Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2013) 1e9

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

A MINLP approach for layout designs based on the domino

hazard index
Julio de Lira-Flores a, Richart Vázquez-Román a, *, Antioco López-Molina a,
M. Sam Mannan b
a
Instituto Tecnológico de Celaya, Departamento de Ingeniería Química, 38010 Celaya, Guanajuato, Mexico
b
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station,
TX 77843-3122, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The Domino Hazard Index used in this work was previously introduced by Tugnoli, Khan, Amyotte, and
Received 11 March 2013 Cozzani (2008a, 2008b) to assess domino effect hazards caused by a unit in a given layout. This index has
Received in revised form been used to compare several layouts in order to select the one with lower risk. A set of piecewise
1 July 2013
differentiable equations have been developed to describe all graphical descriptions given in the original
Accepted 2 July 2013
proposal. Then, this work introduces a complete formulation aimed to achieve optimal facility layouts
taking into account the main variables affecting this index. The result of this formulation is a mixed-
Keywords:
integer non-linear program (MINLP), which can be solved using a GAMS code. The result can provide
MINLP
Facility layout
substantial support for decision-makers during the design stage.
Domino hazard index
2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Risk analysis

1. Introduction
A widely discussed issue refers to the influence of the Facility
Siting and Layout of chemical plants in terms of cost and safety
(Mannan, 2005; Mecklenburgh, 1985). The importance of layout
optimization is evident with the fact that piping costs can easily
represent as much as 80% of the purchased equipment cost (Peters,
Timmerhaus, & West, 2003) and 15e70% of the total operational
costs, and both of them strongly depends on the layout (Tompkins
et al., 1996). This aspect has been well reviewed in several publica-
tions: Drira, Pierreval, and Hajri-Gabouj (2007) present a survey
about layout problems based on numerous literature references; and
Singh and Sharma (2006) have reviewed different approaches to
solve the facility layout problem, viz. formulations, solution meth-
odologies and emerging trends. On the other hand, safety aspects in
layout optimization have been associated with the incorporation of
protection barriers and safety distances to avoid undesired conse-
quences of specific scenarios (Díaz-Ovalle, Vázquez-Román, &
Mannan, 2010; Patsiatzis, Knight, & Papageorgiou, 2004; Penteado
& Ciric, 1996; Vázquez-Román, Lee, Jung, & Mannan, 2010).
Another important contribution, in advising facility layout, has
been the development of inherent safety tools for domino scenarios
prevention (Cozzani, Gubinelli, & Salzano, 2006; Cozzani, Tugnoli, &
Salzano, 2007; Cozzani, Tugnoli, & Salzano, 2009). Tugnoli et al.
(2008a, 2008b) have adapted the Integrated Inherent Safety In-
dex (I2SI) developed by Khan and Amyotte (2004, 2005) in order to
find the inherent safer design of different layout options in early
design stages. A Domino Hazard Index (DHI) has been developed by
them with the aimed of assessing domino effect hazards caused by
a unit in a specific plant layout and considering the effects of both
inherent and passive measures on the domino escalation potential.
The present work aims to achieve optimal plant layout designs
by minimizing the cost associated to potential domino effects;
hence, a mathematical model has been developed based on the DHI
calculation. The optimization problem is an MINLP problem, which
has been solved using GAMS/DICOPT.
2. Domino hazard index methodology
This section gives a brief description of DHI key elements and
additional equations to build the mathematical formulation but the
complete explanation can be found in the original papers. The
procedure to estimate the DHI value, Fig. 1, is described as follows:

* Corresponding author.

Determine the matrix distance (Dij) of each Layout options.
E-mail addresses: richart@iqcelaya.itc.mx, richartvr@gmail.com (R. Vázquez-
Estimate the possible primary events, which can trigger dom-
Román). ino effects (Cozzani et al., 2006).

