Psychological Bulletin Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1996, Vol. 119, No. 1,51-69 0033-2909/96/S3.00

For Better or Worse:

The Impact of Upward Social Comparison on Self-Evaluations
Rebecca L. Collins
University of British Columbia

Upward social comparison is generally regarded as ego deflating, yet people often compare them-
selves with those whose abilities and attributes are better than their own. Upward comparison pro-
vides useful information, which may partially account for this behavior. Furthermore, it is proposed
that upward comparison only sometimes results in more negative self-evaluations; it can also be self-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

enhancing. A review of studies testing upward comparison effects on self-evaluations, self-esteem,

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

and affect is consistent with this conclusion. Thus, people may make upward comparisons in hopes
of enhancing their self-assessments. It is concluded that upward comparison is not in conflict with
the desire for positive self-regard and indeed serves it indirectly (through self-improvement) and
sometimes directly (by enhancing the self).

Anything you can do, I can do better, I can do anything better than
you.—"Anything "Vbu Can Do," Irving Berlin'
There's always going to be someone better than you.—
Lisa Simpson, THE SIMPSONS2
People want to be better than others and, indeed, believe they
are better than other people at the things they consider impor-
tant (Taylor & Brown, 1988; also see Dunning, Meyerowitz, &
Holzberg, 1989). A good example of the latter is the startling
94% of college professors who rate their work as above average
in quality (Cross, 1977). Superiority beliefs are positively cor-
related with self-esteem (Brown, 1986; Campbell, 1986), indi-
cating that people equate being better with being good
(Festinger, 1954). What happens to self-evaluations, then, when
people encounter circumstances in which they are inferior to
someone else?
In this article, I address the question of how upward compar-
ison (as it is called) affects ability evaluations and broader self-
esteem and the related issue of when and why people engage in
it. Two straightforward predictions, given the value people place
on superiority, are that people avoid information that others
are superior to them and when they are unable to do so, their
perceptions of their abilities suffer. I argue, in contrast, that peo-
ple actively seek upward comparison and that in doing so, some-
times enhance their self-evaluations. These assertions are not
contrary to a basic desire for superiority if two assumptions can
be made: (a) that people make upward comparisons partly to
achieve superiority to others and (b) that upward comparisons
are subject to construal. The focus here is on the latter because
it has not been previously documented.
I propose that a discrepancy between one's own and another's
abilities can be construed as indicating either similarity to, or
difference from, the comparison target (cf. Buunk, Collins, Tay-
lor, Dakof, & VanYperen, 1990). Which conclusion one draws
is likely to depend on expectations. Expecting to be different
from an upward target should lead to a contrast effect, feelings
of inferiority, and more negative self-appraisals. However, ex-
pectations of similarity may cause assimilation, increasing the
probability that the target's abilities will be viewed as similar to
one's own and elevating self-worth by placing one in his or her
superior group (Wheeler, 1966). These predictions are consis-
tent with the operation of assimilation and contrast processes in
the construal of other relativistic information (Manis &
Paskewitz, 1984).
Historically, the literature examining the relation between
upward comparison and self-appraisal has assumed (e.g., Pysz-
czynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985; Wilson & Benner, 1971)
or has predicted (e.g., Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Morse &
Gergen, 1970; Wills, 1981) that it has more direct, negative
effects on mood and self-esteem. However, a number of models
incorporating positive effects on these evaluative dimensions
have recently been proposed (Brewer & Weber, 1994; Brown,
Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992; Buunk et al., 1990; Taylor &
Lobel, 1989; Tesser, 1988). The present theory builds on these
models and integrates the body of evidence that they and others
have produced by focusing attention on the construal phase in-
tervening between comparison and evaluative reactions to corn-

Preparation of this article was supported by Social Sciences and Hu-

manities Research Council of Canada Grant 410-91-1919. The insights
and encouragement of Jennifer Campbell, Shelley Taylor, and Joanne
Wood are gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Rebe-
cca L. Collins, who is now at the Social Policy Department, RAND Cor-
poration, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90407-2138. Elec-
tronic mail may be sent via Internet to rcollins@cortex.psych.ubc.ca.
1
Lyrics excerpts from "Anything \bu Can Do" by Irving Berlin,
1946, New \ork: Irving Berlin Music Company. Copyright 1946 by Ir-
ving Berlin. Copyright renewed. International copyright secured. Used
by permission. All rights reserved.
2
From THE SIMPSONS*® & °, 1993, Beverly Hills, CA: Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corporation. Copyright 1993. All rights reserved.
Used by permission.

5!
 52 COLLINS
parison. It is described in detail below. First, the stage is set by
describing people's interest in upward comparison and the mo-
tives this reflects. Then, an outline of both a construal model
and other theories of upward comparison effects, current and
past, is presented. Empirical studies of reactions to upward
comparison are reviewed next, with an eye to identifying factors
that alter its effects. These moderators are discussed in relation
to a general theory of assimilation and contrast effects in social
judgment (Manis & Paskewitz, 1984). The ability of existing
social comparison theories to account for previously obtained
moderating effects is also considered. Finally, the relation be-
tween the present proposal and a prominent theory of down-
ward comparison processes (Wills, 1981), which emphasizes
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the need to focus on worse-off others to feel good about oneself,
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is considered. In closing, some general conclusions about social
comparison and the preservation of self-esteem are drawn.
When and Why People Compare With Those
Who Are Better
People sometimes make social comparisons because such
comparisons are forced on them by circumstance (Wheeler &
Miyake, 1992; Wood, 1989). There will almost always be some-
one who is better than oneself, so upward comparison may be
impossible to avoid. However, people also subject themselves to
these experiences by choice (Collins & Di Paula, 1994; Nosan-
chuk & Erickson, 1985). Traditionally, different directions of
comparison have been linked to different motivational states.
The need for positive self-regard is thought to evoke compari-
son with persons who are worse off and to an avoidance of supe-
rior others (Pyszczynskietal., 1985; Wills, 1981), Because peo-
ple equate being better with being good, downward compari-
sons should, theoretically, increase self-evaluations (Morse &
Gergen, 1970; Wills, 1981). Comparison with persons whose
abilities are similar to one's own appears to be driven by self-
evaluation motives, increasing the stability and subjective accu-
racy of self-appraisals (Radloff, 1966; Wilson, 1973). Such
comparisons may allow people to pinpoint their ability within a
small range (Wood, 1989). Finally, upward comparison has
been argued to reflect both self-evaluation motives, because it
provides a positive instance of the attribute under assessment
(Thornton & Arrowood, 1966), and an interest in achievement
or self-improvement (Major, Testa, & Bylsma, 1991; Taylor &
Lobel, 1989; Wheeler, 1966). For example, dieters sometimes
post pictures of thinner people on the refrigerator. These up-
ward comparisons remind the dieter of his or her own weight,
provide a goal for use in guiding eating behavior, and offer the
inspiration needed to meet that goal (Helgeson & Taylor, 1993;
Wood, 1989).
To determine which motive most strongly controls the com-
parison process, researchers have expended much of their effort
on determining the normative direction of people's social com-
parisons. These studies have consistently indicated that people
compare with others whose ability level is similar to, but slightly
better than, their own (Cruder, 1977; Wood, 1989).3 Partici-
pants presented with their own score on a novel test wished to
know what score was received by someone ranked one or two
places above them in the performance distribution (Wheeler
et al., 1969). Upward comparisons are also preferred among
persons comparing on "real" dimensions with "real" targets.
Bridge players who were asked to nominate people with whom
they would compare in a variety of situations involving the
game gave the names of peers whose lifetime record of play was
objectively superior to their own (Nosanchuk & Erickson,
1985). Thus, contemporary comparison research and theory
suggests that self-evaluation, self-improvement, or both motives
predominantly control the seeking of comparative feedback.
This conclusion is in some degree of conflict with the litera-
ture exploring motives for seeking or avoiding objective (i.e.,
noncomparative) feedback. In this arena, a debate over the rel-
ative strength of self-evaluation and self-enhancement motives
has raged for some time (e.g., Brown, 1991; Trope, 1980). The
central question is, Will people look for information that indi-
cates one or more of their abilities is poor, or will they avoid it
and focus on assessing their positive attributes instead? Recent
work in this area (Sedikides, 1993), as well as the balance of
evidence accumulated over the years (Taylor & Brown, 1988),
indicates that under normal circumstances, people are more
concerned with self-enhancement than with accurate self-as-
sessment. Thus, self-enhancement seems to be paramount to
persons evaluating themselves on the basis of objective criteria
and not to persons seeking social comparison information. An
explanation of this disparity is in order, and two seem plausible.
First, as previously noted, people's selection of slightly up-
ward targets suggests that both self-evaluation and self-improve-
ment motives may be served by their comparisons.4 Quite pos-
sibly, the addition of self-improvement to the "balance of
forces" (Brickman & Bulman, 1977) driving the search for self-
relevant feedback tips the scales away from self-enhancement.
Objective feedback does not provide information that is as use-
ful for improvement. It tells people whether they are good or
bad but not what they would have to achieve to move up in the
ability distribution. Because people define good in comparative
terms, this information may be critical to goal setting. An ex-
ample may help in making this point. Imagine a researcher
comparing publication records with a peer's. If it is learned that
the target publishes more often, the researcher may feel badly
about being behind but has learned a lot. It might be discovered
that publishing two more articles would even the score, and see-
ing that someone else has done this may make it seem more
possible for one to achieve. Objective feedback does not provide
this kind of "get ahead" information. Thus, combining the
forces of self-improvement with those of self-evaluation may
3
Under some conditions, people prefer to compare with highly dis-
similar others (Wheeler et al., 1969). However, this preference appears
to stem from an attempt to understand the comparison dimension
rather than a desire to self-evaluate. Comparisons with dissimilar others
seem to have little effect on self-evaluations or behavior (Wood, 1989).
4
Festinger's (1954) original theory of social comparison nicely lays
out the link between self-improvement and self-evaluation. He argued
that people compare to evaluate their abilities, but throughout his trea-
tise, he equated self-evaluation with achieving or falling short of one's
level of aspiration (i.e., improvement goals). Levels of aspiration were,
in turn, determined by the performances of comparison others, with the
goal a standing slightly better than that of other people.
 UPWARD SOCIAL COMPARISON
lead to the override of esteem-protection factors in comparison
behavior. That is, people may be willing to sacrifice the subjec-
tive experience of being better than others to facilitate its objec-
tive attainment.
