Knowledge of Language in Action

Philosophical Explorations
An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action
ISSN: 1386-9795 (Print) 1741-5918 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rpex20
Knowledge of language in action
Cheng-hung Tsai
To cite this article: Cheng-hung Tsai (2015) Knowledge of language in action, Philosophical
Explorations, 18:1, 68-89, DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2014.897366
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Philosophical Explorations, 2015
Vol. 18, No. 1, 68– 89, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2014.897366
Knowledge of language in action

∗
Cheng-hung Tsai
Department of Philosophy, Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan
Knowledge of a language is a kind of knowledge, the possession of which enables a

speaker to understand and perform a variety of linguistic actions in that language. In
this paper, I pursue an agency-oriented approach to knowledge of language. I begin
by examining two major agency-oriented models of knowledge of language: Michael
Dummett’s Implicit Knowledge Model and Jennifer Hornsby’s Practical Knowledge
Model. I argue that each of these models is inadequate for different reasons. I present
an Acquaintance Knowledge Model, in which a speaker’s knowledge of a language is
a combination of the speaker’s first-order linguistic ability and second-order
acquaintance with his ability and actions.
Keywords: agency; acquaintance; practical knowledge; Michael Dummett; Jennifer
Hornsby
1. Knowledge of language activated

An agent who is competent in a language acts in two characteristic roles: a passive role as a
hearer in comprehending utterances and an active role as a speaker in making utterances.
Corresponding to the two roles, the agent’s linguistic ability can be conceived of as consist-
ing of two sub-abilities: a sub-ability for listening (i.e. the ability to comprehend language)
and a sub-ability for speaking (i.e. the ability to produce language). The critical element of
both abilities is the agent’s knowledge of the syntactic/semantic rules of the language. This
knowledge provides the requisite information for the agent to speak in that language and to
understand what is said in that language.1 Since the 1970s, the primary enterprise of the
philosophy of language has been to explore the nature of knowledge of language (Evans
1985; Peacocke 1986, 1989; Davies 1987, 1989; see also Barber 2003 for recent develop-
ments). However, this knowledge is often studied from a single perspective. As Hornsby
observes, “[w]hen epistemological questions have been discussed in philosophy of
language, the focus has often been on hearers” (2005, 107, emphasis mine). The danger
of this imbalance is that, given that what constitutes being a hearer is receptivity2 and
what constitutes being a speaker is agency, the nature of knowledge of language may be
mischaracterized due to an ignorance of the demands of the agency-oriented approach.
What are such demands likely to be?
Dummett (1976, 1978, 1991), a pioneer of the agency-oriented approach to knowledge
of language, emphasizes the importance of agency in the study of knowledge of language.
He claims that
the theory of meaning has, as its task, to explain what language is: that is, to describe . . . what it
is that we learn when we learn to speak. The fact that the use of language is a conscious rational
∗
Email: chtsai@scu.edu.tw
# 2014 Taylor & Francis

Knowledge of Language in Action 69
activity – we might say the rational activity – of intelligent agents must be incorporated into
any such description, because it is integral to the phenomenon of the use of human language.
(Dummett 1991, 91)
Let us refer to Dummett’s requirement as the rationality requirement, which necessitates

that an adequate theory of meaning must accommodate the rationality of language use
(i.e. the phenomenon that an agent’s linguistic behaviour or performance is a conscious
rational activity). For Dummett, an agent’s knowledge of language must be construed as
consciously accessible to fulfil this requirement (the argument for this proposition is
addressed in the next section).3 Thus, this requirement raises serious doubts regarding a
major contemporary approach (i.e. the cognitive or subpersonal approach) to knowledge
of language that construes such knowledge as tacit or unconscious (Evans 1985; Pea-
cocke 1986; Davies 1987). For proponents of the agency-oriented approach, the notion
of tacit or unconscious knowledge of language is problematic because it completely
ignores the phenomenon of the rationality of language use. Similarly, Hornsby notes the
significance of the agency-oriented approach for the contemporary study of knowledge
of language:
Many philosophers won’t be impressed by considerations about what we are conscious of as

speakers. Believing that theoretical semantic knowledge belongs in one or another category
of tacit knowledge, they say that we should not expect ourselves to be aware of its contents.
But perhaps the introduction of some general considerations about the springs of rational
action will have helped to create a doubt about whether the states they posit, relating language
users to the propositions of semantic theories, can rightly be labelled states of knowledge.
(2005, 123, emphasis original)
The doubt that Hornsby raises is not primarily intended to deprive tacit-knowledge theorists
of the right to use the term “knowledge” but to disqualify the notion of tacit knowledge
(regardless of the term that is used) as incapable of explaining linguistic action qua rational
action. Thus, the dispute is not verbal; instead, it concerns the issue of how a tacit-knowl-
edge theorist can use a notion such as “cognizing a language” (cf. Chomsky 1975, 1980,
1986) to explain rational linguistic action.
Instead of focusing on the debate between the agency-oriented approach and the sub-
personal approach to knowledge of language,4 the primary task of this paper is to pursue
the agency-oriented approach further. Assuming that the agency-oriented approach is
adopted, I enquire what adequate model this approach can offer regarding knowledge of
language. I examine and criticize two major agency-oriented models of knowledge of
language provided by Dummett and Hornsby and offer my own model as the successor
to these models. These three models may be treated as three representative agency-oriented
models of knowledge of language. To explain knowledge of language, Dummett, Hornsby,
and I appeal to the notions of (quasi-)propositional knowledge, practical knowledge, and
acquaintance knowledge, respectively. Together, these three kinds of knowledge appear
to exhaust the sphere of genuine knowledge.5
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I construct a metatheory of knowledge
of language using Dummett’s work as a foundation. This metatheory establishes two con-
straints for constructing and assessing an adequate model of knowledge of language:
knowledge of language must be construed as both conscious and non-propositional. The
metatheory also suggests a two-level structure of knowledge of language, which is a struc-
ture that I believe is prospective. I will reinforce this structure in the two sections that
follow. In Section 3, I use the metatheory to assess Dummett’s agency-oriented model of
70 Cheng-hung Tsai
knowledge of language, a model that appeals to the notion of implicit knowledge (the
Implicit Knowledge Model; IK Model). I argue that Dummett’s model fails because it vio-
lates the constraint that knowledge of language cannot be propositional. In Section 4, I
examine Hornsby’s agency-oriented model, which appeals to the notion of practical
ability (the Practical Knowledge Model; PK Model). Her model fails because it leaves
the systematic character of language use unexplained. In Section 5, I elaborate on the
two-level model of knowledge of language by appealing to the notion of acquaintance
knowledge (the Acquaintance Knowledge Model; AK Model). According to this model, a
speaker’s knowledge of language is a combination of his first-order linguistic ability and
second-order acquaintance with the rules that govern this ability. After presenting the
model, I defend it against what I call the “Challenge from Introspection”. In Section 6, I
conclude the paper by briefly contrasting the roles of theoretical knowledge of language
and acquaintance knowledge of language.
2. A metatheory of knowledge of language