0950-4230/$ e see front matter
2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.07.007

Please cite this article in press as: de Lira-Flores, J., et al., A MINLP approach for layout designs based on the domino hazard index, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.07.007
2 J. de Lira-Flores et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2013) 1e9

reach of the flame envelope (df FF

i ) produced by primary unit i,
assuming that the flame is originated on the outer surface of the
equipment:

(
0 Dij > df FB min
i þ Dij cisj; j˛Rv
DHSFB
ij ¼ (4)
10 Dij  df FB min
i þ Dij

where Rv is the set of units likely to release flammable vapors (e.g. a

floating-roof tank) and Dminij is the minimum distance required be-
tween two units i and j measured from center to center. Assuming
circular footprints, this minimum distance can be calculated by:

Fig. 1. Conceptual flow diagram of DHI assessment (see Tugnoli et al., 2008b) Dmin
ij ¼ Ri þ Rj cisj (5)

Identify the secondary unit and compared their Damage Index
(DI) values (Khan & Amyotte, 2004) for both units to take into
account only units having significant potential to increase
accidental adverse consequences. A set HE is defined in this
work as the set with all pair (i,j) satisfying:
DIj > minðDIi ; zÞ cisj
where Ri and Rj are radii of primary and secondary unit respectively.
2.1.2. Fireball (FB)
An escalation phenomenon for fire ball scenario is unlikely to
occur for radiation from a distant source without impingement and
this scenario affects only atmospheric units. The fireball radius df FB
i
(1) is the key dimension for evaluation of and escalation possibility:

8
where z is an arbitrary threshold value defining the lower limit of >
> 0 Dij > df FB min cisj; ði; jÞ˛H E
i þ Dij
DI for units considered as highly hazardous. <
DHSFB
ij ¼ 5 Dij  df FB min Installed Fire insulation j˛A
i þ Dij
>
>
:

Evaluate the Domino Hazard Score for h-scenario from i-unit to 10 Dij  df FB
i þ Dij
min No installed Fire insulation
j-unit. This index represents the score given to the hazard in
(6)
terms of an escalation from unit i to unit j by event h. When
value is 10 means that escalation is highly probable and zero
represents the inherently “safest” level for domino escalation. where df FB
i is originated on the outer surface of the equipment i and
In consequence, the authors of this methodology created a A is the set of atmospheric vessels.
summary of rules for assignation of Domino Hazard Score as a
function of the escalation vector. These rules can be formulated 2.1.3. Pool fire (PF) and jet fire (JF)
as disjunctions for each event “h”, which is reviewed in the Escalation scenarios triggered involve both flame impingement
next section. and continuous heat radiation from a distant source (drsij ). The

Compare the DHShij in order to select the highest value of them following equation have been used to estimate the distance,
as the DHSij, which can be evaluated using: when the secondary unit j could be affected by flame impingement
(drsij  0) or heat radiation (drsij > 0).
DHSij  DHShij cisj; ði; jÞ˛H E (2)
drsij ¼ Dij  df si  Dmin
ij cisj (7)

Asses the Domino Hazard Index for each unit with the next
equation:
where s ¼ PF,JF; df si is the distances occupied by the flame envelope;
X i.e., pool fire dimension and flame dimension considered horizontal
DHIi ¼ DHSij cisj; ði; jÞ˛H E (3) axis direction originated for a jet-fire scenario. Dmin is used assuming
j ij
that these events are originated in the equipment surface.
The DHS value for radiation effects was evaluated, in the original

Finally, this procedure concludes when all the units have been papers, with graphs for pool fire and jet fire scenarios; hence, we
evaluated. constructed a piecewise linear approximation in order to represent
these graphs using the incremental model (Vielma, Ahmed, &
The above procedure has been formulated here as an optimi- Nemhauser, 2010).
zation problem using the position of each unit, the distance matrix
and the magnitude of escalation vectors as main variables. Rules to 8
>
> 10 drsij  0
assess the Domino Hazard Score Index value, for flame impinge- >
>
>
> P
4 P
4
ment/radiation and blast wave escalation vectors are given in the >
> s s
>
> 10  ask dijk 0 < drsij  U s and drsij ¼ bsk dijk
next section. >
>
< k¼1 k¼1
DHSsij ¼ P
4
s P
4
s cisj
>
> 10  ask dijk 0 < drsij  U s and drsij ¼ bsk dijk
2.1. Flame impingement and radiation >
>
>
> k¼1 k¼1
>
>
>1
> drsij  U s and j˛EFW
2.1.1. Flash fire (FF) >
>
:0 drsij > U s
For FF scenario, passive measures are not considered. The DHSFF
ij
can be 0 or 10 depending on considering if the second unit is within (8)

Please cite this article in press as: de Lira-Flores, J., et al., A MINLP approach for layout designs based on the domino hazard index, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.07.007
 J. de Lira-Flores et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2013) 1e9 3

Table 1
Piecewise parameters to evaluate the radiation effect by pool fire and jet fire scenarios.

