 Hello, everybody, and welcome to the election. It's on global governance and democracy.

0:00
 And I'm going to divide the election into three parts, this time trying to be as disciplined as possible
about the timing.
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 The first section is going to be on some general concepts surrounding democracy, governance and
their relationship to the notion of state sovereignty,
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 and in particular, the way in which state sovereignty might or not have been transformed.
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 Remember last week's discussions by the jemal, by globalization?
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 So I'm going to say something about the processes of democratization first and then something
about the relationship between government,
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 which is perhaps the conventional way in which we approach questions of politics and governance,
particularly global governance.
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 A category that emerged actually quite late in the day,
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 specifically in 1995 on the back of a report commissioned by the United Nations called Our Common
Neighborhood.
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 And the aim of the of the session as a whole is to really start to think a little bit or a great deal,
1:04
 I should say, about the relationship between authority, power and legitimacy.
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 Different expressions of power. All of them which have the state of the center.
1:19
 So I'm going to, in this first section, talk about democratization and governance and how they're
connected, whether we like it or not.
1:24
 This course is shadowed or is defined by what is arguably the most powerful, epochal change of our
lifetimes.
1:35
 I think all of those that are on this course, and that is the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991,
1:44
 and with it the whole project of an alternative modernity, a communist modernity or a noncapital this
modernity like it was really put to an end.
1:52
 To that extent, I think Francis Fukuyama, in a more generous reading, was correct, that there was an
end of history or at least an end of a history.
2:04
 That was the history that pretty much since 1917, if not before then, had pitted one conception of
revolution and liberty,
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 one defined by liberal rights and property rights on the one hand versus another, which emerged or
crystallized in the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.
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 And that is one that focused much more on equality among classes or the overthrow class in equality
and equality among peoples.
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 So the end of the Soviet bloc, for good or real, marks a massive transformation in international
relations.
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 And it opened up, as I think I mentioned last week, the possibilities of a more peaceful,
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 more prosperous global order for liberals who, let's agree, were on the winning side of that Cold
War,
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 in particular, liberals of all stripes, not just Social Democrats, not just liberals proper,
3:06
 but also more conservative oriented defenders of of the freedom of the West won the Cold War.
3:14
 And they recognized that there was a real opportunity now to extend the benefits of liberal
democracy,
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 capitalist markets and everything that went with it or that culture throughout the rest of the world.
3:32
 And so the central concern in the 1990s was how to marry a world that had increasingly come
globalized with the challenges of democratizing,
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 of incorporating those large chunks of the planet that had not fully integrated, but not being fully
liberalized or democratized.
3:51
 And so for David held one of the more left variants of liberalism, social democratic approach this
question,
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 there was a critical disjuncture between the processes of integration that I've
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 already identified and we've explored throughout this thus far on the one hand,
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 and the realities of a planet organized politically in those 200 odd states divided into sovereign
territorial states.
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 So that disjuncture between particular flows and particular transnational phenomena on the one
hand, and our continued attachment to political power,
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 political communities or communities of faith as they would help would have them that are confined
to citizens,
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 to a particular state that boarded that disjuncture, raised questions about the nature of democracy
in.
4:52
 The late 20th and indeed the 21st century. His answer, which will come back to.
4:59
 In just a moment, was to think beyond the nation state and to think Kosma politically or Kosmo
politically, I should say, about democracy.
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 That is to think of the demos and get to think of the power of the people beyond the confines of
specific territorial sovereignties or jurisdictions,
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 and beyond the attachment to specific citizenship, and indeed to think as world citizens and the
thinkers of political problems.
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 Most obviously phenomena like climate change or pollution,
5:34
 but also human rights or any other kind of civil liberty as transcending the net, the narrow confines
or this of this or that state.
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 So the combination of all of this objective disjuncture states on the one hand, globalization on the
other.
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 Combined with the end of the Cold War and the moment of optimism for liberal democracy
5:58
 meant that the 1990s witnessed a real fervent of ideas around a fervent ferment,
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 I guess around the ideas of a cosmopolitan democracy and are thinking about promoting
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 democracy or certain conceptions of democracy globally and transnationally.
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 Now, this is important for our students of global politics, whether it's in global politics and political
economy or security, or indeed,
6:26
 for those of you studying emerging powers or regions like the Middle East because it drives home
one of the major powers in the international system,
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 and that is what Karl Marx called the sixth great power. Remember, he was writing the 19th century
Europe.
6:44
 So he was talking about the five great powers of the time, Austria, Hungary,
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 France and Russia and all the others, the six great powers that revolution.
6:55
 And let's use the term revolution as a shorthand for social mobile mobilizations generally from
below.
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 But often acquiring state power, which challenge, if not radically transformed, the international
system.
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 I mentioned earlier the Bolshevik Revolution that was a world revolution.
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 Communism, for good or ill, inspired millions, if not billions across the world.
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 And of course, almost a fifth of humanity. But more than fifth of humanity now still lives under non
nominal communist states.
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 People's Republic of China, in the epicenter of that under a single party, which is court calls itself the
Chinese Communist Party.
7:38
 But that not withstanding the point is that we are constantly faced in international relations,
7:49
 not just with continuity and order and balancing as realists would point us to, but also with real
subversion, revolution, transformation.
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 And today's session is an opening gambit in thinking through that interaction between order and
transformation, between justice and order.
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 As we encountered it last week and in all this.
