CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
• Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or
after their enactment by the executive, legislative or judicial
authorities, as well as by those who involve in the process of
legislation, knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law.
• Contemporary construction is strongest in law.
Executive construction, generally; kinds of
• Is the construction placed upon the statute by an executive
or administrative officer. Ex. for Labor: DOLE.
(3) Three types of interpretation:
1. Construction by an executive or administrative officer
directly called to implement the law.
2. Construction by the secretary of justice in his capacity as
the chief legal adviser of the government.
3. Handed down in an adversary proceeding in the form of a
ruling by an executive officer exercising quasi-judicial power.
Weight accorded to contemporaneous construction
• Where there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by the
executive or administrative officer charged with its
enforcement will be adopted if necessary to resolve the doubt.
• True expression of the legislative purpose, especially if the
construction is followed for a considerable period of time.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. CA
• Reasons why interpretation of an administrative agency is
generally accorded great respect
● Emergence of multifarious needs of a modernizing
society
● Also relates to experience and growth of specialized
capabilities by the administrative agency
● They have the competence, expertness, experience
and informed judgment, and the fact that they
frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret
Weight accorded to usage and practice
• Common usage and practice under the statute, or a course
of conduct indicating a particular undertaking of it, especially
where the usage has been acquiesced in by all the parties
concerned and has extended over a long period of time
Optimus interpres rerum usus – the best interpretation of
the law is usage.
Construction of rules and regulations
• This rule-making power, authorities sustain the principle
that the interpretation by those charged with their
enforcement is entitled to great weight by the court in the
latter’s construction of such rules and regulations.
Reasons: It is entitled to great weight because it comes
from the particular branch of government called upon to
implement the law thus construed; They are presumed to
have familiarized themselves to the meaning and purpose
of the law, and to have formed an independent,
conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon.
When contemporaneous construction disregarded
• When there is no ambiguity in the law.
• If it is clearly erroneous, the same must be declared null
and void.
Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not
preclude correction nor create rights; exceptions
• The doctrine of estoppel does not preclude correction of
the erroneous construction by the officer himself by his
successor or by the court in an appropriate case.
• An erroneous contemporaneous construction creates no
vested right on the part of those relied upon, and followed
such construction.
Legislative interpretation
• Take the form of an implied acquiescence to, or approval
of an executive or judicial construction of a statute.
• The legislature cannot limit or restrict the power granted
to the courts by the constitution.
Legislative approval
• Legislative is presumed to have full knowledge of a
contemporaneous or practical construction of a statute by
an administrative or executive officer charged with its
enforcement.
• The legislature may approve or ratify such
contemporaneous construction.
• May also be showmen by the legislature appropriating
money for the officer designated to perform a task pursuant
to interpretation of a statute.
• Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.
Reenactment
• Most common act of approval.
• The re-enactment of a statute, previously given a
contemporaneous construction is persuasive indication of
the adoption by the legislature of the prior construction.
• Re-enactment if accorded greater weight and respect than
the contemporaneous construction of the statute before its
ratification.
Stare decisis
• Judicial interpretation of a statute is of greater weight than
that of an executive or administrative officer in the
construction of other statutes of similar import.
• It is an invaluable aid in the construction or interpretation of
statutes of doubtful meaning.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere – one should follow past
precedents and should not disturb what has been settled. •
Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of
interpreting and applying the law in accordance with prior
doctrines but also of protecting society from the improvidence
and wantonness wrought by needless upheavals in such
interpretations and applications
• In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare decisis,
must be categorically stated on an issue expressly raised by
the parties; it must be a direct ruling, not merely an obiter
dictum
Obiter dictum – opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the
case before it; not binding as a precedent
• The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent
and the case to which it is applied are substantially the same.
• Where the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare
decisis does not apply.
• The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. It does not apply
when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law. •
The duty of the court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine
or rule found to be in violation of law in force
• Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot abandon a
precedent enunciated by the SC except by way of repeal or
amendment of the law itself
CHAPTER FOUR: Adherence to, or departure from,
language of statute
LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Literal meaning or plain-meaning rule
General rule: Verba legis. if statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
Index animi sermo – speech is the index of intention. Words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intent or will
Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a
statute there should be no departure. Thus, what is not clearly
provided in the law cannot be extended to those matters
outside its scope.
Judicial legislation – an encroachment upon legislative
prerogative to define the wisdom of the law. Courts must
administer the law as they find it without regard to
consequences.
Maledicta est exposition quae corrumpit textum –
dangerous construction which is against the text
Dura lex sed lex – the law may be harsh but it is the law.
Absoluta sententia expositore non indigent – an
absolute judgment or sentence needs no expositor
➔ When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who
may be affected, even if it may be harsh or
onerous language of the law is clear, no
explanation of it is required.
Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est
– it is exceedingly hard but so the law is written.
➔ A decent regard to the legislative will should inhibit
the court from engaging in judicial legislation to
change what it thinks are unrealistic statutes that
do not conform with ordinary experience or
practice;
➔ If there is a need to change the law, amend or
repeal it, remedy may be done through a
legislative process, not by judicial decree;
➔ Where the law is clear, appeals to justice and
equity as justification to construe it differently are
unavailing;
➔ Philippines is governed by CIVIL LAW or
POSITIVE LAW, not common law;
➔ Equity is available only in the absence of law and
not its replacement.
Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis – equity never acts
in contravention of the law.
DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Statute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise
inoperative • If no judicial certainty can be had as to its
meaning, the court is not at liberty to supply nor to make
one
What is within the spirit is within the law
• Don’t literally construe the law if it will render it meaningless,
lead to ambiguity, injustice or contradiction
• The spirit of the law controls its letter
• Ratio legis – interpretation according to the spirit or reason
of the law.
• Spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter • A law
should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance
with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the law.
• Presumption: undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure.
Literal import must yield to intent
• Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire – words
ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to
the words.
• Guide in ascertaining intent – conscience and equity
• So it is possible that a statute may be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.
Construction to accomplish purpose
• Purpose or Reason which induced the enactment of the
statute – key to open the brain of the legislature/legislative
intent!
• Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed
• As between two statutory interpretations, that which better
serves the purpose of the law should prevail
Supplying legislative omission
• xxx if it is clearly ascertainable from the CONTEXT
• May supply legislative omission to make the statute conform
to obvious intent of the legislature or to prevent the act from
being absurd
Note: differentiate from judicial legislation.
Correcting clerical errors
• As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face
of the whole enactment and no specific provision is
abrogated • This is not judicial legislation
Qualification of rule (of correcting clerical errors)
• Only those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious
mistakes, omissions, and misprints; otherwise, is to rewrite
the law and invade the domain of the legislature, it is
judicial legislation in the guise of interpretation.
Construction to avoid absurdity
• Reason: it is always presumed that the legislature
intended exceptions to its language which would avoid
consequences of this character
• Thus, statutes may be extended to cover cases not within
the literal meaning of the terms if their exact and literal
import would lead to absurd or mischievous results
Interpretation talis in ambiguous simper fienda est ut
evite tur inconvenients et absurdum – where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience
and absurdity is to be adopted.
• Courts test the law by its results – if law appears to be
arbitrary, courts are not bound to apply it in slavish
disobedience to its language.
• Courts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not to
defeat, its provisions; nor render compliance with its
provisions impossible to perform
Construction to avoid injustice
• Presumption – legislature did not intend to work a hardship
or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act
of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose
hardship on the other
Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret – that
interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or
injustice
Construction to avoid danger to public interest
Construction in favor of right and justice
• Art. 10 CC: In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body
intended right and justice to prevail
• Art. 9 CC: The fact that a statute is silent, obscure, or
insufficient with respect to a question before the court will not
justify the latter from declining to render judgment thereon
• In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip
the scales which the court believes will best promote the public
welfare is its probable operation as a general rule or principle
Salvacion v. BSP
Greg Bartelli raped his alleged niece 10 times and detained
her in his apartment for 4 days. Court gave a favorable
judgment of more than 1M Php. BSP rejected the writ of
attachment alleging Sec 113 of the Central Bank Circular No.