A metatheory of knowledge of language aims to help us establish and assess a model of
knowledge of language. The Dummettian metatheory of knowledge of language has a
further aim of constructing constraints that an agency-oriented model of knowledge of
language should satisfy. I refer to this metatheory as “Dummettian” rather than “Dum-
mett’s” because – although the main ideas are derived from Dummett – I advance these
ideas beyond Dummett’s arguments. Moreover, Dummett raises doubts with respect to
his own model of knowledge of language in his later work but he never expressed hesitation
regarding the ideas that underpin his “metatheory”.
The Dummettian metatheory consists of two constraints: knowledge of language cannot
be construed as either pure knowledge-how, which is unconscious in nature, or knowledge-
that, which is propositional in nature. Thus, positively speaking, knowledge of language
must be construed as conscious and non-propositional. Dummett has long argued that
“the classification of knowledge into theoretical and practical (knowledge-that and knowl-
edge-how) is far too crude to allow knowledge of a language to be located within in”
(1993b, x; see also 1978, 95– 96, 2007, 562). His arguments for the two constraints are
instructive but require elaboration.
The first constraint and its rationale are as follows: knowledge of language cannot be
pure practical knowledge or knowledge-how (which is defined in terms of practical
ability) because mere ability to manifest overt linguistic behaviour is insufficient for lin-
guistic action qua intentional action.6 Before proceeding, let us consider the reason that
practical ability (to manifest a particular sort of overt behaviour) alone is insufficient for
intentional action in general. Assume that an action w is governed by procedural rules
c1 – cn such that the mastery and execution of c1 – cn is necessary to perform w. Assume
further that an agent S ws. Now, broadly speaking, S is able to w. However, S’s w-ing
may or may not be intentional. If this action is non-intentional, it may be suggested that
such non-intentionality is because (i) S does not know that what he is doing is w; or (ii)
S does not know that c1 – cn are the ways for him to w (i.e. S’s successful performance
of w is accidental); or (iii) both (i) and (ii). These suggestions indicate that an agent’s inten-
tional action requires him to exercise not only his relevant (first-order) practical ability, but
also a (second-order) perspective7 on his action (i.e. knowing what he is doing) and/or on
his own ability (i.e. knowing how he does it).8
Dummett’s first constraint is influenced by the aforementioned understanding of inten-
tional action in general. Corresponding to the consideration of (i), Dummett argues that
knowing how to speak a language requires not only the exercise of a practical linguistic
ability, but also a perspective on what one is doing:
[S]peaking a language is a conscious process. We can conceive that someone, put in the water
for the first time, might simply find himself swimming. He need not, in any sense, know what
he is doing; he need not even know that he is swimming. But what are we imagining when we
imagine that someone, arriving for the first time in his life in a Spanish-speaking country,
should find himself speaking Spanish? There are two different cases, according as we
suppose that he knows what he is saying or that he just hears the words coming out of his
mouth without knowing what they mean. In either case, it is magic, but, in the latter case,
although, miraculously, he can speak Spanish, he still does not know Spanish. Knowing
Spanish, or knowing how to speak Spanish, is not, after all, to be compared with knowing
how to swim. Both may be called practical capacities: but practical capacities are not all of
one kind. (1978, 95, bold emphasis mine)
One point is noteworthy. In the scenario that Dummett imagines, the person who “hears the
words coming out of his mouth without knowing what they mean” is the one who can speak
Spanish but does not know Spanish. This scenario is not as miraculous as it seems because it
can be regarded as a thought experiment: the imaginary person may be conceived of as a
speaker in a Searlean Chinese room who has a “linguistic ability” – the ability to manifest
the overt linguistic behaviour of a particular language – but does not know or understand
the language.
Corresponding to the consideration of (ii), Dummett argues that knowing how to speak
a language requires not only the exercise of a practical linguistic ability, but also a perspec-
tive on how one does it:
[A] ground for taking seriously the attribution of knowledge to someone able to speak a
language is that his linguistic utterances are (usually) rational acts, concerning which we
may ask after the motives and intentions underlying them; it is in fact essential to an
account of the practice of using language that the hearer may ask himself, or the speaker,
why he said what he did – not only his ground for saying it, but his point in saying it. An inten-
tion or motive in performing an action is always based upon knowledge: it cannot relate to any-
thing the agent did not know about the character, significance, or likely effects of the action. . . .
A mere practical ability does not, however, provide sufficient grounding for a purpose or inten-
tion, because one may be able to do something without knowing how one does it. (1993b, x,
bold emphasis mine)
An agent’s knowledge of a language is essential to achieve his intention in performing a

linguistic action. Consider, for example, how we estimate the intentions of speakers. We
are sometimes unaware that we are estimating the intentions of a speaker by attempting
to detect what he knows about the language that he is speaking. However, when the
speaker we encounter is an uneducated person or a foreigner with an imperfect grasp of
his second language, we must know what the speaker knows about his language so that
we can accurately estimate the speaker’s intention. Dummett conveys this point more
generally:
[The estimation of a speaker’s intention] is based upon what we know or presume about the
speaker’s knowledge of the language: we shall make different estimates according as we
take him to be educated or uneducated, a native speaker or a foreigner, and so on. It is only
because he knows the language – the meanings of the words, the various possible construc-
tions, and the like – that we can ascribe to him motives and intentions in speaking; and so
it is only because speakers consciously understand the words they use that linguistic exchange
has the character that it has. (1993a, 158)
72 Cheng-hung Tsai
The consideration of how we estimate the intention of a speaker in performing a linguistic

action indicates that the speaker’s knowledge of how his language works determines his
linguistic action. Thus, our discussions up to this point regarding the first constraint can
be summarized as follows: on the negative side, an agent’s knowledge of language
cannot merely be practical linguistic ability because the ability alone cannot account for
intentional linguistic action; on the positive side, something extra is required, that is, the
agent must have a second-order perspective on both his first-order action and his ability.9
Let us discuss the second constraint and its rationale: knowledge of language cannot be
a species of theoretical knowledge or knowledge-that because a speaker’s mastery of a
language could not be adequately explained in this context. According to Dummett
Explicit theoretical knowledge consists in the capacity to formulate the relevant

propositions, to present them in a connected manner when there are connections
between them, and to answer questions concerning them. Such knowledge presupposes
mastery of some language within which to frame those propositions; hence knowledge of
that language, or at least of one’s mother tongue, cannot be of that kind. (1991, 94; see also
1993a, 160– 161)
Dummett presents only a version of the argument that knowledge of language cannot be
propositional knowledge because he restricts the notion of propositional knowledge to
theoretical or explicit knowledge. Another version of the argument treats propositional
knowledge as (unconscious) mental representations. There may be a reason that
Dummett does not consider this version because, as we have observed, he rejected the
unconscious conception of knowledge of language.10 However, to render the second con-
straint as self-contained, I reconstruct Dummett’s argument without his restriction. Assume
that a speaker’s mastery of a particular natural language L consists in his knowledge of
language that is defined in terms of propositional knowledge of a set of rules for
L. Propositional knowledge can be construed as either explicit knowledge or mental rep-
resentations. Thus construed, the speaker’s propositional knowledge of the rules must pre-
suppose a certain language L∗ that is mastered by the speaker either to frame the
propositions regarding the rules or to be in a certain language-like mental state. On the
one hand, if L∗ is L, then what ensues is a vicious circle in explaining what mastery of
L consists in. On the other hand, if L∗ is a language other than L, then what ensues is an
infinite regress in explanation (or else a vicious circle follows). Neither case is explanatorily
desirable. Thus, knowledge of language cannot be propositional knowledge; knowledge of
language must be non-propositional.11
Thus far, I have completed my construction of the Dummettian metatheory of knowl-
edge of language, which asserts that knowledge of language cannot be construed either
as a mere practical ability or as propositional knowledge. In my construction, the rudimen-
tary model of knowledge of language has a two-level structure. The first level is a speaker’s
first-order practical ability to generate overt linguistic behaviour, and the second level is the
speaker’s perspective on that ability and the behaviour that is or could be generated by the
ability. This two-level model of knowledge of language,12 although rudimentary in its
present form, is well equipped to explain the intentional aspect of linguistic action. Now
we have reached the stage at which we must elaborate further upon the nature or mode
of a speaker’s second-order perspective on his first-order linguistic behaviour and ability.
The agential perspective may be construed as (quasi-)propositional knowledge (Dummett’s
model) or acquaintance knowledge (my model). In the following discussion, I address the
first construal, and I return to the second construal in Section 5.
3. The IK Model
As stated at the beginning of this paper, knowledge of a language proffers the requisite
information for a language user to speak in that language and to comprehend what is
said in that language. This information should be sufficient to enable a language user to
produce and comprehend an indefinite number of novel utterances that he has not produced
or encountered before (this is the linguistic phenomenon known as the creativity of
language use). Thus, it is proposed that the knowledge that a language user possesses
must be knowledge of a compositional semantic theory (such as Davidson’s truth-con-
ditional semantic theory or variants of this theory). However, a problem arises when we
consider how ordinary language users can know a compositional semantic theory. As
Richard Heck observes:
The suggestion that speakers know theories of truth [as theories of meaning] for their languages
raises some very hard problems. It is far from clear what it might mean to ascribe knowledge of
such a theory to a speaker, since ordinary speakers obviously do not consciously know theories
of truth for their languages. (2007, 540)
A possible response to this problem is that ordinary language users possess tacit or uncon-
scious knowledge of compositional semantic theories. However, as I have argued in the pre-
vious section, Dummett would not accept this response. At this point, he appeals to the
notion of implicit knowledge:
What is it that a speaker knows when he knows a language, and what, in particular, does he
thereby know about any given sentence of the language? Of course, what he has when he
knows the language is practical knowledge, knowledge how to speak the language: but this
is no objection to its representation as propositional knowledge; mastery of a procedure, of
a conventional practice, can always be so represented, and, whenever the practice is
complex, such a representation often provides the only convenient mode of analysis of it.
Thus what we seek is a theoretical representation of a practical ability. Such a theoretical rep-
resentation of the mastery of an entire language is what is called . . . “a theory of meaning” for
the language; . . . A theory of meaning will, then, represent the practical ability possessed by a
speaker as consisting in his grasp of a set of propositions; . . . . The knowledge of these prop-
ositions that is attributed to a speaker can only be an implicit knowledge. (1976, 36)
“Implicit knowledge” is defined here as “knowledge which shows itself partly by

