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IN THIS ISSUE: THE SOLDIERS, ARMIES, AND WARS OF THE NEO-ASSYRIAN EMPIRE (911 – 609 BC)

VOL XIV, ISSUE 6

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The Neo-Assyrian Empire at war

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THEME – ASSYRIAN ROYAL BODYGUARDS // THE BATTLE OF MOUNT WAUSH // AN URARTIAN RIVALRY
SPECIALS – CENTURION BATTLEFIELD AUTONOMY // ATHENIAN CAVALRY // ROMAN ARMY HORSES
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
0
Ancient Warfare magazine
Editor-in-chief: Jasper Oorthuys
Assistant editor: Murray Dahm
News editor: Lindsay Powell
Proofreader: Naomi Munts
Image research: Lauren van Zoonen
Design & Media: Christianne C. Beall
Design © 2016-2021 Karwansaray Publishers

Contributors: Jo Ball, Duncan B. Campbell, Murray

Dahm, Tamás Dezsö, Thomas James, Christopher
W. Jones, Sean Manning, Mark McCaffery, Anneka THEME: e O-ASSY AN E I AT R
Mihajlov, Michael Rasak, William Shepherd, Michael Famously warlike and imperialistic, the Neo-Assyrians cut a swathe across the ancient Near
J. Taylor, Pavel Vaverka
East. Surviving artwork and written sources give us clues as to how they accomplished this.
Illustrators: Zvonimir Grbasic, Sean Ó Brógáin,
Tomás Ó Brógáin, Jose Morán, Angel García Pinto,
Marek Szyszko 14 The way of the future 26 Like a furious arrow
Studying the Assyrian army The battle of Mount Waush, 714 BC
Print: Grafi Advies

Editorial office 18 Assyria's rival 36 Ashur's battlefield justice

PO Box 4082, 7200 BB Zutphen, The Netherlands The kingdom of Urartu Imperial Assyrian chariot tactics
Phone: +31-848-392256 (EU), +1-800-549-4742 (US)
E-mail: editor@ancient-warfare.com -
24 The Qurbutu 58 Further reading
Customer service: service@karwansaraypublishers.com
Website: www.ancient-warfare.com The Assyrian king's elite bodyguard More books and articles on the theme
Contributions in the form of articles, letters, re-
views, news and queries are welcomed. Please send SPEAL FEAS
to the above address or use the contact form on
www.ancient-warfare.com 8 Quintus Sertorius 42 Following the transverse crest
The empty throne and the white fawn *LU[\YPVUH\[VUVT`VU[OLIH[[SLÄLSK
Subscriptions
Subscriptions can be purchased at www.kp-shop.com,
via phone or by email. For the address, see above. 12 Making the cavalry 48 Lessons from Domitius Corbulo
The rise of a neglected Athenian corps Beating the enemy with the dolabra
Distribution
Ancient Warfare is sold through retailers, the internet
and by subscription. The exclusive distributor for the UK DEPARTS
and the Republic of Ireland is Seymour Distribution Ltd,
2 East Poultry Avenue, London, EC1A 9PT, United King- 4 Preliminaries 52 All the pretty horses
dom. Phone: +44 (0)207 429 4000. News and updates Managing horses in the Roman army
Copyright Karwansaray B.V. All rights reserved. Noth-
ing in this publication may be reproduced in any form
46 Trusting the gods 56 Book reviews
without prior written consent of the publishers. Any A votive altar from the Antonine Wall The AW team checks out new releases
individual providing material for publication must en-
sure that the correct permissions have been obtained
before submission to us. Every effort has been made 36 42
to trace copyright holders, but in few cases this proves
impossible. The editor and publishers apologize for
any unwitting cases of copyright transgressions and
would like to hear from any copyright holders not
acknowledged. Articles and the opinions expressed
herein do not necessarily represent the views of the
editor and/or publishers. Advertising in Ancient War-
fare does not necessarily imply endorsement.

Ancient Warfare is published every two months by

Karwansaray B.V., Zutphen, The Netherlands. PO Box
4082, 7200 BB Zutphen, The Netherlands.

ISSN: 1874-7019

Printed in Slovakia.

CHARIOTS OF FIRE LEADING FROM THE FRONT

The vehicle of kings, chariots played an How can we best understand the role of
important role in Assyrian warfare, and also centurions on the battlefield during the Ro-
held a religious and political significance. man Republic and early Empire?

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

3
ES
NEWS ITEMS BY LINDSAY POWELL
EDITORIAL - Then and now
Anyone who has ever published anything will
recognize the feeling of getting that first copy
back from the printer. It’s a great feeling, and
P MINA
then you open it up and spot a typo or realize
you should have done something differently.
It’s good to be critical of your own work, I’m
sure. If you’re in magazine publishing it can be
strangely startling to look at a copy that, by the
time you see it, feels old already while the next
edition is clamouring for attention. It’s different
with issues from a long time ago, however.
Incidental articles excepted, we’ve only
had an Assyrian theme once before. That was
issue V-4, published in 2011. It feels like re-
discovering my own work. It looks different,
that’s for sure, and we cover different ground
Building virtual chainmail armour brings real benefits to war studies
Experimental archaeology has a long and
proud tradition as a tool for historical re-
search, but virtual reality (VR) technology
used in video games for the same application
has received relatively little attention. A new
study sets out to demonstrate its real value.
Martijn A. Wijnhoven of VU University
Amsterdam told Ancient Warfare that for
him the two approaches were not opposed
but complementary ways to understand the
past. “The nice thing about getting the same
results using two different methods is that
you are able to validate your findings and
One of the earlier ter- Greek warriors marching off to war
racotta slabs from Sozo-
A fragment of a ceramic frieze depicting an-
pol, depicting two hop-
cient Greek warriors marching in formation
lites, one wearing his
shield on his back. Now has been discovered during excavations of two
in The Louvre, Paris. temples of Apollo on St Cyricus Island in the
© Marie-Lan Nguyen (Jas- Bulgarian Black Sea town of Sozopol.
trow) / Wikimedia Commons The depiction was part of a larg-
er display, some twenty pieces of
which have already been found
during archaeological digs. The ar-
chaeologists also found fragments
from two figural fragrance vessels
and terracotta items, two bronze
arrow tips, and other artefacts.
The latest slab to be found
dates to 500 BC and depicts two
m of the Colossus of Apollonia Pontike, a thirteen-
crested C
reveal their f
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
4
in this issue. You might say they complement
each other... and that’s a good thing. Check-
ing the further reading in this issue and V-4,
there were, and still are, very few easily acces-
sible recent books about the Assyrians. I’d like
a few myself in fact. Sean Manning’s call to ac-
tion in this issue’s introduction ensures that I’ll
henceforth look differently at the civilisation
we think we know so well from its famous re-
liefs. There’s a lot more to it than just that, and
much of it very interesting to the an-
cient warfare aficionado.
Jasper Oorthuys
Editor, Ancient Warfare
be much more certain that the conclusions
you derive are correct,” he said.
To test out the theory, Wijnhoven
teamed up with Aleksei Moskvin of Saint Pe-
tersburg State University of Industrial Tech-
nologies and Design. They chose to create a
chainmail coat because it is one of the most
complex things to recreate virtually.
Rather than make a generic object, they
decided to reconstruct the coat of mail from
Vimose (Funen), Denmark, now Copenhagen.
Dating to AD 150–220, and weighing almost
ten kilogrammes, it is the oldest completely
hair of one of the men is long. Each carries a
large round aspis shield and holds a spear. They
both wear linothorax body armour.
Archaeologists have been exploring
the Archaic Greek period temple site since
2018. It was in the upper layer that the field
archaeologists discovered an ‘arrow coin’
(a form of early currency) and a fragmented
black-figure skyphos (a deep, two-handed
wine cup), as well as two more fragments of
the ceramic slab with low relief decoration
depicting marching ancient Greek warriors.
St Cyricus Island was the ancient Greek
colony of Apollonia Pontike on the western
Black Sea coast. It may have been the location
metre-tall statue of Apollo that towered over the
harbour of the Greek colony for four centuries.
preserved chainmail from Northern Europe.
Crucially, despite being damaged, this garment
was preserved well enough to provide the ini-
tial data set for the digital model.
Using parameterization and paramet-
ric 3D modelling software, Wijnhoven and
Moskvin replicated each of the 19,123 rings
in the original. Each digital ring was accu-
rately placed in the matrix and followed the
precise construction of the original artefact.
They made digital replicas of the Vimose
coat, one in its original pristine condition
and a second in its current condition. With
these digital versions, the researchers could
then determine the properties of the mail
fabric by draping it over a rigid mannequin,
and the similarity between the replicas and
the coat was demonstrated.
Native Americans among earliest makers of copper projectiles
Native Americans were among the world’s
first societies to work copper, according to
new, ground-breaking research.
A team of researchers from Kansas
State University studied copper projectile
points and prehistoric mine pits associated
with the Old Copper Complex (OCC); this is
y carbon dates
The digital models proved to have the Three views showing the digital
reconstruction of the Vimose coat
advantages of high accuracy, low cost, high
of mail, allowing the researchers to
speed, and objectivity. “It takes a matter of a examine it from all angles.
few minutes or hours to create a new, virtual © Aleksei Moskvin, Mariia Mosvina, and
replica. As a mail maker myself, even I can- Martijn Wijnhoven.
not compete with this,” said Wijnhoven.
The big advantage of re-enactment and
experimental archaeology, he explained, was
that the researcher could physically experi-
ence something. “Some of our results may not
be mind-blowing to a re-enactor, but they do
confirm each other’s findings. The work in VR
is complementary, and that will achieve the
best understanding of the past.”
The team have published their findings MORE ONLINE
in a paper entitled “Digital replication and Learn more about the
reconstruction process.
reconstruction of mail armour” in the Journal
https://bit.ly/3wub1x2
of Cultural Heritage 45.
Various copper finds from Wisconsin,
copper-tool technology by Archaic Native circa 3000-1000 BC, including a knife,
spearpoints, awls, and a spud (adze),
American societies in the Lake Superior re-
on display at the Wisconsin
gion of the United States. Historical Museum.
The researchers published their findings © Daderot / Wikime-
ing of the Old dia Commons
er-
r
ica: A comparison of radio-
es from different
Ancient Warfare X
5
 x
at
Some of the bones of the lynx foundana.
the Castellum Albani
April 2021
© ScienceDirect, Reports Volume 36,

d the lynx
Southern
e Roman
army to a fort on the German Limes frontier, according to
an analysis of bones performed by Dutch scientists.

© Roberta F / Wikimedia Commons

The bones of the large wild cat were found in the ditch
of the Roman fort of Castellum Albaniana during excavations
at Alphen aan den Rijn in the Netherlands. Only bones of the
body were found, not of the head. The scientists set about
trying to find out more about the animal using ancient DNA
amplification, sequencing, and alignment to confirm species
identification and to determine the haplotype.
The researchers have published their findings in a paper
entitled “Lynx presence in Roman times in the Lower Ger-
manic Limes region: The case of Alphen aan den Rijn’ in the
Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports 36.
They established that the species was a Eurasian lynx
(Lynx lynx). Comparing the DNA to a control animal from a
known location, analysis “revealed that the [Alphen] animal
carried a DNA haplotype, different from those from North Sea
fossil lynx [control] remains, but comparable to a haplotype
found in southern France.”
The natural habitat of a Eurasian lynx is forest or open moun-
tainous terrain, such as that found in Spain. Significantly, it is not
native to the Netherlands, a fact that intrigued the Dutch team.
The scientists noted that “it is tempting to conclude that
the animal was brought by Roman soldiers with a southern
origin,” and that “the bones of the lynx from Alphen aan den
The Eurasian lynx used to be widespread throughout much of Europe.
Rijn did not show any signs of butchery, indicating that the
animal was not consumed”.
Discounting the possibility that the animal was killed for its
meat, they proposed instead that “it might be assumed that it was
hunted or kept, maybe as a mascot, for its fur and skin as in the
case of wolf or lion skins used as part of a military costume”. Ro-
man standard- and eagle-bearers wore animal pelts over their kit.
Castellum Albaniana was established around AD 40/41 as
a wooden fort as part of preparations for the invasion of Britain.
During the Revolt of the Batavi (AD 69-70) it was demolished by
the local Cananefates. Shortly thereafter it was rebuilt. It was re-
constructed in brick under Septimius Severus and continued to be
used before being abandoned around AD 275.

archaeological contexts” in Radiocarbon 63.2. and cordage found embedded or wrapped

MORE ONLINE
The original article on
dating the copper tools.
https://bit.ly/3hQRinm
In the paper the team writes: “To better around fifteen OCC copper artefacts. The re-
define the timing of the OCC, we evaluated sults ranged from 8500 to 3580 calibrated
53 (eight new and forty-five published) radi- years before present (cal BP), that is between
ocarbon (C14) dates associated with copper 6500 and 1500 BC. The research team had
artefacts and mines. We compared these produced reliable data “confirming that the
dates to six lake sediment-based chronolo- OCC was among the oldest known metal-
gies of copper mining and annealing in the working societies in the world”.
Michig The evidence demonstrated that hunter-
By gatherers living beside Eagle Lake in Wiscon-
objects a sin were producing conical projectile points
Michigan measuring ten centimetres in length made of
researcher pure copper as early as 6500 BC. They were
of organic likely used to hunt big game.

Weapons ho
Following conse mountain in Sauerland in North Rhine-West-
the Regional Ass phalia where the hill fort was occupied from
(LWL), Germany the fourth to the first century BC. Sections of the
weapons a defensive wall are still visible.
on Between 2018 and 2020, local history
The hillfort is located on the researcher Matthias Dickhaus conducted sur-
658-metre-high Wilzenberg veys with a metal detector on behalf of, and

Some of the finds from the weapon

hoard discovered at the Wilzenberg s
x

hillfort, including 'killed' weapons.

© LWL-Archaeologie fuer Westfalen
/Hermann Menne.

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

6
in close co-ordination with, LWL-Archäologie
für Westfalen. In part due to “exemplary doc-
umentation”, around 100 finds dating from
the Iron Age were recovered.
As early as 1950, two spear and lance
tips wrapped in two swords were unearthed
by chance at Wilzenberg. The newly discov-
ered items, approximately 40 tips of spears and
lances, fragments of shield bosses, and harness
parts, as well as tools, add to the hoard.
Both swords, and many of the spear
blade tips, were found bent. Evidence from
France and Wales indicates that, after battle,
it was customary for the weapons of the van-
quished to be ‘killed’ by the winners. It was
a ritual typical of Celtic cultures, perhaps
confirming that the occupants of Wilzenberg
hillfort were not Germanic.
π HAVE YOU READ?
OUR ANCIENT WARS: RETHINKING WAR THROUGH THE CLASSICS Edited by V. Caston and S. Weineck
We read, hear and think about war on a regular
basis, and when we do, this book argues, west-
ern thinking 'turns and returns to ancient Greek
writing on the subject’. The chapters in Part 1
(‘Rethinking the Ancient, in View of the Mod-
ern’) discuss how modern experiences of war-
fare can prompt us to explore ancient wars in
new ways. In Part 2 (‘Rethinking the Modern, in
View of the Ancient’), contributors consider the
“It is conceivable that a fight took place Aerial view of the Wilzenberg Moun-
in the area around Wilzenberg and that the tain on which traces of the hillfort
victors completed their triumph by bringing still remain and where the hoard
was found.
the captured weapons, belts, and harnesses
© El Grafo / Wikimedia Commons
to the Wallburg,” said LWL archaeologist Dr
Manuel Zeiler. The victors then displayed the
captured war spoils for all to see. Many of the
weapons could not be precisely dated, howev-
er, so it could not be determined whether they
were damaged and laid down over time, or if
they were deliberately bent at a single event.
The outstanding finds included part of a
very rare type of horse snaffle. The existing han-
dle parts for guiding the horse suggest that this
type of bridle was used on horses that pulled a
chariot. The bit allowed the horse to be steered
precisely and directly – vitally important to a
warrior standing on a moving chariot in battle.
ways in which ancient warfare might illuminate
aspects of the modern. A third section (‘Other
Moderns, Other Ancients’) analyses past uses of
ancient texts on warfare, paving the way for a
discussion in the Epilogue of the Theater of War
project, which uses Greek drama to engage
military and civilian communities in discussion
of issues, such as war and mental health.
– Alice König
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
7
SPECIAL
THE EMPTY THRONE AND THE WHITE FAWN
Serto us
We saw in the last article (AW 14.4) that there
is much to explore in the remarkable career of
Eumenes of Cardia, especially in his use of ‘false
religion’ to survive such tribulations. The career
of Quintus Sertorius offers parallels to Eumenes’
in many of the facets common to the two men’s
lives, and it was upon this basis that their two lives
were paired by the Greek biographer Plutarch.
By Mark McCaffery
n contrast to Eumenes, Quintus Sertorius began
I
his career in a more conventional fashion, un-
dergoing a formal Roman education before join-
ing the military to serve initially as a tribunus
militum under Servilius Caepio. Like Eumenes,
Sertorius was considered a relative outsider in Ro-
man politics, coming from the Sabine town of Nursia.
Whilst having citizenship and the patronage of estab-
lished Roman nobiles, the label of novus homo would
be used against him throughout his career.
Sertorius in uncertain times
Demonstrating resilience as one of the few survivors of
the military disaster of the Battle of Arausio in 104 BC,
swimming across the River Rhone to escape, Sertorius’
career took a less conventional course when he became
a spy amongst the Cimbri, reporting back to Gaius Mari-
us. His ability to blend in with the Germanic/Celtic Cim-
bri (their origins are highly debated), both with regard to
physical appearance and linguistic skills, suggests that it
was not simply Sertorius’ origins of birth that marked him
out as different in the Roman political scene.
The conclusion of the wars against the Cimbri and
Teutones led again to Sertorius serving as a tribunus mili-
tum, this time in Spain under the proconsul Titus Didius
in 97 BC. An independent posting to the town of Castulo
in Andalusia presented the opportunity for Sertorius to
demonstrate his abilities when the local inhabitants and
their neighbours rose up in revolt. With his troops bil-
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
8
leted amongst the local inhabitants of Castulo, and their
ill-disciplined behaviour as lodgers having earned them
a poor reputation, the Celtiberians set upon their Ro-
man occupants with deadly intent during the night. The
situation was only retrieved by Sertorius’ quick actions
regrouping his troops and methodically taking back
control of the town before then setting out in disguise
to infiltrate and seize control of the neighbouring town
of the Oritanians, who had assisted in the uprising. Ser-
torius’ success and reprisal resulted in the deaths of all
men of military age in the two towns. According to Plu-
tarch (Sertorius 4.1), this action not only gained Sertorius
a reputation amongst the Spanish, but also paved the
way for his return to Rome, where he was elected to the
quaestorship for 91 BC. The Social War between Rome
and its Italian allies also broke out this year. Sertorius
raised troops and incurred the loss of one eye in battle, a
disfigurement he afterwards prized as an outward mark
of his valour (Sallust Historia frag. 1.76).
The same period witnessed the intensifying rivalry
of Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla. This im-
pacted upon Sertorius’ career when his electioneering
for the tribuneship of 88 B.C. was thwarted by Sulla’s
opposition. Earlier association with Marius counted
against Sertorius, despite efforts to distance himself, al-
though these were sufficient appeasement when Sulla
marched upon Rome. Remaining in the city through
Sulla’s consulship, Sertorius attached himself to the con-
sul of the following year, Lucius Cornelius Cinna, whom
he viewed as neither as “sluggish nor distrustful” as the
alternatives (Plutarch Sertorius 4.4). As conflict erupted
between the two factions, Sertorius took a leading role
but was vocal in his criticism of Marius. After the deaths
of Cinna and Marius, and with the return of Sulla to Italy
looming, Sertorius voiced more criticism against his col-
leagues. This dissatisfaction came to a head when Ser-
torius demonstrated his disapproval of Scipio Asiaticus’
negotiations with Sulla by seizing the town of Suessa
during a truce. Whilst Sertorius was heavily criticised for
his action, his wariness of Sulla turned out to be correct
as, corrupted by words and bribery, Scipio’s troops de-
fected to Sulla (Plutarch Sulla 28.1).
Feeling undervalued by his faction and sensing
the direction in which the conflict was heading in Italy,
Sertorius now decided to depart for his provincial com-
mand in Spain, for which he was entitled by his previous
position as praetor. He thought that in Spain he might
provide a refuge for other anti-Sullan compatriots soon
to find themselves fleeing from Sullan persecution.
Sertorius and his Spanish refuge
Just as throughout his career Eumenes had consistent-
ly claimed to be acting under the authority of higher
Quintius Sertorius used the captured
white fawn to convince his followers
that he had received divine advice.
This was more than just for native
troops, but Roman supporters too.
© Jose Morán