960 (applicable to transient foreigners). BSP did not honor the
writ of attachment pursuant to RA6426
Sec 8 – “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever”
ISSUE: Whether the dollar bank deposit in a Philippine bank of
a foreign tourist can be attached to satisfy the moral damages
awarded in favor of the latter’s 12-year-old rape victim
HELD: Court applied the principles of right and justice to
prevail over the strict and literal words of the statute.
•The purpose of RA 6426 was to exempt such assets from
attachment: at the time the said law was enacted, the country’s
economy was in shambles. But in the present time, the country
has recovered economically. No reason why such assets
cannot be attached especially if it would satisfy a judgment to
award moral damages to a 12-year-old rape victim!
Surplusage and superfluity disregarded
• Where a word, phrase or clause in a statute is devoid of
meaning in relation to the context or intent of the statute, or
where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or
renders it without sense, the word, phrase or clause may be
rejected as surplusage and entirely ignored
Surplusagium non noceat – surplusage does not vitiate a
statute
Utile per inutile non vitiatur – nor is the useful vitiated by the
non-useful
Obscure or missing word or false description may not
preclude construction
Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat
– false description does not preclude construction nor
vitiate the meaning of the statute which is otherwise clear
Exemption from rigid application of law
Ibi quid generaliter conceditur – every rule is not without
an exception
Inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus
basque – where anything is granted generally, this
exception is implied
• Compelling reasons may justify reading an exception to a
rule even where the latter does not provide any; otherwise
the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice –
summum jus, summa injuria (extreme justice is extreme
injustice)
Law does not require the impossible
Nemo tenetur ad impossibile – the law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility.
Impossibilium nulla obligatio est – no obligation to do an
impossible thing.
• Impossible compliance versus substantial compliance (as
required by law)
Number and gender of words
• When the context of a statute so indicates, words in plural
include the singular, and vice versa.
• A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular person
or thing, just as a singular word may embrace two or more
persons or things
• Art. 996 CC – (law on succession) such article also applies to
a situation where there is only one child because “children”
includes “child”
• Election Code – “candidate” comprehends “some candidates”
or “all candidates”
• On gender – the masculine, but not the feminine, includes all
genders, unless the context in which the word is used in the
statute indicates otherwise
Doctrine of necessary implication
• So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced •
StatCon rule: to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication
• Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed
• Ex necessitate legis – from the necessity of the law
• Every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to
include all incidental power, right or privilege.
• In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus – greater
includes the lesser
Necessity – includes such inferences as may be logically be
drawn from the purpose or object of the statute, from what the
legislature must be presumed to have intended, and from the
necessity of making the statute effective and operative;
excludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, or desirable;
must be consistent with the Constitution or to existing laws
• An implication which is violative of the law is
unjustified or unwarranted
Ubi jus, ibi remedium - where there is a right, there is a
remedy for violation thereof
Right → Obligation → Remedy
• The fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does
not preclude him from vindicating his right, for such remedy
is implied from such right
• Once a right is established, the way must be cleared for
its enforcement, and technicalities in procedure, judicial as
well as administrative, must give way
• Where there is “wrong,” (deprivation or violation of a right)
there is a remedy
• If there’s no right, principle does not apply
Grant of jurisdiction
• Conferred only by the Constitution or by statute
• Cannot be conferred by the Rules of Court
• Cannot be implied from the language of a statute, in the
absence of clear legislative intent to that effect
What may be implied from grant of jurisdiction
• The grant of jurisdiction to try actions carries with it all
necessary and incidental powers to employ all writs,
processes and other means essential to make its
jurisdiction effective.
• Where a court has jurisdiction over the main cause of
action, it can grant reliefs incidental thereto, even if they
would otherwise be outside its jurisdiction e.g. forcible entry
and detainer is cognizable in MTC. MTC can order payment
of rentals even though the amount exceeds the
jurisdictional amount cognizable by them, the same merely
incidental to the principal action
• Statutes conferring jurisdiction to an administrative agency
must be liberally construed to enable the agency to
discharge its assigned duties in accordance with the
legislative purpose e.g. the power granted the NHA to hear
and decide claims involving refund and any other claims
filed xxx, include attorney’s fees and other damages
Grant of power includes incidental power
• Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the
performance of the other is also conferred
• The incidental powers are those which are necessarily
included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power
granted
 Power to establish an office includes authority to abolish it,
unless xxx
 Warrant issued shall be made upon probable cause
determined by the judge xxx implies the grant of power to the
judge to conduct preliminary investigations
 Power to approve a license includes by implication the
power to revoke it;
 Power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant license,
from which it is derived
 Power to deport includes the power to arrest undesirable
aliens after investigation
 Power to appoint vested in the President includes the
power to make temporary appointments , unless xxx
 Power to appropriate money includes power to withdraw
unexpended money already appropriated
 Etc… see page 171-172
Grant of power excludes greater power
• The principle that the grant of power includes all incidental
powers necessary to make the exercise thereof effective
implies the exclusion of those which are greater than that
conferred.
➔ Power of supervision DOES NOT INCLUDE power to
suspend or removal
➔ Power to reorganize DOES NOT INCLUDE the
authority to deprive the courts certain jurisdiction and
to transfer it to a quasi-judicial tribunal
➔ Power to regulate business DOES NOT INCLUDE
power to prohibit
What is implied should not be against the law
• Power to appoint includes power to suspend or remove
– Constitutional restriction of CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES,
that it must be a cause provided for by law precludes such
implication (unless the appointment was made outside the civil
service law);
• Power to appoint a public officer by the President includes
power to remove
– Provided that such removal is made with just cause o Except
is such statute provides that term of office to be at the pleasure
of the appointing officer, power to appoint carries with it power
to remove anytime;
• Power to investigate officials DOES NOT INCLUDE the
power to delegate the authority to take testimony of witnesses
whose appearance may be required by the compulsory
process of subpoena. Nor does such power to investigate
include the power to delegate the authority to administer oath.
Illegality of act implied from prohibition
In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis - In equal
fault
• where a statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done
in violation thereof is by implication null and void
➔ Prohibited acts cannot serve as the foundation of
a cause of action for relief.
Ex dolo malo non oritur actio – no right of action can
have its origin in fraud
•no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own
wrongdoing or inequity
Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria
– no man should be allowed to take advantage of his own
wrong.
• Public policy requires that parties to an act prohibited by
statute be left where they are, to make the statute effective
and to accomplish its object
➔ Party to an illegal contract cannot come to court of
law and ask that his illegal object be carried out
➔ A citizen who sold his land to an alien in violation
of the constitutional restriction cannot annul the
same and recover the land, for both seller and
buyer are guilty of having violated the Constitution.
Two (2) Exceptions to the rule
• Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its enforcement
or application will violate an avowed fundamental policy
or public interest.
Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per
obliquum – what cannot, by law, be done directly cannot
be done indirectly
PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE
STATUTES, DISTINGUISHED
• Prospective – operates upon facts or transactions that occur
after the statute takes effect; looks and applies to the future.
• Retroactive – law which creates a new obligation, imposes a
new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a
transaction already past; A statute is not made retroactive
because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or part
of the requirements for its action and application is drawn
from a time antedating its passage.
*Laws operate prospectively, generally
• It is a settled rule in statutory construction that statutes are to
be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the
intendment of the legislature is to give them a retroactive
effect, expressly declared or necessarily implied from the
language used.
• No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the
legislature has not said so.
• Art. 4 of the Civil Code which provides that “Laws shall have
no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.”
Lex prospicit, non respicit – the law looks forward, not
backward
Lex de future, judex de praeterito – the law provides for the
future, the judge for the past.
• If the law is silent as to the date of its application and that it is
couched in the past tense does not necessarily imply that it
should have retroactive effect.
Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non
praeteritis – A new statute should affect the future, not the
past.
• Prospectivity applies to:
o Statutes
o Administrative rulings and circulars
o Judicial decisions
• The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or
amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include:
*Presumption against retroactivity
• Presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless
the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied.