manifestation of the practical ability, and partly by a readiness to acknowledge as correct
a formulation of that which is known when it is presented” (Dummett 1978, 96). Dummett’s
two-level model of knowledge of language, the IK Model, can be expressed as follows: A
speaker’s implicit knowledge of language is a combination of the speaker’s (first-order)
practical ability to generate overt linguistic behaviour and his (second-order) ability to
acknowledge a theoretical representation of his practical ability.
The merit of the IK Model is that it accommodates both the phenomenon of the crea-
tivity of language use (by positing the first-order ability to manifest various overt linguistic
behaviours in a structured manner) and the phenomenon of the rationality of language use
(by positing the second-order ability to consciously acknowledge linguistic rules that
govern the first-order practical ability). However, the IK Model is associated with three
major problems, all of which concern the second-order ability described by the model.
The first problem concerns the actualization of the second-order ability: the IK Model
allows for the potentiality that the second-order ability may not be actualized or realized;
thus, it would fail to explain linguistic action qua intentional action. According to
74 Cheng-hung Tsai
Dummett, implicit knowledge is knowledge that is “possessed by a subject who cannot

himself formulate the content of the knowledge, but can recognize as correct a formulation
that is offered him” (1993b, xi). The notion of implicit knowledge thus construed indicates
that the trigger condition of the second-order ability of a speaker is defined by the speaker’s
being offered a relevant formulation rather than by the speaker’s exercise of his first-order
ability. Therefore, the IK Model allows the possibility that when a speaker exercises his
first-order ability to manifest overt linguistic behaviour, he does not simultaneously exer-
cise his second-order ability to consciously recognize or acknowledge a formulation of
the linguistic rules that govern his first-order ability, if no one else offers him the formu-
lation. In such a scenario, which is not only possible but also commonplace, the exercise
of one’s knowledge of language equates to the mere exercise of one’s practical ability to
manifest overt linguistic behaviour. The problem, as we have argued in Section 2, is that
a mere practical ability cannot explain linguistic action qua intentional action.
Let us set the first problem aside. Assume that a speaker’s implicit knowledge of
language is exercised or made explicit by another person’s providing a formulation. The
second problem, often called the delivery problem, refers to the manner in which the speak-
er’s knowledge of language can be utilized by the speaker. In his later writings, Dummett
assesses his notion of implicit knowledge:
A speaker’s employment of his language rests upon his knowledge of it: his knowledge of what
the words and sentences of the language mean is an essential part of the explanation of his
saying what he does. What matters about knowledge . . . is not how it is stored but in what
form it is delivered. . . . Chomsky’s characterization of mastery of a language as unconscious
knowledge . . . rules out one way in which the knowledge might be delivered to [a speaker]:
it does nothing to explain how it is delivered – how possession of the unconscious knowledge
operates to guide, prompt, or control the speaker’s utterances. The same, however, is true of
implicit knowledge, explained as comprising an ability to recognize a formulation of its
content when presented with one. That definition tells us nothing about how the knowledge
is applied when the occasion for its application arises: it therefore fails to explain what the phi-
losopher seeks an explanation for. (1993b, xi; see also 1991, 97; 1993a, 161)
Dummett finds that his notion of implicit knowledge of a meaning-theory is on a par with
Chomsky’s notion of unconscious knowledge of grammar in an important respect: both
knowledge types – regardless of whether they are accessible to consciousness – are diffi-
cult for a typical speaker to utilize in performing, guiding, or controlling his rational linguis-
tic action.
The third problem for the IK Model, which is also the most serious problem for
Dummett, concerns the propositional character of the second-order perspective. According
to this model, when a speaker’s implicit knowledge of language is made explicit, it is con-
strued as propositional acknowledgement of rules. However, as argued in Section 2, such
explicit knowledge fails to explain in what the speaker’s mastery of his language consists.
The speaker’s propositional knowledge of the language (regardless of whether this knowl-
edge is construed as explicit knowledge or mental representations) presupposes mastery of
a certain language, which makes the explanation of the mastery of the original language
viciously circular or infinitely regressive.
In summary, the explanatory power of the IK Model is insufficient. Dummett acknowl-
edged this lack of success and was thus discouraged from developing other substantial
models of knowledge of language. Nevertheless, his failure or reluctance to propose
other substantial models does not indicate the failure of the agency-oriented approach.
On the contrary, Dummett maintained confidence in the Dummettian metatheory of
knowledge of language (1993a, Chap. 13; 1993b, Preface). I propose an alternative model
in Section 5. Similar to Dummett’s model, my model aims to explain the rationality and the
creativity of language use in a unified framework. However, from Hornsby’s perspective,
we should address each feature of language use separately and focus on its rationality in
pursuing an agency-oriented approach to knowledge of language. In the following discus-
sion, I examine Hornsby’s model of knowledge of language.
4. The PK Model
4.1. The model constructed
In “Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge” (2005), Hornsby claims that “by bring-
ing speaking into an account of agency . . . [I am] well placed to appreciate a view of
language use as – as Dummett has said – ‘conscious and rational activity’”; and for her,
“treating semantic knowledge as practical is fully compatible with such a view” (2005,
123). Before explaining Hornsby’s notions of practical knowledge and semantic knowl-
edge, we should first clarify what her notion of semantic knowledge is not: “[i]n order
for speech action to be seen as rational, there is no need to credit speakers with meta-
linguistic beliefs, or knowledge such as semantic theorists uncover, about words’ and
sentences’ meaning” (2005, 123– 124). Hornsby reasons that such theoretical belief or
knowledge is unnecessary for speaking a language: “in order for [ordinary users of a
language] to know the theorists’ propositions, they would need intellectual resources
which are simply not needed for using their language” (2005, 109). Thus, Hornsby
appears to deny that speakers possess knowledge of a semantic theory. However,
because the ascription of knowledge of a semantic theory to speakers is widely believed
to be the most robust explanation for the creativity of language use, Hornsby tries to
explain the creativity of language use independently of her explanation of the rationality
of language use. (I will return to this point later in Section 4.3.)
Let us address Hornsby’s positive thesis. In pursuit of an agency-oriented model of
knowledge of language, Hornsby believes she can offer a model superior to Dummett’s by
appealing to the notion of practical knowledge. According to Hornsby, practical knowledge
is closely related to procedural knowledge. When an agent performs an intentional action, he
draws on his procedural knowledge of how to execute such an action, which can be expressed
in the form “One can w by c-ing”. Hornsby argues that a potential regress arises at this point,
and a distinct kind of knowledge is introduced to halt such regress:
Often an agent needs to invoke several pieces of procedural knowledge . . . . [E]ven a limited
goal usually takes a more than one-step procedure to achieve . . . . Even where only a one-
step procedure is called for, more than one piece of procedural knowledge may be required.
Thus, to take a well-worn example, someone may know how to illuminate the room – by press-
ing that light switch; and know how to press that light switch – by using their finger appropri-
ately. Here one can w by c-ing and one can c by x-ing; and c-ing and x-ing will both be things
an agent does intentionally if she exercises such knowledge of how to w. Sometimes a whole
series of procedural facts needs to be known to get something done: One can w by c-ing and x-
ing and One can c by 6-ing and One can x by v-ing, and . . . (whatever). There are potential
regresses here. But it must be possible to halt them . . . . Thus some things – at the end of
these “by”-chains, as it were – must be done without possession of knowledge of procedures.
There are things the agent does “directly” . . . . They are things which we are inclined to say the
agent is able to simply do. (Hornsby 2005, 113 –114)
To terminate the infinite regress of actions, we must posit a basic action that an agent may
simply or directly perform. Because a basic action is an intentional action, this kind of
76 Cheng-hung Tsai
action also requires knowledge. Such knowledge cannot be expressed in the form “One can
w by c-ing”; rather, its form must be “One can simply w”. Hornsby refers to this distinct
kind of knowledge as “practical knowledge”: “Someone whose knowledge how to w is
practical is able to simply w (at least so long as it is actually possible for her to w)”
(2005, 115). According to Hornsby, practical knowledge “provides for our doing all of
the things and engaging in all of the activities which we do or engage in as agents”
(2005, 115). Thus, all activities require practical knowledge.
Linguistic activity, as a type of activity, requires practical knowledge (that is, the prac-
tical ability to simply w). What fulfils w when an individual speaks a language? According
to Hornsby, when a speaker speaks, he simply voices his thoughts. Thus, Hornsby’s model
of knowledge of language maintains that a speaker’s knowledge of language is his practical
knowledge understood in terms of the speaker’s ability to simply voice his thoughts. Let us
refer to this model as the PK Model.
Prior to examining this model, we must identify what justifies Hornsby’s claim that what
we do when we speak is to simply voice our thoughts. According to Hornsby: “the idea that
we directly voice our thoughts when we speak . . . corresponds to our experience as speakers”
(2005, 120). For her, the claim can be justified by a phenomenology of speaking:
the phenomenology of hearing has a counterpart for speaking. Just as it seems that you directly
hear utterances as the meaningful things that they are, so it seems that when you speak you
directly produce meaning things: it seems . . . that you directly voice your thoughts.
(Hornsby 2005, 112)
4.2. The model elaborated by comparison

