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The Economics of Wildlife Trade and Consumption
Article in Annual Review of Resource Economics · October 2022

DOI: 10.1146/annurev-resource-111920-010503
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Annual Review of Resource Economics

The Economics of Wildlife
Trade and Consumption
Rohan Prasad,1 Gordon Rausser,2
and David Zilberman2
1
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA;
email: rohan.prasad@berkeley.edu
2
Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley,
California, USA
Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ. 2022. 14:29.1–29.23 Keywords

The Annual Review of Resource Economics is online at
wildlife, public health, animal welfare, shadow economies, supply chains,
resource.annualreviews.org
government policy
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-111920-
010503 Abstract
Copyright © 2022 by Annual Reviews.
The global wildlife trade dates to antiquity. Recently, its harms to endan-
All rights reserved
gered species, animal welfare, and public health have become critical to
JEL codes: D61, O13, O17, Q2, Q31, Q58
address. The complexities of the wildlife trade are numerous, including the
fact that much of the economic activity is illegal and unobserved. We find
that wildlife products are used for sustenance, signaling status, medicine,
and entertainment. There is vast heterogeneity in products and species
traded. Supply chains extend from biodiverse, low-income regions to richer
countries or urban centers. Empirically, we use data findings from the liter-
ature to rank countries in terms of intensity of the wildlife trade and identify
factors that contribute to wildlife trade. We also identify supply-side and
demand-side interventions that can control abuse in wildlife trade. Innova-
tive techniques for observation, econometric analysis, and enforcement are
sorely needed to support effective policies to preserve the world’s wildlife.
29.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Wildlife trade and consumption have existed for all recorded history (Sas-Rolfes et al. 2019).
Wildlife, defined as nondomesticated species of plants, animals, and microbes (Usher 1986), have
been harvested for use as sustenance, medicine, and entertainment. Estimates of the scale of the
trade range in the tens of billions of dollars a year, making it one of the largest illegal industries
worldwide (Warchol 2004).
With the worrying decline in endangered species and the ongoing global coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, harms associated with the trade have become particularly salient.
Three out of every four emerging infectious human diseases are sourced from animals (https://
www.cdc.gov/onehealth/basics/zoonotic-diseases.html), and the wildlife trade creates billions
of animal encounters that might produce zoonotic viruses1 (Karesh et al. 2005). From 1970 to
2020, wildlife populations have declined by 68% (Almond et al. 2020), and if this trend continues,
few species will be left for future generations to appreciate. Furthermore, millions of wild animals
slaughtered in the trade annually (Harfoot et al. 2018) often face miserable welfare conditions
(Baker et al. 2013, Faria & Paez 2019).
Our examination of the literature reveals many challenges facing scholars and policy makers
wishing to address the wildlife trade. For instance, wildlife exploitation remains a major source
of income for people in the Global South, where many wildlife species originate. As we address
in Section 4, much of the wildlife trade exists in illegal and informal sectors of the economy.
Therefore, the lack of direct observation makes it difficult to draw robust inferences about the
nature and extent of the trade. Ultimately, wildlife public policy must support trade and tourism,
while protecting endangered species, animal welfare, and the spread of infectious disease (Sas-
Rolfes et al. 2019). Our purpose is to synthesize the literature through the lens of economics,
distilling the major challenges that lie ahead for wildlife protection.
Our synthesis of the literature is presented in the following six sections. Section 2 reviews the
major patterns of wildlife trade across the globe, and Sections 3 and 4 investigate the nature of
demand and supply. Section 5 centers on the empirical analysis of indicators and causative factors
contributing to the wildlife trade. Sections 6 and 7 present solutions and our conclusion.
2. COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE WILDLIFE TRADE

This Section presents the basic theory for understanding the wildlife trade and reviews the use of
wildlife across Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, and South America.
2.1. Theory
Consumers benefit from wildlife in many ways. Depending on preferences and financial con-
straints, one might use wildlife products for direct consumption, medicinal usage, recreational
hunting, or to sell for a profit. Others derive utility principally from the preservation and exis-
tence of wildlife.
More formally, we can consider consumers as having a multi-attribute utility function affecting
the demand for wildlife (Rausser & Yassour 1981). The utility is derived from (a) consumptive
use of goods including food, medicine, crafts/souvenirs (e.g., items made of ivory), garments/
decorations, and recreation activities like hunting; and (b) nonconsumptive use through owning
1 These are diseases that come from a nonhuman animal. The economic costs of zoonotic diseases in the
twenty-first century have been estimated at $US200 billion (excluding COVID-19, whose impacts are still
being felt) (Karesh et al. 2012).
29.2 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

pets, tourism, benefits from the bequest of biodiversity, and the existing value of wildlife. The na-
ture of the benefits depends on the location. For example, in some places, consumption of wildlife
meats is an inferior good, and in others it is a luxury good. Different individuals weigh the com-
ponents of the utility functions differently, reflecting differences in income and culture. For many,
the main benefits of wildlife accrue from existence value and from the preservation of biodiversity
(Rausser & Small 2000); such motivations conflict with the interest of individuals who weigh the
consumptive use more heavily. Nevertheless, because the preservation of biodiversity and existence
of wildlife have features of global public goods, and destruction of wildlife is a negative externality,
there is a role for government intervention in protecting wildlife; indeed, regulatory frameworks
to protect wildlife have emerged across various countries. Because of these regulations, much of
the trade in wildlife and its associated supply chains are illegal. Thus, improved policy designs, as
well as monitoring and enforcement of implementable policies, are of major interest.
2.2. Evidence Across the Globe

The quality of evidence available varies in different world regions. Regions such as Asia and North
America are well studied through large surveys and data collection, but in other regions, disparate
studies on local preferences are used to elucidate macro trends. We rely primarily on evidence
from consumer surveys and articles analyzing relevant seizure data.
In Europe, wildlife activities involve hunting and importation of goods from other countries.
Studies show significant wildlife consumption in Europe, but the amount of this is hitherto unde-
termined because of limited monitoring (Halbwax 2020). Europe has strict government regula-
tions but arguably not enough enforcement to disincentivize illegal wildlife purchases.2 Notably,
Europe is home to wildlife protection agencies such as TRAFFIC (a wildlife monitoring and ad-
vocacy center) and the International Criminal Police Organization, or Interpol. This indicates
some desire for wildlife preservation alongside well-regulated consumption.
The Asian wildlife trade is the most studied and has the most conclusive literature (Challender
et al. 2015, Nijman et al. 2016, Zhang & Yin 2014). Wildlife is mainly consumed for medicine and
artifacts.3 Governments are aware of consumers’ preferences for wildlife products and the related
externalities and therefore allow limited trade of wildlife to mitigate mass illegal trade.
In Africa, wild meat is sometimes directly consumed as food, whereas wildlife artifacts are
frequently harvested from elephants and rhinos and then exported to Europe or Asia (Biggs 2013).
There are several large-scale studies of wildlife consumption in Africa (such as Brashares et al.
2011), but most studies focus on small localities rather than the broad swath of consumers on the
continent. Economic/political crises such as the Ebola virus outbreak affect the perception and
consumption of wildlife products (Ordaz-Nemeth et al. 2017).
In North America, wildlife is hunted for recreation. Additionally, wildlife products (mainly fur
and other artifacts) are imported from abroad. Revenue from the hunting industry (e.g., hunt-
ing licenses, taxes on gear) creates funding for conservation of wildlife, facilitated by the North
American model for wildlife management (Organ et al. 2012).
Finally, in South America, wildlife is mostly consumed locally for food, with minimal export to
distant countries (Mendonca et al. 2016). With a range of available species on different parts of
the continent, locals derive value from the tastes and nutritional content of products immediately
2 Agencies that track wild meat and consumption include the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation, the Global Biodiversity Information Facility, and the European Bird Atlas (Schlup et al. 2014).
3 Wild meat (e.g., from pangolin) is also consumed in Asia and as a luxury good (Volpato et al. 2020).
www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.3

