PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 1. Gravity, i.e.
, it must be grave and serious such that the party incapable
Q: Jocelyn was married to Fumio in 1993, and in 2007, they jointly filed for
divorce before the City Hall of Sakado City, Saitama Prefecture. As the
divorce was accepted, Jocelyn sought the recognition thereof here in the
Philippines. Jocelyn submitted the Acceptance Certificate stating that her and
Fumio’s written notification of divorce had been accepted, as certified by the
Mayor of Sakado City, Saitama Prefecture. The Acceptance Certificate was
accompanied by an Authentication from the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo,
Japan. Is the Acceptance Certficate sufficient to prove the fact of divorce?
A: Yes. The Acceptance Certificate that was issued to Jocelyn and Fumio
when they filed their divorce before the mayor already suffices as proof of the
fact of divorce.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by the court, the party
pleading it must first prove the fact of divorce and its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it. (Republic v. Kikuchi, G.R. No. 243646: June 22, 2022,
Hernando, J.)
• PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
o Clear and convincing evidence
o Prove juridical antecedence by ordinary witness
o Incurability - enduring, not in the medical, but in a legal sense
with respect to a specific person
Q: Hannamer filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code before the TC. Hannamer alleged that Grant,
her husband, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with all the
essential marital obligations. She averred that Grant showed complete lack of
understanding of his duties and responsibilities as a husband and father during
their marriage. He never worked, and only depended on his older sibling for
financial support, Despite not earning, Grant spent most of his time and money
on gambling and going to cockfights, instead of taking care of his family. If
you were the judge, would you grant Hannamer's Petition? Why or why not?
A: No, Hannamer failed to sufficiently prove that Grant is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with one's essential marital obligations. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by:
1
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
2. Juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestation may emerge
only after the marriage; and
3. Incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it be otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved (Pugoy-Solidum v.
Republic, G.R. No. 213954; April 20, 2022, Hernando, J.).
• DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION
o If after 3 years of living together with her husband, the wife
remained a virgin, the husband is presumed to be impotent.
(Rabuya, 2018) The husband will have to overcome this
presumption.
NOTE: Relative impotency may now be invoked as a ground for
annulment. The Committee has decided to include relative impotency
of one party because there are cases where a person is impotent with
respect to their spouse but not with other men or women. (Sempio Diy,
1995)
Q: M and J were sweethearts but ended after some time. J dated someone else.
By March, M and J reconciled after J insisted that no one touched her. In April,
J was one month pregnant which made M doubtful if he was the father. J
ensured M that he was the only one she had sexual intercourse with. Three
years after, M and J got married. Years after, M took a DNA test which showed
he is not the father of their child. This prompted M to file an annulment of
marriage on the ground that the consent of M was obtained by fraud in relation
to the concealment of J of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband. Will the annulment of marriage
prosper?
A: No. The concealed pregnancy, which vitiates consent, must have existed at
the time of the marriage. Thus, if the wife had previous relations with other
men and as a consequence of which she became pregnant or bore a child
previously, the concealment thereof will not be a ground for annulling the
marriage if at the time the marriage was celebrated the wife was not pregnant.
It is the concealment of the fact of pregnancy by another man at the time of
marriage that constitutes fraud as a ground for annulment. In this case, the
child was already almost three years old when M and J got married. As J was
not pregnant at the time of the marriage, any purported fraud she may have
committed to induce M to marry her cannot be considered he fraudulent
concealment contemplated under Article 46 (2) (Republic v. Villacorta, G.R.
No. 249253, June 23, 2021.)
DEFECTIVE MARRIAGES
Q: Rosario recalls that a friend introduced her to Yoshio as one with whom
she can simulate marriage as a way to facilitate her acquisition of a Japanese
visa. She acceded. Thus, she and Yoshio met at the Manila City Hall. There,
they signed a blank marriage certificate, but were assured by the solemnizing
officer that the certificate will never be registered or recorded in the Civil
Registry. It was the last time she saw Yoshio. Discuss the effect of absence,
defect or irregularity of the requisites of marriage.
A: The Family Code provides that marriages lacking any essential or formal
requisite are void ab initio (with the exception of marriages solemnized by any
person not legally authorized to perform marriages where either or both parties
believed in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do
so), that marriages attended by a defective essential requisite are voidable, and
that marriages attended by an irregularity as to formal requisites are valid,
subject to the potential criminal, civil, or administrative liability of those
responsible for the irregularity (Ado-an-Morimoto v. Morimoto, G.. No.
247576, March 15, 2021)
LEGAL SEPARATION
Q: W and L have been married for more than 20 years when L filed a
complaint for legal separation on the ground of repeated physical violence or
grossly abusive conduct against her and their children. One day, W hit L on
different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her, and asked her to leave the
house, which she did. W contends that L abandoned the family, thus, the
complaint for legal separation should be denied because they have both given
grounds for legal separation. Is the contention of W correct?
A: No. L's act did not constitute abandonment so the petition for legal
separation should be granted. Following Article 56 (4) of the Family code,
when both parties have given ground for legal separation, the petition for legal
separation should be denied. However, as a ground for legal separation, the
abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one (1) year. The act of I leaving the house due
2
to W's abusive conduct does not constitute abandonment contemplated in the
aforementioned provision (Ong. v. Ong, GR. No. 153206, October 23, 2006.)