Atmospheric equipment Pressurized equipment

Unprotected Fire insulated Unprotected Fire insulated

Pool fire scenario K ask bsk ask bsk ask bsk ask bsk
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.5 4.5 7.6 4.5 1.4 4.5 7.8 4.5
3 2.5 35.5 0.6 35.5 3.0 11.7 0.8 11.7
4 7.0 10.0 1.8 10.0 5.6 2.8 1.4 2.8
Jet Fire Scenario 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 1.0 5.0 7.6 5.0 3.0 5.0 8.2 5.0
3 2.2 40.0 0.0 40.0 2.2 10.0 0.6 10.0
4 6.8 5.0 1.8 5.0 4.8 4.0 1.2 4.0

8
where ask and bsk have constant values that depend on conditions >
> 10 dbij  uBW cisj
such as atmospheric or pressurized units, protected or fire-
< i
DHSBW ¼ 1 dbij  uBW and j˛EBW (14)
insulated vessel (Table 1 provides these values); EFW is a set with ij >
>
i
:0 BW
dbij  ui
all the equipment with firewalls; Us is the safety distance proposed
in Cozzani et al. (2006) where Us ¼ 19 for pressurized equipment
s In this work, we have not incorporated yet fragment projection
and Us ¼ 50 for atmospheric equipment; and dijk are variables
scenarios but we are working in this regard.
satisfying:

s 3. Mathematical model
aÞ dij1  1
s
bÞ dij4  0 cisj (9) The proposed mathematical programming formulation mini-
mizes a cost-based objective function and includes constraints for
cÞ dsijkþ1  Bsijk  dsijk ; Bsijk ˛½0; 1 ck˛½1; 2; 3; 4 separation distances among facilities, non-overlapping, probable
damage cost, potentials of domino effect using the DHI, etc.

2.2. Blast wave (BW) 3.1. Distance and non-overlapping

Using a BW model the static peak overpressure can be related to The Euclidian distance, Dij, is used to evaluate the separation
the dbij distance from the explosion source once the energy is between two units from center to center, i.e.:
released. The assessment of dbij is through:
rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
 2  2
dbij ¼ Dij  dei  Rj cisj (10) Dij ¼ xi  xj þ yi  yj cisj (15)

where dei is the distance of the explosion source from the center of where: (xi,yi) is the position of the center of unit “i” and (xi,yi) is the
the primary unit. The Domino Hazard Score Index for blast wave is center of unit “j”, in the process or plant area. To avoid situations
evaluated as a function of the static peak overpressure, Ps, and it is a where two units are allocated in the same physical location, non-
function of the distance. Therefore, DHS can be calculated directly overlapping constraints are included in the model (1996):
as a function of dbij using:
8 Dij  Dmin
ij cisj (16)
>
> dbij  lBW cisj
> 10
> i
>
>
< aBW db þ bBW lBW  db  uBW and
ij i ij 3.2. Determination of domino hazard index
DHSBW
ij ¼ i i i
(11)
>
>1 dbij  uBW and j˛EBW
>
> i
>
> Disjunctions have been proposed above in order to evaluate
:0 dbij  uBW
i DHI; however, commercial computer codes do not directly accept
disjunctive formulations. Hence, the whole model has to be refor-
 
mulated as an MINLP using the convex hull methodology (Balas,
abw
i ¼ 10= lbw
i  ubw
i (12)
1998; Grossmann & Türkay, 1996; Lee & Grossmann, 2000).

bbw
i ¼ abw bw
i ui (13) Table 2
Static peak overpressure to determinate distance parameters for blast wave
BW
where: E is the set with all protected equipment with barri- scenarios.
cades such as blast walls or cubicles installed around the equip-
Equipment lBW
i uBW
i
ment, lBW
i and uBWi are distances with static peak overpressure
Atmospheric vessel handling toxic and 22 kPa 5 kPa
values, for blast wave scenarios, between 31 kPa and 5 kPa which
flammable material
can be evaluated using multi-energy model or Baker Strehlow Pressurized equipment handling toxic e 16 kPa
model. These values have been associated to the secondary unit and flammable material
(Tugnoli et al., 2008b), Table 2 (also see (Cozzani et al., 2006)). Column handling toxic Material e 16 kPa
Pressurized equipment has been formulated with the next Column handling flammable material 31 kPa 16 kPa
Small equipment handling toxic material 31 kPa 12 kPa
equations:

