Accepted manuscript to appear in CQISS

Accepted Manuscript
China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies

Article Title: The U.S.-China Tech War: Impacts and Prospects

by 181.215.82.153 on 11/11/19. Re-use and distribution is strictly not permitted, except for Open Access articles.

Author(s): Sun Haiyong

DOI: 10.1142/S237774001950012X

Received: 04 November 2019

China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

Accepted: 04 November 2019

To be cited as: Sun Haiyong, The U.S.-China Tech War: Impacts and
Prospects, China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, doi:
10.1142/S237774001950012X

Link to final version: https://doi.org/10.1142/S237774001950012X

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The U.S.-China Tech War: Impacts and Prospects

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Sun Haiyong

Abstract: The Trump administration has waged a technological war against China
due to the differences between China and the United States in political values and
geopolitical pursuits, as well as their rivalry on regional and global arenas. The United

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States regards itself on the moral high ground in the existing international order and
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intends to force China to abandon its policies in high-tech industries and technology
transfer from foreign enterprises, in order to maintain its global supremacy. With a
zero-sum mentality, the Trump administration is trying to use the leverage of
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advanced science and technology to maximize the U.S.’ benefits in trade with China.
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Its tech war attempts against China mainly include trade sanctions, investment control,
export control, and restrictions on the exchange of technological personnel. These
moves will further harm China-U.S. security relations as well as their science and
technology cooperation and undermine the regional situation and global science and
technology governance. In order to promote sustainable global development and
strategic stability, both sides need to take more effective efforts to manage their
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strategic competition, build a more balanced and mutually beneficial relationship in

high-tech industries, and expand the space for cooperation in the field of global
science and technology governance.

Keywords: Technological war, Trump Administration, China-U.S. relations, global

governance
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Sun Haiyong is Senior Research Fellow at the Center for American Studies, Shanghai
Institutes for International Studies. His mailing address is: 195-15 Tianlin Road,
Shanghai 200233, China. He can also be reached at sunhaiyong@siis.org.cn.
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China-U.S. relations have become increasingly tense since 2017 as trade frictions and
technological contests between the two giants keep heating up. With zero-sum

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thinking, the Trump administration has launched a tech war against China, which will
profoundly impact the development of the bilateral relationship and even the future
trends of world politics and economy. This paper is divided into four parts. The first
and second discuss the causes and means of the U.S.-China tech war. The third part
provides an in-depth analysis of the impacts of the tech war on China-U.S. relations.
After exploring how the tech war may unfold in the future, the fourth part puts

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forward a few feasible ways for the two sides to manage their strategic competition
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and build a more balanced and mutually beneficial relationship in the field of science
and technology.
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Why Trump’s Tech War Against China Is Inevitable?

Cooperation in science and technology, including in high-tech industries, has been an

integral part of China-U.S. economic relations. After the Cold War, the globalization
process enables enterprises of the United States and other Western countries to tap
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into China’s low-end labor and relatively loose environmental control to transfer the
middle and low ends of the industrial value chains into the Chinese mainland.
Although they exercise tight technology export control over China, they have in
general facilitated China’s entry into the global economic system and industrial value
chains, hoping to spur China’s political development in their desired direction.

The 2008 global financial crisis struck a heavy blow on the economy of the
United States and Europe. In contrast, China’s economy as well as scientific and
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technological strengths have been on a steady rise, and its high-tech sectors
represented by information and communication technology (ICT) have been soaring,
too. The high-tech industries in the Western countries with high added value have
been faced with growing challenges from Chinese enterprises. Therefore, as early as
under the Obama administration, the United States made several attempts to prevent
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Chinese enterprises from investing in the U.S. semiconductor industry, and gradually
tightened China’s access to American technology through commercial channels. After
President Trump took office, witnessing the rapid rise of China’s cutting-edge science
and technology like ICT, he decided to launch a tech war against China based on his
judgment on the trends of China’s high-tech development as well as its domestic and
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foreign policy.