In the following discussion, I elaborate on the PK Model by considering how it differs from
and may be superior to the IK Model.
Hornsby’s notion of “practical knowledge” is akin to what I characterize as “practical
ability” – that is, an agent’s first-order executive ability without the agent’s second-order
perspective on what he is doing or how he does it. However, in this interpretation, a
problem arises: such practical knowledge, which is understood as a single-level practical
ability, is insufficient for an intentional action, as we have argued in constructing the
Dummettian metatheory in Section 2. Must Hornsby face this problem? A careful
reading of Hornsby’s notion of intentional action suggests that she characterizes the knowl-
edge required for intentional action as consisting of two components, practical knowledge
and agents’ knowledge. In explaining agents’ knowledge, Hornsby says:
If someone is doing something intentionally, then it is no accident that she knows that she is
doing it. As an agent intentionally doing something, she can know “without observation”
that that is what she is doing. She already knew how to w, and now, while she is w-ing, she
knows that she is w-ing. (2005, 121)
Thus, it is possible to interpret Hornsby as presenting the view that an agent’s intentional
action w requires the agent to exercise both his (first-order) practical knowledge – in
our terminology, his practical ability – to w and his (second-order) agential knowledge,
i.e. his knowledge without observation of what he is doing. In this interpretation, the PK
Model, like the IK Model, purports to be a two-level model of knowledge of language.13
However, two major differences between the PK Model and the IK Model should be
noted: one difference concerns the objects of the second-order perspective, and the other
difference concerns the characterization of the first-order ability. First, Dummett’s IK Model
requires a speaker to have a second-order perspective on both his own first-order linguistic
ability and his first-order performance that is or could be generated from the first-order
ability, whereas Hornsby’s PK Model only requires a speaker to have a second-order per-
spective on his performance (that is, on what he is doing). Second, in Dummett’s IK Model,
the first-order linguistic ability is characterized as an ability to generate an indefinite number
of novel utterances, which is an ability that can be theoretically represented by a compo-
sitional theory of meaning. However, in Hornsby’s PK Model, the first-order linguistic
ability is characterized as an ability to simply voice thoughts.
These two differences appear to render Hornsby’s agency-oriented model as superior to
Dummett’s model. The PK Model appears to be superior because it removes the obstacle
that Dummett’s model encounters: the need to answer the question of how an ordinary
speaker can have a second-order perspective on his first-order linguistic ability which is rep-
resented by a compositional theory of meaning. For the PK Model, this question is either
non-sensical because a speaker is not required to have a perspective on his ability or answer-
able because a speaker’s first-order ability refers to his ability to simply voice his thoughts,
an ability upon which the speaker can readily reflect.
It becomes clear that the explanatory power of the PK Model is superior to that of the
IK Model because the former model construes first-order linguistic ability as the ability
to simply voice one’s thoughts. In what follows I focus on the nature and the limits of
this particular ability.
4.3. The model clarified and exposed

In her 2005 paper, Hornsby anticipates two possible criticisms and offers two caveats
regarding her thesis of semantic knowledge as practical knowledge.14 These criticisms
can be found in Stanley’s commentary paper (Stanley 2005), in which he expresses
doubt regarding the phenomenology of speaking that allows Hornsby to construe semantic
knowledge as the ability to simply voice one’s thoughts.
Stanley’s first criticism concerns the correctness of the phenomenology of speaking. He
considers several cases to demonstrate the following point:
If I merely voice my thoughts, then the vehicle by which I voice them should not matter. But
there are many reasons to use one vehicle rather than another, and our linguistic behaviour
shows that we are extremely sensitive to these reasons. (Stanley 2005, 142)
Examples that support this point include the case of issuing manner implicatures, the case of
using expressions that have normal felicity conditions, and the case of using expressions
that contain anaphoric elements. For the third case, Stanley considers three sentences: (1)
John is a donkey-owner; (2) John owns a donkey; and (3) Mary beats it. For Stanley, the
thoughts expressed by (1) and (2) are identical, whereas the utterance of (2) licenses the
use of the anaphoric element in (3). Therefore, if a speaker intends to utter (3), then he
should utter (2) rather than (1). This example demonstrates that the vehicle by which a
speaker voices his thoughts matters; the speaker does not simply voice his thoughts but
voices them according to rapid word-choosing.
In response to such criticism, Hornsby would caution that “[o]ne must not confuse the
idea that we are able to simply voice our thoughts with the idea that voicing our thoughts is
something that we simply do” (2005, 126). Hornsby’s (first) caveat can be formulated more
explicitly in the following manner. The idea that voicing thoughts is an easy thing to do is
78 Cheng-hung Tsai
not tantamount to the idea that voicing thoughts is the only thing that we do. The phenom-
enology of speaking does not suggest that semantic knowledge (that is, the ability to simply
voice our thoughts) alone is sufficient to master a language. Hornsby notes that “practical
knowledge is exercised in concert with other knowledge and abilities. This is obviously true
of semantic knowledge: a whole edifice of practical possibilities surrounds its exercise”
(Hornsby 2005, 125). In addition to semantic knowledge of a language, knowledge of con-
texts, knowledge of circumstances, and knowledge of how to do something non-semanti-
cally are invoked by a speaker when he uses language. If one confuses the
aforementioned two ideas,
then one might get the impression that explanations of a speaker’s actions had to be confined to
explanations of their saying whatever they do . . . [and] the expression that a person’s voicing
her thought was a matter of her blurting something out. (Hornsby 2005, 126)
Stanley’s second criticism concerns the effectiveness of the phenomenology of speaking.

