Chapter 3

Post-colonial Period in the History

of Africa: Development Challenges

W. M. Kassaye Nigusie and N. V. Ivkina

Introduction

In 1945, there were only four African states among the founders of the United
Nations—Egypt, Liberia, Ethiopia, and the Union of South Africa. In the 1950s,
some other states joined the UN after achieving the independence—Libya (1952),
Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia (1956), Ghana (1957), and Guinea (1958). The year of
1960 went down in world history as the “year of Africa” with the emergence of 17
new states. One by one, flags of independent African states were raised at the UN
headquarters.
The “year of Africa” ended by adopting the “Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” at the 15-th session of the UN General
Assembly on December 14, 1960.1 The Declaration became a crucial milestone in
the history of the African continent as it reaffirmed the right of all peoples to self-
determination and declared the need for the speedy and unconditional eradication
of colonialism. Two years later, a special Committee on decolonization was estab-
lished to monitor its implementation process. As a result, many territories gained
independence with subsequent UN membership.
Classical colonialism ended in the middle of the 1970s. Peoples of the Portuguese
colonies—Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde—defended their
independence with arms in hand and then came the turn of colonial-racist regimes
of Southern Africa. The national liberation movements of the South differed by

1 “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”. https://www.

un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/colonial.shtml.

W. M. Kassaye Nigusie · N. V. Ivkina (B)

RUDN University, Moscow, Russian Federation
e-mail: ivkina-nv@rudn.ru
W. M. Kassaye Nigusie
e-mail: kassae-nv@rudn.ru
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 39
A. M. Vasiliev et al. (eds.), Africa and the Formation of the New System of International
Relations, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77336-6_3
40 W. M. Kassaye Nigusie and N. V. Ivkina

a combination of armed and political forms of struggle. Majority rule was estab-
lished in Zimbabwe in 1980, in Namibia in 1990, and in South Africa in 1994. The
Soviet Union substantially contributed to the collapse of the colonial system. N. S.
Khrushchev, head of the USSR of that period, heavily insisted on adopting “Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (Denisov
& Urnov, 2010).
As in the colonial period, today Africa occupies a key position in the world’s
mineral and hydrocarbon markets. And this role is growing. Thus, Africa accounts
for a large share of the world’s highly sought-after minerals: 50%—thorium and
uranium, the same amount—phosphates, cobalt, manganese; 85%—platinum, 80–
90%—chromium, over 80%—diamonds, coltan, etc. But new dimensions of natural
resource potential are becoming even more important. These include biodiversity,
as Africa accounts for more than 25% of mammalian species, 20% of bird species,
and 24% of plants; the presence of vast organically clean, agricultural land (over
400 million hectares), and forests; the presence of a large potential for renewable
energy resources—solar, wind, and hydro resources; and a large potential of fresh
water (Deych & Korendyasov, 2017).

Neo-patrimonial Approach as a Theoretical Background

Within the framework of classical theories of international relations, African studies

mostly fit into the postulates of neo-Marxism. This follows from two basic assump-
tions. First, the lack of a high level of development in peripheral countries forces them
to accumulate capital and fight for economic justice, contrasting themselves with
capitalist countries (Whitaker & Clark, 2018: 13). Second, neo-Marxist scholars,
while analysing the problems of the developing world, could not ignore the vast
exploitation of colonial territories by former metropoles.
As F. Fanon, proponent of critical and postcolonial theories, assumes “Europeans
used the ideology of superiority to oppress African peoples both before and after the
collapse of colonialism” (Fanon, 2005: 112). If the first part of the statement does not
raise any questions, as it has been repeatedly proved in the framework of postcolonial
studies, the second provokes heated debates between supporters of Western and non-
Western theories. European countries heavily invest in the development of African
economies, infrastructure, and humanitarian sectors. In this context, it can be argued
that the ideas of neo-Marxism are applicable to the study of the internal political
situation in African countries, as well as to the study of their relationship to former
metropolitan areas.
However, discussing the consequences of colonial policies, local theories should
be primarily taken into consideration as they are helpful not only in analyzing the
public or private sectors but also in assessing the division of power (the party structure
and the leadership), as well as the ethnic challenges.
In contrast to the classical theories, also having a characteristic exhibitor neo-
patrimonialism has undergone significant changes in comparison with traditional
3 Post-colonial Period in the History of Africa … 41