First, the United States can hardly reconcile with the rise of a great power with a
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distinct political system and ideology. With regard to grand national strategy, the
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Trump administration has regarded China as its most formidable competitor, thus
intends to diminish and postpone China’s challenge to the U.S.’ global hegemony by
containing the development of China’s high-tech industries, starting from ICT
represented by 5G technology, for it plays an important role in the new round of

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industrial upgrading and that Chinese enterprises have enjoyed much advantage in
this field. To some extent, the U.S. intensive pressure over Huawei, China’s telecom
giant, can be regarded as an “asymmetrical war” between an established superpower
and a foreign private enterprise.1

Second, the Trump administration tries to stand on the moral high ground in

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strategic competition with China, thus it has labeled China as being “unfair” and
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“government-led” in industrial planning and “engaging in forced technology transfer,”

while advocating such notions as “technology supporting China’s authoritarian regime”
and that China’s developing science and technology “would harm the U.S. national
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interests and regional order.” As a matter of fact, there is no proof that the Chinese
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government has formulated or implemented any policy on forced technology transfer;
and the notion of “technology supporting China’s authoritarian regime” is nothing but
a new form of politicization of economic and technological issues. By exaggerating
the security risks or even making up the “government backgrounds” of Chinese
enterprises like Huawei, the Trump administration attempts to negate the legitimate
rights and interests of Chinese enterprises to expand overseas markets. Yet, despite the
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hidden intention behind President Trump’s emphasis on China’s “unfairness,” in the

short run, Chinese enterprises will not be able to negotiate with Western
multinationals on an equal footing. If China plays by the U.S. rules of “fairness,” it is
likely to be locked in the low end of the global industrial chains indefinitely.

(Highlight: The emerging tech war marks a turning point of the U.S. science and
technology policy towards China.)

Third, with a zero-sum mentality, the Trump administration sees China’s

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progress in science and technology as significantly harming the U.S. interest in trade
with China, affecting the employment and incomes of Americans. Considering their
investment in China, U.S. multinational corporations have mixed feelings towards
“Made in China 2025,” China’s technological blueprint issued in 2015: on the one
hand, they will enjoy a more favorable business environment and modern
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infrastructure in the IT-based manufacturing industry; on the other hand, they have
been stressed out about their long-term survival in China, especially when they face
fiercer competition in key areas from Chinese enterprises after technology transfer.2
1Feng Zhaokui, “Globalization of Science and Technology: China’s Choice and Response [科技全球化的潮流与
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逆流——兼论中国应对科技全球化的历程与对策],” Global Review, No. 3 (2019), p. 69.

2 Alexander Hammer, “‘Made in China 2025’ Attempts to Re-stimulate Domestic Innovation,” USITC Executive
Briefings on Trade, September 2017,
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https://usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/ebot_madeinchina2025hammer.pdf.
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The U.S. policy and business circles tend to believe that if China becomes superior in
technological innovation, the United States will not be able to gain any advantage in
bilateral trade with China, and thus “Made in China 2025” poses a fundamental threat
to the U.S. interests that must be impeded, if not stopped totally.3

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A Tech War by the Whole-of-Government Approach

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In December 2017, the Trump administration issued its first National Security
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Strategy (NSS) report, proposing imposing trade sanctions on China and calling for
relevant legislative measures. Later, the Congress passed the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA 2019), requiring the
Ministry of Defense to formulate a “whole-of-government strategy on China” and
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design a complex of policies toward China among all government departments, while
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strengthening the leading position of the White House in formulating the strategy on
China. This approach is fully demonstrated in the tech war against China waged by
the Trump administration. Put simply, the United States intends to force China to
abandon or revise its state-led high-tech industrial policy and technology transfer
policy through trade sanctions, investment control, export control, and restrictions on
the exchange of technological personnel.
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Above all, the Trump administration aims to force China to abandon its industrial
policy represented by “Made in China 2025” and so-called “forced technology
transfer” by imposing sanctions on Chinese high-tech companies. On August 14, 2017,
President Trump directed the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to
determine whether to investigate China’s laws, policies, practices, or actions that may
be unreasonable or discriminatory and harm American intellectual property rights,
innovation, or technology development. He claimed that the United States is a world
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leader in research-and-development (R&D)-intensive, high-technology goods, and

that China’s policy and practices would “negatively affect American economic
interests.” 4 On March 22, 2018, the White House issued the Presidential
Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301
Investigation, accusing China of using foreign ownership restrictions to require or
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pressure technology transfer from U.S. companies to Chinese entities, imposing

substantial restrictions on U.S. firms’ investments and activities, directing and