Q: Angelique Pearl and Mark were high school sweet hearts and they
eventually got married when Angelique got pregnant. When Mark eventually
finished college, he made no attempt at all to find gainful employment. He was
lazy, extravagant, and given to vices. He refused to find a job and merely relied
on her for financial support. Their married life had been marred by quarrels,
disagreements, and even violence. Hence, Angelique Pearl sought to nullify
their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Dr. Carcereny, a
psychiatrist, diagnosed Angelique Pearl with Borderline Personality Disorder
and Mark with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The courts ruled in their
favor but the OSG maintains that the reasons stated by Angelique are mere
grounds for legal separation. Can the ground for legal separation be the basis
for declaring the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity?
A: Yes. It is true that physical and verbal abuses, neglect and abandonment of
spouse and children, or acts of infidelity including adultery or concubinage,
each constitutes a ground for legal separation. But where each of these grounds
or a combination thereof, at the
combination thereof, at the same time, manifests psychological incapacity that
had been existing even prior to marriage, the court may avoid the marriage on
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
(Republic of the Philippines v. Claur, G.R. No. 246868; February 15, 2022,
Hernando, J.).
PROPERTY RELATIONS
Q: Can a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced enter into a marriage settlement?
A: Yes, provided that a guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a
party to the marriage settlement. For the validity of any marriage settlements
executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable
for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto
(Article 79 of the Family Code).
Q: X and Y were married on December 27, 1988, but their marriage was later
nullified on the ground of psychological incapacity. However, the proceedings
for liquidation, partition, distribution of the common properties and the
delivery of their children's presumptive legitimes remain pending. If you are
the judge in this case, what law will you apply to liquidate the properties of X
and Y?
A: The property relations of parties to a void marriage is governed either by
Article 147 or 148 of the Family Code. Since the petitioner and respondent
suffer no legal impediment and exclusively lived with each other under a void
marriage, their property relation is one of co-ownership under Art 147 of the
Family Code. The said provision finds application in this case even if the
parties were married before the Family Code took effect by express provision
of the same on its retroactive effect for as long as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquire rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Here,
no vested rights will be impaired in the application of the said provision given
that Article 147 of the Family Code is actually just a remake of Article 144 of
the 1950 of the Civil Code (Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8,
2020).
FAMILY HOME
Q: Dario died intestate. He was survived by his daughter, Perla, and son,
Marcelino. They extrajudicially settled the estate of Dario. Thereafter, Perla
formally advised Marcelino of her intention to partition the subject property
and terminate the co-ownership. Marcelino refused to partition the property,
hence, Perla instituted an action for partition. Marcelino opposed on the
ground that the subject land is a family home because his minor son is living
on the same. Is a minor entitled to the continued use and non-partition of a
family home despite the death of the head of the family who constituted the
same?
A: Yes, provided the following requisites concur:
1. The relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
2. They live in the family home, and
3. They are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family
(Patricio V. Dario Ill, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006).
Q: Do the beneficiaries of the family home include the grandchildren and great
grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home?
3
A: Yes, the term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must
necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses
who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemos (Patricio v. Dario lIl G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006).
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Q: Chiong executed a Deed of Donation bequeathing a land to Jose. However,
Mario filed a complaint for Annulment of such donation and argues that he has
the right over the land because he is the grandson of Chiong. He claims that
his late mother, Barbara, is the daughter of Chiong. He even presented a
photocopy of the birth certificate of his mother to establish the legitimate status
of the latter. Can Mario file an action to claim legitimate filiation on behalf of
her mother, Barbara?
A: No. As provided by Article 173 of the Family Code, an action to claim
legitimate filiation is strictly personal to the child whose fillation is in question,
and he or she may exercise such anytime within his lifetime. The only three
instances when such right passes to the child's heirs are:
(a) when the child dies during minority;
(b) when the child dies in a state of insanity; or
(c) when the child dies after the commencement of the action.
Although there is a mention of Barbara's passing, there is nothing in the records
of the case which would show that Barbara had died under any of the
circumstances outlined under Article 173, which would have transmitted the
right to claim her legitimate status to her heirs, herein petitioners (Bernardo v.
Fernando, G.R. No. 211034. November 18, 2020).
Q: Y registered the birth of their illegitimate children without the knowledge
and signature of X, his partner and the mother of the said children. X filed a
petition for the cancellation of said birth certificates on the ground that she had
not consented to the registration. Rule on the petition.
A: The petition for the cancellation of the birth certificates must be granted.
Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, state that in cases
of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly
by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses to
acknowledge the child. Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate
child signs the birth certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether
the father recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of
an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who
conclusively carries the blood of the mother. The mother must sign and agree
to the information entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental
authority and custody of the illegitimate child (in the Matter of Petition for
Cancellation of Certificates of Live Birth of Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan
v. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017).
SUPPORT
Q: A and B were married and were blessed with three (3) children. The
relationship went sour and A decided to leave the conjugal home taking their
children with her. Subsequently, A filed a petition claiming support from B.
However, B only claims to be able to afford P6,000 in support, which is
insufficient. The trial court decided in favor of A and ruled that B's parents
will be jointly responsible for the support of A and B's children. Is the trial
court's decision correct?
A: Yes, the decision of the trial court is correct. Following Article 199 of the
Family Code, grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are
capable of supporting them. In this case, the support B can provide is clearly
Insufficient, hence his parents can be held jointly liable. Although the
obligation to provide support arising from the parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and
general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. Also, while
parental authority and the correlative parental rights pertains to parents,
passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation
to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the
parents but also for the latter's inability to provide sufficient support (Spouses
Lim. v. Lim, G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009).
Q: A judgement declaring the marriage of X and Y void becomes final and
executory. In consequence thereof, an amount for support pendente lite for Y
and their 3 children was approved by the court for P175,000 per month.