patrimonialism. If the second term refers to the traditional form of government

described by M. Weber, being close to an authoritarian regime, the first implies
a process of studying the postcolonial system, including political parties, legislative
bodies, and formal institutional structures (Cheeseman et al., 2019).
Neo-patrimonialism is far from being a full-fledged theory. As well as classical
theories, it tries to understand the phenomenon of statehood and global processes.
In African studies, states are seen as illusory or informal because the rule of law is
poorly enforced and the opportunities for free public policy are extremely limited.
At the same time, states have weight in the sense that their political elites strive to
gain maximum control over all areas of domestic and foreign policy (the Palgrave
Handbook of Political Elites, 2018: 246).
Neo-patrimonialism considers the struggle for power and patronage initiated by
elites as the main processes in the world political arena (Bratton & Van de Walle,
1994: 487). It also raises the question of the legitimacy of power, which is extremely
relevant for many African countries.
According to B. J. Berman, in the post-colonial era, obtaining state legitimacy2 by
new countries became the most difficult task in the context of public administration
(Berman, 1998: 305–306). The artificial borders of African states created in the
post-colonial era caused ethnic, social, and religious divisions. But even in those
countries, where the transition to democratic regimes took place during the period of
rapid presidential elections from 1990 to 1993, military and one-party regimes did
not completely disappear.

Challenges of Formation of Modern African States

There are currently 55 African states, including the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR), a member of the African Union, recognized by 84 UN member-
states.3 Africa is distinguished by the absence of mono-ethnic states. Therefore,
ethnic stratification (uneven distribution of ethnic groups across a multinational terri-
tory, unequal access to economic resources and social benefits) is one of the most
pressing issues in Africa.
Some researchers believe that the current problems of African societies were
mostly inculcated by European colonizers who had divided Africa into several terri-
torial entities at the end of the nineteenth century, and in the 1960s transformed them
into states. But one cannot fully agree with this statement.4 Obviously, the methods
used by the colonialists in forming future independent states had a negative impact
on the current situation on the continent. The delimitation of borders did not take into

2 Not synonymous with sovereignty.

3 Lesotho and Madagascar are considered to be relatively monoethnic.
4 Deng F. M. Ethnicity an African predicament. Brookings. June 1, 1997. https://www.brookings.

edu/articles/ethnicity-an-african-predicament/ (accessed: 08.01.2020).

42 W. M. Kassaye Nigusie and N. V. Ivkina

account neither the historical distribution of African ethnic groups nor the political,
ethnic, economic or cultural factors that determine the diversity of local tribes.
The assumption that the colonialists, leaving Africa, planned to incite ethnic and
confessional strife in order to preserve their dominance is also highly controversial.
Some experts have even suggested that it was the period of colonialism that pushed the
peoples of Africa to fight for self-determination: “It can be argued that colonialism
gave rise to regressive ideas about African identity, which became the centre of
nationalist and anti-colonial struggles” (the Palgrave Handbook of African Colonial
and Postcolonial History, 2018: 431).
It should be noted that the colonizers could not act otherwise than by arbitrarily
establishing political boundaries in order to divide spheres of influence. This was
primarily due to the following circumstances: first, while signing in 1885 the Berlin
Agreement,5 the Europeans were not preoccupied by preserving ethnic borders in
Africa; the conference’s decisions set out only the rules for dividing the continent’s
territories; secondly, they acted without knowing the true ethnic composition of the
object of their claims.6
The transition from territorial entities to statehood in Africa greatly differed from
the European and American cases as it was not a natural internal process and was fully
imposed by the metropoles. This transition was carried out in conditions of diffusion
of self-identity of the continent’s population. Multi-ethnic states were created without
taking into account such important elements as a common past (history), culture,
language, and natural borders (Kassaye Nigusie, 2016b).
In addition, the process itself proceeded very quickly. African officials not only
had no experience in resolving inter-ethnic conflicts but were not ready to manage
multinational entities. As a result, fragile, imperfect political systems alien to local
societies and practices were formed, unable to cope with the demands of ethnic
groups defending their interests.
Thus, modern African states are for the most part products of the political thought
of Europe and not Africa itself. After gaining independence, the ruling elites of
African countries had to establish national statehood. The system of governance
created by the Europeans was not able to meet the interests of socio-economic and
spiritual development of a society that had entered the path of independent develop-
ment. This applies both to countries where the military ruled and to formally civilian,
even “democratically” created regimes (Abramova, 2002: 48; Abramova & Fituni,
2015).

