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Title
Mamiscal vs. Abdullah
Case
A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J
Ponente
MENDOZA, J
Decision Date
1 Jul 2015
A man files a complaint against a court clerk for partiality and violation of due process in
relation to the registration of a divorce, but the court dismisses the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, emphasizing the separation of powers and referring the matter to the
appropriate authorities.
DigestSummaryJurisprudenceSimilar
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Background and Parties Involved

 Baguan M. Mamiscal (complainant) filed a complaint against Macalinog S. Abdullah
(respondent), Clerk of Court, Shari'a Circuit Court, Marawi City.
 The complaint charged Abdullah with partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty, and
conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
 The complaint also initially charged Judge Aboali J. Cali, Presiding Judge, Shari'a Circuit
Court, Marawi City, but the charges against him were dismissed for lack of merit.

The Facts
 Mamiscal and his wife, Adelaidah Lomondot, had a heated argument on September 26,
2010.
 Mamiscal decided to divorce his wife by repudiating her (talaq) and signed an agreement
(kapasadan) to that effect.
 The next day, Adelaidah left their conjugal dwelling and went back to her family's home.
 During the obligatory period of waiting ('iddah), Mamiscal had a change of heart and sent
their common relatives to make peace with Adelaidah on his behalf.
 Almost five months later, Adelaidah filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD) with the
office of Abdullah for registration.
 Abdullah issued an Invitation for the couple and their representatives to appear before the
Shari'a Circuit Court to constitute the Agama Arbitration Council (AAC) for possible
reconciliation.
 Abdullah later issued the Certificate of Registration of Divorce (CRD) finalizing the
divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah.

Mamiscal's Complaint
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 Mamiscal sought the revocation of the CRD, claiming that the kapasadan was invalid as
he did not prepare it and there were no witnesses to its execution.
 He also denied executing and filing the COD and argued that he had revoked his
repudiation of his wife.
 Mamiscal claimed that he was deprived of due process as the AAC was yet to be
constituted and that the trial court should have considered the opposition of their children
to the divorce.

Abdullah's Defense
 Abdullah argued that he only had a ministerial duty to receive and process the COD and
the kapasadan.
 He claimed that the divorce had already become final and irrevocable due to the lapse of
the 'iddah and the opposition of Adelaidah.
 Abdullah also stated that Mamiscal did not inform his office of any revocation of the
divorce.

Office of the Court Administrator's Findings

 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Abdullah guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and recommended a fine of P10,000.00.
 Abdullah filed a motion for the early resolution of the complaint, stating that he was due
for compulsory retirement.

Court's Ruling
 The Court dismissed the administrative matter against Abdullah for lack of jurisdiction.
 The Court clarified that the jurisdiction to impose disciplinary sanctions against civil
registrars lies with the National Government, the Office of the Mayor, and the Civil
Service Commission.
 The Court referred the complaint to the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City, and the Civil
Service Commission for appropriate action.

INS V CHADHA Brief Fact Summary.

Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), which authorized either House of Congress to
invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General (Attorney General), the
House of Representatives (the House) suspended an immigration judge’s deportation ruling regarding
Chadha.
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Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where the House takes actions that have the purpose and effect of altering legal
rights, duties, or relations of persons outside of the legislative branch, bicameralism and presentment
are required.

Facts. Chadha overstayed his student visa and was asked to show cause why he should not be
deported. After a hearing, the immigration judge ordered that Chadha’s deportation be suspended on
the grounds that he would suffer “extreme hardship” if deported. Under the Act, once the Attorney
General’s recommendation for suspension of a deportation was conveyed to Congress, the House had
the power to veto the Attorney General’s determination. After the House veto of the Attorney General’s
decision to allow Chadha to remain in the United States, Chadha was deported. Since the House action
was pursuant to the Act, the resolution was not submitted to the Senate or presented to the President.

Issue. Was the part of the Act authorizing a “one House veto” constitutional?

Held. NO. The Act violated explicit constitutional standards of lawmaking and congressional
authority. The House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and
regulations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside
of the legislative branch. When the House takes such actions it must comply with the requirements of
Article I regarding bicameralism and presentment.

Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, the authority to allow
deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. Congress may delegate
authority, but once it does so it must abide by its decision until that delegation is legislatively altered or
revoked.

Dissent. Justice Byron White (J. White) stated that this decision sounds the death knell for nearly
200 other statutory provisions for which Congress retains a legislative veto. The Supreme Court of the
United States (Supreme Court) should have decided this case on the narrower grounds of separation of
powers. Concurrence. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell) stated that the House’s action raises the very
danger the Framers sought to avoid – the exercise of unchecked power. In deciding whether Chadha
should be deported, Congress is not subject to any internal constraints that prevent it from acting
arbitrarily to deprive him of his right to remain in this country.