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

9
 powers, Sertorius’ authority in Spain rested upon the le-
gitimacy of orders given by the Marian faction. Within a
year of his arrival in November 82 BC, however, news ar-
rived that Sulla had taken Rome and that the Marian cause
was in ruins. Upon his arrival in the province Sertorius had
ousted the Sullan commander through military might and
by approaching the Celtiberian tribal leaders. Yet by Janu-
ary or February 81 BC, Sertorius was already facing the
arrival of another Sullan commander set on ousting him
from the province and thus eradicating the lingering Mar-
ian outpost in Spain. This he achieved, forcing Sertorius to
embark his limited forces on ships bound for Africa.
Just as fortune was fickle for Eumenes, so it was for
Sertorius. Having established a hold over the Maurita-
nian city of Tinga, after a brief alliance with a fleet of Cili-
cian pirates operating around the Pillars of Hercules, Ser-
torius received overtures from the Lusitanians to return to
Spain. Plutarch argues (Sertorius 9. 3) that the Lusitanians
had made the offer based on his reputation as a leader
and his proven character, and that life under the govern-
ance of Sertorius would be better than under that of any
other Roman appointee. In reality, their judgement was
probably based more on the fact that in their limited ex-
perience of Sertorius he had sought to deal with provin-
cials on fairer terms, squeezing less tax out of them since
he was not passing a share back to the Sullan government
in Rome, and acting more in the interests of the inhabit-
ants of the Iberian Peninsula.
As he made the return journey from Africa in 80 BC,
Sertorius faced Sullan opposition: first at sea near the
coastal town of Mellaria (Plutarch Sertorius 11.3), then af-
ter making landfall on the banks of the Baetis river (Sallust
Historia frag. 1.95). Sertorius defeated both opponents,
thus justifying the Lusitanians’ evaluation of his military
prowess and building provincial confidence in him. These
were not to be the last Sullan commanders dispatched to
deal with the rebel Sertorius, however.
Recognising the need to bolster the confidence of
the province and his hodgepodge army, it was at this time
that Sertorius adopted a less-than-conventional tactic. We
are told that a man by the name of Spanus, described as a
Lusitanian by Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights15.22) or of ple-
beian status by Plutarch (Sertorius 11.2), was out hunting
and came upon a doe and her fawn. Although the doe was
able to escape, he captured the fawn and, considering its
brilliant white colour to be a thing of virtue, decided to of-
fer it as a gift to Sertorius, obviously trying to curry favour.
Sertorius graciously accepted the gift and in a short time
managed to tame the fawn so that it responded to his calls,
followed him around, and was indifferent to the noise of
military camp life. Astutely, Sertorius observed the propa-
ganda value in this, and he began to suggest a religious
significance to this phenomenon, spreading word that the
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
10
hind was a gift from the goddess Diana herself. He also let
it be known that he received divine advice, military intel-
ligence, and inspiration via the hind; at times he hid mes-
sengers who had arrived and staged the deer entering his
presence to seemingly announce victories achieved by his
subordinates. Plutarch and Valerius Maximus (Facta et Dicta
Memorabilia 1.2.5) argue that this strategy targeted the su-
perstitious ‘barbarians’ in his army, but even for those who
were not convinced that the fawn represented divine inter-
vention, the theatricalities of this drama must have had an
uplifting effect on troop morale. Indeed, similar tactics had
previously been used both by Marius, who was in the habit
of consulting a Syrian wisewoman prior to battles (Frontinus
Strategemata 1.9.12), and Sulla, who carried a small image
of Apollo from Delphi on campaign (Plutarch Sulla 29).
Like Eumenes, Sertorius did not limit himself to the
use of the white fawn for inspiring loyalty and confidence.
Welcoming numerous political exiles from Rome to join
his faction in Spain, Sertorius appointed commands uti-
lising Roman nomenclature and even created a Roman
senate in exile to emphasise that he was not the leader of
a foreign enemy army, but a legitimist undertaking the du-
ties of one loyal to Rome. Yet, to appeal to the provincial
population, he demonstrated a very progressive approach
of spreading Romanitas through the education in both
Greek and Latin of local aristocratic youths in the Roman
manner at a school in the city of Osca and the promise of
extending citizenship.
In another recorded incident, Plutarch recounts (Ser-
torius 16.3–5) how Sertorius justified his tactics to his
Iberian troops. Sertorius had a limited supply of legionar-
ies for his army, the majority of whom consisted of the
five-and-a-half legions brought by Marcus Veiento Per-
penna as the remnants of the unsuccessful rebellion of
Lepidus in 76 BC. Sertorius consistently avoided a set-
piece battle against the forces of the Sullan Q. Caecilius
Metellus Pius with his superior numbers of legionaries.
His Iberian forces did not hold the same perceptions as
he did, however, being confident that armed as scuta-
ti, similar to Roman legionaries with their large shields,
heavy spears, and predominately scale or chain armour,
they could match their Sullan opponents. In order to rec-
tify this ill-conceived notion, Sertorius first allowed his
Iberian forces to engage the enemy in a limited capacity,
and when they began to be turned by the opposition,
Sertorius intervened to successfully extract the Iberians
from the situation. A few days later (this part being told
by both Plutarch and Valerius Maximus, Facta 7.3.5),
Sertorius called an assembly of his troops, presenting
before them two horses, one small and weak, the other
large and strong. The weaker horse was accompanied by
a large, robust soldier to whom the task was given to
seize the tail of the horse and pull with all his might, as
if to remove it by such force. Whilst he attempted this, to
the amusement of the crowd, a more diminutive soldier,
described by Plutarch as being of “contemptable size”,
set about removing one hair at a time from the strong
horse’s tail until it was fully removed. In this theatrical
manner Sertorius conveyed to his troops the message that
his guerrilla tactics could ultimately prove more efficient
than an attempt at using blind force against the Sullan
forces of Metellus.
By the time of the arrival of young Gnaeus Pompeius
Magnus in the peninsula in 76 BC, a greater emphasis
had been placed by both factions on the acquisition and
retained control of towns throughout the peninsula. The
resilience and flair with which Sertorius undertook these
operations was another means by which he could inspire
confidence and enthusiasm for his leadership. Already
in 78 BC Metellus had made a rapid, determined drive
into the west of the peninsula to take the town of Lango-
briga, loyal to the Sertorian cause. Believing the objec-
tive could be attained quickly due to the town’s depend-
ence on a single well for water supply (Plutarch Sertorius
13.4), Metellus ordered his men to take only five days’
rations. Having received intelligence of Metellus’ in-
tentions, however, Sertorius arranged for two thousand
wine-skins full of water to be conveyed by hired men
over the mountains and into Langobriga prior to Metel-
lus’ arrival. When Metellus realised that this had been
done, he dispatched troops to forage for supplies, but the
harassment and ambushing of these troops by Sertorius
left Metellus with no option for the time being other than
to lift the siege.
In 76 BC it was Sertorius who had set about the be-
sieging of a town, namely Lauron in the east of the penin-
sula. Upon his arrival, Pompeius took up a position plac-
ing the forces of Sertorius between himself and the town.
Thus, feeling confident that he had Sertorius in a vulner-
able position and unable to move freely, Pompeius sent
word to the inhabitants of the town to take up positions on
the walls of the town in order to watch “the spectacle of
Sertorius undergoing siege” (Plutarch Sertorius 18.3). Ser-
torius’ response was again to harass the foraging forces
dispatched by Pompeius to nearby fields, forcing them to
go further afield. Once they adapted to this as a new rou-
tine, Sertorius then set an overnight ambush combining
his forces. As Pompeius’ foragers returned weighed down
by their acquisitions, they were first hit by the light-armed
Spaniards in their rear, before a second attack by the le-
gionaries and scutati at their front delivered confusion,
and the cavalry swooped upon any fleeing for the safety of
their camp. Upon receiving reports that his foragers were
in trouble, Pompeius dispatched a legion to the rescue, but
as this legion engaged the infantry that had wiped out the
foragers it was hit in the rear by the roaming cavalry and
thus began its own destruction (Frontinus Strategemata
2.5.31). As Pompeius realised what was transpiring he pre-
pared to deploy his whole remaining force, only to realise
that if he did so he would be placing his army at the peril
of a flank attack from Sertorius’ main army, which had
now deployed. The result was that Pompeius was forced
to accept the loss of two legions, and since the Sertorian
forces that had perpetrated the ambush remained in their
new position, he could not prevent Sertorius from turning
his attention back to Lauron, which promptly surrendered
to him and was destroyed. Sertorius had taught Pompeius
a lesson in the most dramatic of ways.
Ultimately, Sertorius’ programme of winning hearts
and minds through both conventional and unconven-
tional means of inspiration, could not overcome the
personal political ambitions of men who worked both
with and against him. Years of warfare had ravaged the
landscape and population of the Iberian Peninsula,
whittled down Sertorius’ limited supply of Roman le-
gionary troops, and exposed Sertorius increasingly to
the discriminative slander of men within his own ranks
such as Marcus Veiento Perpenna, a man who could
never overlook the perceived shame of being under the
command of a novus homo such as Sertorius. Ultimate-
ly the combination of Sertorius’ Italian heritage and his
willingness to placate provincial whims inspired Per-
penna to conspire in his assassination.
Dying alone
Both Eumenes and Sertorius had been born outside the
mainstream, ascended to positions of authority by means
of their own personal abilities, and consistently showed
themselves to be individuals unwilling to compromise
their own moral compass. Certainly, a greater amount of
blame can be placed on the shoulders of Sertorius for os-
tracising himself through his criticism of others. For each,
the fickleness of fortune took them from being in the van-
guard of military might to isolation and ignominy, then
back again. Yet their resourcefulness and resilience of
character is demonstrated best in their formulation, exe-
cution, and profiteering from the unconventional means
they adopted by which to inspire those around them. 0
Mark McCaffery is a regular contributor to Ancient War-
fare magazine.
FURTHER READING
x Matyszak, Philip. Sertorius and the Struggle for Spain.
Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2013.
x Sampson, Gareth C. The Collapse of Rome: Marius,
Sulla & the 1st Civil War (91–70 BC. Barnsley: Pen
and Sword Military, 2013.
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
11
GRAVE MATTERS

The ruins of the fortifications at the city of Plataea, besieged at the opening of the Peloponnesian War, 431 BC, and razed after its capture in 428.

THE RISE OF A NEGLECTED ATHENIAN CORPS By Anneka Mihajlov

In Athe horses trained as weapons of war, using their

hooves, teeth, and weight in battle (Herodotus
tary se 5.111). To further the issue of early ineffective
were too Athenian cavalry, their weakness was perhaps
ern schola most keenly felt at Plataea in 479. Aristides, one
of the Athenian generals, asked for 1,000 cav-
s ems tha
se alry to support his 10,000 hoplites and 1,000
triremes, yet this number of cavalry in Athens
he Athenian cavalry saw a massive rise in use would not be reached until under Pericles in
and success following the watershed changes the 430s (Plutarch Aristides 21.1). The last straw
under Pericles, in which the cavalry grew from came later, at Tangara in 457. Here, the hired
a mere handful to 1,000 citizen riders – dis- Thessalian cavalry of 1,000 deserted the Athe-
counting the 200 hippotoxotai (horse-archers) nian cause (Thucydides 1.107–7). No doubt
wh this was a deciding factor in the choice to up-
pou grade the Athenian citizen cavalry.
tim
nes Pericles’ reforms
era As early as 431, Pericles used the cavalry, sup-
It was through the Persian cavalry that the Atheni- ported by Thessalians, to hold off a Spartan of-
ans fensive (Thuc. 2.22.3). Around the same time,
dotus tells us (7.87) that Pericles, as general, led out 100 ships along
Whit lekythos (oil jug) the Persians sent a swarm he
show v-
of 80,000 mounted men
his s
upon the Greeks, their c.
ing to
© The M
This pair of fourth-century BC roun-
dels that were found in a tomb near Elis,
Greece once decorated a set of horse
x

tack. Depicting images of a satyr and a

man in oriental dress, they were once
Ancien
nt Warfare XIV-6 completely covered in silver.
1
12 © Mary Harrsch / Wikimedia Commons
 Mouth of an Attic black-figure Din

x
picting hoplite battle; the warriors os de-
ridden horses to the fight. have
© J. Paul Getty Museum

so-called ‘
and this fun
© George E. Koronaios / Wikimedia Commons

minating in w The three faces of the pentelic mar-

nian cavalry and t ble Academy trapeza base showing
This impressive in the three different scenes of cavalry
battle (with the same rider?) from
Academy in 1931, w of a fu-
the early fourth century BC.
2.56.1). It must be noted that this was the first s three © Lauren van Zoonen
time the city’s cavalry had been transported on ac-
ships. This operation proved such a success that ed
it would be repeated twice after Pericles’ death: lar
in 424, and again in 414–413 during the disas- ilar
trous Sicilian campaign. Athenian cavalry suc- her
cesses in defending Attica may go some way ps a
to explain the Spartan creation or recreation of hree
their cavalry arm in 425 (Thuc. 3.1.1). Dex-
After Pericles’ death the cavalry would ileos relief (see AW the
continue their success, stopping the annihila- cal
tion of the Athenian infantry at Mantinea in 418 for
(Thuc. 5.73) and travelling across the empire Un-
throughout the war. They were also to be pivot- heir
al at Nemea in 494 and in Boeotia (Xenophon what
Hellenica 4.2.17; Diodorus 15.26.2). They ical
were no longer the rabble band of unsuccessful in subject, size and style.
riders they had been before Pericles. ase
that
Hold your head up high hint that they reflect three different battles of
Whilst one could not argue that they garnered a highly successful cavalryman. For exam-
the same arête (excellence) or timé (honour) ple, relief A shows the rider bare chested,
as the hoplite, cavalrymen could just as easily whereas in C he is covered in a chiton. In
be heroes of war. Furthermore, as the only unit relief B, the horse’s head is markedly slim-
to continuously defend Attica during the Pelo- mer than in A and B, perhaps representing
ponnesian War, their presence was no doubt a different horse. There are also differenc-
uniquely seen and felt by everyday Athenians. es with the fallen enemy. Whilst some of
This shift of thinking, to deploy instead of side- these could be explained due to different
line the citizen cavalry, was pivotal in their re- angles, they seem more likely to be inten-
ception. They appeared in festivals and public tional and thus different enemies. On two
display, becoming a valid body of the military sides, both fallen men are clothed, whilst on
protecting the Athenian chôra (the territory out- the third the trampled enemy is nude.
side of the city itself). Whether their more posi- h
tive reception is down to Periclean changes or -
a cause of it, the reality is that cavalry service potrophic family of successful cavalry-
was now one entered with pride and purpose. men. One can imagine these panels ex-
This change in status and attitude is per- alting their success in the battles of the
haps best illustrated in some of the grave stelae fifth century. Had we been left with an
surviving from the classical period. Athenian epigram, we would no doubt know more.
monuments served as a reminder of the de- What we are left with is an impressive
ceased’s wealth and status. Grave stelae were monument which, to their contemporary
ally ch community, showcased cavalrymen who
ceased as a tool were heroes of war. 0
imagery
div .
s great interest is the She recently s
on Greek cavalry.

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

13
THEME: The Assyrian Empire at war

Siege of a city along a river, drawn by Sir Austen Henry Layard from the reliefs in the Palace of Sennacherib (the king himself is shown in a chariot).