The second possibility does not entail such a sacrifice, or at
least not as inevitably. It goes back to one of the assumptions
of social comparison theory. Comparison theorists base their
prediction that self-enhancement motives lead to downward
comparison on the premise that downward comparisons are
self-enhancing, and conversely that upward comparisons are
ego deflating. Perhaps they are not. If upward comparison does
not result in negative self-evaluations, or it does so only occa-
sionally, then people could satisfy their desires to evaluate and
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improve themselves with moderate risk to their self-esteem. In
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fact, if upward comparisons are sometimes self-enhancing, then
comparers might be enticed into making them by the possibility
of satisfying all three motives simultaneously. How could being
inferior be self-enhancing? Recall the researcher discussed ear-
lier. Imagine this person concludes that two publications is a
negligible difference in output; therefore, his or her research re-
cord is as good as that of the "better" person with whom a com-
parison was made. Because the target is objectively superior, the
discrepancy and its dismissal moves the comparer up in the abil-
ity ranks into the target's somewhat higher performance cate-
gory (note that an exact similarity would not do this). In a mo-
ment, the comparer has gone from a vita with 10 papers to one
with "10 or 12."
The possibility that people make upward comparisons to en-
hance or maintain self-esteem was first raised by Wheeler
(1966), and his study illustrates this point further. In that study,
he introduced the rank-order paradigm that has become a sta-
ple in social comparison research. First, participants were given
false feedback concerning their performance on a task, as well
as a list of session participants, rank-ordered by performance
level. Participants were told that they would be permitted to
view the score associated with one other rank in the distribution
and were asked to indicate the rank they preferred. Their selec-
tion was the primary dependent measure: Choices ranked above
versus below a participant's own position were interpreted as a
preference for upward versus downward comparison informa-
tion, respectively. As a secondary measure, after making a target
selection (but without viewing it), participants were asked to
indicate whether they thought their score was closer to that of
the person just below them in the rank order or to that of the
person just above. Results revealed that most participants
(87%) preferred upward comparison. Moreover, 75% of those
comparing upward assumed that they were more similar to the
better-off target, whereas only 36% of those comparing down-
ward made this assumption. Wheeler concluded that upward
comparison is used to confirm that one is "almost as good as
the very good ones" (p. 30).
Wheeler's (1966) findings suggest that people do not see up-
ward comparison as a threat to self-esteem but may in fact view
it as a chance to self-enhance. There is some risk in this method
of enhancement because the comparer may not be able to dis-
miss whatever discrepancies exist. Using it, however, provides
evaluative and improvement benefits not afforded by compar-
ing with worse-off others, and so upward comparison might be
53
worth this gamble. Indeed, being one of the "better ones" may
be more pleasant than not being one of the worse ones, and so
upward comparison may have a bigger self-enhancement payoff
than downward. Of course, to argue that upward comparison
can ever be self-enhancing, there must be a reason to believe
that comparisons can be reconstrued, that people do not react
automatically to the direction of ability discrepancies, alone.
Construal of Comparison Information
Return to the example of the researcher whose record is a few
publications short of a colleague's. Clearly, to draw any conclu-
sion about the meaning of this difference, the researcher must
interpret the discrepancy between the two records and decide
whether it is negligible or significant. The task of construing com-
parison information is similar to locating two points in space and
deciding whether they are close or distant or judging two apples
to determine if they are similarly red. As long as the comparer
and his or her target are within range of one another (and as
noted, targets are selected so that this is the case), the interpreta-
tion of relative differences is not straightforward. A relevant il-
lustration of the amorphous nature of such differences is the self-
other asymmetry effect. It has been shown repeatedly that re-
sponses to the questions "How similar are you to (a given
person)" and "How similar is (the same person) to you?" are
different (e.g., Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Holyoak & Mah,
1982). The phrasing of the latter question elicits higher similarity
estimates than the former, although the persons judged and their
objective similarity obviously remain the same.5
Mettee and Riskind (1974) also demonstrated the vulnera-
bility of comparison information to multiple construals. They
gave participants score information indicating either that they
had been slightly or greatly outperformed by a target, and then
they interpreted these score differences for participants in vari-
able ways. Some participants were told that the two perfor-
mances were quite similar; to the rest, it was suggested that the
performance discrepancies indicated a difference in ability.
When score differences were objectively large, this similarity
feedback had a strong effect, indicating that comparisons were
reconstrued. Participants were not reacting to labels alone be-
cause the feedback had no effect on the construal of small per-
formance discrepancies.
The study of bridge players noted earlier (Nosanchuk & Er-
ickson, 1985) provides a particularly compelling demonstration
of construal. As the reader will recall, bridge players gave the
names of people with whom they would compare themselves
in several different hypothetical situations. The experimenters
5
The difference in these two judgments may stem from the use of
different dimensions to assess likeness with each judgment (Medin,
Goldstone, & Centner, 1993). For example, one may make the first
judgment on the basis of intelligence level and the second on the basis of
sociability, depending on each characteristic's centrality to the self and
to perceptions of the other. The researcher's judgment concerning pub-
lication rate, in contrast, involves a specified dimension and should not
be subject to this effect. However, other explanations of the asymmetry
effect (see Holyoak & Mah, 1982) generalize to the interpretation of
more circumscribed self-other differences.
 54 COLLINS
determined that the nominated players were objectively supe-
rior to comparers by matching these names with lifetime play-
ing records (the number of master points earned). However,
participants had also been asked to indicate whether they would
compare with a player who had similar ability, a player who
had slightly worse skills than their own, or a better player than
themselves. Their choice on this measure was a similar target.
This suggests that Nosanchuk and Erickson's participants saw
themselves as similar to the objectively superior targets whom
they had named, not as inferior to them.
In several other studies, construal is demonstrated by a non-
correspondence between direct ratings of similarity to a com-
parison target and separate ratings of the self and the target on
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a comparison dimension (e.g., DeVellis et al., 1991; Miyake &
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Zuckerman, 1993). For example, a group of people with arthri-
tis was asked to rate (a) their coping, (b) the coping of a target
portrayed in a videotape, and (c) how they were coping in com-
parison with the target. The comparative rating was found to be
significantly different from a combination of the separate rat-
ings of self and other. Across various conditions, comparison
targets were seen as more similar to the self than the difference
between self and other ratings suggested (DeVellis et al., 1991).
Thus, it is not merely that people distort their own objective
abilities and perceive similarity to upward targets on the basis
of this distortion (an interpretation that might be applied to
the Nosanchuk and Erickson, 1985, bridge study). Subjective
judgments of self and target can indicate a recognition of the
superior ability possessed by the target, while a direct judgment
of similarity fails to reflect this. People can simultaneously see
others as similar to and better than themselves.
In summary, people construe meaning from performance in-
formation to determine relative status, rather than responding
directly to the direction of ability differences. This idea is con-
sistent with contemporary portrayals of the comparison process
as substantially cognitive, often involving the biased selection
of targets that meet a comparer's goals, or even the manufacture
of comparison information (e.g., Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman,
1983; Wood, 1989). The present analysis suggests that cognitive
processes influence the targets available for comparison in yet
another way: by interpreting objective, and even subjective, sta-
tus differences. This construal process may play a crucial role
in determining the self-evaluative impact of comparison infor-
mation. People's responses to upward comparisons should be
inconsistent, if their perceptions of them are variable. Empiri-
cal evidence showing exactly this pattern is reviewed later, after
a brief overview of some other theories of social comparison
effects that provide a context for this literature.
Before doing either, it should be noted that, although con-
strual processes may apply to downward comparison as well as
upward, discussion of the former is brief and reserved for the
conclusion of this article. There, it is argued that perceiving one-
self to be similar to a target is unlikely in the case of downward
comparison. Because the contrast effects of comparison to
worse-off others have already been the subject of multiple re-
views (Affleck & Tennen, 1991; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991;
Wills, 1981, 1991), downward comparison processes require
only minimal attention herein.
Other Theories
The Wheeler (1966) study described earlier suggested that
people might assimilate their performances to those of upward
comparison targets. Another article suggesting that upward
comparison is self-enhancing was published alongside Wheel-
er's investigation (Thornton & Arrowood, 1966). Thornton
and Arrowood attributed people's interest in upward compari-
son to "goal approach on the irreality level" (p. 46). To re-
phrase their view, upward comparison allows people to identify
with someone at a higher level of success than themselves.
Neither Wheeler (1966) nor Thornton and Arrowood (1966)
tested the impact of upward comparison, and their conclusions
were somewhat counterintuitive. Perhaps for these reasons, sub-
sequent theorists made quite different predictions about up-
ward comparison effects. In an oft-cited study, Morse and Ger-
gen (1970) exposed students waiting to be interviewed for a job
opening to a fellow applicant (a confederate) who was ex-
tremely well kempt and competent, a Mr. Clean. While the ap-
plicants waited, they filled out a number of forms, including a
measure of self-esteem. Half of the scale was completed before
the comparison target entered the situation and half was com-
pleted afterward. Students' self-esteem decreased in response to
Mr. Clean, according to this pre-post measure. A similar point
was made in another classic article. Brickman and Bulman
(1977) discussed both "the pleasure and pain of social compar-
ison," referring (in part) to the beneficial but hedonically costly
effects of upward comparison:
Comparison with superior others, although painful, is more valu-
able than comparison with inferior others, since more useful infor-
mation may be acquired by observing superior others.. . . Com-
parison with inferior others, although less useful, has greater he-
donic value than comparison with superior others, (p. 179)
In support of their argument, they demonstrated that partici-
pants who were expecting a face-to-face exchange of scores with
a person who was better off believed they would enjoy this en-
counter less than persons who were to exchange scores with a
downward comparison target.
These two studies have had a continuing influence on the so-
cial comparison literature. Since their publication, theorists dis-
cussing the self-evaluative and hedonic implications of upward
comparison have focused almost exclusively on negative conse-
quences (e.g., Gibbons, 1986; Major, Sciacchitano, & Crocker,
1993; Major et al., 1991; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992; Wills,
1981), and the suggestions of Wheeler (1966) and Thornton
and Arrowood (1966) seem to have been forgotten. Indeed, the
stance taken by Brickman and Bulman (1977) might best char-
acterize the Zeitgeist in the social comparison literature today—
upward comparison is useful but usually painful (e.g., Major
et al., 1991). However, some problems with this position have
recently been raised. Some have noted the frequency of upward
comparison and suggested that this conflicts with the idea that
comparison lowers self-esteem (e.g., Wheeler & Miyake, 1992).
Why would people constantly make comparisons that lower
their self-worth? Why isn't low self-esteem more common if
they do? Another issue involves self-improvement motives, a
focus on which is relatively new to the comparison literature.
 UPWARD SOCIAL COMPARISON
Exposure to better-off others appears to be vital in both moti-
vating and producing high levels of achievement (Seta, 1982;
Taylor & Label, 1989). This means that (if upward comparison
is ego deflating) the more people are motivated to achieve, the
more they will be faced with feelings of failure (Wheeler, 1966).