5 The final act of the Berlin African conference. Berlin, February 14/26, 1885 http://istmat.info/
node/27251 (accessed: 02.01.2020).
6 In Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Nigeria, the colonial authorities were able to achieve an

approximate overlap of administrative divisions with the areas of settlement of previously living
ethnic groups.
3 Post-colonial Period in the History of Africa … 43

The Ruling Elite and Its Impact on the Political System

and Culture of Africa

During the period of African colonization along with the representatives of the tradi-
tional pre-colonial, a new elite emerged. The core of this Europeanized elite was
formed by the national intellectuals and entrepreneurs, who had received European
education and adhered to various Western political currents, such as conservatism,
liberalism, and socialism. Some preferred radical (revolutionary) methods, while
others tried to partially preserve national identity, for example, the leadership. For
centuries the institution of leader had a rather visible impact on the consciousness
of the local population and the political elite. This was an attempt to combine tradi-
tional and Western values. On the one hand, there was an increase in the number of
Western political institutions, but, on the other, the respect for traditional values was
demonstrated.
Communication with colonial administrative structures, trainings, and education
at European schools strongly contributed to the formation of new political interests
among the representatives of the African elite. This is basically due to two factors.
Firstly, the number of young people who received education in local and especially
foreign universities, including Soviet and American ones, gradually increased. Due
to their social status, the elite had more opportunities to introduce their children to the
achievements of European culture and civilization. Realizing the need to modernize
traditional political institutions for the further successful development of society, the
new elite started reforming African traditional political culture.
Secondly, the transfer of European political institutions (the state, political parties,
politicized social movements), as well as representative, legislative (Parliament), and
judicial authorities on the model of European countries, had a great impact on the
state of political culture in Africa. At the same time, some territories—Benin, Ghana,
Morocco, Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Congo—retained traditional institutions
of governance. Thus, the political system of post-colonial Africa consisted of two
subsystems: European and traditional.
Ch. Clapham in his book “Third World Politics” suggested that within the frame-
work of neo-patrimonialism the system of distribution of political governance in
African countries will be based on formally built legal principles (Clapham, 1985:
48). In other words, the officials who hold positions in the bureaucratic apparatus
with conditionally defined powers are formally in power, but the implementation
of vital issues is taken over mostly by the European forces. If during the period of
colonialism the metropoles used the ruling aristocracy as agents to control the local
population, then in the postcolonial period the modern African political elites took
on the role of mediators between Europeans and Africans on certain issues (Bassey,
2009: 30–31).
Subsequently, with modern political institutions, African countries acquired not
so much democratic as authoritarian traditions.7 As a result, “democratic values”

7 With the exception of the Ethiopian Empire.

44 W. M. Kassaye Nigusie and N. V. Ivkina

were either absent or not rooted in either the political culture of the masses, or
the political culture of the elites. The results of this, along with other factors and
reasons, to a certain extent affected the formation of power structures in independent
African countries, namely, the preference of presidential regimes over parliamentary
ones (Kosukhin, 2015). The study of African political elites is complicated by the
fact that it requires a unified consideration of the region, which is impossible in the
conditions of heterogeneous types of government in Africa. However, it is possible to
identify common elements of political regimes, such as weak institutionalization of
political systems, a steady predominance of informal political relations, long periods
of leadership in power, and particularistic economic policies (the Palgrave Handbook
of Political Elites, 2018: 241).
In the second half of the 1980s, almost all African countries were preoccupied by
the reform of the traditional political culture and of the former political structure. It
was supposed to make the transition from a one-party to a multi-party system. This
was a kind of condition for the democratization of political systems in Africa. But
the presence of a large number of political parties does not indicate a high degree of
political pluralism in society. Many parties are small in numbers, and sometimes it
is rather difficult to determine their political and ideological orientation. In addition,
large number of political parties in Africa represented individual ethnic groups, rather
than the state as a whole. Because of the weakness of the opposition parties, their
participation in the political process is determined by their traditions and loyalty to
the ruling regime.
In most cases political parties in Africa are formed not around a political platform
or the policy, but rather on the basis of the so called “patron-client” relationship,
that is, personal ties between leaders and ordinary members, the relationship of
clannishness, ethno-tribal community, land, religious, and similar principles that are
in no way related to either the platform or the policy of this party (Efimova, 1996).
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia with the absolute majority of ethnic
based political parties serves an example. Although the revised Regulation on the
Registration of Parties (Proc. No. 573/2008)8 recognizes only political parties estab-
lished at the national or regional level, about 70% of registered parties have ethnic
titles, indicating their affiliation to a specific language group residing in one of the
states of Ethiopia (Gebru, 2014). Moreover, many of the parties registered as national
do not hide their belonging to a particular ethnic group and use it as a means of
mobilizing the population.
Despite the party’s shortcomings, since the early 1990s, the multiparty democracy
has become the norm in many African countries. At the same time, no conceptual
or comparative work was carried out at the final stages of its implementation, and
non-industrialized African countries received the same guidelines for creating the
system as Western countries.
L. Diamond and R. Gunther, who were among the first to propose a typology of
political parties for African countries, do not treat it as a problem, arguing that the