STUDYING THE ASSYRIAN ARMY By Sean Manning

e y of e fu
If ancient army studies were a party, the Neo-Assyrian army would be the guest who some other
guests are deliberately ignoring. In the seventh century BC, the Assyrians were sending armies
from the Tigris to the Nile while Greeks were squabbling with their neighbours about women and
pastures. They had siege engineers and engines, and paid officials to collect and redistribute grain
and
an d silver and informat
of
techniques such as iron smelting and shooting the bow from horseback.

he Assyrians were hardly iso- The Neo-Assyrian army is not the easiest to
lated. Their tributaries in Sidon get to know. We have reliefs, documents, royal
and Tyre were sailing to Iberia, inscriptions, the ruins of cities, and the remains
while the Ionians robbed their of weapons. Foreigners from Judeans to Baby-
subjects or enlisted in Assyri- lonians give their own perspective. But it is hard
an to focus and turn this kaleidoscope of sources
gr into a clear and sharp picture. Archaeologists,
pe art historians, and philologists each have differ-
th ent viewpoints. Time has not left us a Polybius
a or a Josephus who describes the Assyrian army
from the outside looking in. All of those careful-
G wn from
w
o us,
g

Neo-Assyrian bronze swords and /

©
x

or daggers now in the British

Museum. First half of the first
millennium BC.
© Gary Todd/Flickr

A ci
An cien
ent Warfaree XIV-
en V-6
14
4
© New York Public Library
but we cannot understand everything they say.
The Assyrians expected that whoever opened
the tablet-box or gazed upon the reliefs could
ask someone else for explanation if they did not
understand something of what they saw. The
troubles in Iraq since 1991 have made research
difficult, while, in contrast, Roman military ar-
chaeology is in a 'happy time'.
To be a Neo-Assyrian king was to build,
to worship, and to wage war. In theory, every
year was a campaign, beginning with the ac-
cession year where an ambitious king was ex-
pected to do something that had never been
seen before. Kings competed with their ances-
tors to march farther, build greater temples and
palaces, and collect tribute that no king before
them had gathered. Just to take the throne,
Neo-Assyrian kings often had to fight their way
through the armies of other princes (and some-
times the army of the previous king).
To wage these wars, the kings could draw
upon the taxes and service obligations of their
kingdom and the troops of their allies. All As-
syrian men were obliged to provide service un-
less they were specially exempted. This service
might take the form of manual labour, practis-
ing a craft, or carrying a bow for the king. As-
syrian kings deported so many peoples to As-
syria and made them ‘part of the land’ because
a new Assyrian man was a new conscript and a
new taxpayer. A network of scribes and officials
kept lists of men liable for service, collected the
number of men required, and gathered them to
central points where they were organized and
trained. Some women and children received
the king’s rations while their men were away.
In practice, the army was divided into the royal
corps or kisir šarrūti, who served for a long time,
and the ordinary militia, which were called up
as needed. The reliefs probably concentrate on
troops of the royal corps, who received the best
equipment. The fighting qualities of the ordi-
nary militia probably varied, but at least they
were more strong backs to carry supplies, clear
reedbeds, and dig earthworks.
Allies were expected to provide supplies,
horses, and often troops. This is a common im-
perial practice, but some of these allies were
not what they seemed. The terms Itu'ean and
Qurrean (or Gurrean) seem ethnic, but in As-
syrian military jargon they correspond to ‘aux-
iliary archer’ and ‘auxiliary spearman’. Behind
the boastful reliefs and royal inscriptions, rural
communities probably talked to officials and
agreed to provide a number of troops in ex-
change for tax reductions, payments, grants, or
support in disputes with their neighbours.
Surviving letters to kings and officials
show an intricate system of intelligence-gath-
ering. Agents in cities reported rabble-rousers
who urged the assembly to turn away from m
s
e
al
r
r-
g-
ng
ar-
r
uilt
ter,
heir
the
ods
ders
ings
efore
crip-
tions they might present themselves as fearless Prism containing the Annals of Sen-
nacherib, narrating his third military
heroes confident in the support of the gods, but
campaign. The prism is named after
in the quiet darkness of the temples they want-
Colonel Robert Taylor, who found it
ed divine as well as human reassurance. in the 1830 at Nineveh.
From their mustering points on the upper © David Castor / Wikimedia Commons
Tigris, the armies marched in three different di-
rections. West across the Euphrates were many
cities and small kingdoms. To stand a chance,
Assyrian bas-relief from the Palace
they needed to work together. North, the nearest
of Ashurnasirpal II in Nimrud, which
military threat was in the mountains of Urartu.
depicts a siege tower and battering
When Tiglath-Pileser III took the throne, Sarduri ram destroying a fortified city, ca.
of Urartu was threatening to replace Assyria as 865 BC. Now in The British Museum.
the dominant power. It took years of hard fight- © Anthony HuanFollow / Flickr
A
15

Relief of a kneeling Assyrian soldier
from King Ashurbanipal's palace at
Nineveh, 668-627 BC. He besieges
an Elamite city holding his round
shield over his head for protection.
© The Walter's Art Museum
πAssyria
DID YOU KNOW?
was so rich in iron
that the invaders who de-
stroyed its cities left more
than a hundred tons of iron in
one store-room at Khorsabad:
https://bit.ly/3pkfDna
ing to drive S
up hostile c
Media. From
won many v
never occup
lakes Van an
gris were th
and the Ch
peting factio
usually be d
cities were
was harder
ever the Ass
someone wo
silver, and st
Ther
where Assy
but not tak
sacked Egy
pharaoh Taharq
brought back may have inspired the verse in
the Iliad about “Thebes, Egyptian Thebes where
the houses overflow with the greatest troves of
treasure/Thebes with the hundred gates” (Iliad
9.381-383). The Assyrians marched far into
Iran. But they had to withdraw from Egypt after
appointing a pharaoh, and in all of Iran only
Media in the west was reduced to a province
like Syria. Assurbanipal invaded Elam, ruined
cities and tossed the king of Elam off his throne,
but he did not occupy this ruined land either.
Battles are glamorous, and kings loved to
boast about the fights they had won and the
enemies they had humiliated. But battles did
not happen as often as they do in stories. When
enemies saw an overwhelming force approach,
they often refused to fight. Sometimes they scat-
tered to the four corners of the earth or hid in
hills and marshes and waited for the Assyrians
to go away. It was hard to feed an army once it
moved away from the waterways and granaries,
and it took time for strangers to find these hid-
ing-places and force their way in. Other times
enemies hid in walled cities and fortresses. This
was a tempting choice for kings and councils,
because they could shelter their families and
treasures there and leave the countryside to
fend for itself. So to have an empire, the Assyr-
ians needed to be able to take strong cities.
There was nothing innovative in what the
Assyrians did to a city that defied them. They
could wait outside the city, felling orchards
and burning houses until the defenders made
peace. They could negotiate with the defend-
ers to accept tribute and leave, or bribe some-
one to let them over a remote section of wall.
They could starve the defenders out or cut off
the supply of water. Because the Assyrians had
systems to keep their men fed and equipped,
the besieged could not trust that they would go
away after a few days. They knew what would
happen to them and their families if they con-
tinued to resist and failed. Most spectacularly,
e
rs
sh
an
sieges did not always succeed. Often the As-
syrians focused their attentions on small set-
-
es,
nego-
ncient
world, the difference between the army of a
king and a band of robbers was that one could
take walled cities and the other could not.
Eventually the Assyrian Empire fell apart.
The sculptures and inscriptions and treasure-
houses that we remember were the result of
about 200 years of successful predation spread
over 300 years. Scholars debate whether the
Empire fragmented because of military decline,

826 – 820 814

THE ASSYRIAN EMPIRE 883 – 859
Ashurnasripal II – campaigns 853 – 823 Conflict in Assyria to
secure the succes-
Battle of Dur-papsukkal against Babyloni-
an king Marduk-zakir-shumi I. Campaigns
A TIMELINE OF EVENTS (1049 – 614 BC) through Aram and Canaan. Trib- Shalmaneser subjugates
all of Babylonia, Aramea, sion after the long and against Chaldeans, Arameans.
1049 – 1031 ute paid by Aramea, Phrygia,
935 – 912 Phoenicia. Revolts by Medes Israel, Moab, Edom, successful reign of 810 – 782
Ashurnasirpal I – Ashur-Dan II – secures the Urartu, Phoenicia and the Shalmaneser III between
and Persians in the Zagros Succession of the boy-king Adad-nirari
campaigns against territory of Assyria and Neo-Hittite Empire. Also brothers Shamshi-Adad
Mountains suppressed. Capital III. He conquers the Levant, Persians,
Neo-Hittites and Ara- makes raids outside of campaigns against Arabia and Assur-danin-pal.
moved to Nimrud (Kalhu). Medes and reaches the Caspian Sea.
means. Assyrian territory. and Chaldeans.
Aramea and Babylon pay tribute.

1000 BC 900 BC 860 BC 820 BC 822 – 811

780 BC
891 – 884 853 Shamashi-Adad V defeats
858 – 823 his brother in 820. He
Tukulti-Nunurta II – campaigns reach Za- Battle of Qarqar – Shalmaneser Shalmaneser III – challenges
gros Mountains bringing Persians, Parthi- campaigns to bring rebel-
III defeats an alliance of twelve to Assyrian authority met
1013 – 972 der Assyria s sway. lious territories back
nations arrayed against Assyria, with aggressive conque under Assyrian control
Ashur-rabi II – campaigns and subjugation.
including Egypt. including Nineveh and
reach the Mediterranean Sea.
Babylonia.

Electrotype replica of a bronze ban

of armed men with booty from the d
x

Ancient Warfare XIV-6 Balawat Gates (Imgur-Enlil, Iraq).

16 © Osama Shukir Muhammed Amin /
Wikimedia Commons
 Assyrian mace head from Sam'al,
crats being subjugated at spearpoint by great
x

Turkey, eighth to seventh century BC,

now in the Pergamon Museum, Berlin.
© Gary Todd / Flickr
internal power struggles, or long-term structural
changes such as the stress of endless wars and
endless deportations. It is hard to look closely
at what the Assyrians did, because their ways
of hiding the ugliest parts are not our ways. But
this squeamishness may be a mistake. The story
of the first millennium BC is the story of free
cities and peaceable nations and proud aristo-
kings and mighty cities. Other kinds of armies
had many virtues, but for a thousand years they
failed to stop one empire after another from
rising like the waves at high tide. Even if your
main interest is the Athenians, the Romans, or
the Dacians, speaking to the Neo-Assyrians at
that party would be well worth your time. 0
Dr. Sean Manning is a regular contributor to
Ancient Warfare magazine.

726 – 723 626 – 609

755 – 745
Ashur-nirari III – a
period of immense
internal conflict until
deposed by usurper
Pulu who becomes
Tiglath-Pileser III.
Shalmaneser V – conquests in Levant, stops Egyptian
expansion. Deports Ten Tribes of Israel.
722 – 705
Sargon II – defeats raids by Cimmerians
and Scythians, revolt in Canaan, and
defeats Egypt on Assyria’s western bor-
der. Wars against Urartu and conquest
of Babylon. Sargon dies in battle.
Downfall. A series of civil
681 – 669 wars allowed other powers
Esarhaddon brings peace to empire 615 to rise, especially the Medes
after murder of Sennacherib. Vast num- Battle of Arrapha under Cyaxares.
ber of vassal states. Rebuilds Babylon. – Medes defeat
671 Assyrians.
Conquest of Egypt. Assyrian Empire is
the largest the world has ever seen.

740 BC 700 BC 660 BC 620 BC 580 BC

772 – 755
Ashur-dan III. Internal
conflict within Assyria. No
expansion. Generals be-
come rivals for power.
691 653 614
705 – 681 Revolt by Per-
Battle of Halule. Sennacherib defeats a Battle of Assur – Medes
Sennacherib succeeds. Campaigns sians and Medes decisively defeat Assyrians
huge alliance. Each nation is then subju- in Cilicia and the Levant against
gated individually. Babylon destroyed. defeated. and sack the city.
Egyptians. Major revolt within As-
668 – 631
745 – 727 syria. Capital moved to Nineveh.
Ashurbanipal. Memphis and Thebes in Egypt sacked. Last great
Tiglath-Pileser III – aggressively expands territory. Reorganises Assyrian Army king of Assyria. Libraries and temples built all over empire.
and administration. Campaigns against practically all neighbouring states.

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

17
ian Empire at war
THEME:
An iron spear-
head from
Hasanlu, Iran. The
city was situated on
the trade route through
the Zagros Mountains.
© UPenn Museum / The
Hasanlu Project
Fragmentary furniture
plaque with a bearded
male dignitary. From
Hasanlu, possibly the
capital of the Kingdom
of Mannea.
© Metropolitan Museum of Art
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
8
THE KINGDOM OF URARTU By Pavel Vaverka
On
now
half o
stretch
ograph
the As
he beginnings of Urartu were well suited to breeding cattle and horses. There
humble. The mountains and was an abundance of mineral resources for
valleys of eastern Anatolia har- metallurgy, and these conditions allowed for
boured many small kingdoms the expansion of the population and economy.
that were periodically raided by Moreover, the land was well-placed to inter-
Assyrian expeditions. In the late twelfth centu- cept the trade in tin, required to make bronze,
ry BC, Tiglath-Pileser I bragged of defeating no from further east into Assyria.
less than 23 kings in this area. Possibly band- In addition to fortresses and garrison cit-
ing together to defend themselves, a kingdom ies on the borders, the Urartians also built
emerged, probably in the tenth century BC, a system of watch towers every thirty km in
whose rulers referred to themselves as “Kings of the hinterland. Key strategic points such as
Nairi”. The Assyrians called the land Urartu. Its the Kelišin Pass were defended by a system of
first recorded king is Arramu (r. 858–844). strongholds, some of which have been exca-
The King List (see text box) shows that vated. Cities stood mostly on mountains and
all kings had relatively long reigns, implying hills, and only rarely on plains. The metropo-
stability a lis of Tushpa (Turushpa) was founded in the
and civil w ninth century and lay on a 100-metre-high
ily. On a plateau about 1,345 metres long and 200
Musasir an metres in width. The city had several fortifi-
es and one cation zones with walls were as high as ten
in his ha metres, making it practically unconquerable;
could be the Assyrians never took it by storm.
of the illeg
Desp Urartu on campaign
spaces o Exploiting a period of Assyrian internal unrest,
built the Urartian king Arramu began an era of con-
ma quest. As far as we can establish, Urartu oper-
in ated very similarly to its southern neighbour.
t Every year there was a military campaign, of-
C
ten led by the king. These were aimed at the
p
smaller states in the region, though Urartu was
sy
generally careful not to invade the plains of As-
when
syria directly. They pillaged, plundered, and de-
m
ported populations with a ferocity matching the
su
Assyrians. In annexed lands they built watch
c
towers and roads, but also granaries, orchards,
Men wearing lamellar armour
and conical helmets in an Urar-
tian chariot clash with neigh-
bouring Assyrian cavalrymen
using axes and bows.
© Angel García Pinto
 A view of Van Fortress, Turkey,
the ancient Urartian capital of
Tushpa; it was never taken by
the Assyrian in a siege.
© Livius.org
Stele possibly depicting the god
Khaldi – one of the three chief
deities of Urartu – standing on the
back of a lion. Now in the Erebuni
Museum, Yerevan, Armenia.
© Rita Willaert / Flickr
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
20
vineyards, gardens, and kings built new sanctu- A copper or bronze mace
head, from Hasanlu, the
x
aries for the Urartian pantheon.
Pompeii of Iran, dated to
The kings Ishpuini (r. 828-810), and between 1000-800 BC.
ct
Menua (r. 810-785) (known as the “king © UPenn Museum / The Hasanlu Proje
architect”) were renowned for their depor- s created an in-
tations, affecting tens of thousands of peo- ar, storing weap-
p aries and securing
o
horse-rearing capability with stables and pas-
p
turages. Tribute as well as loot helped pay for
an
all this. Campaigns also brought many enemy
U
horses; some inscriptions of Argishti I record
la
numbers of captured cavalry horses, from as
U
few as 25, to 987 and even 17,942.
t
o
t
Urartian armies
e Urartian armies were composed differently to
g Assyrian ones, with a focus on close combat,
t more cavalry than chariots - not practical in
s mountainous terrain, though they do appear -
o and a combination of foot archers and spear-
c men. This emphasis may have been due to
t Urartu's social system, the mountainous terrain
d or the need to deal with nomadic raiders. An-
Ir other reason could be the ability of cavalry to
e easily defeat infantry. We have many examples
fo of horse armour: bronze frontlets, breast plates,
p headdresses, and collars. Leather and linen ar-
s mour (perhaps combined with metal parts) may
 Chalcedony cylinder seal of king
,
Urzana of Musasir, an Urartian city

x
circa 715 BC.
© Rijksmuseum van Oudheden

also have existed; such equipment was avail- d spear-

able to chariot and cavalry horses alike.
It is possible that Urartian warfare had
an influence on Assyrian warfare. The domi-
nance of cavalry under the Sargonids in the
seventh century BC may have developed from
the greater number of cavalry in Urartian ar-
mies. Armoured horsemen and horse armour
itself both came to Assyria after they had been
established in Urartu (horse armour only
coming in the reign of Ashurbanipal (r. 668-
631). Urartian equipment and armour may
also have influenced the Assyrians.
In 735 BC Tiglath Pileser III invaded the
Urartian homeland and defeated the Urar-
tian army before the very gates of Tushpa. He
erected his
ended due
even Assy
r
also
copied the larger, three- and four-horse Assyr-
ian chariots. In the seventh century, Assyrians
may have been inspired by Urartu in the intro-
duction of protection for cavalry horses, and in
issuing shorter, broader infantry swords
Two armies?
Urartian armies had regular units (royal army,
royal guard), provincial auxiliary armies, and
units from allied states and tribes under their
own leaders. Urartian armies grew in size
throughout the period; the field army of Argishti
I and Sarduri II may have had 70–80,000 men.
Sarduri II (r. 763–735) had a pool of 352,011
soldiers available, with 100,000 men forming
his professional army. It is very probable that
chariots and cavalry were organized in a cohort
(Top) Replica of a bronze band
from the Balawat Gates, now in The
British Museum. Here a group of
(Urartian?) prisoners are escorted
by their Assyrian conquerors.
© Osama Shukir Muhammed Amin /
Wikimedia Commons
(Bottom) Tributary scene from in
the palace at Dur-Sharrukin (Khors-
abad), Iraq. King Sargon II receives
tribute from Urartu, late eighth cen-
tury BC, now in the Iraq Museum,
Baghdad, Iraq.
© Osama Shukir Muhammed Amin /
Wikimedia Commons

against Tu
Pileser pl
the first ti
ed a new
an enem
confined
List
province kuta-
haté): li
thing li palton, both spear
and jav
reign o
ian auxiliary soldiers using Irtu armour; perhaps
adopted from the Neo-Hittite states or Urartu.
By the reign of Sargon II (r. 722–705), the larg-
est Urartian unit had 3,000 footmen (including
engineers and baggage train), commanded by
a magnate or provincial governor. Five or ten
smaller units of 300-600 men were command-
perhaps no accident that,
e read of units of 3,000
uring Sargon II’s reign.
rartian warriors could
ported from Assyria,
ably a domestic in-
asus tribes, where
shields from the
enturies BC.
gn of Rusa I
Urartu royal
mposition,
ssyrians.
intro-
s for

