FROM ANALOGY TO PROOF: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CHINESE MODE OF KNOWLEDGE

Author(s): Yuet Keung Lo

Source: Monumenta Serica , 1995, Vol. 43 (1995), pp. 141-158
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

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 Monumenta Serica

43 (1995): 141-158

FROM ANALOGY TO PROOF:

AN INQUIRY INTO THE CHINESE MODE OF KNOWLEDGE

YUET KEUNG LO

During the Six Dynasties period (A.D. 221-589), there was a series of debates
between Chinese Buddhist and non-Buddhist thinkers over the immortality of the
soul. Ironically, in these debates the non-Buddhist thinkers adopted a quintessen-
tially Buddhist position in refuting the existence of a permanent soul, while the
Buddhists adamantly argued for the existence of such an entity in order to ac-
count for the theory of karma and retribution. These debates were vehement, but
ultimately futile in solving the problems at issue. One of the reasons behind this
futility is that these debates were often reduced to ideological polemics which
focused on whether Buddhism, as a foreign and thus inferior and heterodox doc-
trine, should be allowed to develop on Chinese soil. As a result, the debate over
the nature of the soul became a mere vehicle for the ideological struggle between
indigenous Chinese doctrines and Buddhism.
Clearly, philosophically significant conclusions could hardly be reached in
such an ideologically charged mode of discourse. Moreover, both parties to the
debate were so stubborn in upholding their own positions that neither was prone
to examine the logic and arguments of the opponents' positions. Oftentimes in the
debate over the immortality of the soul we find that each party propagated its
own thesis without directly challenging or refuting its opponents'; philosophical
discussions in an argumentative manner were not common. Furthermore, since it
was the early medieval Chinese intellectual tradition to argue and sustain a philo-
sophical position by virtue of illustrative analogies, philosophical discussions
often ended in a deconstruction of analogies rather than a thorough examination
of the premises and logical inductions of given arguments. Yet, granted that even
an apt analogy can at best only illustrate a philosophical point, thereby lending
persuasive power to it, analogies are hardly self-sufficient as arguments or proofs
for a thesis. In light of all these reasons, the debate over the immortality of the
soul wound up inconclusively.
The so-called candle and light analogy (or fire and firewood analogy) was
often employed to prove or disprove the existence of an immortal soul in the
early medieval debates. The usage of this analogy in the indigenous Chinese
tradition prior to the fourth century A.D., and its transformation in the philo-

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 142 YUET KEUNG LG

sophical discourse of Huiyuan H5H (33

tic community in early medieval Sout
The question of the sources of Huiyuan
conclusively. Huiyuan claimed that th
origin, but he failed to identify his Bu
Buddhist materials which may have inf
yuan apparently does not appeal to th
suggest a number of Buddhist texts tha
trying to confirm that Huiyuan did in
ogy-
It is common knowledge that Indian Buddhism generally teaches the doctrine
of anãtman (no self). According to this doctrine, sentient beings are composed
only of the five skandhas (mental and physical aggregates), namely, matter, sen-
sation, perception, predisposition, and consciousness linked together in a psychic
continuum (sanitaria). None of these skandhas has permanent existence and thus
the idea of a timeless substance imprinted with personality was totally out of the
question.
The doctrine of anãtman witnessed a new turn of development on Chinese
soil. As early as the Han dynasty when Buddhism first came to China, the notion
of the existence of a permanent soul was introduced. In Han dynasty translations
of Buddhist texts we find a family of terms used to refer to the permanent soul.
These terms include: hun Ëjt, hunling $J|, hunpo $fl& (yingpo ^Èfë),1 hun-
poshen sjtSlft,2 hunshen *j|ft,3 fing ff, jinghun ff§|, jingshen ffft, jingshen-
hunpo ff ftçfèâjl,4 ling fi, linghun MM, lingpo liffll,5 shen ft, shi f$, and shishen

1 For instance, it was used by An Shigao ^tïrfj in Taishõ shinshü daizõkyõ ^lEfHEMcäföS
(The Taishõ edition of the Chinese Buddhist canon; Tokyo: Taishõ shinshü daizõkyõ kankõkai,
1927; repr. 1968), work no. 729, vol. 17, p. 518a, lines 4-5 , 20-21, p. 518b (hereafter, T.
729:[17].518a.4-5, and so forth).