• In case of doubt: resolved against the retroactive
operation of laws
• If a statute is susceptible of construction other than that of
retroactivity or will render it unconstitutional- the statute will
be given prospective effect and operation.
• Presumption is strong against substantive laws affecting
pending actions or proceedings. No substantive statute
shall be so construed retroactively as to affect pending
litigations.
Words or phrases indicating prospectivity
• Indicating prospective operation:
➔ A statute is to apply “hereafter” or “thereafter”
➔ “from and after the passing of this Act”
➔ “shall have been made”
➔ “from and after” a designated date
•“Shall” implies that the law intends the enactment to be
effective only in future.
•Statutes have no retroactive but prospective
effect:
➔ “It shall take effect upon its approval”
➔ Shall take effect on the date the President shall
have issued a proclamation or E.O., as provided in
the statute
*Retroactive statutes, generally
• The Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of
retroactive statutes which do not impair the obligation of
contract, deprive persons of property without due process of
law, or divest rights which have become vested, or which
are not in the nature of ex post facto laws.
• Statutes by nature which are retroactive:
➔ Remedial or curative statutes
➔ Statutes which create new rights
➔ Statute expressly provides that it shall apply
retroactively
➔ Where it uses words which clearly indicate its intent
• Problem in construction is when it is applied retroactively, to
avoid a frontal clash with the Constitution and save the law
from being declared unconstitutional.
*STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
Penal statutes, generally
• Penal laws operate prospectively.
• Art. 21 of the RPC provides that “no felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
• Provision is recognition to the universally accepted principle
that no penal law can have a retroactive effect, no act or
omission shall be held a crime, nor its author punished, except
by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed.
Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege – there is
no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law.
Ex post facto law C-A-P-E-R-P
• The Constitution provides that no ex post facto law shall be
enacted. It also prohibits the retroactive application of penal
laws which are in the nature of ex post facto laws.
Test if ex post facto clause is violated: Does the law sought
to be applied retroactively take from an accused any right vital
for protection of life and liberty?
• Scope: applies only to criminal or penal matters
• It does NOT apply to laws concerning civil proceedings
generally, or which affect or regulate civil or private rights or
political privilege
Bill of attainder
How to spot a bill of attainder [PJ - BRIM]
Singling out of a definite minority
Imposition of a burden on it
A legislative intent
Retroactive application to past conduct suffice to stigmatize
• Bill of Attainder is objectionable because of its ex post
facto feature
• Accordingly, if a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is also an
ex post facto law.
• The Constitution provides that no bill of attainder shall be
enacted.
• Bill of attainder – legislative act which inflicts punishment
without judicial trial
• Essence: substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt
• Serves to implement the principle of separation of powers
by confining the legislature to rule-making & thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of judicial functions.
• History: Bill of Attainder was employed to suppress
unpopular causes & political minorities, and this is the evil
sought to be suppressed by the Constitution.
*When penal laws applied retroactively
RULE: Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect.
XPN: When they are favorable to the accused.
XPN:XPN:
• When the accused is a habitual delinquent
• When a statute provides that it shall not apply to existing
actions or pending cases
• Where the accused disregard the later law and invokes
the prior statute under which he was prosecuted.
• Art.22 of RPC “penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not
a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 Art 62
of the Code , although at the time of the application of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same.
• This is not an ex post facto law.
• Exception to the general rule that all laws operate
prospectively.
• Rule is founded on the principle that: the right of the state
to punish and impose penalty is based on the principles of
justice.
Favorabilia sunt amplianda, adios a restrigenda –
Conscience and good law justify this exception.
• Exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity and
accepted by science.
Two (2) laws affecting the liability of accused:
1. In force at the time of the commission of the crime –
during the pendency of the criminal action, a statute is
passed
 reducing the degree of penalty
 eliminating the offense itself
 removing subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
to pay the civil liability
 prescription of the offense
• such statute will be applied retroactively and the trial court
before the finality of judgment or the appellate court on
appeal from such judgment should take such statute in
consideration.
2. Enacted during or after the trial of the criminal action
• When there is already a final judgment & accused is
serving sentence, remedy is to file petition of habeas
corpus, alleging that his continued imprisonment is illegal
pursuant to said statute & praying that he be forthwith
released.
Exceptions to the rule:
➔ When accused is habitual delinquent
➔ When statute provides that it shall not apply to
existing actions or pending cases
➔ Where accused disregards the later law & invokes
the prior statute under which he was prosecuted.
General rule: An amendatory statute rendering an illegal act
prior to its enactment no longer illegal is given retroactive
effect does not apply when the amendatory act specifically
provides that it shall only apply prospectively.
*Statutes substantive in nature
• Substantive law
➔ creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life,
liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or
instrumentalities for administration of public affairs.
➔ that part of law which creates, defines & regulates
rights, or which regulates rights or duties which give
rise to a cause of action.
➔ that part of law which courts are established to
administer
➔ when applied to criminal law: that which declares
which acts are crimes and prescribe the punishment
for committing them.
➔ Cannot be construed retroactively as it might affect
previous or past rights or obligations
Substantive rights
➔ One which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of
normal relations.
Cases with substantive statutes:
Tolentino v. Azalte
• In the absence of a contrary intent, statutes which lays down
certain requirements to be complied with before a case can be
brought to court.
Spouses Tirona v. Alejo
• Law: Comprehensive Land Reform Law granting
complainants tenancy rights to fishponds and pursuant to
which they filed actions to assert rights which subsequently
amended to exempt fishponds from coverage of statute
• Held: Amendatory law is substantive in nature as it exempts
fishponds from its coverage.
• Test for procedural laws:
➔ if rule really regulates procedure, the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law & for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
➔ If it operates as a means of implementing an existing
right.
• Test for substantive laws:
➔ If it takes away a vested right
➔ If rule creates a right such as right to appeal
Generally, procedural rules are retroactive and are
applicable to actions pending and undermined at the time of
the passage of the procedural law, while substantive laws
are prospective
*Effects on pending actions
• Statutes affecting substantive rights may not be given
retroactive operation so as to govern pending proceedings.
Iburan v. Labes
• Where a court originally obtains and exercises jurisdiction,
a later statute restricting such jurisdiction or transferring it to
another tribunal will not affect pending action, unless statute
provides & unless prohibitory words are used.
RULE: Jurisdiction stays until the case is decided
(procedural)
XPN: Unless the law explicitly provides.
Lagardo v. Masagana
• Where court has no jurisdiction over a certain case but
nevertheless decides it, from which appeal is taken, a
statute enacted during the pendency of the appeal vesting
jurisdiction upon such trial court over the subject matter or
such case may not be given retroactive effect so as to
validate the judgment of the court a quo, in the absence of
a saving clause.
*At the time of filing, the court a quo really has no
jurisdiction, then a law was passed vesting the court a quo,
jurisdiction. Thus, it can't be given retroactive effect.
Republic v. Prieto
• Where a complaint pending in court is defective because it
did not allege sufficient action, it may not be validated by a
subsequent law which affects substantive rights and not
merely procedural matters.
• Rule against the retroactive operation of statutes in
general applies more strongly with respect to substantive
laws that affect pending actions or proceedings.
Qualification of rule
• A substantive law will be construed as applicable to
pending actions if such is the clear intent of the law.
• To promote social justice or in the exercise of police
power, is intended to apply to pending actions
• As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the law as
it exists at the time of the decision of the appellate court,
where the statute changing the law is intended to be
retroactive and to apply to pending litigations or is
retroactive in effect
• This rule is true though it may result in the reversal of a
judgment which was correct at the time it was rendered by
the trial court. The rule is subject to the limitation
concerning constitutional restrictions against impairment of
vested rights
Statutes affecting vested rights
• A vested right or interest may be said to mean some right
or interest in property that has become fixed or established
and is no longer open to doubt or controversy
• Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or
prospective, has become the property of some particular
person or persons, as a present interest
• The right must be absolute, complete and unconditional,
independent of a contingency
• A mere expectancy of future benefit or a contingent
interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of
existing laws does not constitute a vested right
• Inchoate rights which have not been acted on are not
vested
• A statute may not be construed and applied retroactively
under the following circumstances:
➔ if it impairs substantive right that has become
vested;
➔ as disturbing or destroying existing right embodied in
a judgment;
➔ creating new substantive right to fundamental cause
of action where none existed before and
➔ making such right retroactive;
➔ by arbitrarily creating a new right or liability already
extinguished by operation of law
• Law creating a new right in favor of a class of persons may
not be so applied if the new right collides with or impairs any
vested right acquired before the establishment of the new right
nor, by the terms of which is retroactive, be so applied if:
➔ it adversely affects vested rights
➔ unsettles matter already done as required by existing
law
➔ works injustice to those affected thereby
People v. Patalin
• The abolition of the death penalty and its subsequent re
imposition. Those accused of crimes prior to the re imposition
of the death penalty have acquired vested rights under the law
abolishing it.
• Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent
their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not
impair or interfere with vested or existing rights. Accused
appellant ‘s rights to be benefited by the abolition of the death
penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from
them.
*Statutes affecting obligations of contract
➔ Any contract entered into must be in accordance with,
and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of
execution. Such law forms part of, and is read into,
the contract even without the parties expressly saying
so.
➔ Laws existing at the time of the execution of contracts
are the ones applicable to such transactions and not
later statutes, unless the latter provide that they shall
have retroactive effect.
➔ Later statutes will not, however, be given retroactive
effect if to do so will impair the obligation of contracts,
for the Constitution prohibits the enactment of a law
impairing the obligations of contracts.
➔ Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intention of the parties necessarily
impairs the contract itself
➔ A statute which authorizes any deviation from the
terms of the contract by postponing or accelerating
the period of performance which it prescribes,
imposing conditions not expressed in the contract,
or dispensing with those which are however
minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon
the contract, impairs the obligation, and such
statute should not therefore be applied
retroactively.
➔ As between two feasible interpretations of a
statute, the court should adopt that which will
avoid the impairment of the contract.
➔ If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be
rendered illegal by a subsequent legislation.
➔ A law by the terms of which a transaction or
agreement would be illegal cannot be given
retroactive effect so as to nullify such transactions
or agreement executed before said law took effect.
*STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
Procedural laws
RULE: the law has no retroactive effect.
XPNs: procedural laws; curative laws which are given
retroactive operation
• Procedural laws
➔ adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of
procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for
their invasion
➔ they refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
injustice
➔ They include rules of pleadings, practice and
evidence.
➔ Applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate
the steps by which one who commits a crime is to
be punished.
➔ Remedial statutes or statutes relating to modes of
procedure- which do not create new or take away
 vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of the rights already
existing, do not come within the legal conception of
a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes.
➔ A new statute which deals with procedure only is
presumptively applicable to all actions – those
which have accrued or are pending.
➔ Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.
• The retroactive application of procedural laws is not:
➔ violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected;
➔ nor constitutionally objectionable.
Rationale: no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.
• A person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and
a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his
case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing
rules of procedure
XPN: The rule does not apply where:
• The statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are exempted from its
operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings
would impair vested rights.
• Courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural
laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or
would work injustice.
Curative statutes
➔ curative remedial statutes are healing acts
➔ they are remedial by curing defects and adding to
the means of enforcing existing obligations
➔ the rule to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted
or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect
sought to be removed or made harmless, is
something which the legislature might have
dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by
a subsequent one
➔ curative statutes are intended to supply defects,
abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain
evils. They are designed and intended, but have
failed to meet expected legal consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in
their own action. They make valid that which, before
the enactment of the statute, was invalid.
➔ Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that
would have been invalid under existing laws, as if
existing laws have been complied with
➔ Curative statutes are forms of retroactive legislations
which reach back on past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective
attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective
for the purpose the parties intended.
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee
• Statutes intended to validate what otherwise void or
invalid marriages, being curative, will be given
retroactive effect.
Legarda v. Masaganda
• Where a curative statute is enacted after the court
has rendered judgment, which judgment is naturally
void as the court has at the time no jurisdiction over
the subject of the action, the enactment of the statute
conferring jurisdiction to the court does not validate the
void judgment for the legislature has no power to make
a judgment rendered without jurisdiction of a valid
judgment.
Limitations of rule
➔ remedial statutes will not be given retroactive effect if
to do so would impair the obligations of contract or
disturb vested rights
➔ only administrative or curative features of the statute
as will not adversely affect existing rights will be given
retroactive operation
➔ the exception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is
a remedial or curative statute which is enacted as a
police power measure
➔ Statutes of this type may be given retroactive effect
even though they impair vested rights or the
obligations of contract, if the legislative intent is to
give them retrospective operation
Rationale: The constitutional restriction against impairment
against obligations of contract or vested rights does not
preclude the legislature from enacting statutes in the exercise
of its police power
*Police power legislations
• as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the exercise of police
power to regulate certain activities, are applicable not only to
those activities or transactions coming into being after their
passage, but also to those already in existence
Rationale: the non-impairment of the obligations of contract or
of vested rights must yield to the legitimate exercise of power,
by the legislature, to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people
• Any right acquired under a statute or under a contract is
subject to the condition that it may be impaired by the state in
the legitimate exercise of its police power, since the
reservation of the essential attributes of sovereign power is
deemed read into every statute or contract as a postulate of
the legal order
*Statutes relating to prescription
• General rule: a statute relating to prescription of action,
being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after its
effectivity. In other words, such a statute is both:
➔ prospective in the sense that it applies to causes
that accrued and will accrue after it took effect, and
➔ retroactive in the sense that it applies to causes that
accrued before its passage
• However, a statute of limitations will not be given retroactive
operation to causes of action that accrued prior to its
enactment if to do so will remove a bar of limitation which has
become complete or disturb existing claims without allowing a
reasonable time to bring actions thereon
*Statutes relating to appeals
➔ The right to appeal from an adverse judgment, other
than that which the Constitution grants, is statutory
and may be restricted or taken away
➔ A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural
in nature and applies to pending actions in which no
judgment has yet been promulgated at the time the
statute took effect.
➔ Such statute, like other statutes, may not however be
construed retroactively so as to impair vested rights.
Hence, a statute which eliminates the right to appeal
and considers the judgment rendered in a case final
and unappealable, destroys the right to appeal a
decision rendered after the statute went into effect,
but NOT the right to prosecute an appeal that has
been perfected before the passage of the law, for in
the latter case, the right of the appellant to appeal
has become vested under the old law and may not
therefore be impaired.
➔ Stature shortening the period for taking appeals is
to be given prospective effect and may not be
applies to pending proceedings in which judgment
has already been rendered at the time of its
enactment except if there’s clear legislative intent
CHAPTER ELEVEN: Constitutional Construction
Constitution defined
➔ fundamental law which sets up a form of government
and defines and delimits the powers thereof and
those of its officers, reserving to the people
 themselves plenary sovereignty
➔ written charter enacted and adopted by the people by
which a government for them is established
➔ permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to
existing conditions but also to future needs
➔ basically it is the fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation
➔ absolute and unalterable except by amendments
➔ all other laws are expected to conform to it
Origin and history of the Philippine Constitutions
• 1935 Constitution (People v. Linsangan – explained as to
how this Constitution came about)
• Tydings-Mcduffie Law- allowed the Filipinos to adopt a
constitution but subject to the conditions prescribed in the Act.
Required 3 steps:
 drafting and approval of the constitution must be authorized
 it must be certified by the President of the US
 it must be ratified by the people of the Philippines at a
plebiscite
• 1973 Constitution
adopted in response to popular clamor to meat the problems
of the country
March 16, 1967: Congress passed Resolution No.2, which
was amended by Resolution No. 4, calling a convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution
• 1987 Constitution
after EDSA Revolution
also known as the 1987 Charter
Primary purpose of constitutional construction
• primary task of constitutional construction is to ascertain the
intent or purpose of the framers of the constitution as
expressed in its language
• purpose of our Constitution: to protect and enhance the
people’s interests
Constitution construed as enduring for ages
• Constitution is not merely for a few years but it also needs to
endure through a long lapse of ages
WHY? Because it governs the life of the people not only at the
time of its framing but far into the indefinite future • it must be
adaptable to various crisis of human affairs but it must also be
solid permanent and substantial
• Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of the
people (rich or poor)
• It must be construed as a dynamic process intended to
stand for a great length of time to be progressive and not
static
What it is NOT:
 It should NOT change with emergencies or conditions
 It should NOT be inflexible
 It should NOT be interpreted narrowly
• Words employed should not be construed to yield fixed
and rigid answers because its meaning is applied to meet
new or changed conditions as they arise
• Courts should construe the constitution so that it would be
consistent with reason, justice and the public interest
How language of constitution construed [GLOC-B]
1. If the words used have both general and restricted
meaning, General prevails over the restricted
unless the contrary is indicated.
2. Primary source in order to ascertain the
constitution is the LANGUAGE itself;
3. Words must be understood in their common or
Ordinary meaning except when technical terms
are employed. Because the fundamental law is
essentially a document of the people.
4. Do not construe the constitution in such a way that
its meaning would Change
5. The words that are used are Broad because it
aims to cover all contingencies;
Aids to construction, generally
• apart from its language courts may refer to the following in
construing the constitution:
1. history
2. proceedings of the convention
3. prior laws and judicial decisions
4. contemporaneous constructions
• These aids are called extraneous aids because though their
effect is not in precise rules their influence describes the
essentials of the process.
1. HISTORY: Realities existing at time of adoption; object
to be accomplished
• History basically helps in making one understand as to how
and why certain laws were incorporated into the constitution.
• In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken into
consideration because there are certain considerations rooted
in the historical background of the environment at the time of
its adoption (Legaspi v. Minister of Finance)
2. Proceedings of the convention
RULE: If the language of the constitutional provision is
plain it is not necessary to resort to extrinsic aids
XPN: When the intent of the framer doesn’t appear in the
text or it has more than one construction.
• Intent of a constitutional convention member doesn’t
necessarily mean it is also the people’s intent
• The proceedings of the convention are usually inquired
into because it sheds light into what the framers of the
constitution had in mind at that time. (refers to the debates,
interpretations and opinions concerning particular
provisions)
3.Contemporaneous construction and writings
• May be used to resolve but not to create ambiguities • In
construing statutes, contemporaneous constructions are
entitled to great weight however when it comes to the
constitution it has no weight and will not be allowed to
change in any way its meaning.
• Writings of delegates – has persuasive force but it
depends on two things:
if opinions are based on fact known to them and
not established it is immaterial
on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may
not
be a shade better in the eyes of the law.
4. Previous laws and judicial rulings
• Framers of the constitution are presumed to be aware of
prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the subject of
constitutional provisions. THUS when courts adopt principles
different from prior decisions it is presumed that they did so to
overrule said principle
Changes in phraseology
• Before a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of revisions
and changes in phraseology (ex. deletion of words) and these
changes may be inquired into to ascertain the intent or
purpose of the provision as approved
• HOWEVER mere deletion, as negative guides, cannot prevail
over the positive provisions nor is it determinative of any
conclusion.
• Certain provisions in our constitution (from 1935 to the
present) are mere reenactments of prior constitutions thus
these changes may indicate an intent to modify or change the
meaning of the old provisions.
Consequences of alternative constructions
• consequences that may follow from alternative construction
of doubtful constitutional provisions constitute an important
factor to consider in construing them.
• if a provision has more than one interpretation, that
construction which would lead to absurd, impossible or
mischievous consequences must be rejected.
• e.g. directory and mandatory interpretation: Art. 8 Sec 15(1)
requires judges to render decision within specific periods from
date of submission for decision of cases (construed as
directory because if otherwise it will cause greater injury to the
public)
Constitution construed as a whole
• provision should not be construed separately from the rest it
should be interpreted as a whole and be harmonized with
conflicting provisions so as to give them all force and effect.
• sections in the constitution with a particular subject should be
interpreted together to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution.
Mandatory or directory
RULE: constitutional provisions are to be construed as
mandatory unless a different intention is manifested.
Why? Because in a constitution, the sovereign itself speaks
and is laying down rules which for the time being at least are
to control alike the government and the governed
CASE DISCUSSIONS
E. Subjects of Construction
• The Constitution
(a) How should the Constitution be construed?
#21. Sarmiento vs. Mison (GR L-79974, 17 December 1987)
In 1987, then Pres. Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting
his nomination to the CoA. Sarmiento et al filed the instant
petition for prohibition on the ground that the appointment
violated Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution. They
argued that the appointment of a bureau head should be
subject to the approval of the CoA.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of bureau heads should be
subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: NO. construing Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution would show that the Pres. is well within her
authority to appoint bureau heads without submitting such
nominations before the CoA. The SC traced the history of the
confirmatory powers of the CoA (which is part of the legislative
department) vis-a-vis the appointment powers of the President.
1935 Constitution - Sec. 10, Art. VII, almost all presidential
appointments required the consent or confirmation of the CoA.
As a result, the Commission became very powerful, eventually
transforming into a venue for horse-trading and similar
malpractices.
1973 Constitution - (Marcos regime) Consistent with the
authoritarian pattern, placed the absolute power of
appointment in the Pres. with hardly any check on the part of
the legislature.
1987 Constitution - the Court held that the framers intended
to strike a "middle ground" in order to reconcile the extreme
set-ups in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. As such,
while the Pres. may make appointments to positions that
require confirmation by the CoA, the 1987 Constitution also
grants her the power to make appointments on her own without
the need for confirmation by the legislature. Section 16, Art. VII
of the 1987 Constitution, although this was enacted in 1935
(requires consent), It should now be construed in harmony with
the 1987 Constitution.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated.
•it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the CoA.
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to
give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves. The Court will thus
construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in accordance with
what they say and provide.
COMPARISON OF THE CASES: #22, #23, #24
#22:In Perfecto vs Meer, SC ruled in favor of Perfecto Art. 8
Sec. 9 1935 of the 1935 Constitution
#23: In Endencia vs David, SC ruled in favor of Endencia
based on the Perfecto case even though Art 8 Sec. 9 1935 –
repealed by Sec. 13 of RA950 & Art. 15 Sec. 6 1973 of the
1973 constitution. SC ruled that it was unconstitutional.
#24: In the Nitafan vs CIR case, SC ruled against Nitfan.
During the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the framers have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and
importance of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Consti that
the burden of general income taxation applies to ALL citizens -
Judiciary is of no exemption.
#25. Arturo M. De Castro vs. JBC (GR 191002, 3/17/ 2010)
The compulsory retirement of CJ Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 which occurred just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010 which fall during the election
appointment ban under Article VII, Section 15 of the Consti.
ISSUE: WON the Court has erred in applying the basic
principles of Statutory construction in interpreting Article VII,
Section 15 and Sections 4 and 9 of Article 8 of the 1987
Constitution.
HELD: NO. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and
Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution. Section 14,
Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.
that every part must be considered together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
Applied verba legis; stare decisis et non quieta movere
(Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled) -
abandoned the Valenzuela doctrine in this case.
#26. Chaves vs. JBC
The unexpected departure of former CJ Renato C. Corona on
May 29, 2012, and the nomination of Chaves, as his potential
successor. Chavez seeks judicial intervention with regard to
JBC composition as mandated in Article VIII, Sec. 8 of the
1987 Constitution.
In compliance, Congress, from the moment of JBC creation,
had only 1 representative (the HR and Senate would send
alternate representatives to the JBC).
Subsequently, in 1994, the composition of the JBC was
substantially altered. Instead of having only 7 members, an 8th
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC (one from the HR and one
from the Senate)), with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.
ISSUE: WON the current practice of the JBC to perform its
functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: YES. The use of the singular letter "a" preceding
"representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. Congress may designate only
(1) rep to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than (1)
rep from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers of
the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Reason: practical purpose in case of stalemate in voting
(tie-breaker); congress is bicameral and therefore, they are
co-equal otherwise, it would "negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in
the Constitution."
The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have
been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word
employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its
deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against
disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says,
according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
CrIdApCoI. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration
of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified; only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.
(b) May the Preamble be referred to in the construction of
constitutional Provisions?
#27. Aglipay vs. Ruiz (GR 45459, 13 March 1937)
The government had authorized a special stamp issue on the
occasion of the observance in Manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic
Church. The petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent
Church, assailed the measure, contending that it violated the
Constitution because it benefited a particular religion; thus he
sought to prohibit the issuance and selling of the stamps
commemorative of the event.
ISSUE: WON the authorized stamp issue be declared invalid
for violating the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article
VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines (Principle of separation
of Church and State)
RULING: The stamp was NOT INVALID. Although the original
design of the stamp featured a Catholic chalice, this was later
rejected in favor of the map of the Philippines under which
appeared the caption, “”Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937.” What was emphasized, therefore, is
not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, as the seat of
that congress. The issuance of the postage stamps in question
was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The only
purpose was “to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country.” The stamps were not issued and sold
for the benefit of the Church. Nor was money derived from the
sale of the stamps given to the church. The officials concerned
merely took advantage of an event considered of international
importance “to give publicity to the Philippines and its people”.
STATCON: The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with
reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged act of the
respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act
because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori
"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule,
therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not
confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within
the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will
issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts
are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the
writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong
arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a
multiplicity of actions."
(c) Are the provisions of the Constitution self-executing?
#28. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (GR 122156, 3 Feb 1997)
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution,
i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its
bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel.
Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares
form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by
the protective mantle of the Constitution.
HELD:
(1) YES. A provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing
if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred
to the legislature for action. The prevailing view is that, in case
of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing, unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall
be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
(2) In its plain and ordinary meaning, when the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. Built as a first-class hotel in
1912, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was
called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of
many festivities, it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors
who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. The
history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The
Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. For more than
eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the
hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents'
claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable
since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares
of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands. The term qualified Filipinos as used
in Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of
which are owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
#29. Tañada v. Tuvera (Publication of Laws Requirement)
• ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided.
• Statcon: one should understand that if the phrase refers to
the publication itself it would violate the constitution (since all
laws should be made public).
Ordinances
(i) Rule on Construction of Ordinaces visà-vis Statute
#30 Primicias vs. Urdaneta (GR L-26702, 28 Oct 1979)
The main issue in this appeal is the validity of Ordinance No.
3, Series of 1964 by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, which was declared null and void by the CFI.
Augusto B. Primicias, plaintiff-appellee, was apprehended for
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, for
overspeeding "and more particularly, for overtaking a truck.".
Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being
"patterned after and based on Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act No.
3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law). But Act No.
3992 has been superseded/repealed by Republic Act No.
4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which
became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after
the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta’s
Municipal Council. The explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is
embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136.
HELD: The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision.
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others,
that is "must not contravene . . . the statute," for it is a
"fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in
status and subordinate to the laws of the state." Following this
general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an
ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must give way."
F. Particular Latin Rules
• Mens Legislatoris
#31 Matabuena vs. Cervantes (GR L-28771, 31 Mar 1971)
Mens Legislatoris/Mischief Rule - It is a principle of statutory
construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much
a part of it as what is written. (Mischief: Mabuybuyan)
Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation
between the spouses during the marriage," in rel Art. 900 (if
only the wife is the surviving heir of the intestate, only entitled
to half, and half to the collateral relative unless there are
surviving children).
Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was
living maritally without benefit of marriage to Petronila
Cervantes, was void.
The lower court ruled adverse to Cornelia. It reasoned out
thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil
Code is void if made between the spouses during the
marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena
in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila
Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that
time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when
they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of
donation had been executed.
SC held: The lack of validity of the donation made by the
deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in the plaintiff having exclusive right to the
disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was legitimized
by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his
widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving
sister, to the other half.
If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory
construction is that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the
basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be
attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be
remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective.
• Dura Lex Sed Lex
The law is harsh but it is the law.
COMPARISON OF CASES
People v Macarandang (1959) ACQUITTED
Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides, as
shown at least by the subject matter therefore, that "peace
officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms.
#32: People vs Mapa (1967)
FACTS: Defendant Mario Mapa, was accused of illegal
possession of firearms. THE LAW IS CLEAR.: No provision is
made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
"Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them.
#33: People v. Jabinal (1974) EX-POST FACTO
(Judgement was reversed and he is ACQUITTED)
•Appointed Secret Agent by the Prov Govt in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Prov Comm in 1964, the prevailing
doctrine on the matter was laid down by SC in People v.
Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). SC’s
decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine
came only in 1967.
• The case was arraigned while the Macarandang Doctrine
was still prevailing, however, the decision was promulgated
when the Mapa doctrine was in place. SC reversed the
judgement and Jabinal was Acquitted. New doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof
Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system.
#34 People vs. Santayana (GR L-22291, 15 Nov 1976)
Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" by then Col.
Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS which ordered not to
register a pistol since its a gov’t property and that he’s
authorized to carry it. Oct 29, 1962, he was found in Plaza
Miranda in possession of firearm without a license to possess
them. At the time of appellant’s apprehension, the doctrine
then prevailing doctrine is the case of PP v. Macarandang
wherein the SC held that the appointment of a civilian as
"secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within
the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879."
The case of PP v. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the
Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the
Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of
appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no
criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
ACQUITTED
• Expressio unius est exclusion alterius
#35 People vs. Estenzo (GR L-35376, 11 Sep 1980)
The express mention of one or more things of a particular
class may be regarded as impliedly excluding others.
RA 6236: AN ACT EXTENDING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE
FILING OF APPLICATIONS FOR FREE PATENTS AND FOR
THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR
INCOMPLETE TITLES.
RA 931: AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE
PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF
CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT
HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY
YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT
RA 2061: AN ACT SETTING A NEW TIME LIMIT FOR THE
FILING OF APPLICATIONS FOR FREE PATENTS, FOR THE
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR
INCOMPLETE TITLES, AND FOR THE REOPENING OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ON CERTAIN LANDS WHICH
WERE DECLARED PUBLIC LANDS.
In 1940 the Cadastral Court rendered a decision declaring, Lot
4273 a public land (the Aoetes failed to appear on the date of
the hearing because of ignorance and excusable neglect).
They filed a petition to reopen the decision invoking RA 931 as
amended by RA 6236. The Aotes claimed that since the time
limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for
judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have
been extended up to December 31, 1980, the reopening of
cadastral cases is also extended until December 31, 1980.
The lower court affirmed and On July 22, 1972 adjudicating
said lot in favor of the private respondents in undivided interest
in equal share of one-fourth (1/4) each.
ISSUE: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263
also applies to Re-opening of Cadastral Proceedings.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court reiterated that RA 6236 does
not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings and as a
consequence, the respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over
the petition of the Aotes to reopen the cadastral proceedings.
The extension as provided for by the RA 6236 makes no
reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law,
RA 2061, expressly did.
Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied
Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in a law, as a
general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly
mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent,
is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. If RA 6236 had intended that the extension it
provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it
would have so provided in the same way that it provided the
extension of time to file applications for free patent and for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The
intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or
certain lands which were declared public land in RA 6236 is
made clearer by reference to RA 2061 which includes the
reopening of cadastral cases, but not so included in RA 6236.
• Ejusdem Generis
Of the same kind." When a law lists classes of persons or
things, this concept is used to clarify such a list.
(i) When do we apply this rule?
#36. Mutuc vs. Comelec (GR L-32717, 26 November 1970)
Petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, was prohibited by respondent,
Comelec, from using tape jingles in his mobile units equipped
with sound systems and loud speakers. The justification for
the prohibition was premised on a provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for
candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute
sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic
goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."
ISSUE: Whether the taped jingles can be categorized under
the phrase “and the like”
. May 23, 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had
HELD: NO. The Court cannot give merit to the justification of
the COMELEC under the well-known principle of ejusdem
generis, the general words following any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the
kind –being made of that kind–referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution. Furthermore, the respondent
Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or
outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
Constitution. The Court could not adhere to a ruling which
would nullify a constitutional right as free speech. Thus, the
respondent Commission is permanently restrained and
prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding
compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political
taped jingles.
• Casus Omissus (case omitted)
(i) Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est (restrictive
rule)
#37 People vs. Manantan (GR L-14129, 31 July 1962)
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the
CFI dismissing the information against Manantan (defendant).
CA and RTC has erroneously applied the rule of "expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that
justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54.
ISSUE: Whether a justice of the peace is included in the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
HELD: On law, reason and public policy, Manantan’s
contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the
injunction of Section 54 must be REJECTED. To accept it is to
render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid
down by the legislature. Justice of peace was not omitted,
rather it is now referred to the broader term “judges”.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of
the peace from participating in partisan politics. They were
prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No.
1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by
the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed
the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later,
Commonwealth Act No. 357.
The rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving
at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by
Section 54. The rule has no application. If the legislature had
intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of
Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has
given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no
reason for the alleged change. Hence, it has been erroneously
applied.
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its
provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating
them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest
injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim
expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered
by the trial court should be set aside and this case is
remanded for trial on the merits.
(ii) Permissive Rule
#38 Lopez vs. CTA (GR L-9274, 1 February 1957)
FACTS: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from
Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the
corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis
of consular and supplies invoices. Said customs duties were
paid and the shipments were released. However, after
reassessment (freight) additional customs duties were levied
and imposed in the amount of P1,966.59. Failing to secure a
reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional
customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the CTA. Acting
upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the SolGen on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the CTA, by its resolution of
no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs
of Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court.
Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner contends that the literal meaning of Section 11 of
RA 1125 should be adopted in the sense that the CTA has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioner of Customs over
Appeals from decisions of Collectors of Customs, so that a
person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of
Customs is given the choice of appealing the said decision
either to the Commissioner of Customs or to the CTA.
ISSUE: Whether the literal meaning of Section 11 of RA 1125
should be adopted and that the CTA has concurrent
jurisdiction over the decisions of the Collector of Custom.
HELD: NO. Section 7 of RA 1125 specifically provides that the
(CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, Section 11 of
the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and
entities who may appeal mentions among others, those
affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Customs,
and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. The court
ruled that a clerical error was committed in Section 11,
mentioning therein the Collector of Customs. It is more
reasonable and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the
Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of
Customs, instead of Collector of Customs. The two remedies
suggested by petitioners are entirely different, one from the
other; an appeal to the Commissioner of Customs is purely
administrative, whereas, appeal to the (CTA) is manifestly
judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the
Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should first
be exhausted. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is
not the letter but rather the spirit of the law and intention of the
Legislature that is important and which matters. When the
interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal
import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous
results, or would contravene the clear purposes of the
Legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the latter
of the law.
• Noscitur a sociis
#39 Sanciangco vs. Rono (GR L-68709, 19 July 1985)
FACTS: Petitioner was elected Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Sta.
Cruz, Ozamiz City. Later, he was elected President of the
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the
Board of Directors of and was appointed by the President of
the Philippines as a member of the City's Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis
Occidental but was not successful. Petitioner informed
respondent Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming
his duties as member of that body Invoking Section 13(2),
Article 5 of BP 697:
Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.
(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active officers and members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Integrated National Police, as well as
officials and employees of government-owned and GCCO and
their subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease in office or position as
of the time he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
however, that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister,
the Members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Ministers shall
continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the
filing of their certificates of candidacy.
(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang
or barangay officials shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy
be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Although it may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697, admits of
more than one construction, taking into consideration the
nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein,
namely, governors, mayors, members of the various
sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to
distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as
contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the
all-encompassing clause reading "any person holding public
appointive office or position," is clear. It is a rule of statutory
construction that "when the language of a particular section of
a statute admits of more than one construction, that
construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and
object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as
a whole, must be followed."
A statute's clauses and phrases should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts.
#40 Caltex Phil. Vs. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247
The well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a
sociis — it is only logical that the term under a construction
should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
G. Construction of words and phrases
“May” and “Shall”
#41Capati v. Ocampo, GR L-28742, April 30, 1982)
Virgilio Capati (plaintiff), a contractor of the Feati Bank for the
construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur, on May 23,
1967, entered into a sub-contract with the defendant Dr. Jesus
Ocampo, a resident of Naga City. The contract-agreement
stipulated that construction must be completed before June 5
1967, and that all actions arising out, or relating to this
contract may be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga.
Ocampo (defendant) finished the construction only on June
20, 1967 thus plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an action
for recovery of consequential damages. Ocampo then filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the venue
of action was improperly laid but Plaintiff filed an opposition to
the motion, claiming that their agreement to hold the venue in
the CFI of Naga City was merely optional to both contracting
parties. In support thereof, plaintiff cited the use of the word
"may " in relation with the institution of any action arising out of
the contract.
The lower court, in resolving the motion to dismiss, ruled that
"there was no sense in providing the aforequoted stipulation,
pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, if
after all, the parties are given the discretion or option of filing
the action in their respective residences," and thereby ordered
the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the CFI erred in its decision to dismiss the
complaint of the Ocampo.
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that the stipulation as to venue in
the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said
stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits solely
and exclusively with the CFI of Naga. They merely agreed to
submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their
right to seek recourse in the court. Since the complaint has
been filed in the CFI of Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides,
the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section
2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. It is well settled that the
word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the
term "may be'' connotes possibility; it does not connote
certainty. "May" is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty,
opportunity, permission or possibility.
• “Of” and “May”
#42. GMRC vs. Bell Telecommunications, 271 SCRA 790
FACTS: On 19 October 1993, Bell Telecommunication
Philippines, Inc. (BellTel) filed with the (NTC) an Application for
a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure,
Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated
Telecommunications Services and to Charge Rates Therefor
and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional
Authority (NTC Case 93-481). At the time of the filing of this
application, BellTel had not been granted a legislative
franchise to engage in the business of telecoms service.
Hence, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area
assignments for local exchange carrier service Only GMCR,
Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co.,
Inc. and International Communications Corporation, among
others, were beneficiaries of formal awards of service area
assignments. On 25 March 1994, RA 7692 was enacted
granting BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private
respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority to carry on
the business of providing telecoms services. BellTel filed with
the NTC a second application and proposed to install 2.6M
telephone lines in 10 years using the most modern and latest
state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100%
digital local exchange telephone network. BellTel’s second
application was opposed by GMCR et al. In December 1994,
BellTel completed the presentation of its evidence-in-chief
together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in
support of its application. It was referred to (CCAD) for study
and recommendation. The finding proved that the project is
feasible and BellTell has financial capacity to support it. The
Legal Department prepared a working draft of the order
granting provisional authority to BellTel. However, it was not
signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. The inaction
caused BellTell to file the petitions for Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition.
Statutory Construction: “And” construed. The conjunctive word
‘and’ is not without any legal significance. It is not, by any
chance, a surplusage in the law. It means ‘in addition to’. The
word ‘and’, whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full
sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as
relating to one another. From the context of Section 16 of
Executive Order 546, the Commission is composed of a
Commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners; not the
commissioner alone. (“May” is permissive)
Every part of statute should be given effect in interpreting a
statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the theory
that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a
combination of dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes,
“that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.”
• “Principally” and “Exclusively”
#43. Alfon vs. Republic (GR L-51201, 29 May 1980)
FACTS: Petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
filed a petition praying that her name be changed from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon for the
following reasons:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her
childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college
using the same name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since
her infancy and all her friends and acquaintances know her by
this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same
name.
ISSUE: Whether a legitimate or legitimated children are
required to use the surname of their father.
HELD: NO, the word "principally" as used in Art. 364 of the
Civil Code is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no
legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose
to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
Moreover, this Court held in Haw Liong vs. Republic. The
following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner
for change of name;
(1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change
of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and
(3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
It has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne
the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and
baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the
schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella
S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she finished her
course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a
diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of
suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample
justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but
on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e.
to avoid confusion.
• “Previously”
#44. Rura vs. Lopena (GR L-69810-414, 19 June 1985)
FACTS: Petitioner Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and
convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different
dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin,
Tubigon, Bohol. The five cases were jointly tried and a single
decision was rendered. Rura applied for probation. The
application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the
ground that petitioner is disqualified for probation under Sec.
9(c) of the Probation law thereof which disqualifies from
probation those persons:
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of
an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day and or a fine of not less than 200 Pesos.
The court denied the application for probation. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is disqualified for probation.
HELD: NO. The court ruled that when he applied for probation
he had no previous conviction by final judgment and the only
conviction against him was the judgment which was the
subject of his application. The statute relates "previous" to the
date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the
Crime. Thus, the petition is granted and the respondent judge
is directed to give due course to the petitioner's application for
probation.
• “Every”
#45. NHA vs. Juco , 134 SCRA 172
Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco ,a project engineer of respondent
National Housing Corporation (NHC), was separated from the
service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or
malversation of public funds. Juro filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the NHC with DOLE. In September 1977,
the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.
Juro then elevated the case to the NLRC which reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Dissatisfied with the decision of
the NLRC, they appealed before the Court and rendered a
decision reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s. Juro filed with the
CSC a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary
mandatory injunction. NHC moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the CSC has no jurisdiction over
the case. On April 11, 1989, the CSC issued an order
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated
that: The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss
meritorious. It was not disputed that NHC is a government
corporation without an original charter but organized/created
under the Corporate Code.
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically
provides: The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government, including
every government-owned or controlled corporation. ...
The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1,
Article XI I which stated: A Civil Service embracing all
branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be
provided by law.
Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to
modify the phrase "government-owned or controlled
corporation."
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It
means all possible and all taken one by one. Of course, our
decision in this case refers to a corporation created as a
government-owned or controlled entity. It does not cover
cases involving private firms taken over by the government in
foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on
these latter cases when the appropriate controversy is brought
to this Court.
• Suplusages
#46. Demafiles vs. Comelec, GR L-28396, 29 Dec 1987
The new municipality of Sebaste in Antique province held its
first election of officers November 14, 1967, with the petitioner
Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying
for the mayoralty. On November 21 the respondent Galido
asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of
canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised
Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the
election return from precinct 7 on the ground that the said
return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188
voted), when, according to a certificate of the municipal
election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of
October 30, 1997.
At its session on the following day, the board, over the
objection of one member, voted to reject the return from
precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns
from the other precincts. The resulting tally gave Galido 888
votes as opposed to 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido
was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste.
Petitioner, challenged the right of the two board members to sit
considering that they are re-electionist. Respondent
Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. However, Galido
asked for reconsideration, stating that the said board members
in question were disqualified only when the board was acting
as a provincial but not as municipal and that the COMELEC
resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials
was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard.In
light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous
decision. Galido was proclaimed and the respondent
Commission held "that the canvas and proclamation already
made by the local officials . . . stands". Demafiles, after failing
to secure a reconsideration of the latter resolution, filed a
petition. Hence the case. Galido, argued that the case is moot
because he had taken his oath and assumed office on
November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870 section 2 of the
statute which reads:
“The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality
of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for
local officials and shall have qualified”
"and shall have qualified" — is devoid of any meaning, is
unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant
the respondent's reading that the term of office of the first
municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their
proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the
legislature meant. But here is a clear case of a failure to
express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty
forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from
supplying. A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to
enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the
statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest,
construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration.
Accordingly, we have to go by the general rule that the term of
office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of
January following their election,3 and so the assumption of
office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic
issues in this case, which we need not reach and resolve.
• Punctuations
#47. Arabay vs. CFI of Zamboanga del Norte, 66 SCRA 617
FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No.
19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution of gasoline,
lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleum based products.
Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum
products, filed with the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte a
complaint against the City of Dipolog, contesting the validity of
such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a
municipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which
provides that municipalities may not impose tax on articles
subject to specific tax except gasoline. The court a quo
rendered judgment upholding the validity of the questioned
provision of Ordinance No. 53, as amended, essentially on the
grounds that the Arabay, Inc. failed to present evidence that
the tax provision in question imposed a sales tax, and the tax
prescribed therein was, moreover, not a specific tax on the
products themselves but on the privilege of selling them.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the questioned tax provision imposes a sales tax.
(2) Whether the Arabay, Inc. is entitled to a tax refund.
HELD:
(1) Yes. Dipolog levies a sales tax, not only because the
character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance was
admitted by the parties below, but as well because the
phraseology of the said provision reveals in clear terms
the intention to impose a tax on the sale of oil, gasoline and
other petroleum products. Thus, the ordinance provides:
"There shall be charged for the selling and distribution of
refined and manufactured oils ... based on the monthly
allocation actually delivered and distributed and intended for
sale … by the Company or supplier to any person ... whether
as dealer ... or as operator of any station ... the following tax
payable monthly: ..." It is quite evident from these terms that
the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly
dependent upon or bears a direct relationship to the volume of
sales which the owner or supplier of the itemized products
generates every month. The ordinance in question therefore
exacts a tax based on sales; it follows that the Municipality of
Dipolog was not authorized to enact such an ordinance under
the local Autonomy Act.
(2) Even if the prohibition contained in section 2 of RA 2264
applies only to municipalities and not to chartered cities; the
obligation of the City of Dipolog to refund the sum collected
under the void provisions of an ordinance enacted while it was
still a municipality, is not open to doubt. The court ruled that
the legality of an ordinance depends upon the power of the
municipality at the time of the enactment of the challenged
ordinance. The right of the Arabay, Inc. to a refund of the local
sales taxes it had paid under the questioned ordinance may
not, however, include those levied on its gasoline sales. The
relevant proviso of Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act
states: ... Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts
shall, in no case, impose any percentage tax on sales or other
taxes on articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code: The
reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the
proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress, in
excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put
it within the power of such local governments to impose
whatever type or form of taxes.
• Other Examples
#48. People vs. Mejia, 275 SCRA 127
In the evening of 10 March 1994, several persons on board a
passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the
latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon
them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his
seat and dumped on the shoulder of the road. One of the
attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away.
Catugas was thrown out to the middle of the road when the
jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a
consequence of the injuries he sustained. Catugas survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin
Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one
alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another
unidentified person. Mejia and Benito were taken into police
custody a few hours after the incident; Paraan, the following
day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was found dead 3
days after the incident in question, while the others have
remained at large. 3 separate criminal complaints for murder,
frustrated murder, and violation of RA 6539 (Anti Carnapping
Act of 1992, as amended) were filed against them with the
MTC of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. Despite service on their
subpoenas requiring submission of counter- affidavits,
accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito did comply.
On 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order
declaring the accused "to have waived their right to be heard
in preliminary investigation"; finding a prima facie case against
the accused; recommending that they be charged with and
prosecuted for the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and
violation of RA 6539, as amended; and ordering that the
records of the cases be forwarded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. After appropriate
proceedings, the OPP filed with the RTC of Dagupan City
three separate informations for murder, frustrated murder, and
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended,
against the aforenamed persons.
The LARON court gave credence to the version of the
prosecution and even took the incident as an offer of
compromise, which may be considered an implied admission
of guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. There is no evidence whatsoever that any of
the appellants authorized his parents to approach Catugas or
knew the matter of payment of P80K. Moreover, if one were to
believe the explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80K
represented the expenses he incurred for his hospitalization
and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not
admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to
the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130. On the whole
then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the
participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes
charged.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal Case for
murder, frustrated murder, and violation of Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972 are REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gregorio
Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito are
ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt or with moral certainty. Their
immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless
other lawful and valid grounds for their further detention exist.