To deal with these problems, some theorists (e.g., Suls, 1986;
Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wills, 1986) have argued that people do
not allow upward comparisons to influence their self-evalua-
tions. When people encounter an unfavorable comparison, they
may use the information to motivate themselves, to provide in-
spiration, and even to elevate mood, but not to self-evaluate
(Taylor & Lobel, 1989). This may sometimes be the case, espe-
cially when the ability difference between comparer and target
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is large (Festinger, 1954; see also Footnote 1). The research re-
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viewed below, however, shows that upward comparison some-
times does lead to decrements in self-evaluation. If people are
capable of avoiding negative comparisons at will, why don't
they do so uniformly? Thus, positions holding upward compar-
ison effects on self-appraisals to be wholly negative, as well as
those arguing that self-evaluations are uninfluenced by upward
comparison, are difficult to defend.
Other researchers have developed models that view the effects
of upward comparison as variable. Most prominently, Tesser
(1988) has suggested that people sometimes bask in the re-
flected glory of persons superior to themselves (cf. Cialdini et
al., 1976), feeling better and increasing their self-appraisals
when exposed to such persons. Reflection, according to Tesser's
self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) model, occurs only on di-
mensions that are not central to one's self-concept. Abilities
that are self-relevant, in his view, automatically evoke contrast
effects. When an attribute is not self-relevant, self-esteem is bol-
stered by upward comparison as long as the other individual is
someone with whom a bond of psychological closeness is shared
(usually based on similarity or a personal relationship). If not,
the comparison is hypothesized to have little effect.
Most recently, two groups of researchers (Brewer & Weber,
1994; Brown et al., 1992) have built on Tesser's SEM model and
suggested that closeness allows people to assimilate to compari-
son targets even on attributes high in self-relevance. Whether
this occurs depends, according to these theorists, on whether
assimilation serves the comparer's motives. Brown et al. sug-
gested that people assimilate their status to that of upward
targets because it bolsters their own self-image. Their model
does not predict assimilation to downward targets because this
would harm self-esteem. Brewer and Weber predicted assimila-
tion in both directions. Their hypothesis, which is based on
Brewer's (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory, predicts
stronger perceptions of similarity to unusual (i.e., minority)
group members than to mundane (majority) group members.
Thus, when closeness is operationalized as shared minority
group membership, Brewer and Weber predict that it will result
in assimilation.
A final distinction between these two theories and Tesser's
(1988) should be noted. Brewer and Weber (1994) and Brown
et al. (1992) predicted changes in self-appraisals on the com-
parison dimension as a result of assimilation processes. SEM
does not hypothesize an alteration in specific self-evaluations.
The esteem one gains through the reflection process is esteem
55
through association, not through enhanced perceived ability.
For example, when I claim to know a famous record producer
(as I often do), there is no suggestion that this makes me any
more musical, and certainly not more capable of producing a
hit album. Rather, it implies that I am worthy of accomplished
friends. Tesser often uses the example of William James's self-
acknowledged "wallowing in the grossest ignorance of Greek"
(Tesser & Campbell, 1980, p. 341) as an illustration of self-per-
ceptions on a low self-relevance attribute. The implication is
that James might bask in the glory of a close other's Greek
scholarship but continues to see himself as incompetent in this
domain.*
In summary, contemporary theory emphasizes the idea that
upward comparison is costly to self-appraisals. A few investiga-
tors have suggested that exposure to better-offothers can also be
self-enhancing but in limited contexts or on limited dimen-
sions. In contrast, early research proposed that upward com-
parison is esteem promoting. The present proposal is in many
ways an integration of these positions, predicting that people
decrease their self-evaluations in response to upward compari-
son when they conclude that they are inferior to a target and
increase them when they believe their own attributes are in the
same class. It is acknowledged that comparers may also feel
good for reasons other than an increased perception of ability.
They may bask in their association with a superior other or may
feel inspired and hopeful when they come in contact with a pos-
itive model.
More is said later regarding the relation between construal
and other models. First, the evidence regarding comparison
effects is reviewed, so it can be discussed in reference to each
position.
Empirical Tests
Because many contemporary researchers have regarded the
effects of upward comparison as self-evidently negative or null,
few have set out to test them. However, a number of studies
spurred by an interest in downward comparison processes have
included upward comparison conditions to provide a control
group. As a result, there are data available to review, but the
methods on which they are based do not always map on to any
of the specific theories or processes outlined above. Another re-
sult is that because upward comparison was considered a base-
line condition in these studies, a no-comparison control group
or a measure of self-evaluations prior to comparison was often
omitted from the designs.7 When the latter occurs in the studies
reviewed, it is feasible to draw conclusions about the relative
6
1 am grateful to Jennifer Campbell for supplying this insight.
7
An astute reviewer noted that neither of these may be appropriate
controls. Comparers may evaluate themselves on the basis of manufac-
tured comparisons (Taylor et al., 1983), that is, assumptions about the
abilities of other people, even without exposure to a target. This is an
intriguing notion but a sticky one and beyond the scope of this article or
the available evidence. However, keep in mind that comparison effects
relative to no-comparison or pretest controls should be thought of as the
effects of exposure to comparison information, rather than the effects of
comparison, per se.
 56 COLLINS
impact of upward versus downward comparison, but it is im-
possible to determine the source of any differences between
their effects. To clarify, results indicating that people evaluate
themselves more negatively following upward comparison than
downward might mean that (a) both directions of comparison
had a (differentially) negative effect on participants, (b) both
had a (differentially) positive effect, (c) upward comparison
had a negative impact and downward comparison produced no
change in self-worth, or (d) downward comparison enhanced
self-appraisals and upward comparison had no effect. This in-
terpretive difficulty is noted where appropriate.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Mood Effects
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
A caveat. Most empirical assessments of upward compari-
son effects have used mood as an outcome variable. The studies
to be reviewed operationalized mood as depressive affect, plea-
sure or displeasure, or as generalized positive or negative feel-
ings. These studies bear indirectly on the issue of how upward
comparison changes self-evaluations. Upward comparison
should influence mood negatively when one's state is assessed
as inferior to the target's (i.e., when a contrast effect occurs)
because depressive affect and lowered self-evaluations tend to
covary. Negative mood change would also be consistent with
studies suggesting that upward comparison produces feelings of
dissatisfaction (Emmons & Diener, 1985; although see Fox &
Kahneman, 1992), as well as deprivation and anger (Crosby,
1976; Martin, 1986). Upward comparison may also produce
positive affect in the form of inspiration and optimism (Taylor
& Lobel, 1989) or reflection (Tesser, 1988), even when self-eval-
uations and other forms of mood are negative. In contrast, up-
ward assimilation should result in a uniformly positive re-
sponse: happiness, pleasure, and feelings of satisfaction. These
positive effects may be difficult to distinguish from any caused
by inspiration. Thus, documentation of positive mood follow-
ing upward comparison suggests assimilation effects but does
not confirm them. Nonetheless, the majority of social compar-
ison theorists predict negative mood when a contrast effect has
occurred (e.g., Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Gibbons, 1986;
Major et al., 1991, 1993; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988;
Wheeler & Miyake, 1992; Wills, 1981). An absence of such
effects would therefore undermine the position that upward
comparison is ego deflating.
Evidence. Two experiments by Gibbons and Gerrard
(1989; Reis, Gerrard, & Gibbons, 1993) have suggested that
exposure to better-off others can enhance subjective well-being.
In the first of these investigations, college students learned of
someone adjusting to college life better than themselves. They
showed improved mood in response to this information but
only if they were high in self-esteem. Students with low self-
esteem did not respond to the comparisons either positively or
negatively. In the second study, college women read about a
woman who was using birth control more effectively than them-
selves. This information also resulted in significant improve-
ments in mood, relative to a precomparison assessment. Unlike
the previous study, all participants responded to upward com-
parison with more positive moods. However, chronic self-
esteem did play a role. Women high in self-esteem experienced
the greatest increment in well-being among participants.8
This effect was replicated in a recent experiment by Aspin-
wall and Taylor (1993, Study 1). Again, college students were
presented with information concerning a fellow student's ad-
justment to academic life. The content of the information was
manipulated to ensure that students perceived the fellow stu-
dent as significantly better or worse adjusted than themselves.
Mood improved among students exposed to an upward com-
parison target, and this effect was strongest among students with
high chronic self-esteem. A second study in the same report
failed to replicate either finding, however, demonstrating no
change in students' mood in response to upward targets, regard-
less of the comparer's self-esteem.9
These four studies are the clearest tests of mood effects in the
literature, and three of the four indicate that they can be positive
if the comparer's chronic self-esteem is high. None of them
identified conditions under which mood was more negative
when people were exposed to better-off others.
The remaining laboratory studies of upward comparison and
mood examine upward comparison effects relative to down-
ward or lateral comparison rather than to a baseline condition.
Taylor, Aspinwall, Guiliano, Dakof, and Reardon (1993) ex-
plored reactions to comparison information provided by third
parties—stories told to people about others' standings in a self-
relevant domain. In Study 3, college students read stories that
others might tell them about students who were coping with
university life somewhat better than themselves. These students
reported significantly more positive moods than a group who
read about students whose coping was at a level similar to their
own. A replication of these relatively positive responses to up-
ward comparison is provided by Crocker and Gallo (1985). In
this study, the effect obtained was specific to participants whose
chronic self-esteem was high. Mood was equivalent among low
self-esteem individuals, regardless of comparison direction.
Two other studies, part of Taylor et al.'s (1993) report, also pro-
vide suggestive evidence. A sample of entering college students
(Study 2) and a group of persons coping with cancer (Study 1)
indicated that their moods were better after reading or hearing
stories about someone in their situation who was doing well.
This was not true of participants who learned about someone
doing poorly. However, this pair of studies did not assess partic-
ipants' status relative to the persons described, so it is not clear
8
It should be noted that because all participants in the Reis et al.
(1993) investigation experienced a postcomparison increase in mood,
the effect may have been independent of the comparison opportunity.
That is, participants may have experienced a spontaneous increase in
mood during the course of the study (an explanation preferred by the
study's authors). If this is the case, then it can merely be concluded that
upward comparison did not prevent mood enhancement from
occurring.
9
Aspinwall and Taylor (1993) suggested that the first study's result
was the more reliable of the two because a substantial period of time
and several other measures intervened between the comparison manip-
ulation and mood assessment in Study 2, and this was not the case in
Study 1. Thus, any transient change of mood may have dissipated before
the measurement took place.
 UPWARD SOCIAL COMPARISON
that the targets were better-off than the comparers. Thus, they
should be interpreted with caution.
Tesser et al. (1988) looked at mood following manipulations
of comparison direction, closeness, and self-relevance, as a test
of the SEM model. In Study 2, they found that participants ex-
posed to a better-off friend experienced more positive affect
than those exposed to a friend with ability equal to their own.