He argues that even if Hornsby’s phenomenology of speaking is correct, it is not incompa-
tible with the view that linguistic mastery consists in knowledge of a compositional theory
of meaning: it is “[i]n virtue of this standing knowledge, I am able to voice directly an inde-
finite number of thoughts” (Stanley 2005, 137). Here, Stanley highlights an important
aspect of voicing one’s thoughts: one can voice an indefinite number of novel thoughts
in a structured way. In terms of explaining how this phenomenon – the creativity or pro-
ductivity of language use – is possible, it is widely held that a speaker possesses knowledge
of a semantic theory that is compositional in nature.
In response to such criticism, Hornsby offers the second caveat:
Nor . . . should the idea that we are able to simply voice our thoughts be confused with the idea
that an ability to voice our thoughts is a simple ability. Very evidently the ability is not a simple
one. The ability which semantic knowledge equips a person with is seen as complex as soon as
it is allowed that a particular speaker’s semantic knowledge is not marked out until at least her
vocabulary is specified. Speakers . . . know the meanings of individual words. They also
know the ways in which their words can be combined in phrases and sentences of the
language. Their knowledge is productive. (2005, 126, bold emphasis mine)
This caveat attempts to accommodate the phenomenon of the creativity of language use by
clarifying that a speaker’s linguistic ability to simply voice his thoughts is not simple, but
complex. This complex ability encompasses the speaker’s knowledge of the meanings of
individual words and of the ways in which the meaningful words are structurally combined
into sentences. Thus, Hornsby must agree with Stanley that “there is only one clear model
that has ever been developed of the productive character of linguistic competence. This
model involves attributing to speakers knowledge of the meanings of individual words,
and the significance of syntactic structure” (2005, 144).
The PK Model, when first introduced, was thought to be attractive by virtue of its sim-
plicity (“one’s knowledge of language is his ability to simply voice his thoughts, period!”)
and was believed to be superior to the IK Model because it might legitimately sidestep the
issue of the creativity of language use. However, the PK Model, when it has been clarified
with the two aforementioned caveats, is found to resemble the IK Model in several impor-
tant respects. First, the PK Model, like the IK Model, must accommodate the creativity of
language use as well as the rationality of language use (because the latter aspect of language
use involves the former aspect). Second, to explain the rationality of language use, both
models advance the second-order agential perspective (despite being construed differently
by the two models). Third, to explain the creativity of language use, the PK Model, like the
IK Model, must ascribe knowledge of a compositional theory of meaning to speakers.
However, if such similarities exist, then the PK Model encounters the difficulty or
problem that it seeks to sidestep – the same problem that the IK Model acknowledges
and attempts to resolve: “an unsolved problem in contemporary philosophy of language”,
in Crispin Wright’s words, regarding “how best to construe the [epistemic] relation between
a formal theory of meaning for a natural language . . . and the competence of actual speakers
of that language” (1991, 135). Hornsby must agree that an actual speaker’s linguistic ability
or competence is explained by his knowing a formal theory of meaning. But in what manner
does he know the theory? The PK Model thus leaves unfinished the task of specifying the
epistemic relation.
Let us take stock. The Dummettian metatheory demonstrates that the rudimentary form of
an agency-oriented account of knowledge of language must be understood as a two-level
model in which each level explains a crucial phenomenon of language use. An agent’s knowl-
edge of language in its entirety requires both a first-order linguistic ability and a second-order
agential perspective. Our critical evaluation of two representative models, the IK Model and
the PK Model, reinforces the two-level model and reveals that the difficulty in constructing a
substantial and adequate model is specifying the second-order perspective. In particular, pro-
blems arise in specifying how a speaker knows his first-order practical ability.
5. The AK Model
5.1. The argument
In pursuing an agency-oriented account of knowledge of language, we lack (and thus seek)
an adequate notion of second-order perspective or self-knowledge of one’s first-order
ability. Such a second-order perspective or self-knowledge is often construed by philoso-
phers as a kind of propositional knowledge (such as implicit knowledge), but this construal
is inadequate to explain in what language mastery consists, as described above. When a
speaker’s first-order linguistic ability is combined with his second-order propositional
acknowledgment of rules that govern the ability to form the agential knowledge of
language, such knowledge as a whole is propositional. However, this notion of agential
knowledge of language violates the constraint that knowledge of language cannot be con-
strued as propositional; otherwise, an explanation of language mastery would be either cir-
cular or regressive.
Is there an alternative construal of the second-order knowledge of one’s own first-order
ability in which the knowledge is construed as both conscious and non-propositional? Here,
I suggest that the notion of acquaintance provides an answer.15 Russell, the contemporary
proponent of this notion,16 characterizes acquaintance as follows: “We shall say that we
have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary
of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths” (1912, 25). By applying the notion
of acquaintance or direct awareness to construe second-order knowledge, we reach the view
that a speaker’s knowledge of language as a whole is a kind of acquaintance knowledge.
More specifically, a speaker’s knowledge of a language, which is agential in character, is
or requires a combination of his first-order linguistic ability and second-order acquaintance
with the rules that govern such ability. Let us refer to this version of the two-level, agency-
oriented model of knowledge of language as the AK Model.
My argument for the AK Model assumes the form of an argument by elimination. In
characterizing an agent’s knowledge of language using our general notion of knowledge,
80 Cheng-hung Tsai
three kinds of genuine knowledge are available: propositional knowledge (which can
assume a variety of forms, such as explicit, implicit, or unconscious knowledge), practical
knowledge (or practical ability), and acquaintance knowledge. Because the first two alterna-
tives – that is, characterizing agential knowledge of language using the notions of prop-
ositional knowledge and practical knowledge – have been eliminated, only the notion of
acquaintance knowledge remains. One might object to this argument because these three
kinds of knowledge do not exhaust all possible kinds of knowledge. However, this objec-
tion can arise only when the critic is able to offer plausible alternatives. Even if the critic
provides an alternative, he must demonstrate that this alternative is superior to the notion
of acquaintance knowledge for addressing our particular concerns. Furthermore, the
notion of acquaintance knowledge remains not simply because of the elimination of the
other two alternatives but because this notion is able to characterize knowledge of language
in a manner that its rivals cannot. That is, knowledge of language must be characterized as
non-propositional (to avoid explanatory circularity and regress) and conscious (to explain
the rationality of language use). These requirements are both fulfilled by the notion of
acquaintance knowledge.
The above argument by elimination explains why we can justifiably believe that a
typical speaker of a language (particularly a mother tongue) is acquainted with the rules
of the language. However, the AK Model might be challenged as follows:
The above argument by elimination appears to be quite persuasive, or let us assume that it is
persuasive. Thus, we can assert, from an argumentative perspective, that we are justified (based
on the above argument) in believing that we are acquainted with the rules of a language, par-
ticularly our mother tongue. However, a question naturally arises: Are we acquainted with the
linguistic rules from an introspective perspective? It is natural to assume that if a subject S is
acquainted with or directly aware of an object O, then, when S reflects on his relevant experi-
ence, S knows that he is directly aware of O and knows what O is. Therefore, a speaker, who is
assumed by theorists of language to be acquainted with the rules of his mother tongue, must
know, after reflecting upon his own experience of speaking and listening, that he is acquainted
with the linguistic rules and what these linguistic rules are. However, it seems that
typical speakers barely know the rules of their mother tongue, even after reflection. Therefore,
it is questionable, from an introspective perspective, whether we are acquainted with the
linguistic rules.
We label this the Challenge from Introspection. The AK Model faces this challenge fre-
quently when it is presented. In what follows, I first elaborate the AK Model using Russell’s
distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description and then
respond to the Challenge from Introspection.
5.2. Acquaintance with logical form

