not
the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution
to the President in matters of security and defense.
FACTS: On 15 January 2009, members of the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG) kidnapped three members
from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in
Patikul, Sulu. Following the incident, Governor Tan
of Sulu organized the Sulu Crisis Management
Committee, which included the forming of the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed
male civilians coming from different municipalities,
who were redeployed to surrounding areas of
Patikul. The organization of the CEF was embodied
in a “Memorandum of Understanding” entered
into between three parties: the provincial
government of Sulu; the AFP; and the PNP. The
Whereas clauses of the Memorandum alluded to
the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the
willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal
mayors to offer their services in order that “the
early and safe rescue of the hostages may be
achieved.”
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued
Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-
09), declaring a state of emergency in the province
of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground
for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist
act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372).
It also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which
bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to
carry out emergency measures during man-made
and natural disasters and calamities, and to call
upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
In the same Proclamation, Governor Tan called
upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints
and chokepoints, conduct general search and
seizures including arrests, and other actions
necessary to ensure public safety.
Guideline on the implementation of Proclamation
1-09 was issued which included among others
suspension of all Permits to Carry Firearms Outside
of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the
PNP, and allowed civilians to seek exemption from
the gun ban only by applying to the Office of the
Governor and obtaining the appropriate
identification cards. The said guidelines also
allowed general searches and seizures in
designated checkpoints and chokepoints.
Petitioners, who are residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed
this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its
Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires,
and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and
18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the
President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief
executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief
of the armed forces. Additionally, petitioners claim
that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by
any law to create civilian armed forces under his
command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of
PTCFORs to his own private army.
Respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was
issued ultra vires, as Governor Tan allegedly acted
pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local
Government Code, which empowers the Provincial
Governor to carry out emergency measures during
calamities and disasters, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion
or sedition. Furthermore, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of
a state of emergency as evidenced by Resolution
No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009
during its regular session.
ISSUE: WON Section 465, in relation to Section 16,
of the Local Government Code authorizes the
respondent governor to declare a state of
emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated
under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct
of general searches and seizures. Subsumed herein governor to carry out emergency measures and call
is the secondary question of whether or not the upon the appropriate national law enforcement
provincial governor is similarly clothed with agencies for assistance. But a closer look at the said
authority to convene the CEF under the said proclamation shows that there is no provision in
provisions. the Local Government Code nor in any law on
which the broad and unwarranted powers granted
HELD: NO. Only the President is vested with calling-
to the Governor may be based. Respondent
out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the
governor has arrogated unto himself powers
Republic. Springing from the well-entrenched
exceeding even the martial law powers of the
constitutional precept of One President is the
President.
notion that there are certain acts which, by their
very nature, may only be performed by the Petitioners rightly assert that the implementation
president as the Head of the State. One of these of “General Search and Seizure including arrests in
acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander- the pursuit of the kidnappers and their
in-Chief powers to which the “calling-out” powers supporters,” would be sufficient to render the
constitutes a portion. proclamation void, as general searches and
seizures are proscribed, for being violative of the
In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
regarding executive power it is clear that the
framers never intended for local chief executives to The Local Government Code does not involve the
exercise unbridled control over the police in diminution of central powers inherently vested in
emergency situations. the National Government, especially not the
prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial
the President in matters of security and defense.
governor is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In The intent behind the powers granted to local
issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan government units is fiscal, economic, and
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of administrative in nature. The Code is concerned
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the only with powers that would make the delivery of
police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The basic services more effective to the constituents,
calling-out powers contemplated under the and should not be unduly stretched to confer
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An calling-out powers on local executives.
exercise by another official, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local Government Code, as will be discussed
subsequently.
Section 465 of the Local Government Code cannot
be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under
Proclamation 1-09. Respondent governor
characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC
workers as a terroristic act, and used this incident
to justify the exercise of the powers enumerated
under Proclamation 1-09. 56 He invokes Section
465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local
Government Code, which purportedly allows the
 A group of congressmen challenged the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 216, which declared martial law in the
Mindanao region. The petitioners argued that the proclamation
was issued without sufficient factual basis and that it violated
the 1987 Constitution by suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Proclamation No.