Please cite this article in press as: de Lira-Flores, J., et al., A MINLP approach for layout designs based on the domino hazard index, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.07.007
4 J. de Lira-Flores et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2013) 1e9

Thereby, the final equations and variables representing each 3.2.3. PF and JF equations
possible situation includes the following superscripts: secondary The effect of flame impingement and radiation effect, for both PF
unit inside the exposure radius without any protection (superscript and JF scenarios, were formulated using piecewise linear function
“Haz”); secondary unit inside the exposure radius with fire insu- and convex hull methodology:
lation (“FI”), fire resistance wall (“FW”), or barricades such as blast
walls or cubicles (“blast wall”) installed; and secondary unit is DHSsij ¼ DHSs;Haz
ij
þ DHSs;FI
ij
þ DHS3s;FW
ij
cisj (28)
outside the exposure radius (“Safe”). Thus, the model to assess the
DHS is presented next where variables have been disaggregated for
each specific scenario. drsij ¼ Dij  df si  Dmin
ij cisj (29)

3.2.1. Equations for FF scenario

drsij ¼ drs;Haz þ drs;FI þ drs;FW þ drs;Safe cisj (30)
A process unit j is assumed to be included in the radius of ij ij ij ij
exposure for flash fire scenario of a unit i, df FF i , if the effective
rectilinear distance between i and j, Dij  Dmin ij , is less or equal to the X
4
s;x
exposure distance of i. To calculate the value of the DHSFF ij , we need DHSs;x
ij
¼ 10Bs;x
ij
 as;x d
k ijk
cisj; cx (31)
to introduce new variables dFF;Haz
ij
and d FF;Safe
ij
expressing the dis- k¼1
tance between i and j, if j is allocated inside or outside the radius of
exposure of i. The total rectilinear distance will be equal to the X
4
s;x
addition of dFF;Haz
ij
and dFF;Safe
ij
: drs;x
ij
¼ df si Bs;x
ij
þ bs;x d
k ijk
cisj; cx (32)
k¼1

DHSFF FF;Haz
ij ¼ 10Bij cisj; j˛Rv (17) s;x
Bs;x
ij
 dij1 cisj; cx (33)

Dij ¼ dFF;Haz þ dFF;Safe cisj; j˛Rv (18) ds;x s;x

ds;x
ij ij ijk  B1ijk  ijkþ1 cisj; cx; ck ¼ f1; 2; 3g (34)

 
dFF;Haz  dfiFF þ Dmin BFF;Haz cisj; j˛Rv (19) ds;x
ij4  0 cisj; cx (35)
ij ij ij

   df sij Bs;x

ij
 drijs;x  U s Bs;x
ij
cisj; cx (36)
dFF;Safe
ij
 df FF min
i þ Dij 1  BFF;Haz
ij
cisj; j˛Rv (20)

where BFF;Haz is a binary variable where BFF;Haz ¼ 1 means that DHSs;FW

ij
¼ Bs;FW
ij
cisj (37)
ij ij
having the secondary unit allocated inside the radius damage and
escalation is highly probable, and BFF;Haz ¼ 0 means that the sec-
ij df sij Bs;FW
ij
 drs;FW
ij
 U s Bs;FW
ij
cisj (38)
ondary unit has a safety level for domino escalation.

3.2.2. Equations for FB scenario U s Bs;Safe

ij
 drijs;Safe  Dmax Bs;Safe
ij
cisj (39)
In a similar way, the FB scenario has been represented with:

FB;Haz Bs;Haz þ Bs;FI þ Bs;FW þ Bs;Safe ¼ 1 cisj (40)

