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Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 1999. 24:113–37

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NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY: Examination of a Contentious
Subject
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Peter W. Beck
Energy & Environment Programme, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London SW1Y 4LE, United Kingdom; e-mail: peter beck frant@msn.com
Key Words public judgment, history, future of energy, nuclear options

■ Abstract The worldwide future of nuclear energy is a highly disputed subject; one
side is certain that nuclear energy will have to expand in the next century to meet energy
demand, whereas the other side is equally certain that this energy form is too dangerous
and uneconomical to be of longer-term use. By looking at the way such beliefs are
formed, the history of nuclear power, and the energy scene in the next century, this paper
tests both points of view and concludes that both are flawed, but there is a strong case
for keeping the option for nuclear expansion open. Yet, there has to be doubt whether
today’s technology is adequate for such expansion. There are alternative technologies
under development that may make nuclear power more acceptable; however, although
there is the time to develop such new processes, the question has to be asked whether
such work can be funded, unless public opposition to nuclear power can be reduced and
international collaboration improved. The long-term future of nuclear power depends
more on successful research and development than on achieving early orders for more
nuclear plants.
CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
The Formation of Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
The Wish is Father to the Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Measurement of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A Brief History of Nuclear Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
The Early Years: 1945 to the Mid-1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
The Years of Expansion: Mid-1960s to Mid-1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
The Years of Uncertainty: Mid-1980s to the Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Is There a Need For Nuclear Energy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
1056-3466/99/1022-0113$12.00 113
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The Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Oil and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Renewable Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
The Nuclear Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Expansion Using Present Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Alternative Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Phasing Out the Industry—Foreclosing the Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
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The Research and Development Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
133
INTRODUCTION
Many people who take a close interest in the nuclear industry feel confident that the
industry will have an important role in the world’s energy scene during the next
century, especially in view of the issue of climate change—which will require
reduction of fossil fuel use—and the likelihood (as they see it) that depletion of
oil and natural gas resources will lead to scarcities and increases in prices.
Many other people believe equally strongly that nuclear power has no future and
will be phased out in the next century. They see nuclear power as too dangerous,
uneconomical, and not needed; even if the emission of carbon dioxide must be
reduced, they believe that the reduction of fossil fuel use will be counterbalanced by
improvements in the efficiency of energy use and by a far-greater use of renewable
energy resources.
Both sides believe so strongly in the logic of their case that they see the opposi-
tion as either illogical or deliberately untruthful and, therefore, not worth talking
to. There is little real contact between them, and each side is confirmed in its beliefs
by largely debating issues with colleagues holding similar beliefs. Both parties try
to convince the public that their position is correct, and it has to be said that in
most democratic countries the antinuclear lobbies seem to have been more con-
vincing. Although this has convinced only a few governments to withdraw from
the production of nuclear energy, it has made politicians reluctant to be seen to
support nuclear power, so that decisions that are needed, such as the destination
of nuclear waste, are not made; thus, the industry is drifting.
This paper analyzes the reasons for this state of affairs and considers how this
deadlock could be broken. The analysis consists of five sections.
The first section looks at the formation of beliefs, a process that seems to be
quite different for “experts” than for the public. An understanding of this subject
is vital to the comprehension of the present nuclear dilemma and to finding ways
to overcome it. This section is largely based on years of practical experience in
industry and on discussions with experts.
The second section provides a brief history from the wartime Manhattan Project
to the present. There are many lessons to be learned from that history.
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 115
The third section discusses the need for nuclear energy in the next century.
Three questions are examined in that section:
1. Can one foresee a firm requirement for nuclear power in the next century?
2. Conversely, can one say with confidence that there will be no need for
nuclear power in the next century?
3. If neither case is strong, are there sufficient uncertainties to keep the
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nuclear option open?
The fourth section looks at the practical implications of the answers from the
third section. Finally, the concluding section draws the various strands together
and suggests actions that might start to move nuclear energy out of the present
impasse.
THE FORMATION OF BELIEFS

A situation of totally opposing views is not unique to nuclear energy; it is common
in politics and religion. Whereas in these areas we can understand why there should
be different beliefs (there are no provable facts), it might be thought that the field
of nuclear energy has sufficient scientific and economic facts to show one side to
be right and the other wrong. In reality, both sides base their arguments not on
“facts” but on interpretation of facts. Interpretations, however, can differ widely,
as they are based on one’s judgment and beliefs. But how are judgment and beliefs
formed?
Experience has shown that there could be three strands to a person’s judgment.
The first is his/her belief about what is rational, the second might best be described
by the saying “The wish is father to the thought,” and the third concerns the
management of risk.
Rationality
It is rare to meet a person who does not believe he/she is rational. If we meet
people whose convictions we don’t share, we tend to mistrust them and believe
them to be irrational or even dishonest. Yet different people can hold quite different
convictions about the world and the environment (1). Thus, beliefs about the
relationship between nature and man vary from those who consider nature to be
benign and forgiving to those who believe that man lives in an unstable equilibrium
with nature. The former people assume that we can treat nature harshly without
having to worry about the consequences; such people are to be found in the ranks
of entrepreneurs and business people. The latter feel that unthinking action by us
could lead to catastrophe; these are the people who make up the backbone of the
environmental movements. Most people’s views are somewhere in between, but
they do tend to lean in one or the other direction.
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The Wish is Father to the Thought

Why and when people acquire their outlook and prejudices are difficult to establish,
but they could be connected with the second strand—most of us would like to
believe what appears to be in our interest to believe. We, therefore, tend to gravitate
toward people with beliefs similar to our own and to jobs in which such beliefs are
accepted. We can then reinforce our logic or, as others might say, our prejudices.
This bias of the selection process is very dangerous to organizations, and those
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who run them are usually unaware that this is happening. If a nuclear company
advertises for a manager or for a consultant, it is doubtful whether someone strongly