3
James Pethokoukis and Derek Scissors, “How to Think about the US-China Trade War: A Long-read Q&A with
Derek Scissors,” American Enterprise Institute, June 22, 2018,
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http://www.aei.org/publication/how-to-think-about-the-us-china-trade-war/.
4 Executive Office of the President, “Addressing China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, and Actions Related to
Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Technology: Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative,”
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August 14, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-08-17/pdf/2017-17528.pdf.

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facilitating the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies and
assets to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and to generate
large-scale technology transfer in key industries, and conducting and supporting “theft”
from the computer networks of U.S. companies.5 The investigation partly led to a 25

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percent extra tariff on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports from July 6, 2018.

(Highlight: All branches of the U.S. government have joined together in the tech war
against China.)

Next, under congressional legislation, U.S. agencies on foreign investment

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review and export control have stepped up regulatory efforts in order to block China’s
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access to American advanced technology. The Trump administration has dramatically

reformed the review mechanism of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) in the name of strengthening the U.S. national security. In
August 2018, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018
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(FIRRMA), as part of NDAA 2019, was signed into law by President Trump. The Act
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expands CFIUS’s jurisdiction, extends its period of review, introduces a “declaration”
process that mandates filing for certain transactions, and establishes a process for
parties to voluntarily file streamlined notices for expedited review. The reform of the
foreign review mechanism is mainly targeted at Chinese companies investing in the
United States. As a result, Chinese investment in the United States has fallen sharply
since 2018, and is being subject to stricter scrutiny as the terms of the FIRRMA come
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into effect. At the same time, the Trump administration has comprehensively
upgraded the export control system in the supply chain. The Export Control Reform
Act of 2018 (ECRA) has further tightened the export control of technological products
to China. In November 2018, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S.
Department of Commerce identified emerging technologies essential to the U.S.
national security and listed 14 “representative technology categories,” which clearly
aimed at China’s high-tech industrial planning and included the innovative
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technological achievements produced by the R&D branches set up by Chinese

enterprises in the United States in the scope of control. In addition, the Trump
administration has stepped up export control enforcement while cracking down on
so-called technology “theft” committed by Chinese companies. In this context, it is
extremely difficult for Chinese companies to expand the U.S. market, as they face
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more pressure in compliance to the U.S. rules and more risks of sanctions.

Moreover, the U.S. State Department, Department of Education, Department of

Homeland Security, and Department of Justice have taken concerted measures to limit
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5 The White House, Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301
Investigation, March 22, 2018,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-actions-united-states-related-section-3
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01-investigation/.
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China’s use of U.S. cutting-edge science, technology, education and research
resources. The Trump administration believes that part of China’s military
modernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation
economy. 6 The United States has repeatedly accused China of “stealing U.S.

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technologies” through various channels, so it has tightened the examination of visa
application of Chinese nationals, and strengthened the monitoring of the mobilization
of Chinese science and technology personnel. For one thing, the Trump administration
stresses that it will review visa procedures to reduce economic theft by non-traditional
intelligence collectors, and will consider restrictions on foreign students from

US
designated countries to ensure that intellectual property is not transferred to U.S.
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competitors.7 Indeed, for Chinese students and visiting scholars to the United States
in specific majors, the Trump administration has adopted a stricter visa procedure to
gradually reduce the access of Chinese scholars to U.S. key laboratories. For another
thing, the Trump administration believes that talent recruitment of foreign
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governments, including China, also encourages theft of intellectual property from U.S.
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universities.8 Thus, it has strengthened the monitoring, screening and censorship of
Chinese scholars in the United States, especially those involved in the overseas talent
recruitment programs, and even adopted compulsory repatriation measures.