Several years later, Y applied for the increase of support because two of their
children are already in the age of majority. Rule on the contention of X.
4
A: Article 198 of the Family Code provides that the obligation of mutual
support between spouses ceases when a judgement declaring a marriage void
becomes final and executory-As the parties' marriage was declared void,
petitioner was only obliged to support, after such date, their 3 children.
Moreover, 2 of their children already attained the age of majority. If such is
the case, Y ceased to have authority to claim support in their behalf (Paterno
v. Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020).
PROPERTY
Q: ABC Corporation is a state-owned corporation with the primary purpose of
administering the operations of the Petrochemical Industrial zone. XYZ
Corporation is a private corporation engaged in the business of transmitting
electric power and was granted a franchise to operate under a law. Pursuant to
its franchise, XYZ Corporation sought to expropriate a parcel of land, upon
payment of just compensation, located in the Petrochemical Industrial Zone.
The zone was initially part of the parcel of land of the public domain but its
administration and management was subsequently granted to ABC corporation
for the development and operation of petrochemical and related industries.
ABC Corporation contended that such land is a land of the public domain as it
is devoted to public use or purpose that is a matter of national interest, and not
a private property. Thus, it cannot be a subject of expropriation. Does the land
still form part of public domain, or does it form part of private property?
A: The land is a patrimonial property that assumes the nature of private
property. The mere fact that a parcel of land is owned by the State or any of its
instrumentalities does not necessarily mean that such land is of public
dominion. Upon the explicit declaration of alienability and disposability, the
land ceases to possess the characteristics inherent in properties of public
dominion, namely, that they are outside the commerce of man, cannot be
acquired by prescription, and cannot be registered under the land registration
law and accordingly assume the nature of patrimonial property of the State,
that is property owned by the State in Its private capacity (PNOC Alternative
Fuels Corp. v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936;
September 4, 2019).
Q: A is the registered owner of Lot A and adjoining the same was the lot
owned by C. A filed an action to quiet title and to recover possession, claiming
that he had extended his possession up to the former's property. To support his
action, he presented an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, a Free Patent
Certificate, a Transfer of Certificate of Title, and tax declarations. C, on the
other hand, presented a deed of sale and several tax declarations in the name
of his predecessors-in-interest. However, based on the survey by the geodetic
engineer, it was discovered that C's deed of sale and tax declarations covered
Lot B. Decide.
A: A's certificate of title cannot be defeated by the deed of sale and tax
declarations presented by C. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. As against an array of proof consisting of tax
declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of
ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title
indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed
premises (Spouses Alcantara v. Spouses Belen, GR No. 200204, April 25,
2017)
HIDDEN TREASURE
Article 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or
other property on which it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the
State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be
allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any
share of the treasure. If the things found be of interest to science or the arts,
the State may acquire them at their just price, which shall be divided in
conformity with the rule stated.
Q: H, owner of Lot A, learning that Japanese soldiers may have buried gold
and treasures at the adjoining vacant Lot B belong to spouses X and Y.
excavated without the consent of the spouses in Lot B where he succeeded in
unearthing gold and precious stones. How will the treasures found by H be
divided?
A: Article 438 of the Civil Code provides that hidden treasure belongs to the
owner of the land, building, or other property on which it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the
State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be
allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespassed, he shall not be entitled to
any share of the treasure. In this case, H, who found the treasure, Is a trespasser
5
land of spouses X and Y. Therefore, he shall not be entitled to a share of the
hidden treasure.
ACCESSION
Q: E and P borrowed P100,000 from T. As security for the loan, E and P
mortgaged their land to T. However, P died in 1989. In 1990, T found out
about P's death when she went on vacation in the Philippines. Later, E was
unable to pay the loan and thus agreed to sell the land to T for P150,000. The
parties executed a deed of sale and release of mortgage in 1992, on which deed
appears the signatures of E, P, and T, whereby the land was sold to T. T
constructed a 3-storey building worth P2,000,000 on the land, E refused to
acknowledge the sale, claiming that P's signature was forged. Hence, T
demanded from E PI50,000, the consideration for the land sold, and
P2,000,000, for construction cost of the buildings. What are the rights of T and
E?
A: Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner and
the builder, planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if both
of them were in good faith. T is a builder in bad faith. When the deed of sale
was executed in 1992, which contained a signature purportedly of P, she was
already aware of P's death. Despite such awareness of the defect in their title
to the land, T still constructed the building thereon. E is a landowner in bad
faith. E knew of the defect in the execution of the deed of sale from the start
but still acquiesced to the construction of the 3-storey building. Where both
the landowner and builder are in good faith, the landowner, in this case. T is
given two options under Art. 448: (a) he may appropriate the improvements
for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith, in this case,
the necessary and useful expenses under Arts. 546 and 548: or (b) he may sell
the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent (Delos
Santos v. Abejon, G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017).
Q: Spouses P are the registered owners of a certain parcel of land. M, in turn,
on the basis of representation made by D, a complete stranger, that he is the
owner of said property, rented the same from him and thereon, constructed a
house. Upon discovery that M built a house on said lot, Spouses P made
repeated demands for him to vacate. M, however, refused to comply.
Aggrieved, Spouses P filed a complaint for recovery of possession against M.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, M alleged that they Are
builders in good faith since they truly believed that the lot belonged to D. Is M
considered a builder in good faith?
A: M is not a builder in good faith. A builder in good faith is a builder who
was not aware of a defect or flaw in his or her title when he or she introduced
improvements on a lot that turns out to be owned by another, in the given facts,
M claims that he believed D when he claimed that the lot belonged to her. Yet,
as also stated in the facts, D was a complete stranger to him. The lack of blood
relation should have been enough to put him on guard and convince him not
to rely on her claim of ownership. If M had looked into the ownership of the
lot, he would have easily discovered chat it was titled to Spouses P (Padilla v.