DHSFB
ij ¼ DHSij þ DHSFB;FI
ij
cisj; j˛A (21) ij ij ij ij

where x ¼ {Haz,FI}; Bs;Haz

ij
; Bs;FI
ij
; Bs;FW
ij
and Bs;Safe
ij
are binary variables.
DHSFB;Haz
ij
¼ 10BFB;Haz
ij
cisj; j˛A (22)
3.2.4. BW equations
In Section 2.2, the disjunctions were divided in two blocks.
  Disjunction (11) becomes:
dFB;Haz
ij
 df FB FB;Haz
i þ Rj Bij cisj; j˛A (23)
DHSBW
ij ¼ DHSBW;Haz1
ij
þ DHSBW;Haz2
ij
þ DHSBW;blastwall
ij
cisj; j˛C
DHSFB;FI
ij
¼ 5BFB;FI
ij
cisj; j˛A (24) (41)

  dbij ¼ dbHaz1
ij þ dbHaz2
ij þ dbblast
ij
wall
þ dbSafe
ij cisj; j˛C (42)
dFF;FI
ij
 df FF FB;FI
i þ Rj Bij cisj; j˛A (25)

DHSBW;Haz1 ¼ 10BBW;Haz1 cisj; j˛C (43)

  ij ij
dFB;Safe
ij
> df FB
i þ Rj BFB;Safe
ij
cisj; j˛A (26)
0  dbHaz1
ij  lBW BW;Haz1
i Bij cisj; j˛C (44)

BFB;Haz
ij
þ BFB;FI
ij
þ BFB;Safe
ij
¼ 1 cisj; j˛A (27)
Haz2 BW
DHSBW;Haz2
ij
¼ aBW
i dbij þ bi BBW;Haz2
ij
cisj; j˛C (45)
where BFB;Haz
ij
; BFB;FI
and
ij
BFB;Safe
are binary variables. Constrain (27)
ij
forces that only one of these variables can be taking a value equal to
lBW BW;Haz2
i Bij  dbHaz2
ij  uBW BW;Haz2
i Bij cisj; j˛C (46)
one; and A is the set of atmospheric units.

Please cite this article in press as: de Lira-Flores, J., et al., A MINLP approach for layout designs based on the domino hazard index, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.07.007
 J. de Lira-Flores et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2013) 1e9 5

DHSBW;blast
ij
wall
¼ BBW;blast
ij
wall
cisj; j˛C (47)

0  dbblast
ij
wall
 uBW BW;blast wall
i Bij cisj; j˛C (48)

BW;Safe
uBW
i Bij  dbsafe
ij  Dmax BBW;Safe
ij
cisj; j˛C (49)

BBW;Haz1
ij
þ BBW;haz2
ij
þ BBW;blast
ij
wall
þ BBW;Safe
ij
¼ 1 cisj; j˛C
(50)

where C is the set of atmospheric vessels, columns handling

flammable material and small equipment; BBW;Haz1 ij
, BBW;haz2
ij
;
BW;blast wall BW;Safe
Bij and Bij are binary variables; and the superscript
Haz was divided as Haz1 and Haz2, the first one apply when the
DHS value is 10 and the second one apply if the DHS value is
between 0 and 10.
The second block of disjunctions (14) was formulated as:

DHSBW
ij ¼ DHSBW;Haz
ij
þ DHSBW;blast
ij
wall
cisj; j˛P (51)

dbij ¼ dbHaz
ij þ dbblast
ij
wall
þ dbSafe
ij cisj; j˛P (52)
Fig. 3. Initial layout option of acrylic acid process by Tugnolli et al. (2008b).

DHSBW;Haz
ij
¼ 10BBW;Haz
ij
cisj; j˛P (53)
where BBW;Haz
ij
; BBW;blast
ij
wall
and BBW;Safe
ij
are also binary variables
and P is the set of pressurized vessels and columns handling toxic
0  dbHaz
ij  uBW BW
i B1ij cisj; j˛P (54)
material.

DHSBW;blast
ij
wall
¼ BBW;blast
ij
wall
cisj; j˛P (55) 3.3. Protective device cost

The costs for implementing blast, fire insulation and fire resis-
0  dbblast
ij
wall
 uBW BW;blast wall
i Bij cisj; j˛P (56) tance walls are analyzed in this section. Passive measures are
required to prevent or reduce escalation. The protection devices
installed on secondary units minimize the damage when an acci-
uBW BW;Safe
i Bij  dbsafe
ij  Dmax BBW;Safe
ij
cisj; j˛P (57) dent occurs in a primary unit. The installation of passive measures
modifies the DHS value and generates an expense. Thus, next
equations are used to determinate which unit needs passive
BBW;Haz þ BBW;blast wall
þ BBW;Safe ¼ 1 cisj; j˛P (58)
ij ij ij protections:

Fig. 2. Acrylic acid process flowsheet.