(Highlight: The U.S. aims to hinder China’s ICT progress by all means.)

Finally, the Trump administration has resorted to political, economic, judicial

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and even diplomatic measures to pressure on China’s strategic high-tech companies,

especially in the field of ICT. As China is highly dependent on foreign companies in
terms of technologies and core components, and the situation is unlikely to change in
the short term, the United States has set up a stringent regulatory network for Chinese
enterprises through targeted domestic legislation. For example, the Trump
administration has restricted its market for Chinese companies such as Huawei in the
name of safeguarding the U.S. national security, prohibiting federal agencies from
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procuring telecommunications and video surveillance services or equipment from

companies linked to the government of China, including Huawei, ZTE, Hytera,
Hikvision and Dahua Technology.9 The Trump administration has also threatened to
cut off the core supply chains of Chinese companies like Huawei for violation of
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6
The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 25,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf.
7 Ibid, p. 22.
8 Bill Priestap, “Student Visa Integrity: Protecting Educational Opportunity and National Security,” Federal
Bureau of Investigation, June 6, 2018,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/student-visa-integrity-protecting-educational-opportunity-and-national-securit
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y.
9 “H.R.5515 -- John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,” The U.S. Congress,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text#toc-H4350A53097BD46409287451A50C4F39
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7.
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regulations, such as export control. In May 2019, the BIS issued a final rule amending
the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) by adding Huawei and 68 of its
non-U.S. affiliates (collectively “Huawei”) to the Entity Control List, cutting off trade
opportunities between Huawei and its U.S. suppliers of key components.

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Meanwhile, with domestic legislation and law enforcement, supplemented by
various political maneuvering, the United States persuades or even forces its allies
and partners to give up cooperation with Chinese enterprises, so as to cut the overseas
market of Chinese enterprises. Under the pressure from the repeated lobbying of the
Trump administration, several U.S. allies or partners have demanded their domestic

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service providers to refuse Huawei to participate in the 5G network projects. As a
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result, Chinese companies are facing more uncertainty in opening up and maintaining
markets in major U.S. allies and partners.
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Impacts on China-U.S. Relations

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The Trump administration’s tech war attempts, coupled with the ongoing trade war,
will greatly impair the China-U.S. relationship and global strategic stability. Firstly,
the tech war seriously undermines China-U.S. security relations. By exaggerating
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China’s progress in cutting-edge technologies and seeing China as a “hypothetical

enemy,” the Trump administration has kept increasing investment in national defense
and arms building, in particular in such new areas as cyberspace and artificial
intelligence (AI), which adds to global strategic instability. In February 2019,
President Trump signed an executive order on the “American AI Initiative,” and a
summary of the Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy (DoD AI
Strategy) was released shortly afterwards. The new executive order makes it a clear
priority for the United States to compete with China and other countries to sustain U.S.
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AI leadership. 10 Thus, it is fair to say that the true agenda behind the Trump
administration’s securitization of China’s technological rise is to start a new round of
arms race among global powers in the name of “safeguarding national security.”

(Highlight: The U.S.-China tech war harms bilateral economic cooperation and the
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global industrial chains.)

Secondly, the tech war further impedes China-U.S. economic cooperation, and
exerts indirect impact on regional and global economic development. With political,
diplomatic and other measures, the Trump administration has to much extent severed
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10 Robert O. Work, et al., “White House AI Executive Order and DoD AI Strategy,” Center for a New American
Security, February 13, 2019,
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https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/white-house-ai-executive-order-and-dod-ai-strategy.
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the high-tech industrial chains constructed by global market forces, and suppressed
the innovative development of Chinese enterprises by tightening export control and
restricting the market space of China’s high-tech products. Undoubtedly, it will affect
the mutually beneficial cooperation between China and the United States in science

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and technology and those high-tech industries and further weaken the “ballast” role of
economic cooperation in the bilateral relationship.