Historical relationship
Human recreation
Interaction
Consumptive use
Nonconsumptive use
Consumptive uses
Wildlife species and habitats
• Commercial hunting
• Sport hunting
• Subsistence hunting
Nonconsumptive uses
• Commercial fishing
• Sport fishing • Birdwatching
• Subsistence fishing • Whale watching
• Fur trapping and hunting • Photographic trips
• Hunting for animal parts • Organized and individual
and pet trade Low-consumptive uses nature walks
• Indirect kills through • Commercial photography
other activities and cinematography
(pollution, bycatch, road • Zoos and animal parks • Secondary wildlife
kills) • Aquaria and oceanaria viewing in parks, reserves,
• Eradication programs for • Scientific research and recreational areas
animals with real and
perceived threats
Figure 1
Outline of consumptive, low-consumptive, and nonconsumptive uses of wildlife. Adapted with permission
from Duffus & Dearden (1990); copyright 1990 Elsevier.
available to them. One comparative review article (Nielsen et al. 2017) studies the overall compar-
ison between South America and other regions through a survey of several thousand households
globally. The paper suggests that in Latin America, hunting is twice as common as it is in Asia
(comparable to Africa), and there is a higher reliance on wildlife for food consumption.
3. CONSUMER DEMAND FOR WILDLIFE PRODUCTS

We broadly classify uses for wildlife products to be consumptive and nonconsumptive. Consump-
tion includes direct engagement with wildlife (e.g., hunting and fishing), whereas nonconsump-
tive usages focus on aesthetics and existence values, as illustrated in Figure 1 (Duffus & Dearden
1990). For wildlife trade to decline, consumptive uses must diminish, and nonconsumptive uses
must assume greater relative importance.
3.1. Nonconsumptive Demand

Nonconsumptive demand comes in two types: wildlife-oriented recreation and the existence value
of wildlife. Mendelsohn & Olmstead (2009) review the range of methods that can estimate for both
categories, which we discuss here in their application to wildlife.
The sum of all ecotourism activities is estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars (Ceballos-
Lascurain 2008). Consumers will readily pay for activities such as whale watching, scuba diving, or
safari excursions, which need living animals in their natural habitats for the activity to be worth-
while (Rutten 2002, Salam et al. 2000). The value of wildlife in these activities can be discovered
using the revealed preference method, which uses the fact that “even if an [environmental good] is
not readily traded, [its] value can be calculated indirectly through market analysis” (Mendelsohn
& Olmstead 2009, p. 329). An example of such a method is the travel cost method, which uses the

relationship between travel cost to an ecotourism site and visitation rates to estimate the demand
function for the activity (Mendelsohn & Olmstead 2009).
The travel cost method and other revealed preference methods have been sporadically applied
to wildlife species. A notable paper is by Gallagher & Hammerschlag (2011) regarding the eco-
nomic value of shark ecotourism globally. Considering the amount of money that every individual
is willing to pay for a human–shark interaction, the survey found that one shark located in a prime
tourist area brings $35,000 in revenue annually (enough that sharks as an attraction comprise a
major portion of the Greater Caribbean’s tourism revenues). When measured and monetized, eco-
tourism can bring significant revenue for lower-income countries and can aid wildlife protection.
The other kind of valuation method, the contingent valuation method (CVM), uses “carefully
designed surveys that ask consumers how much they value environmental goods and services”
(Mendelsohn & Olmstead 2009). Table 1 presents the results of a meta-analysis of 31 studies
estimating willingness-to-pay (WTP) for threatened and endangered species in the United States
(Richardson & Loomis 2009). The analysis notes important factors that statistically influence the
Table 1 The annual, per household economic value (in $US) of threatened, endangered, and
rare species from a meta-analysis in the United States, 2006. Adapted with permission from
Richardson & Loomis (2009)
Average of all
Species Low value High value studies
Studies reporting annual WTP
Bald eagle $21 $45 $39
Bighorn sheep ND ND $17
Dolphin ND ND $36
Gray whale $24 $46 $35
Owl $39 $130 $65
Sea lion ND ND $71
Sea otter ND ND $40
Sea turtle ND ND $19
Seal ND ND $35
Silvery minnow ND ND $38
Squawfish ND ND $12
Striped shiner ND ND $8
Turkey $11 $15 $13
Washington state andadromous fish populations $147 $311 $241
Whooping crane $44 $69 $56
Woodpecker $13 $20 $16
Studies reporting lump sum WTP
Arctic grayling $20 $26 $23
Bald eagle $245 $350 $297
Falcon (indeterminate species) ND ND $32
Humpback whale ND ND $240
Monk seal ND ND $166
Wolf $22 $162 $61
Salmon/Steelhead $10 $139 $81
Abbreviations: ND, no data; WTP, willingness-to-pay.

reported average WTP value, such as whether the species is marine or a charismatic megafauna.
WTP is also influenced, however, by unrelated factors such as whether the survey was more
recently published. Therefore, we proceed with caution when interpreting the results of CVM
studies.
Several other issues complicate the use of both the revealed preference and stated preference
(i.e., contingent valuation) methods. Concretely, wildlife species create documented ecosystem
services (Green & Elmberg 2014, Ripple et al. 2014). These are the life-sustaining benefits given
by nature, such as fertile soil, pollination, and clean air and water (Dasgupta 2021). These benefits,
subtle as they are, are likely undervalued by survey respondents and ecotourists.
Moreover, the global values of biodiversity and natural capital are more than their benefit
to humans. The UK Treasury’s recently commissioned report on the economics of biodiversity
recognizes that “nature nurtures and nourishes us, so we will think of assets as durable entities
that not only have use value but may also have intrinsic worth” (Dasgupta 2021, p. 5). If there is
intrinsic value to nature and wild animals, then the market will undervalue it, particularly if we
consider natural capital to be a global public good.
Finally, it is worth noting that the nonconsumptive value of wildlife changes depending on
framing and awareness. Veríssimo et al. (2017) note that effective conservation marketing, even
of unpopular species (i.e., those other than rhinos or elephants) can increase donations to wildlife
protection groups by up to 26 times. Similarly, Han et al. (2011) found that WTP for wildlife
reserves increases with better attitude and impressions of a site, so the promotion of a park’s bio-
diversity and natural beauty can galvanize public support and funding.
3.2. Consumptive Demand