Malicsi, G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016)
Q: Perez applied for the administrative titling of his lot and subsequently,
Torrens titles were issued to him. Because of this, a complaint for
reconveyance of lot was filed by Magsaysay alleging that their predecessor-
in-interest, the late Jesus, was in lawful possession in the concept of an owner
of the subject land. That the land was first declared in the name of Jesus under
a Tax Declaration although it did not contain a specific cadastral lot number.
Moreover, after Jesus died, Magsaysay, introduced various improvements but
were eventually destroyed when Mt. Pinatubo erupted in 1992. Lastly, he
alleged that the Torrens titles are void as Perez purportedly falsified and
committed fraud in their respective applications of the issuance of the patent
as they have never been in actual and physical possession of the subject land.
Decide.
A: In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim. In other words, the person who claims a better right of ownership to the
property sought to be recovered must prove two things: first, the identity of the
land claimed, and second, his title thereto. As applied in this case, Magsaysay
utterly failed to prove the identity of the land they are claiming and also their
titile thereto. The property being claimed by Magsaysay is not identical to the
property titled to Perez (Heirs of Magsaysay v. Sps. Perez, G.R. No. 225426,
June 28, 2021, Hernando, J.).
Q: Belinda owns a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. She
acquired said land from her predecessor-in-interest who, in turn, merely
tolerated the occupation of the property by Espinosa. After title was transferred
to Belinda, she likewise tolerated the presence of the respondents upon the
6
understanding that they will peacefully vacate the land once the petitioners
need to use the same arises. When petitioners demands to vacate the property
were made, however, the respondents refused to comply. Belinda filed an
action for unlawful detainer but was opposed by Espinosa on the ground that
the action was improper because he is in possession of of the lot in the concept
of an owner, not by tolerance of Belinda. Decide.
A: The action for unlawful detainer must be sustained. The Certificate of Title
being held by Belinda should be respected as it proves her ownership over the
property. Clearly, she possess superior rights over the possession of the
property as the registered owner thereof. Moreover, Espinosa's claim of
possession of the property in the concept of an owner is a collateral issue that
may not be decided upon in a case for unlawful detainer. To stress, the only
issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership
by any of the parties involved (Sps. Liu v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 238513, July
31, 2019, Hernando, J.)
Q: Josefina filed a complaint for Quieting of Title against Gatos. Josefina
claimed ownership over a lot, having inherited the subject property from her
predecessor-in-interest wo had openly, publicly, continuously, and peacefully
possessed the same without interruption for more than 30 years in the concept
of an owner and having uncontroverted tax declarations under her ancestor's
name. She alleged that Gatos surreptitiously and without their knowledge and
consent caused the subject property to be surveyed for the purpose of claiming
ownership. Gato's acts disturbed and put a cloud on her ownership, possession,
and title over the subject property. Will the case prosper? Why or why not?
A: No. In an action for quieting of title, the plaintiff has the burden to show by
preponderance of evidence that they have a legal and equitable title to or
interest in the real property. subject of the action. It is thus clear that legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the real property subject matter of the action
must be established by the plaintiffs as a prerequisite in order for their action
to quiet title to prosper. Josefina did not have a legal title to the subject property
because there were no certificates of title in her name. She failed at the outset
to establish the first requirement of having legal or equitable title over the
property in dispute (Viloria v. Heirs of Gaetos, G.R. No. 206240; May 12,
2021, Hernando, J.).
Q: O bought a piece of agricultural land in Sorsogon evidenced by a notarized
absolute deed of sale. B, his brother, managed the lot and in exchange, B would
deliver the produce of such to o. The real property tax on the property was paid
by o. However, B eventually failed to turn over the produce and failed to vacate
the lot despite repeated demands. Thus, O filed for quieting of title against B.
B averred that he has open, continuous, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the property for fifty (50) years and thus owns the land thru
acquisitive prescription. Decide.
A: O's case for quieting of title should prosper. For an action for quieting of
title to prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to, or interest in the property which is the subject matter of the action. Legal
title denotes registered ownership while equitable title means beneficial
ownership. Equitable title is derived through a valid contract or relation. In this
case, O's title over the lot is derived through a contract of sale as evidenced by
the notarized deed of sale. His ownership is proven not only by the deed of
sale in his favor but also by his exercise of rights (receiving the fruits) and
obligations (paying taxes) as owner thereof (Heirs of Extremadura v.
Extremadura, G.R. No. 211065, June 15, 2016).
Q: Ronico filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against Potoy
that sought to quiet title over a parcel of land registered in the name of the
former. Ronico denied having executed any deed of conveyance covering the
property and averred that Potoy's allegation that they acquired the property
was baseless. During trial, Potoy presented « notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
and offered as witness the notary public who notarized the same. The notary
public testified that the parties went to his office sometime for the execution
and notarization of a deed of sale. Ronico countered that the presumption of
regularity of a notarized document should not be upheld because she knows in
her heart that the sale did not happen. If you were the judge, how would you
rule the case?
A: I would rule in favor of Ronico. The testimony of a notary public, who is
an officer of the court, enjoys greater credence. Aside from denials, Ronico
failed to present any other evidence to prove his claim. Therefore, the second
indispensable requisite for an action to quiet title to prosper was not met,
namely: the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on one's title must be shown to be in fact Invalid or Inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, Ronico failed to
discharge the burden of proving their claim that no deed of sale was executed
7
in favor of Potoy covering the subject property (Sps. Lopez v. Sps. Potoy, G.R.