8The Revised Political Parties Registration Proclamation No. 573/2008. Federal Negarit Gazeta.
No. 62. 24.09.2008. p. 4282–4312.
3 Post-colonial Period in the History of Africa … 45

presence of ethnic parties only “diversifies the landscape of the concept of African
political competition” (Diamond & Gunther, 2001: 30–36). This statement cannot
be fully accepted because individual ethnic parties might increase their influence
by expanding the community, which puts pressure on the political system and leads
to internal contradictions. In addition, Western countries seek to provide external
assistance exclusively to parties with a national presence, avoiding funding individual
unstable associations (Elischer, 2013: 271). This leads to the transformation of the
intra-political political system, when key decisions depend on those parties that
manage to pass off the interests of the ethnic majority as national ones.
After gaining independence, African countries proceeded to an “independent”
economic policy. The first decades of African history are generally known as the age
of optimism. The post-colonial development of African states was characterized by
the key role of the state, which was largely due to the weakness of national private
capital (the bourgeoisie). The creation of an extensive public sector that controlled
the main spheres of the national economy was considered as one of the main ways to
overcome backwardness and accelerate development. In many ways, this was done
by nationalizing enterprises that belonged to representatives of former metropolitan
areas.
The development of the public sector was accompanied by an increase in the
number of civil servants and administrative and technical personnel, an increase in
the social status and prestige of this social stratum, which served as a basis for the
formation of the privileged groups, which turned into a source of formation of a new
elite, partially transformed subsequently (late 1980s—early 1990s) into technocracy.
The arrival of a new generation of specialists to governing the state has become one
of the most significant processes in the public life of African countries. New managers
who received training in metropolitan universities (which was often paid for by the
government or public institutions of former metropoles or TNCs), liberals in their
views, occupy key positions in the government, and become prominent figures in
regional administrations. They are usually well-educated (mostly economists and
lawyers), and some have academic degrees and internship experience in former
metropolitan states.
The group of managers, which can be conventionally called the “new bureau-
cracy”, is mostly reform-oriented. At the same time, this new generation of managers
perceives reforms as a breakdown of the existing order. In addition, the old order (the
older generation of elites) is seen as an obstacle to the acceleration of the country’s
development, and above all, to them.
Thus, the formation of the political culture of the ruling elites after independence
can be divided into two periods: the 1960s–1980s, when the first generation of the
ruling elite was in power, and from 1980 to the present, when it was replaced by the
second generation. The methods of political leadership of both generations can be
still considered as largely authoritarian, which are explained by the need to solve the
most acute or escalating socio-economic problems, and to consolidate the nation.
At the same time, the concentration of power in the hands of one person (and
his inner circle) is substantiated by traditional ideas about power and justified from
a religious point of view and the peculiarities of the national mentality. This also
46 W. M. Kassaye Nigusie and N. V. Ivkina

confirms the neo-patrimonial behaviour of African countries based on factionism,

which is justified by the presence of a single person or a limited circle of people,
realizing personal interests (Lodge, 2014: 1–2).
Representatives of the first generation of the ruling elite of Africa somehow ideal-
ized the original aspect of the socio-political and economic development of the
nation, with search of a special and unique path of development, different from the
“Western” one. In addition, the African elite accompanied this strategy by creating
ideologies: pan-Africanism, African socialism, Negroes, etc. But because of the
non-competitiveness of these ideologies, Africans were forced to orient themselves
toward the West (USA) or the East (USSR). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
they had no choice at all.
The second-generation of African leaders was committed to the principles of
“good governance” in conditions of poor and insufficient economic development.
For most African countries “good governance” boiled down to aid programs and
loans from the IMF and World Bank, as well as from the donor countries, which
were accompanied not only by economic but mostly by political conditions and
requirements. Thus, industrialized countries and organizations in which they hold
leading positions have leverage over governments that are unwilling or unable to
“effectively” manage their countries (Piskunova, 2008: 42–43). This is the essence
of a new type of colonialism.

