POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

KA-POLI NOTES conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to

another prosecution for the same act.

Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense, whereas the second
sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act.

Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different

statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of the
offenses charged. The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown
to exist between the earlier and subsequent offenses charged.

The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is

addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the
offenses charged, as such elements are set out in their
respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved.

Does this mean, there could be no similar offenses, where the

This reviewer is made out of love and fear for the law. Please
elements are the same, if the other is national law, and the
do not hesitate to share this material because sharing is caring
other local law?
and karma always has its ways. #NoToCrabs
What are the two (2) kinds of double jeopardy?
BILL OF RIGHTS (1.) Double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense;
and
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of (2.) Double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either What is meant by “same offense”?
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (1.) The very same offense;
(2.) An attempt or frustration of an offense; or
DOUBLE JEOPARDY (3.) That which necessarily includes or is included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
What is the Doctrine of Waiver of Double Jeopardy?
What is the test in determining whether the former complaint
This doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was examined and
or information charges the same offense?
formally introduced in People v. Salico, where Justice
W/N the evidence to prove the same or the two are the same,
Felicisimo Feria stated: "when the case is dismissed, with the
or if the elements or ingredients in the former constitute the
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a
latter or vice versa.
bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his
action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
What are the elements of double jeopardy?
constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby
(1.) A valid information sufficient in form and substance to
prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits
sustain a conviction of the crime charged,
and rendering a judgment of conviction against him."
(2.) A court of competent jurisdiction, and
(3.) An unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the
What does this provision cover?
prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the
Double Jeopardy
acquittal of the accused.
Why is “double jeopardy on the same act” included? Is the
What are the requirements of double jeopardy?
double jeopardy on the same crime not enough?
(1.) A valid indictment;
This was explicitly distinguished in the case of People vs.
(2.) Competent court;
Relova, which states that our Bill of Rights deals with two kinds
(3.) Valid arraignment;
of double jeopardy.
(4.) Valid plea entered; and
(5.) Case is dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
The first sentence of Section 21, Article III of the Constitution
express consent of the accused.
ordains that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The second sentence
provides that if an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance,