opposed to nuclear power will apply; if someone with those opinions does apply,
it is doubtful whether he/she would get the job. The opposite would apply to
Greenpeace. Organizations, therefore, tend to get advice that feeds their bias,
and this makes the chance of a constructive dialogue with the opposition more
difficult. “We know we are right, so why waste time arguing” is an all-too-common
attitude.
The effect of strong beliefs on the interpretation of facts is well known, but it is
rarely taken into account when debating the importance of facts. As an example,
there was a partial meltdown in a nuclear reactor at the US Three Mile Island
power plant in 1979. It was an accident that the industry had said could never
happen, but there were no casualties and hardly any escape of radioactivity. The
opposition could and did say that the accident showed that nuclear reactors are not
safe enough; the industry could and did make the point that, although the meltdown
was a serious event, the plant managed to contain it, and this proved that the reactor
design is sufficiently safe. How can one tell who is right? Even if an inquiry is
held, its results are likely to depend on the bias of its members, especially its chair.
That does not imply bad faith, but it is an acceptance of human failings.
Measurement of Risk
Here there tends to be a major misunderstanding between scientists and engineers
on one side and the public at large on the other (2). The former attempt to assess
the level of risk, first by using as much data as possible about past performance
of material, experience elsewhere, and other factors and then by using complex
statistical methods to determine the level of risk of a given event. As an example,
the latest designs of nuclear reactors are assessed to have a chance of a serious
accident, such as a meltdown, of one in a million reactor years (3).
The public is quite unimpressed; it looks at risk not by calculations, but by
balancing a perceived risk against a perceived benefit. It knows the risks of using
a motor car, but the perceived benefits of the car are seen to outweigh the risk;
consequently, cars stay popular, even though the risk of being killed in a car is
vastly greater than being injured by a nuclear reactor. But, the public asks, where is
the benefit “to me and my family and friends” from a nuclear reactor? Few people
would be able to answer this question. Unless such a benefit can be perceived,
people see no reason to take a risk, however small. When the risk is imposed
without the community being able to have influence, the antagonism toward the
risk becomes larger.
The fact that nuclear energy seems far more popular alongside a major nuclear
plant, such as Sellafield in the United Kingdom or La Hague in France, provides
some corroboration for this theory. Much of the employment and spending power
in these areas is generated by such plants. There is, therefore, a tangible benefit
from nuclear power that counteracts possible fears about radioactive damage to
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spouses or children.
Summary
We are all prejudiced, and we interpret past facts in line with our prejudices.
What matters in decision-making is not the facts, but perception of the facts. Such
perceptions can differ widely but be perfectly logical to those who hold them.
WL Thomas, a US social psychologist of the 1920s stated: “Things which are
perceived as real will be real in their consequences” (2).
If one wishes to change perception, one must first attempt to understand the
opposition’s viewpoints and why they are held; peremptorily dismissing them and
accusing the opposition of “ignorance of the facts” are unlikely to succeed in
influencing beliefs.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY1
The Early Years: 1945 to the Mid-1960s

The use of nuclear energy for power production arose from the US Manhattan
Project during World War II. The project developed two materials that could,
under the right conditions, initiate a nuclear chain reaction, which releases a vast
amount of heat instantaneously, thus causing a gigantic explosion. One was an
isotope, uranium-235, present in natural uranium in a concentration of ∼0.7%;
it had to be concentrated to >90% by a difficult and costly enrichment process
before it could be used in weapons. The other was an isotope, plutonium-239, of
the artificial element plutonium, which is formed when the most common isotope
of uranium, 238U, is bombarded by neutrons. The nuclear reaction released heat; by
controlling it in a nuclear reactor, the heat could be used for power production (4).
Early development of nuclear energy was largely led by defense priorities and
was surrounded by great secrecy. Notwithstanding such secrecy, the Soviet Union
and the United Kingdom achieved nuclear weapons capability by the early 1950s,
France in 1960, and China in 1964. US policy changed in 1953 when, as part of
President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” Program, it promised collaboration in
the worldwide development of civil nuclear power.
1 This section is a shortend and updated version of Chapter 3 in reference 4.

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As a result, worldwide activities outside the Soviet block were greatly affected
by US actions. These were led by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which
considered itself the only body with sufficient knowledge and expertise in as
complex a field as civil nuclear energy to make decisions. At the time, this view
was largely accepted by the President and Congress (5).
The AEC sponsored research into different fuel cycles and types of reactors, but
the winners tended to be those technologies that were developed for the Manhattan
Project or were developed subsequently for defense reasons. That included the
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thermal2 light water reactor (LWR), now being used in some 75% of world reac-
tor capacity. It was originally developed for the US Navy to propel submarines;
because of its military sponsorship, it was developed and tested with high priority.
It therefore had a head start in the commercial power generation market, which,
so far, it has not lost. The cost and time needed to develop and test radically new
processes turned out to be so large that it always seemed to make more sense to
stick to tried technology.
In the 1950s, nuclear power was marketed to utilities for its economic advan-
tages; safety was not seen to be a major problem. This lack of concern brought the
industry into conflict with local bodies, but these could make little progress until
they joined forces with environmentalists, the antibomb campaigners, and dissident
scientists with experience of the industry, who could take on the “official” experts.
The arrogance of the AEC, the secretiveness of the industry, and the assumed
connection with nuclear weapons helped to make the industry unpopular (5).
Experience in the world outside the United States mirrored experience inside.
Many governments were keen to stake a position in this new energy form, which
promised not only cheap power, but also energy security. In this early period,
however, France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were more interested
in the development of nuclear weapons and designed their first reactors so that
they could be used for plutonium production. Most countries imported from the
United States not only the technology, but also the aura of secrecy and arrogance.
By the mid-1960s, the industry had established itself in many countries. How-
ever, because early plants were small and many were not yet in operation, the
energy supply based on nuclear power was still very small, far less than 1% of
total energy demand.
The Years of Expansion: Mid-1960s to Mid-1980s

During the 1960s, power generation technology advanced rapidly, so that 1000-
MW power stations became economical. To remain competitive, nuclear power
plant suppliers had to follow, so they took orders for such stations, although their
experience was limited to plants generating ≤200 MW. When these plants started
2 Thermal reactors use neutrons that have been slowed down by moderators, such as carbon
or water to “thermal” (i.e. moderate) speed. Fast reactors operate with “fast” neutrons and
there is no moderator.
in the next decade, it was found that most were late, their costs were far above
budget, they were difficult to start up, and they were unreliable. Two incidents
during the 1970s in the United States, at Browns Ferry and at Three Mile Island,
brought the issue of reactor safety to the fore, and there was suspicion that, in some
instances, safety may have been compromised for the sake of profitability (6).
The oil crises of the 1970s led to the fear that fossil fuels would become scarce
and very expensive, and it became clear to students of the energy scene that nuclear
power had to be expanded rapidly if energy crises were to be avoided. Estimates
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of world nuclear capacity for the year 2000 soared to between 1400 and 2200
GW (7) (compared with today’s capacity of 345 GW), and this led to the fear
that there would be inadequate uranium resources to fuel such a rapid expansion.
This problem could be resolved by making use of fast breeder reactors (FBRs),
which are able to convert 238U into plutonium, thereby producing more fuel than
they burn. By making use of such reactors and by reprocessing spent fuel to
separate plutonium (for reuse in fresh fuel) and unburned uranium (largely 238U)
for recycling to FBRs, it should be possible to get ∼60-fold more energy from
natural uranium, thus making the energy resource base of uranium some threefold
larger than all the fossil fuel resources together.
The real world turned out to be quite different. The 1980s brought energy
surpluses and falling oil prices, whereas many of the new nuclear units turned
out to be far less profitable and more troublesome than anticipated. That and the
increasing unpopularity of nuclear power caused the US power industry to abandon
any thoughts of additional nuclear plants, with the result that there have been no
new orders since 1978.
At that time, the concept of a large expansion of nuclear power based on re-
processing plants and FBRs was looked at in the United States and was shown
to increase the dangers of nuclear proliferation (8). Appreciation of these dangers
caused the US government to prohibit reprocessing of spent fuel from civilian
plants and to stop research into FBRs. Spent fuel in the United States was assumed
to be high-level nuclear waste (HLW), which would eventually be disposed of in
deep underground repositories.
A number of countries did not follow the US lead and continued to plan for
reprocessing of spent fuel and use of FBRs. Long-term energy security was one of
the main reasons. Additional reprocessing facilities were planned by France and
the United Kingdom in the early 1980s, partly for reprocessing spent fuel from
other countries. This was done to relieve pressure on temporary storage facilities for
such spent fuel alongside power stations, which were difficult to expand because of
public opposition. The separated plutonium and HLW streams were to be returned
to the countries of origin, but the final destination for such material, which was
scheduled to be in deep underground repositories in highly stable rock formations,
had yet to be built.
By the mid-1980s, the nuclear industry had come of age, generating ∼4% of
the world’s energy needs. As it grew, so did its detractors, and, except for some
countries such as France and Japan, there were strong antinuclear groups in most
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democratic countries, often connected with the antibomb lobbies. Then, in 1986,
came Chernobyl.
The Years of Uncertainty: Mid-1980s to the Present

