WEEK 3

G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR.,
TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY
AVELINO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16,
1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition.

Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his
first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.

The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino
are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The
other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.

The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that
she be appointed the administrator of the estate.

On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said
judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.

On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:

Acting on the "Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition", considering that the
petitioner is the only heir not amenable to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs
manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino,
Sr., the same is granted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio
Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal
properties left by the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning. Notify all the parties and their counsel of this assignment.

SO ORDERED.1

On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June
16, 1993.

On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
31574.

On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the
"petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed. 2

On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:

1
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE PREMISES.

ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE

DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.3

For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is whether respondent
appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's
finding that a partition is proper.

Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has
yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles
v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the existence of other properties of the decedent
is a matter still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the
same.4 In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an
administrator to manage and attend to it.

Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the
issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was,
thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.

When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is
incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78.5 The exceptions to this rule are found in
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 746 which provide:

Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. . .

Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever the gross value of the estate of a
deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that
fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of
an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than
three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after
such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,
without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper,
allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate
in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate
as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and
legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall
thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded
to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the
proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded
in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be
recorded in the proper register's office.1awp++i1

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the
latter's death.7 Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves
without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending
obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.8

We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age."9 With this finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should
apply.

In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to
partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a
complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate

2
has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court
did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition.

Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters of
administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The
basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the
heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary
action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious
remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to
submit to administration proceedings. 10 The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters
of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible
error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990

BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner, vs.

HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro Manila and
TERESA F. OLBES, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the Order
of the respondent Judge, dated 15 January 1985, cancelling the appointment of the petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales as a co-administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate
of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis," Branch 143, RTC, Makati, Metro Manila; and the Order of 15 May
1985 denying reconsideration of the same.

The facts are:

Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the court a quo, is an intestate proceeding involving the estate
of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis. Doña Ramona is survived by her four (4) children
who are her only heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-
Gomez.

On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and private respondent Teresa
Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.

On 11 November 1984, while petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States accompanying her
ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that country, private respondent Teresa Olbes filed a
motion, dated 26 November 1984, to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, on the ground that
she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the
interest of the estate and the heirs. Copy of said motion was served upon petitioner's then counsel of record,
Atty. Manuel Castro who, since 2 June 1984, had been suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice
of law throughout the Philippines. 1

After the filing of private respondent's aforesaid motion, respondent Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo issued an Order
dated 4 December 1984 which required Beatriz F. Gonzales and the other parties to file their opposition, if
any, thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, as the
latter was still in the United States attending to her ailing husband.

In an Order dated 15 January 1985, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to
Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona
Gonzales. The Court, in explaining its action, stated:

. . . In appointing them, the court was of the opinion that it would be to the best interest of the
estate if two administrators who are the children of the deceased would jointly administer the
same. Unfortunately, as events have shown, the two administrators have not seen eye to eye
with each other and most of the time they have been at loggerheads with each other to the
prejudice of the estate. Beatriz F. Gonzales has been absent from the country since October,
3
 1984 as she is in the United States as stated in the motion and opposition of Asterio Favis
dated December 11, 1984, and she has not returned even up to this date so that Teresa F.
Olbes has been left alone to administer the estate. Under these circumstances, and in order
that the estate will be administered in an orderly and efficient manner, the court believes that
there should be now only one administrator of the estate. 2

Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of 15 January 1985. Her motion was opposed separately by private
respondent Teresa Olbes and another co-heir Cecilia Gomez. In her manifestation and opposition to
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, Cecilia Gomez stated that it would be pointless to re-appoint Beatriz
F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of Teresa Olbes, as the former would be leaving soon for the United States
to attend to unfinished business. Moreover, she expressed satisfaction with the manner respondent Teresa
Olbes had been managing and administering the estate.

In his Order dated 7 May 1986, a part of which is hereunder quoted, respondent Judge denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. He said:

xxx xxx xxx

After a consideration of the motion for reconsideration and the oppositions thereto, the court
believes and so holds that it should be denied. The court in its discretion has issued its order
dated January 15, 1985 cancelling the appointment and the letters of administration issued to
Beatriz F. Gonzales and it reiterates the same for the best interest of the estate of the
deceased. It is noteworthy that of the four heirs of the deceased, one of them being the
movant Beatriz F. Gonzales, two of them, namely, Cecilia F. Gomez and Teresa F. Olbes,
opposed the motion. The other heir Asterio Favis, did not file or make any comment to the
motion. As can be gathered from the oppositions of Cecilia F. Gomez and Teresa F. Olbes,
the reappointment of Beatriz F. Gonzales as a co-administratrix would not be conducive to
the efficient and orderly administration of the estate of the deceased Ramona Gonzales vda.
de Favis. 3

Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge's Order dated 15 January 1985 should be
nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown by respondents to be
anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings

upon death, resignation or removal — If an executor or administrator neglects to render his
account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the
court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its
discretion, may permit him to resign. . . .

While appellate courts are generally disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the probate court in the
matter of removal of an administrator, 4 we find, in the case at bar, sufficient cause to reverse the order of
the probate court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate.

The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, the court must appoint an administrator of the
estate of the deceased 5 who shall act as representative not only of the court appointing him but also of the
heirs and the creditors of the estate. 6 In the exercise of its discretion, the probate court may appoint one, two
or more co-administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented. 7

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration
reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 8 This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer
the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential
motive to administer the estate correctly.9

Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to protection from
removal without just cause. 10 Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the legal and
specific causes authorizing the court to remove an administrator. 11

4
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it
however must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an
act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders
of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making
such a determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.

In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix on any of
the causes specified in respondent's motion for relief of the petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine
the validity of the charges brought against petitioner by respondent Olbes. The court based the removal of
the petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have
existed between petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the
added circumstance that petitioner had been absent from the country since October 1984, and up to 15
January 1985, the date of the questioned order.

Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with harmonious relations
between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct,
one's removal is not favored. 12 Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur
between persons with different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the co-
administrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the estate and its heirs.

We, like petitioner, find of material importance the fact that the court a quo failed to find hard facts showing
that the conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrices were unjustly caused by petitioner,
or that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management
of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her
continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate. Petitioner
Beatriz F. Gonzales is as interested as respondent Olbes and the other heirs in that the properties of the
estate be duly administered and conserved for the benefit of the heirs; and there is as yet no ground to
believe that she has prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate to warrant the probate court into removing
petitioner as co-administratrix.

Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the estate also on the
ground that she had been absent from the country since October 1984 and had not returned as of 15 January
1985, the date of the questioned order, leaving respondent Olbes alone to administer the estate.