When the same information was obtained in regard to a
stranger, this difference disappeared; upward and lateral com-
parison had similar effects on mood. These results were ob-
tained under low self-relevance conditions and thus conform
to the predictions of SEM (Tesser, 1988). In Study 3, upward
comparison to a friend again produced more positive reactions
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than downward comparison when self-relevance was low. The
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same conditions produced the reverse pattern when relevance
was high. That is, upward comparison had a more negative
effect than downward under these conditions. This, too, is con-
sistent with SEM. The only result that was an exception to
the predictions of Tesser's model was an interaction with
self-esteem. This interaction indicated that under high self-
relevance conditions, people low in self-esteem experienced a
more positive reaction to upward comparison with a stranger
than to downward comparison with such.
Salovey and Rodin (1984) also conducted an SEM-based
study of mood. Participants in their upward comparison, high
self-relevance, and high closeness condition experienced more
negative mood than those in the study's other seven cells, ac-
cording to a planned contrast and consistent with SEM predic-
tions. The authors did not predict any other effects. However,
the other cells (which involved varying numbers of upward,
downward, and lateral comparisons on high and low relevance
dimensions) are pertinent to a consideration of the more gen-
eral effects of comparing in different directions. Tukey tests re-
vealed no differences in mood across any of the conditions.
Testa and Major (1990) manipulated participants' beliefs
that they could control their standing on a dimension of com-
parison, as well as whether the target was upward or downward.
They found that when participants could not control their
standing on the comparison dimension, the effects of upward
comparison were negative relative to downward. In contrast,
upward and downward comparisons produced the same effect
on mood under controllable conditions.
Finally, a recent study by Major et al. (1993) examined the
impact of group status (in-group versus out-group) on compar-
ison effects. Participants were exposed to three targets, all either
superior or inferior to themselves. Some participants believed
that they shared group membership with these targets; others
believed that the targets were out-group members. Depressive
affect was highest among those encountering in-group-upward
comparisons. Out-group-upward comparisons had the same
effect on mood as downward comparison with either group.
Thus, there have been four studies comparing the effects of
upward, downward, and lateral comparison showing conditions
under which upward comparison is debilitating, relative to
other comparison directions. Five studies (mostly the same
ones) found upward comparison effects that were no different
from downward comparison. Finally, four studies found that
upward comparison effects were sometimes more positive than
57
those of downward comparison, and two more were suggestive
of this. These data imply that the effects of upward comparison
and downward comparison are not particularly different. In
many instances, the two directions of comparison had the same
effect on mood. When this was not the case, differences in both
directions occurred. However, it is difficult to make inferences
about what is typical from laboratory studies. The positive
effects of upward comparison may be overrepresented in the
experimental literature because of a desire among a few re-
searchers to document that they can occur at all. Fortunately, a
number of field studies have also investigated the relation be-
tween upward comparison and mood and may provide more
representative frequency information.
Wheeler and Miyake (1992) looked at comparison effects in an
article aptly titled "Social Comparison in Everyday Life." Using a
diary methodology, they asked students to record their spontane-
ous social comparisons and their reactions to them on a daily basis
for 2 weeks. Students rated each target relative to the self, on a 7-
point scale labeled with inferior/poor/undesirable, similar/about
the same, or superior/better/desirable (at the ends and
midpoint). Responses other than the midpoint were analyzed as
upward and downward comparisons, as appropriate, and the mid-
point was treated as a lateral comparison. Students reported that
upward comparison resulted in negative mood change—that it
was "depressing" and "discouraging." Thus, perceptions of inferi-
ority led to negative mood.10
Other field studies have used very different samples from the
college student participants in Wheeler and Miyake (1992) and
most of the laboratory studies. Buunk et al. (1990) asked mar-
ried couples (Study 2) and people with cancer (Study 1) how
often they felt better and how often they felt worse after upward
comparison. Both groups reported that upward comparison
could make them feel badly. However, they described feeling
good in response to upward comparison more often. Hemphill
and Lehman (1991) replicated this finding using a sample of
persons with multiple sclerosis. Similarly, cancer patients par-
ticipating in a survey conducted by Molleman, Pruyn, and van
Knippenberg (1986) indicated that interactions with healthier
cancer patients made them feel better than contact with worse-
off others. All of these studies are vulnerable to reinterpretation,
given that participants defined others as better or worse than
themselves as part of the measure, just as Wheeler and Miyake's
students did. In addition, they relied on retrospective self-
reports of mood change. Thus, they may reflect participants'
theories about how comparison should affect them, rather than
how comparison did affect them (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Likewise, results could have stemmed from self-presentational
factors like social desirability.
A study by van den Borne, Pruyn, and van den Heuvel (1987)
avoided these problems, although an interpretation of its results
10
Interestingly, from the perspective of a construal model, affective
responses were positive to persons perceived as similar. Objectively,
these persons may have constituted lateral, upward, or even downward
comparisons. However, the positivity of the response suggests that they
might have been upward targets because it is difficult to see how per-
ceiving one's abilities as common would be uplifting. Of course, this
interpretation is extremely speculative.
 58 COLLINS
requires the reader to draw some inferences. The investigation
examined participants in cancer support groups, using a longi-
tudinal research strategy. Group participation led to decreases
in anxiety, depression, and other psychological complaints. In
regard to the comparison issue, it was found that mood im-
proved most among those who were most ill—the people likely
to have encountered upward comparisons in their groups. Of
course, it may also be that contact with others provides social
support and that this support is most effective in helping very ill
persons. Thus, the results obtained are not necessarily due to
comparison processes, but they are suggestive.
Finally, note that chronic self-esteem was measured in three
of these field studies with similar effect. Wheeler and Miyake
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(1992) found that when high self-esteem participants made up-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ward comparisons, they responded to them less negatively than
did persons low in self-esteem. Buunk et al. (1990) found that
cancer patients with high and low self-esteem reported positive
responses to upward comparison equally often. However, high
self-esteem participants indicated that upward comparison
made them feel badly less often than persons with low self-
esteem reported this effect (identical to the Wheeler & Miyake
finding). HemphiU's (1989; see Hemphill & Lehman, 1991)
replication documented the same pattern of response in
multiple sclerosis patients.
Thus, field investigations that looked at social comparison as
a regular occurrence, rather than an isolated experience, and
used highly important dimensions of comparison, an array of
methods, and diverse samples suggest that upward comparison
can hurt, something not clearly documented in the laboratory
studies. However, upward comparison more typically resulted
in positive feelings. The field studies also replicated the finding
that persons with high, chronic self-esteem are least likely to
experience negative effects as a result of upward comparison. In
nearly all of these field studies, the responses documented may
be the result of self-report biases. However, their results in terms
of mood enhancement converge fairly well with the experimen-
tal data, suggesting otherwise.
To summarize the mood evidence, it is clear that upward
comparison can improve mood and often does so. In studies
using relatively rigorous methodological controls, upward com-
parison had only a positive impact. In studies comparing the
effects of upward comparison versus comparisons with down-
ward or lateral targets, mood was often more positive in the
upward comparison cell than in the others. There were also
many cases in which each type of comparison had equivalent
effects. Finally, a number of field studies showed upward com-
parison to be mood improving, at least sometimes. A consistent
moderator of these effects was self-esteem. Persons high in self-
esteem responded to upward comparison with more favorable
moods than did persons with low self-esteem. The evidence
linking upward comparison to depressive affect is less clear. In
many instances, upward comparison produced a negative
mood, relative to downward comparison. In three field studies,
upward comparison was also reported by participants to make
them feel badly. Thus, negative effects may exist, but if they do,
they appear to be less robust than positive ones.
As a whole, these results are consistent with a model assum-
ing both assimilation and contrast effects in the construal of
upward comparisons. Although positive effects predominate,
they are probably not wholly attributable to assimilation pro-
cesses. Rather, they may sometimes occur in the context of con-
trast. Perceived control and self-relevance influenced the effect
of comparison in some studies, and these factors are more likely
to evoke reflection or optimism than assimilation processes.
Moreover, feelings of inspiration and hope may account for
some of the positive changes in mood. People can evaluate
themselves negatively but feel good because they have obtained
useful information. It is striking, nonetheless, that upward com-
parison did not always, or arguably ever, produce negative
changes in mood. As noted at the outset of this section, many
theorists would not have predicted this.
Self-Evaluation Effects
Because mood is vulnerable to change through processes
other than assimilation and contrast, it is important to also con-
sider the direct effects of upward comparison on self-percep-
tions. A smaller body of evidence has tested such outcomes. In
one study, Cash, Cash, and Butters (1983) exposed female col-
lege students to photos of attractive or unattractive women. The
results revealed an apparent contrast effect: Those in the attrac-
tive photo condition rated their own looks more negatively than
persons who viewed unattractive photos. Brown et al. (1992)
also looked at comparison effects involving physical attractive-
ness. In their first study, Brown et al. replicated the attractive
and unattractive photo conditions of Cash et al.'s study but
added a control group—women who viewed pictures of men.
These photos should not have affected self-perceptions because
men do not provide a comparison group appropriate to women
on the attractiveness dimension (see Miller, 1984). When such
a control was added to Cash et al.'s design, Brown et al. found
that contrast effects were actually weak. Self-perceptions were
only marginally more negative in the upward comparison con-
dition than in the control.
Brown et al. (1992) conducted three other studies of compar-
ison processes and physical attractiveness. In these, they intro-
duced the model reviewed earlier, attempting to induce assimi-
lation with a manipulation of psychological closeness. In Study
2, closeness was induced by telling some participants that they
had similar attitudes to the target's in regard to a variety of is-
sues. A weak assimilation effect was obtained, in pattern. That
is, upward comparison produced lower attractiveness ratings
than downward when the target was not close, but the two com-
parison directions had a similar effect when the target and com-
parer were purportedly similar in their beliefs.
Brown et al.'s (1992) Study 3 supplies better evidence regard-
ing assimilation and contrast because it includes a pre-post
measure of self-evaluated attractiveness. In this experiment,
closeness was manipulated by telling some participants that
they shared a birthday with the target in the photos, whereas the
remaining participants thought their birth date was different
from the target's. This use of a rare attribute created a stronger
version of closeness than attitude similarity. In the birthday-
matched condition, attractiveness ratings increased in response
to upward comparison. In the birthday-unmatched condition,
self-evaluations showed no change in response to upward com-
 UPWARD SOCIAL COMPARISON
parison. This effect was replicated in Study 4 among persons
low in chronic self-esteem (Brown et al., 1992). Among high
self-esteem individuals, upward comparison had no effect, re-
gardless of birthday condition. In summary, Brown et al. found
evidence that upward comparison can enhance self-perceptions
when targets and comparers share some unusual attribute.
However, they found little evidence of contrast. The only nega-
tive effect of upward comparison was the marginally significant
pattern in Study 1.
A more recent set of similar studies (Thornton & Moore,
1993) obtained very different results, however. Again, reactions
to attractive and unattractive photos were examined, this time
without a manipulation designed to produce assimilation.
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Three studies—each including both an upward comparison, at-
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tractive photo condition, and a control no-photo condition—
were conducted. In all of them, self-rated attractiveness was
lowered by upward comparison, relative to the control groups.