Although this accident happened to a reactor and to a safety culture that would
never be accepted outside the then Soviet Union and its satellites, its effect was so
terrible on the surrounding districts and its range of radioactive contamination so
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wide that it gave an enormous boost to the credibility and strength of the antinuclear
lobbies. It also underlined the global nature of nuclear safety.

At about the same time, further technological improvements to fossil fuel plants
(especially the development of combined-cycle gas-turbine plants), no sign of
fossil fuel shortages, and cost increases to nuclear plants led to the abandonment
of plans for rapid expansion of nuclear power. The industry settled down to the
fuel cycle shown in Figure 1. No shortage of uranium could be foreseen for many
decades, which removed the case for FBRs, which, in any case, had not yet been
proven; except for some small reactors in Russia, to date no such plant is in
commercial operation.
These changes of plans raised the question of the final disposal of spent fuel.
Spent reactor fuel contains ∼1% plutonium, which, when separated from the rest
Figure 1 The nuclear fuel cycle. This diagram shows the approximate yearly flows of
materials for the operation of a 1000-MW(e) light-water reactor. Case I, No recycling;
case II, recycling. Redrawn from Uranium Institute fact sheet, “Radioactive Waste and
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.” London: Uranium Inst. (1992)
of spent fuel, can be used in nuclear weapons (9). Military-grade plutonium has
a high content of 239Pu, whereas plutonium from civil reactors includes a higher
proportion of other plutonium isotopes. Nevertheless, such plutonium is fissile,
but the explosive yield may be lower than from military material. Less than 10 kg
would be sufficient for a bomb; a 1000 MW reactor would produce ∼200 kg/year
of plutonium (Figure 1). Although radioactivity of fresh spent fuel makes the
extraction of plutonium difficult, storage for some decades reduces radioactivity
sufficiently to make extraction relatively easy.
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With neither FBRs nor an adequate number of reprocessing plants on the hori-
zon, some 7000 tons/year of spent fuel are accumulating in temporary stores on
power station sites throughout the world. They contain increasing quantities of
plutonium (10, 11), and there are no final repositories likely to be ready until well
into the next century. Finding sites has proved extremely difficult not just for ge-
ological reasons, but also owing to strong local resistance and strong opposition
from antinuclear groups to the whole concept of deep repositories.
The issue of final storage has been made even more difficult by the US/Russian
treaties for the reduction of nuclear weapons. This is likely to release ∼100 tons of
military-grade plutonium, which somehow has to be brought to a state at which it
is no longer a proliferation threat. Although there a number of ways of achieving
this, it is likely to take more than a decade or even two before all the material will
have been made safe (12).
Because final disposal is unlikely to be resolved for many years, there is an
urgent need for an intermediate solution that can ensure monitored safety of spent
fuel, other nuclear waste, and plutonium released from military use. Schemes for
this intermediate solution are under study (13), but these also may take some time
to come to fruition.
Owing to these problems and the continuing public-relations effect of the
Chernobyl accident, resistance to nuclear power has increased over this period;
even the public in countries previously accepting nuclear power, such as France
and Japan, has become far more skeptical. Nevertheless, nuclear production has
been increasing and now provides for some 7% of total world demand for energy.
Increases were caused as much by many older plants becoming more efficient as
by new power stations coming into operation.
New orders, however, have been few, especially from Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (with the exception of
Japan). The countries of the Far East as well as India have substantial plans for
nuclear energy, but it cannot be estimated how many of these plans will survive the
present economic problems of the area and the difficulty of getting World Bank
assistance for nuclear plants.
Summary
Forty years after the launch of the “Atoms for Peace” program, nuclear energy
produces ∼7% of world energy and 17% of electric power; outside the former
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Soviet Union and its satellites, the industry’s safety record has been good. On
the other hand, nuclear energy failed to become the cheap energy of the future,
insufficient progress has been made with finding acceptable means of dealing with
spent reactor fuel, and it became deeply unpopular in many quarters. As a result,
orders for new plants virtually stopped by the 1980s, and there are no signs of
them restarting.
Perhaps the most worrisome lesson is that the industry seems to have lost
the support of much of the public, who consider it arrogant and untrustworthy.
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The industry’s attitude (which may at last be changing) of accusing the public of
ignorance and refusing to accept that it has a case to answer, does not help its cause.
IS THERE A NEED FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY?
Notwithstanding today’s lack of orders and the unpopularity of nuclear energy,

there are many voices who argue this to be a temporary phenomenon that will
pass when the next energy crisis hits us (which, from past experience, is bound to
happen). It will then be recognized that nuclear power is an essential component
of the energy supply picture to meet the world’s ever growing demand. The issue
of climate change, which may require restrictions in the use of fossil fuels, makes
it even more likely that there will be a strong need for nuclear power.
Others entirely disagree with such an analysis and believe that strong action to
increase energy efficiency and expand the use of renewable energy resources will
be adequate to match supply with demand, even if the use of fossil fuels has to be
restricted. The world, they suggest, can achieve energy balance without the use of
nuclear energy.
Even though both of these views have a strong whiff of the wish being father
to the thought, uncertainties of the future could well be so great that both can lie
within the bounds of possibility. Past experience has shown that the human race is
not good at forecasting (14). As shown by the forecasts for nuclear power quoted
earlier, even medium-range energy projections, developed in the 1970s, proved
wildly wrong and so did forecasts made in earlier decades. Consensus forecasts
seem particularly prone to being worthless. [There might be good reasons for this.
If we all believe something will happen in the longer term, we tend to take action
that negates the forecast (14).] Forecasts a century ahead are, therefore, of little
value, but it is still possible to achieve an understanding of the social, economic,
technological, and political forces that will strongly affect the energy scene.
This can be done by the use of scenarios to explore alternative futures of energy.
They are not, nor are they meant to be, forecasts. If the chosen futures are widely
different from each other, but still plausible, the broad range of possible outcomes
comes into view. Such scenarios were developed by the World Energy Council
and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, two organizations
of international renown, seen to be neutral in the pro- and antinuclear battle. This
section is based on their analysis (15).
TABLE 1 The energy mix under different scenarios for the year 2050a
A B C
Scenario (%) 1990 A1 A2 A3 C1 C2
Primary energy (TWy) 12.9 35 35 35 28 20 20