Please cite this article in press as: de Lira-Flores, J., et al., A MINLP approach for layout designs based on the domino hazard index, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.07.007
6 J. de Lira-Flores et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2013) 1e9

Table 3
Operation conditions and damage radius.

Equipment T ( C) P (atm) Static peak overpressure Pool fire

31 kPa 16 kPa

lBW
i (m) uBW
i (m) dfiPF (m)

Feed Mixer 200 4 8.8 13.6 e

Reactor 280 5 19.5 30 e
Quench 100 5 14.8 22.9 e
Absorber 100 3 14.5 22.7 e
Splitter 100 3 5.6 8.4 e
Acid Extractor 90 2.4 e e 3.6
Distillation 1 150 3 22 16 e
Solvent Mixer 100 3 e e 4
Distillation 2 150 3 13 9 e
Distillation 3 150 3 22 16 e

CiDevice ¼ CiFire Insulationi BFI Fire Wall FWL

i þ Ci Bi þ CiBlast wall BBWL
i ci
(59)

h;FI
BFI
j  Bij cisj (60)

BFWL
j  Bh;FW
ij
cisj (61)

Fig. 4. Acrylic acid process layout by Tugnolli et al. (2008b).

BBWL
j  BBW;blast
ij
wall
cisj (62)

where CiFire Insulationi is the cost associated with the purchase,
installation and maintenance of fire insulation such as cork, foam
glass, fiberglass or mineral wool; CiFire Wall and CiBlast wall are the cost
of purchase, installation and maintenance of a fire wall and barri-
cades respectively; CiDevice is the total cost of purchase, installation
and maintenance of protection devices installed to protect the unit
i; and BFI FWL and BBWL are binary variables [0,1]. The above
j , Bj j
constrains have been formulated as inequalities to improve the
convergence.
where CALj, CHHLj and CECCj are the additional direct asset loss,
human health loss, environmental cleanup costs for the failure of
each secondary unit j, as a result of escalation from the primary unit
under assessment. The factor sij accounts for the credibility that the
failure of the considered unit affects the secondary unit. It can be
evaluated as a function of the maximum Domino Hazard Score. Eq.
(64), which is a substitution to the curve presented in (Tugnoli
et al., 2008a) to evaluate sij. The functions to assess CALj, CHHLj
and CECCj are reported in (Khan & Amyotte, 2005):

3.4. Domino escalation cost sij ¼ a$DHS3ij þ b$DHS2ij þ c$  DHSij cisj (64)

Domino Escalation Cost CDECi is a cost term introduced by where a ¼ 6.7374  104, b ¼ 4.9158  104 and c ¼ 2.7498  102.
Tugnoli et al. (2008a) to account for the loss consequences of the
possible chain of accidents. It represents the sum of the loss related
to the secondary units involved, weighted by the parameter sij, that 3.5. Function objective
features the probability of being involved. The CDECi is assessed
with Eqs. (63) and (64): The objective is to minimize the cost associated with the layout.
The cost is composed of three terms: piping costs, protection de-
X  
CDECi ¼ sij CALj þ CHHLj þ CECCj cisj (63) vices cost, and loss cost caused by the possible chain of accidents
j events.

Table 5
Table 4
Results of the location of the process plant layout using MINLP model.
Equipment dimensions and purchase costs and protection cost.
Unit Location
Unit DI R (m) Purchase $ Fire Fire Barricade $
insulation $ wall $ x(m) y(m)

Compressor (CM) 7 1.00 6000 563 8000 8000 Compressor 27.5 20.9
Feed Mixer (FM) 29 1.25 41,735 2661 20000 58000 Feed mixer 26.7 25.0
Reactor (RT) 47 1.40 88,906 2925 20000 61429 Reactor 41.4 22.2
Quench (QC) 25 1.65 45,836 2787 20000 53636 Quench tower 36.2 2.9
Absorber (AB) 30 1.25 62,335 2212 20000 48400 Absorber 29.5 1.3
Splitter (SP) 21 1.55 23,365 1640 15000 30645 Solvent splitter 27.9 14.2
Acid Extractor (EX) 30 1.25 67,876 2506 20000 54800 Acid extractor 11.5 10.1
Distillation 1 (D1) 22 1.50 94,909 2117 20000 42000 Distillation column 1 3.5 23.5
Solvent Mixer (SM) 20 0.90 33,417 2273 20000 54444 Solvent mixer 0.9 9.5
Distillation 2 (D2) 21 1.25 48,898 2212 20000 48400 Distillation column 2 17.9 25.0
Distillation 3 (D3) 27 1.10 59,236 2351 20000 53636 Distillation column 3 6.2 1.1