The Role of Army in the Political Life of African States

An important, and at some stages decisive, role in the political life of African coun-
tries belongs to the army. According to G.I. Mirsky, the army is the main national
institution in a state where the nation is still at the stage of formation, where national
ties are weak, where family, tribal, and regional ties determine people’s conscious-
ness to a greater extent than the sense of belonging to one community (Mirsky,
1976: 8–9). In other words, the absence of an established developed system of public
administration in African countries on the eve of independence, as well as the fact
that it was the military (partisans) who led the anti-colonial struggle, determined
their coming to power.
The role of the army in the political life of various African countries is not the
same. In some countries, revolutionary democratic regimes were established with
the help of the army. In others, the army did not contribute to their formation. It
is difficult to find a common denominator (Mirsky, 1976). However, a clear trend
has been revealed: the degree of militarization depends on the standard of living in
the country. According to the prevailing approach, the poorer the state, the more
militarized the government and society are (for example, Mozambique, Somalia,
Chad, Tanzania) (Barany, 2012: 288).
Thus, in each of the African countries, the army, and mainly the middle and
higher military ranks, left an imprint on the formation of the political culture of
the ruling elite, contributed to the formation of state institutions and influenced the
3 Post-colonial Period in the History of Africa … 47

ways and forms of the country’s political development. In many African countries,
the army did not just take power, it also contributed to the coming to power of a
new generation of the ruling elite, who managed to carry out transformations that
contributed to economic development and raise the standard of living of broad strata
of the population. An example is the armies of Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and Ghana.

Ethnic Factors in Post-colonial Development in Africa

During the formation of colonial society, ethnic groups were divided or united with
little regard for their common characteristics or distinctive features. They were placed
in a new administrative framework governed by new values, new institutions, and
new principles and methods of governance. The autonomous local views of the old
order were replaced by the control mechanisms of the state, in which the alien was
the supreme power.
This mechanism functioned through the centralization of power, which ultimately
relied on the police and military force, as well as the tools of authoritarian rule. This
brute force, however, was mitigated by expanding state control over tribes and local
communities, which gave the leaders the status of legitimate rulers. In addition to this
type of legitimacy, a social security system was introduced, through which the state
provided poor social services and limited development opportunities in privileged
sectors. Otherwise, national resources were extracted and exported to support the
industry of the metropoles.9
Colonialism tried to block ethnic interests and the involvement of ethnic groups in
politics. Different ethnic groups that lived on the same territory established relations
vertically (ethnos—colonizer) and not horizontally (ethnos—ethnos). Therefore, the
ethnic hierarchy took place only in relation to the central government (the colonizer).
But in the 1960s, with the acquisition of independence, the common enemy—the
“colonial oppressor”—was eliminated. A new set of disagreements arose that led to
serious conflicts and even genocide, as was in the case in Rwanda or Sudan (Kassaye
Nigusie, 2016b).
A few decades after the independence of African states, it became apparent that
“the first leaders of the liberated countries did not realize that in most cases the states
they led were a mosaic of poorly or not at all integrated local communities, in which
there were conflicting patterns of subordination (i.e., distribution of power), as well
as the limits of available resources and opportunities” (Austin, 1984: 15).
Currently, almost every African conflict has an ethno-confessional dimension.
Even in conflicts that may seem free of ethnic issues, groups and their allies, based on
the ethnic principle, are actively involved. Amidst the economic crisis and transition
to a different formation, fanatical devotion to their group is cultivated in people,
reaching the point of complete denial of the rights of other groups. Politicians use

9Deng F. M. Ethnicity an African predicament. Brookings. June 1, 1997. URL: https://www.bro

okings.edu/articles/ethnicity-an-african-predicament/ (accessed: 08.01.2020).
48 W. M. Kassaye Nigusie and N. V. Ivkina