Mix
Coal 23 15 32 9 21 11 10
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Oil 36 32 19 18 20 19 18
Natural gas 18 19 22 32 23 27 24
Nuclear energy 5 12 4 11 14 4 12
New renewables 2 16 17 24 15 29 26
Old renewablesb 16 6 6 6 7 10 10
a
Based on reference 15, Table 5-1.
b
Includes noncommercial and large-scale hydroelectric generation.
The Scenarios
The study used three scenarios, each based on different economic, social, and
political conditions. For studying the energy supply position, variants making
different technological and supply assumptions were introduced. The assumptions
were chosen to give a wide range of outcomes, although all are still within the
bounds of possibility. Table 1 shows the total energy demand and the energy mix
for the year 2050. Scenario A assumes high economic growth and rapid increase
in wealth; B looks at more modest growth; whereas C is “ecologically driven,”
which assumes the help of governments toward improvements in energy efficiency
and with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
The table shows that demand could vary between 20 and 35 TWy3 , i.e. between
∼50% and 200% more than demand in 1990. Such a wide range is plausible because
demand is tied to many uncertain factors, such as the rate, the kind, and the areas
of future economic growth; the rate of improvement in energy intensity (energy
use/gross national product); technological developments; population growth; and
government policies.
Regarding energy supply (nuclear fusion was omitted from this analysis; its
future is still too uncertain), scenario A1 assumes continuation of a strong oil and
gas sector for the whole of next century, even though this may mean bringing some
unconventional resources into play. A2 presumes less worry about greenhouse
gases, which, together with improvements in technology, would bring coal to
the fore at the expense of oil and gas. A3 looks at a world that has made rapid
technological gains in renewable energy resources and made nuclear energy more
acceptable; coal and oil demand is reduced to low levels by the end of the century.
31 TWy (Tera watt/year) = 0.73 Gtoe (tonnes oil equivalent × 109) or 3.15 × 1019 J.
124 BECK
B makes more pessimistic assumptions about oil and gas resources and lets coal,
renewable resources, and nuclear power take the strain.
Finally, the C variants assume a reduction in the use of fossil fuel throughout
the century. In C1 it is also assumed that nuclear energy is phased out, so that by
the end of the period, renewable resources would take up some 80% of supply
with oil and gas the rest. C2 presumes that by 2100 nuclear energy will be able to
expand considerably and meet nearly 20% of total demand.
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Oil and Gas
The assumption is made that there are sufficient conventional oil and gas resources
to meet even the high demands of scenario A1 and that the present high level of
technological advances will continue, making it possible to increase production
from existing fields and making it economical to develop small fields. Although
the oil industry tends to agree with such assumptions, it must be noted that there
are other voices that take a far more pessimistic line and assume that oil production
from conventional resources will start dropping early in the century (16).
There are, however, large resources of unconventional oil (such as heavy oil, tar
sands, and shale oil) and of gas (in the form of methane hydrate deposits). Their
extraction would undoubtedly be more expensive than today’s oil, which is mostly
below $7/barrel; unconventional sources may cost $20–25/barrel (17).
Renewable Resources
The development of renewable energy resources is another very controversial
subject, but here the disagreements are quite different than those of the nuclear
controversy. In the latter, there is strong opposition to nuclear power, and the
opposition has the aim to shut the industry down. For renewable resources, there is
little opposition, but considerable skepticism as to whether it can play as important
a role as assumed by the environmental movement and those working in the field.
Protagonists accept that much progress has to be made before new renewable
resources could become a major source of energy, but they believe that this is
possible, although it would require assistance from governments to speed up such
work and provide incentives to make early commercialization possible.
New renewable resources include a large number of technologies, such as
biomass, wind, ocean energy systems, geothermal sources, and many different
solar energy systems. The figures for “old renewables” in Table 1 include large-
scale hydroelectric and “noncommercial” fuel, like firewood, peat, and dung. Be-
cause large hydroelectric and noncommercial fuel sources are unlikely to produce
more energy in future, their proportion will drop as total energy demand increases.
The proportion for total energy from renewable resources is well within the 50%
assumed as possible by 2060 in scenarios developed by Shell International (18),
as well as by other oil companies.
The skeptics are doubtful about such figures, believing that the various tech-
nologies will first have to prove themselves before more realistic estimates of pen-
etration into the energy market could be made; that may well take some 15 years.
In that time, renewable energy resources will have to show that those technologies
that provide intermittent output can satisfy the pattern of demand and that biomass
and other systems needing large land areas can find the required areas. Workers
in the field maintain that there are answers to such problems, but they accept that
they will have to show this through practical demonstration. As will be seen, that
is rather similar to the nuclear situation, but because of the far smaller scale of
individual units in the renewable-resources field and little antagonism from the
public, getting assistance from governments and private organizations should be
?
substantially easier.
Summary
The scenarios show that the demand side is very uncertain. On the supply side,
there is a healthy resource base of fossil fuel, especially coal; with the plausi-
ble assumption that renewable resources will expand, even if more slowly than
now assumed, nuclear energy is unlikely to be essential as long as there are no
constraints on greenhouse gas emission.
If there are such constraints, the situation changes. Without nuclear energy,
the supply/demand balance of energy would be very dependent on considerable
improvements in energy efficiency and on the fast development of renewable en-
ergy resources. With present knowledge, that is a very risky, but not impossible,
assumption.
There are, thus, considerable uncertainties both on the demand and supply side.
Bearing in mind that the strategic answer to uncertainty is flexibility and because
nuclear energy is the only other source that does not emit greenhouse gases, it
makes sense to keep the nuclear option open.
The above does not take into account the possibility that nuclear power would
have a firm economic advantage over other fuels and that its expansion would
be politically accepted. In such a case, nuclear power expansion would be driven
by normal market forces; currently, however, such a case seems unlikely. Even
though existing nuclear power plants tend to be competitive with other electricity-
generating plants, that does not appear to be the case for new nuclear plants,
especially vis-à-vis combined-cycle gas plants.
On balance, it is suggested that, with today’s knowledge, there is a strong case
for keeping the nuclear option open perhaps for 15–20 years, by which time more
should be known about the potential of renewable resources and the developments
in the field of nuclear power. But what does “keeping the option” mean? This is
discussed in the next section.
THE NUCLEAR OPTIONS
Keeping the option open has to imply that, if required, nuclear power must be in a
position to supply a significant proportion of the world’s energy needs. The World
Energy Council/International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis scenarios
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TABLE 2 Nuclear capacity under different scenarios