In her motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January 1985, petitioner explained to the court a
quo that her absence from the country was due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to
the United States for medical treatment. 13 It appears too that petitioner's absence from the country was
known to respondent Olbes, and that the latter and petitioner Gonzales had continually maintained
correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the estate during the petitioner's
absence from the country. 14 As a matter of fact, petitioner, while in the United States, sent respondent Olbes
a letter addressed to the Land Bank of the Philippines dated 14 November 1984, and duly authenticated by
the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests
accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the payment of accounts
necessary for the operation of the administration. 15

The above facts, we note, show that petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the
estate nor had she been remiss in the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the
state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's Will, a
temporary residence outside of the state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is
not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.

. . . It seems quite clear that a temporary absence from the state on account of ill health, or on
account of business or for purposes of travel or pleasure, would not necessarily establish the
fact that an executor "has removed" from the estate, within the intent of the statute. The
learned surrogate was evidently satisfied that the sojourn of these executors in New Jersey
was nothing more than a departure from the state for the benefit of relatives, not designed to
constitute a permanent change of abode, and contemplating a return to New York as soon as
the purpose of their absence should be accomplished. In this view, I am inclined to think that
he was right in refusing to hold that he was constrained to revoke the letters by the provisions
of the Code to which I have referred. I therefore advise an affirmance of the order. 16

Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other three (3) heirs of the
estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have opposed the retention or re-
appointment of petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the removal of an
administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor

5
on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration. In re William's
Adm'r., the court held:

A county court having appointed a stranger administrator as expressly authorized by Ky. St.
3897, after the relatives of decedent had lost their right of precedence, could not remove the
appointee merely because of the request of relatives and the belief upon the part of the court
that the best interest of deceased would be thereby subserved, since the administrator had
such an interest as entitled him to protection from removal without cause. 17

As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her removal
was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her. Stated differently, petitioner
Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her removal was therefore improper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo dated 15 January 1985 removing
petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021, entitled "In the Matter
of the Intestate Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis" and the Order of the same Court dated 15 May
1985 denying reconsideration of said Order, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered
reinstated as co-administratrix of said estate.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioners,

vs.
ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Belen Sagad Angeles
seeks to set aside the Decision dated May 29, 20021 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 66037,
reversing an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the herein respondent Aleli
"Corazon" Angeles-Maglaya.

The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at
Caloocan City, respondent filed a petition2 for letters of administration and her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). In the petition,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-2140 and raffled to Branch 120 of the court, respondent alleged,
among other things, the following:

1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan, died intestate on January 21, 1998
in the City of Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable
properties;

2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco’s estate;

3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together
with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the
decedent; and

4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator.

Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix
of Francisco’s estate.3 In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on
August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union which was ratified
two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco
represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred that
respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate
6
daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged
that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not
presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to
prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being the only child of Francisco,
petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A.
Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as
possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.

In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, the
January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the
alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply, respondent
dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed with the Court of
Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.4

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation of her
evidence by taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the
legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988.5 She also
testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other
witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles,6 Francisco Yaya,7 Jose O. Carreon8 and Paulita
Angeles de la Cruz.9 Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry
stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space below the question
"Legitimate? (Legitimo?)"; pictures taken during respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T.
Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service
records.

After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion to
Dismiss" under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition
for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove a cause of action", it
being her stated position that "[P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis-à-
vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles."10

To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by petitioner’s reply, to which
respondent countered with a rejoinder.

Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,11 the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to prove
her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the [respondent] to state a
cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of Procedure. (Word
in bracket added]

Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court in its Order of
December 17, 1999.12 Therefrom, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals where her recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29,
2002,13 reversed and set aside the trial court’s order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as
administratrix of the estate of Francisco, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby ordered to
appoint petitioner-appellant Aleli "Corazon" Angeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco
Angeles.

SO ORDERED.

The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main premises:

1. Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised on the alleged failure of the
underlying petition for letter of administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a
demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33;14

2. Petitioner’s motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived her right to present opposing
evidence to rebut respondent’s testimonial and documentary evidence; and

7
3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the deceased Francisco.

Hence, petitioner’s instant petition for review on certiorari, on the submission that the Court of Appeals
erred: (1) in reversing the trial court’s order of dismissal;15 (2) in treating her motion to dismiss as a
demurrer to evidence; (3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco; and (4) in
decreeing respondent’s appointment as administratrix of Francisco’s intestate estate.

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of whether or not respondent is the
legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals resolved
the issue in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the trial court to appoint
respondent as administratrix of Francisco’s estate.

We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court’s conclusion on the legitimate status of respondent,
or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore,
implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate
filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
"Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting from Tison vs. Court of
Appeals,16 stated that since petitioner "opted not to present any contrary evidence", the presumption on
respondent’s legitimacy stands "unrebutted."17

Following is an excerpt from Tison:

It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally
recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing than the presumption that children born in wedlock
are legitimate. And well-settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:

‘The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .

actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally.
xxx

xxx xxx xxx

‘Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family Code], the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes
fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child
born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as
to the paternity of such child so that the evidence material to the matter . . . may still be easily available.’

xxxxxxxxx

‘Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . . . .’(Words in bracket added;
Emphasis ours)

Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a child
is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such
child cannot be attacked collaterally.

A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to
establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. 18 For, a presumption is prima
facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima
facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved,19 the presumption of
legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code20 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual
basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred
during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.

In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did not categorically state from what
facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondent’s supposed legitimacy arose. But even if
8
perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondent’s gratuitous assertion and
an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to respondent’s
mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract – doubtless the best
evidence of Francisco’s and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been solemnized 21 – was offered in evidence.
No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he
solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say
anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent
was Francisco’s daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz testified that they
know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas’) father and her (Paulita’s) mother, who are both
Francisco’s siblings, told them so.22 And one Jose Carreon would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in
Francisco’s house in Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to court Genoveva before the war. 23 In all, no
evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage
contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the
persons present, and like significant details.

While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and Genoveva,
we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her
putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife. Clearly, therefore, the Court of
Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained,
should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent such a marriage,
as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut.

Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in 1938,
respondent never, thru the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen
Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were, she
made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion – as well as the appellate court’s conclusion -
that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had declared that her
mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with
petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already "spouses". Now, then, if, as
respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married
in 1938, it follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to
Genoveva’s death, would necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void,24 in which case petitioner could not
be, as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a "surviving spouse" of the decedent.
We quote the pertinent allegation:

4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who is 58 years old, and BELEN S.
Angeles, the surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his second marriage, who is about 77
years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . " (Emphasis and word in bracket added)

We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that the legitimate filiation of a
child can be established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of
his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated
November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. "E"). In it, her birth was
recorded as the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word "married" is
written in the certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and Genoveva.

Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that "[I]t was error for the Court of Appeals to have
ruled . . . that [respondent’s] Birth Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married".

9
The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it is elementary: the Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by
Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having
attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is,
under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution:
the fact of birth of a child.25 Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating
proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by
the mother alone if the father refuses.26 Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the probative value of the
entries in a certificate of birth, wrote:

xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting of his name by
the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is necessary.27

The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of respondent, unsigned as it were
by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes – and "indubitably" at that - not only respondent’s filiation to
Francisco but even her being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity to the limit.
In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as defining proof of filiation, and not just
filiation but of legitimate filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally married. In
the apt words of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a physician who merely
certified having attended "the birth of a child who was born alive at 3:50 P.M. ", created " a marriage that
of ‘ Francisco and Genoveva’, and filiation (that said child) is the daughter of ‘Francisco’"’28

It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself.29 It cannot,
as the decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the attending
physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother, with or
without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her offspring
through the simple expedient of writing the putative father’s name in the appropriate space in the birth
certificate. A long time past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth
certificate prima facie evidentiary value of filiation:

Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming unmarried mother
to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater familias. How? She
simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the newborn babe is her legitimate offspring
with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for registration . . . . And any lawyer with sufficient
imagination will realize the exciting possibilities from such mischief of such prima facie evidence – when
and if the "father" dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design xxx30

Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to Atty.
Maglaya and from her student and government records which indicated or purported to show that Francisco
Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving
respondent’s hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the
execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition. 31 And needless to
stress, they cannot support a finding of the legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva.

The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the school and service records and the
testimony of respondent’s witnesses lend support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous possession
of the status of a child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent may have been the natural
child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately, however, that angle is not an, or at issue in the case before
us. For, respondent peremptorily predicated her petition for letters of administration on her being a
legitimate child of Francisco who was legally married to her mother, Genoveva, propositions which we have
earlier refuted herein.

If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition were it not for another
compelling consideration which petitioner has raised and which we presently take judicially notice of.

As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at the trial court, filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the petition of
spouses Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A. Yamat and two
others. In that petition, docketed with the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned "Aleli
‘Corazon’ Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora A. Santos, Franco
Angeles and Belen S. Angeles", respondent alleged that as legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should have
been notified of the adoption proceedings.

Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned annulment case to RTC,
Caloocan for reception of evidence. Eventually, in a Decision32 dated December 17, 2003, the Court of

10
Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not, contrary
to her claim, a "legitimate daughter" of Francisco, nor "a child of a lawful wedlock between Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado". Wrote the appellate court in that case:

Petitioner [Aleli "Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the argument that she is a
legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado . . . .

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in the record to
support petitioner’s claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married before or at anytime
prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938

While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during the war
years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove the existence
of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no witness was
presented to confirm the celebration of such marriage . . . .

Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs are not sufficient
evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.

To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner’s birth certificate and even her marriage contract.. . .
Reason: These documents were not signed by Francisco . . . . Equally inconsequential are petitioner’s school
records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both Francisco and Genoveva . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural child of the late
Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her
consent thereto is not essential or required. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added)

Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.47832 was
effectively affirmed by this Court via its Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No. 163124, denying
Aleli "Corazon" Maglaya’s petition for Review on Certiorari,33 and Resolution dated October 20,
2004,34 denying with "FINALITY" her motion for reconsideration. Another Resolution dated January 24,
2005 resolved to "NOTE WITHOUT ACTION" Maglaya’s second motion for reconsideration.

In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as affirmed with finality by this
Court in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious objection to applying in this case the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment,35 one of two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicata principle. Following the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate
daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation
to Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by
a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or
litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the
form of the latter.36

Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as sustained by this
Court in G.R. No. 163124, virtually confirms the ratio of the trial court’s order of dismissal in Special
Proceedings (SP) No. C-2140, i.e, that respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a legitimate child of
Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the Motion to Dismiss37 interposed by herein
petitioner, as respondent in SP No. C-2140, is in the nature of a demurer to evidence has become moot and
academic. It need not detain us any minute further.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased,
the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.38 When the law speaks of "next of
kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent’s
property;39 one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed,40 or, in
short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next
of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court
acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late
Francisco Angeles.

11
WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.

No costs. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004

TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY

EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband
BEDA UNGOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO
ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P.
ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an
administrator is the issue in this case.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as
its Resolution2 dated March 26, 1997, denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and
real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City.3 He also left a widow, respondent
Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are
the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-
Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and
Angelo P. Orfinada.4

Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children.
They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital
relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-
petitioners Veronica5, Alberto and Rowena.6

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29,
1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan
City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984
and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and
Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan
of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.7

On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying
that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.8

On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related Documents with
Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.9

On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that
the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally
belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero10 and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance
inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name.11 Petitioners also raised the
12
affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.12 On April 29, 1996, petitioners
filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing13 on the aforesaid ground.

The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents, as
heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed
in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration15 but the motion was likewise denied.16

This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053.17 Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that
the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents.18

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision19 dated January 31, 1997, stating that it discerned no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when
he denied petitioners’ motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its discretionary nature.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.20 Hence, the petition before this
Court.

The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute
the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings.21

Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for preliminary hearing
on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent and not the
respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies in
the discretion of the court. This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in
this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.22 (Emphasis supplied.)

Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional character
of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory
effect.23 Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase "in the discretion of the Court", apart from the retention of
the word "may" in Section 6,24 in Rule 16 thereof.

Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower court’s doorstep for not hearing petitioners’
affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as
heirs to bring the suit.

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit
in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code
"that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision
in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of
the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation
of law.25

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to
the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 326 and Section 2, Rule 8727 of the
Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,28 this Court recognized the legal standing of the
heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of
an administrator. Thus:

The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits
on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are
easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an
estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances,
the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see
if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests

13
 of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent
are violated or dissipated.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor
or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of31 and he is made a party defendant.32 Evidently, the necessity for the
heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed
administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring
suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.

All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the
estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is
no appointed administrator such as in this case.

As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower court, recourse to
this Court is not warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G.

GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C.
Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying
reconsideration, be set aside.

On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act
in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his
provisional liberty.

On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court
approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department
of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial
Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been
arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is
evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the
knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied
on 28 July 1988.

Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence,
this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.

After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to
decide the case.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July
14
1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could
not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to
travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national
security, public safety or public health."

We perceive no reversible error.

1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it
was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments had already
been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for
hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed to by respondent
Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28 July
1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset,
mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to
appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;

2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never appeared in person
before the Court;

3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been
issued against him all for the same reason –– failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.

In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more than
enough consideration. The limit had long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-
6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).

Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on
erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a
Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled
by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.