any methods to rally the population, and any actions are justified, including the use of
the most cruel measures and methods against their opponents. Negative stereotypes
and the image of the enemy are artificially supported by participants in conflicts and
are fixed in the minds of the population. Moreover, the negative perception of another
ethnic group or another religious group is sometimes deliberately cultivated by the
ruling circles in order to encourage the continuation of the war and distract the main
part of the population from socio-economic difficulties (Kassaye Nigusie, 2016b).
In most African countries, the determination to preserve national unity after inde-
pendence has served as a justification for one-party rule, excessive centralization of
power, repressive authoritarian regimes, and systematic violations of human rights
and fundamental freedoms. This, in turn, provoked a reaction manifested in increased
tension and the demand for a second release.10 At the present time, managing ethnic
diversity within the framework of preserving colonial borders is the main task of
African states. At the same time, there are no practical, but also theoretical approaches
and mechanisms for resolving inter-ethnic and inter-confessional conflicts.
In Africa, there are several waves of conflict that have emerged in local hotbeds
and spread to regions and sub-regions of the continent.
It follows that the “hot spots” of Africa are not only points of collision of interests
and bilateral claims of a political, territorial, or economic nature, they are “knots of
conflict” that were formed by transformation, “spill-over” of an internal conflict for
a country into a border conflict, then into a conflict in another country, etc. Such a
process is dangerous with the tendency to develop into “waves of conflict”, which
can cover the entire continent. By “overflowing”, the conflict generated by the claims
of two parties and often within the same state entity becomes self-replicating and
acquires acceleration, its own dynamics and logic. This situation is significant, as it
demonstrates a global trend (Piskunova, 2008: 42–43).
According to modern conflictologists, the distinctive feature of conflicts in the
twenty-first century is not only the difficulty of management but also the tendency
of local conflicts to grow into regional ones. Ultimately, the initial contradictions of
the original opponents sometimes have nothing to do with what they turn into. Two
factors deserve a close study. First of all, this is a phenomenon of global significance
associated with the explosion of conflict after the end of the cold war. Another factor
is the growing conflict on the continent and the disintegration of a number of states;
this factor in itself is not a new phenomenon, but the potential for conflict in Africa
is higher than ever: continental contradictions are no longer restrained by powerful
external players.

African Inter-state Political Groups

In the post-colonial years, the best minds in Africa were busy searching for ways
to achieve complete independence (political, military, economic, and cultural) of

10 Ibid.
3 Post-colonial Period in the History of Africa … 49

the continent from European domination. At the same time, opinions among the
leaders of African countries were divided. Some believed that Africa could achieve
the desired results by immediately uniting all the states of the continent, while others
were sure that the most effective solution would be to create an economic union based
on the relations established by the colonizers. The result of these differences was the
emergence of radical (K. Nkrumah, A. Sekou Toure, G. Abdel Nasser), moderate (L.
cedar Senghor), conservative (F. Houphouet-Boigny), and neutral (Emperor Haile
Selassie I) leaders in the political arena of Africa in the early 1960s.
In 1958, Gold Coast leader K. Nkrumah convened a Conference of independent
African states in Accra, the capital of Ghana. The conference was held on December
8–13 under the slogan of the struggle for the conquest of political independence by
all the peoples of Africa. Among the many issues that were discussed at the confer-
ence, the most topical at that historical moment were the following—developing a
common line in the field of foreign policy of African states; measures to protect
the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integration of the continent; ways and
means of expanding economic cooperation among African states based on technical,
scientific, and information exchanges; cultural exchange between African countries
(Kassaye Nigusie, 2016a: 240–241). The conference called for unity among all the
peoples of Africa. At the conference it was decided to annually celebrate the “Day
of Africa”, 15 April (Kassaye Nagusie, 2013: 58). The conference also agreed to
meet every two years and decided that the second conference would be held in Addis
Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, in 1960.
Addis Ababa conference was held on June 14–24, 1960, with the participation of
the leaders of nine countries: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya,
Morocco, the UAR, Tunisia, and representatives of the Provisional government of
the Republic of Algeria. The conference discussed important international and pan-
African issues and adopted a number of resolutions condemning any nuclear weapons
testing on African territory. For the first time, participants drew the attention of
African states to the dangers of neo-colonialism and recommended effective control
over foreign firms, as well as demanding that the colonial powers set dates for granting
independence to all territories still in colonial dependence.
It was clear from the outset that the real driving forces with the power and the
means to achieve the goal of uniting Africa are the leaders of states. In other words,
the fate of Africa’s unity was, to a certain extent, in their hands. The idea of unity
was promoted among Africans who were educated in European or European-created
educational institutions. The “Europeanized” African elite had a more adequate
understanding of the concept of unity than the majority of the population, for whom
it was an abstract and incomprehensible phenomenon.
In 1961–1962, due to political differences between African states, all attempts to
convene a continental conference were unsuccessful, and the first interstate political
groups were formed.
On December 15–19, 1960, representatives of 12 African states: Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey (since 1975 People’s
Republic of Benin), Gabon, Ivory Coast (since 1985 The Republic of Côte d’Ivoir),
the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta
50 W. M. Kassaye Nigusie and N. V. Ivkina