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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Considering that the verbal order of dismissal is void, can the
accused invoke double jeopardy if he would be tried again?
No. Legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there as no valid
dismissal or termination of the criminal case against the
accused. To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the
following must be demonstrated:
(1.) First jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2.) The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
(3.) The second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or
the second offense includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
When does legal jeopardy attach?
(1.) Upon a valid indictment;
(2.) Before a competent court;
(3.) After arraignment;
(4.) When a valid plea has been entered; and
(5.) The case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
One of the elements of double jeopardy is that, the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
What is the test of this requirement?
(1.) W/N one offense is identical with the other or is an
attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or
(2.) W/N one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the other, as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
If an information was filed by an officer not authorized to file
was dismissed, does the refiling of another case put the
accused in double jeopardy?
No, because the first information was filed by a person who
had no authority to do so; hence, the information was not
valid.
Suppose a case was remanded for further proceedings, can
the accused plead double jeopardy?
No, because the decision was declared void. He was never put
in jeopardy of conviction in the case.
If a case if dismissed before the prosecution could finish
presenting its evidence or it is pre-emptively dismissed, and
the appellate court remands the case for further hearing or
trial, can the accused invoke double jeopardy?
No, because the remand of the case for further hearing or trial
is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy. When the court pre-
emptively dismissed the case, it violated the fundamental
right of the accused to due process. With such violation, its
orders are therefore null and void and cannot constitute a
proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
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A person was charged with an offense. Upon his motion, the
case was dismissed. Can he invoke double jeopardy in case he
is charged with the same case?
No. As a rule, he cannot invoke double jeopardy because
when he moved for the dismissal, he waived the right to
interpose it. He prevented the State from presenting evidence
and the court from pronouncing his guilt or innocence.
If the case has been unduly prolonged and if the accused
moves to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial, there would be double jeopardy. Is this rule
absolute?
No, because the exceptions are:
(1.) When the delay was caused by the accused. It would be
a mockery of justice to allow him to benefit out of his
wrongdoing or tactical maneuvers.
(2.) When he agreed to a provisional dismissal even if he
invoked speedy trial.
Can the accused invoke double jeopardy in case the
information is dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction?
No. The dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is not
equivalent to acquittal.
The accused requested the judge to wait for his lawyer when
asked to present evidence. The judge considered it as an
assault on the dignity of the court. Thus, he dismissed the
case. Was the dismissal valid?
No, because it violated the right of the accused to due
process. Double jeopardy would not attach since the dismissal
was without due process. If there was an assault on the dignity
of the court, then, contempt would have been the proper
remedy.
In a criminal case where a person was charged, and the same
was dismissed. Can the State appeal? Are there exceptions?
No, the State cannot appeal because it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, there are exceptions:
(1.) The dismissal is made upon motion or with the express
consent of the defendant;
(2.) The dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or the merits of the case;
and
(3.) The question to be passed upon by the appellate court
is purely legal so that, should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Philippine Savings Bank vs. Bermoy
G.R. No. 151912. September 26, 2005
Facts:
➔ Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine
Savings Bank (“petitioner”), respondents Pedrito and
Gloria Bermoy (“respondent spouses”) were charged
with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the
Regional Trial Court.
➔ Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded “not
guilty” to the charge and the case was set for trial.
➔ The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the
prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the
accused. However, the appellate court reversed this
ruling.
➔ The Solicitor General contends that the trial court’s
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy
does not apply in this case.
Issue: W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?
Held: YES. For double jeopardy to apply, section 7 requires the
following elements in the first criminal case:
(1.) The complaint or information or other formal charge was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2.) The court had jurisdiction;
(3.) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(4.) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed
without his express consent.
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the
express consent or upon motion of the accused does not
result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two
exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency
of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.
A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first
exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it
amounts to an acquittal.
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required
in Section 7 were all present.
Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a
public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had
jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent
spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which
they entered “not guilty” pleas. Finally, Criminal Case was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense became vested on respondent spouses.
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a]ny
party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the
accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.”
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Here, petitioner seeks a review of the Order dismissing
Criminal Case for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect
appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the
Constitution and Section 7, the courts are barred from
entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits
of the dismissal.
Doctrine: The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if:
(1.) The accused is charged with the same offense in two
separate pending cases;
(2.) The accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense
after he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense;
or
(3.) The prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same
case.
People vs. Obsania
G.R. No. L-24447. June 29, 1968
Facts:
➔ The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before
the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan.
➔ He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the
dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs
in the info. Said motion was granted.
➔ From this order of dismissal, the prosecution appealed.
Issue: W/N the present appeal places the accused in Double
Jeopardy.
Held: No because the dismissal is with the express consent of
the accused.
In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the
following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the
Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The “doctrine of double jeopardy” applies when the case is
dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the
dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense because his action in having the case is dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the
reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to
the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction
against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally
not only with the express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double
jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him
is revived by the fiscal.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
DISMISSAL WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED.
From the above quoted statement, it is clear that what in
Salico was repudiated in Labatete was the premise that the
dismissal therein was not on the merits and not the conclusion
that a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the
accused, is deemed to be with his express consent and
therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to plead double
jeopardy in the event of an appeal by the prosecution or a
second indictment for the same offense.
This Court, in Labatete, merely pointed out that the
controverted dismissal in Salico "was in fact an acquittal."
Reasoning a contrario, had the dismissal not amounted to
acquittal, then the doctrine of waiver would have applied and
prevailed.
In Cloribel, the Court held "that the dismissal here complained
of was not truly a 'dismissal' but an acquittal. For it was
entered upon the defendants' insistence on their
constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the
prosecution's failure to appear on the date of trial."
Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear
that there is no parallelism between Cloribel and the case