Discussion. The student must be cognizant of the nature of Congress’ actions. If they are legislative in
nature than Congress must comply with the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment.

CASE SUMMARY OF INS V. CHADHA:

Respondent Chadha overstayed his visa in the U.S.

Although he was deportable, the Attorney General allowed certain deportable immigrants to remain in
the U.S., including Chadha.

A federal immigration law, however, gave either chamber of Congress the ability to veto an Attorney
General decision. The House exercised that veto, and ordered Chadha deported.

Chadha sought review of the deportation order in federal court, arguing that the federal immigration
law’s one-house veto mechanism was unconstitutional. The INS agreed with Chadha’s position.
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The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately held that the one-house veto mechanism was unconstitutional. It
reasoned that such decisions must go through the bicameral legislative process that is outlined in the
Constitution.

Arnault v Baltazar G.R. No. L-6749 Digest

G.R. No. L-6749 July 30, 1955

Labrador, J.:

Topic: Legislative power

Facts:

1. The controversy arose out of the Government's purchase of 2 estates, the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the
purchase which was effected. The price paid for both estates was P5, 000,000.

2. Thereafter, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the
validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate
investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440, 000, was
delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for
contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the
Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the
Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440, 000 and to answer questions
pertinent thereto. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus proceeding.

3. CFI ruled that the continued detention and confinement of petitioner pursuant to a Senate
Resolution No. 114, is illegal, and that the Senate committed a clear abuse of discretion in not
considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of
P440,000 was made. Further, on the ground that that petitioner, by his answer has purged himself of
contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and discharged.

ISSUE: W/N the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for contempt

YES

1. The Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This is implied or
incidental or necessary to the exercise of legislative power. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective
authority; it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independent of
the other's authority and power.
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2. Provided that contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the
course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious
witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and
a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise
of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.

3. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it to
exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process wherein
offenders are brought to the courts of justice for punishment that criminal law imposes upon them.
The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts;
because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter
has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.

ISSUE 2: W/N petitioner has already purged himself of contempt

4. No. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as the person to whom delivery of the sum of
P440, 000 was made. However, the Senate Committee refused to believe that this is the real name
of the person whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the
act of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or reiterated it.

5. Finally, it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued confinement is an abuse of the
legislative power and thereby interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.

Belgica v. Ochoa | Case Digest

Belgica, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November
19, 2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
 The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.
 The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise
known as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and
realignment of unexpended portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
 In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also
became involved in project identification.
 6

 The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called
“Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving of lump-
sum allocations to individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public
works project or “hard projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as those which
would fall under education, health and livelihood.
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork
barrel was revived through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas
Development Fund”.
 In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”). The
CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.
 CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing
agencies subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators
and congressmen could identify any kind of project from “hard projects” such as roads,
buildings and bridges to “soft projects” such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
 In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made
upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual
legislators. This was also the first time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.
 The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of
Budget and Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from
the funds.
 Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside
from the CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to
direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.
 In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of
CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii)
Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision
requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for the release of funds.
 In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA.
PDAF required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release
of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except
personal services and other personnel benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may
be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from
2006-2010.
 It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-
governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
 The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for
individual legislators.
 In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum
amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a
 7

provision on realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only
once.
 The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies.
Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his legislative
district. Realignment of funds and release of funds were required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
 The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
 The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree (“PD”) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
 The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD No.
1993. The PSF is managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is
sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
 In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of
money regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of
PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
 In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate
defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers
and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.
 In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit
investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
 Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had
gone into a dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
 Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar
the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers,
(b) non-delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e)
political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding
the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
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 The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for
their utilization are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners.
 The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does
not actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have
constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.
 The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the case
considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a situation of exceptional character
and is a matter of paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive
ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d)
the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
 The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
 The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme
Court has the power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on
the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to sue
 Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the
Philippines.
 As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
 As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
 The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez because the
Philconsa case was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress.
 On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-
relation between the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-
relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas
of fund release and realignment.
 Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
considering that the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the
power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This
power cannot be exercised by individual members of Congress and the authority to
appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed.
 The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and
Management does not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on
a procedural technicality and hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
 9