2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the
right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of
national security, public safety or public health."

To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been
cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to
appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the
conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any
court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule
114, Secs. 1 and 2).

The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law,
Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested
without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of
the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ])

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to
curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the
right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared to
the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one
provision.1âwphi1 Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired.

15
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or
when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health (Article IV,
Section 5).

The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently, to
wit:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the
grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."

The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel
may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities
are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of
"national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which
did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p.
263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending
before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Section 6, Rules of Court).

Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the
condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the
1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged
whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was
but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to
appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes
would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside
the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts
by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is
the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court
Orders and processes.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C.
Silverio.

SO ORDERED.

16
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,

vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July
29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also
designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his
appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children,
namely, Kimberly and Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 4 As administrator of
Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1)
Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati,
Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash
balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also
admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was
likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.

Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July
24, 1986.8

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle
as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with
Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors,
Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati
property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February
12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati
to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of
W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G
Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and
directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to
the heirs.12

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent,
while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground
that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the
testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the
Makati property should be given to respondent.

17
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated
Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he
disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her
will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property
should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate,
except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property
should now pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good
faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no
knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he
believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would
receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and
executory, and cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated February
12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 17 The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in
lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W.
Richard Guersey; and

(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the
issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27,
1999.19

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA
gravely erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE
DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND
HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE
ANNULLED.

B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT

COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN
THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS
EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988
can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to
all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the
parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been
executed.21

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the
relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws.
Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will,

18
stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate
will be divided.22

Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate
amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms
of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a
senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was
not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her estate to
Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the
settlement of Richard’s estate.

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding
effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the
estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that
a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason
of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground
that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For
fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought
within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s
failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted to
extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent
that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of
her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with
Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey
Hill.

Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984,
respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will,30 and the complaint was filed only in
1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no
opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it
was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her
inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the
terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is
petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent
act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-
year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and
the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all
done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was
only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s
acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case.
Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 33 the Court
stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the
unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was
procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to

19
any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently
or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a
real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside
and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.34

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest
trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the
performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he
expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair
average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his
conduct is to be judged.36

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her
will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the
RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the
reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of
Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and
Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City
and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City
on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are her
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the
Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary,
or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall
extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and
expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate
upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound
to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of
20
Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a
judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept
petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as
the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was
a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner
in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to
determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator
with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner
failed to perform his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider
said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring
Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project of partition
submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional
right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or
mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great
hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the purposes of justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s
estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over
Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated,
which the Court adopts, thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta
invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs.
Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins,
57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that
the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute
the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle
established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed
domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the
pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill
Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the
subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a
different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:

xxx

It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was
prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff’s
adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his
duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty
admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature
of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine
to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission
to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the
procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the
case.41 (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as
a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner’s
pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent
was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her
own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal
implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the

21
same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty
to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the
State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his
death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and
distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in
the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject
of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative
is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little
sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances".43

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s conjugal
share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G
Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s death.
Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the
entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition
that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the
testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding
No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v.
Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same.
The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the
hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share,
the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants'
(herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First
Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as
Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records,
Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the
laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent
law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice
of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA,
and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the
proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person
for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate
should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition
submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent.

Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the
probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as
they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as
the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that
instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant
just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over
Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave,
inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.47

22
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who
owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired
the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of
the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were
reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified
that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises
the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private
agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973
Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary
succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15,
Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits
non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only
by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to
respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the
Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August
27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the
court.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 August 4, 2009

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R.

MARCOS, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the March 13, 1997 Decision2 and August 27, 1997 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 43450.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in
Special Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order4 granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents
Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament
of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The dispositive portion of the January 11, 1996 Order reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the Last Will and Testament of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos to have been duly
executed in accordance with law, the same is hereby ALLOWED AND ADMITTED TO PROBATE.

Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued in solidum to
Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II, named executors
therein.

23
Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of
Ferdinand Edralin Marcos.

Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons having an
interest in the estate for them to lay their claim against the Estate or forever hold their peace.

SO ORDERED.5

On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration6 in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters testamentary to respondents.
On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.

On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed a
bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as directed by the January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that he took his oath
as named executor of the will on January 30, 1996.

On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration7 to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-
Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dated September 9, 1994, appointing her as Special
Administratrix of the Marcos Estate.

On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of Administration
issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.

On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by
petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos, the penultimate
portion of which reads:

Under the Rules, a decedent’s testamentary privilege must be accorded utmost respect. Guided by this legal
precept, therefore, in resolving the two (2) motions at hand, the Court is constrained to DENY both.

Examining the arguments poised by the movants, the Court observed that these are but a mere rehash of
issues already raised and passed upon by the Court.

One has to review the previous orders issued by the Court in this case, e.g., the orders dated September 9,
1994, November 25, 1994, as well as October 3, 1995, to see that even as far back then, the Court has
considered the matter of competency of the oppositors and of Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as
having been settled.

It cannot be overstressed that the assailed January 11, 1996 Orders of the Court was arrived at only after
extensive consideration of every legal facet available on the question of validity of the Will.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration filed separately by petitioner Republic and
oppositor Imelda R. Marcos are both DENIED.

SO ORDERED.9

On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the
Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents.

On February 5, 1997, the First Division of this Court issued a Resolution referring the petition to the CA, to
wit:

xxxx

The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed herein are REFERRED to the
Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem
appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the Case, and this Court having
been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first
instance.10 (Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied)

On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision,11 dismissing the referred petition for having taken the wrong
mode of appeal, the pertinent portions of which reads:

24
Consequently, for having taken the wrong mode of appeal, the present petition should be dismissed in
accordance with the same Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which expressly provides that:

4. Erroneous Appeals – An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the
wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was, however denied by the CA in a
Resolution14 dated August 27, 1997.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON

TECHNICAL GROUNDS DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY
REFERRING SAID PETITION FOR A DECISION ON THE MERITS.

II.

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

RESPONDENTS IMELDA R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND R. MARCOS II SHOULD BE
DISQUALIFIED TO ACT AND SERVE AS EXECUTORS.

III.

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT SAID

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE DENIED AND DISCLAIMED THE VERY EXISTENCE
AND VALIDITY OF THE MARCOS WILL.

IV.

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT ITS ORDER
OF JANUARY 11, 1996, WHICH ADMITTED THE MARCOS WILL TO PROBATE AND
WHICH DIRECTED THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY IN SOLIDUM TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS EXECUTORS OF SAID MARCOS WILL, WAS BASED ON
THE EVIDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC ALONE.

V.