216, finding that the President had sufficient factual basis to
believe that the rebellion in Mindanao posed a threat to public
safety and order. The Court also found that the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus was justified, as it was necessary to
prevent the escape of suspects and to ensure the success of the
military operations.

However, the Court did place some limitations on the

President's powers under martial law. The Court held that the
President could not use martial law to suppress dissent or to
target political opponents. The Court also held that the
President was required to report to Congress on the progress
of the martial law and to lift the martial law once the threat to
public safety had been eliminated.

Lagman v. Medialdea is an important case that clarifies the

powers of the President under martial law. The case also sets
out some important safeguards to prevent the abuse of martial
law powers.

Here are some of the key points of the decision:

 The President has the power to declare martial law in

times of invasion or rebellion, but the declaration must be
based on sufficient factual basis.
 The President may suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus during martial law, but this suspension must
be justified by the circumstances.
 The President is required to report to Congress on the
progress of martial law and to lift the martial law once the
threat to public safety has been eliminated.
 The President's powers under martial law are not
unlimited and must be exercised in accordance with the
Constitution.

Lagman v. Medialdea is a significant decision that has
implications for the future of martial law in the Philippines.
The decision clarifies the powers of the President under
martial law and sets out some important safeguards to prevent
the abuse of martial law powers.

1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of

[CASE DIGEST] Lagman v. Medialdea (G.R. No. the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and declaration of martial law is that the
231658)
petitioner should be a citizen. He need not even be a
taxpayer.
July 4, 2017 2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII
reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to
FACTS: determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of
independent from Congress’ duty to review. factual basis must be limited only to the facts and
It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.
possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his
power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of
The Court held that the President, in issuing
the writ of habeas corpus.
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
The Court may strike down the presidential President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause
proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of
citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. the writ of habeas corpus.
On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, such a revocation shall not
The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely
be set aside by the President.
from unverified news articles on the internet, with
neither the authors nor the sources shown to have
The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent affirmed the contents thereof.
investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand,
Congress may take into consideration not only data
As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are
available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without
declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe
any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other
deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the
than proving the truth of the matter asserted.
facts presented before it.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only
pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these
initiated by the filing of a petition “in an appropriate
alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts
proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’
showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion
review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may
exists.
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its