Having reviewed nonconsumptive uses of wildlife, we detail the consumptive uses of wildlife (food,
medicine, and artifacts). This Section builds on the overview of countries in Section 1 and presents
more detailed evidence of wildlife demand across different regions of the world.
3.2.1. Europe. Schlup et al. (2014) find that about one in five EU citizens consume wildlife
(plant or animal). Major cities act as trading nodes for illegal business (van Uhm 2018). Airports
in Paris, Zurich, and Geneva have seen massive quantities of seized wildlife products each year
(Bezerra-Santos et al. 2021). In Paris, for instance, Chaber et al. (2010) estimate that five metric
tonnes of wild meat per week are smuggled through personal baggage in the Roissy-Charles de
Gaulle Airport. The flights observed mainly come from African countries, and species include
primates, rodents, crocodiles, pangolins, and elephant. In Switzerland, a similar story is seen from
a study between 2008 and 2011 (Falk et al. 2013). The authors estimate the annual inflow of wild
meat to Switzerland to be 8.6 tonnes, a mere subset of the imports to the entire European Union.
The European Union itself reported almost 21 million live reptiles imported between 2004 and
2014 (Auliya et al. 2016). The demographics of these wildlife consumers is impossible to know
without detailed consumer surveys.
These findings can only be viewed as indicators of an unknown amount of illegal wildlife goods
entering the European Union. With many high-income countries in this region, the potential
contribution of EU consumers to the wildlife trade is substantial, and the actual extent of illegal
trade must be better examined.
3.2.2. Asia. Two surveys of over 200 households in five major Chinese cities conducted by
Zhang et al. (2008) and Zhang & Yin (2014) suggest that Chinese consumers who are younger, high
income, and well educated are more likely to consume wildlife. Wildlife consumption is especially
prevalent in respondents between age 18 and 29 years (36% versus 23.7% for older populations)

and those who are college educated (42.5% versus 18.4% noncollege educated) and have monthly
incomes above US$635 (39.5% versus 22.9% for lower incomes). At the same time, 53% of all
those surveyed believe wildlife should not be consumed (up from 43% in 2004). These surveys
show that wildlife consumption, though significant, is far from ubiquitous across consumers in
China and is a potentially divisive issue.
In Asia, medicinal wildlife products come from pangolins (Nijman et al. 2016), bears (Davis
et al. 2019, Dutton et al. 2011), and rhinos (Biggs 2013). The quantity of pangolin scales seized at
borders, the number of bear bile farms in Vietnam and Cambodia, and the usage of rhino horn in
traditional medicine suggest widespread usage of wildlife (Broad & Burgess 2016, Warchol 2004,
Zhou et al. 2018).
Many consumers in Asia ascribe value to the rarity of wildlife products. Rhino horn, the use of
which is forbidden by international treaties, has seen price increases from $4,700 per kilogram in
1993 to $65,000 per kilogram in 2012 (Biggs 2013). While this drastic increase in prices ought to
deter most consumers, the continued harvesting of rhinos suggests a desire for rare products in
conjunction with restricted demand. More recently, a study analyzed a Hong Kong–based internet
forum over 36 months and found several thousand illegally traded turtles for sale. Over three-
quarters of the turtles were from threatened species, and the prices of the turtles increased with
rarity/endangered species status (Sung & Fong 2018).
Knowing that rarity is a desired quality for wildlife products has consequences for government
policy. For instance, banning specific products might have unintended consequences on the eco-
nomic activity. Challender et al. 2015 analyze a combination of sources, such as gray literature,
online searches, and data from TRAFFIC and the Convention on International Trade of En-
dangered Species (CITES), to estimate the number of pangolins traded between 1977 and 2013
(Challender et al. 2015). Despite the zero-export quota imposed by CITES in 2000, which pre-
sumably increased prices, quantity demand stayed roughly constant after the change in regulation.
As before, rarity seems to be desirable, or at least not a cause of concern for wildlife users. Desire
for scarce products, however, creates major risks of extinction in target populations. As scholars
describe, the “price-rarity relationship creates financial incentives to extract the last remaining in-
dividuals of a population, despite higher search and harvest costs” (Holden & McDonald-Madden
2017, p. 170).
3.2.3. Africa. For many in rural regions, wildlife is an easily accessible source of protein. This
is particularly true for those who live in frontier forests, which have abundant wildlife (Poulsen
et al. 2009). In communities around the Serengeti National Park (in Tanzania), one survey found
that 29% of household consumption of meat/fish comes from wildlife. Prices of wild meat in this
region vary between villages, but wild meat is generally cheaper than alternatives such as beef,
chicken, or sheep, and is most comparable to fish (negative supply shocks to fisheries dramati-
cally increase wild meat consumption) (Rentsch & Damon 2013). These products seem far more
accessible to African consumers compared to those in Asia, where wild meat is a luxury good.
Still, many studies on Africa find a positive correlation between income and wildlife consump-
tion. This relationship is robust across vast differences in biogeographic, social, and economic
aspects in four countries: Ghana, Cameroon, Tanzania, and Madagascar (Brashares et al. 2011).
These findings resonate in Equatorial Guinea (East et al. 2005) and the Serengeti National Park
(Rentsch & Damon 2013). Additionally, an increase in population is, rather expectedly, correlated
with an increased use of wild meat: When the population of five towns in northern Republic of
the Congo grew their population by 70%, the annual biomass of wild meat consumed increased
by 64% (Poulsen et al. 2009). Poulsen et al. found that the major species consumed were types of
deer (duiker, the majority), monkeys, bushpigs, and small reptiles.