The central notion of the AK Model is acquaintance,17 and my usage of this notion is
similar to Russell’s usage but differs in its purpose.18 According to Russell, knowledge
can be broken down into knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, and the former
can be further distinguished into two kinds. The first kind is knowledge (of things) by
acquaintance, which can be defined as follows: a subject S knows an object O by acquain-
tance if and only if S is directly aware of O itself “without the intermediary of any process of
inference or any knowledge of truth [i.e. knowledge that so-and-so is the case]” (Russell
1912, 25). The second kind is knowledge (of things) by description, which can be
defined as follows: S knows O by description if and only if S knows that O is “the so-
and-so”, that is, S knows “that there is one object [O], and no more, having a certain
property” (Russell 1912, 29). Unlike knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by descrip-

tion “always involves . . . some knowledge of truths as its source and ground” (Russell
1912, 25). Knowledge by description is propositional knowledge (knowledge that so-
and-so), whereas knowledge by acquaintance is non-propositional knowledge.
Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by descrip-
tion is useful for clarifying the status of the theoretical study of knowledge of language.
According to the AK Model, ordinary speakers have, and are required to have, (second-
order) knowledge-by-acquaintance of rules that govern their (first-order) linguistic
ability. However, this requirement does not deny that speakers might have knowledge-
by-description of the rules: for example, most (if not all) linguists and philosophers of
language have articulated propositional knowledge of the rules of a language. For an advo-
cate of the AK Model, although speakers (such as linguists) may possess knowledge-by-
description of the rules of a language for a variety of purposes, such knowledge is not
necessary for a person to speak the language. The aim of pursuing such knowledge is theor-
etical, i.e. to render linguistic behaviour intelligible or to give a rational reconstruction of
linguistic behaviour. In speaking a language (particularly one’s mother tongue), as
opposed to theorizing about a language, knowledge-by-description of the rules of the
language is neither possessed by nor required of ordinary speakers. Ordinary speakers typi-
cally have no such knowledge of language, and the fact that they are able to speak a
language without having such knowledge indicates that knowledge-by-description of the
rules of language is not required for speaking.
However, what is stated above neither indicates that “knowledge” of the rules of
language is not required in speaking nor implies that typical speakers have no “knowledge”
of the rules of language. First, language mastery requires knowledge of the rules of
language, as argued throughout this paper (recall the discussion pertaining to the creativity
of language use). Second, ordinary speakers do seem to have experience (and knowledge)
regarding the rules of their language, as Saul Kripke observes:
An individual often does have the experience of being confident that he has “got” a certain rule
(sometimes that he has grasped it “in a flash”). It is an empirical fact that, after that experience,
individuals often are disposed to give responses in concrete cases with complete confidence
that proceeding this way is “what was intended”. (1982, 108)
The requirement and experience of possessing knowledge of the rules of language should
not be regarded as illusory just because most ordinary speakers do not have or require
knowledge-by-description of the rules of language to speak. All speakers have knowledge
of language after we realize that knowledge of language is knowledge-by-acquaintance of
language.
For Russell, the objects suitable for the relation of acquaintance can be classified into
three categories: (a) particulars, the sub-categories of which include our sense-data, our-
selves, and memories, (b) universals, i.e. abstract ideas such as whiteness, roundness,
and brotherhood, and (c) logical forms, i.e. what logical terms, such as “predicates”,
“relations”, “or”, “not”, “all”, and “some” stand for. In my view, knowledge of logical
forms can be treated as the starting point for elaborating the AK Model because Russellian
logical forms are, or have a close affinity with, linguistic rules. At this point, two questions
arise: First, are Russellian logical forms linguistic rules? Second, why are logical forms lin-
guistic rules? With regard to the first question, Ian Hacking has observed that the role of
logical form in Russell’s philosophy is analogous to that of deep grammar in Chomsky’s
linguistic programme or that of semantic axioms in Davidson’s semantic programme.19
82 Cheng-hung Tsai
But a further and more fundamental question is why or in what sense logical forms (or
Chomskyan grammar or Davidsonian semantic axioms) are linguistic rules. One answer
to this question is that Russellian logical forms (or Chomskyan grammar or Davidsonian
axioms) concern linguistic understanding.20 With respect to this point, Hintikka’s explica-
tion of logical form (in linguistics) is relatively brief and useful. Hintikka once posed the
question: “[W]hat is logical form supposed to be and why has it been such an intensive
concern of both philosophers of language and . . . syntacticians” (1989, 41)? He answered
the question by employing a straightforward thought-experiment:
Let us assume that someone addresses a well-formed English sentence to you, which you
(usually unreflectively) understand. Let us assume further that your feat in understanding the
sentence is not based (partly or wholly) on the conversational situation but merely on the
message you received. (Hintikka 1989, 41)
Now, how is it possible for one to understand this sentence?
What was given to you when you received the message was a physical (acoustical or optical)
structure . . . . Now let us . . . call the structure given to you a syntactic structure. Somehow
from this structure you managed to derive a semantical representation of the sentence in ques-
tion. This derivation was largely independent of the particular words used, and hence depends
indeed crucially on the given structure. Its outcome is what can be called logical form. The role
of this form is to facilitate the understanding of the sentence. (Hintikka 1989, 41)
Logical forms, so construed, are linguistic (and thus evoke interest among philosophers of
language and linguists) because they are something without the possession and application
of which a certain sort of linguistic understanding is impossible. Russellian logical forms
can be treated as logical forms in linguistics because they adopt the role identified above
and thus resonate with Chomskyan grammar and Davidsonian axioms.21
As mentioned above, logical form is known by acquaintance. According to Russell, we
are acquainted with the logical forms of what he calls atomic and molecular complexes:
I think it may be shown that acquaintance with logical form is involved before explicit thought
about logic begins, in fact as soon as we can understand a sentence. Let us suppose that we are
acquainted with Socrates and with Plato and with the relation “precedes”, but not with the
complex “Socrates precedes Plato”. Suppose now that someone tells us that Socrates precedes
Plato. How do we know what he means? It is plain that his statement does not give us acquain-
tance with the complex “Socrates precedes Plato”. What we understand is that Socrates and
Plato and “precedes” are united in a complex of the form “xRy”, where Socrates has the x-
place and Plato has the y-place. It is difficult to see how we could possibly understand
how Socrates and Plato and “precedes” are to be combined unless we had acquaintance
with the form of the complex. . . . Besides the forms of atomic complexes, there are many
other logical objects which are involved in the formation of non-atomic complexes. Such
words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; and since we can use such
words intelligently we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. (1984, 99,
bold emphasis mine)
Here, Russell explains why we are acquainted with logical forms through an inference by
abduction: our acquaintance with logical forms is the best explanation for how it is possible
to understand the meanings of atomic and molecular complexes. So, from an argumentative
point of view, we must accept the view that we are acquainted with logical forms.
(Compare: I explain why we, as typical speakers, are acquainted with linguistic rules
through an argument by elimination; from an argumentative perspective, we must accept
the view that we are acquainted with linguistic rules.) However, another distinct question
arises: Are we acquainted with or directly aware of logical forms, from an introspective per-
spective? Russell’s answer to the question, if there is an answer and if that answer is ade-
quate, may assist in responding to the Challenge from Introspection.
Russell, however, admits that there is an introspective difficulty regarding acquaintance
with logical forms. But he does not consider it as a threat to his view that we are or must be
acquainted with logical forms:
As a matter of introspection, it may often be hard to detect such acquaintance [with the logical
form of a complex]; but there is no doubt that, especially where very abstract matters are con-
cerned, we often have an acquaintance which we find it difficult to isolate or to become
acquainted with. The introspective difficulty, therefore, cannot be regarded as fatal, or as out-
weighing a logical argument of which the data and the inference seem to allow little risk of
error. (Russell 1984, 99)
Russell avoids the introspective difficulty (i.e. the difficulty of introspecting or detecting
acquaintance with logical form) by positing the superiority of the argumentative power
over the introspective matter. However, I believe that the introspective difficulty (upon
which the Challenge from Introspection is based) can be resolved by the following two
lines of thought. The first line diagnoses a possible obstruction in detecting acquaintance
with logical form, and the second line suggests a positive way to detect acquaintance
with logical form.
Why is it difficult for one to detect his acquaintance with a particular logical form, such
as the form for which the physical (acoustic or optical) word token “and” stands? For
example, when a subject (particularly a layperson or non-philosopher) focuses his attention
on a molecular complex – such as, “Bill Clinton was a president and Al Gore was a vice
president” – and attempts to become aware of his acquaintance with the logical form of the
molecular complex, he might achieve this awareness by asking himself, “What is the par-
ticular logical form with which I am directly acquainted?”. The subject might answer, “I
have no idea what that particular logical form is that is involved in my linguistic experience,
although the Russellian tells me that it is something for which ‘and’ stands. After all, I do
not feel anything about it!”. One possible obstruction in such detection lies in that the
subject, when reflecting on his linguistic experience, expects to become aware of a particu-
lar “sense-datum-like” logical form. This expectation, however, is based on an uncritical
assumption that the detection of acquaintance with logical form proceeds similarly to,
and with a similar result as, acquaintance with sense data. After all, acquaintance with
sense data is the paradigmatic case of knowledge by acquaintance, and a person may
detect his acquaintance with a particular sense datum, first, by attending to the relevant par-
ticular sensory experience and second, by asking himself what the particular sense datum is
that is involved in his sensory experience. It is often not difficult for such a person to
become aware of a particular colour (e.g. red or yellow), shape (e.g. square or circle),
taste (e.g. sweet or bitter), and so on as a result of the detection. Because acquaintance
with sense data is the paradigmatic case of knowledge by acquaintance, people tend to
assume that acquaintance with logical form may be detected similarly and with the
similar results (such as that one can become aware of a particular “sense-datum-like”
logical form, e.g. a visible “___& . . . .” involved in his linguistic experience). However,
this assumption is hypothetical and may be replaced.
I suggest detecting one’s acquaintance with logical form using the active process of
“sentence-making”. When a subject focuses on the following complex, “Clinton was a
84 Cheng-hung Tsai
president and Gore was a vice president” and asks himself, “What is the particular logical
form with which I am directly acquainted?”, the subject cannot just stare at the complex or
recite the complex to himself and hope that something comes into his head. The subject, I
suggest, can detect the particular logical form involved in his linguistic experience through
the process of making a variety of sentences that have the same logical form as the complex
that he understands. (This process may be questioned along the following lines, “However,
the subject in question cannot begin this process because it requires the subject to know the
logical form of the complex that he does not know”. To this, I have two responses. First, it is
not entirely correct to say that the subject “knows” nothing about the logical form of the