power of review with, and independently from, the
power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived
inaction or default on the part of Congress does not
deprive or deny the Court of its power to review. Citizen, taxpayers, lawyers, former
Senate members, member of the 1986
3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to
calibrating the President’s decision pertaining to which
ConCom Padilla, Saguisag, Rosales,
extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set Gorospe, Tanada et al, petitioners
of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to
an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive
and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at Congress of the
least initially, lies with the President. Philippines, respondents
The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a
sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-
in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of
powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner by which III. Disputed matter
the President decides which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers
only the information and data available to the President
prior to or at the time of the declaration.
Failure and/or refusal of respondent
Congress of the Philippines to convene
in joint session and therein deliberate on
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state
of martial law and suspended the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole of Mindanao.
I V. A n t e c e d e n t f a c t s
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
a state of martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the Mindanao group of islands
on the grounds of rebellion and
necessity of public safety pursuant to
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution.
On May 25, 2017, or within 248 hours
from said proclamation, the President
submitted a report to the Congress
pursuant to aforementioned
constitutional provision.
The Senate and the House of
Representatives separately conducted
conference briefings regarding the
circumstances, details, and updates
surrounding the President’s
proclamation.
Both houses deliberated separately and
adopted below resolutions indicating
their support of the President’s
Proclamation:
— Senate Resolution No. 49:
Resolution Expressing the Sense of the
Senate Not to Revoke x x x
Proclamation No. 216;
— House Resolution No. 1050:
Resolution Expressing the Full Support
of the House of Representatives to
President Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds
No Reason to Revoke Proclamation
No. 216, x x x.
The House of Representatives also
purportedly discussed the proposal
calling for a joint session of the
Congress to deliberate and vote on the
Proclamation but was rejected.
V. P e t i t i o n e r s ’ a r g u m e n t s
Petitioners contend that the Congress
has an obligation to jointly convene and
vote in case there is declaration of
martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ.
VI. Issues and ruling
IS IT MANDATORY FOR THE CONGRESS UNDER
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, TO AUTOMATICALLY CONVENE
IN JOINT SESSION IN THE EVENT THAT THE
PRESIDENT PROCLAIMS A STATE OF MARTIAL
LAW AND/OR SUSPENDS THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE PHILIPPINES
OR ANY PART THEREOF?
HELD – NO. THE CONGRESS IS NOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED TO CONVENE
IN JOINT SESSION EXCEPT TO VOTE JOINTLY TO
REVOKE THE PRESIDENT’S DECLARATION OR
SUSPENSION.
The Commander-in-Chief clause of Art.
VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution vests
with the President control over the
persons and actions of the members of
the AFP in recognition of its role as the
Chief Executive to promote public
peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, the
more specific duty to suppress lawless
violence and rebellion. Thus, he is
granted the power to declare a state of
martial law and/or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the
Philippines or a portion thereof.
However, in order to safeguard against
possible abuse of power, the
Constitution instituted checks and
balances on the President’s power
through the two co-equal branches, the
legislative and the judiciary.
— 1) The Constitution requires the
President to submit a report to the
Congress after his proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and grants the Congress the power to
revoke, as well as extend, the
proclamation and/or suspension;
— 2) The Constitution vests upon the
Judiciary the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for such
proclamation and/or suspension.
There are four provision in Art. VII,
Sec. XVIII that pertains specifically to
the role of the Congress when the
President proclaims martial law and/or
suspends the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus:
— 1) The requirement for the President
to submit a report to the Congress
within 48 hours after such declaration;
— 2) The power of the Congress to
revoke such declaration by a vote of at
least a majority of the all its Members
voting jointly;
— 3) The power of the Congress to
extend such declaration, for a period to
be determined by it, upon the initiative
of the President, voting in the same
manner provided in No. 2;
— 4) If not in session, to convene
within 24 hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need
of call.
1 — Verba legis. The plain meaning of
the provision:
“The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President.”
It grants the Congress the power to
revoke the President’s proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ and prescribes how
the Congress may exercise such power,
i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members, voting jointly, in a regular
or special session.
The provision only requires Congress to
vote jointly on the revocation of the
President’s proclamation and/or
suspension. It is not obligatory for the
Congress to convene in joint session
following the President’s proclamation
of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ.
2 — Intention of the Framers. The
deliberations of ConCom on the
relevant constitutional provision does
not reveal a manifest intent of the
framers to make it mandatory for the
Congress to convene in joint session
following the President’s proclamation
and/or suspension, so it could deliberate
as a single body, regardless of whether
its Members will concur in or revoke
the President’s proclamation and/or
suspension.