2 For instance, An Shigao used the term interchangeably with hunpo. Admittedly, this is a rare
case. Nevertheless, it precisely demonstrates that there was really no terminological consis-
tency for the notion of soul in early Chinese Buddhist literature. See T. 732:(17).533b.21-28.

J For instance, Zhi Qian 5jf identified hunshen with shen, see 7. 20:(l).262b.9-ll.

4 Like hunposhen, this term is extremely rare in early Chinese Buddhist literature. It was used,
perhaps only a few times, by Faju fè'JË and Fali }£:£, who translated Buddhist sutras into
Chinese in Luoyang γ&|ξ§, the Western Jin capital, in the late third and early fourth centuries.
See T. 23:(l).304c.3-5, 9, 304c.29-305a.3. The term jingshenhunpo appears to be idiosyncratic
to Faju and Fali, but it is also used interchangeably with jingshen in the cited text.

5 The term, for instance, was used by Kang Senghui Rf## to refer to a transmigrating soul.
SeeT. 152:(3).37c.l3.

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 Chinese Mode of Knowledge 143

fg#$.6 In this paper, these terms are all loosely t

of convenience.7 Of these terms, however, nei
ness-soul) possessed the meaning "soul" before
dhist scriptures into Chinese. In fact, the comp
exist in pre-Buddhist China. In Buddhist translati
literally means "to know, to differentiate" or "co
render the Sanskrit term vijfíãna.
In Indian Buddhism, vijfíãna is the third memb
form the chain of causation (pratïtya-samutpad
mental aggregates that constitute a person. It
conditions (hetu-pratyayd) which have not yet bo
tainly not a soul. In Han dynasty Buddhist texts,
tity drowned in ignorance (avidyã), and according
emotions, thought, and so forth. As a consequenc
able karma that determines its future destiny in t
Thus, the Chinese Buddhists assumed that shi
tence and was, thus, indestructible.8 Since shen
thought and action and the principle of life, and
human being, it was no doubt selected as the b
Indian Buddhist term vijfíãna.
The Indian Buddhist notion of anãtman did not
the Chinese Buddhists as did vijfíãna. In early (Ha
century) Buddhist translations, anãtman was u

6 For instance, except jingshenhunpo, hunposhen, shi, and

early Chinese Buddhist texts, all other terms appeared
mentary on the Chuci lfê$fr (Elegies of Chu), and were o
shi and shishen did not figure in Wang Yi's commentary
of Buddhism and died prior to the wide acceptance of B
hunpo and hunposhen, they were hardly used even in Budd

7 The actual denotations and connotations of these terms

contextually. See Yuet Keung Lo, "The Destiny of the
Medieval Confucian Metaphysics (A.D. 221-587)," (Ph
1991).

8 Cf. Walter Liebenthal, "The Immortality of the Soul in Chinese Thought," Monumenta Nip-
ponica 8 (1952), pp. 336-337, and Richard Mather, "The Conflict of Buddhism with Native
Chinese Ideologies," in Laurence G. Thompson, The Chinese Way in Religion (Belmont:
Wadsworth, 1973), pp. 79-80. [Mather's article first appeared in Review of Religion XX
(1955-1956), pp. 25-37]. Such an understanding of shi still had wide acceptance in the early
medieval period. See Zong Bing's tk'JR "Mingfo lun" Β^ίΦϋ (Explication of Buddhahood),
and Zheng Xianzhi's Hßffö "Shenbumie lun" tf^MIro (On the Immortality of the Soul) in
Hongmingji SZflBSI (Collection of the Great Lumination [hereafter, HAM] ), T. 2102:(52).9b-
16aand27c.29-29a.16.