cited therein, on the one hand, and the instant case, on the
other. Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on the
erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was
defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the
court a quo, and not on the right of the accused to a speedy
trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute.
The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under
consideration did not terminate the action on the merits,
whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the
dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to
prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a
case against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed
innocent.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel
require two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must
be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through
his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the
merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.
Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery
of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired
in the corpus of our jurisprudence.
Doctrine: The Requisites of Double Jeopardy
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may
inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must
have obtained in the original prosecution:
(1.) A valid complaint or information;
(2.) A competent court;
(3.) The defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(4.) The defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
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An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available
if the defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardy.
NACHURA:
DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION.
The dismissal of the action may either be a permanent
dismissal or a provisional dismissal. A permanent dismissal of
a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on the
merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the
accused; to the dismissal of the case because of the
prosecution’s failure to prosecute; or to the dismissal thereof
on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings in
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. In contrast,
a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is dismissal without
prejudice to reinstatement thereof before the order of
dismissal becomes final, or to the subsequent filing of a new
information within the periods allowed under the Revised
Penal Code or the Revised Rules of Court.
Paulin vs. Gimenez
G.R. No. 103323. January 21, 1993
Facts:
➔ On November 10, 1989, an incident occured when the
jeep ridden by private respondent and Barangay Captain
Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan
Patrol ridden by herein petitioners, the spouses Dr.
Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the former with
dust.
➔ Irked by this incident, Mabuyo followed the Nissan Patrol
until it entered the back gate of Rattan Originals in
Tanke, Talisay, Cebu. Inquiring from a nearby security
guard as to who owns the Nissan Patrol, he was informed
that it belonged to and was driven by petitioner Dr.
Ramon Paulin.
➔ Later, while Mabuyo was investigating some problems of
his constituents in Kilawan at Tanke, Cebu, Dr. Ramon
Paulin and his wife, Angie, allegedly pointed their guns
at Mabuyo while Jose Bacho, a companion of the
spouses, acted as back-up.
➔ Mabuyo instructed one of the barangay tanods to call
the police in Talisay and the rest to block the exit of the
spouses and their lone companion.
➔ Sensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put
their guns down and upon the arrival of the police
officers, they were brought to the police station.
➔ On the same date, Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel
Palcuto filed a complaint for "grave threats," against the
spouses Paulin and Bacho, herein petitioners, which was
later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5204.
➔ On November 20, 1989, the station commander filed a
complaint for, "grave threats and oral defamation,"
against private respondent Mabuyo, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 5213.
➔ The cases were jointly tried and, on June 13, 1990, the
Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu (Branch IX), acting
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho,
dismissed Criminal Case No. 5204.
➔ On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a, "Motion for
Reconsideration," of the said dismissal order which the
court granted in a resolution dated July 3, 1990.
➔ At the hearing of Criminal Case No. 5213 on July 5, 1990,
petitioners vigorously sought the setting aside of the
July 3, 1990 resolution in Criminal Case No. 5204, but the
same was denied in another resolution.
➔ On July 31, 1990 a petition for "certiorari, prohibition,
damages, with relief for preliminary injunction and the
issuance of a temporary restraining order" with the
Regional Trial Court and such was dismissed.
➔ Still not contented, petitioners have now resorted to the
instant petition, arguing that (a) the decision of the
municipal trial court dated June 13, 1990 dismissing the
case against them was a judgment of acquittal, and may
no longer be set aside without violating petitioners' right
against double jeopardy: and (b) the regional trial court,
in dismissing the petition for certiorari… abused its
discretion as it ignored petitioners' right against double
jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not the municipal trial court's dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 5204 against petitioners precludes a
subsequent reconsideration or reversal of such dismissal as
the same would violate petitioners' right against double
jeopardy.
Held: NO. There was no double jeopardy in the case at bar.
Petitioners insist that the June 13, 1990 decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) is an acquittal since it was issued
after it had allegedly considered the merits of the
prosecution's evidence.
The MTC decision dismissing the case is not an acquittal from
the charge considering that no finding was made as to the
guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
In the case at bar, the original case was dismissed without the
proper information having been filed, it appearing that the
proper charge should have been, "disturbance of public
performance," punishable under Article 153 of the Revised
Penal Code instead of "grave threats," under Article 282 of the
same penal code.
Petitioners' motion to dismiss premised on procedural
grounds cannot be considered a demurrer to evidence nor
was the dismissal sought by them predicated on the denial of
their right to speedy trial. Hence, the exceptions mentioned
find no application in the instant case, especially so because
when the municipal trial court dismissed the case upon
petitioners' motion, the prosecution still had to present
several witnesses.
In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of
petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
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The municipal trial court thus did not violate the rule on
double jeopardy when it set aside the order of dismissal for
the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because
it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated
and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the
right to complete the presentation of its evidence. It follows
then that the decision of respondent regional trial court
sustaining that of the court of origin cannot be said to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Doctrine: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the
case must be without the express consent of the accused.
Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the
express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived
his protection against double jeopardy.
What are the requisites of double jeopardy?
(1.) a valid complaint or information;
(2.) a competent court;
(3.) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(4.) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
What are the exceptions?
An appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of
the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double
jeopardy if:
(1.) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express
consent of the defendant;
(2.) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the
case; and
(3.) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is
purely legal so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the
guilt or innocence of the defendant."
What is the Doctrine of Waiver of Double Jeopardy?
This doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was examined and
formally introduced in People v. Salico, where Justice
Felicisimo Feria stated: "when the case is dismissed, with the
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his
action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby
prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits
and rendering a judgment of conviction against him."
What are the instances where double jeopardy attaches
although dismissal was made on the motion of the accused?
(1.) When the dismissal may be held to be final, disposing of
the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made
on motion of the accused himself, to wit:
(2.) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence
filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested,
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and
operates as an acquittal.
(3.) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the
accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy
trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
Distinguish acquittal from dismissal.
This Court, applying the Bocar case, ruled that the order of
the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for
further hearing by the trial court does not violate the rule
on double jeopardy inasmuch as the trial court was ousted
from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.