What is evident in the deliberations of
the 1986 ConCom were the framers’
intentions to remove the requirement of
prior concurrence by the Congress for
the effectivity of the President’s
proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; and grant to the
Congress the discretionary power to
revoke the President’s proclamation
and/or suspension by a vote of at least a
majority of its Members, voting jointly.
3 — The provision on revocation
under Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution did not even come
into operation, thus there is no
requirement for the Congress to
convene in a joint session. The Senate
and House of Representatives already
separately adopted resolutions
expressing support for President
Duterte’s Proclamation No. 216. Given
the express support of both Houses of
the Congress for Proclamation No. 216,
and their already evident lack of intent
to revoke the same, the provision in
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution on revocation did not even
come into operation and, therefore,
there is no obligation on the part of the
Congress to convene in joint session.
4 — The Constitution does not
regulate the manner by which the
Congress may express its concurrence
to a Presidential proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Thus, the Houses of the
Congress have the discretion to adopt
rules of procedure as they may deem
appropriate for that purpose. And the
Court is bound to respect the rules of
the Congress, a co-equal and
independent branch of government.
5 — The precedents cited by the
petitioners were inapplicable in the
case at bar. On December 4, 2009, then
President Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1959, entitled
“Proclaiming a State of Martial Law
and Suspending the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province
of Maguindanao, except for Certain
Areas.” the two Houses of the Congress
in 2009 also initially took separate
actions on President Macapagal-
Arroyo’s Proclamation No. 1959, with
the Senate eventually adopting
Resolution No. 217, expressing outright
its sense that the proclamation of
martial law was unconstitutional and
necessarily implying that such
proclamation should be revoked.
6 — Petitioners contend that if the
Congress is not in session, it is
constitutionally mandated to convene
within 24 hours from the President’s
proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, then it is with all the
more reason required to convene
immediately if in session. First, the
provision is merely to ensure that the
Congress will act swiftly on the matter.
Second, there is no requirement to meet
in a joint session. Third, the present
Congress did act immediately by
convening and adopting the concurrent
resolutions.
7 — There is no violation of the right
of the public to information when the
Congress did not convene in joint
session. The Congress still conducted
deliberations on the subject
Proclamation, albeit separately; and the
public’s right to information on matters
of national security is not absolute. Each
House may decide to hold an executive
session due to the confidential nature of
the subject matter to be discussed and
deliberated upon. Matters affecting the
security of the state are considered
confidential and must be discussed and
deliberated upon in an executive
session, excluding the public therefrom.
VII. Dispositive position
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST : PANGILINAN vs CAYETANO
CASE DIGEST : PANGILINAN vs CAYETANO
GR 238875 March 16, 2021
SENATORS FRANCIS "KIKO" N. PANGILINAN,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, PAOLO BENIGNO "BAM"
AQUINO :CV, LEILA M. DE LIMA, RISA HONTIVEROS,
AND ANTONIO 'SONNY' F. TRILLANES IV, Petitioners,
-versus-
ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., AND
SALVADOR S. PANELO, Respondents.
On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its
withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On
March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of
Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United
Nations Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The
Secretary General received this communication the
following day, March 17, 2018. Through these actions,
the Philippines completed the requisite acts of
withdrawal. This was all consistent and in compliance
with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. On March
16, 2018, the Philippines formally submitted its Notice of
Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court to the
United Nations. Enrique Manalo, the Permanent
Representative of the Republic of the Philippines to the
United Nations in New York, deposited the Note Verbale
to Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet of the
United Nations' Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. On
March 17, 2018, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations received the notification from the Philippine
govemment. On May 16, 2018, Senators Francis
Pangilinan (Senator Pangilinan), Franklin Drilon, Paolo
Benigno Aquino, Leila De Lima, Risa Hontiveros and
Antonio Trillanes IV filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus, 20 assailing the executive's unilateral act of
withdrawing from the Rome Statute for being
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, on June 13, 2018, the
Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court, and its members, Loretta
Ann P. Rosales, Dr. Aurora Corazon A. Parong, Evelyn
Balais-Serrano, among others, also filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
239483. On August 14, 2018, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines filed its own Petition,24 and an Omnibus Ex-
Parte Motion for Consolidation and for Inclusion in the
Oral Arguments. Oral arguments were conducted on
August 28, 2018, September 4, 2018, and October 9,
2018
In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners-senators argue that, as a
treaty that the Philippines validly entered into, the Rome
Statute "has the same status as an enactment of
Congress,"29 as "a law in the Philippines."30 They claim
that the President "cannot repeal a law."
In G.R. No. 239483, pe,titioner Philippine Coalition for
the International Criminal Court and its members assert
that their rights to life, personal security, and dignity were
impaired by the withdrawal from the Rome Statute.33
Citing a decision of the South African High Court, they
also claim that the ratification of and withdrawal from a
multilateral treaty require the Senate's concurrence.