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT BOTH

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE OBSTRUCTED THE TRANSFER TO THE PHILIPPINES OF
THE MARCOS ASSETS DEPOSITED IN THE SWISS BANKS.15

In the meantime, on October 9, 2002, the RTC, acting on the pending unresolved motions before it, issued
an Order16 which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby appoints as joint special administrators of the estate of the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos, the nominee of the Republic of the Philippines (the Undersecretary of the Department
of Justice whom the Secretary of Justice will designate for this purpose) and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R. Marcos II, to serve as such until an executor is finally appointed.

SO ORDERED.

The petition is without merit.

When the assailed Orders granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents were issued by the RTC,
petitioner sought to question them by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,17 which was then in effect, reads:

25
2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. – Except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed
to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear
intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that "(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by
petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis and
Underscoring Supplied)

The pertinent portions of Section 1718 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 read:

The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as
herein provided, in –

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive
order or regulation is in question;

(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto;

(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;

(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, however, That if,
in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next
preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the
aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter
may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ
of certiorari; and

(5) Final awards, judgments, decision or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of Tax
Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.

A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, clearly
shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters testamentary to
respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA
was thus correct in declaring that the "issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant case."19

Moreover, the Court’s pronouncement in Suarez v. Judge Villarama20 is instructive:

Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time of the antecedents, provides that an appeal taken
to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall
be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a
court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision
involving both questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals.21

Also, in Southern Negros Development Bank v. Court of Appeals,22 this Court ruled:

It is incumbent upon private respondent qua appellants to utilize the correct mode of appeal of the decisions
of trial courts to the appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of their remedy, they can blame no one but
themselves (Jocson v. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550 [1989]; Yucuanseh Drug Co. v. National Labor Union, 101
Phil. 409 [1957]).

xxxx

Pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, which provides that "[a]n appeal taken to either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed," the only course of action of the Court to which an erroneous appeal is made is to dismiss
the same. There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one
26
court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, November 12, 1990, First Division,
Minute Resolution).23

Based on the foregoing, petitioner cannot deny that the determination of whether or not respondents should
be disqualified to act as executors is a question of fact. Hence, the proper remedy was to appeal to the CA,
not to this Court.

Petitioner is adamant, however, that notwithstanding the improper remedy, the CA should not have
dismissed therein petition. Petitioner argues in the wise:

However, as can be seen in the Resolution of February 5, 1997, (Annex "H") this Honorable Court deemed
it more proper to transmit the first Petition for Review to respondent appellate court for the reason that:

This Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the
first instance. x x x

It would appear then that even though this Honorable Court apparently considers the Republic’s petition as
deserving to be given due course, it deemed it in the best interest of the parties concerned if the Court of
Appeals would first take cognizance of said case, thereby preserving its stance as a court of last resort.

Additionally, this Honorable Court itself plainly stated that the case under review is:

….REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits…. The latter
having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the case……24

Petitioner’s arguments are misplaced. To stress, the February 5, 1997 Resolution reads:

The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed herein are REFERRED to the
Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem
appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the Case, and this Court having
been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first instance.25

Based thereon, this Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that said resolution gave the CA discretion and
latitude to decide the petition as it may deem proper. The resolution is clear that the petition was referred to
the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem appropriate.
Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when the action it deemed appropriate was to dismiss the petition
for having availed of an improper remedy. More importantly, the action of the CA was sanctioned under
Section 4 of Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which provides that "an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed."

Moreover, petitioner mistakenly relies in Oriental Media, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,26 in which this Court
made the following pronouncements:

In the case at bar, there was no urgency or need for Oriental to resort to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari for when it learned of the case and the judgment against it on July 25, 1986, due to its receipt
of a copy of the decision by default; no execution had as yet been ordered by the trial court. As
aforementioned, Oriental had still the time and the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration, as was
actually done. Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration in the first case, or at the latest upon
the denial of its petition for relief from judgment, Oriental should have appealed. Oriental should have
followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court for —

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of
substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to purpose that substantive law
and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the
courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution
of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due
process whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.27

In the case at bar, as found by this Court in its February 5, 1997 Resolution, therein petition offered no
important or special reason for the Court to take cognizance of it at the first instance. Petitioner offered no
plausible reason why it went straight to this Court when an adequate and proper remedy was still available.
The CA was thus correct that the remedy that petitioner should have availed of was to file an appeal under
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court which states:
27
Section 1. Orders of judgments from which appeals taken. – An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) allows or disallows a will;

Because of the preceding discussion, herein petition must necessarily fail. However, even if this Court were
to set aside petitioners’ procedural lapses, a careful review of the records of the case reveal that herein
petition is without merit.

At the crux of the controversy is a determination of whether or not respondents are incompetent to serve as
executors of the will of Ferdinand Marcos.

Ozeata v. Pecson28 is instructive:

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to
dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of
his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of the estate. The curtailment
of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights granted by will take
effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil Code of the Philippines), the management of his estate by
the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his
assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted
to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor
upon his application (23 C.J. 1023).

xxxx

The case of In re Erlanger's Estate, 242 N.Y.S. 249, also reiterates the same principle.

The courts have always respected the right to which a testator enjoys to determine who is most suitable to
settle his testamentary affairs, and his solemn selection should not lightly be disregarded. After the
admission of a will to probate, the courts will not name a better executor for the testator nor
disqualify, by a judicial veto, the widow or friend or other person selected in the will, except upon
strict proof of the statutory grounds of incompetency. Matter of Leland's Will, 219 N.Y. 387, 393, 114
N.E. 854. x x x29

Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as executors, to wit:

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – No person is competent to serve
as executor or administrator who:

xxxx

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of drunkenness,
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary to respondents,
specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of cases 30 and, hence,
should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with questionable integrity.31

The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following findings:

However, except for petitioner Republic’s allegation of want of integrity on the part of Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last will and testament, so
as to render them "incompetent" to serve as executors, the Court sees at this time, no evidence on record,
oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation. (Emphasis Supplied)

Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the action
taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or
gross abuse of discretion is shown.32 The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty and discretion to
determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor. The sufficiency of any
ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place,

28
affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the
rules of orders of the court.33

Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court must evaluate the evidence presented or
alleged by petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification. However, after a painstaking review of
the records and evidence on hand, this Court finds that the RTC committed no error or gross abuse of
discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation.

Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have already
been reversed by this Court. Her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17453 was reversed by this Court
in Dans, Jr. v. People.34 Likewise, her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17450 was reversed by this Court
in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan.35 Hence, the so-called "convictions" against respondent Imelda Marcos cannot
serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.

On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four charges for
violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section 50 (non-
payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC).

It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569,36 the CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos II
of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction for all the four charges for
violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a
fine for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner, 37 said decision is
still pending appeal.

Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to four violations of
Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an
executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on
affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the "failure to file an income tax return" is not a
crime involving moral turpitude.

In Villaber v. Commision on Elections,38 this Court held:

As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law
Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."

In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."

xxxx

We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that "not every criminal act involves
moral turpitude," and that ''as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to
determine."39

Moreover, In De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces:40

Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote
moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as
involving moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206).

The "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the mere omission is
already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual. This conclusion is
supported by the provisions of the NIRC as well as previous Court decisions which show that with regard to
the filing of an income tax return, the NIRC considers three distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2) a
fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and (3) failure to file a return.

The same is illustrated in Section 51(b) of the NIRC which reads:

(b) Assessment and payment of deficiency tax – xxx

In case a person fails to make and file a return or list at the time prescribed by law, or makes willfully or
otherwise, false or fraudulent return or list x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)

29
Likewise, in Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals,41 this Court observed:

To our minds we can dispense with these controversial arguments on facts, although we do not deny that the
findings of facts by the Court of Tax Appeals, supported as they are by very substantial evidence, carry
great weight, by resorting to a proper interpretation of Section 332 of the NIRC. We believe that the proper
and reasonable interpretation of said provision should be that in the three different cases of (1) false return,
(2) fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, (3) failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a
proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten
years after the discovery of the (1) falsity, (2) fraud, and (3) omission. Our stand that the law should be
interpreted to mean a separation of the three different situations of false return, fraudulent return
with intent to evade tax, and failure to file a return is strengthened immeasurably by the last portion
of the provision which segregates the situations into three different classes, namely, "falsity," "fraud"
and "omission."42 (Emphasis Supplied)

Applying the foregoing considerations to the case at bar, the filing of a "fraudulent return with intent to
evade tax" is a crime involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of
the individual. The same, however, cannot be said for "failure to file a return" where the mere omission
already constitutes a violation. Thus, this Court holds that even if the conviction of respondent Marcos II is
affirmed, the same not being a crime involving moral turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his
disqualification.

Anent the third error raised by petitioner, the same has no merit.

Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will, and are, therefore, estopped from
claiming to be the rightful executors thereof. Petitioner further claims that said actions clearly show that
respondents lack the competence and integrity to serve as officers of the court.

This Court does not agree with the posture taken by petitioner, and instead, accepts the explanation given by
respondents, to wit:

Respondents opposed the petition for probate not because they are disclaiming the existence of the will, but
because of certain legal grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not have the requisite interest to institute it; (b)
the original copy of the will was not attached to the petition for probate as required by the rules; and (c) the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is not qualified to be appointed as administrator of the
estate.43

Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition, respondents cannot be held guilty
of estoppel as they merely acted within their rights when they put in issue legal grounds in opposing the
probate proceedings. More importantly, even if said grounds were later on overruled by the RTC, said court
was still of opinion that respondents were fit to serve as executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition.
Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the
RTC’s discretion.

As for the remaining errors assigned by petitioner, the same are bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that respondents have strongly objected to the transfer to the Philippines of the Marcos
assets deposited in the Swiss Banks44 and thus the same should serve as a ground for their disqualification to
act as executors. This Court does not agree. In the first place, the same are mere allegations which, without
proof, deserve scant consideration. Time and again, this Court has stressed that this Court is a court of law
and not a court of public opinion. Moreover, petitioner had already raised the same argument in its motion
for partial reconsideration before the RTC.1avvphi1 Said court, however, still did not find the same as a
sufficient ground to disqualify respondents. Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of
discretion, this Court will not interfere with the RTC’s discretion.

Lastly, petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders were based solely on their own evidence and that
respondents offered no evidence to show that they were qualified to serve as executors.45 It is basic that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.46 Consequently, it was
the burden of petitioner (not respondents) to substantiate the grounds upon which it claims that respondents
should be disqualified to serve as executors, and having failed in doing so, its petition must necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 13, 1997 Decision and August 27, 1997 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450 are hereby AFFIRMED.

30
The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, acting as a probate court in Special Proceeding No.
10279, is hereby ORDERED to issue letters testamentary, in solidum, to Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and
Ferdinand Marcos II.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. L-22429 and L-22430. October 29, 1966.]

ANG FANG and ANG KIM TIAO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Rosendo J. Tansinsin, for Petitioners.

Solicitor General for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF PROHIBITED DRUGS AND SMUGGLING;

PATTERN OF CONDUCT SHOWS GUILT; CASE AT BAR. — Found ingeniously concealed with
legally imported "joss" papers were other undeclared goods and some 170 tins of opium. The accused, Ang
Fang, the importer, and Ang Kim Tiao, long time employee and cousin of Ang Fang, maintain that they
were ignorant of the clandestine shipment and that they were but victims of an ingenious plot concocted by
others. HELD: The bales in which the smuggled items were discovered were consigned to Ang Fang. The
two Angs are both interested in the release because they imported the goods. Ang Kim Tiao pressed for the
immediate release of the goods. When told that the bales would undergo rigid inspection at the Parcel office,
petitioners shed away; they did not appear at the scheduled examination, despite the fact that both were duly
notified thereof. They did not bother to procure delivery of the joss papers, did not even as much as inquire
about the cause for refusal to release them; and this in spite of the fact that Ang Kim Tiao was at first
insistent in prompt release. This pattern of conduct does not comfort with petitioner’s claim that they are
ignorant of the shipment and that they are but victims of an ingenious plot concocted by others.

2. FRAUDULENT PRACTICE AGAINST CUSTOMS REVENUE; PENALTY. — For violation of

Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code, petitioners are hereby sentenced to imprisonment for an
Indeterminate period ranging from one (1) year to two (2) years and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment.

DECISION

SANCHEZ, J.:

Two criminal cases against petitioners are before this Court for review on certiorari: The first, a violation of
Section 2703, Revised Administrative Code [fraudulent practice against customs revenues (smuggling)];
and, the second, a violation of Article 192, Revised Penal Code [illegal importation of prohibited drugs
(opium)]. The Manila court 1 found petitioners guilty on both counts. The sentence against each: For
smuggling (violation of Section 2703, Revised Administrative Code), "an indeterminate penalty ranging
from a minimum of not less than one (1) year imprisonment (no maximum provided) and to pay a fine of
P2,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency," and, for illegal importation of opium (violation
of Article 192, Revised Penal Code), "an indeterminate penalty ranging from a minimum of one (1) year and
one (1) day to a maximum of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional and to pay a fine of P2,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency." On appeal,
the Court of Appeals 2 voted to affirm, except for the smuggling case where an indeterminate prison term
"consisting of a minimum of not less than six (6) months and a maximum of not more than two (2) years"
was imposed, with costs.