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 144 Yuet Keung Lo

literally "non body" or "no (phys

Chinese to comment on a Buddhist
century A.D. as follows: "The hum
Great Elements. At death these fo
they cannot be treasured by onese
this interpretation of anãtman, it a
Chinese Buddhists were not so muc
tainly a novelty in Chinese thinkin
a notion deeply rooted in traditio
derstood as the impermanence of th
personal self.
This early Chinese Buddhist under
by the understanding of feishen
probably borrowed by the Buddhist
which reads: "The reason I have g
longer I have a body, what trouble
of the Daodejing, we find no notion
be taken literally to mean "not phy
of this Daoist interpretation throug
notion of anãtman, it is understand
tension, no soul, was likely to escap
In addition to the Daoist origin
there is another piece of evidence t
dieval Chinese interpreted "no se
Analects, Ma Rong J^lk (77-166),
phrase keji ^£B (literally, "to ov
Indeed, Han Confucians generally
(body). The interpretation of "self"
that the gloss was incorporated
(Collected Commentaries on the A
cian text.12

9 For example, see two of the sutras translated by An Shigao, T. 105:(2).501a-b, and T.
98:(l).923a.l6, and 923b.2O.
10 SeeT. 1694:(33).10b.9-10.
11 D.C. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (Baltimore: Penguin, 1976 rpt.), Chapter xm, p. 69.

12 See Huang Kan Mil, Lunyu jijie yishu WefèW&B$L (Subcommentaries on the Collected
Commentaries on the Analects), 2 vols. (Taibei: Guangwen, 1968), juan 6, 2:21b. In the Song
commentary on the Analects by Zhu Xi ^yfif (1130-1200), "self" was interpreted as "the self-
ish desires of the body."

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 Chinese Mode of Knowledge 145

Given this background to the early Chinese Bud

soul, it may be a little less surprising to find Hui
immortality of the soul in his well-known essay
tyf^WîMWl· (The Sramanas Do Not Pay Homa
treatise, Huiyuan employs a fire and firewood an
soul survives the physical body.13 He writes,
The passage of fire to firewood is like the passage of
body. The passage to different firewood is like the p
new body. If the former firewood is not the latter f
that the way in which the finger fulfills its duty [in
comprehension. If the former body is not the latter
stands that the interaction of the feelings and the in
found. The person in error, seeing the body wither i
the soul and feelings perish with it. It is as if one we
out in one piece of wood, and say that all fire had
time.14

In his essay, Huiyuan claims that the fire and firewood analogy has a Buddhist
origin.15 However, he does not specify which Buddhist text(s) he actually cites.
Before trying to identify the Buddhist locus classicus of the fire and firewood
analogy used in this passage, it should first of all be pointed out that the analogy
is an allusion to the closing sentence of Chapter 3 of the Zhuangzi Jîr?·. Accord-
ing to Guo Xiang's $$1& (d. 312) interpretation which de Bary has followed in
the translation cited above, that crucial passage reads, "If the finger (zhi fg) ful-
fills its duty in adding firewood (xin #f), then the transmission of the fire knows

13 For the historical and ideological backgrounds of Huiyuan's essay, see Leon Hurvitz, "'Render
unto Caesar' in Early Chinese Buddhism," in Kshitis Roy (ed.), Liebenthal Festschrift: Sino-
Indian Studies, Vol. V, Parts 3 & 4 (Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1957), pp. 79-95.

14 HMJJuan 5, T. 2 102: (52). 32a. 1-5. The translation is adapted from W.T. de Bary et al. (eds.),
Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 1:326.
Both "spirit" and "soul" are used to render shen in de Bary 's translation. For the purpose of
consistency, I changed all occurrences of "spirit" to "soul." Ling is translated as "immaterial"
in de Bary 's work, but judging from the literal meaning and the context, it is better to render it
as "pure intelligence," which of course is immaterial. Finally, although de Bary is correct in
pointing out that the fire and firewood analogy alludes to the Zhuangzi passage, he fails to no-
tice that Huiyuan attributed his analogy to a Buddhist origin.