(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been
violated.
 The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution, which belongs to the executive department.
 Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, including ―the evaluation of work and financial plans
for individual activities and the ― regulation and release of funds in violation of the
separation of powers principle.
 Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.
 That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature
does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law.
 Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in
nature. They even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a
mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated
 The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled
in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
 The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of
them determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
 Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
 This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters
the creation of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.
 It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.
 In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited
form of lump-sum appropriation. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does
 10

not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of
item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of
checking itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation
of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
 The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate.
 The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government, because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage
of their own office.
 The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority
and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to
perpetuate himself in office.
 The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based
on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.
 Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
 Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy
 The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local
autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute
their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.
 The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents.
 The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality,
wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
 This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already legally
mandated to―assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic
and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.
 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no
law-making authority except only when acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.
 For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
 11

pursuance of an appropriation made by law”, it is enough that (a) the provision of law
sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for
a particular public purpose.
 Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable
amount: a Special Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy
Development] Board from any and all sources.
 It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a
determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or
60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00.
 It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of
legislation powers.
 The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as
it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
used.
 This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
 This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it
allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government, remains legally effective and
subsisting.
 Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because
it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
 The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and
hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.
 The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification
since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.

HomeConstitution

Separation of Powers: Mendoza vs People

G.R. No. 183891 October 19, 2011
byDagitab-June 17, 2013

0
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Facts:

Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a special law known
as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the Social Security Service (SSS)
contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his
fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and apply the proper
penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex).

The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, the court
the Court transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and
RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.

Issue:

Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the President, the grant
of executive clemency to a convict?

Ruling:

The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its
power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code
which provides; “Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution
of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of
a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.”

Case No. 11. People v Dacuycuy

People vs Dacuycuy
173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M.
Zanoria
 13

Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria,
public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for
violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not
guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the correctional nature of the
penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and
may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were
the legislative department of the Government.

On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge
Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.

Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by vesting
in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts
were the legislative department of the government.

Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine of not
more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts.

Decision:

The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded
to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
 14

BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 177597 • July 16, 2008 • En Banc

Constitutional Law | Legislative Department | Apportionment of legislative districts
FACTS:

Congress enacted RA 9054, the Section 19, Article VI of which

delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
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Pursuant to such delegation, the ARMM Regional Assembly enacted

Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in
the first district of Maguindanao.

ISSUES:

(1)

Whether or not Congress validly delegated to the ARMM Regional

Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives;

(2)

Whether or not RA 9054 is constitutional;

(3)

Whether or not MMA Act 201 is void.

 15

RULING:

(1)

No. The power to create a province, or a city with a population of

250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district.

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the

power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested
exclusively in Congress.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power

to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of
existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that
Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local
legislative bodies enact.

(2)

RA 9054 is unconstitutional. (See above ruling.)

(3)

MMA Act 201 is void. (See above ruling.)

G.R. No. 207851 Case Digest

G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014
Angel Naval
vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia
 16

Facts:

Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd District of

CamSur. On October 12, 2009, RA 9716 was approved, reapportioning
the legislative district of Province of CamSur.

Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District
to form the present Third District. The present Second District is
composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with
five towns from the old First District.

In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of
the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.

In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member

of the Sanggunian, Third District.

Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third

District in the 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked
Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed before
the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had
fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three
consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of
the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit rule’s
application is more with reference to the same local elective post,
and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial
jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the
fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly
construed.

COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC.

The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are
present in the instant case as the records clearly establish that
[Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same government post.
To put things in a proper perspective, it is imperative to review
 17

and discuss the salient points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC].

The case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor,
having been elected and had already served for three (3)
consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the conversion
of the municipality to a city. In applying the three-term limit
rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the municipality
into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into
a local government post different from the office of the city
mayor. The Court took into account the following circumstances: (1)
That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as
that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same
group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same group
of voters [over] whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years.

Ruling:

Court denies the petition.

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and

for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation
and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public
functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on
their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they
are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal.

R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be

created, but the Third Districtis to be renamed. Verba legis non
est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers mean what they say.

The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional

requirement to achieve equality of representation among the
districts. It is with this mindset that the Court should consider
Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing
him into office in 2010 and 2013.
 18

Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-

term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal
representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or
without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new
set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another
eligible person.