ACQUITTAL DISMISSAL
Acquittal is always based Dismissal does not decide
on the merits, that is, the the case on the merits or
defendant is acquitted that the defendant is not
because the evidence does guilty. Dismissals terminate
not show that defendant's the proceedings, either
guilt is beyond reasonable because the court is not a
doubt; court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence
does not show that the
offense was committed
within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or
the complaint or
information is not valid or
sufficient in form and
substance, etc.
DOCTRINES re double jeopardy
In People v. Bocar (138 SCRA 166 [1985]), this Court found
that the prosecution was denied due process as it never
had the chance to offer its evidence formally in accordance
with the Rules of Court in view of the trial court's order of
dismissal. The trial court was thereby ousted from its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to
due process by aborting its right to complete the
presentation of its evidence and, therefore, the first
jeopardy had not been terminated.
Hence, the remand of the case for further hearing or trial
is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 95642. May 28, 1992
Facts:
➔ Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of authority,
for manifest partiality and incompetence.
➔ The administrative complaint arose from two (2) orders
of detention issued by the said acting Judge against
complainant (Magbago) for contempt of court because
of her continued refusal to comply with a fifth alias writ
of execution.
➔ After evaluating the allegations of the complaint,
respondent's comment thereon and the Court
Administrator's recommendation, the Supreme Court
dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit,
➔ Magbago also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
the same letter-complaint earlier filed with the Supreme
Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge Icasiano,
Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
➔ Subsequently, a recommended dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. The recommendation was
approved by then Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan Raul
M. Gonzales. It appears from the records of the
Tanodbayan, which were forwarded to the Supreme
Court, upon order of the Court in connection with this
case, that the resolution dismissing the complaint was
released.
➔ Thus, Icasiano moved to quash the information on the
ground that he shall be placed in double jeopardy.