The undisputed facts are:

Sometime in March, 1955, petitioner Ang Fang, a merchant with an annual allocation of $1,000.00, opened
a letter of credit with the China Banking Corporation for $100.00 to be used for the importation of "joss"
papers from Hongkong. In accordance with the accepted firm offer and the letter of credit, a bill of lading
covering "joss" papers contained in four bales was sent to, and received by, Ang Fang from the shipper, Bee
Chiong Hong in Hongkong.

31
On March 16, 1955, a shipment of four bales supposedly consisting of "joss" papers, bearing identification
mark "BTC" and consigned to Ang Fang, was unloaded in the Port of Manila from the steamer "S/S
Schwabenstein" which came from Hongkong. The shipment was placed under customs’ custody pending
release in due course to the consignee.

After arrival of the bales above-mentioned, petitioner Ang Kim Tiao, in representation of consignee Ang
Fang, submitted to the Bureau of Customs the necessary documents for the release of the shipment, which
was later given Entry No. 23450. These documents consisted of the permit to deliver the imported goods;
the importer’s declaration for advance payment of sales tax; the official receipt of cash deposit made to
cover the estimated taxes; the release certificate from the Central Bank through the China Banking
Corporation as agent; the bill of lading; the commercial invoices; and the Customs Consumption Entry.

Prior to the arrival of the shipment, there had been reports of illegal importation of dutiable merchandise.
Said shipment was, consequently, subjected to rigid inspection. Instead of examining the bales at the pier
where they were unloaded, the customs authorities decided to inspect them thoroughly at the Parcel Section.
Upon opening the four bales — by a committee composed of Customs Examiner Alcantara, Chief Appraiser
Aceron, Deputy Collector Millares and Rizalino de Guzman of the Port Terminal Secret Service, in the
presence of other persons — it was found that two of the bales, Nos. 3 and 4, had holes in the center 1/2 foot
square (6 x 6 inches) and about 1 foot deep. In bale No. 3, twenty-two packages containing ladies’ and
men’s watches of different makes, together with stainless steel and gold-filled bracelets and watch crowns,
were found viz: 2,860 watches for men and ladies: 973 gold-filled watch crowns, and 2,400 gold-filled and
stainless bracelets for men’s and ladies’ watches. In bale No. 4, 170 tins of opium (Dog Brand) were
discovered.

The tins of opium were submitted for analysis to the National Bureau of Investigation. Its chemist, Lorenzo
A. Sunico, selected at random several tins from the six packages submitted to him, found that the contents
thereof were opium.

Ang Kim Tia — who submitted the papers for the release of the four bales of supposed "joss" papers was
investigated. His statement was taken down in writing. There, he stated that he is a cousin of Ang Fang who
resides at 503 Nueva St.; that the negotiable bill of lading was among the papers signed by him and
submitted to the Bureau of Customs for the release of the four bales. In none of these papers were the goods
in question declared. Only "joss" papers in four packages were mentioned. Ang Fang, however, asserted that
he did not order them. Ang Kim Tiao testified that he took steps to have the goods released that he was not
able to do so as he was informed on March 23, 1955 by Mr. Aceron, Chief Appraiser, that they would not be
released; that he informed Ang Fang about the matter, but that the latter did not do anything.

1. Our inquiry is mainly directed at the question of whether the People had discharged its heavy burden.
And this, on the face of the petitioners’ disclaimer.

But the facts just recited — without more — will support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that" [N]o
one else in the whole world could have ordered them to be shipped to Manila." 3 Because there is no point
in petitioners’ averment that the innocuous documents show only an importation of "joss" papers. For,
documents would not recite the clandestinely imported goods. These are, as here, ingeniously concealed
with legally imported merchandise on the chance that the former could escape detection. Or, if discovered,
the importer could, by improper methods, obtain delivery thereof just the same. Smugglers thrive on their
wits. Neither will it profit petitioners to throw the burden of illegal shipment on their shipper. Reason: the
shipper will not include it unless ordered and paid; or, unless a secret understanding was had between him
and the local importer. Those undeclared goods could not have been planted either. The value thereof leaves
us unwilling to accept that a racketeer mixed them with the genuinely imported "joss" papers. Unless, of
course, an unholy alliance existed between him and petitioners. So much is to be risked for so uncertain a
result.

Here is the picture that the record projects: Ang Fang is the importer. The bales, in which the smuggled
items were discovered, were consigned to him. Previous reports of illegal importation of dutiable
merchandise reached the authorities. The other petitioner, Ang Kim Tiao, is a longtime employee and cousin
of Ang Fang. The two Angs are both interested in the release because they imported the goods. Ang Kim
Tiao pressed for the immediate, release of the goods. When told that the bales would undergo rigid
inspection at the Parcel Office, petitioners shied away; they did not appear at the scheduled examination,
despite the fact that both were duly notified thereof. They did not bother to procure delivery of the joss
papers, did not even as much as inquire about the cause for refusal to release them; and this, in spite of the
fact that Ang Kim Tiao was at first insistent in prompt release. This pattern of conduct does not comport
with petitioners’ claim that they are ignorant of the clandestine shipment and that they are but victims of an
ingenious plot concocted by others. Correctly, as the Court of Appeals observed," [I]t would be sheer
naiveté if not pure infantilism of thought to accept their pretensions." 4

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2. Next, we address ourselves to the penalty. That imposed by the courts below for the illegal importation of
opium is fair. For the crime of fraudulent practice against customs revenues (Section 2703, Revised
Administrative Code), we feel that we should — under the Indeterminate Sentence Act — elevate the
minimum of the penalty to the level set by the trial court.

Wherefore, the judgment under review is modified in the sense that, for the violation of Section 2703 of the
Revised Administrative Code, petitioners are hereby sentenced each to imprisonment for an indeterminate
period ranging from one (1) year to two (2) years 5 and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000), with
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. In all other respects, said judgment is affirmed. Costs against
petitioners. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., is on leave.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31,
1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its
May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s
surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more
or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership
assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo
claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has
no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

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On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions
to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify
Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was
properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then
Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also
filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it
does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was
re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin
issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and
June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence,
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions
were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the
case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence"
of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
34
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of
the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O.
No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against
divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should
do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained
by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be
denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
35
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. Rodolfo
later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile
at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article
26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous
marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his
death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

35
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of
his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing
that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating
the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented
proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address,
and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was
validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The
subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration,
we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June
20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that
the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties
from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the
divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the
divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are
to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:

36
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of
a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the
adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the
divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties
in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of
upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known
as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) x
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net

37
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad
against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine
law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed
above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to
be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes.
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice
are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation,
we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to
err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these
words import a policy that goes beyond them."

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every
one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of
a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that
the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.