Case Digest: Reyes vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
(Topic: Legislative Department – Constitutional Law 1)

Petitioner: Regina Ongsiako Reyes

Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Joseph Socorro B. Tan
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended
petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations
regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship.
Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8,
2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last
exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the
petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of
her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013
the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and
on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives.
She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

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On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the
May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.
 19

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to
run for office
Discussion:
1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the
members of House of Representative.
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible
for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following
1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-
general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied
with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator
cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to
the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a
Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his
domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show
that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and
the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile
of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner
renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13,
2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized
her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount
of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned
her domicile of choice in the USA.
Held:
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.
 20

BANAT vs COMELEC GR No
179271 21 April 2009

11 WednesdayMAR 2015

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

≈ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the
Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as quoting the COMELEC of using the Panganiban
formula used in Veterans case in allocating party-list seats. BANAT contend that Article 6
Section 5 should be followed and that 20%of party-list representatives shall be proclaimed.
COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article 6
Section 5 (2) of the Constitution mandatory?
Decision: Petition has partial merit. The party-list election has four inviolable parameters
stated in Veterans. First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent
threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional
seats; Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

Case Digest: Walden Bello v Comelec

GR 191998 (2010)
6/20/2020
 21

0 COMMENTS

ISSUE: 1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPP's nominees motu
proprio or to cancel AGPP's registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due
course to AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010... elections, the canv

FACTS: GPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination together
with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the first nominee is Mike Arroyo. Several
petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been dismissed both by Comelec Second
division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required
percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as AGPP’s first nominee, to sit
in the House of Representatives. He was proclaimed as AGPP’s duly -elected party-list representative in
the House of Representatives. On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPP’s Representative.
And, his name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s representative in the House of
Representatives. The HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo to
file his Answer to the two petitions

DECISION: Dismissed

RATIO DECIDENDI: For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus petitioners
must comply with Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides: "In the present case, the
mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Under Section 2, in relation with Section 4, of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any... interested party may file with the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification against a party-list nominee
 22

G.R. No. 203766 • April 2, 2013.

Constitutional Law | Legislative Department | Registration | Party-List System
FACTS:

The Comelec disqualified 52 party-list groups and organizations from

participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, particularly those
that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and
sectoral groups or organizations must represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors; AND (2) all nominees must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.

Aggrieved by the disqualification, said part-list groups via Petitions for

Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the Comelec.

ISSUES:

(1)
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Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections;

(2)

Whether or not the criteria for participating in the party-list system

laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections.

RULING:
 23

[NOTE: This case abandoned the ruling in BANAT case]

(1)

No. We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing

jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing
jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse
of discretion.

However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must

now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned
and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. —

NEW RULE (abandoning BANAT doctrine):

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and

subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)

national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or

organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they

register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,
that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
 24

independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a

coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and

underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.”
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and
the youth.
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5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that

represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to
the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties
or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors,
or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must
be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

(2)
 25

No. The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only

resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such
experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end. (See above ruling for the
new parameters.)

CASE DIGEST: DEFENSOR VS GUINGONA, GR NO. 134577,

November 18, 1998
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 AUGUST 11, 2023

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope
of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It
speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers
in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
 28

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices
and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any
rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence
of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.

On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to
direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts
may intervene.

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority.

While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of
the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over
which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this
Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with
grave abuse of discretion. This is the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only
“to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” but likewise “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”

The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court “to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” is restricted
only by the definition and confines of the term “grave abuse of discretion.” “By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.”
 29

FACTS

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was
declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected:
Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised
the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to
the “minority.”

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate “minority,” Sen. Juan M.
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party —
numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day,
the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering
privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to
resolve the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a
letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President
formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
 30

HELD

FIRST ISSUE

The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate
President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the
domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately
assumed jurisdiction (1) “in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;”
and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect
a Senate President (read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court’s power of
judicial review).

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did
not depend on the Senate’s “full discretionary authority,” but was subject to mandatory
constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty
to consider and determine the issue.

SECOND ISSUE

There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners
finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even
from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall
ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily,
no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting
the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

THIRD ISSUE
 31

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power

by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto
proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by
the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another.

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show
that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions
of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office
of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been
shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

FOURTH ISSUE

Grave abuse of discretion – such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his
discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be
the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a
caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise

of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.”
Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has
been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence
and authority.

Jose Avelino vs Mariano Cuenco

written by Howard
 32

G.R. No. L-2821 – 83 Phil. 17 – Political Law – The Legislative Department –

Election of the Senate President

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the
senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He
requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day
however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon
insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, and other Senators,
Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all
dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions
being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they
even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp
then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and
they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his
gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his allies.
Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record – it was so
made – that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by Avelino, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of
the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to
Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This
was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the
Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then
filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate
President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the
case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in
the Senate Session Hall – not in the Supreme Court.
 33

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a
continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al)
may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from
passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be
different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen.
Confesor was in the USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session

(presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum
constituting such session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the

minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session
that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a
majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a
majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all”
the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “”the House””. There is a
difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of
“the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve
did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the
absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would
be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the
case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it
be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when
Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators;
one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of
senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is ½ + 1;
 34

in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when
Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case
in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice
agrees with the result of the majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon the
ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional
requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the
evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuenco’s election as
Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,
has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against
senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent
efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC
believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and
with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as
Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of all the
members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact
that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read “a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,” shows the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or
provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this
must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their
duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the
house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned
impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to
issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a
quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a
mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all the members” as
unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original
Constitution which required “concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly to expel a member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the
present Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
 35

members of each House”. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States
and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its
session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a
majority.