Scenarios (GWe)a
Year A1 A2 A3 B C1 C2
2020 646 417 732 645 480 605

2050 1875 782 1860 1915 380 1240
2100 6415 3680 6725 5700 0 2750
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a
Present capacity, 345 GWe; for definition of scenarios, see p. 123.
indicate that, by 2050, nuclear energy might supply ∼10%–15% in those cases
in which greater acceptability of nuclear power is assumed; that may increase
to ∼20% by the end of the century. That means being ready for a considerable
expansion of the industry, perhaps the addition of 80–100 GW/year by midcentury
and continuing for the rest of the century. Table 2 provides an estimate of nuclear
capacity for the different scenarios (19).
To make such an expansion a practicable proposition, the industry will have to
resolve at least those issues which presently make it unpopular and feared: safety,
economics, proliferation, and waste disposal (20).
These issues are, of course, deeply interlinked; improved safety can affect
economics, and waste disposal can affect the risks of proliferation. Different people
will also have different priorities; the concerned citizen may wish to give priority
to safety, whereas the industrial user may consider economics to be the more
important factor. In reality, all four factors have to reach a level acceptable to the
public, the politician, and the industrialist.
This section examines three alternative developments for nuclear power:
1. Expansion using present technologies—asks whether the required public

acceptance could be achieved
2. Expansion using different technologies—considers whether this would
improve the chances of such acceptance.
3. The only alternative to expansion, namely to phase out the
industry—considers how this would affect the above four issues.
Before tackling these alternatives, there is one other requirement that is not
strictly connected with technology. It is the need to build international systems
that not only set standards, but also monitor them to ensure compliance, so that
the public can be assured of nuclear safety everywhere (21). Although the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and the International Nuclear Safety Convention
have powers in this field, much of the responsibility still rests with individual
governments. However, all governments cannot be trusted all the time, and it may
well be necessary to strengthen international supervision if many more countries
were to have nuclear installations.
Expansion Using Present Technology

Major expansion would mean many more reactors, perhaps 10- to 20-fold today’s
430. Are present designs safe enough? The industry is confident that this is so,
but, as mentioned earlier, the public is not. Even the risk assessment for present
designs of one major accident per a million reactor years has some worrisome
“small print” attached (3), namely that it is limited to plants “suitably designed,
constructed and maintained.” If reactors are sited in many more countries, that
?
cannot be guaranteed. Construction or maintenance might be handled by “crony”
contractors, or operators might be inadequately trained. It is unlikely that local

regulators can be trusted to deal with such issues under every political system,
unless international control is somehow strengthened.
Safety issues have already had a considerable effect on the complexity of reac-
tors and the economics of nuclear power by increasing both capital and operating
costs (22); the addition of still more safety measures may not improve matters
because of the added complexity they would cause. Only by considering the total
design might one get the benefit of improved safety at acceptable cost (23). Over re-
cent years a number of design organizations have worked on such designs with the
purpose of providing an “evolutionary” design which makes use of past world-wide
experience with LWRs (24). The design specifications include the requirement that
safety and containment are maintained even under very unfavorable conditions.
Owing to the very low rate of orders for new reactors world wide, experience with
these designs is so far limited to two plants in Japan, which have only recently
come into operation; more are being built in Korea. Other designs are ready to be
used, but, so far, no opportunity has been found. We must have more experience
before we can tell whether these new designs will remove or at least reduce public
concerns about reactor safety. If replacement of outworn nuclear reactors is to make
use of these designs, we need to have such experience within the next 10–15 years.
Given good experience and no regulatory insistence that additional safety pro-
visions have to be added, it is assumed that such plants would have considerable
economic advantages over existing designs, owing to lower capital and operat-
ing costs per power produced. However, whether these advanced designs would
be competitive with Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) generation or even
modern coal-fired stations is doubtful under present fossil fuel prices.
That is especially so in view of the promotion of competitive electricity markets
by many governments, leading to the demand by investors for higher returns on
capital invested than required when electricity markets were local (controlled)
monopolies. Such a development damages more capital-intensive schemes, such
as nuclear power. However, in the longer term the situation may change if fossil
fuel prices increase and/or if CO2 emission is penalized in one way or another, or
if the concerns of the 1970s about energy security, leading to the need for diversity
in energy supplies, return.
The issue of the destination of highly radioactive waste (HLW) and of spent fuel,
which is not reprocessed, is perhaps the most difficult one. As mentioned earlier,
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until now the only permanent solution planned is burial in deep underground
repositories within rock formations deemed to be stable and impervious to water
for tens of thousands of years. This has proved far more difficult than had been
thought, so that, after ∼15 years of trying in a number of countries, no such storage
is available. Perhaps the greatest effort is under way in the United States, where
work on the Yucca Mountain repository, planned to hold 70,000 tons of waste
and spent fuel, has been in progress with a completion date of 1998. The latest
indications (December 1998) (25) are that, without further unforeseen delays, it
?
may be ready in ∼10 years, that it would be full around 2016, and it would then
be under surveillance for ∼100 years. The total cost of the full project could be
>$40 billion by the time the repository is finally sealed in 2116.