15 T. 2102:(52).31c.25. Huiyuan refers to the Buddhist scriptures as the "holy scriptures" (sheng-
dian 5?ft)- Leon Hurvitz has translated shengdian as "the canons of the Sages," which he
refers in this context to be the "Yangsheng Zhu" HfcE chapter (Chapter 3) of the Zhuangzi
$£? discussed below, and he totally misses the point. To the best of my knowledge, no
Chinese Buddhist had ever considered a Daoist scripture "holy." See Hurvitz, "'Render unto
Caesar'," p. 110, n. 83.

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146 Yuet Keung Lo

no exhaustion."16 Indeed, this pas

tional controversy. However, it i
("finger") is a variant for zhi f
("firewood" or "faggot") probably r
Hence, my reading of this senten
exhausted faggoin the making of a
cessation."19 If this interpretatio
indeed a candle and light analogy.
In any case, the reference of the
ticularly clear. Some scholars argue
the immortal soul survives bodily d
two counts. First, there does not a
responds to the notion of an immo
cept, it at least does not appear in
an analogy does not have any intri
must be determined contextually. T
tence in which the analogy app
Zhuang Zi, through the mouth o

16 Guo's commentary on the Zhuangzi is t

See Guo Qingfan ICJS9F. Zhuangzi jish
sentence may also be translated as "If th
will [still] continue to burn, [but] its ex
lematic passage definitely lends itself to
some sort.

17 The phonetic notations of both zhi Jg and zhi fig represent Bernhard Karlgren's reconstruction
of Ancient Chinese. The two characters are homophones with a different tone.

18 See Chen Jinsheng |$Cáfc£, "Zhuangzhou shenbumielun de kaoshi" ^^tt^äSiÄW^fll

(The Explication of Zhuang Zhou's Theory of the Immortality of the Soul), in Zhexueshi Lun-
cong ÏM^HA (Juin: Jilin renmin, 1980), pp. 177-187. It is very likely, as Wen Yiduo
[gj- ^ argues, that there were no candles in ancient China, and people bound animal fat
around faggots to produce tapers, these being called xin ffi or zhu 'Jg. Quoted in Chen,
"Zhuangzhou ...," p. 183.
19 Hurvitz cites Yu Yue's #uöS interpretation to be the correct one. See "'Render unto Caesar',"
p. 110, n. 84. Hurvitz only paraphrases Yu's interpretation and I render Yu's reading as fol-
lows: "If one supplies firewood with one's fingers [to a fire] and burns it, then one will run
short of supply. [However, if one leaves] the fire alone to burn of itself, then one does not
know its extinction. See Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzi, 1:130. According to Yu's reading, the fire
will be extinguished without one knowing it. Adding the grammatical subject "one," which
may have been understood here, is possible, but this interpretation is obviously contrived to il-
lustrate the thesis of no immortal soul. However, this contrivance still does not preclude the in-
herent possibility of the passage being interpreted to support the thesis of an immortal soul.

20 Chen Jinsheng has provided the most recent and detailed argument for this position, see
"Zhuangzhou ...," pp. 182-186.

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 Chinese Mode of Knowledge 147

says that Lao Dan happened to come into this wo

come, and he happened to leave this world because i
along with the course of nature. If one is content
follow along, then grief and joy have no way to
seems to be related to the natural process of life in
In one of the Outer Chapters,21 "Qiushui" ^K (C
life and death are described in terms of conglom
primal force.22 This naturalistic view of death is in
immortality of the soul.
Analogy is basically a method of comparison w
one thing by means of another. There is no neces
the two things being compared. Analogy, therefore
the inference from individual instances in which
occur that it will occur in all similar instances. Earl
believed that the relation of fire to firewood and the relation of the soul to the
body belong to the same class of phenomenon or event. That is why they concen-
trated on their analysis of the fire and firewood relation in order to prove a simi-
lar relation between body and soul. Thus, it is plausible that early medieval
thinkers treated analogy as induction in their philosophical disputations. The re-
lation between the two classes of phenomena or events in a comparison were
considered to be logically necessary. In this case, the fire and firewood relation
in the natural realm was necessarily structurally parallel to the body-soul relation
in the human realm. Such a correlation between the natural realm and the human
realm might possibly be traced back to the earliest Chinese philosophy,23 but the
theory was brought to prominence in the Han dynasty thinker Dong Zhongshu's
Sí+áf (179-104 B.C.) theory of sympathetic resonance (ganying $M)·

21 Unlike the Inner Chapters which have been convincingly proved to have come from the brush
of Zhuang Zi himself, the Outer Chapters are generally believed to have been written by the
disciples or followers of Zhuang Zi. Nevertheless, the "Qiushui" chapter is also particularly
acknowledged to be philosophically in tune with the Inner Chapters.