CASE DIGEST: PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.

(PHILCONSA) VS MATHAY, G.R. NO. L-25554, OCTOBER 4, 1966
1. Requirements for First-Time Passpo...
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 AUGUST 12, 2023

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Taxpayers may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law (Cf. Philippine Constitution Association
vs. Gimenez, L-23326, December 18, 1966 and other cases).

As the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents’ passing in audit and the
approval of the payment of the Representatives’ increased salaries, and not the
collection or receipt thereof, the members of the House of Representatives need not be
joined as defendants in the present action. Only the respondent auditors are the
indispensable or proper parties def endant.

The purpose of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that no
increase in the compensation of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives “shall take effect until after the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase,” is to place a
“legal bar to the legislators “yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries.
Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of
time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor
 36

to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt” (Tañada and Fernando,
Constitution of the” Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).

In establishing a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators

becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision (Art. VI, Sec. IV) refers to “all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Repre-sentatives” in the same sentence, as
a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. The fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted
the measure (whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the
increase in compensation can become operative.

It follows that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when :the full term of all members of the Senate
and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Insofar as Republic Act
No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriations Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased
compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be
held null and void.

FACTS:

Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently
enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives
before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding
year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec.
14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8
senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have
expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

ISSUE:
 37

Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

HELD:

In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the

increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional
provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the
same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This
unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration
of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using
the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to
consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single
Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the
following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in
the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that
the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must
have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134
is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard Gordon - GR No. 175352 Case Digest

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as
Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
 38

subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations

or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of
Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC,
in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate
when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, [1] held that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is
not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a
GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and
because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals.
Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman
during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is
void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by
the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to
incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a),
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.
95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC
likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
 39

questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the
PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

II. THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the
PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting
the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the
very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private
corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues
defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated
the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,
Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will
be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court
should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground
upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely
affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was
being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
 40

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August
16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No.
1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of
structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and
the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in
recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective
from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not
been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique
status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and
effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the
former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international
humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations
under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither
“be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law
and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC
or a subsidiary thereof so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold
his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not
ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.
 41

[T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-
to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of
a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood
requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled.

The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not
only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities
but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The
sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive
portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]

DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J. GORDON, GR No. 175352, 2009-07-15

Facts:
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with
this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.
officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors.
respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,[1] he was elected Chairman
of the PNRC
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board... of Governors, respondent
has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his... term without forfeiting his seat.
 42

Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Camporedondo v. NLRC,[2] which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation.
Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and
that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present
case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an... employment.
Issues:
Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled
corporation;
Ruling:
petition without merit.
Republic Act No. 95,[7] otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-
funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate... humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of
nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services,
Community
Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.
In order to be recognized as a National
Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental
Principles of the Movement.
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral
workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as
belonging to any side of the armed conflict.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or
controlled by the government.
the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and
does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress.[13] The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals
and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors
The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only six of the
thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines.
an... overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private
sector members of the PNRC.
The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC
Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent
Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled
 43

PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is
not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.
the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment
does not fall under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a... government
official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or
employment.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,[17] the President exercises control over all
government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the control of the
President, then such office is not part of the
Executive branch.
PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is
not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC,[22] which ruled that
the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple test used... was whether the corporation was
created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the
general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled
that it is a government corporation. However,... the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the
definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code
Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature, and owned by the Government directly or through... its instrumentalities either wholly, or
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of
its capital stock
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of
a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the
case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the... members must be government
officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this
criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special charter...
subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions prohibiting Congress from
creating private corporations except by general law.
Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a "body corporate and politic,"
Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike
the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in
the PNRC.
 44

In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation.
However, the constitutional... prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special
charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the
PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers,
[27] is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,[28] 2,[29] 3,[30] 4(a),[31] 5,[32] 6,[33] 7,
[34]
8,[35] 9,[36] 10,[37] 11,[38] 12,[39] and 13[40] of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.
since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it... creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC
should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.