It needs to be pointed out that, although the tech war against China will affect the
development of Chinese enterprises and China’s domestic economy through coerced
industrial chain transfer, it will also take a toll on the cost, quality control and market

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space expansion of American enterprises. In fact, a considerable part of China’s
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high-tech products exported to the United States are produced by American

enterprises in China. In the trade of high-tech products with China, American
enterprises “import” Chinese labor force in order to reduce costs so as to enhance
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competitiveness. If the Trump administration insists in translating his political

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campaign against outsourcing production to China into actual policy, the
competitiveness of related American companies will inevitably be eroded, further
undermining the strength of the U.S. manufacturing sector. 11 Besides, about
two-thirds of China’s exports to the United States are intermediate goods, with a large
proportion of high value-added key components imported from Japan, South Korea,
and the United States and then assembled in the Chinese mainland; the major
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producers of China’s exports to the United States are also enterprises from those
developed economies, including the United States, that have invested in the Chinese
mainland. Therefore, the U.S. trade sanctions against China will hurt the existing
industrial chains in East Asia; and foreign enterprises in China are faced with the issue
of readjusting the layout of their transnational business.

Meanwhile, both China and the United States enjoy unique advantages that other
countries cannot replicate in some emerging science and technology fields, including
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their advanced research level, strong investment capacity, rich data support, favorable
policy environment and friendly innovation ecosystem. The U.S. export control will
not only dampen the enthusiasm of Chinese high-tech enterprises to set up R&D
branches in the United States, but also impede the cooperation between enterprises
and research institutions of the two countries in high technology. Despite the U.S.
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hardliners’ advocacy, it will delay the process of innovation in related technology

areas and undermine the prospects of mutually beneficial cooperation between China
and the United States in the field of advanced science and technology.

Thirdly, the tech war against China will dim the prospects for cooperation
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between China and the United States in global governance in science and technology.

11Dong Jung Kim, “Trading with the Enemy? The Futility of US Commercial Countermeasures against the
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Chinese Challenge,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2017), pp. 298-300.
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At present, the international community is in dire needs of common norms and rules
related to the rapid development of disruptive innovation in science and technology,
so as to prevent or minimize the negative impacts of technological progress on global
sustainable development and strategic stability. The tech war may lead to weakening

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or even serious delay of necessary efforts in global governance in this regard.

Take the uncertain development of artificial intelligence, for example. As the

competition among major scientific and technological powers for AI leadership will
generate significant consequences for international politics, economy and security,
there remains a risk that these powers (and their high-tech enterprises) strive to take

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the lead while putting aside safety and reliability concerns, which may trigger various
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AI-driven accidents both in the commercial and military sectors. 12 For another
example, although autonomous-operation offensive weapons based on artificial
intelligence will lower the threshold of war, and unforeseen fatal mistakes related to
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these weapons can lead to grave conflicts among countries, there is a lack of law and
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prevention measures against such possible prospects in the existing international
system. The impact of strong AI development and other technologies on human
society has thus become more uncertain; and regardless of the original intention,
specific applications of such technologies may cause irreparable disasters to the
human society.

(Highlight: Lack of global high-tech governance may threaten world peace and
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stability.)

Therefore, there is an urgent need for the international community to work

together to promote global governance in the field of science and technology, to
formulate and improve the ethical norms and application rules for the development of
relevant technologies. In addition, the application and proliferation of cutting-edge
technologies such as AI in some specific areas will aggravate non-traditional security
risks. For example, while more countries are obtaining AI-driven drones at lower
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prices, terrorist organizations or criminal groups also have easier access to drones to
carry out their operations. As the two most important countries in the research,
production and export of drones, China and the United States should undertake the
responsibility of leading the establishment of the international drone control system.13
Unfortunately, the U.S.-China tech war has weakened the mutual strategic trust
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between both countries and will hinder global science and technology governance,
including on issues in non-traditional security realms.