complex. Based on what I have argued in this paper, the subject, from an argumentative
perspective, has knowledge-by-acquaintance of the logical form, although he does not
have knowledge-by-description of the logical form. Second, the process of making sen-
tences with the same logical form is not used to define one’s acquaintance with the
logical form but to assist the subject in becoming aware of what he is acquainted with.
In that case, there is no worry about begging the question when, to facilitate the process
of making sentences, the subject is given hints about what the technical terms such as
“form” and “pattern” mean, or about what a particular logical form might be in his linguistic
experience.) When the subject exercises the process and successfully makes sentences such
as, say, “Obama is the president and Biden is the vice president”, “Socrates is a philosopher
and Confucius is a sage”, and “Albert is rich and Bob is smart” (the more constructions, the
better it is for the subject), he is likely to become aware of the logical form for which the
word “and” stands, although the logical form exemplified in these sentences is still charac-
teristically invisible and inaudible (but might be visualized as symbols for the sake of con-
venience). The rationale of my suggestion that a subject’s acquaintance with a particular
logical form LF1 of a sentence S1 can be detected or elicited by his actively making sen-
tences (S2, S3, S4 . . . ) with the logical form LF1 is that the logical form can be exemplified
by different sentences that the subject can produce by his possession and application of the
form, and this feature of logical form suggests that the subject need not limit his detection of
acquaintance with the logical form LF1 to a single sentence such as S1; instead, the subject
can process the detection through various different sentences that have the form LF1. When
the subject begins to make different sentences S2, S3, and S4 with the form LF1, he grows
increasingly aware of what LF1 is because, to successfully construct S2, S3, and S4, he must
ponder what is crucial and what can be ignored in structurally constructing S1.
So far I have explained how a speaker can detect his acquaintance with logical form via an
example. This explanation is applicable to all other logical forms/linguistic rules with which a
speaker is acquainted. But in doing so, we must keep in mind the first line of thought, which is
concerned with the diagnosis of a possible obstruction in detecting acquaintance with logical
forms/linguistic rules. The antidote, briefly, is that we should not expect that there is a “sense-
datum-like” logical form/linguistic rule of which we can become aware.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have pursued an agency-oriented approach to knowledge of language by
examining or developing three major agency-oriented models of knowledge of language,
specifically, the IK, PK, and AK Models, and by supporting the AK Model. The AK
Model, which takes acquaintance as its central notion, can adequately explain both the
phenomena of the creativity of language use (by positing the first-order practical ability
to manifest various overt linguistic behaviours in a structured manner) and of the rationality
of language use (by positing the second-order acquaintance knowledge of linguistic rules
that govern the first-order practical ability and actions). By contrast, the notion of knowl-
edge-by-description of language encounters serious theoretical difficulty (i.e. explanatory
circularity and regress) and phenomenological difficulty (i.e. ordinary speakers do not con-
sciously know theories of meaning for their languages). But these difficulties do not imply
that the notion of knowledge-by-description of language is defunct because knowledge-by-
description of a language is useful for linguists in theorizing about the language. That said,
such kind of knowledge cannot adequately explain what we are concerned with presently,
i.e. how actual speakers, as agents engaging in rational action, know their languages.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Body, Cognition & Meaning (BC&M) Conference
held at Academia Sinica in 2009, at the Faculty Research Colloquium held at Soochow University in
2010, at the 2010 Annual Conference of Taiwan Philosophical Association (TPA), and at the Knowl-
edge and Logic Conference held at National Taiwan University in 2012. I am grateful to the partici-
pants and especially to Kuang-ming Cheng (my commentator at the BC&M conference), Wan-chuan
Fang, Chien-hsing Ho (my commentator at the TPA conference), Jih-Ching Ho, Richard Hou, Daisy
Ku, Cheng-hung Lin, and Norman Teng for helpful comments and questions. I am also grateful to
Barry C. Smith and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and constructive criticisms
on earlier versions of this paper. This work was supported by National Science Council (NSC 99-
2410-H-031-009-MY3).
Notes
1. Cf. “Knowledge of a language supports both the active ability to speak in that language and the
passive ability to understand what others say in it” (Dummett 2007, 562). See also Dummett
(2006, 49 –50).
2. The assumption that what constitutes being a hearer is receptivity is widespread but not unchal-
lengeable. Some scholars might assert that listening, like speaking, is something we do, not
something that happens to us. For example, Crowther says, “It is a familiar thought that in per-
ception we are passive and at the mercy of our immediate environment. But perceptual goings-
on like listening and watching are also active” (2009, 173). In this paper, I do not dwell on the
issue of whether listening is active because even if it is, this fact would not affect the study of
this paper; on the contrary, this fact would support the agency-oriented approach. Nonetheless,
the hearer-oriented approach, once it is integrated into the agency-oriented approach, must
reveal something more than what it originally said, i.e. it must convey more than how it
would accommodate the agential character of listening into its original account of knowledge
of language.
3. According to Dummett, “the rationality of using language is sufficiently recognized . . . if
knowledge of a language is treated as of the intermediate type” (2007, 563); the conditional indi-
cates that “[k]nowing a language is a species of knowledge intermediate between pure practical
knowledge and pure theoretical knowledge” (1993b, x).
4. For a critical overview of the debate, see Smith (1992).
5. Here, I assume that the anti-intellectualist view of knowledge is correct. Generally, intellectu-
alism in epistemology claims that (i) propositional knowledge is the only genuine knowledge,
and (ii) other kinds of alleged knowledge, such as practical knowledge and acquaintance knowl-
edge, are either not genuine knowledge or they can be genuine knowledge only when they are
defined in terms of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualism in epistemology contests
these claims. Much of the recent debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism
focuses on the nature of practical knowledge or knowledge-how: the intellectualist position
claims that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that (Stanley and Williamson 2001;
Stanley 2011), whereas the anti-intellectualist position denies this claim (for a weak version
of this position, see Ryle 1949, and for a strong version, see Hetherington 2011, which
argues that knowledge-that is a species of knowledge-how). My own defence of the anti-intel-
lectualist view of knowledge-how can be found in Tsai (2011a, 2011b, 2014).
86 Cheng-hung Tsai
6. In proposing this constraint, Dummett aims to avoid behaviourism in the theories of meaning,
such as Quine’s linguistic behaviourism (1960, 1975).
7. The second-order “perspective” is posited to explain intentional action and can fulfil its role
only if understood as functioning at the personal – not the sub-personal – level.
8. Although the notion of intentional action characterized here is commonsensical, it also enjoys
theoretical and experimental support. See particularly Malle and Knobe’s “The Folk Concept of
Intentionality” (1997), in which they devise experiments to develop a model of the folk concept
of intentional action. According to this model,
performing an action intentionally requires the presence of five components: a desire for
an outcome, beliefs about an action that leads to that outcome; an intention to perform the
action; skill to perform the action; and awareness of fulfilling the intention while per-
forming the action. (Malle and Knobe 1997, 111, emphasis mine; see also Malle 2004)
The concept of intentional action characterized in the present paper refers to three components:
(the first-order) ability, (the second-order) knowledge of one’s own ability, and (the second-
order) knowledge of one’s own action. These three components roughly correspond to the
skill component, the belief component, and the awareness component in Malle and Knobe’s
model.
9. The two distinctive conditions for intentional action – that an agent must have a perspective on
either his action (i.e. knowing what he is doing) or on his ability (i.e. knowing how he does it) –
are intimate in the case of linguistic action:
There is no gap between knowing what it is to speak Spanish and knowing how to do so
. . . : you do not first learn what speaking Spanish is and then learn a means by which this
feat can be executed. (Dummett 1978, 95)
10. See also Dummett (1981) for his more detailed objections to the (Chomskyan) unconscious con-
ception of knowledge of language.
11. This version of the argument is primarily provided and adopted by Harman (1967, 76) and
Devitt (2006, 92), respectively. I have elaborated this argument in greater detail in Tsai (2011a).
12. Ernest Sosa is the most prominent philosopher to advocate a two-level model of knowledge,
which is now known as virtue perspectivism (see esp. Sosa 2007, 2009, 2011). My
characterization of the two-level model of knowledge of language in its most basic form is
inspired and influenced by Sosa’s works, although with some important differences. For
example, Sosa construes an epistemic agent’s second-order perspective on first-order ability
as propositional knowledge, whereas I leave this issue open. In particular, I demonstrate in
Section 3 that this particular construal should not be supported with respect to knowledge of
language.
13. The notion of “knowledge without observation” is understood by Hornsby as follows:
if [an agent] were to attend to, or to reflect upon, what she is doing, then it is something
she could find herself doing, and in finding herself doing it, she would not need to make
observations of the sort that a spectator might make. (2005, 121)
Applying this notion to the case of knowledge of language, Hornsby says that
[i]f the speaker did exercise procedural knowledge of how to voice her thoughts, then,
even if the procedure were something of which she was not explicitly aware, she
should be in a position to know of it “without observation” as she spoke. (2005, 121)
14. In fact, Stanley also knows about these caveats:
I am conscious, however, that there are many caveats and complexities in Hornsby’s paper
that I may have missed. For example, . . . [t]he subtle distinction [i.e., one must not confuse
the idea that we are able to simply voice our thoughts with the idea that voicing our
thoughts is something that we simply do] Hornsby has in mind here is one that has no
doubt escaped me, and perhaps some of the considerations I have adduced against her
position are idle once this distinction is made perspicuous. (2005, 143)
Stanley’s criticisms nonetheless merit attention because they help explain why Hornsby offers
these caveats for her notion of knowledge of language.
15. I suggest that knowledge of language is acquaintance knowledge initially (but only briefly) in
Tsai (2010).
16. According to Hayner (1969, 426– 428), prior to Russell, philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle,
and Spinoza regard acquaintance as a distinctive kind of knowledge. In addition to Russell, con-
temporary acquaintance theorists include Fumerton (1995), Fales (1996), BonJour (2001),
Chalmers (2003), and Gertler (2011, Chap. 4).
17. In this paper, I use the terms “acquaintance” and “knowledge by acquaintance (or acquaintance
knowledge)” interchangeably. Some scholars might question whether acquaintance (direct con-
sciousness or direct awareness) can be treated as a distinctive kind of knowledge (for a discus-
sion of this issue, see Hicks et al. 1919; Hart, Hughes, and Findlay 1949). I offer two responses
to this question. First, this question arises because some critics assume that propositional knowl-
edge is the only kind of genuine knowledge. When this assumption is dropped, acquaintance
can be treated as knowledge, which is consistent with the treatment of acquaintance by many
great philosophers throughout history (cf. Hayner 1969). Second, Tye provides two possible
answers that may be more constructive:
[W]hy should consciousness of something . . . yield knowledge of that thing? One partial
answer is that such consciousness is undeniably epistemically enabling; via conscious-
ness of a thing, one is put in a position to know facts about the thing. A more direct
answer is that it is simply incoherent to suppose that one might be genuinely (non-infer-
entially) conscious of an entity and yet not know it at all. (2009, 98)
The second answer is what I intend in treating acquaintance as knowledge.