Urartian conical
bronze helmet of King
x

Ishpuini (r. 828-810

BC), now in Mainz.
© Karwansaray Publishers

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

21
 system
Footm
of hu
matio
D clear. These were produced deliberately and
BC w
and
end
have
Clay cuneiform tablet detailing
cal helmets and la
the eighth military campaign of
Sargon II against Urartu, circa. 714 60–120 cm in diam
BC, from Assur, Iraq. Now in The dished, round shields had also disappeared.
Louvre, Paris. At the turn of the eighth century BC, we find
© Livius.org new types of daggers, and swords with hemi-
spherical or conical handles. Blades were
KINGS OF URARTU mostly straight, shorter types 40 cm long, al-
Aramu (858–844) though sometimes blades were curved, with
Lutipri (844–834) an edge on one side. Long swords had blades
Sarduri (834–828) 70 cm long – an ideal cavalry weapon. From
Ishpuini (828–810) archaeological finds, we know of six types of
Menua (810–785) sword handles and four types of blades, and
Argishti I. (785–763)
we have finds of wooden or leather scabbards
Sarduri II. (763–735)
(in both ‘V’ and ‘U’ shapes) with metal chapes.
Rusa I. (735–713 or 709/708)
Argishti II. (ca.709/08–680) Shields were wooden, bronze (even iron), or
Rusa II. (680–639) wicker with leather, mostly flat with a signifi-
Sarduri III (639–635) cant bronze shield boss.
Erimena (635–629) Quivers had a capacity of 36–40 arrows.
Rusa III (629–615) Typical arrow shapes were bilobate, leaf-head,
Sarduri IV (615–595) and bodkins, all made of iron, unlike the tri-
Rusa IV (595–585)
lobite bronze arrowheads of the Cimmerians,
Scythians, and Medes. In the first quarter of the
A view of the ruins of the fortified seventh century BC, Urartians also started us-
Urartian hill city of Erebuni (Arin- ing these bronze arrow heads. Urartian armour
Berd), Yerevan, Armenia. Built on
and helmets were of better quality than Assyr-
Urartu’s northern border, it was one
ian ones because their blacksmiths worked
of the region’s most important cities.
© Livius.org iron into a ‘red heat’ (900°C), whereas Assyr-
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
22
ians only heated their lamellar scales to 600°C,
making them mildly carbonized. Urartu had
superb quality weapons, which metallurgical
analysis of swords, daggers, and knives makes
with great skill, and their carbon content is only
0.4–0.5%, or 0.3–0.9%.
Armour was probably mostly leather, pos-
sibly with metal parts. In the eighth century BC,
lamellar armour was used by elite warriors.
The Irtu was a bronze chest plate similar to the
cardiophylax or pectorale; we have an exam-
ple from Menua’s reign 24.6 cm in diameter.
From the eighth/seventh century BC we see
tall shields reaching from chin to knee, simi-
lar to later seventh-century Egyptian and Assyr-
ian types (slimmer at the top with a curve, but
broader below). Early on in Urartian warfare,
angular, convex bows were common, but lat-
er, near the end of the eighth century, analysis
shows that angular bows were rare, with 41%
convex bows and 59% recurved bows. Argishti
II (r. ca.709/8–680) mentions how he fired the
bow a distance of 434.34 metres. Cimmerians
and Scythians influenced Urartu bow making;
some types look like Scythian examples, with a
longer upper limb.
On one Urartian belt (ca.858–734/714
BC), a battle is depicted. An infantry formation
is led by swordsmen with round shields; they
disperse light infantry. Following them are arch-
ers and javelineers with slightly concave round
shields. These soldiers are in loose formations,
covering each other. After this vanguard we can
see spearmen in helmets, with round shields
armed with short spears. A second type looks
similar but their spears are longer, perhaps de-
picting pikes. These pikemen were the last line
of defence, behind whom other units could
regroup, including chariots and cavalry. They
might also lead charges against enemy heavy
infantry because their pikes had greater reach.
Chariots attack in front of cavalry armed with
javelins, and mounted spearmen act as escorts
to the chariots. Both types of cavalry have small,
round shields and conical helmets.
The later period (714/708–585) brought
changes. Horse archers are seen for the first
time in the second half of the eig
There are now various types of chariots, with
two, three, or four horses. Crews had bows and
spears, and in one case a man is shown with a
shield and sling. Urartian chariots had a short
 Bronze or copper helmet earflap
or cheekpiece from Hasanlu, Iran, her adversaries were mostly mountain tribes or 1850 drawing of a relief from Sargon's
decorated with floral motifs dated
x

between 1000-800 BC.

nomads. Heavy infantry acted as a reserve and
© UPenn Museum / The Hasanlu Proje a refuge for other units to regroup. They could
ct
also lead a decisive charge at a suitable mo-
po
ment to take control of the battlefield.
bi
palace in Dur-Sharrukin showing the
Assyrian sack of the city of Musasir
and of its temple dedicated to the
Urartian god Khaldi, circa 714 BC.
© Public domain

Ch
Decline
pe In the seventh century, the Urartian kingdom
rio suddenly went into a rapid decline. Unfor-
I tunately, both Urartian and Assyrian sources
the are lacking for this period, though it seems
of the Assyrians were not the cause. In about
ha 640 BC, king Sarduri had acknowledged Hundreds of Urartian bronze belts
cavalry s Assyrian supremacy by sending tribute to survive from the period of Urartu’s
but no s Assurbanipal. The culprits may have been expansion, ranging from practical
shields, Scythian and Cimmerian nomadic horse- versions (like this one) to highly
horse archers. Infantry formations of 3,500 decorated versions. The protection
men; warriors archaeologically attested to
were composed of 500 men with large pavise- afforded is obvious.
the destruction
n of
of © EvgenyGenkin / Wikimedia Commons
like shields (with bows); behind them are 1,000 s. In the early
archers, and a last line of 2,000 spearmen with an lands
circular shields and bows. M des,
Me
The organisation of regular infantry units fter As-
also changed in the second period, perhaps for sed and
more sophisticated forms of combat. New units Babylon
had 3,000 men, with 20% swordsmen, jave- .0
lineers, archers, and now slingers; the rest were
light spearmen with tall or round shields. These a free-
units fought in a coordinated manner, but bri- as writ-
gades were flexible and ide everal
operations and manoeuvres on the battlefield. articl mili-
Urartu needed a fast and agile army because tary hi law.

Complete iron sword fro

Iraq, 1000-800 BC. Pom Hasanlu,
blade are one unit. mmel, hilt, and
x

© UPenn Museum / The

Hasanlu Project

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

23
THEME: The Assyrian Empire at war

Overhead view of Shulmu-sharri's house at Dur-Katlimmu, also called the Red House. Obviously, this Qurbutu had done well for himself.

THE ASSYRIAN KING'S ELITE BODYGUARD ones

e qbū
The Assyrian king’s eyes and ears were a group of elite soldiers
- Their name translates as ‘the close ones’ in Ak-
called qurbutu.
kadian, indicating they were kept close to and were trusted by
- - variously served as bodyguards to the
the king. The qurbutus
king, as an elite military force, and as a domestic intelligence
agency monitoring the actions of all the officials of the empire.
he qurbūtūs appear to have originated
as royal bodyguards. Accounting lists
documenting the distribution of wine ra-
tions reveal that in the early ninth cen-
tury BC between a few dozen and a few
h qurbūtūs guarded the king and had their own
c king, officials who ended up on their wrong
m qurbūtūs marching at the vanguard of the
a to complain about their bad behaviour. One
Sargon II (r.
T
722–705 BC) appears
documenting the purchase of
a woman and her daughter by to have massively ex-
Shulmu-sharri for 1/2 a mina panded the qurbūtu
and 5 shekels of silver. to a force of several
© Courtesy Tell Sheikh Hamad
Archive, Free University of Berlin.
n and
afterwards reveal that the qurbūtūs cted
iti-
n-
trust a qurbūtu ed
ed
out. The qurbūtūs on
h-
ted
any suspected disloyalty back to the king.
This arrangement made the qurbūtūs w-
erful, respected, and feared. Governors sought h
to win them over, sometimes by offering them
a cut of any corrupt scheme they were a part
of in hopes of 'buying their silence'. Governors
whose orders were being disobeyed also often
asked the king to send a qurbūtu in hope that a
bodyguard bearing a message straight from the
king’s mouth might be better respected.
Because qurbūtūs reported directly to the
side had no recourse but to write to the king
governor complained that a qurbūtu had taken
the entire supply of reeds from his province,
leaving him with nothing to use for making
the mudbricks he needed for building fortifica-
tions. A palace supervisor complained that oth-

Anci
An ciient Warfarre XIIV-
V6
24
4
© Courtesy Tell Sheikh Hamad Archive, Free University of Berlin.

er qurbūtūs were violent alcoholics and “when involving a qurbūtu alla (a

they are drunk, none of them can turn an iron e man
sword away from his colleague”. Others were o slav-
accused of extorting possessions from people a bag
who had been deported from conquered lands, her to
seizing money and property from those who hidden
were already destitute and vulnerable. told a
The kings highly rewarded qurbūtūs for qurbūtu, who told the Assyrian king.
their service. They were given shares of plunder The qurbūtūs derived their power This tablet documents a loan of
from campaigns and sometimes granted plots through the king’s reliance on them for ob- three shekels of silver which Shul-
of land with tenant farmers who could provide taining accurate information about what his mu-sharri made to a man named
revenue. In 1993, German archaeologists ex- subordinates were doing. Yet, their position as Silim-Hadad at 33% interest (some
cavating the ancient city of Dur-Katlimmu (Tell loans were as high as 50%). It dates
part intelligence agency, part political officers
from the 620s or early 610s BC.
Sheikh Hamad in Syria) discovered the house gave them plenty of opportunities to engage © Courtesy Tell Sheikh Hamad Archive, Free
of a qurbūtu named Shulmu-sharri. Dubbed in graft and corruption, which they exploited University of Berlin.
the ‘Red House’ due to its red-painted interior as much as they could. 0
walls, the house featured over eighty rooms and Photos of the Red House, showing
two courtyards and covered an area of nearly the red-painted interior walls, which
Dr. Christopher W. Jones is a historian of the
5200 square metres. gave the building its name.
Silver pendant show- Neo-Assyrian empire who recently completed © Courtesy Tell Sheikh Hamad Archive,
ing a devotee worship- Excavators found his dissertation at Columbia University. Free University of Berlin.
ping before Ishtar. This an archive of tablets
goddess, in one of her
guises, has been sug- documenting 50 years of
gested as the patron for Shulmu-sharri’s business
the king's bodyguard. dealings, written in both
© Neuroforever /
Wikimedia Commons Akkadian and Aramaic.
x Fourteen tablets docu-
ment purchases of land, usually
sm
Sh
on
now
been
lived
turn for a
tto Shulmu-sharri as income.
Shulmu-sharri’s main source of income,
however, appears to have been slave trading.
Forty-two documents from his archive are re-
ceipts for the purchases of slaves, whom he
bought from sellers all across the empire from
Cilicia to the Zagros Mountains of Iran. Nearly
half of all these documents whose dates survive
were drawn up during the time when he served
as a qurbūtu, suggesting that he used the fre-
quent travels to make connections that his posi-
tion provided in order to further his side busi-
ness buying and selling human beings.
In the Assyrian Empire, people often be-
came enslaved due to inability to pay off debts.
Lending was frequently exploitative: Shulmu-
sharri made additional money through loan-
ing barley or silver to farmers at 50% interest.
Another letter from Nineveh describes a case

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

25
THEME: The Assyrian Empire at war

THE BATTLE OF MOUNT WAUSH, 714 BC

ke a fuRious
arrow
Unlike accounts of Greek, Roman, and even Egyptian
battles, Assyrian warfare has left us no narratives with
which we can easily reconstruct how an Assyrian battle
was fought. We do, however, have a rich archaeological
record of reliefs, inscriptions, and other finds, which re-
veal several aspects of Assyrian warfare and campaigns.
Used with care, these resources can be used to recon-
struct how an Assyrian battle may have been fought.

By Tamás Dezso''

I
n 714 BC, Sargon II (r. 722–705 BC) invaded the Kingdom
of Urartu and fought against its king, Rusa I (r. 735–714 BC).
Sargon’s predecessor, Tiglath-Pileser III (r. 745–727 BC), had
recognised the rising threat that Urartu posed, and Rusa had
backed a rival in the kingdom of Mannea who overthrew the
Assyrian candidate. Several other states joined this rebellion against
tian gains, but his successes were undone by
Assyrian authority. Sargon prepared and, in 716 BC, he retook
a fresh rebellion in Harhar and Phrygian raids
Mannea, which surrendered unconditionally; the other rebel client
into Quwê. These were quickly dealt with.
states soon followed suit, probably exceeding Sargon’s hopes. He
Agents informed Sargon of what was going on
reclaimed or took over Mannea, Karalla, Allabria, and Kishesim,
in Urartu, where Rusa continued to agitate on
a d his armies marched over 600
an
the northern Assyrian border. Relatively late in
Sargon’s armies included
levies, Gurrean spearmen the campaigning season of 714, Assyrian forces
ther into new territory th invaded Urartu and made their way towards
they became. Reliefs sh Wauš, Mount Waush (or Uaush; possibly mod-
corpses, and towns b ern Mount Sahand in north-western Iran, al-
bat and Harhar. Ura though the battle site is much debated).
and Sargon’s Ann record that Rusa took 22 for-
tresses, probabl Encamped at Mount Waush
der. In 714, Rusa had already encamped in a ravine and
Assyrian kin sent an invitation to Sargon, challenging him
nea and to meet him in battle there, according to the
territory “Letter to Ashur”, the Assyrian text that details
multipl the campaign. Rusa had probably already
lost a battle against the Cimmerians earlier
A wel in the year, and the army at Waush was ei-
conic ther the remnants of that army or a second
now army. It is possible that Rusa knew he would
hel
need to face Sargon, especially if news of his
©G

Anci
An ciient Warfarre XIV-
V6
26

vulnerability after defeat at the hands of the
Cimmerians was known to the Assyrian king
– which in all probability it was.
According to Assyrian sources, the Urar-
tian army consisted of infantry, a corps of 260
royal cavalrymen (who may have been elite
warriors from the king’s own clan), and allied
troops from Andia, Zikirtu, Wishdish, and oth-
er states. Rusa’s army took up a position at the
mouth of a valley. Sargon arrived ahead of his
main infantry but, instead of awaiting their ar-
rival, immediately launched an attack with his
chariotry and cavalry. His Annals record:
With my single chariot, together with my
(bodyguard) cavalry who never leave my
side, nor in enemy, nor in friendly country,
the regiment (kitullu pirru) of Sîn-ahu-usur
(the king’s brother), like a furious arrow, I
plunged into their midst and defeated them
caused a
of his warriors I buqlu)
and filled the pla sapannu) of the moun-
Possible chariot or hors
x
ment made of shell fro e orna-
rud, ca. eighth centur m Nim-
© Me
y BC.
tropolitan Museum of Art
Drawing of a relief from the
Dur-Sharrukin Palace of Sargon II
showing Assyrian spearmen and
archers (and siege engines) as-
saulting an enemy city.
© New York Public Library
de
their blood to flow into
the ravines and preci-
pices of the mountain
like a river, and paint-
ed the (battle)field, the
plain red (with blood).
This is probably slightly
exaggerated, something
we can expect in Assyr-
ian texts. It does, howev-
ty to apply what
A relief fragment from the palace of
ies and the cam- Sargon in Dur-Sharrukin depicting a
paign to the battle. foreign groom walking in a procession
with two horses, circa 721 - 705 BC.
The light infantry © Metropolitan Museum of Art
According to depictions of the Assyrian ar-
my’s marching columns, the army was led by
the light infantry: cohorts of auxiliary archers
and auxiliary spearmen. On the map (p.32)
there are 4,000 auxiliary spearmen (Gurre-
ans) and 4,000 auxiliary archers (Itu’eans).
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
27

The Sargon Stele, found on Cyprus
in 1845 at the site of the former
kingdom of Kition (Larnaca, Cyprus).
Inscribed in Akkadian, it is now in
the Pergamon Museum, Berlin.
© Rijksmuseum van Oudheden
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
28
Since the account says that there was also
a rearguard, we have supposed that all the
auxiliary troops marched at the head of the
attacking Assyrian column. As fast-moving
skirmishing units, they have taken the tra-
ditional role of reconnaissance and would
deploy on the wings to cover the flanks of
the Assyrian battle array. It is likely that these
auxiliary infantry troops rushed to the wings
to cover the flanks, and that they prevented
the wings of the Assyrian battle array from
being outflanked.
The cavalry charge
It is clear from the Assyrian account that the de-
cisive Assyrian blow was delivered by the As-
syrian (bodyguard) cavalry immediately at the
start of the battle (or at least no other phases are
reported). Emerging from behind the auxiliary
infantry, the Assyrian king launched the cav-
alry charge, which – according to the account
of Sargon II – had a devastating effect on the
Urartian battle line and consequently caused
the crushing defeat of the army of Rusa.
The impact of a cavalry charge and its
effect would be quite different depending on
the tactics adopted by the commander. The
cavalry may have attacked in line or in col-
umn. In line, the cavalry attacks on a relative-
ly broad front and meets the enemy cavalry or
infantry. This charge could not break an en-
emy formation because the weight of the cav-
alry would be dispersed along the wide front
contacting the enemy. For this reason, such
a charge could be intercepted and stopped
relatively easily by disciplined infantry. In
column (or wedge or diamond), the charging
squadrons formed a cutting edge at the front
of the formation, which, concentrated onto a
very small section or single point of the en-
emy line, could easily break through. Further-
more, such tactics could be aimed at the gaps
that arose between the different infantry units
in the enemy battle line, the weakest points of
the enemy line and consequently the easiest
points to break through. It is therefore most
likely that Sargon charged in column.
During the first phase of the Battle of
Waush, if Sargon II deployed all of his eques-
trian (cavalry and chariotry) units, this would
have amounted to 4,000 cavalry, including
1,000 guard cavalry (pēthalli qurubte) and
about 600 chariots. Such a formation 20 caval-
val-
en able
(“like a
ciplined
wo men
n at all),
ed at a
of this
tor of
ght at
g major- r
ity of the enemy front line had no chance to
join the first phase of the battle and hold their
 Horse blinkers similar to
this stone examole from
Nimrud can be seen on
several relief panels.
x
column formation for Greek cavalry. A view of the Sahand Mountains,
possible contender for the location
Alexander the Great was the master of
this tactic; this same manoeuvre decided the of Mount Waush.

© Metropolitan Museum of Art © Ensie & Matthias / Flickr

battles of Chaeronea, Granicus, Issus, and
position Gaugamela. With his companion cavalry (he-
tacking cav tairoi), Alexander found a gap in the enemy
line and launched a cavalry charge through An Urartian shield decorated with
but these would be ‘
beasts belonging to King Sarduri II,
continuing its for this gap. It remained a very popular tactic dur-
father of Rusa I. Sarduri was defeat-
It is not known whether this formation was ing the Wars of the Diadochi as well. ed by Tiglath-Pileser III, but his son
an invention of Sargon II himself or his gener- continued to agitate within Assyria.
als, or if this was the traditional tactic of the y © EvgenyGenkin / Wikimedia Commons
Assyrian cavalry. Later historical sources men- ere the cohorts
tion similar cavalry tactics, however. When ave arrived on
the Spartan king Agesilaus was on the march ehind the cav-
with his troops in Anatolia in 396 BC, the Per- eir attack
sian heavy cavalry of Pharnabazus surprised . This is
his army at Daskyleion. In the encounter, the eased
Persian cuirassier column attacked the hastily of
formed Greek cavalry line with devastating ef- de
fect. The Greek cavalry was drawn up like an d
ordinary phalanx, four horses deep, while the d
Persian heavy cavalry was drawn up with a y
narrow front of only about twelve horses and of
had a disproportionate depth. The Greek cav- 2,
alry fled (Hellenica 3.9–11). Xenophon, prob- o-
ably a cavalryman and certainly the author of ch
two cavalry treatises (On Horsemanship and that
The Cavalry Commander) and who was with and
Agesilaus, recommended the adoption of a of the

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

29
πSargon
THE CENTERFOLD
II leads the charge in his chariot
— flanked by guard cavalry and with
light troops protecting his flanks — di-
rectly towards the Urartian lines during
the Battle of Waush, 714 BC.
© Marek Szyszko
 A clay seal of Sargon II, 721-
705 BC, from Dur-Sharrukin.

x
Now in the Louvre, Paris.
© Rama / Wikimedia Commons

an-
den
cav-
nfan-
enemy
battle array from the side or from the rear
and widen the gap further. It seems plausible to
suppose that the heavy infantry, including the
bodyguard units (the sa—sepe and sa—qurb-
ute infantry), fought under the command of the
Chief Eunuch (rab ša—rēšē), who was the com-
mander of the royal corps (kisir šarrūti).
The other Assyrian infantry units prob-
ably deployed into line from column as they
entered the valley battlefield. When they
took their position leaving the marching col-
umn and deployed next to each other to form
the battle line, they may have formed an
oblique battle order with a ‘cutting edge’ or
‘hammer-head’ formed by the cohorts of the
armoured spearmen (heavy infantry) each
joining battle one after the other. This will
have increased the pressure on the Urartian
battle line and prevented their infantry units
from filling the gap opened by the charge of
the Assyrian equestrian units and probably
widened by the Assyrian heavy infantry.
These units were under the command of the
officers who brought them from the provin-
cies (governors), whose status had changed
during the different levels of reviews until fi-
nally they became unit commanders of the
Assyrian battle line. The account of the bat-
tle mentions the units of the eunuch officials
and the governors, and it mentions Tāb-šar-
Aššur, a high official (the treasurer, masennu)
and an important military commander.
From that point the initial battle was
probably divided into two separate encoun-
ters: a cavalry battle (the Assyrian equestrian
units fighting the Urartian coalition cavalry
and chariotry behind the main battle line
and around the Urartian camp) and an in-
fantry battle, where the Assyrian infantry met
the Urartian infantry.