12 Michael C. Horowitz, et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era of Artificial Intelligence,” Center for a New
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American Security, July 2018, p. 9,

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/strategic-competition-in-an-era-of-artificial-intelligence.
13 Bei-Er Cheok, “Rivals in Arms: Sino-U.S. Cooperation, Problems, and Solutions and Their Impact on the
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International UAV Industry,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2018), p. 753.
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Managing China-U.S. Science and Technology Cooperation

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Over the past decades, China, the United States, the European Union, Japan, South
Korea, and other major economies have been deeply integrated and benefited greatly
from the evolving global industrial chains, which have made invaluable contributions
to the sustainable growth of global economy. Out of fear for China’s rapid rise in
science and technology, however, the Trump administration has launched a tech war

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against China, aiming to decouple the U.S. high-tech industries from China’s. It is
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expected that due to the strong concerns of those hardliners about strategic
competition with China, as well as the lobbying of some interest groups, the Trump
administration will not refrain from exerting pressure on China on the political and
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technological fronts. Nonetheless, the Trump administration cannot totally ignore the
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call from the U.S. business circle and governments of most other countries for
continuing economic cooperation with China; and thus it is not very likely to
completely shut down the channels of bilateral cooperation in high-tech industries --
although tensions and frictions will remain. In this context, easing frictions between
the two countries is not only conducive, but also necessary, to the sustainable
development of global economy and strategic stability. To this end, China and the
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United States must explore new ways of improving their relations in science and
technology cooperation.

(Highlight: Complete China-U.S. decoupling in science and technology is not quite

likely.)

Most importantly of all, as the China-U.S. competition in high-tech industries is

part of their strategic competition, both countries need to try every means of
communication to maintain stability of the bilateral relationship as well as of the
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regional and global order. Specific measures may include: 1) Both countries should
expand high-level exchange, enhance mutual understanding of each other’s key
interests, and prevent further escalation of hostility between them. A cooperative
mentality in science and technology will be fostered on such basis, featuring win-win
cooperation, benign competition, and stable development. 2) Both countries can
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enhance cooperation and exchange among high-tech industries at the local level
through the existing cooperation mechanisms between sister provinces (states) and
cities, and try to establish more service-oriented institutions to provide market
information and intermediary services for high-tech cooperation between
governments and enterprises of both sides. 3) China should strengthen communication
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and cooperation with other major economies in science and technology, in particular
high-tech industries, in order to prevent confrontation between emerging economic
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blocs of the world as a result of the tech war. Currently, the Trump administration is
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seeking self-interest by a unilateral approach and levying pressure to different extents
on China, India, Japan and some European countries on economic and trade issues,
which has seriously disrupted the global economic order. Against this backdrop,
China needs to initiate more dialogue and cooperation with other economies on

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science and technology cooperation, so as to jointly guard against the
anti-globalization trends that endanger the momentum of global economic
development.

Furthermore, China and the United States should foster a consensus on the future
world order, and enhance a new cooperative relationship between them in science and

US
technology while properly addressing their trade disputes and alleviating their
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high-tech competition. For one thing, China needs to adopt new measures of
economic reform and further opening up, whilst the United States should develop a
firm belief in the new market opportunities that China can offer. Indeed, China has
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upgraded its foreign-related economic laws and regulations in the new round of
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opening up, especially since the beginning of 2019. The new Foreign Investment Law,
which was approved by the Second Session of the 13th National People’s Congress in
March 2019 and will go into effect on January 1, 2020, will provide new impetus for
China to expand its opening up and meet the call of many American enterprises. On
the basis of respecting each other’s core interests and major concerns, both countries
should refrain from using political measures to intervene in global economic resource
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allocation, in order to minimize the negative impacts of their strategic competition on

the global industrial chains and the legitimate interests of multinational enterprises.