ISSUE : whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from
the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale delivered to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid,
binding, and effectual
While Senate concurrence is expressly required to make
treaties valid and effective, no similar express
mechanism concerning withdrawal from treaties or
international agreements is provided in the Constitution
or any statute. Similarly, no constitutional or statutory
provision grants the president the unilateral power to
terminate treaties. This vacuum engenders the
controversy around which the present consolidated
Petitions revolve. All told, the president, as primary
architect of foreign policy, negotiates and enters into
international agreements. However, the president's
power is not absolute, but is checked by the
Constitution, which requires Senate concurrence. Treaty-
making is a power lodged in the executive, and is
balanced by the legislative branch. The textual
configuration of the Constitution hearkens both to the
basic separation of powers and to a system of checks
and balances. Presidential discretion is recognized, but it
is not _absolute. While no constitutional mechanism
exists on how the Philippines withdraws from, an
international agreement, the president's unbridled
discretion vis-à-vis treaty abrogation may run counter to
the basic prudence underlying the entire system of entry
into and domestic operation of treaties,. The mirror
principle and the Youngstown framework are
suitable :starting points in reviewing the president's acts
in the exercise of a power shared with the legislature,
However, their concepts-and methods cannot be
adopted mechanically and indiscriminately.'. A
compelling wisdom underlies them, but operationalizing
them domestically requires careful consideration and
adjustment in view of circumstances unique to the
Philippine context
Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles
of relevant foreign concepts, and considering our own
historical experience and prevailing legal system, this
Court adopts the following guidelines as the modality for
evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal
from international agreements
1) The president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing
from agreements which he or she determines to be
contrary to the Constitution or statutes
2) the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from
agreements which were entered into pursuant to
congressional imprimatur.
3) the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from
international agreements where the Senate concurred
and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be
made with its concurrence
In sum, at no point and under no circumstances does the
president enjoy unbridled authority to withdraw from
treaties or international agreements. Any such
withdrawal must be anchored on a determination that
they run afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such
determination must have clear and definite basis; any
wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is
correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific
circumstances attending Congress's injunction on the
executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the
Senate's specification of the need for its concurrence to
be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the president and
may prevent him or her from proceeding with withdrawa
PIMENTEL vs EXEC SEC
FACTS:
On 28 December 2000, the Philippines signed the Rome
Statute through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of
the Philippine Mission to the United Nations (PMUN).
The Rome Statue establsihed the International Criminal
Court which provides “shall have the power to exercise
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes
of international concerns…”. However, the treaty’s
provisions require that it be subject to ratification,
acceptance, or approval of the signatory states.
Petitioner/s filed an instant petitione compelling
respondents to transmit the signed text of the treaty to
the Senate for ratification. It is on the theory that
ratification of a treaty is a function of the Senate. Hence,
the duty of the executive it to sign the same and
transmit it thereafter to to the Senate for concurrence.
The OSG, representing respondents, contends that the
executive department has no duty to transmit the said
treaty to the Senate for concurrence.
ISSUE: WON Respondents have the ministerial duty to
transmit the copy of the subject treaty to the Senate
signed by a member of the PMUN even without the
signature of the President for concurrence?
RULING:
No. The President, being the head of the Sate, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external
relations with foreign nations. In the realm of treaty-
making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.
Although it is correct that the Constitution, in Article VII,
Section 21, provides for the concurrence of 2/3 of all
members of the Senate for validating a treaty and is
deemed essential to provide check on the executive’s
foreign relations, it is not absolute. The power to ratify
does not belong to the Senate.
The process of treaty making: negotiation, signature,
ratification, and exchance of th instruments of
ratification. Petitioner’s arguments equate the signing of
the treaty by the Phil. representative with ratification.
However, it should be noted that signature and
ratification is two separate steps. Signature is for
authentication, on the other hand, ratification is the
formal act of acceptance. the latter is generally an
executive act undertaken by the head of the state.
Moreover, under E.O. 459, issued by Pres. Ramos,
provides for guidelines in the negotiation of
international agreements and its ratification. The said
Order provides that a treaty, after it was signed by the
representative of the State, shall be subject to
ratification by the President. before the Senate can
concur it, the President must ratify it first.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution,
the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to
the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the latter is
limited only to giving consent to the ratification. Hence,
the President has the authority to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate, and/or refuse to ratify it.
LAGMAN ET. AL vs. PIMENTEL
Facts:
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state
of martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60)
days, to address the rebellion mounted by
members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG).
On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set
in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President submitted to the Senate and the
House of Representatives his written Report,
citing the events and reasons that impelled him
to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the
Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 3883 while
the House of Representatives issued House
Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full
support to the Proclamation and finding no
cause to revoke the same.
Three separate petitions were subsequently
filed before the Court, challenging the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation
No. 216. In a Decision rendered on July 4, 2017,
the Court found sufficient factual bases for the
Proclamation and declared it constitutional.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the
Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session
on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 26 extending
Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.
In a letter to the President, through Defense
Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana (Secretary
Lorenzana), the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Chief of Staff, General Rey Leonardo
Guerrero (General Guerrero), recommended the
further extension of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao for one year beginning
January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based
on current security assessment.” On the basis of
this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana
wrote a similar recommendation to the
President “primarily to ensure total eradication
of DAESH-inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul
Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign
Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless
Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists
(CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and
financiers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation,
recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi,
and the attainment of lasting peace, stability,
economic development and prosperity in
Mindanao.
Acting on said recommendations, the President,
in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both
the Senate and the House of Representatives to
further extend the proclamation of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one
year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31,
2018, or for such period as the Congress may
determine. Urging the Congress to grant the
extension based on the “essential facts”.
On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the
House of Representatives, in a joint session,
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 413
further extending the period of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year,
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. In
granting the President’s request.
Petitioners went to the SC questioning the
extension of the Declaration of Martial Law in
Mindanao and ask the court to use its Expanded
Jurisdiction to declare the Martial Law
Unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether a certiorari petition invoking the
Court’s expanded jurisdiction is a proper remedy
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ.
Held:
No, Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
pertains to the Court’s judicial power to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The first
part is to be known as the traditional concept of
judicial power while the latter part, an
innovation of the 1987 Constitution, became
known as the court’s expanded jurisdiction.
Under its expanded jurisdiction, courts can now
delve into acts of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government traditionally considered as
political if such act was tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
In seeking the Court’s review of the extension of
Proclamation No. 216 on the strength of the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, alternately invoke the Court’s
expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction under Section
1, Article VIII.
We emphasized that this Court’s jurisdiction
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
VII is special and specific, different from those of review in the exercise of the Court’s sui
enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It generis authority under Section 18, Article VII,
was further stressed therein that the standard which is principally aimed at balancing (or
of review in a petition for certiorari is whether curtailing) the power vested by the Constitution
the respondent has committed any grave abuse in the Congress to determine whether to extend
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of such proclamation or suspension.
jurisdiction in the performance of his or her
functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII,
the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the President’s exercise of
emergency powers. Hence, the Court concluded
that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section
1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper
tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. SC held that to apply the standard of
review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate
the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18,
Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide
an additional safeguard against possible martial
law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of
the Commander-in-Chief.

With regard to the extension of the

proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ, the same special and
specific jurisdiction is vested in the Court to
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. Necessarily, and by parity of reasoning,
a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s
expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ.

Furthermore, as in the case of the Court’s review

of the President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ, the
Court’s judicial review of the Congress’
extension of such proclamation or suspension is
limited only to a determination of the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. By its plain
language, the Constitution provides such scope