The infantry battle

During this second phase of the battle, the in-
fantry lines clashed along the remaining sec-
tions of the original battle array. It seems that
the Assyrian infantry attacked the remaining
Urartian lines from the side and tried to en-
ciircle them. This infantry battle

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

32
the bloodiest part of the encounter. Follow-
ing from the quote above:
“[Sargon] painted the (battle)field, the
plain red (with blood) like the flower of the
illuru plant (like the red poppy?). Rusa’s
warriors, the best troops of his army, were
carrying bows and spears; Sargon slaugh-
tered them about his (Rusa’s) feet like sac-
rificial lambs and cut off their heads.”
The cavalry battle
It is quite possible that the coalition troops
were deployed separately on one of the wings
of the Urartian line, especially the Zikirtean
cavalry of Metatti, since the account of Sargon
II mentions that he and his troops had to be
defeated separately. Consequently, our recon-
struction indicates two different (cavalry) en-
counters: one with the troops of Metatti, king
of Zikirtu, and another with the Urartian cav-
alry of Rusa. If we suppose that, following the
breakthrough of the Urartian line, the Assyr-
ian cavalry met these two cavalry forces next
to one another. It seems plausible to suppose
that the Assyrian cavalry was divided into two
parts: the provincial cavalry units and the cav-
alry of the royal corps (kisir šarrūti), including
A Cimmerian da
date and prove gger of unknown
rians would pr nance. The Cimme-
Urartu and Assove problematic to
x
© O.
yria.
Mustafin / Wik
imedia Common
s
the bodyguard cavalry. If Sargon II launched a Assyrian royal guard cavalry (armed
with lances and bows) charge down
cavalry and chariotry charge against the bod-
their fleeing enemies from a relief at
yguard units of Rusa, the provincial cavalry,
the Dur-Sharrukin Palace of Sargon II
probably under the command of the Com- (note the decapitated bodies below).
mander-in-Chief (turtānu), would have met © New York Public Library
with the Zikirtean cavalry at the same time. It
makes no sense to suppose that the Zikirtean
cavalry remained inactive watching the cav- Relief showing a royal guard caval-
alry battle between the Assyrian and Urartian ryman leading his horse, from the
reign of Sennacherib, Southwest
cavalry on the way to the Urartian camp. Con-
Palace at Nineveh ("the Palace
sequently, the Zikirtean cavalry had also to be without Rival"), circa 704–681 BC.
attacked – a move that would also lead © Metropolitan Museum of Art
f the
Urartian infantry.
mo-
was
on’s
lry.
eu-
syr-
r
sa,
mp.
was
av-
he
an
ch
m-
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
33
 pletely
might
alries,
the ho
emph
charge
ent m
applie
alry w
only o
well.
gon c
sello
rela
cav
the
trea

A well-preserved Assyrian conical
iron helmet with bronze or copper
decorations. Now in the Royal Mu-
seum for Art and History, Brussels.
© Livius.org
A relief from Southwest Palace,
Nineveh, showing a royal guard cav-
alryman leading his horse across a
ford. From the reign of Sennacherib,
we can clearly see the spear, bow
and sword on his left hip.
© Metropolitan Museum of Art
The
Sargo
to his
troops
ed the
camp
ians). A close-quarters melee evolved, during
which the troops of Sargon surrounded Rusa
dispersed. The defeated troops of the Urartian
and the troops in his camp, and the Assyrian
coalition army started to retreat under the pres-
king shot the horses off the yoke of Rusa’s char-
sure of the Assyrian attack, and when the As-
iot with mulmullu-arrows. The Urartian king
syrian (provincial) cavalry started to encircle
abandoned his chariot, mounted on a mare,
them, they fled from the battlefield.
left his army behind, and fled to save his own
Reliefs also provide details of the Urar-
life. Meanwhile, as the Assyrian cavalry fought
tian flight and their chase by the Assyrians.
in the camp, the infantry finished their coun-
Some abandoned their horses and climbed
terparts, and th

The evo
The fi the cavalry bodyguard were equipped with
pear both a lance and a bow. It is important to note
Ashu that the armoured cavalry lancers were repre-
from sented as fighting in pairs, which at that point
wer means that they fought in close formations,
of t which was the other important development
poin in the history of the (Assyrian) cavalry. These
cava armoured cavalry units soon became the de-
a rou ng the
first arm nnach-
on the pala ). The
III (745–727 BC To
waistcoats (at tha 8–
and the characte rse
met. It seems tha d the
cavalry lancers om the
separated at that words.

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

34
up Wauš Mountain, but the Assyrians pur-
sued them and fought with them in the val-
leys, gorges, and ravines of the mountain,
filling the mountainside with their corpses.
It seems from the Assyrian royal account that
some contingent (probably of the Urartian
and coalition cavalry) managed to escape in
time from the battlefield, since Sargon and his
cavalry chased them from the Wauš to Mount
Zimur, “the jasper mountain”, for “six double
hours” (60 km) “at the point of the arrow”.
According to our reconstruction, based
partly on the evidence provided by the rela-
tively detailed account of Sargon II and partly
on the reconstruction of the composition and
structure of the Assyrian army, a probable im-
age of the battle emerges. This reconstruction
is based on two further tactical innovations:
the possible use of the oblique (echelon) bat-
tle line (which was an inh
moured infantry) and the
of the cavalry, also docu
sources of the later peri
The Urartians at Waus
is possible that, havin
defeat at the hands o
they were not prepared
Assyrian bronze plaque
x
of horse and rider with
traces of gold overlay,
circa 883 - 859 BC.
© Metropolitan Museum
of Art
ous armies of Sargon and did not put up much Ziwiye Tepe (near Saqqez, Kurdis-
of a fight. Nonetheless, the way into Urartu tan, Iran), a reconstructed hilltop
was opened up to the Assyrians. fortress dating back to the Man-
naeans; the site was occupied by
the Medes and Scythians.
Aftermath © Anvarghaderi / Wikimedia Commons
Devastated at the defeats he had suffered at
the hands of both the Assyrians and the Cim-
merians, Rusa committed suicide in 714 BC.
His son, Argishti II, became king, and Sargon
A terracotta cylinder with nine
continued to campaign against the Urartians
facets containing cuneiform in-
until his death in 705 BC. Thereafter, Argish- scriptions that record the military
ti II was able to launch a series of successful campaigns of Sargon II. Dating to
counterattacks, push the Assyrians back to the ca. 710 BC, it was originally found
Urartian borders, and even campaign into As- in Dur-Sharrukin and is now in the
syrian territory in what is now north-western Iraq Museum, Baghdad.
© Osama Shukir Muhammed Amin
Iran. Argishti established the Urartian Golden
/ Wikimedia Commons
Age until his death in ca.680 BC. This contin-
–639
5 BC) As-
ormed into an
Assyrian client state. 0
ember of the Assyriol-
l
ös Loránd University,
and author of The
Assyrian Army hree volumes (a
fourth is forthcoming).
)
A i W f XIV 6
3
THEME: The Assyrian Empire at war

Sir Austen Henry Layard's drawing of a palace hall gives an idea of the overwhelming impression Assyrian royal propaganda must have made.

IMPERIAL ASSYRIAN CHARIOT TACTICS, 911–609 BC By Thomas James

Bafield juice
of e god Ash
From roughly 911 to 609 BC, a series of Assyrian monarchs, or “kings of all the four quarters” as
they often called themselves, were able to build a series of impressive text- and image-laden
oon
numents that are pr
to this day. Yet, as was mentioned by distinguished Assyriologist Julian
Reade (1972, 87), these can be “somewhat difficult to use” as historical
sources, particularly when attempting to discuss topics such as warfare.
The approaches we can take to such topics are, however, varied indeed.

he modern historiogra- could briefly sit down and note how he and

T
phy of the Neo-Assyrian his compatriot, Edward Ledwich Mitford, had
Empire begins in 1840. traversed much of Anatolia and Syria over the
On 18 March that year, in previous few months:
Aleppo, Syria, British ar-
chaeologist and adventurer Sir Austen “We’re both equally careless of comfort
Henry Layard pulled up a chair so he and unmindful of danger. We rode alone;
our arms were our only protection; a va-
Relief panel from the Northwest Palace at Nim-
lise behind our saddles was our wardrobe,
rud (Kalhu, Iraq) depicting a winged super-
natural figure (an Apkallu), circa. 883–859 BC.
© Metropolitan Museum of Art

Anci
An ciient Warfarre XIV-
V6
36
6
© New York Public Library
and we tended our own horses, except
when relieved from the duty by the hos-
pitable inhabitants of a Turcoman village
or an Arab tent. Thus unembarrassed by
needless luxuries, and uninfluenced by
the opinions and prejudices of others, we
mixed amongst the people, acquired with-
out effort their manners, and enjoyed with-
out alloy those emotions which scenes so
novel … cannot fail to produce. I look
back with feelings of grateful delight to
those happy days” (Layard 1867, 1–2).
By 10 April the pair had made it to Mosul in
northern Iraq. They stayed a short while in town
and decided to explore a series of monumen-
tal ruins on the eastern side of the river; Layard
would later confirm that the structures be-
longed to a settlement called Nimrud that had
been constructed by a powerful Mesopotamian
empire nearly 2,500 years before. And thus be-
gan the modern study of Neo-Assyria.
The Neo-Assyrians
Like many ancient southwestern Asian cultures,
the Assyrians believed they co-inhabited the
earth with thousands of other spirits, supernatu-
ral forces, and gods with whom they interacted
on a regular basis. All these forms tended to fol-
low one of two paths. The first sought to main-
tain the divinely established societal Order, first
ensured by the god Marduk in the traditional
Babylonian telling of the Enūma Eliš world cre-
ation myth. The second path belonged to the
forces of Chaos that attempted to disrupt this
world Order, highlighted most prominently by
the primeval creature Tiamat. The Neo-Assyri-
ans strongly believed their primary god, Ashur,
was the main deity responsible for preserving
this world Order, with Assyria’s monarch being
perceived as his representative on earth as long
as the king followed the pre-established cus-
toms of his position appropriately. All enemies
of the Assyrians were portrayed as ‘evil’ agents
of Chaos who were attempting to disrupt this
desired Order. The main purpose of monumen-
tal imagery was to illustrate an idealised version
of their world, where the Assyrian monarch
showed the power of Ashur by crushing his
Chaotic enemies who attempted to resist him.
This world view is a fascinating one that
is very well attested in our available sources,
the purposes of
A circular shell boss (pos-
sibly from a chariot or horse
x
fitting) that was found in the
Northwest Palace of Ashurna-
sirpal II at Nimrud.
© Metropolitan Museum of Art
extrapolating conflict-related infor-
mation for the period. Because the
main objective of the artwork was to
present a mythology-infused, ideal-
ised world, attempting to directly cat-
alogue the images and assess them
as realistic artistic depictions of past
populations without heeding their
original contexts is a problem. It can
be like trying to use J.R.R. Tolkien’s
fantasy novels of Middle-earth to
construct a historically accurate rep-
resentation of early medieval Norse
warfare. Elements of the artwork are
certainly true to real life while others
are most clearly not, but establish-
ing a definitive line between the two Sir Austen Henry Layard (1817-
is extremely difficult and largely depends on 1894), famed for the rediscovery of
which expert is asked. Nimrud and Nineveh, was a travel-
ler, archaeologist, cuneiformist, art
Assyrian chariots historian, draughtsman, collector,
Given the subjective nature of these sources, it politician, and diplomat.
© Wellcome Collection
is unsurprising to note that ancient Near Eastern
scholars have traditionally struggled to assess
the tactical employments of chariots through-
out the period. Only a decade ago, Robin
Archer (2010, 58) exasperatedly noted that
it was “disconcerting to think how little con-
The Nergal Gate of Nineveh (Mosul,
sensus there is in the scholarly community on
Iraq) was associated with the Sumer-
the relatively straightforward questions of how
ian god Nergal. Excavated by Layard,
a war chariot was actually used in battle and he came across two large winged
how formations of chariots would have oper- bulls (lamassu) at the entrance.
ated in relation to each other”. Archer followed © Diane Siebrandt / Livius.org
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
37

Assyrian ceremonial bronze belt,
circa. 850-650 BC. Decorated with
reliefs depicting infantry, cavalry
(both spearmen and horse archers)
and three-man chariots with driver,
archer and shield-bearer.
© Detroit Institute of the Arts
Layard’s drawing of an Assyr-
ian king in his chariot before a
besieged city, from The monuments
of Nineveh. It contains details of
weapons, dress, and equipment.
© New York Public Library
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
38
i three main sources of evidence (material re-
p mains, texts, iconography) for additional infor-
i mation when faced with a quandary, I feel a
t foray into one of the most-referenced military
w history publications of all time may provide
to a helpful alternate perspective on the topic.
to One of the major points of emphasis in Prus-
ma sian Major General Carl von Clausewitz’s On
ting the vehicles that War (Vom Kriege in German, first published in
wer f 1832) was discovering an overall commander’s
region. She then attempted to reconstruct po- individual initiative, or “genius” as he termed
tential chariot tactics from there. Scholars have lemmas as they
tried to establish that Late Bronze Age Aegean establishing set
chariots (including those of all Minoan and My- manders
cenaean cultures) were utilized as transports, doc-
that New Kingdom Egyptian ones served as ans-
archery platforms, and that Neo-Assyrian vehi- to
cles may have been heavier archery platforms rship
that had shock charge capabilities (see below
for more on the latter). It must be remembered be thought of as guide-
y to
x
that all of these suppositions face significant lines. These doctrines An ornament or button
for a horse's harness
academic opposition to this very day, with could even exist when from the Northwest
the Pharaoh’s mobile bowmen being the most in direct conflict with Palace of Ashurnasir-
the first-hand experienc- pal II at Nimrud.
agreed upon of the group.
© Metropolitan Museum of Art
How can we try to come to a greater con- es of some of those who
sensus about chariot tactics, at least for the fought at the time. As anybody who wargames
Neo-Assyrians? Whilst it is orthodox practice or has played a PC title (such as those from the
for archaeologists to look ever deeper at their Total War series) with a real-time tactical ele-
ment knows, the inherently tumultuous nature s,
of battlefields sometimes forces commanders of
to throw the base rules of any doctrine out the s
window in order to achieve victory. For Clause- y
witz, the discussion of tactical doctrines did not n
seek to find only one standard way to employ a -
piece of equipment, but to explore the continu- s
ally changing balance between the ‘ideal’ em- -
ployment of battlefield theories and how they e
were actually applied in ‘real’ situations. -
Given this information, when we simply e
compile all the e
we have on char of
come as no surp s
used in all sort d
ing on the s e
question. A i-
wars were a o
ity of the ent al
ed upon their e
pedients deem This is reflected by Servants carrying a chariot from a
associated wit relief in the palace of Sargon II in
ave been provided by As-
Dur-Sharrukin, “the Fortress of Sar-
doned by Assy present day. They have
gon” (Khorsabad, Iraq), 713–706 BC
survival of their carefully constructed world. By been able to use the archaeological evidence and now in the Louvre, Paris.
the early seventh century BC, the Neo-Assyri- to suggest that imperial chariots may have © Darafsh / Wikimedia Commons
an Empire was a large political entity that had been actively employed as anything from anti-
forces operating in all manner of terrain types cavalry archer specialists (Scurlock, 1997), to
stretching from the future plains of Antioch to vehicles capable of a headlong shock charge
against enemy infantry formations (e.g. Nada-
li, 2010), and as ‘fire support’ for other allied A solid chariot wheel (only the nails
forces (De Backer, 2007). More passive usages around the rim survive) from Kish.
have also been proposed, with Florence Mal- It dates to a much earlier period,
bran-Labat (1982) championing the idea of the ca. 2750-2640 BC. Now in the Orien-
tal Institute Chicago.
Assyrian chariot as a warrior transport while
© Gary Todd / Flickr
Duncan Noble (1990, 68) felt that after 705 BC
they were “of little use” outside of being an im-
pressive prestige item on a battlefield.
ese sug-
ar to pop-
as, I do not
ons of these
e regularly
Neo-As-
when in
senti-
t with
of evi-
fficult,
Assyr-r
poraries
nforma-
d-specif- f
sands of