Expansion, for example to 1500 GWe by 2050, would, without reprocessing and
recycling of plutonium, produce between 30,000 and 45,000 tons/year of spent fuel
world wide, depending on the level of power produced per unit of fuel. That would
require a new Yucca Mountain type waste repository every ∼2 years. Even assum-
ing large cost reductions with experience, that seems an impossible target, if only
because of the difficulties of finding suitable sites. Critics of deep disposal of spent
fuel tend to believe that such waste sites would become the plutonium mines of the
future, which raises longer-term proliferation issues.4 The idea of having many
such sites scattered across the world is unlikely to gain much acceptance; indeed,
the likelihood of major expansion on a once-through basis (i.e. with all spent fuel
designated as HLW) seems unrealistic, even if sufficient uranium became available.
The alternative is to base such expansion on reprocessing and use of FBRs,
perhaps by mid-century. As long as work continues on the development of FBRs,
this may be possible with prototype units being built within the next 20 years, but,
from an economic point of view, present designs are unattractive unless the cost
of uranium ore were to increase substantially, which may not happen for many
decades. In any case, use of reprocessing and FBRs raises other issues.
First, reprocessing of 30,000 tons/year of spent fuel would require between 15–
20 reprocessing plants of the size of the latest U.K. and French plants. These plants
are technically complex and require a high standard of operation and regulatory
inspection to ensure that the required radioactivity release standards are kept. Such
levels of operation and inspection are unlikely to be available in all countries that
will wish to have such plants. The present process (the Purex process originally
developed for the Manhattan Project) also has the disadvantage of producing some
14 m3 of waste streams per ton of spent fuel.
Second, such plants separate plutonium from spent fuel; each would have stocks
of that material and, therefore, would be a potential proliferation hazard. There
would also have to be a considerable number of shipments between the reactors,
reprocessing plants, and fresh-fuel production centers, most involving plutonium-
4 Plutonium in fresh spent fuel is “protected” by the high radioactivity of the material; this
radioactivity decays after some decades, whereupon separation of plutonium from the fuel
would become relatively simple.
containing material and, in some instances, without radiation protection (e.g. fresh
MOX fuel, which is mixed uranium and plutonium fuel in which the plutonium
substitutes for some of the 235U). Such a system would again increase the dangers
of proliferation, as was concluded in the studies undertaken in United States during
the 1970s (8). Unless circumstances change, many countries, including the United
States, are unlikely to agree to such a course of action.
In summary, there has to be considerable doubt whether large-scale expansion
of nuclear power, by using existing process technology and the present fuel cycle
?
with or without recycling of plutonium, can be realistically expected to resolve the
above four main issues of concern. Obtaining more new orders for reactors during
the next few years could strengthen the industry, but that may not help to keep
a nuclear option open. That does not imply that reprocessing and FBRs may not
have a future, but their future may lie in the development of new designs, a matter
that fits into the next section.
Alternative Technologies
There has, over the last few years, been an increasing acceptance by the re-
search community that the four issues—safety, economics, proliferation, and waste
disposal—have to be resolved, before nuclear energy can become a candidate for
major expansion (24–26). As a result, work is going on in laboratories in the United
States, Europe, Russia, and Japan, as well as in a few other countries, to develop
processes and consider different fuel cycles to see whether these problems could
be overcome.
Regarding LWRs, over and above the evolutionary designs, a number of more
unconventional schemes are under study. These include a variety of “intrinsically
safe” reactors (27), in which safety would be based on the interplay of natural
forces, such as gravity, to shut a reactor down should dangerous conditions arise.
Present designs depend on engineered safety, which makes use of automatically
triggered safety systems and/or the intervention of operators. Protagonists of in-
trinsically safe systems claim that such designs would be simpler and easier to
operate and could make it possible to build smaller units that would fit the demand
from developing countries (24). Such claims cannot, of course, be tested until
commercially sized prototypes are available.
Considerable interest is also being shown in a totally different type of thermal
reactor, the High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR). Although this type of
reactor was a failure 20 years ago when a commercial plant was built in the United
States technological advances since have made renewed efforts worthwhile. The
reactor utilizes helium as coolant, which can be heated to very high temperatures
(900◦ C+), and it can, therefore, achieve far higher efficiency in power generation
than LWRs—up to 47%, compared with ∼33%; that should have a considerable
effect in lowering the capital cost per unit of power produced. The high temperature
should also make such a reactor suitable for supplying process heat, for example,
for hydrogen production or other chemical processes. The reactor makes use of
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coated fuel particles that can withstand ∼10-fold higher burn-up (burn-up is the
amount of heat produced per weight of reactor fuel, e.g. 30 GWd/t of fuel) than fuel
in LWRs, which would greatly reduce the volume of spent fuel per unit of power
generated. The refractory nature of the fuel provides greater safety compared with
the fuel in LWRs, in a loss-of-coolant accident. There is a considerable amount of
international collaboration in this area, with pilot reactors being built or planned
in Japan, Russia, and China and a larger-scale unit being planned for South Africa
(28, 29). We need more experience with these units before the renewed enthusiasm
?
for this type of reactor can be translated into real potential.
Resolution of the HLW issue is also high on research agendas. These agendas
start with the assumption that the fuel cycle must not be proliferation prone and
that the volume of waste to be securely stored should be greatly reduced as should
the length of time the waste has to be in secure storage.
One means considered is transmutation, a nuclear reaction in which long-lived
components of nuclear waste are transmuted into shorter life-time elements. One
proposal (30) starts with spent fuel and other nuclear waste being separated into
three streams, possibly making use of new developments in reprocessing tech-
niques. One stream, consisting of uranium is sent for re-use or dumping; another,
containing long-lived minor actinides,5 plutonium, and other radioactive materi-
als suitable for transmutation, is fed into fast reactor (FRs) or sub-critical FRs6
to burn up the actinides and the other radioactive compounds. The third stream
would consist of all other fission products and would, after conditioning, be sent
to secure long term storage.
The transmutation reactors would act as burners, not as breeders and their
development may be assisted by the application of a Bismuth/lead eutectic mixture
as a coolant, instead of sodium, which could considerably simplify the process,
reduce costs, and improve the safety of FRs. Russia has been using this eutectic
in reactors for special fast submarines since the early 1960s (30), and hence there
is substantial operational experience with this coolant.
The plan for such transmutation is to have the reactors and the separation
processes on one site and recycle all actinides close to extinction. Such a site
would receive spent fuel from thermal reactors and ship out uranium for reuse,
electric power, and quite small volumes of nuclear waste that would have to be
securely stored, but possibly for no longer than ∼300 years (30, 31). In such a
system, plutonium would always be in a form in which it would be protected
by high radiation, thus reducing, if not eliminating, the dangers of proliferation.
Considerably more research will have to be done before the merits of such a scheme
can be adequately evaluated.
5 Minor actinides are elements formed in nuclear reactors with an atomic mass number higher
than actinium, but excluding plutonium or uranium; they tend to be highly radioactive and
have a long half-life.
6 Sub-critical reactors require the addition of neutrons from an outside source, such as
accelerators, to keep the nuclear reactor going.

In the longer term, such a fuel cycle may make it possible to use thorium, a
fertile element that is widely available throughout the world. On absorption of a
neutron, it is transmuted into 233U, a fissile isotope. In contrast to plutonium, 233U
can be denatured by being mixed with natural uranium, so that it could not be
used in weapons, but it could be used as fuel in thermal reactors. More generally,
there continues to be interest in making more use of thorium (32), especially in
countries like India, which have ample deposits of the ore.
The work mentioned opens up possibilities for future nuclear fuel cycles (33),
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which could resolve many of today’s concerns, but, as with all such research, there
can be no guarantee of success. Naturally, the development and demonstration on a

commercial scale of new processes will take a number of decades. As long as means
are found to store spent fuel and other HLWs safely and securely in intermediate
storage for 30–40 years, we have the time. But the major questions are whether
there is the will and who would provide the funds to continue the work to the point
that there are better indications whether and which of the various research leads
will succeed in providing an acceptable and economic nuclear fuel cycle.
Phasing Out the Industry—Foreclosing the Option

Although antinuclear groups would like to see a quick exit of the industry, their
wish cannot be achieved. Countries make their own decisions about energy and,
even should another Chernobyl-type accident occur, it is difficult to imagine a
situation in which all countries will decide to shut down all nuclear plants. In
any case, 17% of electric power would have to be replaced worldwide, and that
would take time and vast funds. Far more likely would be a slow fade out, with
nuclear stations being replaced by nonnuclear sources as they reach the end of
their lifetimes and with some countries, possibly France, China, India, and Russia,
continuing to depend on nuclear energy. Bearing in mind the continuing work to
extend the lifetime of reactors, there would be only a slow reduction until 2010,
which would speed up thereafter, but with a few nuclear stations still operating
well beyond 2030 (34). Even that would be far from the end of the industry.
Still to be carried out would be the disposal of all spent fuel plus the fuel
inventory from all the power stations, as well as the decommissioning of all nuclear
plants and other facilities and sites that had been contaminated with radioactive
material. Then there would be the military programs; in the hope that these would
be run down, surplus weapon-grade material would have to be made safe and
securely disposed of, and the many military sites would have to be cleaned up. All
of these tasks could take a century or more and cost hundreds of billions, if not
trillions, of dollars with today’s technology.
As already indicated earlier, disposal of HLW has for the time being no accept-
able answer, with deep burial being seen as the least bad method. So research will
be needed to find better answers, as well as ways to reduce costs of clean up. If
research is successful, based on today’s knowledge the most promising route for
spent fuel and other HLW disposal may well involve transmutation of a sort and
132 BECK
use of nuclear reactors, with only a small proportion of waste requiring disposal
in deep repositories. Without such research, deep disposal may well be the only
course open, leaving many sites that have to be kept safe and secure for tens of
thousands of years.
Research about disposal of spent fuel and about decommissioning and clean up
is necessary, whatever the fate of the industry. (After all, an expanding industry
would be continually involved in such activities.) However, without an industry
and universities to provide expert staff in nuclear matters, which may be the case
?
if people see the demise of nuclear power, such research will be more difficult to
carry out. Yet, if it were to save just 10% of clean-up costs, the savings would be
far greater than the additional cost of research to keep the nuclear option open.
If such research were to be stopped and the cost of the clean-up operation be
seen as too high for this generation to bear, there is the possibility of playing for
time in the hope that future generations will be able to deal with the mess left by
this one; that would not be a good example of sustainability.
The Research and Development Dilemma

There is never a guarantee that research will succeed; it is a risky undertaking.
Over many years, most nuclear research was carried out and paid for by govern-
ments. Now, as many governments are attempting to disengage from the electricity
market and leave it to the forces of competition, they wish to disengage themselves
from research and development (R & D) and leave that to business organizations.
Unfortunately, the time span of nuclear research, plus demonstration projects, is
measured in numbers of decades, and companies, under competitive pressure and
needing to satisfy the short-term expectations of their shareholders, cannot afford
to fund such long-term, expensive, and risk-laden projects. As a result, worldwide
energy R & D, especially in nuclear fission, has been dropping fast (35). As an
example, US Department of Energy research on nuclear fission dropped by a factor
of 12 between 1986 and 1997.
In economic theory it is argued that research can be likened to insurance. In the
area of energy it can be insurance of the population against future energy crises
and/or the costs of coping with climate change. As such costs would fall on citizens,
the “insurance premium,” that is, much of the research expenditure, should be the
responsibility of governments. In any case, in a truly competitive market, there is
no guarantee that companies would be able to derive benefits commensurate with
the risks and costs, even if their research were successful. Thus, governments need
to accept that they have an important role in funding research, although, hopefully,
in collaboration with companies from within the industry, who have to “insure”
themselves against becoming uncompetitive.
The next question is how to spend the research funds. That is again a matter
of risk assessment. Is it best to concentrate on energy conservation and renewable
energy resources in the hope that high funding will produce such good results that
there would be no need for nuclear power? Or would it be sensible to keep the
nuclear option open, at least until more is known about the other options? At this
stage, political bias might creep in; giving more help to renewable-resource R & D
could be politically advantageous, whereas increasing nuclear R & D might not.
There is yet another question. With many different research projects under study
in many laboratories and design offices, not all can or should be developed; some-
one has to choose. Although there is an increasing amount of international collabo-
ration, especially at the expert level, there must be a case for more cross-boundary
collaboration in directing and funding research. The expenditure to develop and
prove new nuclear processes is bound to be high because it would involve building
?
and operating prototype plants; as in areas of the defense industry, such expendi-
ture could be too risky for one country and, however difficult, collaboration might
well become the only way to proceed.

Such messages will not be welcome to governments, and there will be many
lobbies suggesting that nuclear research has never delivered and there is no reason
to expect this to change (36). Unless, therefore, the industry can make a strong
case to convince both the public and governments that the risk premium to keep
the nuclear option open is worth paying, the chances of obtaining sufficient funds
for research cannot be good.
To achieve such understanding requires the following steps by the industry:
1. It must take the view of the opposition seriously and be seen to do so.
2. It should establish a dialogue with the more reasonable section of the
opposition, with skeptical but neutral “opinion formers,” governments, and
private corporations to argue the case for the nuclear option. A joint study
on what an acceptable nuclear industry would have to comprise could be
the next step, but only after some trust has been established between the
different parties.
3. Having developed a vision of a more acceptable industry, it must consider
how that could be achieved, whether research could deliver, and if so, what
research to sponsor and how to fund it. Being an international problem, the
studies will have to be internationally focused.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Lessons from History

• Two different views on nuclear power are firmly held by the pro- and
antinuclear factions, and there are good arguments on both sides.
The Pronuclear View “Nuclear power is a success; after 50 years it has

about 430 reactors in operation, producing some 17% of the world electric
power, and it has had only one serious accident.”
The Antinuclear View “Nuclear power is a failure; it failed to meet

economic expectations, and it caused and continues to cause dangers from
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radiation and grave concern about proliferation. It would never have been
developed, except for its military connections.”
• The relationship between the public and the industry is bad. The public
sees the industry as arrogant and untrustworthy; the industry believes
that the public is being misled and has insufficient knowledge to
distinguish the truth from lies.
• Notwithstanding the large sums spent on research by many
?
governments, most of the technology of today’s fuel cycle (Figure 1) is
still largely based on military research of the 1940s and early 1950s.
There have been many improvements, but few radical changes.

2. The Need for Nuclear Power in the Next Century
• Assuming no constraints on fossil fuel use, there are ample energy
resources for the next century. That takes into account the fossil fuel
resource base and the likely increase in the use of renewable energy,
although possibly more slowly than now assumed by enthusiasts.
Nuclear energy would have a role only if it became economically
justified and more acceptable to the public.
• Should there be constraints on the use of fossil fuels, there is
controversy. Some argue that improvements to energy efficiency and the
rapid development of renewable resources can compensate for the
reduction in fossil energy use; they believe that nuclear energy is not
necessary. Others disagree and believe the estimates for renewable
resources to be far too optimistic and that a significant input from
nuclear energy will be essential.
• Because of large uncertainties about the level of future demand and
about the feasible rate of progress with renewable energy resources,
there is need for flexibility on the supply side. That can be achieved by
keeping the nuclear option open, at least until more is known about the
level of constraints on fossil fuels, the potential scale of renewable
resources, and the potential for a more acceptable nuclear
technology—possibly in 15 years.
3. The Nuclear Option
• To make the nuclear option worthwhile implies that nuclear energy
should be able to supply a significant proportion of total energy demand
by mid-century and perhaps ≥20% by 2100. That would indicate, for
example, a fivefold expansion in the first half of the century and yet a
further doubling or more in the second.
• There have to be grave doubts whether this can be achieved with
present technology and the present fuel cycle. The technology of
reprocessing and disposal of waste in deep repositories is deeply
mistrusted by the public, and there must be concern whether these
methods are suited for large, world-wide expansion and yet provide
acceptable economic performance, levels of safety, and antiproliferation
security.
• Work in a number of laboratories has, over the last decade, indicated
ways that could make nuclear power more acceptable and perhaps more
competitive. This involves new reactor designs, novel means of
reprocessing, and studies of transmutation. Considerably more work is
?
required to confirm these hopes and develop the processes to
commercial applicability.
• Not to keep the nuclear option—phasing out the industry—will, with

present technology, be a difficult, lengthy, and expensive undertaking.

Decommissioning plants, dealing with nuclear waste and residues, and
cleaning up sites will require research to underpin such work. Because
decommissioning and waste disposal would also be an indispensable
task of an expanding nuclear industry, such R & D would be similar to
that needed to keep the nuclear option open. However, without a healthy
nuclear industry to back such research, this would be a difficult option,
with most problems falling to future generations to resolve.
4. The Research Dilemma
• Worldwide research expenditures in the nuclear fission area have been
dropping fast. Governments wish to disengage from the power market,
and private industry considers such research too long term to be funded
by it, unless it is backed by governments and/or the international
community.
• To ensure that current steps toward a more acceptable nuclear
technology are followed up, funds for carrying out such research will
have to be found. Much of this will have to come from governments.
• Today, many different schemes are being examined in many
laboratories; eventually a choice will have to be made about which ones
to take further. To ensure that funds are well spent, especially when it
comes to building prototype commercially sized units, there is a need for
international collaboration to guide such choices.
• Such suggestions will have to be “sold” to unwilling governments.
Owing to the unpopularity of nuclear energy, that may well be too
difficult for politicians to accept. Thus, finding funds for the research to
keep the nuclear option open will depend on the industry greatly
improving its public image.
5. In Summary
• The future of the nuclear industry is more in the hands of research than
in receiving orders for more plants. The latter would be welcomed by
nuclear-energy proponents, but only the former can save the industry.
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• To convince governments to fund the research and do so through

international collaboration will first require a change in public opinion,
at least to neutrality.
• The industry has to make a major effort to gain public confidence. As a
first step, perhaps a dialogue with the more moderate members of the
opposition might be established, with the aim to reach a better
understanding of each other’s position.
?
• Without such a change in acceptability, the industry’s future during the
next century could be bleak.

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Annual Review of Energy and the Environment
Volume 24, 1999
CONTENTS
ON THE ROAD TO GLOBAL ECOLOGY, H. A. Mooney 1
THE ART OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY: Protecting the Environment with

Better Technology, Arthur H. Rosenfeld 33
ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, John V. Mitchell 83

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
Examination of a Contentious Subject, Peter W. Beck 113
NUCLEAR POWER ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: Challenges and

Opportunities, Mujid S. Kazimi, Neil E. Todreas 139
IT'S NOT EASY BEING GREEN: Environmental Technologies Enhance

Conventional Hydropower''s Role in Sustainable Development, Patrick A.
March, Richard K. Fisher 173
BIOMASS ETHANOL: Technical Progress, Opportunities, and

Commercial Challenges, Charles E. Wyman 189
PROSPECTS FOR BUILDING A HYDROGEN ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE, Joan M. Ogden 227
FUEL CELLS: Reaching the Era of Clean and Efficient Power Generation
in the Twenty-First Century, Supramaniam Srinivasan, Renaut Mosdale,
Philippe Stevens, Christopher Yang 281
METHODS FOR ATTRIBUTING AMBIENT AIR POLLUTANTS TO
EMISSION SOURCES, Charles L. Blanchard 329
HARMFUL ALGAL BLOOMS: An Emerging Public Health Problem
with Possible Links to Human Stress on the Environment, J. Glenn
Morris Jr. 367
ECONOMIC GROWTH, LIBERALIZATION, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A Review of the Economic Evidence, Swee Chua 391
THE ECONOMICS OF ""WHEN"" FLEXIBILITY IN THE DESIGN

OF GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT POLICIES, Michael A.
Toman, Richard D. Morgenstern, John Anderson 431
HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE: The Status of Yucca Mountain,

Paul P. Craig 461
HOW MUCH IS ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT WORTH
AS INSURANCE, Robert N. Schock, William Fulkerson, Merwin L.
Brown, Robert L. San Martin, David L. Greene, Jae Edmonds 487
A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL CHANGE IN ASSESSMENT OF

CLIMATE POLICY, Christian Azar, Hadi Dowlatabadi 513
MODELING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: Implications for the Global

Environment, Arnulf Grübler, Nebojsa Nakicenovic , David G. Victor 545
A REVIEW OF NATIONAL EMISSIONS INVENTORIES FROM
SELECT NON-ANNEX I COUNTRIES: Implications for Counting
Sources and Sinks of Carbon, R. A. Houghton, Kilaparti Ramakrishna 571
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ALONG THE UNITED STATES-
MEXICO BORDER: Drivers of Change and Responses of Citizens and
Institutions, Diana M. Liverman, Robert G. Varady, Octavio Chávez,
Roberto Sánchez 607
NON-CO2 GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE ATMOSPHERE, M. A. K.

Khalil 645

Annurev Energy 24 1 113

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October 28, 1999 10:20 Annual Reviews AR090-04

Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 1999. 24:113–37

NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST

Key Words public judgment, history, future of energy, nuclear options

The Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 115

THE FORMATION OF BELIEFS

The Wish is Father to the Thought

advertises for a manager or for a consultant, it is doubtful whether someone strongly

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 117

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY1

The Early Years: 1945 to the Mid-1960s

1 This section is a shortend and updated version of Chapter 3 in reference 4.

The Years of Expansion: Mid-1960s to Mid-1980s

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 119

The Years of Uncertainty: Mid-1980s to the Present

lobbies. It also underlined the global nature of nuclear safety.

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 121

IS THERE A NEED FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY?

Notwithstanding today’s lack of orders and the unpopularity of nuclear energy,

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 123

Primary energy (TWy) 12.9 35 35 35 28 20 20

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 125

THE NUCLEAR OPTIONS

TABLE 2 Nuclear capacity under different scenarios

2020 646 417 732 645 480 605

1. Expansion using present technologies—asks whether the required public

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 127

Expansion Using Present Technology

contractors, or operators might be inadequately trained. It is unlikely that local

>$40 billion by the time the repository is finally sealed in 2116.

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 129

accelerators, to keep the nuclear reactor going.

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 131

can be no guarantee of success. Naturally, the development and demonstration on a

Phasing Out the Industry—Foreclosing the Option

The Research and Development Dilemma

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 133

well become the only way to proceed.

1. Lessons from History

The Pronuclear View “Nuclear power is a success; after 50 years it has

The Antinuclear View “Nuclear power is a failure; it failed to meet

There have been many improvements, but few radical changes.

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 135

• Not to keep the nuclear option—phasing out the industry—will, with

present technology, be a difficult, lengthy, and expensive undertaking.

• To convince governments to fund the research and do so through

next century could be bleak.

Visit the Annual Reviews home page at www.AnnualReviews.org

TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NUCLEAR ENERGY 137

THE ART OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY: Protecting the Environment with

ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, John V. Mitchell 83

NUCLEAR POWER ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: Challenges and

Opportunities, Mujid S. Kazimi, Neil E. Todreas 139

IT'S NOT EASY BEING GREEN: Environmental Technologies Enhance

BIOMASS ETHANOL: Technical Progress, Opportunities, and

THE ECONOMICS OF ""WHEN"" FLEXIBILITY IN THE DESIGN

HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE: The Status of Yucca Mountain,

A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL CHANGE IN ASSESSMENT OF

MODELING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: Implications for the Global

NON-CO2 GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE ATMOSPHERE, M. A. K.

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