Issue: W/N there was a violation of the constitutional right

In the subsequent case of People v. Albano (163 SCRA 511
[1988]), this Court reiterated its previous ruling in the Bocar
case, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
and acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction, when it pre- emptively dismissed the
case and as a consequence thereof, deprived the
prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case,
thereby its fundamental right to due process.
With such violation, its orders are, therefore, null and void
and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy.
In the more recent case of Saldana v. Court of Appeals (190
SCRA 396 [1990]), the issue raised was as follows: "Where
the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of
the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the
information for insufficiency of evidence, may the case be
remanded for further proceeding?"
against double jeopardy.
Held: No. The distinction between administrative and criminal
proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is
not a bar to the other.
It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that
double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy
because the Supreme Court case was administrative in
character while the Sandiganbayan case also against said
petitioner is criminal in nature.
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges
or any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it
acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not
as a court judging justiciable controversies. Administrative
procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules.

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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. Lejano vs. People of the Philippines
Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other G.R. No. 176389. January 18, 2011
hand, while they may involve the same acts subject of the
administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable Facts:
doubt.
➔ On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment
of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused
To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is
in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano,
fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel
in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or
Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the
information; (b) a competent court; c) a valid arraignment; (d)
charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him
➔ On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde,
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to
consent. 6 All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the
reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the
administrative case, which should take care of petitioner's
prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated
contention that said administrative case against him before
the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
the Supreme Court, which was, as aforestated, dismissed,
credibility."
entitled him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the
➔ But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be
criminal case in the Sandiganbayan.
reconsidered because it places the accused under
double jeopardy.
The charge against petitioner Judge Icasiano before the
Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of authority, manifest
Issue: W/N a judgment of acquittal can still be reconsidered
partiality and incompetence in having issued two (2) orders of
detention against complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily,
Held: As a general rule, no.
complainant's available remedy was to appeal said orders of
detention in accordance with the Rules. It is only when an
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused
appellate court reverses the lower court issuing the
twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he
questioned orders can abuse, partiality or incompetence be
has already been absolved.
imputed to the judge. 8 Here no appeal from the questioned
orders of the issuing judge (petitioner Icasiano) was taken:
In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against
instead, administrative and criminal cases were filed against
the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the
the judge for issuing the orders.
accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the
infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and
It is precisely for this reason, among other, that the
repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused
administrative case against petitioner was dismissed by the
in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
Supreme Court for lack of merit; and yet, it cannot be assumed
at this point that petitioner is not criminally liable under R.A
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v.
3019, par. 3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention.
Sandiganbayan:
In fact, the Ombudsman has found a prima facie case which
led to the filing of the information. [A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the
sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment
for the same offense would arm the government with a potent
Doctrine: An administrative case is different from a criminal
instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees
case, and being two different procedures, neither could
that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated
adhere to the requirement of double jeopardy which states
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
that such case must be one and the same.
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty.