A i tW f XIV 6
39

Ivory, spade-shaped horse blinker
from Nimrud, possibly inspired by
Egyptian motifs.
© Metropolitan Museum of Art
(Top) Detail of one of the bronze
bands from the Balawat Gates
(Imgur-Enlil, Iraq) showing chariots.
Now in The British Museum.
© Osama Shukir Muhammed Amin / Wiki-
media Commons
(Bottom) Relief from the Northwest
Palace in Nimrud, showing
chariots being transported by boat.
Now in The British Museum.
© Gary Todd / Flickr
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
40
tablets’ worth of informa-
tion, which give details on
everything from complex
military leadership struc-
tures to very precise jus-
tifications for why t
war was necessar
in the first place, there is a complete absence of
anything resembling a proper military manual
that discusses details about the tactical dilem-
mas their commanders encountered. This lack
of information tells us a great deal about the
Assyrians and many of their contemporaries.
For them, recording the ‘ideal’ nature of war-
fare inside massive palatial environments was
clearly far more important than contemplating
the ‘real’ nuances associated with each individ-
ual battlefield experience at the time. I believe
Assyrian commanders had to make practical
decisions, just like most other military individu-
als throughout history. Those decisions, though,
were not what was celebrated on the basalt
walls of Assyria’s palaces for audiences to see
millennia into the future. As we move forward,
instead of asking questions that attempt to as-
sess every individual chariot tactic that the As-
syrians may have been capable of, we should
be focusing more on what the Assyrians felt
the ideal usage of their chariots was during the
period. When we approach the topic from this
angle, the propagandistic mythological nature
of Assyria’s monumental iconography we ex-
plored at the beginning of this article actually
begins to work to our advantage.
The most desirable chariot tactic
Warfare-related illustrations have been pre-
served mainly from the reigns of six Neo-As-
syrian monarchs, including Ashurnasirpal II
(883–859 BC), his son Shalmaneser III (858–
824 BC), Tiglath-pileser III (745–727 BC), Sar-
gon II (721–705 BC), Sennacherib (704–681
BC), and Ashurbanipal (668–631 BC). All these
rulers participated in multiple types of chariot
engagements, which would have involved ac-
tions such as scouting, initial deployment, and
the actual inflicting of physical harm on the
opposing side during the engagement. But the
existing idealised artwork is surprisingly con-
sistent when representing the Assyrian chariot
in battle. All of the listed rulers, except for Sen-
nacherib, had their artisans feature at least one
scene that was devoted to their chariots pursu-
ing routed enemies in the final pursuit phase of
the engagement. In fact, this was the only bat-
tlefield situation the vehicles were illustrated in
until the reign of Tiglath-pileser III started in 745
BC. After his accession, the final pursuit phase
remained the most common situation to show
a chariot team in, even when the vehicles were
enlarged to contain four men during Ashurban-
ipal’s time. Assyria’s artisans were clearly skilled
individuals who were capable of representing
many different types of situations if it was de-
sired by their monarch. They would have had
access to information from commanders who
knew how to employ chariots in a variety of dif-
ferent situations, including the king himself; yet
it is this one theme that was almost always fea-
tured in the idealised battle artwork.
We can reconstruct how this tactic of bat-
tlefield pursuit could have been devastating
enough to cause so much damage to oppos-
ing forces that it caused severe strategic conse-
quences in ideal situations. We know from vari-
ous textual records scattered across the region
 Cylinder seal depicting an
Assyrian archer in a chariot,
x
from Ur (Tell el-Muqayya,
Iraq), circa 800-700 BC.
© The Trustees of the British Muse
um
that chariots were expensive pieces
of machinery that required signifi-
c choice but to bow to the might of Ashur’s pri-
cia
costly in terms of upkeep as well. They tended
to carry societal elites, including the divinely
sanctioned monarch himself. Losing him or a
high percentage of his men risked destabiliz-
ing the entire state, especially if it was coupled
with a perceived loss of favour among the gods.
Chariot archers also had limited supplies of ar-
rows, so releasing them towards the fronts of
shielded infantry formations, who likely formed
the core of most Early Iron Age forces, could be
an effective tactic but was unlikely to achieve
consistent decisive results by itself. Once the en-
emy had already been broken and was fleeing,
though, then chariot teams could have thun-
dered down on their opposition with relative-
ly little risk to themselves and converted even
the smallest victory between the two
armies into a deci-
sive, war-winning result. Constantly harried by
charioteers, who delivered their arrows of di-
vine justice without any possibility of retribu-
tion in return, opposing commanders would
have had no way of reorganising their forces
after the defeat. They would have had little
mary earthly representative, who would have
had artisans record the victorious result on his
palace walls. The projective power of these
images is still strong to this day, so if you look
closely enough at one of them it is easy to imag-
ine a moment nearly three millennia ago when
Ashurnasirpal II dismounted from his chariot to
stand over a fallen enemy, pausing only long
enough to say, “I am lord, I am praiseworthy, I
am exalted, I am important, I am magnificent, I
am foremost, I am a hero, I am a warrior, I am a
lion, I am … Ashurnasirpal, strong king, king of
Assyria” (Grayson 1991, 195–196). 0
Dr. Thomas James earned his PhD at the
University of Liverpool.
King Ashurnasirpal II chasing down a
Neo-Hittite spearman. The Assyrians
relished emphasising their victories in
this manner, sending a powerful mes-
sage to friends and enemies, with the
monarch able to present himself as
an instrument of divine justice who
could call upon the gods and their
associated mythological creatures
(above) to help in the chase.
© Sean Ó Brógáin
Neo-Assyrian bronze quiver cover,
circa ninth to eighth century BC,
showing mythological scenes and
the killing of enemies. It was proba-
bly originally mounted on a chariot,
as can be seen in various reliefs.
© Metropolitan Museum of Art
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
41
SPECIAL

Following the transverse crest of

their centurion, Roman legionaries
attack and break into the serried
ranks of the Macedonian phalanx
at the battle of Pydna, 168 BC.
© Zvonimir Grbasic

Anci
An cien
ent W
Waarf
rfar
are XXIIVV--6
42
CENTURION AUTONOMY ON THE BATTLEFIELD, 218 BC – AD 73 By Michael Rasak

FoLLowing e ansverse c

Polybius informs his readers that Rome’s ideal centurion was a ‘stable’ leader, someone who preferably
stood his ground in the face of defeat rather than someone who took risks (Polybius 6.24). Vegetius portrays
the centurionate along similar lines, claiming a centurion should be “more ready to do the things ordered
of him than to speak” (De Re Militari 2.14). Thus many historians paint the model centurion as a shepherd
of his men – a leader who was unwavering, difficult to provoke, and the embodiment of Roman disciplina.
Why is it, then, that almost all of the sources comment on the brazen actions of centurions in combat?

n the writings of Livy, Caesar, Plutarch, Appian, the centurionate. Perhaps even more compelling is the fact

I
and Josephus, centurions are frequently cred-
ited with superhuman acts of daring valour; they
were the first to scale walls, assault the interlocked
shields of a phalanx, or sacrifice their lives for their
unit. Indeed, while many of these anecdotes could be dis-
missed as fanciful embellishments, the sheer volume of
accounts of centurions vainly throwing themselves into
the teeth of battle indicates that either Polybius’ charac-
terization of the ‘ideal’ centurion was inaccurate, or the
Roman army did a poor job of recruiting, training, and
promoting ‘ideal’ centurions.
In an attempt to rationalize this contradiction, many
modern scholars make the argument that the Roman army,
as an institution, was designed to promote individual acts
of bravery, for the purpose of encouraging others into ac-
tion. Such bravery was habitually rewarded with promises
of increased pay, promotion in rank, or the public bestow-
ing of symbols of martial valour, such as military crowns
or medallions. This argument could certainly explain why
centurions demonstrated seemingly undisciplined acts of
bravado in the midst of battle. After all, Caesar himself,
among others, admittedly promoted centurions for little
more than their observed bravery in battle.
Characterizing the centurion, however, either as
merely an obedient shepherd of men, or as an audacious
warrior responsible for demonstrating conspicuous indi-
vidual courage, seems to fall short of the true spirit of the
office. Neither of these characterizations would require a
centurion to possess a high degree of expertise in tacti-
cal doctrine – a fact frequently referenced by the sourc-
es. Centurions, particularly those within the First Cohort,
served on a general’s board of military advisors. Moreover,
it was from the extant pool of senior centurions that the
military tribunes of the Republic were often drawn. Famed
centurions such as Spurius Ligustinus, who possessed a
storied two-decade-long career campaigning in Spain and
Greece, and Quintus Statorius, who so impressed the Nu-
midian prince Syphax that the latter requested he serve as
his permanent military advisor, both point to the tactical
competence and institutional knowledge resident within
that Livy tells us the senate appointed a centurion, M. Cen-
tenius, as the commander of an eight-thousand-man force
charged with halting Hannibal during the Second Punic
War. Indeed, the offices of the centurionate demanded
more than mere obedience, steadfastness, or courage –
they called for a large degree of tactical proficiency.
The flexibility of Roman warfare
Understanding how scholars currently view the actual
mechanics of Roman warfare helps explain why leaders
commanding at echelons as low as the century needed a
firm grasp of tactical doctrine. Philip Sabin has developed
a model of Roman combat positing that heavy infantry
lines likely clashed for only short periods of time, meas-
ured in minutes, until mental and physical exhaustion
prompted one side to retrograde to a “safety-distance”
outside of sword range. After a period of rest, one side
would again surge forward in a “localized flurry of hand-
to-hand combat” until it or the other side retrograded
back to the safety distance. This pattern would repeat un-
til one side eventually collapsed and routed altogether.
Sabin explains that it was “Roman sub-units such as cen-
turies, maniples, and cohorts [which] offered an ideal ba-
sis for such localized charges.” Understanding this, and
further noting that all these echelons were commanded
by centurions, indicates that it was the prerogative of the
centurions to decide when their formations would retro-
grade to, or assault from, the safety distance.
Sabin’s model also helps explain observations made
by ancient sources regarding Roman subunits’ flexibility
and tactical responsiveness. Polybius notes, “The order of
a Roman force in battle … enables every man individu-
ally and in common with his fellows to present a front in
any direction” (15.15). This description indicates that they
relied on some degree of low-level autonomy. Livy states
that the military oath legionaries took before battle forbade
them from breaking ranks unless to “pick up a weapon, to
strike an enemy, or to save a comrade” (22.38). Allowing
soldiers to break ranks in order to strike an enemy would
further support Sabin’s model, indicating that groups of

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 individuals were wholly permitted, if not encouraged, to
surge forward, diagonally, or laterally in the midst of com-
bat. Josephus, too, describes the Roman army as fluid in
its manoeuvres, and legionaries as highly responsive to or-
ders and signals. Fluidity and responsiveness in combat
can only be achieved if subordinate units – at the lowest
echelons – are capable of analyzing conditions and are
empowered with enough authority to make and execute
rapid decisions.
Several battle narratives illuminate the full extent to
which small elements were free to make tactical decisions
mid-battle. During Marius’ pitched battle with Boeorix
and the Cimbri, a Roman unit on Marius’ far left flank pur-
sued a Cimbric element feinting flight, threatening to over-
extend the Roman line. Plutarch explains that although
Marius understood the trap Boeorix was setting, he could
not prevent one of the Roman soldiers from encouraging
the entire unit to pursue the enemy. During the Battle of
Pydna, Cato’s son Marcus lost his sword in battle, so he
“ran along the ranks telling every friend and companion
whom he saw” until he had gathered a small force, with
whom he fell upon the enemy in order to recover it (Plutar-
ch Aemilius 21). At the Battle of Antonia, Syrian auxiliary
Sabinus made the decision to assault the fortified walls to
break through the Jewish defences; Josephus tells us that at
least eleven soldiers followed him. Indeed, Rome’s battle
narratives are riddled with anecdotes of individuals lead-
ing small independent manoeuvres, seemingly uncon-
cerned about guidance from higher echelons.
Following the transverse crest
Understanding that Roman battle lines were not as rigid as
is generally purported, the role of centurions can be exam-
ined with better context. We have looked at the argument
that centurions’ overt bravado in combat was intended to
encourage surrounding soldiers to action, but this fails to
take into account that centurions’ actions should often be
considered their orders. By the nature of his rank, a centu-
rion was expected to be followed in combat, and symbols
of that authority were designated by the transverse crest
on his helmet and the unit standard accompanying him.
Vegetius makes this clear when he declares that “every
century was guided not only by its own standard but like-
wise by the peculiar form of the helmet of its command-
ing officer” (Vegetius 2.13). Countless examples are given
by the sources indicating that unit standards were used to
direct the actions of soldiers. The best example of this is
recorded by Livy, who recounts the difficulty Fulvius had
when one of his cohorts hesitated after being ordered to
assault Hannibal’s battle line. In order to motivate the co-
hort into action, one of the cohort’s centurions, Q. Navius,
“grabbed the standard of the second maniple of hastati
from the bearer and advanced with it against the enemy,
threatening at the same time to throw it into their midst if
his men did not promptly follow him” (Livy 26.5).
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If centurions’ actions were their orders, and Rome’s
method of warfare encouraged – at least to some extent –
the tactical independence of small units on the battlefield,
then stories of centurions’ audacious behaviour in combat
should be viewed not as reckless individual acts of cour-
age, but rather as instances of them ordering their units
to action. A comparison between Caesar’s and Appian’s
differing accounts of the Battle of Pharsalus provides a
clear example of this. Appian credits the heroic centurion
Crastinus with individually assaulting the Pompeian line,
making no mention of any other soldier beside him (Civil
Wars 2.82). Caesar, in his account, also credits Crastinus
with making the assault, but he notes that the latter was
accompanied by a group of 120 soldiers (Civil War 3.95).
Caesar’s account seems more likely, not only because
he was present at the battle, nor because it seems more
reasonable that an individual soldier would refrain from
single-handedly assaulting an enemy line, but because it
is clear legionaries were expected to follow the transverse
crest of their centurions. Crastinus’ assault was not a mo-
ment of inspirational bravado. It was a direct order.
Centurion autonomy in action
Examining several battle narratives helps elucidate the full
extent to which centurions, leading their individual centu-
ries or maniples, were capable and empowered enough
to operate semi-autonomously on the battlefield. The Bat-
tle of Cannae, 216 BC, offers a simple illustration of how
centurions exercised the authority to re-vector their mani-
ples mid-combat, when opportunities seemed to present
themselves. In this case, Hannibal deliberately placed his
Celtic auxiliaries in the centre of his line and ahead of
his Carthaginian heavy infantry units on the flanks, form-
ing a convex line facing the Romans. As the Roman line
advanced to meet the enemy, individual maniples con-
verged on the exposed Celtic formation from both sides
and subsequently drove the Celtic formation back. Once
the congregated Roman maniples pursued the fleeing
Celts up the centre, the Carthaginian heavy infantry ele-
ments on the flanks were then able to envelop the Ro-
man forces and annihilate them. A general, cognizant of
the whole breadth of the battlefield, would likely never or-
der his formations to converge on the centre of an enemy
line. Individual maniples, however, led by centurions who
were traditionally encouraged to exercise some degree of
autonomy and exploit enemy vulnerabilities as they ap-
pear, could quite conceivably fall victim to this scheme.
The Battle of Zama, 202 BC, offers another prime
example of centurions demonstrating autonomy on the
battlefield. When the first line of hastati maniples clashed
with Hannibal’s Carthaginians and were subsequently
thrown into confusion, Polybius explicitly states that it was
the officers of the second-line principes – that is, the cen-
turions – who made the decision to commit their maniples
to the fight. Moreover, Polybius further notes that once the
Carthaginian line collapsed and began to flee, Scipio was
forced to rein in his pursuing hastati maniples by bugle,
so as not to create a break in his own line. No order from
the general or his tribunes needed to be given – either for
the principes to commit their maniples, or for the hastati to
pursue the fleeing Carthaginians – because in both cases it
was the prerogative of the centurions to make these deci-
sions and execute them with violence of action.
Rome’s competition with the Macedonian phalanx
during the Battle of Pydna, 168 BC, provides perhaps the
best evidence that Rome’s manipular army relied on the
semi-autonomous actions of subordinate units. It is gener-
ally understood, and documented by Polybius, that a well-
formed phalanx could not be beaten unless its formation
was disrupted by broken terrain or some other variable.
But a broken formation itself does not guarantee defeat;
only if an enemy is able to rapidly exploit these exposed
vulnerabilities can the integrity of a phalanx become truly
overwhelmed. Rome’s method of warfare, with dozens of
centurions executing their traditional authority to order
independent assaults, re-vectors, and local flanking ma-
noeuvres, won them the Battle of Pydna. Livy states (44.4):
The most probable explanation of the victory is that
several separate engagements were going on all
over the field, which first shook the phalanx out of
its formation and then broke it up … In this way [the
Macedonians] were forced to meet the repeated
charges of small bodies of Roman troops … wher-
ever there were gaps [in the phalanx] the Romans
worked their way amongst their ranks.”
Caesar’s narrative of the Gallic War, 58–50 BC, provides
several compelling examples alluding to centurions’ au-
tonomy of action. When Sabinus’ and Cotta’s legion
walked into a Belgic ambush, it was centurions such as
Titus Balventius and Quintus Lucanius who elected to as-
sault from the Roman formation in an attempt to break free
of the ambuscade. Later, when the Germans had a Roman
foraging contingent surrounded outside of Aduatuca, Cae-
sar unambiguously notes that it was the centurions who
deliberated on several courses of action and decided to
lead an assault against the Sugambri. At the Battle of Ger-
govia, Caesar blames the centurion Marcus Petronius for
recklessly leading his unit in a failed assault against the
Arverni; Petronius purportedly said to his remaining men:
“For it was my desire for glory which made me lead you
into danger” (Caesar Gallic War 7.50). Even if Caesar fab-
ricated this story to justify one of his few defeats, Caesar’s
very own acknowledgement that centurions had had the
authority to order these types of independent actions testi-
fies to the autonomy of the rank.
Josephus’ account of Rome’s failed assault on An-
tonia in AD 70 provides another example of centurions
independently manoeuvring their forces. As the Roman
force was beaten back by the zealous Jewish defenders,
the centurion Julianus “launched himself at the Jews …
and single-handedly drove them back to the inner tem-
ple court.” Though Julianus was ultimately overcome and
killed, Josephus interestingly notes, “… those who could
have rescued the man were paralyzed by fear” (Josephus
Jewish War 6.82–90). This story could be seen as a mo-
ment of inspirational bravado, but Josephus’ disclaimer in-
dicates there were indeed soldiers who were in a position
to follow and support him – their fear simply prevented
them from doing so. Speculating on alternative outcomes
of the battle is fruitless, but it is likely that if others had
followed Julianus and the Romans succeeded in driving
the defenders back, this anecdote would not have been
captured in history the way it was; instead, it would have
been recorded merely as another ordinary moment when
‘the Romans’ repulsed the enemy. Julianus’ name would
have been lost to history, as would the fact that a centurion
was the one who initiated the assault. It becomes clear,
then, how the autonomy of centurions could be a fact of-
ten overlooked by the sources.
It is an undisputable fact that centurions did not en-
joy full tactical independence on the battlefield; an army
comprised solely of independent-minded leaders would
crumble at the onset. Roman subunits needed to work in
concert with one another, maintain a formidable line, and
execute overarching grand-strategy issued by the general
and his tribunes. That being said, centurions were far from
merely serving as shepherds of their men or individual
glory-hounds. They were expected to identify tactical op-
portunities, rapidly exploit vulnerabilities, and lead their
subunits on limited-objective manoeuvres without waiting
on signals from higher echelons. 0
Michael Rasak is an Army Intelligence Officer and gradu-
ate student of history at Western Kentucky University.
FU
URT
RTHE
H R RE
REEAD
ADIN
AD ING
x Lendon, J. E. Soldiers and Ghosts: A His-
tory of Battle in Classical Antiquity. New
York: Yale University Press, 2005.
x McCall, Jeremiah. “The Manipular Army
System and Command Decisions in the Sec-
ond Century.” In Romans at War: Soldiers,
Citizens, and Society in the Roman Repub-
lic, edited by J. Armstrong and M. Fronda,
210–231. New York: Routledge, 2020.
x Sabin, Philip. “The Face of Roman Bat-
tle.” The Journal of Roman Studies 90
(2000): 1–17.
x Taylor, Michael J. “Roman Infantry Tactics
in the Mid-Republic: A Reassessment.” His-
toria: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 63, no.
3 (2014): 301–322.
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THE FIND

The Hunterian museum, Glasgow, with the five altars dedicated by Marcus Cocceius Firmus standing next to each other at the end of the room.