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 Finally, in this introductory comment, what will become very apparent is a concern among the
thinkers and the politicians,
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 those in power across different parts of the world over failed states.
8:34
 We will encounter in such successive weeks, in a couple of weeks time when we consider the security
development nexus,
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 the importance that is attached to functioning states as cornerstones of security.
8:48
 The idea here and again, remember that the time period, the 1990s, the beginning of this century,
the penalties.
8:57
 The concern was that a lack of order in one part in one region,
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 say the Balkans in the 1990s or failed states in East or West Africa as well in the 1990s,
9:15
 beginning of the 21st century, would spill over on to not just neighboring states, neighboring
societies, but increasingly transnational.
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 In other words, the defense of one country. Remember what I said last week about the United States
notion of defense as as not
9:32
 just including the territorial integrity of the particular state or its territory,
9:43
 but also the security that is the capacity to secure an environment beyond state borders, through
alliances, through.
9:49
 Anticipated reaction, anticipating potential threats that conception of security became very prevalent
in the 1990s with states like the United
9:59
 Kingdom saying that the security of the United Kingdom and the many Europeans did not stop at
the borders of Europe,
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 but extended to those failed states like Somalia, like Afghanistan, where the threat in this instance
terrorist threat,
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 jihadist terrorism, might spill over again, not just regionally, but globally.
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 So these are broadly the concerns of the moment of the 1990s.
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 On the one hand, there's a real zeal for expanding democracy because democracy is certainly on the
winner's side.
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 And the liberal side promotes prosperity, freedom, peace, cooperation, solidarity,
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 crops across states that Wilsonian or Kantian understanding of international relations.
10:56
 But that had to be reconciled with a reality where the lifting of the lid of various of the Cold War and
the various empires,
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 including the Soviet empire,
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 that collapsed all of regional arrangements like in East Africa, where they've been a close alignment
with Moscow or Washington.
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 The lifting of that of the lid of those conflicts generated all kinds of new threats that were
transnational and global.
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 The answer or one answer to that was global governance.
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 So I'm going to say a little bit now about different conceptions of democracy and how they played
out in a move beyond
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 government understood as the organization of power within a particular state to think of
governments beyond states.
11:43
 You'll see from this from slide show that I've put here that the great the great aspiration to
democratization of the third way,
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 which depending on the account started in the 1970s, has been somewhat curtailed by the realities
of of an imperfect global democratization.
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 Understood. From from 2020, the first wave of democratization before World War One involved the
granting of franchise to women,
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 the extension of franchise to adult men in the course of the second wave.
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 With the wars of national liberation and the struggles for decolonization remaining Western states
and a few Western
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 nonstate non Western countries acquired independence and with it full franchise for their adult
populations.
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 The third wave, as I was saying, is associated to that moment of the nineteen seventies where across
Latin America, parts of southern Europe,
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 there were the beginnings of the beginnings of some kind of contestation against existing
dictatorships,
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 which really came to the fore in the nineteen eighties. Of course, Greece, Spain, Portugal
democratized in the mid to late seventies.
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 But we're looking at Central America or Latin America that came almost a decade later.
13:25
 And the idea was that the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
13:31
 witnessed the book ending of that first wave with the democratization of east,
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 central, at East and Central Europe and the attempts at democratizing the former Soviet bloc proper,
13:43
 the former Soviet Union, Central Asia, the Baltic states.
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 So there was a real moment of optimism in the early 90s. But we can see with the benefit of
hindsight now, some 20 years later, that actually the.
13:54
 Freedom House is one of them. Not a US entity, but the economist is another where on certain
criteria, whether national elections are free and fair,
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 whether security for voters, what the influence of foreign powers might not be on governments,
14:25
 and what the capability of civil servants to implement policies on these kinds of criteria can arrive at
understandings of
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 democracy globally in the globalization of democracy that allow us to make these kinds of grass
present these kinds of grass.
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 When there there's an aggregate illustration of in terms of countries,
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 those that have gone down, the more improved democratic rule or those that have declined it.
14:59
 As you can see, the gap between improvement and decline has grown to the benefit of decline
represented in specific countries.
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 Again, this is by just by way of illustrating how some certain benchmarks are used in global politics
15:15
 to find measure the nature of democratization within states and in aggregate terms globally.
15:20
 But you can see there where countries like Turkey, like Venezuela or like Russia or like Syria are
deemed to have decreased their their freedom,
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 Along those some positive is empirical way, trying to identify particular criteria,
15:48
 particular benchmarks and how far they they apply internationally or not.
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 So the point here is that democracy is not some teleological process.
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 Democratization is not something that happens naturally or in some kind of smooth line and isn't
inevitable.
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 I think that's not controversial for any of us, rather, in so far as there has been an attempt after the
end of the Cold War to extend democracy.
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 It has been, again, very uneven, very unequal, spread in stops and starts.
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 And it's very it's the very definition of the category as itself being contested.
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 This is important for us because as stewards of global politics, governance and security, if we are in a
liberal mode,
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 going to make an association between markets and freedom and representative government,
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 then on the one hand and then security on the other, then we have to somehow measure this.
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 And if it's something that is positive, then we might want to promote it.
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 And here again is where the notion of governance comes into play as a an instance of thinking
about.
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 About thinking about democracy beyond the nation state.
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 So a definition that we can work with here. So the definition that we can work with here.
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 This lets me move on allows me to do so.
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