Please cite this article in press as: de Lira-Flores, J., et al., A MINLP approach for layout designs based on the domino hazard index, Journal of Loss
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 J. de Lira-Flores et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2013) 1e9 7

Table 6
DHS matrix for layout option in Fig. 3, option 3 proposed in [2].

Primary unit Secondary unit

CM FM RT QC AB SP EX D1 SM D2 D3

1 Compressor X e e e e e e e e e e
2 Feed mixer NA X 10.0 e e NA e NA NA NA e
3 Reactor NA 10.0 X 10.0 10.0 NA NA NA NA NA e
4 Quencher NA 10.0 10.0 X 10.0 NA e NA NA NA e
5 Absorber NA e 10.0 10.0 X NA e NA NA NA e
6 Splitter NA e e 10.0 10.0 X e e NA NA e
7 Acid extractor NA e e e e NA X NA NA NA 1.9
8 Distillation I NA e e e e NA 10.0 X NA NA 10.0
9 Solvent mixer NA e e e e 1.5 8.4 3.6 X 1.4 1.8
10 Distillation II NA e e e e e e 3.0 NA X 10.0
11 Distillation III NA e e e e e 10.0 e e e X

NA means that condition (1) is not satisfied.

X X X
min C pipe Dij þ CiDevice þ CDECi
ði;jÞ˛Pipe i i
where Cpipe is the cost of pipe, $/m, and Pipe is a set whose ele-
ments indicate which pair of (i,j) equipment are interconnected.
4. Case study
In this section, a case study is presented. The aim of the study is
to find an optimal process area layout for the acrylic acid produc-
tion plant analyzed in Tugnoli et al. (2008b). Process units and
equipment connectivity are shown in Fig. 2. Tugnoli et al. made a
comparative study of three process layout options using DHI and
their best layout option, “Option 3”, as given in Fig. 3. For this op-
tion, fire insulation is installed on all units, two firewalls to protect
the quencher, and a bund to contain possible spills from the splitter,
are in place. This result is based on experience and has been
compared to the optimization results in the next section. In this
case, an important note is that the scenarios used in this work are
different to Tugnolli’s work because several conditions to estimate
these indices were not reported in the cited papers. Therefore, this
layout will be evaluated with our proposed scenarios in order to
compare the optimization results.
The scenarios considered here are jet fire, pool fire, flash fire,
fireball, vapor cloud explosion (VCE) and boiling liquid expanding
vapor explosion (BLEVE). Early analysis show that escalation is
unlikely to occur by flash fire and fireball scenarios because it is not
likely to release flammable vapors in normal condition and all nits
are pressurized. The overpressure produced by boiling liquid
expanding vapor explosion was lower than that produced by VCE.
Thus, we only consider the event with the higher value of
(65) overpressure. The Phast software was used to simulate these sce-
narios where the multi-energy model (van den Berg, 1985) was
used to evaluate the static peak overpressure and the Shell jet fire
model was used to estimate the jet fire scenario.
The evaluation of scenarios was made with the following as-
sumptions: Atmospheric conditions considered 1.5 m/sec for wind
speed and temperature of 9.85  C. The worst scenario criterion was
considered for release duration of 600 s with horizontal direction.
The mass release rate of the chemicals was 0.3 kg/s. In the case of
hazardous equipment, the mixes of components into the equip-
ment were created and the compositions were defined using
reported data (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, & Shaeiwitz, 2008).
Furthermore, it has been reported that the presence of inert re-
duces the flammable range of flammable gaseair mixture as well as
the kinetics of the combustion (Molnarne, Mizsey, & Schröder,
2005) so that presences of inert elements in the process were
also taken into account. The results of these scenarios, generated in
Phast, and used operation conditions, temperature and pressure,
are given in Table 3. The jet fire scenario did not reach the required
radiation levels to cause domino effect. Thus, only pool fire and VCE
scenarios exceeded the threshold values and it is assumed that it
happens in the center of the unit. All units presented just one
hazard scenario. The equipment dimensions, damage index (values
reported in Tugnoli et al., 2008b), and purchase costs are given in
Table 4. Additional information is listed next:

Cpipe ¼ 166.13, connection cost.