A MILITARY VOTIVE ALTAR FROM THE ANTONINE WALL By Jo Ball

TRu in e gods
On the whole, Roman soldiers appear to have been a superstitious group who asked for divine help from a
diverse range of deities. One of the most prolific dedicators from Britain is Marcus Cocceius Firmus, a cen-
tu
de
re

lthough all the altars dedicated by Fir- Diversify to thrive?

mus are worthy of study, one in par- Altars are a physical reminder of the direct na-
ticular stands out, dedicated to a range ture of Roman religion – people could speak
of military-related deities: a single altar to the gods directly and ask their favour on a
dedicated to Mars, Minerva, the Camp-
wide range of issues in return for a sacrifice or
estres (goddesses of the parade-ground), Hercules, Epona, dedication. For those who could afford them,
and V altars represented an impressive offering. Based
Auche on the number of altars excavated in Roman
tars, a frontier zones, soldiers called on the gods more
fifth, w than the average civilian as entire units or, as in
it. Th this case, a single soldier (often an officer).
the While it was not unusual for several gods
Al he may have had to be included in an altar dedication, six (and
M Campestres, many military con- more if we count the Campestres as multiple
He cerns on his mind. figures) in Firmus’ single inscription is uncom-
©

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

46
 Roman harness fitting, presum-
© Dan / Flickr

x
ably from a military, cavalry
context, ca. AD 43-100.
Antiquities
© Suffolk County Council / Portable

ilitary many of their even

connections, although they are not often e ear-
r
found named together in a single context. Sev- s to be
eral – Mars, Minerva, Victory – belonged to tra- promoted from service in the gulares
ditional Roman religion and would have been uld not
familiar enough in the army. Hercules, familiar on. For
too, became popular with the military over the ed on it,
second century, particularly through soldiers ider life
with Germanic origins who worshipped him in .
the syncretised form of Hercules Magusanus.
Firmus clearly decided that these dei- Safe passage to retirement?
ties were not enough, and added more. These pt him
show some more non-Roman influences. Al- cases,
though their name is Latinised, the worship of nscrip-
the Campestres had its origins in pre-Roman e an ex-
northern Europe and spread in the Roman army choice
through Germanic and Gallic recruits. These Firmus
deities were often linked to Epona, who is also one of
asso nube.
orig ania),
What lay behind Firmus’ choice of dei- erans
ties irmus Altar dedicated to Hercules Magusa-
reveal some information about his serving as a quaestor. It is possible that this is nus, a syncretised form of the god,
military career that is not immediately the same man, serving a civic role after return- especially popular with soldiers of
o ing to his home province after retirement. At the Germanic origins, like those sta-
from t moment, there is no way to be certain that this tioned in the north of Britain.
© Livius.org
unde is indeed the same man. If he did make it safely
to retirement, Firmus may well have seen his
Fi dedication as a worthwhile investment. 0
F
Jo Ball is a regular contributor.
Legio II Augusta, and from the con-

x text of this altar he must have been

part of a detachment posted FURTHER READING
Roman figurine
Mars, circ at some point to Auchendavy x Birley, Eric. “Marcus Cocceius Ditch from the Antonine Wall at
199. The figurine on the Antonine Wall. The Firmus: An epigraphic study.” Pro-
was probably origi- the Roman site of Bar Hill above
nally horsed, with mention of several deities as- ceedings of the Society of Antiquar- Twechar, Scotland. The turf has left
spear and shield. sociated with mounted troops ies of Scotland 70 (1936): 363–377. fewer traces than Hadrian’s Wall.
© Lincolnshire County Council
/ Portable Antiquities
(the Campestres, Epona) sug- © David McElroy / Shutterstock
gest that Firmus may have had
some connection with the Roman cavalry.
In a study of Firmus, Eric Birley suggested
that the seemingly random choice of deities on
this altar may have reflected the fact that, earlier
in his career, Firmus had served with the equites
singulares in Rome, before being posted to Brit-
ain. A number of votive inscriptions from the
headquarters of the equites singulares in Rome
have survived, showing that the deities men-
deit
mid second cen
tury AD. The Campestres rticular,
h the
equites singulares and

Roman harness mount in the shape

of a male head, probably from a
x

forehead strap or breast-band. Ancient Warfare XIV-6

© Norfolk County Council/Portable
Antiquities
47
SPECIAL

Plaster cast of one of the scenes on Trajan's Column depicting soldiers at work. Several use their dolabra, and a few may have had metal tools.

“THE DOLABRA IS THE WEAPON WITH WHICH TO BEAT THE ENEMY” By Murray Dahm

ssons from mius rbulo

The Strategemata of Sextus Julius Frontinus, probably written in the late AD 80s, contains a small selection
of twelve anecdotes from contemporary warfare. Although there are anecdotes of Vespasian and Domitian,
a o g t e s ot a e pe o
perors Claudius and Nero. Twen

orbulo was suffect con-
sul in 39 under Calig-
ula, but the emperor’s
assassination in 41
brought this career to
a tempora
entrusted
the a
Large
lic 'D
XII.4
e Fossa Corbulonis.
© The Rijksmuseum van Oudheden
There, he dealt with rebellions by the Cherusci
and Chauci tribes and built a canal between
the Rhine and Meuse rivers. Corbulo became
known for this engineering work, called af-
ter him the Fossa Corbulonis. Remains of this
34 km canal have been found on the course of
the modern Vliet canal connecting Leiden and
Voorburg in the Netherlands. The canal was
three metres deep and fifteen metres wide,
enough for two ships to pass one another.
According to Cassius Dio, one of the pur-
poses of this canal was to maintain the disci-

Anciient Warfare XIV-6

48
© Cassius Ahenobarbus / Wikimedia Commons

pline of Corbulo’s soldiers. Tacitus tells us (An- o was

nales 11.18) that Corbulo began his command AD
by restoring discipline in the legions and instill- ore
ing in them a greater fear of their commander agreeable peace.
than of the enemy; he was rumoured to have nts,
put soldiers to death for the smallest lapse in in
discipline. Corbulo’s main tool for redisciplin- cut-
ing his troops and digging canals was to make ving
the legionaries use their dolabra, the digging and fell
and cutting tool every legionary carried. on it, crying out, “Axios “You are
discipline
Corbulo the disciplinarian way.
Corbulo was recalled from Germany because Corbulo’s
he was digging an encampment in hostile ter- a Longi-
ritory on the far bank of the Rhine. Claudius emper-r
did not want a Germanic war and ordered usband,
Corbulo to withdraw. Corbulo duti- ollowing
A well-preserved dola- fully obeyed the order, lived her
x

bra now in the Musee with the following re-

de Reims, France. Simi-
lar pickaxes have been
found elsewhere.
© Gerald Garitan /
Wikimedia Commons
and t
was
der
es, not dy-
joinder: “Happy the Ro- i
man generals before my The so-called pseudo-Corbulo, a por-
the memory of her father and his legacy alive.
tait bust once identified confidently
time.” He was, nonethe- (She also kept a surprisingly positive memory as Gnaius Domitius Corbulo, now
less, granted a Triumph of Domitian alive – see AH 14.) believed to be an unknown man and
dated to the first century BC.
The stratagems of Corbulo © Marie-Lan Nguyen (Jastrow) /
All five of the Corbulo stratagems in the Strat-
Wikimedia Commons

jea egemata concern the Parthian campaigns (

he 58–63). These stratagems offer information that
re is not in Tacitus or Cassius Dio; two cannot be
co found in either account (4.1.28 and 4.7.2), and
even when the historians cover the same topic, An excavated section of the Canal
Cor Frontinus provides unique information. of Corbulo, the Fossa Corbulonis at
Corb pro- Writing in Domitian’s reign, Frontinus Vlietvoorde between the Veurse-
consu in AD 52. When Claudius straatweg and the Vliet, Leidschen-
could safely include Corbulo, the emperor’s
died i dam-Voorburg, the Netherlands.
father-in-law, as one of the few non-imperial © Claudia Thunnissen (Erfgoedhuis Zuid-
sent e figures in his collection of stratagems. This Holland) / Wikimedia Commons
cession
menia.
own ca
throne.
and mo
ing for
taxata,
tually in
Parthian king counterattacked in 61 and put
Tigranocerta under siege. War resumed in 62
with Corbulo defending the Euphrates frontier
in Syria. The new legate of Cappadocia, Lucius
Caesennius Paetus, was, however, defeated at
the Battle of Rhandeia. Corbulo marched to the
rescue, but Paetus surrendered before he could
arrive. The Romans vacated Armenia and sur-
rendered all their gains; they may even have

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

49

Statue of a Parthian
man, known as the
‘Shami Prince,’ found in
Shami, Khuzestan Province, Iran dur-
ing excavations in 1931. Now in the
National Museum of Iran, Teheran.
© Ninara / Flickr
Aerial view of the (reconstructed)
Castellum Matilo, originally built
around AD 47 in the Netherlands.
© Romeinse Limes / Flickr
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
50
sug fore the enemy near the fortress of Initia. They
wa were ordered to atone for their disgrace with
to steady work and successful raids. The men
kee needed their dolabra to return to discipline.
his Frontinus names the location, the fortress Initia,
and which Tacitus (Annales 13.36) omits. Tacitus is
dis the only one to name the officer who caused
am the defeat by disobeying orders. Tacitus only
The Corbulo stratagems open with the has “a few squadrons” and calls the troops un-
sie disciplined and inexperienced, and states that
pro the squadrons were freed on the petition of the
bu whole army. Frontinus is much more specific
the about the offending units, but apparently con-
had siders their behaviour a given, subsidiary to his
ab interests in discipline and the punishment. He
it l does not discuss the petition, which might have
me undermined the stratagem, but that might also
In Tacitus’ account (Annales 14.24), we mean Frontinus used a different source or was
hea even an eyewitness. Both Tacitus and Frontinus
ab use the same words for the punishment, extra
of a vellum iussit tendere, “to camp outside the en-
und trenchments”, which might suggest that it was a
and specific term of legionary punishment.
bef The theme of discipline continues in the
giv next stratagem, 4.1.28, when Frontinus tells us
sub that in Armenia a prefect of cavalry gave way
tinu before the enemy. Discovering that the prefect
the had kept his squadron inadequately equipped,
nus’ detail is notable because it is not the kind Corbulo directed the lictors to strip the clothes
of item that Tacitus or Dio (or his epitomator) from his back and had him stand at headquar-
would normally have excluded. ters. This incident is not recorded in either
At 4.1.21, Corbulo’s reputation for disci- Tacitus or Dio and, unlike in 4.1.21, Frontinus
pline is to the fore, with Frontinus recording names the culprit, one Aemilius Rufus.
that, in Armenia, two squadrons and three co- The discipline of 4.1.21 and 4.1.28 reach-
horts were ordered “to camp outside the en- es its culmination in the pithy 4.2.3: “By im-
trenchments” because they had given way be- proving discipline, Domitius Corbulo with-
stood the Parthians with a force of only two
legions and a very few auxiliaries.” Frontinus’
mention of only two legions makes this refer-
ence time specific, occurring before Corbulo
received reinforcements. Tacitus informs us
(Annales 13.35) that, after discharging the sick
and elderly from the Syrian legions, Corbulo
applied for reinforcements. Levies were held in
Galatia and Cappadocia and one German le-
gion and its auxiliaries joined him (see also Dio
62.19). Frontinus’ anecdote implies that Corb-
ulo withstood the Parthians before the arrival of
the German legion reinforcements, although it
could include the levies.
A comparison of Tacitus and Frontinus
shows that enough information is found only in
Fron- s to infer
A gold aureus of the
emperor Vespasian, ca.
x
AD 77-78. On the re-
verse, a Parthian holds a
signum in supplication.
© Metropolitan Museum of Art /
Gift of Joseph H. Durkee, 1899
 The sheath of a dolabra with hinged ends, and a memoirs, since it is hardly likely that Corbulo Ruins of the fortress on Hill I of the
dotted inscription that reads CCARIF (probably ancient city of Artaxata, Armenia.
x

its owner), ca. AD 15-30. would include such a saying in this form.
© Rijksmuseum van Oudheden
The fortress was captured and
destroyed by Corbulo in AD 59.
information
Conclusions © Carole Raddato / Flickr
The summation of Corbulo’s career in a pithy
these were
statement about the dolabra recalls the ubiq-
relied on a d
uity of the item – all legionaries carried one
tus used, or
and used them, not only to dig camps, but also
to the camp
to perform other engineering works. In his dis-
se
cipling of troops and building of engineering
haps shows us Frontinus drawing
works such as the Fossa Corbulonis and later
from his personal experience – Relief of a Parthian warrior now in
siege works to keep his soldiers occupied, there
d the Louvre, Paris. He is armed with
could be no better item to sum up Corbulo’s spear and sword but seems bare-
was impressed with, and wished to recall. It is
attitude both to soldiering and to restoring and headed. The armour may be scale
the restoration of discipline that is also Tacitus’
ld-fashioned’ or padded, or a decorated surcoat.
main theme in describing Corbulo: “Still, Cor-
e end © Alex Brey / Flickr
bulo’s main difficulty was rather to counteract
onti-
the lethargy of his troops than to thwart the per-
way
fidy of his enemies” (Annales 13.35).
The
The last of Frontinus’ Corbulo strata-
he
gems (4.7.2) is the most succinct; it is also
dolabra th
the one that summarizes his military career:
in
“Domitius Corbulo used to say that the Vegetius (De Re Militari is
pick was the weapon with which to beat s
the enemy.” s
sources. 0
The use of dicebat (“used to say”) implies that
Frontinus was recalling his own experiences t
or that he used a source other than Corbulo’s editor of Ancient Warfare.

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

51
ROMAN ARMY IN DETAIL

Mosaic from Hadrumetum (Tunisia) depicting race horses from the circus factions. The one named Cupido ("Desire") has a brand on his rump.

MANAGING HORSES IN THE ROMAN ARMY By Duncan B. Campbell

ALL e py horses

One of the many interesting facts to emerge from the ar- reason for his letter was the assigning of “a
horse, four years old, reddish, masked, with-
chive of the Twentieth Cohort of Palmyrenes at Dura-Euro- out a brand, approved by me, to Julius Bas-
p s concerns the detailed tre sus, a cavalryman in the Twentieth Cohort of
horses. It is surprising to le
ho
h Palmyrenes which you command, at a cost
of 125 denarii” (P. Dura 56A).
copio It is astonishing that such a high-ranking of-
confi ficial would concern himself with the approval
of a humble cavalryman’s mount. But it is clear
tende
from the cohort’s archive at Dura-Europos that
well. the horses, just as much as the men, were care-
about fully logged and accounted for. A fragmentary
papyrus, probably dating to AD 251, gives us
an insight into the unusual level of detail de-
n 16 March AD 208,
military bureaucracy. It
Lucius Marius Maxi-
ymen along with the sta-
mus, governor of Syr-
orses (P. Dura 97). As the
ia Coele (the north-
it may represent the re-
ernmost of the three
port of a single turma ‘troop’), which ought
Syrian
to comprise 30 men.
Ulpius
he
500 k
y
Tombst ts
from Bu calo) is depicted to
with his
© Livius.

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

5
52
© Livius.org
damage sustained by the document, the papy-
rologist J.F. Gilliam was able to read “Ogelus,
(son) of Malchus: horse, four years old [---] with
white [---], brands on right thigh and shoulder,
approved by the prefects at the time, 20 Octo-
ber AD 246: 125 denarii”. However, the entire
line had then been scored through and a new
line inserted, which read simply: “lost his horse
on …”, followed by an illegible date formula.
Nor was he the only one. The very next line
reads: “Malchus Goras lost his horse,” again
followed by the date, sadly now illegible.
The loss of one cavalryman’s horse may be
put down to misfortune, the loss of two to ex-
treme carelessness, but as we read on through
the papyrus, it begins to smack of some catas-
trophe. Cavalryman number 5, whose name is
now illegible, and cavalryman number 6 (“[---]
son of Antoninus”) had also lost their horses,
as had cavalrymen numbers 11 (“Aurelius Bar[-
--]”) and 19. The latter “lost his horse on 31
August AD 251”. Finally, cavalryman number
20, Aurelius Theodorus, appears without any
equine information whatsoever. As Gilliam tart-
ly observed, “If these equites were typical of all
those in the cohort, the unit was not very well
prepared for combat.”
Indeed, Gilliam suggested that the ‘lost’
horses had actually been killed in battle (al-
though he was prepared to consider that
they may have been victims of an epidemic
of some kind). Certainly, the verb used in the
report (amittere) is one that doesn’t particu-
larly imply blame, while there were alter-
natives (for example, perdere) which would
have suggested that the cavalrymen had been
at fault. Tacitus used the verb amittere when
reporting Agricola’s loss of his infant son, as
did Suetonius when reporting Vespasian’s loss
of wife and daughter prior to becoming em-
peror. More to the point, Suetonius also used
it when he described the future emperor Titus
“losing his horse from under his legs in a par-
ticular battle (Life of the 4). So
perhaps the Twentieth Coho
had been worsted in comba
our sources for events in th
are meagre, but it cannot be
this list of cavalrymen, with
tle losses, was dra
years before the
of Dura-Europ
of the Sassa
Copper alloy psalion
(a type of 'hackamore')
x
thought to have been used
to control unruly warhorses.
© Metropolitan Museum of Art.
Identifying the horses
As for the horses themselves,
we can imagine that they were
probably given suitable names
by their owners. Those used for
chariot-racing (see Ancient His-
tory 32 -
h
as Nitidus (‘Sleek’) and x
s
such as Pyrrhus )
and Glaucus e
er-r
rses, which Fragment of P. Dura 56, the
did not involve naming them. letter of AD 208 from Marius
Maximus (whose name appears at
Besides the obvious fact of its colour (rus-
the start of line 1).
seus or ‘reddish’), the horse in the letter of © Yale University Papyrus Collection
AD 208 (quoted above) is described as being
personatus, a word normally associated with
‘masked’ characters in the theatre. The em-
peror Nero, for example, is said to have sung
tragedies “masked in the likeness of his own
features or those of highly esteemed women”
(Suetonius, Nero 21.3). In the context of the pa-
pyrus, Gilliam took it to be “apparently a term
for some marking on the horse’s face,” and
wondered if perhaps it was a blaze. Certainly,
the seventh-century encyclopaedist Isidorus of
Seville, in his section dealing with horses, men-
tions those “with a white forehead”, which he The ruins of the Temple of Artemis
calls “fiery” (Etymologies 12.1.52), but this is at Dura-Europos (Syria), which
surely a comment on their temperament rather backs onto the north rampart of
than a description of their marking. the fortified town. Several eques-
trian copper alloy fittings were
More intriguingly, the horse in the Dura
discovered in the vicinity.
letter is also described as being sine nota
© Institute for the Study of the Ancient
(‘without a brand’), which shows that the World / Flick
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
53
 recipie
ably πA standard
DID YOU KNOW?
cavalry unit (ala quingenaria) re-
be
quired around 548 horses, allowing for the four
co
spare mounts required by each turma for the
w decurion and his two junior officers, and spares
o for the prefect as well.
E
tw the case if the horses were always sourced
th P. Gen. from the same stud farms.
3 The identification procedure appears in
wo another letter written to Ulpius Valentinus after
spit the one quoted earlier, in which Marius Maxi-
was a mus orders him to assign “a horse, a Cappado-
Egypt, cian, [---] with brands on left thigh and shoulder,
cius Volus approved by me, to Halatha (son of) Marinus,
in question p at 125 denarii” (P. Dura 56C). The mention of
owner’s name, w Cappadocia (the eastern part of present-day
Mosaic depicting two race horses
The scribe at Dura-Europos who wrote Turkey) is interesting, as the agricultural writers
named Adorandus ("Revered") and out the list of twenty cavalrymen (mentioned ng
Crinitus ("Flowing locks"), both above) used a series of abbreviations that seem le,
branded on the upper thigh. to refer to brands. It has been suggested that he
© Ad Meskens / Wikimedia Commons n.f.a.d. was short for notatis femore armo dex- district from where they come” ( l
l-
tris (“branded on the right thigh and shoulder”) ture d
and n.f.d. et a.s. was short for notatis femore Rosea in present-day Lazio.
dextro et armo sinistro (“branded on the right However, prime horse-rearing land
thigh and left shoulder”). According to some, was also found in Cappadocia, which
it was on account of a distinctive brand that would have been particularly convenient
Alexander the Great’s horse had been named -
Reconstruction of Roman equine Bucephalus (‘ox head’), specifically “from the us,
equipment, including a facsimile of mark of a bull’s head branded on its shoulder” a cavalryman in the ala Apriana ed
the chamfron discovered at Vindo- (Pliny the Elder, Natural History from Gaius Ju he
landa in 1987. 8.64.154). As the Dura-Euro- Twenty-Seco ne
© Karwansaray Publishers
or July A Papyri Greci e Latini VI,
729). The
it was “in
and its bo
not perh
baggag
he paid
675 d
of 12
sup
Pa
th
of
am
ma
food, cl
pos brand
is not described, it was Long in the
presumably a mark that We have seen -
would readily be recog- tails of any br
nized, which would be identified by