38
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not
merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be
up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we
ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the
February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this
case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedingsSO ORDERED.

39
G.R. No. L-17759 December 17, 1962

ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

Gatchalian and Sison for petitioner-appellant.

Delgado, Flores, Macapagal and Dizon for oppositors-appellees.

DIZON, J.:

On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales. On May 27, 1960 her
sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin filed with the Court of First Instance of said province a verified petition for the
issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among other
things, that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the Provinces of Zambales and Bulacan
worth approximately P100,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of her surviving heirs were: (1)
Dionisio Lindayag, 60 years of age, surviving husband, residing at Olongapo, Zambales, (2) Isabel V.
Saguinsin 54 years of age, sister of the deceased, residing at Hagonoy, Bulacan (3) Aurea V. Sacdalan, 46
years of age, sister of the deceased, and (4) Ines V. Calayag, 70 years of age, sister of the deceased, both
residing at Paombong, Bulacan; and that, as far as petitioner knew, the decedent left no debts at the time of
her death.

On June 21, 1960 Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in representation of the
minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground lack of interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged that
the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband — the movant — and their legally adopted minor
children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag the decedent having left no
legitimate natural or illegitimate child. A certified true copy of the decision of the Justice of the Peace of
Olongapo, Zambales, dated July 6, 1953 decreeing the adoption of said minors the decedent and her
husband was attached to the motion.

In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts alleged in the petition should be
considered in determining its sufficiency.lawphil.net

On July 28, 1960, after due hearing on the motion aforesaid, the Court issued the following order of
dismissal:

It appearing that the herein petitioner is only a sister of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag; that the
deceased is survived by her husband and her three (3) adopted children named: Jesus, Concepcion
and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag were adopted by the deceased on July 6, 1953; that the herein
petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in estate; and that the surviving heirs oppose
the instant petition on the ground that they want to settle the estate extra-judicially among them to
avoid unnecessary expenses in prosecuting this case, the Court finds the oppositors' opposition to be
well taken.

WHEREFORE, let this case be dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the above order having been denied, she took the present
appeal.

The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of
deceased Maria V. Lindayag.

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed
an "interested person". An interested party has defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of
Julio Magbanwa, 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as
special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, August 22, 1951;
Espinosa vs. Barrios, 70 Phil. 311)

Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed, through a motion to
dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by
three legally adopted children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held in
connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which, according to the lower
40
court, established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband but by three legally adopted
children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.

Upon these facts — which petitioner does not dispute — it is manifest that she is not an heir of her deceased
sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.

Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is filed, only the facts alleged in the
complaint or petition may be taken into account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at
said hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of evidence, and it has
been held that for that purpose, the hearing should be conducted as an ordinary hearing; and that the parties
should be allowed to present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint or of
the petition to state a cause of action (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 44 O. G. No. 10, 3832). In the present case, the
motion to dismiss the petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings
which, as already stated heretofore, was fully substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 174680 March 24, 2008

VICTORIA C. TAYAG, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
29 May 2006, and its Resolution2 dated 28 August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79205.

The antecedents are as follows:

On 15 January 2001, respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag.3 Respondent alleged in the petition, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 5994 (SP 5994), that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag
and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two
allegedly did not have any children of their own.

On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both of which are
in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to
the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her brothers
₱100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half
the amount she promised.

Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused the annotation of 5 September
1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the properties to be the paraphernal properties of
petitioner. The latter allegedly intends to dispose of these properties to the respondent’s and her brothers’
prejudice.

Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of the petition using her
own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got married in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25 October
1973, and that they have an adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag, who is presently residing in the USA. It is
allegedly not true that she is planning to sell the properties. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the suit
because respondent failed to state a cause of action.4

In a Motion5 dated 31 August 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and presented
the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to allege that
respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There being no
such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of
the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the court’s time, petitioner moved for a hearing
on her affirmative defenses.
41
The Motion was denied in an Order6 dated 3 April 2003. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in an Order7 dated 16 July 2003.

The appellate court, in a Decision8 dated 29 May 2006, upheld the denial of petitioner’s motion and directed
the trial court to proceed with the case with dispatch. The Court of Appeals ruled, in essence, that the
allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action, without need to state that she
had been recognized and acknowledged as such. However, respondent still has to prove her allegation and,
correspondingly, petitioner has the right to refute the allegation in the course of the settlement proceedings.

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in a Resolution9 dated 28 August 2006.

In her Petition10 17 dated September 2006, petitioner asserts that respondent should not be allowed to prove
her filiation in the settlement of Ismael Tayag’s estate. If, following the case of Uyguanco v. Court of
Appeals,11 the claim of filiation may no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason that
it should not be allowed to be proved in an action for the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Thus, petitioner
claims, respondent may no longer maintain an action to prove that she is the illegitimate child of the
decedent after the latter’s death.

Unfortunately, the two-page Comment,12 dated 17 April 2007, fails to shed any more light on the present
controversy.

The Reply13 dated 3 September 2007 reiterates the arguments in the petition.

The main issue in this case is deceptively simple. As crafted by the Court of Appeals, it is whether
respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of action
considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without
stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. The appellate court held that the
mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices.

Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag,14 the Court defined an interested party as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent.

Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is
dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse, can no longer be established, such contingent
interest does not make her an interested party. Here lies the complication in the case which the appellate
court had not discussed, although its disposition of the case is correct.1avvphi1

Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she
is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established
through voluntary or compulsory recognition.

Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil register, a final
judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.15 The
voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further court action and is,
therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought during the lifetime of the
putative parent.16 Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the
illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents.17

Petitioner’s thesis is essentially based on her contention that by Ismael Tayag’s death, respondent’s
illegitimate filiation and necessarily, her interest in the decedent’s estate which the Rules require to be
material and direct, may no longer be established. Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that respondent’s
successional rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel recognition but also by proof
that she had been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an illegitimate child.

In Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, supra, Graciano Uyguangco, claiming to be an illegitimate child of the
decedent, filed a complaint for partition against the latter’s wife and legitimate children. However, an
admission was elicited from him in the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial that he had none of
the documents mentioned in Article 27818 of the 1950 Civil Code to show that he was the illegitimate son of
the decedent. The wife and legitimate children of the decedent thereupon moved for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that he could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provision of the
Civil Code.

42
The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which had then already taken effect, ruled that since
Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already
barred by the death of the alleged father.

In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether
she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of petitioner’s
opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to
determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the
death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of
the decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.

We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices even
without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged
therein.19 Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that respondent is the

decedent’s illegitimate child, her interest in the estate as such would definitely be material and direct. The
appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to continue, ruling that, "respondent still
has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the petitioner
has the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement proceedings."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 May 2006
and its Resolution dated 28 August 2006 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

43