18. For his full treatment of acquaintance, see Russell (1984); for a comprehensive summary of
Russell’s account of acquaintance, see Miah (2006, Chap. 2). Like certain philosophers, I do
not accept Russell’s account of acquaintance unreservedly; regarding this point, see Tye’s
(2009, Section 5.1) modification of Russell’s account of acquaintance.
19. Cf.:
Russell’s idea of logical form as opposed to grammatical form is strikingly like Choms-
ky’s idea of depth grammar as opposed to surface grammar. Of course Russell’s forms,
which we now call first-order predicate logic, look not at all like Chomsky’s kernel. But it
is not monstrous to propose that first-order predicate logic is the core of a deep grammar
of English . . . A foremost advocate of such a programme is Donald Davidson. (Hacking
1975, 91)
20. Cf.: “A grammar . . . should . . . be a model of whatever it is that enables people to recognize
new grammatical sentences. . . . [G]rammar becomes part of a theory about how we understand
what is said” (Hacking 1975, 90).
21. In this paragraph, I do not intend to offer an exegesis of the notion of logical form in Russell’s
writings, but to identify a link between Russellian logical form and linguistic rules. Russell’s
concern of logical form is not on linguistics, but this absence of linguistic concern does not
mean that his notion of logical form does not advance the study of language. For more on
the notion of logical form (Russellian and others) in both linguistics and philosophy, see the
anthology edited by Preyer and Peter (2002).
Notes on contributor
Cheng-hung Tsai is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Soochow University,
Taiwan. His research interests are in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of
mind. He has published articles in journals such as Philosophia, Theoria, The Southern Journal of
Philosophy, and Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
88 Cheng-hung Tsai
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Knowledge of language in action

Department of Philosophy, Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan

Knowledge of a language is a kind of knowledge, the possession of which enables a

1. Knowledge of language activated

# 2014 Taylor & Francis

Let us refer to Dummett’s requirement as the rationality requirement, which necessitates

Many philosophers won’t be impressed by considerations about what we are conscious of as

2. A metatheory of knowledge of language

An agent’s knowledge of a language is essential to achieve his intention in performing a

The consideration of how we estimate the intention of a speaker in performing a linguistic

Explicit theoretical knowledge consists in the capacity to formulate the relevant

“Implicit knowledge” is deﬁned here as “knowledge which shows itself partly by

Dummett, implicit knowledge is knowledge that is “possessed by a subject who cannot

4.2. The model elaborated by comparison

4.3. The model clariﬁed and exposed

Stanley’s second criticism concerns the effectiveness of the phenomenology of speaking.

5.2. Acquaintance with logical form

property” (Russell 1912, 29). Unlike knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by descrip-

Now, how is it possible for one to understand this sentence?

14. In fact, Stanley also knows about these caveats:

The second answer is what I intend in treating acquaintance as knowledge.

Peacocke, C. 1986. “Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception and Level

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