(since 1984, Burkina Faso)11 met in Brazzaville to discuss the situation in Algeria.
These countries had nothing in common except their colonial past, and the fact
that the French language became the state language. At the meeting in Brazzaville,
a communique was adopted in which the parties stressed their desire to cooperate
more intensively in the field of economy and culture, as well as to develop a common
position in foreign policy (Kassaye Nigusie, 2016b: 241–242).
The relations between the two countries were not always based on full mutual
understanding and trust. Houphouet-Boigny, the leader of the Cote d’Ivoir, vied for
the leadership, while A. Sekou Toure, the leader of the Republic of Guinea, feuded
with F. Houphouet-Boigny (Anda, 2000: 81). Nevertheless, the “Brazzaville group”
turned out to be quite harmonious and numerous. It united African states whose
political course was characterized by conservatism and moderation.
In January 1961, after the conference, held in Casablanca (Morocco), a radical
group, which later became known as the “Casablanca” group, launched its activities.
Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, representatives of Libya, and the interim
government of the Republic of Algeria attended the conference. Tunisia, Nigeria,
Liberia, and Togo declined the invitation. States managed to adopt the African
Charter (Charter), and agreed to create the military command of African states and the
African common market. In addition, permanent bodies were established, including
economic, cultural and political committees, high command and headquarters in
Bamako (Mali) (Cassie Nagusia 2013: 61).
The “Monrovia” group was formed after a conference held in Monrovia, Liberia, in
May 1961. The forum was attended by representatives from 19 countries (Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoir, Dahomey,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, and Upper Volta). It included all members of the
Brazzaville group, Libya, and most of the former British colonies. The “Monrovia”
group was joined by independent African states whose leaders felt that Africa’s
international policy was not adequately represented by the “Casablanca” group and
the Brazzaville group. Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoir, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Liberia
became its members. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia expressed their sympathy and
support to it.
The “Monrovia” group met again (with the exception of Tunisia and the inclusion
of the former Belgian Congo) in January 1962 in Lagos, Nigeria, to establish a
permanent Secretariat and a permanent Commission of Finance Ministers to draft
and sign the Charter (Charter) Organizations of African states and the island of
Madagascar.
The two groups took different positions on issues related to the role of the state in
the national economy, as well as to relations with former colonizers. Their reaction to
the presence of communist states (the USSR, Eastern European countries, and China)
in Africa was quite ambiguous. The “Casablanca” group proposed to establish state
control over all means of production, arguing that only in conditions of complete

11 Guinea and Mali boycotted the meeting.

3 Post-colonial Period in the History of Africa … 51

economic independence political freedom is possible. This meant the need to expand
the public sector in the national economy by nationalizing foreign enterprises.
Thus, Ghana established state-owned enterprises in the early 1960s. K. Nkrumah,
Prime Minister and first President of independent Ghana, was deeply convinced
that a socialist approach would help accelerate the transformation of a backward
traditional economy into a developed industrial one. Guinea and Mali established
state monopolies on domestic and foreign trade. Many businesses in Egypt were also
nationalized. This was a response to the former mother countries, which, according
to the “Casablanca” group, tried to exercise control over the economy of the former
colonies through various economic, diplomatic tricks and mechanisms, which is
“unfair and illegitimate”. Members of the group called on Africans to take a strong
unified stance against neo-colonial methods of exploitation of Africa.
Many Africans believed that the divergence of views shown by both groups was
insurmountable and that African unity was an unattainable goal. But in May 1963,
an event occurred that reconciled the split into two groups of African leaders-the first
pan-African conference of heads of state and government was convened.
On May 22, 1963, the conference of independent African states was convened
in Addis Ababa after overcoming all obstacles and difficulties. On May 25, 1963
heads of 32 African states: Algeria, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic
Republic of the Congo (Zaire from 1971 to 1997), Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Niger,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda,
and Ethiopian Empire (since 1991 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia)
signed the Charter of the Organization of African unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa. The
main principle of the OAU was “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of each country and its inalienable right to independent existence”.12
The creation of the OAU became an important stage in the history of the post-
colonial Africa. From then on, African countries joined forces against colonialism
and apartheid and started working together in the international arena. But the creation
of the OAU and the adoption of the Charter did not automatically lead to the disap-
pearance of border disputes. Some radical leaders stated at the conference that they
did not fully share the ideas that had formed the basis of the OAU Charter. Funda-
mental changes in the global balance of power during the existence of the OAU
(1963–2001) caused the main reason in forming the African Union, which replaced
the OAU.
The leader of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Colonel
Muammar Gaddafi initiated the transformation of the OAU into the AU and proposed
at the annual regular OAU summit held in Algeria on July 12–14, 1999, to convene
an extraordinary session of the OAU in Libya in order to discuss ways and means to
increase its effectiveness, to respond to the challenges of globalization for preserving