22 Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzijishi, 2:733. In fact, this passage is quoted by the fictitious opponent to
the theory of an immortal soul in Huiyuan's treatise. See T. 2102:(52).31b.29-31c.2.

23 As early as in the Book of Changes, we already find the theory of sympathetic resonance in its
embryonic form. The classic reads: "Things that accord in tone vibrate together. Things that
have affinity in their inmost natures seek one another. Water flows to what is wet, fire turns to
what is dry. Clouds (the breath of heaven) follow the dragon, wind (the breath of earth) follows
the tiger. Thus the sage arises, and all creatures follow him with their eyes. What is born of
heaven feels related to what is above. What is born of earth feels related to what is below.
Each follows its kind (lei)." See The I Ching, The Richard Wilhelm translation from Chinese
into German, rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
3rd ed., 1967), p. 9.

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148 Yuet Keung Lo

According to Dong's theory, the

are a microcosmic miniature of
microcosmic world causes a corres
events in the natural realm and
with the theory of y in-yang and
of sympathetic resonance was fo
events in similar categories stand
different phenomena, however di
a mutually corresponding relati
class or category (lei $$).
Yet, there is probably no "object
and firewood relation and the bod
it is not clear whether we can inf
be observed to happen in the lat
belong to the same class and mu
fire and firewood analogy is still
interpretations, since a thinker's
interpretation of the fire and
interpretation will construe the f
ing the philosophical standpoint w
firewood analogy, therefore, is p
Buddhist as well as the non-Buddh
Indeed, the fire and firewood an
to argue both for and against the
the Huainanzi fëM ■?· of the Han
under the patronage of Liu An
which the body and soul are com
conclusion of the passage is that a
just like "the more the fire burns
About a century later, in an e
course on the Body and Soul) in

24 Liu Wendian SBKft, Huainan hong

l:26b-27a.

25 In Yan Kejun's J^õjféj (1762-1843) edition of Huan Tan's writings, the "Xingshen lun" is
only part of another essay entitled "Qubi" iÈS£ (Dispelling Errors). Yan's edition is generally
believed to be faithful to the original structure of Huan Tan's writings. In the Liu-Song period
(420-478), parts of the "Qubi" chapter were selected and incorporated in the Buddhist anthol-
ogy known as Falun fèjfa (Treatises on the Dharma; T. 2145:[55].85a.3), by Lu Cheng, and
the title "Xingshen lun" was probably added at that time since the terms xing and shen already
became standardized in the debate over the immortality of the soul. Later on when Sengyou
{©"{£ edited the HMJy the "Xingshen lun" was also included in that collection. Both Lu Cheng

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 Chinese Mode of Knowledge 149

WM (43 B.C. - A.D. 28) uses a candle and light ana

who believes the teaching of the Laozi ^^ could h
immortality. Huan Tan says,
The soul (Jingsheri) lives in the body like the flame b
[the candle] is properly tended and turned so that it f
flame] need not be extinguished until the candle is all
the candle has no flame, it cannot become active in
ashes be lighted later. The ashes are like man's old age:
the hair turns white, the muscles and flesh wither an
cannot moisten and lubricate the body. When such
and outside the body, the vital force expires and the m
candle and the flame are both used up.26

Huan' s candle and light analogy was probably insp

mentioned above.27 In accordance with this analo
without the body, just as the light shines only as
Huan Tan, the immortality of the soul was completel
Following Huan Tan, Wang Chong Ï5Ë (27-97)
pendent on the body. In the Lunheng ü$j (Balance
says,

The body relies on the vital force for its maintenance

requires the body to become sentient. There is no fire
quite of itself; how could there be a soul (Jing, literal
body, but conscious of itself?28