Why the difference between these results and those of Brown
et al. (1992)? First, Thornton and Moore (1993) used what was
probably a more sensitive measure of self-rated attractiveness—
a 5-item as opposed to a 1-item scale. Thus, they may have
picked up a subtle change in self-evaluations that Brown et al.
missed. Second, Thornton and Moore's photos were of slightly
more attractive people than those used in Brown et al.'s re-
search. Both studies' stimuli were rated by independent samples
on a 7-point scale. Thornton and Moore reported average judg-
ments from a half to a full point higher (more attractive) than
Brown et al. did. Contrast might be more likely when reaching
the target's status would involve climbing a mountain rather
than a molehill. Thus, when viewed in conjunction, the Thorn-
ton and Moore and the Brown et al. studies indicate that assim-
ilation can occur under shared distinctiveness conditions, but
without them a large difference between comparers and targets
leads to contrast effects.
Another recent investigation also found assimilation effects
based on a shared distinctiveness manipulation of closeness
(Brewer & Weber, 1994). In this research, comparison infor-
mation was supplied to students through a videotape of another
student, who was portrayed as either more or less academically
competent than participating students. A minimal group pro-
cedure was used to create social groups. Some students were
informed that they shared group membership with the compar-
ison target, whereas others were told that the target was part of
an out-group. In addition, half of the participants were led to
believe that members of their group were in the minority. As
noted earlier, it was expected that shared membership in a dis-
tinctive (minority) group would produce closeness and there-
fore assimilation, whereas joint membership in a majority
group would lead to more mundane perceptions of similarity,
merely making the target a relevant person with whom to
compare.
Confirming this, upward comparison led to more positive
self-evaluations than downward comparison when members of
minority groups compared themselves with other in-group
members. When these same students compared themselves
with an out-group-majority target, downward comparison pro-
duced more positive self-perceptions than upward. Downward
comparisons were also more self-enhancing than upward when
59
majority group members made in-group comparisons. Finally,
out-group comparisons by majority group members (with
those in the minority) produced no effects (i.e., self-ratings
were equal in upward and downward conditions). Apparently,
these targets were not seen as relevant comparisons by partici-
pants, as had been predicted.
In a second study, participants always made upward, in-
group-minority comparisons, those that produced assimilation
in Study 1. However, these were paired with either a second
comparison of the same type, a downward comparison with
someone from an out-group majority, or an upward compari-
son with an out-group-majority member. The point of this ma-
nipulation was to vary the association of target status with the
shared uniqueness attribute in participants' minds. That is, ac-
ademic competence was associated with the in-group, uniquely
associated with the in-group, or unrelated to group member-
ship in the three conditions, respectively. It was found that par-
ticipants in the last condition, dissociating competence and
group membership, rated their own academic competence less
positively than participants in the other two conditions, again
suggesting upward assimilation among minority group
members.
Although Brewer and Weber (1994) did not include a control
group, they did provide readers with the average self-rating of
academic competence in the population from which their sam-
ple was drawn (the same measure was used as a dependent
variable). An eyeball comparison of this figure with those re-
ported by each comparison group suggests that upward com-
parison with in-group-minority members increased self-evalu-
ations in all conditions of both studies, except in the final case
where out-group members were shown to be as competent as
persons in the in-group minority. It also appears that upward
comparisons to an out-group majority consistently led to dec-
rements in self-evaluations. Thus, when comparers and targets
shared a distinctive attribute, upward comparisons increased
self-evaluations. When this was not the case, upward compari-
son lowered self-evaluations.
Other data concerning upward comparison effects on self-
evaluations is provided by some of the investigations described
earlier in the section on mood. Recall that Major et al. (1993)
also examined reactions to in-group and out-group compari-
sons. Participants exposed to three upward comparisons,
whether they were in-group or out-group, reported lower levels
of perceived performance than those exposed to three down-
ward comparisons. In addition, upward comparison with the
in-group produced lower self-evaluations than upward compar-
ison with out-group members. In the Aspinwall and Taylor
(1993) studies, students exposed to information about other
students' adjustment to college life rated their own adjustment.
In Study 1, self-evaluations were more positive among those ex-
posed to upward comparison information, relative to down-
ward, unless participants were experiencing threat (a recent set-
back in school). In that case, downward comparison effects
were more positive than upward. In Study 2, upward compari-
son had no effect relative to a no-comparison control group (see
Footnote 7). Gibbons and Gerrard (1989) also found no
change in self-evaluation following comparison with a student
more well-adjusted than oneself.
 60 COLLINS
One final laboratory study looked at the effect of upward
comparison on self-evaluations. Swallow and Kuiper (1992)
used methods quite different from the others reviewed thus far.
Participants were given a test and asked to estimate their perfor-
mance level. Following this, they were allowed to obtain the test
scores of up to 50 other persons and learn whether these scores
were higher or lower than their own (the scores shown to partic-
ipants were randomly selected from those of previous partici-
pants, and the participants' scores remained undisclosed). At
the conclusion of this comparison activity, participants again
estimated what their performance had been. To examine the
effect of upward comparison on self-perceptions, the authors
used the number of upward comparisons that participants
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viewed to predict postcomparison ability assessments, control-
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ling for precomparison ratings. They found that participants
exposed to a greater number of upward comparisons reported
less ability than did participants who viewed relatively few
scores higher than their own.
Only one field study has looked at changes in self-evaluations
on the comparison dimension in response to better-off others.
In this investigation, Marsh and Parker (1984) compared the
self-rated academic competence of students attending a high-
achieving school with those of students in a school where aver-
age competence was lower. Controlling for each student's actual
ability, they found that those in the low-achieving school saw
themselves more positively. It is impossible to know whether
this effect was due to the greater availability of downward com-
parisons in one school or to the higher number of upward com-
parisons in the other. However, it clearly indicates a contrast
effect in one direction or both.
In summary, three studies by Thornton and Moore (1993) and
one by Swallow and Kuiper (1992) show negative changes in self-
evaluations as a result of upward comparison, relative to a base-
line. Brewer and Weber (1994) also (apparently) obtained such
effects. Three of Brown et al.'s (1992) experiments used baselines
but produced only one negative effect, which was marginally sig-
nificant. Gibbons and Gerrard (1989) and Aspinwall and Taylor
(1993, Study 2) also failed to demonstrate negative change in
self-perceptions following upward comparison. Among studies
looking at the relative effects of upward and downward compari-
son, four investigations showed that upward comparison had the
more negative effect; studies demonstrating that the effects of up-
ward comparison are equivalent to those of downward compari-
son were equally common. One study found that upward com-
parison could have a more positive effect than downward
(Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993, Study 1). Finally, both Brown et al.
and (apparently) Brewer and Weber demonstrated conditions
under which upward comparison is self-enhancing. Shared dis-
tinctiveness between the comparer and target was responsible for
these effects. Thus, positive effects of upward comparison on self-
evaluations are less common than they are on mood, as would
be expected. Nonetheless, effects in both positive and negative
directions were documented on this dimension.
Effects on Self-Esteem
Global self-evaluations are fairly stable. However, there is
clear evidence that fluctuations in self-esteem occur over time
and across situations (e.g., Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Thus,
an additional test of upward comparison's impact on self-worth
would be to examine its effect on a global measure of self-
esteem. A handful of the social comparison studies reviewed
above have done so.
One of these was the longitudinal study of support group par-
ticipants (van den Borne et al., 1987). In addition to the mood
improvement previously noted, this study found that the self-
esteem of people who attended cancer support groups improved
over time, especially that of the participants who were most ill.
This positive change in self-worth may have resulted from
exposure to upward social comparisons as part of participation
in the groups.
There is also some experimental evidence of the effect of up-
ward comparison on self-esteem. Brown et al. (1992) measured
self-esteem as an outcome variable in the final study of their
report (Study 4). They used the Texas Social Behavior Inven-
tory (TSBI) to do so, a scale usually used to measure trait self-
esteem (Helmreich & Stapp, 1974). Findings revealed that par-
ticipants in the shared distinctiveness (birthday matched) con-
dition experienced an increase in global self-esteem following
upward comparison. Recall that this is the group who showed
positive change in their self-rated attractiveness as well. In con-
trast, those who were not matched to the target using birth date
showed no changes in self-esteem as a result of upward compar-
ison. Thus, changes in global self-worth paralleled those for
more specific self-evaluations.
Thornton and Moore (1993) used the TSBI to test the effects
of upward comparison in two of their three studies. Scores on
this scale went down following exposure to attractive photos. In
the third study (actually Study 1), the authors used a different
measure of self-esteem, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory
(Rosenberg, 1965). Scores on this scale were unaltered by up-
ward comparison. Salovey and Rodin (1984) used the Rosen-
berg scale in their study (which involved an achievement
situation) and also found that scores were unaffected by com-
parison. The Rosenberg is a more global measure than the TSBI
(which measures social self-esteem), and these null findings
might indicate that social comparison does not have a broad
impact on self-worth (an explanation proffered by Thornton &
Moore). However, the Rosenberg was used in the Mr. Clean
study described earlier, and a negative effect of upward compar-
ison on self-esteem was obtained (Morse & Gergen, 1970).
Finally, Major et al. (1993) looked at the relative effects of
upward and downward comparison on two broad measures of
self-esteem: the Self-Valuation Triads (SVT) test (Gergen,
1962) and the Janis-Field (Janis & Field, 1959). Upward com-
parison with three in-group members led to lower scores on the
SVT than did upward comparison with three out-group mem-
bers, but neither result was different from that produced in per-
sons exposed to downward comparison (in-group or out-
group). Results using the Janis-Field were clearer and were ad-
justed for precomparison self-esteem. They showed that the
highest levels of self-esteem were produced by upward-out-
group comparison, whereas upward comparison with the in-
group had the same effects as downward comparison (again,
either with in-group or out-group members).
In summary, two investigations have documented increases in
 UPWARD SOCIAL COMPARISON
self-esteem among persons exposed to upward comparison, two
have shown just the opposite, and three have found no effect. A
final study suggests that upward comparison has effects much
like those of downward comparison and sometimes produces
more positive changes than downward comparison. This evi-
dence is inconclusive given the few studies published thus far.
However, note that the two investigations showing increased self-
esteem may both have involved shared distinctiveness. In the
study by Brown et al. (1992), this was certainly the case. In that
reported by van den Borne et al. (1987), it might be argued that
being part of a support group of cancer patients makes one a
member of a distinct minority. The reduction of a perception of
deviance by learning that one is not alone is, in fact, one hypoth-
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esized function of such groups (Coates & Winston, 1983).
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Summary
The data reviewed so far support the notion that upward
comparison can be both self-enhancing and self-deflating. Spe-
cific self-appraisals and especially mood were frequently im-
proved by exposure to better-off others. Even global self-esteem
showed evidence of an increase. However, self-evaluations and
self-esteem were also frequently lowered by upward compari-
son. Clearly, the effect of social comparison on self-evaluation is
not intrinsic to its direction. Several factors played a role in the
effects reviewed, but the two that most clearly moderated the
impact of upward comparison were chronic self-esteem and
shared distinctiveness. Persons high in self-esteem or who
shared a distinctive attribute with the target were more likely to
react positively to upward comparison. Before discussing how
these variables might operate, a review of one final body of evi-
dence, separate from that reviewed above, is relevant. It also
suggests a factor influencing the assimilation process: the direc-
tion of comparison. Assimilation appears to be more likely in
the case of upward comparison than downward. These studies
used dependent measures other than self-evaluation or its cor-
relates and thus do not bear directly on the issue of comparison
effects. They do, however, bear on the assimilation process itself,
and what elicits it.
Upward Versus Downward Assimilation
Recall the study by De Vein's et al. (1991) described early in
this review. Persons with rheumatoid arthritis separately rated
themselves and a videotaped target (with arthritis) in terms of
both coping and health, and then made a direct rating of the
target relative to themselves. It was noted earlier that partici-
pants rated the target as more similar to themselves on the rela-
tive measure than the combined separate ratings would have
suggested. There was also an asymmetry to this effect. Partici-
pants always felt superior to downward comparison targets,
whether separate ratings or direct comparisons were made. The
indexes differed from each other in the degree of difference they
showed but not in the direction of this difference. However,
study participants rated themselves as inferior to the upward
target only on the separate scales. When making a direct com-
parison, participants reported themselves to be slightly better
than this target.
61
Another compelling demonstration of asymmetry is pro-
vided by Schwartz and Smith (1976). These researchers asked
participants to view, sequentially, the scores received by them-
selves and another individual on a set of tasks. Participants were
asked to decide whether their own abilities or those of the other
person were superior. The paired scores differed in only one di-
rection within subjects (self was consistently better or target was
consistently better), although the magnitude of differences var-
ied with each pair of scores. Participants were to view a mini-
mum of five score pairs, and then they could either terminate
their viewing or continue until they felt able to make a judgment
regarding whose abilities were superior. The results showed that
participants took more trials to determine that they were infe-
rior to the target than they did to infer their own superiority,
and they were also less confident of inferiority judgments.
Other investigators have found less direct but nonetheless
suggestive evidence that upward comparisons are more vulner-
able to assimilation than downward comparisons. Miyake and
Zuckerman (1993) exposed participants to targets that varied
in their vocal and physical attractiveness and asked them to rate
both their own and the targets' personalities on several dimen-
sions. Participants also directly rated their similarity to the
target. Analysis of the separate personality ratings suggested
that comparers saw themselves as more similar to targets high in
attractiveness than low, although this effect was not consistently
obtained across various statistical tests. More straightforward
results were obtained with the direct comparison measure. In
this case, participants clearly indicated that they were more
similar to targets who were high in both physical and vocal at-
tractiveness, relative to low-attractiveness targets. Although it is
unknown whether the targets in this study were more attractive
or less attractive than comparers (and thus that the targets con-
stituted upward or downward rather than lateral comparisons),
the difference in reactions to the two target types is suggestive of
asymmetrical assimilation.
A footnote in Aspinwall and Taylor's (1993) investigation of
social comparison and perceptions of academic competence is
also relevant:
The upward comparison target was highly successful in that she
had a 3.7 GPA [grade point average] and many friends. Pretesting
demonstrated that reducing the GPA of the upward comparison
target produced higher realism ratings; however, doing so compro-
mised the "upwardness" of the manipulation in that students no
longer rated the target as better off than themselves, (p. 711)
This intriguing bit of information suggests that people see up-
ward targets as similar to themselves; so much so in this case
that they found it implausible that anyone should be more than
negligibly superior to them in academic performance.
Assimilation, Contrast, and Construal
These studies indicate that assimilative construal is particu-
larly characteristic of upward comparison. The question of why
this is so and why chronic self-esteem and shared distinctiveness
might play a role in the same process remains to be addressed.
Manis (e.g., Manis, Biernat, & Nelson, 1991; Manis & Paskew-
itz, 1984) has presented a fascinating theory that may be useful
 62 COLLINS
in this regard. His work involves judgments of others, not the
self, but the basic processes he has identified should generalize
to self-other comparisons. Manis has found that, in fact, assim-
ilation and contrast processes are not mutually exclusive but
instead operate simultaneously in influencing social judgments.
For example, in one set of studies (Manis et al., 1991), partici-
pants made judgments about the height of a series of targets. An
induction phase preceded these judgments and provided what
Manis et al. described as "prior experience." This induction
consisted of either tall or short targets and was expected to pro-
vide a basis for both contrast effects (by anchoring judgments)
and assimilation effects (by leading participants to expect other
similar targets and thus altering their perceptions to ftt these
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expectations). Results supported both predictions. When con-
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trast effects were statistically controlled in a path analytic
model, the respondents presented with a tall induction series
expected taller targets and perceived targets to be taller than did
persons given a short induction. Likewise, contrast effects led to
perceptions opposite to the inductions (i.e., tall inductions led
to short perceptions) when expectancies, and thus assimilation,
were statistically controlled. The net effect in Manis et al. (1991;
i.e., when results were analyzed as a simple analysis of a vari-
ance model with induction as the grouping variable) was con-
trast. However, there is no reason to assume, given the processes
are separate, that assimilation will not outweigh contrast in
other circumstances. For this to be the case, the effects of expec-
tancy processes must surpass those of anchoring.
Applying the Manis (Manis et al., 1991; Manis & Paskewitz,
1984) model to the case of social comparison is fairly straight-
forward. People's assumptions about their own abilities should
produce'a set, a baseline stemming from prior experience,
much as Manis's induction series produced a tall or short set.
Because assimilation processes are driven by the expectation
that future instances will be like prior experiences, the more the
comparer expects the self to be similar to the target, the more
likely it is that he or she will assimilate to the target's status.
Because people expect to be more similar to upward than to
downward targets (Wheeler, 1966), this may explain why up-
ward comparison is more affected by assimilation processes.
The differential expectations evoked by high self-esteem and
shared distinctiveness may also explain their influence on up-
ward comparison effects. Persons with positive self-concepts are
much more likely to expect to be like those labeled superior to
them than are low self-esteem individuals. Likewise, knowing
that one shares a distinctive attribute with someone else may lead
to the expectation that other attributes, such as high levels of
ability, will also be shared. In summary, people may expect some
similarity to any comparison target who is within their own range
of ability, leading to some amount of assimilation in all or most
comparison judgments. In many cases, this effect may be out-
weighed by contrast processes. However, whenever situational or
dispositional factors (e.g., direction of comparison, self-esteem,
and shared distinctiveness) strengthen the expectation of sim-
ilarity, assimilation may have the stronger effect.
Construal Versus Other Models
One final question regarding the construal process remains:
Is this model of the effects of comparison in any way superior to
those that already exist in the literature? All of the data that
have been reviewed can be accounted for by a combination of
the theories proffered by Brewer and Weber (1994), Brown et
al. (1992), Tesser (1988), and Taylor and Lobel (1989). How-
ever, each model on its own encounters many "anomalous"
findings. Brewer and Weber did not predict that self-esteem
should influence comparison reactions. Moreover, the motiva-
tion they identified as the source of assimilation and contrast,
optimal distinctiveness, is unlikely to play a role outside the
context of social groups. Tesser's SEM model can, with some
extrapolation, account for both self-esteem and distinctiveness
effects. It does not, however, account for assimilative changes in
specific self-evaluations or on self-relevant dimensions, both of
which occur.'' Taylor and Lobel's theory accounts only for pos-
itive changes in mood, predicting that upward comparison
should have neutral effects on self-evaluations. Finally, Brown
et al.'s predictions are not entirely clear but seem to suggest ei-
ther that upward comparison should have negative effects when-
ever shared distinctiveness is absent, or perhaps that upward
comparison has no effect under such conditions.
The present model is a broader one than any of these, speci-
fying an underlying perceptual process that can be applied to
multiple situations and outcome variables (including specific
self-evaluations) and thus account for more of the existing evi-
dence concerning comparison effects than the others. It also ex-
plains a separate set of data concerning similarity judgments
(e.g., Schwartz & Smith, 1976), uniting these bodies of evi-
dence in a cohesive whole. Note that the construal model is not
meant to supplant those of previous researchers. Self-enhance-
ment, optimal distinctiveness, and reflection may also influence
reactions to better-off others. In particular, there is a large liter-
ature supporting SEM and reflection apart from the tests of its
effects on mood that were reviewed above (see Tesser, 1988). In
fact, it may be the case that the motives and conditions noted
by other authors are instigators of the basic, perceptual-level
assimilation process proposed herein. Self-enhancement and
optimal distinctiveness could conceivably create a motivated ex-
pectation of similarity to comparison targets that plays out in
assimilation and contrast perceptions. Whether upward assimi-
lation is motivated or purely cognitive will be an important is-
sue to address in future work.
Because the applicability of the proposed process is so
broad, it is important to point out that it is disconfirmable.
Whether a construal model is ultimately able to stand on its
own will depend on the results of empirical research that di-
rectly measures perceptions of similarity, expectations of sim-
ilarity, and comparison effects in combination. Moreover, note
that the model cannot account for all positive effects of upward
comparison that might be observed. If the conditions eliciting
'' Although self-relevance was not manipulated in many of the stud-
ies showing positive responses to upward comparison, they examined
comparison dimensions such as academic competence, adjustment to
college, and physical attractiveness. It seems implausible that these
characteristics have low relevance to college students. Moreover, Brewer
and Weber (1994) had students rate the personal importance of their
comparison dimension (academic competence). The average rating was
6.26 on a 7-point scale.
 UPWARD SOCIAL COMPARISON
such effects are unlikely to have evoked similarity expectations
(e.g., comparison on controllable vs. uncontrollable dimen-
sions; Testa & Major, 1990), assimilation is not a viable expla-
nation for their result.
Downward Comparison Theory
This article focused on upward comparison and its self-eval-
uative effects in an attempt to address a contradiction in the
contemporary literature: People are usually self-enhancing in
their information seeking, and yet they often engage in upward
social comparisons, comparisons thought to be ego deflating.
The resolution that has been offered is that people make upward
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comparisons not only to self-evaluate and self-improve but also
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because they hope that these comparisons will help them self-
enhance. Readers familiar with downward comparison theory
and its supporting evidence may balk at this suggestion. In an
article responsible for generating most of the contemporary in-
terest in social comparison, Wills (1981) proposed that when
people most need to self-enhance (i.e., when they are
threatened), they change their comparison preferences from
upward to downward. Downward comparisons, Wills hypothe-
sized, assist people in increasing their level of subjective well-
being. Which theory is correct?
First, note that Wills's (1981) theory is not, in principle, in
conflict with the present one. People may use both upward and
downward comparisons to self-enhance. Both being among the
better people and not being among the worse ones might in-
crease happiness and self-worth. People might use upward com-
parison to self-enhance when they are not threatened and use
downward comparison to self-enhance when they are threat-
ened. After all, using upward comparison to increase self-worth
apparently depends on believing one is similar to the better-off
target, and threat could undermine such beliefs. Some (Wheeler
& Miyake, 1992; Wood & Taylor, 1991), however, have recently
questioned whether the target preference predictions of down-
ward comparison theory have, in fact, been empirically sup-
ported. Do people prefer downward comparison over upward
when threatened? If not, then this article is consistent with the
downward comparison data, even without making an exception
for conditions of threat.
Target Preferences
Several methods have been used to test the hypothesis that
threat leads to downward comparison. A set of rank-order stud-
ies is the evidence most frequently cited as supporting it. The
first to conduct such a study was Hakmiller (1966). In this ex-
periment, participants were told that they had taken a test of
"hostility toward one's parents" and received a fairly high score.
Nearly all participants (95%) made downward comparisons.
However, those who were told it was a negative characteristic,
and thus felt most threatened, made more comparisons to the
worst scorer than those told it was a positive trait (indicating
maturity and responsibility). Friend and Gilbert (1973) also
obtained a preference for downward comparison over upward.
They gave groups of participants who were high or low in fear
of negative evaluation (a trait strongly and inversely correlated
63
with self-esteem) negative or positive feedback on a comparison
dimension. Sixty percent of the participants who were doubly
threatened, that is, were both under threat and dispositionally
afraid of negative evaluation, made downward comparisons.
The other three groups made mostly upward comparisons.
Thornton and Arrowood (1966) also found that 60% of par-
ticipants who were told they had a negative trait (neurotic
conflict) compared themselves with worse-off others. However,
they interpreted this as equal interest in upward comparison
and downward comparison (a conclusion that was supported
by several additional measures and analyses). Moreover, they
argued that participants compared downward to self-evaluate,
not self-enhance. That is, they proposed that participants were
seeking information about neurotic conflict by examining a
positive instance of the attribute. This explanation might be ap-
plied to Hakmiller's (1966) study as well.
These are the only rank-order studies to show a preference
for downward comparison over upward, and Hakmiller's
(1966) was the only study to demonstrate this preference very
clearly. Notably, Hakmiller also found little interest in upward
comparison, even under low-threat conditions. This lends sup-
port to Thornton and Arrowood's (1966) "positive instance"
reinterpretation.
The remaining rank-order studies show a change in partici-
pants' target preferences when under threat but not a preference
for downward comparison. The target selected is usually closer
in rank to the comparer and thus less upward under threatening
rather than nonthreatening conditions, but the modal choice is
still one who is better off. Most of these studies manipulated
threat by involving participants in public comparisons, when
the comparer must reveal his or her own standing to learn that
of the target. Wilson and Benner (1971) found that partici-
pants' target selections were altered by the combination of a
public comparison and low chronic self-esteem. The effect,
however, was limited to male participants, and the study had
a methodological problem (the manipulation of publicity was
confounded with competition). However, a replication elimi-
nating this confound (Smith & Insko, 1987) clearly docu-
mented a shift in comparison target preferences when compar-
ison was public rather than private. As part of a recent set of
studies, Collins and Di Paula (1994, Study 1) also conducted a
replication, making a change to Smith and Insko's procedures
that allowed participants to opt out of comparison entirely if
they so desired, rather than selecting a target. This allowed
avoidance of upward comparison to be distinguished from a
desire for downward comparison. However, threat had no effect
on the decision to compare; nearly all participants did so. As in
other studies, target preferences were overwhelmingly upward,
but they were less upward when negative feedback was com-
bined with public comparison. Finally, in a departure from the
rank-order procedure, Nosanchuk and Erickson (1985) varied
threat across the scenarios they described to their bridge play-
ers. They found that comparison was less upward when en-
hancement-related motives were high, but again choices re-
mained reliably upward in direction. Together, these studies
show that upward comparisons are the modal behavior, even
under threatening circumstances. Nonetheless, some of them
have been taken as evidence of a downward comparison prefer-
 64 COLLINS
ence (e.g., Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Reis et al., 1993;"Wills,
1981,1991; Wood, 1989; Wood & Taylor, 1991).
Some of the studies reviewed above also looked at threat by
examining the comparison choices of persons with chronically
high versus low self-esteem. One might argue that persons low
in self-esteem are chronically threatened and should be hun-
grier for self-enhancement than persons with high self-esteem
(Wills, 1981). Conversely, persons high in self-esteem might be
most likely to self-enhance, as part of a habitual strategy of self-
aggrandizement (Taylor & Brown, 1988). In either case, if self-
enhancement needs alter comparison choices, differences in
target selections should be manifest across the two groups. The
results of the studies conducted to date have been inconsistent.
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Smith and Insko (1987) found that persons high in self-esteem
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made more comparisons to the top-ranked scorer in their rank-
order study than did persons with low self-esteem. The afore-
mentioned results of Friend and Gilbert (1973), using fear of
negative evaluation, suggest that low self-esieem persons might
make downward comparisons under threat.
However, three other reports were mixed. Collins and Di
Paula (1994, Study 1) found no relation between self-esteem
and rank-order selections in their replication of the Smith and
Insko (1987) study. Recall also that Wilson and Benner (1971)
found a relation between low self-esteem and less upward com-
parison, but only among male participants and only under con-
ditions of threat. Among unthreatened female participants, the
self-esteem pattern was reversed. Wheeler and Miyake (1992)
found that the comparisons of high self-esteem individuals were
actually more downward than those of low self-esteem persons
but only on certain comparison dimensions. Moreover, their
measure may reflect chronic differences in high and low self-
esteem individuals' self-perceptions, rather than comparison se-
lections (i.e., high self-esteem individuals rate themselves as
"more better" than others; Campbell, 1986). Thus, the empir-
ical link between comparison direction and self-esteem is in-
consistent, suggesting a (cautious) conclusion that the associa-
tion is null.
In addition to these rank-order studies, target preferences
have been examined by looking at the number of comparisons
people make in each direction (upward and downward), de-
pending on levels of threat. For example, Levine and Green
(1984) gave participants increasingly positive or negative feed-
back on a series of test items. Additional information indicating
that their responses were consistently better or worse than those
of most other participants was used to manipulate expectations
about the content of any further comparisons they might make.
Participants who received threatening feedback made fewer
comparisons when they expected targets to be better than them-
selves than when they expected them to be worse. Technically,
participants did not avoid upward comparison; they compared
on nearly 8 of the 10 opportunities presented. However, threat
decreased the frequency of upward comparison.
Pyszczynski et al. (1985) also found that participants made
more comparisons when they expected to view scores lower
(rather than higher) than their own. Although the effect of a
failure manipulation incorporated in their design was inconsis-
tent, it suggested that this tendency was enhanced following fail-
ure. Twenty-seven percent of the nonthreatened participants re-
quested comparison information when it was likely to consist of
upward targets, and none of the failure participants requested
such information. Finally, Testa and Major (1990) did not ma-
nipulate threat but induced it in all of their participants. They
then exposed them to either five upward or five downward com-
parisons to manipulate their expectations regarding the content
of further comparison information. Following this, participants
were allowed to request additional comparisons. It was found
that those given downward comparisons in the first phase of the
study asked for more additional comparison information than
those initially exposed to upward comparison.
Some cautionary notes should be made in regard to these
three studies. First, their results are somewhat in conflict. Lev-
ine and Green's (1984) participants were clearly interested in
upward comparison, even under threat, whereas Pyszczynski et
al. (1985) found few upward comparisons, regardless of threat.
Although the latter study is often cited as evidence of the avoid-
ance of upward comparison, the fact that the other study's over-
all result conflicts with this is seldom mentioned. Methodologi-
cal issues are also raised by the research. All of the investigators
provided participants with comparisons prior to, or as part of,
the collection of the dependent measure. Together with the de-
pendent variable itself (number of comparisons), this means
that their results speak to the amount of upward versus down-
ward comparison information people desire, more than to pref-
erences regarding the content of information. Perhaps Pysz-
czynski et al.'s participants were satisfied with the five upward
comparisons they had been supplied prior to the phase of the
study in which comparisons were measured, rather than avoid-
ant of upward comparison. Finally, only one study (Levine &
Green, 1984) found a significant threat effect. Thus, the three
studies can be interpreted as showing a preference for a greater
number of downward comparisons than upward (normally)
and as suggesting that this preference might increase with
threat.
Two final behaviors have been used as measures of compari-
son preferences under threat. In rating scale studies, partici-
pants are asked to rate themselves on some dimension, relative
to the average or typical person. It has been found that cancer
patients rate their coping and health as superior to that of other
cancer patients (Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985), and persons
with arthritis and other medical problems do the same (Affleck
& Tennen, 1991). These people are presumable experiencing
high levels of threat as a result of their life experiences and are
making a form of downward comparison. Recall, however, that
professors also rate themselves as superior to other professors,
and indeed most people think they are better drivers than oth-
ers, are better leaders than others, and get along better with oth-
ers than do most people, to name only a few examples (Dunning
et al., 1989). Thus, the downward comparisons demonstrated
in threatened samples may not stem from threat. Indeed, when
Wood et al. (1985) looked for threat effects (operationalized as
prognosis) within their sample, there was no relation between
threat and downward comparison.
However, other studies that have used rating scale compari-
sons and manipulated or measured threat have sometimes
found that people high in self-esteem exaggerate their percep-
tions of superiority to others when they are threatened (Brown,
 UPWARD SOCIAL COMPARISON
Collins, & Schmidt, 1988; Brown & Gallagher, 1992; Crocker,
Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987, Study 2; although cf.
Thompson & Crocker, 1990). Most of these studies looked at
comparisons of one's group or its members with members of
an out-group, so these findings may be specific to intergroup
comparisons, but they are undoubtedly supportive of the con-
cept of downward comparison under threat.
Finally, some studies have looked at the spontaneous refer-
ences to better and worse-off others made by people with major
medical problems (Affleck & Tennen, 1991; Affleck, Tennen,
Pfeiffer, Fifield, & Rowe, 1987; Wood et al., 1985). The over-
whelming majority of these comparative statements have been
shown to involve downward comparison. However, because no
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control group was used in this research, it is difficult to deter-
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mine whether the comparisons would be made even if the indi-
viduals studied were not feeling threatened. Thus, they may re-
flect the general tendency to see oneself as superior to others,
or they may indeed provide evidence of downward comparison
stemming from threat.