12Resolutions adopted by the First Conference of Independent African Heads of State and Govern-
ment Held in Addis-Ababa. Ethiopia, from 22 to 25 May 1963. OAU Secretariat. https://au.int/sites/
default/files/decisions/32247-1963_cias_plen_2-3_cias_res_1-2_e.pdf (assessed: 10.01.2020).
52 W. M. Kassaye Nigusie and N. V. Ivkina

the social, economic, and political potential of Africa (Kassaye Nigusie et al., 2020).
The decision to establish the AU was taken at the extraordinary summit of the OAU
in September 1999 in Sirte (Libya).
In July 2000, at the OAU summit in Lome (Togo), the African heads of states
approved the founding Act of the AU. In July 2001, the 37th session of the OAU
Assembly, held in Lusaka, Zambia, approved a set of documents defining the structure
and the legal framework of the new organization. By this time, 51 states had ratified
the Act replacing the OAU Charter, although the OAU Charter continued for another
year during the transition period from the OAU to the AU.
On May 26, 2001, the regional international intergovernmental organization
African Union (AU) was established on the basis of the defunct Organization of
African Unity, bringing together 53 states of the continent.
The first African Union summit was held in July 2002 in Durban (South Africa).
The President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, was elected President
of the AU. All states on the continent are members of the AU, with the exception of
the Kingdom of Morocco, which ceased to participate in the work of the OAU after
the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.
The main difference between the AU and the OAU is that the priority of the new
organization is attributed to the economic integration, not political. This indicates the
readiness for the progressive development of integration processes. Nevertheless, the
AU does not completely abandon the basic principles of the OAU, such as respecting
the state borders of the member states established at the time of their independence,
promoting unity and solidarity among the peoples and states of Africa, protecting
sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintaining peace, security and stability on the
continent, and participating in the resolution of regional conflicts. New provisions
of the Act of the AU forbid the representatives of governments that came to power
unconstitutionally to participate in the work of the AU and ensure its dialogue with
the world community only from a unified position.

Conclusion

The post-colonial period of African history is still a top-agenda issue. This is primarily
due to the fact that the continent has not finished forming the political structures, as
well as to the constantly changing situation in the public management. The theory of
neo-patrimonialism has become a kind of link between the internal political processes
in Africa and the external factor of intervention and assistance of Europe to African
states. It was with the help of the above theory that it became possible to demonstrate
the dualistic nature of the influence of former metropoles on the process of creating
African states in the first period of post-colonialism. On the one hand, it was the
European countries that initiated the formation of borders in Africa without taking
into account specific historical, ethnic, and cultural characteristics, which resulted
in internal political conflicts on the continent. On the other hand, without European
influence on the processes of creating state structures with partial preservation of
3 Post-colonial Period in the History of Africa … 53

traditional value systems, it is practically impossible to imagine the modern African

elite; it simply could not be able to restrain individual ethnic initiatives and would
not have acquired management skills.
Especially worth noting the role of army, a crucial dimension of the internal
political situation on the continent amid the regional instability and high conflict
potential. The intervention of the European states has a significant, but rather negative
role. Europeans provide assistance to the individual African states in strengthening
their military structures without regard to the real needs, trying to expand their own
potential in Africa instead of promoting development strategy. The most difficult
challenges of the post-colonial period are mainly concentrated in the military sphere.
The emergence of African inter-state political groups is closely linked to the ethnic
agenda and the formation of new political elites. Obviously, the regional integration
processes have been formed due to both internal and external factors. Internal ones
include the willingness of country leaders to create sub-regional groups to strengthen
their own positions on the continent, while external ones include the recognition by
European countries of African international organizations already formed in the
twenty-first century.

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