Surviving fragment of a monument erec

Hadrian between AD 122-123 for a favour
x

while he was visiting Gaul, near the moder

While the rest of the inscription is now lost
was written down in the sixteenth century.
Ancient Warfare XIV-6 that the animal was named Bo
54 himself likely authored the verses in his memory.
© Carole Raddato / Flickr
 Bronze decorative cheek piece
x
from a Roman (or Gallo-Roman
/ Germanic) bridle, dated to
the third century AD.
© Yale University Art Gallery
the ho murinus
(‘mou
accord
er Columel On Agriculture 6.37.6),
while another
ingly, the sam proro-
stratu , an adjective found nowhere else but
thought to imply that it had a protruding
muzzle. (The word rostrum refers to an ani-
mal’s beak, snout, or muzzle.)
One other term has often caused per-
plexity. Each horse was clearly intended to
be identified by age. The horse lost by the
son of Malchus (noted earlier) had been
four years old when it was acquired in AD
246. Another was two years old when it was
acquired in AD 245, while a third, newly
acquired, was four years old. The ages of
several other horses are no longer legible.
However, four are said to be aequatus (liter-
ally, ‘having become equal’) instead of stat-
ing their age. What could this mean?
Gilliam noted a passage of Columella,
where he explains how to tell a horse’s age
from the developm
nately, by the age of seven, a
horse has renewed its entire set of teeth, and The gyrus (a horse training ring de-
consequently “it is impossible to ascertain scribed by Tacitus in his Germania)
with certainty what age it is” (On Agriculture reconstructed at the Lunt Roman
fort (near Coventry, England).
6.29.5). Its new teeth are said to be aequal-
© Gail Johnson / Shutterstock
iter (‘equal’) to its first set of teeth. So those
horses at Dura-Europos that are described as
aequatus were probably aged seven or more,
as their age could no longer be calculated by
examining their teeth.
One of them, clearly a mare as it is de-
scribed as russeosordida (a feminine adjec-
tive perhaps indicating a sooty red colour),
had been acquired in AD 245, so she was
decidedly middle-aged by the time the list A cavalryman's face mask of the
type used in the training manoeu-
wonder
vres known as the hippika gymna-
al fall of
sia. Found on the Kops plateau in
Dura-Europos, only five years later. 0 Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
© Rijksmuseum van Oudheden
ibutor.
FURTHER READING
x Gilliam, J.F. “Some Latin military
g to
cavalry horses.” Yale Classical
Studies 11 (1950): 171–209.
x Toynbee, J.M.C. Animals in
Roman Life and Art. Balti-
more, Maryland: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1996.
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
55
REVIEWS
Armed Force in the Teispid-
Achaemenid Empire Past
Approaches, Future Prospects
By Dr. Sean Manning
ISBN: 978-3515127752
Franz Steiner Verlag (2021) - ¤74.00
www.steiner-verlag.de
Sean Manning is on a mission. He
has spent several years immersed in
the military history of the Achaeme-
nid Empire and this excellent, major
contribution to the literature of ancient
warfare is based on his doctoral the-
sis. He started out (the journey is well
documented on his website http://boo-
kandsword/.com) with a feeling that
“the scholarship on Achaemenid ar-
mies in English was repetitive and fell
apart at the first gentle question.” His
conclusion from a comprehensive re-
view of the research and more general
studies published over the past 120
years is that most scholars have been
overdependent on classical literature
as their main source. He traces this
back to the writings of Eduard Meyer
(Geschichte des Altertums, 1902) and
observes a persistent tendency to un-
dervalue or ignore the wealth of indig-
enous, non-literary sources. Where,
hitherto, Persian warfare has been ex-
amined predominantly or exclusively
through a Greco-Roman, western
lens, Manning sets out to brings all the
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
56
different types of evidence into pro-
ductive dialogue with one another.
The book weighs in at 437 pages
and has seven chapters, concluding
with nearly 90 pages of very thorough
bibliography and indexes. In the first
chapter, “A History of Research”, Man-
ning considers the scholarship from
Hans Delbrück to the present and ad-
dresses the apparent lack of progress
over the past century. In the second
chapter, “The Ancestors of Achaeme-
nid Armies”, he reviews the evidence
for Assyrian and Babylonian ways of
war from the ninth century. Moving
on to the Achaemenid era (550-323),
the next two chapters, “Kings at War”
and “Commoners at War”, show what
can be learned respectively from royal
inscriptions, and letters and other doc-
uments. “Material Remains” offers an
archaeological perspective. In “Greek
Literature, and the Army in Action”,
the longest chapter in the book and
payback for what has come before,
Manning sets out the methodological
challenges and problems that need to
be confronted and resolved and pre-
sents his “alternative model of combat
mechanics”. “Conclusions and Future
Research” returns to the problems
identified in the opening chapter and
outlines a way forward.
One example of what can be
achieved by a balanced approach to
evidence - Herodotus three times de-
scribes the Persian spear as shorter
than the Greek doru. In Aristagoras’
attempt to win Spartan support, he
has him say, “…the Barbarians are
not at all brave. They go into battle
with bows and short spears, wearing
trousers and with soft bonnets on their
heads.” (5.49). Herodotus repeats this
in his own voice in the epic review of
Xerxes’ army (7.61) and his descrip-
tion of the fighting at Thermopylae
(7.211). In the spirit of Meyer’s ad-
vice not to doubt the Greek authori-
ties, there is wide consensus that the
Persian spear was less than two metres
long, not much taller than its bearer,
discounting contradictory evidence to
be found in Achaemenid art (“Guilty
as charged, your Honour!”). A range
of 1.8-2.4 metres is generally agreed
for the length of the doru, arrived at
from systematic analysis of depictions
in Greek art. An equivalent process ap-
plied to spears depicted in reliefs from
Persepolis and Susa gives a measure
for longer examples of about 2.1 me-
tres. In this respect, the competitive
advantage of Greek weaponry was
significantly less than noted by Hero-
dotus and many since.
How did this belief become es-
tablished in the literary tradition in
the first place? It may indeed have
originated at the time of the Ionian
revolt. It then perhaps lasted through
the fifth century because it graphi-
cally matched a stereotype of the ef-
fete, trousered Asian, demonstrably
less manly than the Greek who stood
against him. There is evidence else-
where in the Historia that Herodotus
did not personally subscribe to this.
To sum up in Manning’s own
words, “this is partially a thesis about
the ancient Near East, and partially
about the forces and ideologies in the
last hundred years which shape how
we talk about it”. His book stands as
a powerful complement to Hans van
Wees’ Greek Warfare Myths and Re-
alities and deserves to be as accessi-
bly priced to reach its full potential
readership. The information Man-
ning marshals and the arguments he
puts forward will surely get us think-
ing and talking about warfare in the
Achaemenid era in ways that are
new and different, and likely to be
refreshingly productive. So, mission
accomplished! But the book is also a
manifesto for the creation of a com-
munity of “researchers willing to cross
disciplinary boundaries, challenge as-
sumptions, and propose broad theo-
ries”, akin to the work being done in
the well-established field of Roman
Army Studies. This will take time, but
after reading this volume, it is impos-
sible to deny the need for it. 0
– William Shepherd

Soldiers & silver. Mobilizing
resources in the age of Roman
conquest
By Michael J. Taylor
ISBN: 978-1477321683
University of Texas Press (2020) - $55.00
www.utpress.utexas.edu
This book is not really about the mili-
tary: you will find no discussion of
fighting styles, or descriptions of bat-
tles. Yet the book describes an essen-
tial aspect of military history: the way
in which ancient states funded their ar-
mies and how their fiscal regimes and
political organization impacted their
recruitment strategies. Its final aim is to
explain why Republican Rome man-
aged to defeat its powerful opponents.
The volume consists of two parts.
The first discusses the population of
each of the players on the Mediterra-
nean stage, and the recruitment poli-
cies of each. The second part discuss-
es the finance aspect of these states.
A conclusion connects the population
and finance aspects and concludes
why Rome was more successful than
its competitors. Each part is subdivid-
ed into a Roman and a ‘rival’ section;
in the rival section, Taylor discusses
the most important rivals to Rome in
the last four centuries BC.
Starting with Roman manpower,
Taylor explains why Rome’s recruit-
ment setup was unique in the Medi-
terranean. Roman hegemony extend-
ed not just over its citizens, but also
incorporated the Italian allies. Tay-
lor briefly discusses the exact size of
the manpower pool that the Romans
could command; however, this is a
complicated debate, due to the un-
certainties regarding the population
of Italy. Unique to Rome was its large
number of citizens and the system of
allies it commanded. Other states had
a very small citizen base, since most
conquered subjects were not made
citizens. These subjects were not usu-
ally recruited into the army, so that
these states depended mostly on allied
tribes, whose leaders were only loose-
ly tied to the hegemon, and whose loy-
alty was therefore never certain. These
states also relied on mercenaries to a
much higher degree than Rome, who
likewise were not always loyal. There-
fore, rival states spent a lot of their citi-
zen manpower on supervising their
own subjects. Rome’s large number
of citizens and allies also meant that
it could more easily absorb large loss-
es than other states could, and that it
could fight at multiple locations simul-
taneously over long periods.
Furthermore, the oligarchical po-
litical structure of the Roman Repub-
lic created an advantage in warfare.
Hellenistic kings regularly had to con-
tend with internal rivals and usurpers.
Again, this required the deployment
of the state’s armies against fellow citi-
zens. Military defeats especially could
cause his legitimacy to be questioned
and thus threaten the stability of the
state. Conversely, the Roman state
could use all its manpower to expand
its territory and thus create new allies
that, in turn, could contribute to its
wars. And lost battles had no direct ef-
fect on the legitimacy of the state.
In the second part of the book,
Taylor focuses on the financing of war.
This again involves quite a lot of cal-
culations, even though it is of course
impossible to determine how much
Rome and its rivals spent on warfare,
and how much income they gained
from wars and other sources, such
as taxation, indemnity payments and
tribute. Still, the numbers give a gen-
eral sense of the cost involved. Taylor
concludes that the Roman fiscal appa-
ratus lagged seriously behind its war-
making capabilities and that its mon-
etary system was, until the Second
Punic War, rather underdeveloped.
However, Rome spent less on armies
than other states; its soldiers were citi-
zens and paid for the army through
their taxes; their wages were also low
compared to those of soldiers in other
states. Rome’s allies, furthermore, paid
their own way, providing Rome with a
large pool of free manpower. The rival
states, in contrast, had to pay their sub-
jects and mercenaries, and at a higher
wage. Furthermore, the Hellenistic
kings faced the expenses of legitimiz-
ing conspicuous consumption.
In all, Taylor concludes that Rome
was exceptional in various respects,
and that its unique combination of re-
cruitments strategies and fiscal appa-
ratus allowed it to conquer the Medi-
terranean, and, moreover, retain the
conquered territory for centuries.
This book was written as an aca-
demic monograph and some aspects
of the discussion may therefore be
too detailed for a general audience. A
small but annoying issue is that Latin
sources are not translated, or only in
the notes – which, even more annoy-
ingly, are printed at the back of the
book. These days, audiences cannot
be expected to have a good com-
mand of Latin, so it would have been
useful if the ancient sources had been
translated. Still, this book will be of
interest to anyone with a serious in-
terest in the mechanics of ancient
Roman and Hellenistic warfare. Its
emphasis on the interplay between
recruitment and finance – an aspect
that has only recently received more
scholarly attention – shows the im-
portance of a solid financial structure
behind any military venture. 0
– Dr. Saskia Roselaar
Ancient Warfare XIV-6
57
FURTHER READING
AnCIENt WaRFaRE readings
THE ASSYRIANS AT WAR The Neo-Assyrians are famous for their many military campaigns across the Near East.
Here are some books to check out if you want to learn more about this warlike people.

THE ANCIENT ASSYRIANS THE ASSYRIAN ARMY

By Mark Healy By Tamás Dezső
Osprey, 1991 Eötvös University Press, 2012 (three volumes)
ISBN: 978-1855321632 ISBN: 978-9633120750 (volume I)

This volume in Osprey’s Elite series uses the typical format of
history and analysis combined with photographs and colour
plates (by the revered Angus McBride) to evoke and give a fla-
vour of how the ancient Assyrians fought from the tenth cen-
tury BC down to the seventh.
These three (soon to be four) volumes give you everything you
could wish for on the Assyrian army. The series aims to explore all
evidence (cuneiform texts, reliefs, and archaeological finds) and
all aspects of the subject. Volume I deals with infantry, volume
II recruitment and logistics, and volume III cavalry and chariotry.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF SARGON II, WARRIORS OF EURASIA: FROM THE VIII

KING OF ASSYRIA, 721–705 B.C. CENTURY BC TO THE XVII CENTURY AD
By Sarah C. Melville By Mikhael V.Gorelik
University of Oklahoma Press, 2016 Montvert Publications, 1995
ISBN: 978-0806154039 ISBN: 978-1874101079

Melville analyses each of Sargon II’s campaigns in the sixteen years
of his rule as he sought to extend Assyrian territory and secure his
throne. Under Sargon II, Assyrian armed forces – infantry, cavalry,
and chariotry – won victories in all types of terrain and against en-
emies of many different kinds, forging an Assyrian empire.
Although the scope of this volume is wide, it does include
plates of Urartian and Cimmerian warriors not found any-
where else. Showing a king’s chariot pursuing a Cimmerian
horse archer (who turns to shoot an arrow), it suggests the type
of warfare discussed in this issue. Unfortunately out of print.

Other articles and publications

• Archer, Robin. “Chariotry to Cavalry: Developments in the
Early First Millennium.” In New Perspectives on Ancient War-
fare, edited by Garrett G. Fagan and Matthew Trundle, 57–79.
Boston, Massachusetts: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010.
• De Backer, Fabrice. “Some Basic Tactics of Neo-Assyrian War-
fare.” Ugarit-Forschungen 29 (1997): 69–115.
• Dezső, Tamás. “A Reconstruction of the Army of Sargon II
(721-705 BC) Based on the Nimrud Horse Lists”. State Ar-
chives of Assyria Bulletin 15 (2006): 93–140.
• Gökce, Bilcan, and Kenan Işık. “Horses and Horse-Breeding
in Urartian Civilization.” Ancient West & East 13 (2014): 1–28.
• Konyar, Erkan, ed. Urartu, Transformation in the East. Istanbul:
Tüpras, 2011.
• Konakçı, Erin, and Mahmut Baştürk. “Military and Militia in
the Urartian State.” Ancient West & East 8 (2009): 169–201.
• Lanfranchi, Giovanni B., and Simo Parpola. The Correspond-
ence of Sargon II, Part 2. Pennsylvania: Eisenbrauns, 1990.
• Nadali, Davide. “Assyrian Open Field Battles. An Attempt at
Reconstruction and Analysis.” In Studies on War in the An-
cient Near East: Collected Essays on Military History, edited
by Jordi Vidal, 117–152. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2010.
• Noble, Duncan. “Assyrian Chariotry and Cavalry.” State Archives
of Assyria Bulletin 4 (1990): 61–68.
• Smith, J.B. “A tactical re-interpretation of the battle of Uaush:
Assyria and Urartu at war 714 BC.” Anatolian Iron Ages 3
(1994): 229-239.
• Scurlock, J. “Neo-Assyrian Battle Tactics.” In Crossing Bound-
aries and Linking Horizons: Studies in Honor of Michael C.
Astour on His 80th Birthday, edited by Gordon Young et al,
491–517. Bethesda: CDL Press, 1997.

Order versus Chaos π ON THE COVER

The Assyrians fought to impose divine Order on the world and any who opposed them were
considered the forces of Chaos. From the reign of Sargon II (722-705 BC), cavalry became the
decisive arm of the Assyrian armies that brought divine Order upon the world.
Here we see an Assyrian cavalryman of the 8th century BC armed with thrusting
spear and wearing an armoured waistcoat and the typical conical helmet of the Assyr-
ian cavalryman, fighting hand-to-hand with an Urartian royal guard who is unarmoured
but has both a shield and typical triangular sword as well as a bowcase. Scenes just like
this played out many times across several centuries as Assyria and Urartu fought one
another again and again in an unending cycle of Order versus Chaos (depending on
whose perspective you share!).
- Murray Dahm

Ancient Warfare XIV-6

58
OLD TESTAMENT WARRIORS OUT NOW
The Clash of Cultures in the Ancient Near East
By Simon Elliott

A history of warfare between Ancient Middle Eastern cultures in the age

of the Old Testament.

Hardback | 9781612009544
RRP: £20.00 | Special Price £16.00

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