For another thing, China and the United States can actively explore cooperation
in science and technology in third-party markets, by which to foster more common
interests. For instance, in helping the vast developing world, especially African
countries, to bridge the huge “digital divide” in advanced science and technology,
China and the United States are highly complementary and have great potential for
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cooperation. In 2015, the U.S. Department of State launched the “Global Connectivity
Initiative (GCI)” to mobilize multi-stakeholder efforts based on the notion that all
stakeholders, including governments, the private sector, civil society, multilateral
development banks, and international organizations, must play their parts to expand
connectivity. 14 The Digital GAP Act (H.R. 1359), which proposes to strengthen
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international cooperation and increase public and private investment in Internet

infrastructure, is also in the process of legislation in the U.S. Congress.15 Cooperation
in this field will greatly enhance China-U.S. common interests and joint endeavor in

14 “The Global Connect Initiative: Accelerating Entrepreneurship and Economic Opportunity by Expanding
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Internet Access Globally,” January 13, 2017, The U.S. Department of State,
https://staticshare.america.gov/uploads/2017/01/Final-version-of-the-GCI-Report-2016-01-115PM.pdf.
15 “H.R. 1359: Digital GAP Act,” The U.S. Congress, February 26, 2019,
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https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1359/text.
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global governance in science and technology.

(Highlight: China and the U.S. have much room for cooperation in global science and
technology governance.)

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Finally, China and the United States need to more actively participate in global
science and technology governance in response to the challenges brought about by
new technological progresses to global security and human well-being, and try to
stabilize their bilateral relationship with the help of multilateral frameworks. In the
field of artificial intelligence, for example, China enjoys a vast market for AI

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applications while the United States boasts leading technologies, making joint
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research between Chinese and American universities and research institutions -- and
even those from other countries -- complementary and mutually beneficial for
everyone. Therefore, institutionalized channels should be consolidated and
encouraged for experts of both countries to exchange views on a regular basis. In
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addition, China and the United States may explore new ways of bilateral cooperation
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on multilateral platforms such as the United Nations, in order to promote global
common standards and norms and create a favorable environment for the stable
development of bilateral cooperation in science and technology.

It is worth noting that in the near future, terrorist groups are very likely to use
AI-driven drones and other advanced technologies to launch attacks on their target
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countries’ critical infrastructure. Therefore, the international community has been

calling for adding those lethal autonomous weapon systems into the list of weapons
banned under the United Nations’ convention on certain conventional weapons (CCW)
brought into force in 1983.16 To address this most salient issue, China and the United
States must work together to enhance the building of an international drone control
system on such platforms as the United Nations or the Group of Twenty (G20).
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Conclusion

Based on its geopolitical considerations and interest calculation, as well as the

perceived gap in values between China and the United States, the Trump
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administration has launched a tech war against China since 2018. Coupled with other
bilateral economic and political issues, such as the ongoing bilateral trade war, the
South China Sea issue, and the restructuring of global and regional order, the tech war
has generated profound and lasting impacts on the development of China-U.S.
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16 Samuel Gibbs, “Elon Musk Leads 116 Experts Calling for Outright Ban of Killer Robots,” The Guardian,
August 20, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/20/elon-musk
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-killer-robots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-war.
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relations and may seriously harm global economy and strategic stability.

Considering the weight of a country’s strength in science and technology in its

comprehensive power, as well as the re-positioning of China as a “strategic rival” by a

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large part of the U.S. policy and even business circles, the tech war is likely to endure
for quite a few years into the future, whose negative effects will spill over to other
countries and further undermine the existing international political and economic
order. In this context, effective dispute settlement and conflict management between
China and the United States over bilateral science and technology issues, together
with strong measures taken by major economies to promote global cooperation in

US
high-tech industries, will help prevent the fragmentation and painful restructuring of
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the global industrial chains, in order to maintain regional and global strategic stability.
If the two leading economic powers adhere to the principle of equality and mutual
benefits and learn to adapt to and accommodate each other’s core interests and major
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concerns, then the international political and economic order can be gradually
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stabilized, on which basis global economy is hopeful to step on a new path of
equitable and sustainable development.
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