In summary, although the studies reviewed above have been
interpreted by some as strong confirmation of Wills's (1981)
prediction that threat produces a preference for downward
comparison, it is clear why others have some doubts. The evi-
dence to date suggests that people normally assume they are
better than others, and they retain or exaggerate this assumption
(respectively) when they are threatened, depending on whether
they are low or high in chronic self-esteem. However, people do
not appear to be interested in learning exactly how much better
they are than others, even when threatened, according to the
rank-order studies. It may be that it is important to people to
know that there are people worse than themselves, but once one
is ahead, it may not matter if the lead is large or small. From a
methodological standpoint, it may be critical that in rank-order
studies comparers are told, prior to comparison, that they out-
rank some people and not others. In such situations, people may
wish to leave well enough (i.e., their superiority to others) alone.
If one appears to be behind, however, there is nothing to lose by
learning if there is a real difference between the self and an up-
ward target and everything to gain. If the difference between self
and target turns out to be large, this confirms what the rank
information already suggested. If the difference is small, this
creates a tie and subjectively moves the comparer up in rank to
the position occupied by the target.
This analysis also fits with the studies looking at the number
of comparisons made under threat (e.g., Levine & Green,
1984). People may wish to establish that a number of persons
are worse than themselves and may avoid learning that many
persons are superior. This would place them, subjectively, in the
position apparently desired—above the midpoint of the distri-
bution of abilities. This preference, of course, should be dem-
onstrated under normal conditions because people generally
wish to be better than average, but it might be exaggerated by
threat. This analysis is also consistent with the patterns of re-
sponse in the rating scale and spontaneous comparison studies.
People may be using these two behaviors to establish their rela-
tive position in the population distribution but may not make
cognitive comparisons to real targets or seek to learn whether
such downward comparison targets exist.
65
This distributional placement effect has implications for the
construal model. It suggests that, in some cases, it may not matter
whether assimilation or contrast processes are stronger during
comparison. Even if people assimilate upward, finding that their
abilities are just like those of many others is not likely to feel
good, no matter how positively they see those other people, be-
cause this will still move them from an ideal spot in the ability
distribution. Ultimately, positive self-regard depends on striking
the proper balance between the number of people who are better
than oneself and the number who are worse (e.g., Marsh & Par-
ker, 1984; Swallow & Kuiper, 1992). I recently overheard a re-
sponse to a store clerk's "How are you?" that exemplifies this
nicely. The customer's response was "better than most, worse
than some." It is easy to see that a reversal of these proportions
would radically alter the customer's message concerning his level
of well-being. Making too many upward comparisons, no matter
how they are construed, should negatively alter one's self-
evaluation.
Comparison Effects
In addition to predicting a preference for downward compar-
ison under threat, Wills's (1981) theory predicts that downward
comparison enhances subjective well-being. Yet, if assimilation
effects occur with downward comparison, then the reverse
could happen—downward comparison could make people feel
bad. There is little evidence that this is the case. As shown ear-
lier, it seems that downward comparison is less vulnerable to
assimilation than upward comparison.
Some of the studies reviewed above, those in which down-
ward comparison effects were more negative relative to upward
comparison, could indicate that downward comparison had a
negative effect on self-evaluations. However, studies looking at
downward comparison relative to a baseline do not corroborate
this interpretation. For example, Gibbons and Gerrard (1989)
looked at downward comparison in their study of adjustment
to college. They found that it had no impact at all on students
high in self-esteem. Those with low self-esteem showed an in-
crease in self-evaluations and more positive mood. Reis et al.
(1993) also obtained an increase in self-esteem among persons
with chronically low self-regard when they were exposed to
downward comparison. Gibbons and McCoy (1991) obtained
positive responses to downward comparison, as well. This time,
the effect was specific to low self-esteem individuals who were
also under threat. Hakmiller (1966) found that downward com-
parison reduced upset in his high-threat participants. Other
studies (e.g., Affleck et al., 1987) have obtained associations
between threatened persons' downward comparisons on rating
scales and their psychological adjustment. Notably, none of
these studies found downward assimilation effects. Self-percep-
tions and mood were enhanced by downward comparison or
were unaffected by it.
There is some support for downward assimilation in the
shared distinctiveness studies. Although Brown et al. (1992)
found that reactions to downward comparison were neutral or
positive, Brewer and Weber (1994) obtained an effect that
might indicate downward assimilation. Finally, some field stud-
ies suggest that people can feel badly in response to worse-off
 66 COLLINS
others (Buunk et al., 1990; Dakof, 1986). However, the latter
effects might be due to worries of becoming like the target,
rather than the belief that one is currently similar to the target
(Gibbons &Gerrard, 1991).
In summary, downward comparison effects appear to be
more consistent than those of upward comparison, and they
appear to be positive. Although downward comparison some-
times makes people feel badly, this may be due to something
other than changes in self-evaluation. Finally, it appears that
the self-enhancing effects of downward comparison most often
occur to people low in self-esteem, those who have been threat-
ened, or both. This not only supports the second prediction of
Wills's (1981) theory, but it also converges with my analysis of
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
his first prediction. People both low in self-esteem and threat-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ened may fear that they "anchor the worse-off endpoint of the
[ability ] continuum" (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993, p. 719). Thus,
they may find the information that someone is worse off reas-
suring, although fail to actively seek this information out of con-
cern that their fears may be confirmed. Other people, however,
probably assume that they are not at the bottom of the ability
heap, even when they have been threatened. For them, exposure
to a worse-off other may have little enhancement value.
Independent of downward comparison theory, the reader
may wonder how the present model would play out under
threatening conditions. There are inadequate published data to
address this question. Only one experimental study, Aspinwall
and Taylor (1993), examined reactions to upward comparison
under threat. As described earlier, persons who had recently ex-
perienced an academic setback responded less positively to up-
ward comparison than downward. However, some of the field
studies reviewed above used threatened samples and obtained
(self-reported) positive responses to upward comparison.
Moreover, recall that people seek information about upward
targets even when under threat. This suggests that they continue
to hope and perhaps expect that they will be similar to these
persons in ability. The downward shift in target choices implies
that these expectations have been dampened but not extin-
guished. When threatened, people may feel confident of their
similarity to a person close in ranking to themselves (and thus
of feeling good after comparison) but not of similarity to the
top-ranked other. Some additional data collected by Collins and
Di Paula (1994) support this.
As reported earlier, Collins and Di Paula (1994) used the
rank-order procedure (Study 1) and found that threatened par-
ticipants selected targets just above themselves in the rank order,
whereas nonthreatened participants chose the highest ranked
other with whom to compare. Participants in these conditions
were also asked, following their choice of targets, to anticipate
the extent to which the upcoming comparison would make
them feel good about their own ability. Their average response
was a rating of 4.25 on a scale of 9, regardless of condition,
that is, regardless of the upwardness of the comparison target.
Another study in the same report (Study 3) asked participants
experiencing threats identical to those in the threat conditions
of Study 1 to make this rating in regard to a forced comparison
with the best-off other. In this case, the average response was
only 3.12, a significantly lower rating, £(259) = 3.03, p < .01.
Although cross-study comparisons are always tenuous, it may
be that participants in Study 1 shifted their target preferences
under threat because the most self-enhancing target had
changed. People may compare with the highest ranked target
whom they believe has a reasonable probability (about a 50%
chance according to the 4.25 rating) of making them feel good.
Normally, this may be the top-ranked performer. When under
threat, however, people may moderate their expectations, recog-
nizing that similarity to a closer ranked target is more probable
and thus more likely to enhance self-image.
Summary
The evidence reviewed herein indicates that upward compar-
ison is not always the ego-deflating experience it has been made
out to be. Part of the basis for its poor reputation may be the
negative effect that upward comparison apparently has on sat-
isfaction (Emmons & Diener, 1985; cf. Fox & Kahneman,
1992) and feelings of deprivation (Crosby, 1976; Martin,
1986). In addition, the times that upward comparison reduces
self-evaluations are probably more salient to people, including
researchers, than instances in which it produces assimilation to
the upward target. Assimilation redefines upward comparisons
as comparisons with similar others. Thus, responding to one's
own inferiority with enhanced self-perceptions is not likely to
be a part of subjective experience.
The idea that upward comparison has benefits has not gone
without proponents. Theorists have previously noted its inspi-
rational qualities and its usefulness in fulfilling motives other
than self-enhancement (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Major et
al., 1991; Taylor & Lobel, 1989) or touted the warm glow pro-
duced by basking in one's association with a superior (Tesser,
1986). However, the fact that upward comparison can and
sometimes does improve people's self-perceptions in a more di-
rect manner has gone almost unnoticed (cf. Brewer & Weber,
1994; Brown et al., 1992). Much discussion in this article fo-
cused on this aspect of construal. This is not a result of the au-
thor's Polyanna disposition, nor is it meant to imply that up-
ward comparison is more typically enhancing than it is deflat-
ing. Ultimately, the frequency with which upward comparison
has positive and negative effects will have to be determined
through the recording of typical experience rather than through
laboratory studies or retrospective reports. Diary methods sim-
ilar to those used by Wheeler and Miyake (1992) may be ex-
tremely useful in this regard. However, such studies will need to
have some way of determining the objective status of compari-
son targets, as Nosanchuk and Erickson's (1985) study of
bridge players did. In summary, I have concentrated, to some
extent, on the positive effects of upward comparison, not to sug-
gest that these effects are typical but rather to document that
they are not atypical.
The reader should by now be convinced that self-evaluative
reactions to comparison are not solely based on their direction.
Instead, the data reviewed above show that comparisons must
be cognitively "digested," actively worked on, and made sense
of. This construal process may be at least one source of upward
comparison's variable effects. Manis's (Manis & Paskewitz,
1984) model was used to illustrate how construal might lead to
both assimilation and contrast, and its predictions fit well with
 UPWARD SOCIAL COMPARISON
the data concerning rhoderator effects. It is possible, of course,
that some other process or processes are responsible for the var-
ious outcomes documented. However, the idea that preexisting
beliefs regarding one's abilities both anchor comparative judg-
ments and also create expectancy based biases in the perception
of comparison targets is a compelling one.
Conclusion
This article began by noting that people want to be better
than others, but they will almost inevitably come into contact
with persons superior to themselves. It was argued that this does
not present a problem for self-esteem maintenance, and that
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
indeed, people frequently seek out upward comparisons. The
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
basis for this is manifold. First, evidence suggests that upward
comparison helps people to achieve and maintain superiority
by serving self-evaluative and self-improvement functions.
However, this alone may not be enough to explain people's in-
terest in upward comparison because they apparently avoid
other forms of useful feedback (Sedikides, 1993). Thus, inter-
est in upward comparison may stem as well from comparers'
beliefs that they are superior to others and thus that upward
comparison will actually serve to minimize or nullify apparent
status differences. The evidence reviewed suggests that upward
comparison will be ego deflating when these expectancies are
weaker than forces promoting contrast, and the comparer is
forced to conclude that he or she is part of an inferior category.
However, comparers are sometimes rewarded for their faith in
themselves and their abilities through the operation of expec-
tancy biases in comparison construal.
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Received March 16,1994
Revision received February 6,1995
Accepted February 8,1995 •