Wild meat consumption responds to public health crises such as the West African Ebola crisis
in interesting ways. Ordaz-Nemeth et al. (2017) analyzed prices, quantities, and food consumption
before and after the Ebola scares. They found that wild meat became taboo at this time because the
Ebola virus stemmed from wild animals, with consumers associating this risk with all wild meats;
in other words, wild meat changed from a luxury good to an inferior good. With reduced income
and reduced desire for wild meat, households doubled their consumption of fish and increased
consumption of chicken by several times, while wild meat consumption decreased to one-fourth
of its normal level (Ordaz-Nemeth et al. 2017). The exact pattern of behavior may change ac-
cording to social environments and shocks (like the Ebola outbreak) affecting them. This theory
is considered further below. We surmise that in Africa, wildlife trade and consumption are rela-
tively widespread. Small animals are often the most accessible (Poulsen et al. 2009) and priced for
day-to-day consumption.
3.2.4. North America. The popularity of hunting in North America is reflected in the
scale of the hunting industry. Between the United States and Canada, there are approximately
15 million active hunters each year who spend about US$40 billion on noncommercial hunting
expenses (Arnett & Southwick 2016). The North American model of wildlife regulation has been
praised for its control of wildlife populations and consistent generation of revenue for govern-
ments (funds that can then be used for wildlife conservation) (Sharp & Wollscheid 2009). At the
same time, Sharp and Wollscheid note that the United States has more hunting than any other
country, causing great amounts of animal suffering.
The United States is a leading importer of legally traded wildlife, with almost 1 billion legally
imported products and 6 million seized wildlife products from 1979 to 2014 (Olsen et al. 2021,
Smith et al. 2012). Most of these products are used for commercial purposes, such as animal
hair paint brushes, fishing flies made of rodent hairs, or décor using primate skulls (Sanerib &
Uhlemann 2020). Legal trade is correlated with seizures of illegal wildlife goods entering the
country (Olsen et al. 2021). Animals found in seizures include protected species such as baboons,
chimpanzees, and rats, and animals that produce luxury fur products (Sosnowski & Petrossian
2020). Such products come from Asia (Olsen et al. 2021) and Africa (Guinea, Nigeria, and Liberia)
(Smith et al. 2012).
3.2.5. South America. The preparation and consumption of wildlife in South America depend
greatly on the local species. Van Vliet et al. (2014, p. 7) state that “[wild] meat is mostly sold
fresh in Colombia, smoked in Peru, and salted or iced in Brazil,” demonstrating how wild meat is
sometimes immediately consumed (nondurable) and sometimes stored for a rainy day (durable).
Furthermore, different species require different time investments: Although the Peruvian mar-
kets demand the yellow-footed tortoise (making them commonly captured and traded), Brazilian
hunters target the thriftier tapirs and tericaya turtles, which are more difficult to catch. The varia-
tion in supply chain and types of goods in different countries demonstrates the locals’ knowledge
of specific species, as opposed to the demand for species across international borders (such as the
pangolin).
In the semiarid region of Caatinga, Brazil, one study found over 200 species of mammals and
750 types of birds registered in local markets (Mendonca et al. 2016). Terrestrial vertebrates,
i.e., big game mammals, comprise about half of South American wild meat consumption. In the
Caatinga (a region with scarce vegetation), wildlife hunters ate game every week or two. The
most common species were types of deer, rodents, and armadillos. Seventy-six percent of species
were consumed as protein (Barboza et al. 2016), and consumers expressed a preference for wildlife
because of taste and protein content (Chaves et al. 2019). On the Amazonian trifrontier (border

villages in Colombia, Peru, and Brazil) mammals were eaten in a similar proportion (60%), with
the paca, tapir, collared peccary, and yellow-footed tortoise commonly consumed in various coun-
tries (van Vliet et al. 2014).
An estimated 6 million metric tonnes of wild animals are slaughtered each year in the Amazon
basin (Nasi et al. 2011), bringing millions of US dollars to local peoples involved in the trade.
Near the Brazilian Amazon, surveys found that 99% of urban households consume wildlife of
some kind, with 80% consuming wild meat (Parry et al. 2014). Surveys show that approximately
80% of urban households have been found to consume wild meat. This rate varies across South
America and is influenced by local customs, wealth, and availability.
In a study of urban Amazonians (from Brazil and Colombia), researchers found that both in-
digenous and nonindigenous locals consumed wild meat at similar rates (Morsello et al. 2015);
therefore, wild meat usage may be a feature of local culture rather than indigeneity. Wild meat
was frequently obtained via household hunting or as a gift. This indicates the low bar to access-
ing wild meat (as opposed to the luxury gift giving occurring in China) and the preference locals
have for wild meat (perhaps demonstrating superior good status). Such preferences are inevitably
carried down through traditions, as in other parts of the world, that continue to promote the hunt-
ing and consumption of wild animals (Barboza et al. 2016). Regarding other factors, the study of
Brazilian and Colombian Amazonians (Morsello et al. 2015) found that social networks had the
most consistent correlation with consumption. Like anywhere else in the world, people eat what
their friends are eating, whether wildlife meats for luxury or wild meat for sustenance.
In conclusion, wild meat consumption in South America is about as common as it is in Africa.
Hunters and nonhunters alike rely, to varying degrees, on wild meat as a food source, and many
consume wild meat regularly (every month). An extraordinary number of animals is slaughtered
for this trade, with the biomass in millions of tonnes.
4. THE SUPPLY OF WILDLIFE PRODUCTS

In this Section we outline the factors driving the supply of wildlife products, specify a multistage
supply chain, and propose interventions.
4.1. Key Regions in Wildlife Supply

Fundamentally, the illegal wildlife trade thrives because of the rural-urban divide. In low-income,
biodiverse, rural regions, wildlife is commonplace, but there is not excessive demand for luxury
goods deriving from those animals. In urban, high-income regions, wildlife is scarce, but there is
plenty of WTP and desire for wildlife products. Like many other types of products, a supply chain
emerges where wildlife products are imported into rich, urban areas. This dynamic is described
in Table 2.
Sections 3.2.3–3.2.5 described regions where rural communities directly consume wildlife (par-
ticularly wild meat). In these situations, the trade networks are more local and do not necessarily
Table 2 Rural-urban divide for wildlife supply

Producer Consumer
Characteristics Rural, biodiverse; minimal enforcement Urban, high-income; have cultural
or regulation present; have few fetish for wildlife products
economic options
Examples African elephant poachers; Vietnamese Asian ivory users; traditional medicine
pangolin hunters; Zimbabwean reptile practitioners; Belgian wildlife users;
hunters; Cambodian monkey farms North American research laboratories

Growth Harvest Transport Retail
Wildlife parts are sold

Wildlife is grown in Wildlife is slaughtered Wildlife bodies/parts
to consumers in a
biodiverse or captured by are smuggled
high-income
regions/countries local poachers across borders
region/country
Figure 2
The four-stage wildlife supply chain.
involve a multistage supply chain. The supply chains presented below are most relevant for pro-
cessed products such as elephant ivory, rhino horns, or pangolin scales.
The rural-urban divide is represented in several ways in Table 2. In each instance, the wildlife
supply chain exploits lax regulations in biodiverse areas to provide desired products to high-
income consumers.
4.2. General Wildlife Supply Chain Model