No. 250846, January 5, 2022, Hernando, J.).
CO-OWNERSHIP
Q: Y sold two (2) parcels of land to A, B, C, D, and X collectively. The titles
were issued to them, hence, a co-ownership over the properties existed. After
5 years, without the parties having entered into any subsequent agreement to
keep the above-said properties undivided, X filed a case to compel the partition
of such properties. A contended that although the name of X appears in the
title of the properties, he cannot be considered a co-owner since he never
contributed to its acquisition and maintenance, nor paid any taxes due thereon.
A also, contended that X was a cousin of theirs who used to work for them as
their trusted laborer. They even sent him to school and allowed him to
construct a house on the condition that he would pay and reimburse them for
all the expenses. Is X a co-owner or a mere trustee of the subject properties?
A: X is a co-owner of the subject properties. Even if x did not contribute in the
payment of the purchase price of the subject properties, it does not necessarily
mean that he could not become a co-owner of the subject properties who can
compel partition. The law does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner
derived his her title, may it be through gratuity or through onerous
consideration. In this case, X who derived his title and was granted co
ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition (Logrosa v. Spouses
Azares, G.R. No. 21761; March 27, 2019).
Q: A and B are co-owners of a parcel of land and of the residential house
located thereon. For taxation purposes, however, the house was declared solely
in the name of A. Being the alleged owner of said house, A demanded B to
vacate the same but to no avail. Thus, A instituted an action for ejectment
against B. Will the case prosper?
A: The case will not prosper. In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right
belong to different persons, with each of them holding the property pro
indiviso and exercising his rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may
use and enjoy. the property with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his co-owners. In the given facts, A does not have a cause of
action to eject B since, as a co-owner, the latter is also entitled to possess and
enjoy the subject property. If, at all, he remedy of A is to file an action for
partition (Azures v. Spouses Ventanilla, G.. No. 222297, July 9, 2018).
Q: Jesus inherited a lot from his father. He diligently pald its real property
taxes from that time on under a tax declaration which is in his name. One day,
he was surprised when he discovered that Ponce encroached upon the entire
portion of his lot. He immediately demanded that they vacate his land and to
return it to him. However, Ponce refused to heed Jesus' demand on the ground
that he bought the land from the latter's brother. He also argued that the tax
declarations in the name of Jesus are not sufficient proof of his ownership,
much less his possession, of the land. If you were the judge, how would you
rule the case?
A: I would rule in favor of Jesus. Indeed, while the tax declaration is not
conclusive proof of ownership of Jesus over the subject land, it is an indication
however that he possesses the property in the concept of an owner for nobody
in his or her right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
or her actual or constructive possession. In this case, Jesus has been diligently
paying the real property tax of the subject land. On the other hand, Ponce failed
to present any proof of ownership such as payment of real property taxes or a
certificate of title in their names over the Lot (Sps. Ponce v. Sps. Aldanese,
G.R. No. 216587, August 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Q: L owns a parcel of land in a nearby town. Because she cannot always visit
the land, N, her sister, asked for I's permission to develop and cultivate the
land for her business. L acquiesced to N's request. After a year, I asked for
monthly rental payments from N for the use of her land. N approached you as
a lawyer, asking if she has an obligation to pay L for the use of the subject
land. What will be your advice?
A: As N's lawyer, I will advise her not to pay L monthly rentals for the use of
the subject land. In the absence of proof of any contractual basis for a person's
possession, the only legal implication is that the possession of the subject
property is by mere tolerance of the owner. Where the possession of the
property. is by mere tolerance of the owner, the latter has no obligation to
receive any payment from the possessor. Thus, N has no obligation to pay L
monthly rentals (Lobrera us. Fernandez, G.R. No. 142882, May 2, 2006).
Q: Y sold to G a Pajero, which turned out to be a vehicle stolen from the Office
of the President. Y delivered the same to G, who had no knowledge that the
vehicle was stolen, in turn possessed the same. Is the possession of the Pajero
by G, acquired in good faith, equivalent to a title?
8
A: No. The general rule that the possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to a title, does not apply in cases where the owner of
said movable property has been unlawfully deprived of the same, as in this
case where the vehicle subject of the sale had been stolen. Y had no right to
transfer the ownership of the subject Pajero at the time it was delivered to G,
as the object of the contract of sale is clearly illicit (Spouses Gaspar v. Disini,
Jr., G.R. No. 239644, February 3, 2021)
USUFRUCT
Q: D was granted a usufruct over the land of O. O eventually constructed a
building on said land and leased such to different tenants. D demanded to
collect the rentals of the building from O by virtue of the usufruct reserved for
the former on the land on which the building was erected. Can D collect the
rentals of the building?
A: No. D cannot collect the rents of the building. The reserved right of usufruct
does not include the rentals of the building subsequently constructed on the
vacant lot. However, it does entitle the usufructuary the right to receive
reasonable rental for the portion of the land occupied by the building. Thus, D
cannot collect the rents from the building, but he is entitled to receive rent for
the portion of the land on which the building was erected.
Q: F is the usufructuary under a will of the income of a building. The will
provides that F, as usufructuary, has the power to collect rents, pay at her own
cost and expense real taxes, special assessments, insurance premiums,
necessary repairs, and such other acts of administration. G is the naked owner
over said property, with whom E entered into a lease contract with, as lessee.
F then instituted an action of ejectment against E, the tenant, because F needs
the premises for her to live in. E argues that F has no right to eject her from
the premises because she has a contract of lease with G, the naked owner, and
that F has no authority at all with respect to leasing the property but only of
collecting the rents. Who has the right to choose the tenant?
A: F, as the usufructuary, has the right to choose the tenant and administer the
property in question. In this case, F has been made the usufructuary of the
income of the property under a will. Subsequently, all the acts of management
and administration such as those to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve
the property making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special
assessments, and insurance premiums thereon were vested as usufructuary.
Therefore, F has the right to choose the tenant as a corollary to her right to
administer such property as a usufructuary (Fabie us. David, G.R. No. L-123,
December 12, 1945).
Q: On January 1, 2020, upon the birth of Spouses C's daughter R, J, the owner
of a parcel of land, granted Spouses C a usufruct over the property untif
January 1, 2040 when k would have reached her 20th birthday. R, however,
died on Junel, 2030 when she was only 10 years old due to an unidentified
blood disease. J notified Spouses C that the usufruct had been extinguished by
the death of R, and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and deliver
the same to the former. The spouses, still grief-stricken over the death of their
daughter, refused to vacate the place on the ground that the usufruct in their
favor would expire only on January 1, 2040 when R would have reached her
20th birthday and that the death of R before her 20th birthday did not
extinguish the usufruct. Whose contention is correct?
A: Spouses C's contention is correct. Under Article 606 of the civil Code, a
usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before a third person reaches a
certain age shall subsist for the number of years specified even if the third
person should die before the period expires, unless such usufruct has been
expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of such person. In the
case at bar, there was no express stipulation that the consideration for the
usufruct is the existence of R. Thus, the usufruct is not extinguished and shall
subsist until January 1, 2040.
EASEMENT
Q: A is the owner of a parcel of land which was being surrounded by the
property of Spouses R. Following an ocular inspection, it was discovered that
a public road fronted A's property. To reach the same, however, she needs to
traverse other properties and a four-meter-wide irrigation canal. It was
likewise discovered that the owners of the neighboring properties have already
constructed their own bridges to cross said irrigation canal. Claiming that the
property of Spouses R is the only adequate and most convenient outlet from
her property to the highway, A filed a complaint for easement of right of way
against Spouses R. Spouses R, on the other hand, argued that the proposed
easement would traverse their fixed improvements. Decide the case.
9
A: A has no right to an easement of right of way. Art. 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code provide the requisites of an easement of right of way:
1. an immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other
persons;
2. it is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
3. payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded
immovable;
4. the isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner' acts; and
5. the proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.
Here, there is an adequate outlet from A's property to the public highway,
which is through the irrigation canal. Although sald outlet may be longer and
more inconvenient to A, because she will have to construct a bridge over the
irrigation canal, such inconvenience will not justity the imposition of an
easement of right of way. Verily, the convenience of the owner of the dominant
estate is not the gauge in determining whether to impose an easement right of
way, especially if the owner's needs may be satisfied without imposing the
easement. Hence, A has no right to said casement (Reyes v. Spouses Ramos,
G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015).
Q: X is the owner of a lot which is isolated by several surrounding estates,
including the lot owned by A. He needs a right of way in order to have access
to a public road. The shortest and most convenient access to the nearest public
road passes through A's lot. A objected to the establishment of the easement
because it would cause substantial damage to the 2 houses already standing on
his property. A alleged that X has other right-of-way alternatives, such as the
existing wooden bridge over sipac Creck bounding X's lot on the northeast;
that the bridge, if made concrete, could provide ingress or egress to the public
road. May X compel A to grant him a right of way?
A: No, X may not compel A to grant him a right of way. Art. 650 of the Civil
Code provides that the easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not
concur in a single tenement, the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the
shortest distance criterion. Here, the establishment of a right-of-way through
the A's lot would cause destruction on the house already standing on the
premises. Thus, although this right of way has the shortest distance to a public
road, it is not the least prejudicial. An option to traverse two vacant lots without
causing any damage, albeit not the shortest distance, is available (Calimoso v.
Roullo, G.R. No. 198594, January 25, 2016).
Q: Spouses E are residents of a subdivision which is situated at the lower
portion of a Village being constructed at the time. After continuous heavy rain
which caused a large volume of water to flow from the Village to Spouses E's
subdivision, which also directly hit Spouses E's house, their fence furniture,
appliances, and car were all damaged. Spouses E then filed a complaint for
damages against V, the developer of the Village. Spouses E blamed V for
negligently failing Rules and Regulations, and failing to provide retaining
walls and other flood control devices which could have prevented the softening
of the soil and consequent inundation. Is V liable for damages caused by the
burdensome flooding of water caused by the constructions in the Village,
which is a higher estate?
A: Yes, V shall be liable for damages. Article 637 of the Civil Code and Article
50 of the Water Code provides that the owner of the higher estate cannot make
works which will increase the natural flow of water which the lower estate is
obliged to receive. Thus, when the waters which flow from a higher state are
those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage
occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to
compensation. In the given facts, the construction works done by V gave
Spouses E's obligation, as owners of the lower estates, more burdensome than
what the law contemplated.
As lower estates they are only obliged to receive water naturally flowing from
higher estates and such should be free from any human intervention. The
bulldozing and flattening of the hills led to the softening of the soil that could
then be easily carried by the current of water whenever it rained, which E is
not anymore obligated to receive. Hence, V shall be liable to pay for damages
caused to the lower estate (Spouses Ermino v. Golden Village Homeowners
Association inc., GR No. 180808, August 13, 2018).