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an

acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and
narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when
a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may
assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.

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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions,
he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration
under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court
"must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and
there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of
witnesses and the evidence." But he has not specified the
violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim
that "the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the
defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision"
is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal
perception.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the
Court's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the
prosecution witnesses' credibility. Private complainant wants
the Court to review the evidence anew and render another
judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not
constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to
secure Webb, et al.'s conviction. The judgment acquitting
Webb, et al. is final and can no longer be disturbed.
Doctrine: To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the
accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of
which he has already been absolved.
However, on occasion, a motion for reconsideration after an
acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and
narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when
a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may
assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.
Lejano vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 176389. January 18, 2011
Facts:
➔ On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment
of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused
in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel
Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the
charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
➔ On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde,
an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to
reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the
prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated
the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility."
➔ But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be
reconsidered because it places the accused under
double jeopardy.
Issue: W/N a judgment of acquittal can still be reconsidered
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Held: As a general rule, no.
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused
twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he
has already been absolved.
In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against
the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the
accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the
infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and
repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused
in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan:
At the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the
sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment
for the same offense would arm the government with a potent
instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees
that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an
acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and
narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when
a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may
assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions,
he has been unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration
under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court
"must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and
there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of
witnesses and the evidence." But he has not specified the
violations of due process or acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim
that "the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the
defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the decision"
is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal
perception.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the
Court's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the
prosecution witnesses' credibility. Private complainant wants
the Court to review the evidence anew and render another
judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not
constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to
secure Webb, et al.'s conviction. The judgment acquitting
Webb, et al. is final and can no longer be disturbed.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Doctrine: To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the
accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of
which he has already been absolved.
However, on occasion, a motion for reconsideration after an
acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and
narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when
a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may
assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.
People vs. Balisacan
G.R. No. L-26376. August 31, 1996
Facts:
➔ On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
➔ To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned,
entered a plea of guilty. In doing so he was assisted by
counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he
was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating
circumstances.
➔ Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he
stabbed the deceased in self-defense, because the latter
was strangling him. And he further stated that after the
incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police
authorities.
➔ Subsequently, on the basis of the abovementioned
testimony of the accused, the court a quo rendered a
decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the
prosecution appealed therefrom.
➔ The prosecution contends that the trial court erred in
acquitting the accused of the offense charged despite
the latter's plea of guilty when arraigned.
Issue: W/N appeal may be had in this case despite a judgment
of acquittal
Held: YES.
A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with
respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to
defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no
alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances. In this case, the defendant was only allowed to
testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the
purpose of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could
not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the
accused, the proper course should have been for the court a
quo to take the defendant's plea anew and then proceed with
the trial of the case.
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In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite
trial, the court a quo not only erred in procedure but deprived
the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the
accused in double jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of
a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the
present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of
being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he
acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect
of vacating his plea of guilty and the court should have
required him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct
that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not
done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing
plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of
acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the
appeal herein.
Furthermore, the court a quo decided the case upon the
merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to
present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the
defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of
law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite its action is
perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity
for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.
Doctrine: It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential
requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true, the
accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently,
however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove
mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-
defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of
guilty and the court should have required him to plead anew
on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty
be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect
there having been no standing plea at the time the court a
quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no
double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Furthermore, the court a quo decided the case upon the
merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to
present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the
defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of
law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite its action is
perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity
for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
People vs. City Court of Silay
G.R. No. L-43790. December 9, 1976
Facts:
➔ Herein respondents altered or falsified the sugar cane
weight report card or “tarjeta”, a private document
showing the weight of sugar cane by increasing the total
actual weight of 22.005 tons to 27.160 tons, thereby
causing damage to the central and other cane planters
of about 8.68 piculs of sugar. This is to the damage and
prejudice of Hawaiian Central and other sugarcane
planters.
➔ After the prosecution had presented its evidence and
rested its case, respondents moved to dismiss the charge
on the ground that the evidence presented was not
sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Acting on the motion, the City Court of Silay
dismissed the case on the ground that the acts
committed do not constitute the crime of falsification.
➔ The petitioners claim that the case shouldn’t have been
dismissed. But the respondents claim there was no error.
➔ Thus, it was asserted that the plea of double jeopardy
was not tenable since the case was dismissed upon the
motion of the accused, and since it was with their
consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy.
Issue: W/N there was double jeopardy.
Held: Yes. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was
dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was a
motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling
for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount
to an acquittal of the accused.
However, in this case, the dismissal of the charge against them
was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished
from other dismissals at the instance of the accused.
All the elements of double jeopardy are here present:
(1.) A valid information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction of the crime charged,
(2.) A court of competent jurisdiction, and
(3.) An unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the
prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the
acquittal of the accused.
The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver
of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be
invoked. It is clear that the dismissal of the criminal case
against the private respondents was erroneous.
The accused were not charged with substitution of genuine
"tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the accusation was that
the accused entered false statements as to the weight of the
sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were
submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act
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of making a false entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act
of falsification of a private document, the accused having
made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they
were under obligation to accomplish as part of their duties.
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and
although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order such
error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of