Growth and maintenance of this trade demand an innovation-induced supply chain design,
wherein new practices are introduced along the multiple stages of the supply chain (Zilberman
et al. 2019). We model the supply of wildlife products with a four-stage supply chain: the growth
of wild species, capture/slaughter of wild animals, transportation and smuggling across borders,
and sale at the destination country (see Figure 2). Each stage is modular and not always present
in each case.
4.2.1. Growth. Regular wildlife harvesting often necessitates the endangerment of species in-
volved (Poulsen et al. 2017). There are 184 Parties (i.e., countries or regional economic organi-
zation) in CITES, which is supported by several nongovernmental organizations, yet poached
species still decline annually in significant proportions (Challender & MacMillan 2014). In
Vietnam, where wildlife is considered the source of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),
“seven out of 11 viverrids [civets] and five out of 12 mustelids are listed as threatened in the 2000
Vietnam Red Book Data” (Bell et al. 2004, p. 1111). The rural spaces where these species grow are
often what makes them threats for zoonotic risk, as much of the risk is brought from the transfer
of animals from rural to urban zones (Bradley & Altizer 2007, Narrod et al. 2012). Overharvesting
of wildlife can make this portion of the supply chain unsustainable.
4.2.2. Poaching. The second stage in the wildlife supply chain is the capture of wild animals.
This stage involves three major actors: the animals, the poachers, and governmental agencies.
The welfare of animals is low in the wildlife trade. Dense transportation conditions lead to
untreated infections and decreased welfare conditions for transported animals, which increase the
risk for infectious disease (Baker et al. 2013). Pangolins, for instance, remain curled in shells for
several days during transport without food or water (Clark et al. 2009). These conditions originate
because poachers mostly sell wildlife for financial returns (Moneron et al. 2020) and thus select
low-cost modes of transportation. Other reasons for poaching exist, such as protecting one’s own
domestic wildlife (Damania et al. 2003) or thrill killing in developed countries (Muth & Bowe
1998), but these methods also neglect animal welfare.
Governments and international regulators have various policy options to limit poaching. A
common one includes a ban to protect certain species. In these situations, poachers compare the
costs and benefits of poaching illegally with nonpoaching sources of income. Often, when poachers
have nothing left to lose and nonpoaching wages are low, fines do little to protect wild animals

(Messer 2010). Some have argued that these circumstances create the need for shoot-on-sight
policies, where poachers are killed by authorities if seen endangering protected species (Messer
2010). Poachers have nothing to lose but their life, and so shoot-on-sight can be an effective (yet
punitive) way to protect animals. The alternative, though complex, is to create better nonpoaching
sources of income (Messer 2000).
In contrast, some advocate the judicious legalization of wildlife products. Legalization of in-
dustries such as the ivory trade is theorized to displace the illegal trade and allow transactions
that happen underground to be regulated (Barbier et al. 2013). This method can also incentivize
private actors to work to protect endangered species (Bulte & Barbier 2005). However, recent em-
pirical work suggests that, owing to changes in producer costs and/or consumer demand, increases
in legal trade are positively correlated with increases in illegal trade, rather than simply displacing
black market activity (Hsiang & Sekar 2016).
4.2.3. Transport. The third stage of the wildlife supply chain is transport across international
borders. Though some wildlife trade occurs domestically, more profit can often be made by ex-
porting wildlife products. The commonly poor but biodiverse countries have wildlife to capture
and poachers to hunt (e.g., the Indo-Burma Region, including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thai-
land, Myanmar, and some Chinese regions, has more than 70% of the endemic mammals listed
by the International Union for Conservation of Nature as globally threatened). These products
are then transported to richer countries or urban centers and consumers who eat wild meat or use
traditional wildlife-based medicines as luxury products (Challender et al. 2015).
As previously noted, large-scale innovation has occurred around international smuggling since
the emergence of the internet (see Section 2.1). This involves another actor in the supply chain:
virtual retailers (i.e., Alibaba or Amazon). These platforms help poachers and merchants make
money from wild animal parts and without government intervention and have little reason to stop
it. Statements on wildlife poaching by major online retailers have been linked to reduced quantities
of wildlife traded online (Yu & Jia 2015).
4.2.4. Retail. Finally, the supply chain involves the retail of wildlife parts online, at restaurants,
or at traditional medicine establishments. Most research on this subject has focused on online
wildlife trade, where illegal items are sold under pseudonyms to evade capture by the authorities
(IFAW 2008).
In terms of physical items, the CRAVED framework has been used recently and describes items
that are concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, and disposable (Moreto & Lemieux
2015). Moreto and Lemieux also note that wildlife items become more processed as they go down
the supply chain toward retail, and the qualities of processable, transferable, and usable are added
to the framework.4 Future field studies on wildlife retail are needed to understand how products
are packaged when they meet the consumer.
4.2.5. Species-specific supply chains. Extended supply chain models for elephants, bear bile, and
pangolin scales are presented in Figure 3. The elephant ivory supply chain graphic is adapted from
Underwood et al. (2013), and the pangolin scale graphic is from the Wildlife Justice Commission
(Wildl. Justice Comm. 2020). We modeled the bear bile graphic based on graphics and information
from Foley et al. (2011).
4 Their framework, CAPTURED, suggests traded wildlife items are concealable, available, processable, trans-
ferable, usable, removable, enjoyable, and desirable.

a Raw ivory Worked ivory
Elephants Transit Worked Transit

Raw ivory put Ivory Retail and
killed through ivory put in through
in shipment processed wholesale
countries shipment countries
IVORY STOCKPILES
Natural
mortality
b
Bears farmed,
bile extracted
Legal in China,
Laos, Russia.
Risk for zoonotic Legal retail in
Transit Transportation
disease and animal
welfare. through traditional
to distributor
countries medicinal products
International Arrangement Bear bile commercialized,

transport sometimes facilitated with minor expansions to
Bears caught forbidden by via online trade or nonmedicinal markets.
in wild, placed CITES. personal networks.
in farms
Illegal in most
countries.
Issues of animal
welfare and species
endangerment.
c
Pangolins Ground Legal retail in
Transportation
killed, scales transportation Loading Delivery traditional
medicinal
to distributor
extracted to port medicinal products
Illegal. Little monitoring. Random Bill of lading Arrangement Pangolin scales common
Issues of animal Products checks by changed. sometimes facilitated at small-time medicine
welfare and species combined with customs Enforcement via online trade or retailers.
endangerment. legal goods. agencies. authorities can personal networks.
Potential for no longer seize
corruption. goods.
Figure 3
(a) Supply chain of elephant ivory. Panel adapted from Underwood et al. (2013) (CC BY 4.0). (b) Supply chain of bear bile for medicinal
products. Data from Foley et al. (2011). (c) Supply chain of pangolin scales for medicinal products. Panel adapted with permission from
Wildl. Justice Comm. (2020). Abbreviation: CITES, Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species.

5. MONITORING THE ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE

Empirical analysis of the wildlife trade can be done through two broad methods. The first is using
indicator data to deduce the extent and concentration of illegal wildlife trade. The second method
is to look at broad causative factors that can foster wildlife trade; for example, greater biodiversity
or more of the population living in rural settings may mean that a country tends to poach more
wild animals. We conduct both analyses in this section.
This Section has three additional parts. We first review the available indicators that scholars
have used to track the extent of the wildlife trade. Next, we conduct an example of such an analysis
with seizure data from TRAFFIC, a wildlife trade monitoring nonprofit. We then combine data
from various public sources to rank 16 countries’ tendencies to produce, consume, and enforce
regulations on wildlife trade. Lastly, we note challenges in using empirical data as a proxy for the
volume of illegal wildlife trade.
5.1. Available Indicator Data and Their Implications

With illegal economic activity, no one data source can be understood as representative of the trade.
It can, however, indicate the extent, nature, or concentration of the trade in some places. Data that
have been studied in recent years include:
Seizure data sets from TRAFFIC and customs data from CITES;
Surveys of the public;
Field interviews and observations;
Online screening; and
Wildlife population monitoring.
Details on the benefits and drawbacks of each approach are detailed in Supplemental
Appendix A.
We present an exploratory data analysis of seizure data from TRAFFIC for all cases pertaining
to China and Vietnam. The data are complete to the end of 2020, and the TRAFFIC source
includes information from the recently published Wildlife Trade Portal, now available online
to the public (https://www.wildlifetradeportal.org). Graphs exploring the commodity types,
species frequencies, countries in supply chain, and geographic location of seizures are presented
in Supplemental Appendix B.
As discussed, seizure data are unlikely to be representative of all the wildlife trade. However,
seizure data are at least part of the whole trade, and we suggest that any sampling biases inherent
to seizure data in China also hold in Vietnam; therefore, a comparative analysis can yield some
meaningful results.
Regarding the commodity types, wildlife products most commonly manifest as worked ivory
in China, followed by living, individual animals. In Vietnam, worked ivory is relatively low in
magnitude; living animals and dead carcasses constitute the products found in most seizures. One
interpretation is that Vietnamese seizures capture wildlife products earlier in the supply chain
where the animals are unprocessed. Interventions in Vietnam might then directly target poachers
rather than intermediaries in the supply chain.
In terms of species frequency, China sees an enormous number of elephant product seizures
(over 25%), followed by pangolins, tigers, miscellaneous plants, and bears. In Vietnam, somewhat
different species are more common: Pangolins, turtles, elephants, snakes, monkeys, and tigers
constitute approximately 50% of the seizure data. Greater diversity in products might mean
that Vietnamese trade more closely reflects the biodiversity in Vietnam, compared to Chinese
ivory that may be imported from other countries. Lastly, Supplemental Appendix B contains

Table 3 Sources of data on variables that affect illegal wildlife trade

Area of concern Factor Rationale Source
Enforcement Conservation More resources spent on conservation Waldron et al. 2013
expenditure ought to yield a higher seizure rate
Rule of law Improved rule of law leads to better World Bank (https://databank.
enforcement and reduced illegal worldbank.org/source/worldwide-
trade governance-indicators)
Consumption Inequality More inequality may lead to elite World Inequality Database (https://
demand of products and subsistence www.wid.world)
demand from endangered species
Animal welfare Rules against cruelty toward domestic Animal Protection Index (https://api.
regulations animals indicate consumer worldanimalprotection.org/)
appreciation for wild animals
Production Percent of population in Those living in rural settings have World Bank (https://data.worldbank.
rural settings more direct access to wildlife supply org/indicator/sp.rur.totl.zs)
Per capita GDP People in low-income countries have World Bank (https://data.worldbank.
more to gain from illegal org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.
exploitation CD)
Number of endangered More endangered species in a region IUCN Red List (https://www.
species mean there is more variety to exploit iucnredlist.org/)
Abbreviations: GDP, gross domestic product; IUCN, International Union for Conservation of Nature.
a graphical representation of the location of seizures, illustrating a general picture of prominent

hotspots of trade/enforcement in the two countries.
5.2. Prioritization Ranking

Having considered indicators that correlate with the wildlife trade, we turn to underlying factors
that could cause wildlife exploitation to emerge. The relevance of our chosen factors is assumed
from sources in the literature, but it is impossible to be certain of their direct relevance to wildlife
consumption. Table 3 lists our chosen variables of interest (enforcement, consumption, and pro-
duction), along with factors that are presumed to influence them in a significant way.
We combined data from these numerous sources to create an unweighted ranking system to
sort countries based on their contributions to illegal wildlife trade. We sorted a subset of countries
using this system and ranked them (Table 4). The method and data sources can be found in
Supplemental Appendix C.
Table 4 Countries sorted into groups based on their contributions toward affecting illegal
wildlife trade
Contribution High risk Medium risk Low risk
Enforcement Mongolia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Belgium, China, South
Philippines Malaysia, Poland, Africa, South Korea,
Russia, Vietnam Thailand, United States
Consumption Japan, Kenya, China, Philippines, South Belgium, Indonesia,
Myanmar, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Mongolia,
Africa United States, Vietnam Poland
Production Indonesia, Kenya, China, Malaysia, Belgium, Japan, Poland,
Philippines, Mongolia, Myanmar, Russia, South Korea,
Vietnam South Africa, Thailand United States

Note that the low level of enforcement and high levels of consumption and production of
wildlife increase the probability of illegal wildlife trade. This method offers an avenue to system-
atize research by ranking countries into risk categories. Further research is needed to provide
more precision to the data and expand them to other countries.
5.3. Estimating Scale

Scholars, government officials, and the public are naturally curious about the extent of the wildlife
trade globally. Because of the illegal nature of much of the actual trade, it is impossible to precisely
estimate its volume. Criminologists name the gap between known and unknown crime the dark
figure (Biderman & Reiss 1967). A large dark figure indicates that economic activity is largely un-
derground and undetected. Problems arising from this are numerous: lower awareness, less fund-
ing and political will, and reduced deterrent effects from penalties for the crime (Wellsmith 2011).
The difficulty of measuring the size of the illegal wildlife trade has been emphasized by Sas-
Rolfes et al. (2019). The paper discusses the large evidence gaps and unsystematic research on the
scale and practices in the wildlife trade. They note that common estimates on the approximate
size of economic activity (which range from US$5 to 20 billion) have been grossly misrepresented
by the media and can be traced back to five haphazard guesses in early research papers.
Some economists have studied the shadow economy (defined as the illegal and informal sec-
tors), but they have not yet applied this term to the wildlife trade (Schneider & Enste 2013;
F. Schneider, personal communication). Inevitably, the dark figure for wildlife varies across species,
time, and location. For an agency such as TRAFFIC, one researcher mentioned factors such
as the “willingness of a region to report seizures, popularity of a species in the media, efforts
(or lack thereof ) of a specific enforcement agency, etc.” (A. Bagott, personal communication).
Other studies have nonetheless used indicator data to draw inferences about the wildlife trade.
The confounding factors (seizure rate and report rate) that complicate this method are visually
described in Figure 4. CITES data have commonly been used to characterize the prevalence of
various species, but if detection rates vary across species, then these conclusions are not completely
accurate. There have been some loose links between legal trade and seizure data (Tittensor et al.
2020), which we find reflected in our data analysis. Other studies have tried to control the inherent
biases of seizure data by creating indices for global volume of transactions of ivory or global
weight of ivory, thereby isolating poaching rates of elephants from exogenous changes in demand
(Underwood et al. 2013). Another way to deduce poaching rates is by combining the proportion
of illegally killed elephants (or other wildlife) by observing carcasses in the wild with the natural
mortality rates of different species (Zhou et al. 2018). These techniques are novel and applied
Illegal ivory Seizure Report

Seizures ETIS records
transactions rate rate
Unobservable
Latent variables
Predictors Predictors
Data
Figure 4
Conceptual model of seizure data recreated from Underwood et al. 2013 (CC BY 4.0). They illustrate how
the actual observation of illegal ivory transactions is obscured by biases in the seizure rate and report rate
(which are also unknowable). Abbreviation: ETIS, Elephant Trade Information System.

substantively to only the elephant trade (Hauenstein et al. 2019) and not yet to other critically
endangered species. Novel methods should be used to measure detection rates and seizure rates
and to comprehensively survey the illegal trade of wildlife. More data collection and analysis are
needed.
6. INTERVENTIONS IN THE WILDLIFE TRADE

Broadly, interventions in the wildlife trade can be categorized into demand side and supply side.
Demand-side interventions shape incentives or norms around wildlife consumption, whereas
supply-side interventions address nodes in the wildlife supply chain.
Any intervention includes its own costs and benefits and could constitute an article in itself. In
this section, we set the landscape of existing interventions across the regions discussed in Section 1
and propose new and improved interventions based on the structure of demand and supply.
6.1. Regulations in Practice

We first consider existing regulations in Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America, fo-
cusing on major countries in each region. Practically all nations follow the CITES, a multilat-
eral treaty to protect endangered animals and plants. Some countries augment the list of species
CITES protects, for example, if a species is endangered in a particular area. In practice, CITES
protections may amount to very little without effective regulation.
In Asia, government regulation varies according to circumstances. For instance, in China, bear
bile is legal when extracted from farmed bears but illegal if the bears are wild caught [though
consumers show a stated preference for wild-caught bile (Dutton et al. 2011)]. Elephant and rhino
products are entirely illegal (except antiques) owing to the conservation status of those animals.
Government regulations are designed to reduce externalities posed by the trade.
It is inevitably difficult to distinguish between farmed and wild-caught bear bile, or between
antique and new ivory. This ambiguity can create loopholes in the trade, which are discussed in
Section 5.3.
Wildlife hunting in Africa is regulated by a variety of legal instruments. Wildlife owned by the
state or president or private landholders, or in national parks, are likely to be protected. Rights to
hunt can be given to safari operations or in some cases to subsistence hunters on certain categories
of land (Lindsey et al. 2013). Despite these legal instruments, poaching in Africa persists and
is a major international concern. Antipoaching efforts range from basic fencing, dehorning of
protected species such as rhinos (Mukwazvure & Magadza 2014), and to remotely piloted drone
systems (Mulero-Pázmány et al. 2014). The development of effective methods, as well as critiques
of militarized antipoaching strategies (Duffy et al. 2015), is the subject of its own literature.
In South America, government regulations follow international conventions (Goyes & Sollund
2016), but fines and punishments often go unenforced (da Silva & Bernard 2016). In North Amer-
ica, infrastructure such as the US Law Enforcement Management Information System (LEMIS)
records trade of CITES-listed and -nonlisted species (Olsen et al. 2021). This system makes it
convenient to study and craft effective policy. Additionally, the revenue generated from the hunt-
ing industry can generate more financial resources to enforce wildlife protection laws. At the same
time, the United States has lacked effective enforcement on products that may act as conduits for
pathogen spread (Smith et al. 2012) and in catching illegal items imported to the country.
6.2. Demand-Side Interventions

As discussed, demand-side interventions can be incentive based or norm based. Incentive-based
interventions include quotas on wildlife consumption (including bans, a zero-quota), taxes on

wildlife products, increased enforcement on illegal products, and alternate development pathways
for communities reliant on the wildlife trade. Norm-based interventions emphasize education and
social change to reduce wildlife demand.
These various interventions have been widely debated by wildlife scholars. Full bans on wildlife
products, such as elephant ivory or pangolin parts, have been implemented in many countries (see
the CITES list). However, banning wildlife trade seems to drive trade to underground markets,
which makes it even more difficult to monitor (Challender et al. 2015). In contrast, some advocate
the judicious legalization of wildlife products. Legalization of industries such as the ivory trade
theoretically can displace the illegal trade and regulate the transactions as they occur (Barbier
et al. 2013, Roe et al. 2020). This method can also incentivize private actors to work to protect
endangered species (Bulte & Barbier 2005). However, recent empirical work suggests that, owing
to changes in producer costs and/or consumer demand, increases in legal trade are positively cor-
related with increases in illegal trade and do not simply displace black market activity (Hsiang &
Sekar 2016).
Norm-based interventions, in contrast, seek to reduce demand for wildlife products. Consumer
demand is one root cause of the wildlife trade, exacerbated by the cultural value placed on wildlife
products. Currently, demand-reduction campaigns have targeted individual species (mostly mam-
mals) and addressed consumers in Asia (Veríssimo & Wan 2019). These campaigns should be
expanded to be more inclusive of other species and address the pressing demand for wildlife in the
West. Moreover, these studies neglect impact evaluation, so it is difficult to identify causal factors
that make a successful campaign.
These campaigns can be enhanced by using best practices to dissuade consumption of other
taboo products, such as cigarettes (Thomas-Walters et al. 2020). As Greenfield & Veríssimo (2019)
describe, social marketing can use techniques such as persuasion and awareness generating to
educate consumers on the externalities associated with the wildlife trade. Education can include a
discussion of alternate medicinal remedies and foods to those from originating from wildlife.
6.3. Supply-Side Interventions

We review three categories of supply-side interventions: amending poaching policies, improving
enforcement, and creating synthetic alternatives to wildlife products. Any wildlife policy designed
to protect wildlife must increase the benefits of wildlife conservation while limiting the benefits
of wildlife exploitation (Cooney et al. 2017).
First, governments and international regulations have various policy options to limit poaching.
A common one is to ban the poaching of protected species. Outright bans, however, ignore the
financial situations of poachers; by comparing the costs and benefits of poaching illegally with
nonpoaching sources of income, locals still may find it beneficial to poach (Messer 2000). There-
fore, bans must be supplemented by the creation of more lucrative, nonpoaching sources of income
from such activities as safaris and birdwatching. One might start a program like the US national
parks system and enlist former poachers to protect wildlife rather than hunt them (Cooney et al.
2017).
The second category of supply-side interventions is increasing the capacity of law enforcement
agencies. Unmanned aerial vehicles ( Jones et al. 2006) or remote sensing technologies (Howitt
et al. 2022) are modern technological solutions that can be employed to monitor and protect
wildlife from harm. These techniques can be used in conjunction with demand-side interventions.
More intelligent policy and information sharing can also strengthen the capacity of law en-
forcement (Sas-Rolfes et al. 2019). Existing databases from CITES and the US Fish and Wildlife
Service are known by relevant scholars to be unwieldy and not comprehensive (Chan et al. 2015).

Domestication Protections Border Online retail Wet market

of endangered against searches surveillance searches
species poaching
Growth Harvest Transport Retail
Wildlife parts are sold

Wildlife is grown in Wildlife is slaughtered Wildlife bodies/parts
to consumers in a
biodiverse or captured by are smuggled
high-income
regions/countries local poachers across borders
region/country
Figure 5
Supply-side interventions in the wildlife trade. These interventions range from the domestication of key
species to anti-poaching regulations to border searches, to online retail surveillance, and to in-person wet
market searches. Interventions extend along the supply chain.
Seizure data from nonprofit organizations such as TRAFFIC are derived from large-scale efforts
to track illegal trade but are biased by detection and reporting biases (Esmail et al. 2020).
Specific points of enforcement can happen at all nodes in the four-stage supply chain
(Figure 5). Naturally, innovation in supply chain practices means that authorities need to
innovate in ways to regulate these illegal scenarios:
Be present at airports/customs when goods are crossing national borders (transport);

Find illegal goods at wet markets (retail);
Find online sales (transport/retail);
Improve protections against poachers/catch poachers (harvest); and
Reduce consumption (retail).
Finally, supply-side policies will be aided by the promotion of sustainable alternatives to wildlife
products. In the past, domestication of key species has been proposed. This tactic, however, creates
significant animal suffering and increased risk of zoonotic diseases. Furthermore, it is not clear
whether it would protect vulnerable species, given the amount of mislabeling (e.g., for products
that are wild-caught but labeled as domestic) (Lyons & Natusch 2011) and the possibility that it
would empower wildlife companies to promote demand even further (Hsiang & Sekar 2016).
Synthetic alternatives to animal products, however, could conceivably replace wildlife products.
Products like faux fur and plant-based meat have risen in popularity in developed countries and
currently offer a viable alternative to Western farmed animals (Bashi et al. 2019). Similarly, prod-
ucts such as synthetic ursodeoxycholic acid—the essential molecule in bear bile—are already under
development as an alternative to captive-bred bile products. If there were consumer acceptance
of these products and government assistance to produce them, they could satisfy the demand for
wildlife products, undercut prices, and eventually eliminate the need for wildlife poaching (Broad
& Burgess 2016).
7. HOPES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

The COVID-19 global pandemic has demonstrated how urgent it is to address the wildlife trade,
both for humans and other animals (Bezerra-Santos et al. 2021). In this review, we surveyed and
synthesized the literature on the global wildlife trade. Our survey emphasized heterogeneity across
continents, identified supply and demand factors affecting the trade, reviewed data sources on
wildlife trade indicators, and recommended interventions.

Major challenges remain ahead. Work is needed to unify studies on the trade and to advance ef-
fective policymaking. Any effective wildlife policy must address the fact that many millions of peo-
ple rely on wildlife exploitation for some sustenance or income. Further studies should combine
insights from conservation biology, developmental economics, criminology, and other disciplines
to study the wildlife trade.
We suggest three major challenges for future research.
1. The study of shadow economies must be brought to the illegal wildlife trade. Econometric
analysis has been done on shadow economies (such as the illegal drug trade) worldwide
(Schneider & Enste 2013) but largely excludes crime related to wildlife trade. By using such
methodologies, more accurate estimates on the scale of trade can be made and conveyed to
authorities.
2. Researchers should collect data, create metrics, and track the effectiveness of wildlife
worldwide. Databases should synthesize data from multiple species and geographic regions,
as TRAFFIC’s Wildlife Trade Portal has begun to do, to allow thorough causative analysis.
Monitoring agencies should have the power to make decisions on resource allocation for
enforcement.
3. Modern technology should be incorporated to aid monitoring and enforcement. Remote
sensing technologies, such as the Thorium satellite network (Howitt et al. 2022), are un-
der development and will allow full monitoring of wildlife in their natural habitats. Such
observation could allow wildlife protection to advance by leaps and bounds if sufficiently
enforced. Computer vision technologies and machine learning can be used to convert this
mass data collection (including what is already available from online retail sites) into sug-
gestions for resource allocation by authorities.
These directions of research must of course be accompanied by a massive global effort to pro-
tect the world’s wildlife. There is no substitute for the diversity and lived experiences of nonhuman
creatures on Earth. They must be protected for public health, for future generations, and for their
own sake.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that
might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to TRAFFIC for making their database public, and in particular to Antony Bag-
got for procuring the seizure data analyzed in Supplemental Appendix B (and answering many
repetitive questions over email). Thank you to esteemed researchers Peter J. Li, Amy Hinsley,
Dan Challender, and Vincent Nijman, who were all kind enough to offer their time to correspond
via phone/email to help our initial research into the wildlife trade literature. Thanks also to the
Wildlife Justice Commission for allowing us to use their graphic in Figure 3 about pangolin scales.
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The Economics of Wildlife Trade and Consumption

Article in Annual Review of Resource Economics · October 2022

Rohan Prasad Gordon Rausser

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Annual Review of Resource Economics

Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ. 2022. 14:29.1–29.23 Keywords

2. COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE WILDLIFE TRADE

29.2 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

2.2. Evidence Across the Globe

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.3

3. CONSUMER DEMAND FOR WILDLIFE PRODUCTS

3.1. Nonconsumptive Demand

29.4 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

Abbreviations: ND, no data; WTP, willingness-to-pay.

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.5

3.2. Consumptive Demand

29.6 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.7

29.8 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

4. THE SUPPLY OF WILDLIFE PRODUCTS

4.1. Key Regions in Wildlife Supply

Table 2 Rural-urban divide for wildlife supply

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.9

Growth Harvest Transport Retail

Wildlife parts are sold

4.2. General Wildlife Supply Chain Model

29.10 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

ferable, usable, removable, enjoyable, and desirable.

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.11

a Raw ivory Worked ivory

Elephants Transit Worked Transit

International Arrangement Bear bile commercialized,

29.12 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

5. MONITORING THE ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE

5.1. Available Indicator Data and Their Implications

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.13

Table 3 Sources of data on variables that affect illegal wildlife trade

a graphical representation of the location of seizures, illustrating a general picture of prominent

5.2. Prioritization Ranking

29.14 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

5.3. Estimating Scale

Illegal ivory Seizure Report

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.15

6. INTERVENTIONS IN THE WILDLIFE TRADE

6.1. Regulations in Practice

6.2. Demand-Side Interventions

29.16 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

6.3. Supply-Side Interventions

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.17

Domestication Protections Border Online retail Wet market

Growth Harvest Transport Retail

Wildlife parts are sold

Be present at airports/customs when goods are crossing national borders (transport);

7. HOPES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

29.18 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.19

29.20 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.21

29.22 Prasad • Rausser • Zilberman

www.annualreviews.org • Economics of Wildlife Trade 29.23