Q: Spouses G purchased Lot B from Spouses S. At the time of the purchase, a
one-storey house was already constructed thereon. Lot A, the adjoining lot
owned by Spouses s, was an idle land without any improvements until latter
started the construction of a two-storey residential house therein. Spouses G
10
claims that, prior to said construction, they received enough bright and natural
light from their windows but the construction rendered their house dark that
they are unable to do their normal undertakings without switching on their
lights. The windows and other openings, were now prevented from receiving
light and view due to the bigger structure built in the wall of Sps. G's one-
storey house by the Spouses S on Lot A. Spouses G filed a complaint for
easement of light, air and view, against Spouses S asserting that they acquired
by title an easement of light and view. Spouses s contended that the more
presence of windows on the one-storey house does not give rise to an easement
by title and that Sps. G also failed to acquire an easement by prescription
because they never alleged that they made a formal prohibition of the
construction of a taller structure on the subject lot. Decide on the case.
A: I would rule in favor of Spouses G for they have already acquired an
easement of light and view with respect to Lot A owned by the Spouses §.
Under Article 624 of the Civil Code, there arises a title to an easement of light
and view, even in the absence of any formal act undertaken by the owner of
the dominant estate, if this apparent visible sign such as the existence old door
and windows, continue to remain and subsist, in this case, prior to the purchase
of the subject property by Spouses G, the subject property and its adjoining
lot, were both owned by the Spouses S. On the subject property, a one-storey
house laden with several windows and openings was built and the windows
and openings remained open. There exists an apparent sign of servitude
between two estates. Spouses 5 are prohibited from building any structures or
improvements that will obstruct the window of the one-storey house. Thus,
Spouses G have acquired an easement of light and view by title despite the
lack of any formal notice or prohibition made upon the owner of the servient
estate (Spouses Garcia vs Spouses Santos, G.R. No. 228993, June 17,2019).
DONATION
Q: Prudencio, Florentino, and Valentin inherited a land from their mother. The
land was equally divided among themselves. One day, Valentin requested
Prudencio to donate the 10-square meter portion of his land being encroached
by the former's balcony. Prudencio agreed to Valentin's request out of his love
and trust for his brother. Valentin then asked Prudencio to sign a document
that was written in English but Prudencio was unable to understand the
contents. Valentin told Prudencio that the document is for the partition of their
inherited land. 14 years later, Prudencio found out that the document he signed
was a Deed of Donation in favor of Valentin. Is the deed of donation executed
by Prudencion valid?
A: No. Donation is an act of liberality, as such, the requisites of a valid contract
under Article 1318 of the Civil Code must concur, namely: (1) consent of the
contracting parties, that is consent to donate the subject land to petitioners; (2)
object certain which is the subject matter of the contract: (6) cause of the
obligation which is established. Consent is absent in the instant case.
Prudencio did not give his consent to the donation of their land to Valentin. As
for prescription, the action for annulment of the Deed of Donation is
imprescriptible. Hence, no valid donation had transpired between the parties
(Cardinez v. Sps. Cardinez, G.R. No. 213001, August 4, 2021, Hernando, J.).
Q: A filed a complaint for quieting of title over a parcel of land against B. He
alleged that he is the true and owner of the parcel of land after acquiring it
through a Deed of Donation executed by his mother. His mother acquired the
same property from C and her co-owner D through a Deed of Sale dated
December 16, 1994 which finds its origin from OCT No. R-578. B, in his
defense, alleged that his title was based on authentic documents while the title
of A's predecessor-in-interest is evidently null and void ab initio because it was
derived from a Deed of Sale which was supposedly signed by vendor C
although she was already dead, having died in 1988. Moreover, the signatory-
vendor, D denied that she ever signed the Deed of Sale which is supposedly
that of her husband, I, signifying his conformity to the sale, is likewise a fake
signature of her husband because he was already dead at the time of the
execution of the document having died on June 14, 1980. A argues that he is
an innocent holder for value. Decide.
A: The concept of an innocent purchaser for value cannot apply to A for the
reason that he is a donee acquiring the property gratuitously by a Deed of
Donation and by purchase. In cases of falsified documents involving properties
such as deed of donation of titled property, cancellation of affidavit of loss and
agreement of subdivision with sale, being falsified documents, are null and
void, and the TCT issued by virtue of the falsified documents are also null and
void. There is fraud on the transfer of the property from C and D to A's mother
on the basis of fake signatures considering that the vendor signatories therein
are all dead. As such, the deed is considered a forged deed and hence null and
void. Thus, the title that A's mother based upon the fraudulent Deed of Sale is
null and void which, therefore, transferred nothing to him by his mother's Deed
of Donation (Gambitov Bacena GR. No. 225929, January 24. 2018).
11
Q: Aniceto filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim against the property of her
girlfriend, Doris. Aniceto alleged that Doris knew a seller that is selling his
land for a cheap price. Doris offered to pose as the buyer because the seller,
who was her close friend, allegedly wanted to deal only with her to keep his
financial constraints within his close family friends. Aniceto agreed and gave
the money to his girlfriend. Years have passed, the land is still in the possession
of Doris. On the other hand, Doris claims that Aniceto volunteered to finance
the renovation of the house on account of their special relationship. However,
when their relationship turned sour, Aniceto surreptitiously filed an adverse
claim over the subject properties with the register of Deeds, falsely claiming
ownership thereof. Was there a valid donation?