double jeopardy.
Doctrine: The elements of double jeopardy are:
(1.) A valid information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction of the crime charged;
(2.) A court of competent jurisdiction; and
(3.) An unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the
prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the
acquittal of the accused.
Esmena vs. Pogoy
G.R. No. L-54110. February 20, 1981
Facts:
➔ Esmena and Alba, and their co-accused, were charged
with grave coercion for having allegedly forced Reverend
Father Tibudan to withdraw the sum of five thousand
pesos from the bank and give it to them since the priest
lost it in a game of cards.
➔ The case was calendared. However, upon the letter of
Father Tibudan, the case was reset. Since Esmena and
Alba were not duly notified, they were not able to
appear.
➔ During their arraignment, Esmena and Alba pleaded not
guilty. Thus, no trial was held after the arraignment since
Father Tibudan requested the transfer of the hearing to
another date.
➔ Subsequently, the fiscal lost his records of the case. So,
the hearing was cancelled. The Judge issued an order
setting the trial for “the last time”.
➔ When the case was called, the fiscal informed the court
that Father Tibudan was sick. The counsel for the
petitioners opposed the cancellation of the hearing and
invoked the right to have a speedy trial.
➔ The Judge provisionally dismissed the case because it
has been “dragging”.
➔ 27 days later, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of
the case and attached the medical certificate of Father
Tibudan. The fiscal cited the ruling that a provisional
dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks the
impress of finality and, therefore, the case could be
revived without the filing of a new information. It was
granted.
➔ Esmena and Alba filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of double jeopardy.
Issue: W/N the revival of a grave coercion case, which was
provisionally dismissed because of complainant’s failure to
appear at the trial, would place the accused in double
jeopardy.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Held: Yes. In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should
be:
(1.) a valid complaint or information;
(2.) Before a court of competent jurisdiction and
(3.) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or information.
When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or
conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination of
the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata
and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included
therein.
The previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), previous conviction
(autrefois convict) or the dismissal or termination of the case
without his consent precludes his subsequent indictment for
the same offense.
In this case, it was held that the petitioners were placed in
jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion
case. That provisional dismissal would not have placed the
petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the
precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their
consent. In this case, it is not very clear that the petitioners
consented to the dismissal of the case.
It is the practice of some judges before issuing an order of
provisional dismissal in a case wherein the accused had
already been arraigned to require the accused and his counsel
to sign the minutes of the session or any available part of the
record to show the conformity of the accused or his lack of
objection to the provisional dismissal. The judge specifies in
the order of provisional dismissal that the accused and his
counsel signified their assent thereto. That procedure leaves
no room for doubt as to the consent of the accused and
precludes jeopardy from attaching to the dismissal.
The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their
constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not
ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge
on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The
petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the
provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in
jeopardy. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a
speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and,
therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them
in jeopardy.
Thus, the use of the word "provisional" would not change the
legal effect of the dismissal. If the defendant wants to exercise
his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for
the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the
prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied
and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot
produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the
defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall
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dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of
the defendant.
Doctrine: The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the
accused is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would
bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.
People vs. Pineda
G.R. No. L-44205. February 16, 1993
Facts:
➔ That on or about the 17th day of August, 1971 in Pasig,
the above-named accused, being then private individual
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify a public document by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, committed as follows:
1. That the said accused on August 17, 1971, executed a
document entitled "Application For Registration" for
parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal. The Court
declared the accused the true and absolute owner of said
parcel of land.
➔ Private Respondent Consolacion Naval moved to quash
the information for falsification, premised, among other
things, on the apprehension that she is in danger of
being condemned for an identical offense.
➔ The following day, Naval pleaded not guilty to the
charge levelled against her for falsification and on
December 22, 1975, the court a quo denied her motion
to quash.
Issue: W/N the court may in its discretion entertain at any time
before judgment a motion to quash on the ground of
jeopardy.
Held: It would now appear that prior conviction or acquittal in
the first case, as long as the accused had entered his plea
therein is no longer required in order that the accused may
move to quash a second prosecution for the same offense on
the ground of double jeopardy."
Legal jeopardy attaches only:
(1.) Upon a valid indictment;
(2.) Before a competent court;
(3.) After arraignment;
(4.) A valid plea having been entered; and
(5.) The case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITAL OR DISMISSAL OF THE
CASE WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED IS
NECESSARY TO SET IN MOTION DOUBLE JEOPARDY. The
mere filing of two information charging the same offense is
not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy
since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous
conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the
consent of the accused.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
From the conclusion thus reached, it would appear that one
simply "charged" may claim possible jeopardy in another case.
However, a closer study of the case adverted to reveals that
the ponente may have overlooked the fact that the accused
therein was not only charged, but he actually admitted his
guilt to the charge of serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence and more importantly, he was convicted of such
crime and commenced serving sentence.
In short, in order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of
the accused to the charge must be coupled with either
conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous case
without his express consent thereafter.
Doctrine: Prior conviction or acquittal of the case without the
consent of the accused is necessary to set in motion double
jeopardy.
People vs. Tampal
G.R. No. 102485. May 22, 1995
Facts:
➔ The respondents were charged of robbery with homicide
and multiple serious physical injuries in the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo
Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only private
respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio
Padumon, and Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the
others remained at large.
➔ The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero
moved for postponement due to his failure to contact
the material witnesses.
➔ The case was reset without any objection from the
defense counsel. The case was called on September 20,
1991 but the prosecutor was not present.
➔ The respondent judge considered the absence of the
prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal
case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a
motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence
was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the
office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that
day.
Issue: W/N the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of
the case.
Held: The dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to
prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be
stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on
the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are
not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the
right of the private respondents to a speedy trial has not been
violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents
cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
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What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial
are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an
unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there was no
showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the
prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given
the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case.
In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the accused
to speedy trial, courts carefully weigh the circumstances
attending each case. They should balance the right of the
accused and the right of the State to punish people who
violate its penal laws. Both the State and the accused are
entitled to due process.
Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against
double jeopardy. The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy
are:
(1.) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2.) The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and
(3.) A second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that
in the first. Legal
Jeopardy attaches only:
(4.) Upon a valid indictment;
(5.) Before a competent court;
(6.) After arraignment;
(7.) When a valid plea has been entered; and
(8.) When the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.
The dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is
equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution
of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed,
however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear
right of the accused to speedy trial.
Doctrine: Dismissal of a case based on erroneous application
of the right to speedy trial may be appealed without violating
the right against double jeopardy.
Melo vs. People
G.R. No. L-3580. March 22, 1950
Facts:
➔ Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal with frustrated homicide, for
having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a
kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious
wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and
incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor
for the same period of time.
➔ On December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning,
the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged,
and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin
Obillo died from his wounds.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
➔ Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only
on January 3, 1950, and on the following day, January 4,
1950, an amended information was filed charging the
accused with consummated homicide.
➔ The accused filed a motion to quash the amended
information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was
denied by the respondent court.
Issue: W/N there was Double Jeopardy
Held: NO. The amended information was rightly allowed to
stand.
Rules of Court Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph, is as
follows:
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court may
dismiss the original complaint or information and order the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the
defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy,
and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial."
Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the
first information and order the filing of a new one for the
reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former
and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy
for the same or identical offense.
It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitutional
inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense,
the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution,
that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same
offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to
mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the
same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that
the two offenses are identical. Under said Rules there is
identity between two offenses not only when the second
offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information.
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential ingredients of the
former as alleged in the information constitute the latter. And
vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included
in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a
part of the elements constituting the latter. In other words,
one who has been charged with an offense cannot be again
charged with the same or identical offense though the latter
be lesser or greater than the former.
This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first
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Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is
no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to
be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus,
where the accused was charged with physical injuries and
after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy. Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where
after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the
offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense", the accused cannot be
said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or
to be necessarily included in another offense, for the purpose
of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both
offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first
prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then
inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first
prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the
same cannot constitute second jeopardy.
Doctrine: It must be noticed that the protection of the
Constitutional inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the
same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same
Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The phrase
same offense, under the general rule, has always been
construed to mean not only that the second offense charged
is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information,
but also that the two offenses are identical. Under said Rules
there is identity between two offenses not only when the
second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when
the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information.
This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is
no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to
be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus,
where the accused was charged with physical injuries and
after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
People vs. Adil
G.R. No. L-41863. April 22, 1977
Facts:
➔ Margarito Fama Jr. attacked Miguel Viajar by hitting the
latter’s cheek with a stone. This act constituted physical
injuries which required medical attendance.
➔ A criminal complaint for slight physical injuries was filed
against Fama Jr.
➔ Subsequently, Viajar filed another complaint on the
ground that the injury in his face left a permanent
deformity. Here, he impleaded Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul
Fama, and, again, Margarito Fama, Jr.
➔ Fama Jr. successfully sought dismissal of the first case
(slight physical injuries), now he moves for the dismissal
of the second case (serious physical injuries) on the
ground of double jeopardy.
Issue: W/N there was double jeopardy.
Held: No, because in this case, the rule of identity does not
apply.
According to the case of Melo vs. People, the court held that
when the second offense was not in existence at the time of
the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case
there is no possibility for the accused during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent.
Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries
and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide
against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy."
In this case, when the complaint was filed, only three days had
passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained
took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury
or consequence to be suffered by said offended party.
Evidently, it was only later, after the first case had already been
filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed,
that the alleged deformity became apparent.
In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr.,
cannot hold.
Doctrine: When the second offense was not in existence at the
time of the first prosecution, there is no possibility to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
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POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE III, SECTION 21
KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva
People vs. Relova
G.R. No. L-45129. March 6, 1987
Facts:
➔ Members of the Batangas City Police, equipped with a
search warrant, searched and examined the premises of
the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage
owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel
Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring,
devices and contraptions had been installed, without the
necessary authority from the city government. These
electric devices and contraptions were "designed
purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the electric meter of the said
electric [ice and cold storage] plant." During the
subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in
a written statement that he had caused the installation
of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease
the readings of his electric meter."
➔ An information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of
Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City was filed.
➔ Opulencia filed a motion to dismiss the information
upon the grounds that the crime there charged had
already prescribed. Batangas City Court granted the
motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it
appearing that the offense charged was a light felony
which prescribes two months from the time of discovery
thereof, and it appearing further that the information
was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after
discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
➔ Fourteen (14) days later, the Acting City Fiscal of
Batangas City filed before the CFI another information,
this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in
relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised
Penal Code.
➔ Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia
filed a Motion to Quash alleging that he had been
previously acquitted of the offense charged in the
second information and that the filing thereof was
violative of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy. Respondent Judge granted the accused's
Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed.
Issue: W/N there was Double Jeopardy.
Held: YES, under the second sentence.
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance is the
installing of electric wiring and devices without authority from
the proper officials of the city government. In contrast, the
offense of theft under Article 308 of the RPC has quite
different essential elements. The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance is
not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal
Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit
the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is
not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information."
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course
correct. The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is
that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first
sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather
under the second sentence of the same section.
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act." (Emphasis
supplied; Article IV (22),1973 Constitution)
Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged:
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an identity is shown to exist between the
earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.
In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical
inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said
to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise
to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a
municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or
have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is
addressed by examining the essential elements of the two
offenses charged.
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. The
extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by
the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In
the present case, accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted
during the police investigation having stolen electric current
through the installation and use of unauthorized electrical
connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty
before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having
appropriated electric power. However, there is no evidence in
the record as to the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations
having been dismissed before trial could begin. Accordingly,
the related civil action should be remanded to the Court of
First Instance for reception of evidence on the amount or
value of the electric power appropriated.
Doctrine: Where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes,
the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charged: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In
contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical
inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said
to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise
to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a
municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or
have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.

The question of identity of the acts must be addressed by The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. The
examining the location of such acts in time and space. When extinction of criminal liability whether by prescription or by
the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged.
regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and
where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a
continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts
may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole
capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under
different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a
national statute).

In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the
same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975.
During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed
electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining
the necessary authorization from the municipal authorities for
the very purpose of reducing his electric power bill. This
corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that
such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical
effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of
electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the
corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other
words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with the
unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.

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POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE III, SECTION 21

KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva