 Hello, everybody.

I wanted in this last part of the lecture to focus on an illustration that is the US led
invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a good example,
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 a good instance of how some of the themes that we've been talking about,
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 authority, legality, legitimacy, play out in that tension between the attempts at governing the globe,
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 generating global governance whilst operating in a system of states.
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 And I think the Iraqi conflict in its various forms.
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 Of course, the there was a first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran as Saddam Hussein invaded Iran.
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 Subsequent to the Iranian revolution, then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait again in 1990, leading to
the 1991 war and defeat of Saddam Hussein.
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 Subsequent to that, for a good decade, the Iraqi regime, this the.
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 Saddam's Baathist regime was subject to the most stringent.
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 Some sanctions, international sanctions that any society has experienced certainly since after 1945.
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 And that then eventually led to the crisis ostensibly over weapons of mass destruction,
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 where all kinds of agencies were involved, transnational agencies in terms of non-governmental
organizations,
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 intergovernmental organizations in the shape of the specialist agency, specialized agencies that the
UN,
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 particularly the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Association and the.
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 There were also, of course, regional dimensions to the war.
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 But in the context of barely a decade out of the Cold War, here was an opportunity for many,
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 it seemed, to restore order and to use all the V the instruments of.
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 The emerging new world order, state power, to be sure, but also the international organizations,
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 international institutions and the kinds of coalitions that after 1991, it led to the defeat of Saddam
Hussein in the 2003 context.
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 Of course, that context was also immediately after the attacks, the 9/11 attacks on U.S. territory and
in New York City in particular.
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 So as you can see, many of the key words that we have been using thus far and will continue to be
using this course networks in this instance,
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 terrorist networks, although they also important transnational networks,
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 the role of Iraqi exiles in persuading or advising the United States and its allies over the invasion.
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 Those networks, clearly there was state authority.
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 The military power that the United States mustered is the old fashioned form of of hard, hard power.
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 But the United Nations was also invoked in various contexts in the run up to the war.
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 And although there was no formal authorization for the invasion and occupation of Iraq subsequent
to the occupation,
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 the United Nations and indeed other international alliances in this instance, NATO played a big role.
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 So really, that's by way of highlighting how all these features came together in this particular crisis.
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 Now, the reason why we're interested in this today is because one of the drivers of the 2003 invasion
was the claim for democracy.
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 The idea here was in, again, fairly liberal internationalist, Wilsonian or indeed Kantian mindset that
Saddam Hussein's dictatorship,
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 Baathist dictatorship had since the 1970s been a major obstacle in maintaining order in the region.
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 It had generated wars with Iran, with Kuwait.
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 It had antagonized the West or those you many of you will know. We discussed this in the seminar
for a period during the 80s.
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 Saddam Hussein was a an ally of parts of the West, particularly France or the French allies of Iraq, I
should say.
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 Weapons were sold to both sides, to the Iranians and Iraqis.
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 But Iraqis were certainly seen in some quarters as the secular, more civilized, in inverted commas,
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 alternative in the region to the raging Iranian ayatollahs and the Khomeini's kind of regime.
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 So in that context, by two, by the beginning of this century, Iraq, a democratic Iraq, a stable,
democratic Iraq, where, as we know,
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 significant part of the known or retrievable oil reserves resided in that in that country or within the
region,
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 became an especially powerful arena to send the message that the new world order would promote
democracy.
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 Many actors in Washington at the time, the so-called neoconservatives on the George Bush junior,
George the son, the younger.
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 So the defeat of Saddam Hussein as a real opportunity for democratizing the greater Middle East.
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 Remember, again, here we have a situation where Afghanistan in the outer reaches eastern reaches
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 of this region called the Middle East had also been generating great anxieties,
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 not just regionally, but globally because of the impact of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida in the
promotion of insurgencies,
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 jihadist insurgencies across the world and indeed, jihadist terrorism.
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 It was said, of course, of Afghanistan that it was not a state sponsored terrorism, but.
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 A state sponsored by terrorists. So in that context,
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 there was a real opportunity to develop a Burián conception of state sovereignty
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 that combined both the shrimp attarian view of democracy that is free.
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 Competitive elections, when not Saddam's clique would rule and the Baathist Party, but where there
would be a variety of options for all Iraqis,
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 including the Shia majority who had been oppressed by Saddam's clique and other Sunni minority
elites.
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 And therefore, the war was as much about the global regional order as it was about creating the
cornerstone of that order through a state,
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 a stable working state, where they would be,
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 as I say, competitive democracy, but also the kind of legitimacy domestically to allow for a more
prosperous Iraq,
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 an Iraq that was reliable, particularly as an as an oil exporter.
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 And the historical model for this most explicitly presented by Condoleezza Rice at the time was West
Germany and Japan.
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 The idea was that after the decapitation of the regime, after doing away with Saddam Hussein,
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 the establishment of a fall for it was meant to be a provisional authority,
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 a coalition provisional authority, again mandated by the U.N. Security Council.
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 What would ensue was a reconstruction, a deep ossification,
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 a democratization and modernization in the style of West Germany and Japan after World War Two.
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 This was the model which was doing the rounds in the United States and in the White House.
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 And the challenges here revolved around what is known as the endogenous enforcement of
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 democracy or democracy from the outside in or foreign imposed democracy or imperialism,
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 whatever you want to call it. And the challenges were that.
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 Iraq had suffered, as I mentioned earlier. Ten years of the most stringent, the most the harshest
forms of.
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 International sanctions, which had effectively eviscerated, had hollowed out the state centralized
power in Saddam Hussein, but also.
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 Deepened existing sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shia, between different regions in the more
rural areas,
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 between different tribes, a different kinship groups in the more urban areas, the site between
different militias.
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 So there'd been a real process of involution. Of Iraq, which merely until the 1980s.
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 Regardless of what things that path is,
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 a more dictatorship had been one of the most advanced countries of that part of the world in terms
of prosperity,
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 in terms of infrastructure, in terms of some degree of coherence or legitimacy.
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 So here we have a problem, or at least the the international community had a problem that you can
break a state down,
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 you can defeat an enemy in war, but then you have to reconstruct it in peace.
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 And you can win the war. But if you don't win the peace, then in many respects it's just been one
battle.
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 And this was the challenge for endogenous enforcement of democracy.
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 How do we identify that? How does the Coalition Provisional Authority, the outside powers, identify
legitimate counterparts domestically?
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 How do they combine or reconcile democracy, which is meant to be about division of power, civilian
rule, representation on the one hand,
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 and the military or the militarization of occupation,
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 the fact that it was the military that had a leading role certainly in the first four or five years of the
post invasion.
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 Administration of of of Iraq.
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 So already you can see there's all kinds of obvious tensions, if not contradictions, even within the
mindset of this Coalition Provisional Authority.
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 One answer to the question was that there should be troops on the ground.
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 And I'll refer you to the text by Dobbins, who which is on your on your reading list, where you can
see that.
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 Dobbins, let me open the presentation here.
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 Sorry, I'm not sure it's appearing on your screen.
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 I hope it is, actually.
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 Where there's been state evolution, where there's all kinds of threats, both internally and outside.
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 And that is to have a high proportion of occupying forces in relation to the population.
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 You can see here this is taken from the Tobins reading that I just mentioned in your which is on your
reading list.
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 And it is very good accounts of various post-World War Two international occupations in a
comparative sense.
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 Obviously, Iraq was a focal point for this. And as I just mentioned, people like Condoleezza Rice and
right.
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 To talk to the president. There was an idea that what was happening in Iraq after 2003 should be
similar to that, what happened in Japan,
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 West Germany, or indeed had a country in the 1990s in Somalia, Kosovo, I.T. in terms of foreign
presence.
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 Now, you can see already here in this graph where there is a high number of soldiers per thousand
inhabitants in the case of.
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 Kosovo, we're looking to start starting, what, about twenty thousand as well as in the case of Bosnia.
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 So those with the Balkan cases and although there is a secular decline in the numbers quite sharply,
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 so in some cases, as in the cases of Haiti and Somalia.
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 Notice how a in Afghanistan and indeed in also in in Bosnia and in.
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 Kosovo, they were talking about a long term presence of fairly high numbers of troops per local
population.
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 If we bring Germany in, there is again a similar pattern when high numbers of foreign troops were
present over an extended period of time.
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 So the. Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq was all but provisional.
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 Of course, there was an attempt to transfer authority, remember authority to local forces.
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 Local democratic forces in order to legitimated that authority, make it have a Buy-In and make it
credible for the local population.
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 But we do need to go into this right now over the process of codifying that, namely combining
authority and legitimacy into a legal form.
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 Arguably still extends to this day and we can talk about that.
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 But I think that in many respects, Iraq has never really recovered its own legality,
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 let alone its legitimacy or authority, certainly not in a very Burián sense, in a centralized sense since
2003.
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 But I think perhaps the more most interesting for me anyhow diagram is this one where if the
intention was to reproduce in Iraq after 2003,
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 a kind of occupation like that experience in West Germany and Japan,
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 or indeed in after the Cold War in places like the Balkans or in Afghanistan,
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 then these are the kinds of levels of ground troops that should have been present.
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 With the exception of Haiti and Somalia, if we're looking at Germany, if we're looking at Afghanistan
in 2003, according to these calculations,
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 that should have been over two million U.S. or allied troops in Iraq in order for that to be
correspondant presence,
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 that Germany after 1945, even a couple of years after that, we're talking to three hundred twenty one
thousand troops.
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 If one were to make the comparison with Afghanistan in 2005, it's half a million troops.
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 The fact of the matter is that at its height, the Coalition Provisional Authority had no more than two
hundred thousand allied troops in Iraq.
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 That's a significant number. It was a significant operation. But in terms of comparisons, it wants to
enforce authority.
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 Then the argument was that it was not good enough simply to win the air war, to defeat Saddam
through air power.
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 But you needed to then establish authority on the ground. So that was one avenue for trying to do
that.
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 The other argument that has been presented and is not just relevant to Iraq.
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 It's Roland Paris who who developed this in the context of the Balkan crisis and then some 15 years
ago in another context,
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 is the idea that there should be. That there should be instituted institutionalization before
liberalization of the Democratic mainstream,
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 democratic understanding of exoticness enforcement suggested that, OK,
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 once you've got rid of the dictatorship or you really have to do is open up markets, allow for civil
liberties,
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 allow for competitive elections, and that will emerge a fully developed liberal democratic.
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 Institutional or state? Of course, the reality is that without the institutionalization of those agents of
civil society,
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 be they market forces or political parties or trade unions or civic associations.
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 The liberalization of any society, particularly society that had gone through the traumas,
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 the successive traumas of war and sanctions likely or Iraq actually generates greater conflict.
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 It it pluralize, but also divides and fragments.
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 And so to rule a fragmented society under those kinds of material conditions of destruction,
impoverishment.
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 As I was saying, division among classes between urban and rural, within the rural,
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 between different kinship groups and in urban areas, between different militias or sectarian groups.
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 That is a recipe for an exacerbation of existing conflicts, or at least the continuation of new conflicts
in a so-called post-conflict scenario.
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 And I think that is pretty much what happened in Iraq after 2003.
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 The outcome of these tensions that I've been describing of a foreign imposed rule that was heavily
militarized in a very fragmented
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 society was the reinforcement of patrimonial what Max Baiba called patrimonial or client list forms of
rule that I mentioned earlier,
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 the opposite of the barbarian Westphalian state where there is a legitimate monopoly over the
means of violence within a well-defined territory.
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 That is what arguably the West and the United States administration under George W. actually
wanted.
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 But what they got as a result of the way in which they handled the post occupation phase of of the
of regime change was a fragmentation,
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 a reinforcement of tribal kinship groups in order to protect certain regions,
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 especially as the occupation unfolded after 2003, the years of 2005, six, seven and beyond.
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 Militias in urban settings. And as I was saying, tribal groups in rural areas, particularly in the west of
of of Iran,
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 gained a monopoly over the means of violence in that territory.
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 And therefore, the central authority in Iraq beats the CPA or its successors how to make deals with
these with its tribal elders,
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 self-styled tribal elders. I mean, there's an anecdote told by Charles Tripp, a emeritus professor.
 19:57
 So us on Iraq, which he actually witnessed, which which is that on the one hand,
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 you would have all these tribal elders from several conflicted provinces turning up in Baghdad with
all their paraphernalia,
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 you know, their swords and their their their tribal gear.
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 That representation of traditional authority assuring the central, the Coalition Provisional Authority,
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 the central authorities that they would be able to maintain order.
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 And those very same people, once they got off their guards and left their ceremonial swords in their
hotel room,
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 would the Hilton or whatever would turn up for dinner dressed in business suits with U.S. dollars in
them in their in their suitcases.
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 So you get a sense there of that dual power and the way in which at the beginning of the 21st
century and arguably still today, post invasion,
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 Iraq was ruled not through a librarian, bureaucratic, rational state, but rather through patriotism,
patronage and Clyde realism.
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 Iraq has become a territory fragmented, politically sectarian and social logically segment tree states
or society.
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 In other words, it is a failed or collapsed state, exactly the opposite of what was meant to have been
the outcome of this endogenous.
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 Enforced Democratic rule. Thanks very much for your time and I'll see you at the seminar next week.