LxP ¼ 45m, maximum length of the process area in direction x.

LyP ¼ 53m, maximum length of the process area in direction y.

Dmax ¼ 70m, maximum distance between two process
equipment.

Table 7
DHS matrix for layout option obtained with MINLP model.

Primary unit Secondary unit

CM FM RT QC AB SP EX D1 SM D2 D3

1 Compressor X e e e e e e e e e e
2 Feed mixer NA X e e e NA e NA NA NA e
3 Reactor NA 10.0 X 10.0 10.0 NA NA NA NA NA e
4 Quencher NA e 10.0 X 10.0 NA e NA NA NA e
5 Absorber NA e e 10.0 X NA 1.0 NA NA NA 0.7
6 Splitter NA e e e e X e e NA NA e
7 Acid extractor NA 1.5 e e 1.6 NA X NA NA NA 2.2
8 Distillation I NA e e e e NA 1.0 X NA NA 0.9
9 Solvent mixer NA e e e e 0.0 2.2 2.0 X 4.2 3.2
10 Distillation II NA 10.0 e e e e e e NA X e
11 Distillation III NA e e e e e 1.0 e e e X

NA means that condition (1) is not satisfied.

Please cite this article in press as: de Lira-Flores, J., et al., A MINLP approach for layout designs based on the domino hazard index, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.07.007
8 J. de Lira-Flores et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries xxx (2013) 1e9

Table 8 6. Conclusions
Results of domino hazard index.

Unit CM FM RT QC AB SP EX D1 SM D2 D3 A mathematical approach has being developed with the aim of

DHI option 3 of [2] 0 10 30 30 20 20 1.9 20 16.7 13 10
preventing domino chains by improving the inherent safety of the
DHI MINLP model 0 0 30 20 11.7 0 5.2 1.9 11.6 10 1 layout. This work has been based in the Domino Hazard Index
develop by Tugnoli et al. (2008a, 2008b). The ultimate goal is to find
an optimal layout by using a mathematical formulation that re-
duces subjectivity of the analysis and provide useful information to
mitigate de effects of fires and explosions. Moreover, this formu-
5. Results and discussion
lation is able to provide substantial support for decision-makers
during the design stage.
The result of the optimization problem is given in Fig. 4 where
In this work, the layout of process area of acrylic acid plant has
only a couple of units with potential to produce escalation events
been found using this MINLP model. This layout was compared to
have been considered. The numerical evidence satisfies equation
the “option 3” proposed in Tugnoli et al. (2008b). The comparison
(1) assuming a value of z ¼ 25. Unit allocations are reported in
shows a decreased of the Domino Hazard Score Index value, which
Table 5. Additional constrains have been used to compare the
means a reduction in the possibility of trigger escalation for the
layout option showed in Fig. 3, i.e. the result must have the same
solution obtained from the MINLP model. It is evident that using
process area and the same amount of pipeline.
the equations will help decision-makers to select better solutions to
Values of DHS index for both layouts are given in Tables 6 and 7.
current problems demanding experience such as the presented in
It should be observed that passive measures have been installed to
this work.
prevent the domino effect. Feed mixer, absorber, acid extractor,
Finally, there is also additional work planned within our
distillation column 1 and distillation column 3 units are protected
research group to incorporate the I2SI index to formulate this
with fire insulation to prevent the radiation effects of a possible
problem as a MILP model with the aim to produce optimal solutions
pool fire produced by solvent mixer or acid extractor. The acid
for more complex cases.
extractor is protected with a cubicle to attenuate blast wave effects
because it is allocated inside of the damage area of both the
distillation column 1 and the absorber. A decrease in the DHS value Acknowledgment
was obtained in all units, which means a reduction of the possibility
of trigger escalation. A unit with the potential to trigger escalation The authors from ITC thank CONACyT and DGEST for support.
at longer distances sometimes implicitly means accepting a
heightened escalation possibility. In this case, the reactor received
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Please cite this article in press as: de Lira-Flores, J., et al., A MINLP approach for layout designs based on the domino hazard index, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.07.007