A: No. The law relevant to this transaction would be Article 748 of the Civil
Code, which requires that donations of personal property exceeding P5,000.00
must be in writing. Since Doris, insists that the purchase money for the
properties was gratuitously furnished by Aniceto, the formalities of a valid
donation under Article 748 of the Civil Code should have been complied with,
failing which, there could be no donation to speak of. Thus, her claim of an
alleged donation should necessarily fail (Lopez v. Saludo, G.R. No. 233775,
September 15, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Q: In 1966, the LGU of the CS donated a portion of a parcel of land to the
CASTEA by virtue of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which included a
condition that the land should only be used for the construction of a building
to house the offices of CASTEA, and that the said property, including its
improvements, should not be sold, mortgaged or encumbered. in 2007, the
LOU of the province of Camarines Sur executed a Deed of Revocation of
Donation on the ground that CASTE violated the provision of non-
encumbrance by leasing a part of the building constructed in the property to
Bodega Glassware. The lease was for a period of 20 years, the rentals of which
were given to members of CASTE as mutual aid and death benefits. CASTEA
contended that the Province of Camarines Sur has ceased to be the owner of
the property because the ownership thereof has already been transferred to
CASTE by virtue of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos it executed. Moreover,
CASTE argues that there was no violation of the conditions of the Deed of
Donation. Did the lease defeat the object of the Deed of Donation so that it can
be considered as a breach to warrant the revocation of said Deed of Donation?
A: No. While under Article 764 of the Civil Code, a single violation or non-
fulfillment is sufficient to revoke a donation based on the phrase any of the
conditions," its application must be circumscribed within the rules on
obligations and contracts wherein substantial and fundamental breach as to
defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement and substantial
compliance are given due recognition and importance. In this case, the
encumbrance was not perpetual as it is time-bound to only 20 years, which is
not an unreasonable period, the lease did not cover the entire donated 600-
square meter lot and the building that CASTEA constructed, the rentals that
were being collected were being given to members of CASTE as mutual aid
and death benefits, and CASTE had already complied with its main prestation,
which is the construction of the intended building. In order for the breach to
reach the threshold of substantiality and fundamentality, the breach by should
be of a permanent character as to totally and perpetually deprive CASTE of
the use of the donated lot and the building that it constructed (Camarines Sur
Teachers and Employees Association, Inc. v. Province of Camarines Sur, G.R.
No. 199666; October 7, 2019).
PRESCRIPTION
Q: If the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the
subject land, will the action for reconveyance be subject to prescription?
A: No. Where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession
of the subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes in effect an action to
quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription. Prescription does
not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because
such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity
to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
his title (Heirs of Tomakin u. Heirs of Navares, G.R. No. 223624, July 17,
2019).
Q: Juan filed a complaint for ownership and recovery of possession against
Yadao. Allegedly, Yadao occupied the subject land and refused to leave
despite their opposition and vigorous prohibition. Yadao countered that Juan's
successor sold the land to the former and that the former has an owner's
duplicate copy. Even assuming that no sale was made, the fact remained that
they had been in possession of the lot since 1962 to the present. Lastly, Yadao
stressed that Juan brought the matter to more than thirty (30 years after they
12
have taken possession thereof. Hence, acquisitive prescription has ripened
their de facto possession into legal possession and ownership. Decide.
A: I will decide in favor of Yadao, Extinctive prescription refers to the rule
that bars even the registered owner from availing of remedies to vindicate their
right over the subject lot. It is a shield rather than a sword - the mere fact that
the party seeking recovery can no longer sue the party in possession does not
mean automatically that the latter already has the right to possess or own.
When the complaint for recovery was filed, the uitimate and all-encompassing
prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. It no longer matters
whatever Juan's cause of action was. The super prescriptive period has set in.
With the lapse of the prescriptive period to file an action, Juan could no longer
seek relief from the courts (Heirs of Yadao v. Caletina, G.R. No. 230784,
February 15, 2022, Hernando, J.)
LACHES
Elements of Laches:
1. Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation complained of;
2. Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the
defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue;
3. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
4. Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant
By way of an exception, however, estoppel by laches may bar a party from
invoking lack of jurisdiction when the issue is raised later in the proceedings
of the case and only after the party raising the argument has actively
participated during trial and lost.
Laches vs. Prescription
Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to
an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. Laches is different from
and applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned
with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription
is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a
claim to be enforced, this inequity. being founded on some change in the
condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory;
laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law.
Prescription is based on a fixed time; laches is not. While a person may not
acquire title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession,
in derogation of the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter,
however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property
and he title thereto, by reason of laches (Heir of Cardenas v. The Christian and
Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc., G. No. 222614, March
20, 2019).

Q: Amado claiming to be the surviving heirs of Ende, filed a complaint for

quieting of title against the Roman Catholic Prelate Inc. (RCPI). He alleged
that his family is a member of the Manobo tribe and that the CPI took
advantage of their ignorance and illiteracy by gradually taking possession of
portions of the subject property through deceitful machinations. RCPI on the
other hand contends that the subject property spanned at least 30 years to at
most 50 years already. Since Amado failed to assert their alleged rights over
the subject property, laches already set in that barred their recovery thereof.
Amado countered that he was notable to exercise his rights because he was
driven away from the subject property by CPI. Did laches bar the action of
Amado? Decide.

A: No. Laches does not imply that a case in court must be filed in order that it
may not be successfully invoked. It merely requires delay in asserting
complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after
he has an opportunity to sue We cannot blame Amado from not filing
immediately in court since they were still in the process of collating the
necessary documents in support of their right. To note, they immediately
intervened in the case after having knowledge of the case filed. This shows
that Amado were serious in asserting their right against the herein plaintiffs,
who were claiming to be the alleged heirs of the spouses Ende and in the
recovery of the subject property from the Roman Catholic (Ende v. Roman
Catholic Prelate of the Prelature Nullius of Cotabato. In., G.R. No. 191867,
December 6, 2021, Hernando, J.)

13