[T. 2145:(55).82c.25-27] and Sengyou [HMJJuan 5, T. 2102:

Tan's essay was written without any knowledge of Buddhist tea

26 Yan Kejun (ed.), Quan Shanggu Sandai Qin Han Sanguo L

ï^M~X, 9 vols. (Taibei: Shijie, 1963), vol. 2, Quan Houhan
7a. I have modified the translation found in Timotheus Pokor
of Huan Tan (43 B.C. - 28 A.D.), (Ann Arbor: Center for
Michigan, 1975), pp. 76-77.
27 Huan Tan once commented that "the Zhuangzi is a book of p
it is advisable to appropriate what is sound there. Why shoul
Yan Kejun, Quan Shanggu ...Juan 13, p. 2a. So, it is very li
the candle and light analogy from the book of Zhuangzi. If
Zhuangzi passage would be consistent with the findings of m
Zhuang Zi indeed used a candle and light analogy rather than

28 Alfred Forke, Lun-heng: Philosophical Essays of Wang C

Book Gallery, 2nd ed., 1962), 1:195. Forke translated jing a
to "soul" on the ground that historically, in Han and Wei-Jin
with jingshen, which was another term for "spirit" or "soul.
ant for jingshen in this context can also be vindicated by the p
in the Han period. See Lo, "The Destiny of the Shen (Soul) ...

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150 Yuet Keung Lo

Still later, Yang Quan HH (fl. ca.

against an immortal soul in his e
the Principles of Things). He says,
Endowed with vital force, humans
exhausted, they die as if they are ex
fire; when the wood is exhausted, t
no light. Therefore as a fire being e
leave no soul {hun) after his death.29

From these examples, it is clear th

tradition tended to reject the not
literature, there is not a single exa
light analogy was used to argue for
and light analogy, however, wield
derstanding of the body-soul relati
In fact, it provided the standard ap
least five centuries subsequent to t
Six Dynasties debates over the imm
position, which is basically oppos
mortal soul, his "Xingshen lun" w
that it was included in Sengyou's
of the Great Lumination), a colle
says defending the Buddhist positi
candle and light analogy, but they
case, the candle and light analogy w
the body-soul relation could be m
thinkers, Buddhists or otherwise. V
light analogy set the paradigm for
One of the crucial presuppositio
that the present life is the only ti
there is no rebirth of any kind. In
that the Ultimate Principle {zhili U

29 Taiping yulan ΧΨΜ% , 4 vols. (Beiji

A large number of the documents relate
benthal in his article cited above in no
"The Destiny of the Shen (Soul) ... ."

31 T. 2102:(52).29a:17-29c.l8. Huan Tan w

tainly due to an editing error made in M
Wailu i^fHt et al., Zhongguo sixian
1958), 3:335, and Ying-shih Yü, "View
Harvard University, 1962), pp. 182-183.

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 Chinese Mode of Knowledge 1 5 1

of birth and death. Huiyuan turns the tables on his op

actly this presupposition,32 introducing the idea of kar
and strategically reversing the candle and light analog
vantage. Huiyuan interprets the candle and light analo
moves from old firewood to new, so the soul moves
him utilizing the fire and firewood analogy is a co
theory of reincarnation from a secular Chinese sou
consistent with his method of teaching Buddhist doct
Chinese philosophical concepts.33 This pedagogic ap
(idea-matching).34 From the Buddhist point of view, H
the Chinese version of the candle and light analogy w
would simply be regarded as a classic example of
which allows the preacher to discourse on the Budd
every which way that is appropriate to the propens
audience. Because Huiyuan's opponents were familia
analogy in the Chinese philosophical tradition, its
them an emotive response to the body-soul relatio
would in turn render the analogy somewhat more per
opponents.35

32 Huiyuan later elaborated his theory of three kinds of retribution based on this view that human
life is not restricted to one single lifetime. See his "Sanbao lun" (On Three Kinds of Retribu-
tion) mHMJ, T. 2102:(52).34b.3-34c.
33 Although Huiyuan's teacher Dao'an jS^ generally forbid the teaching of Buddhism in terms
of Chinese philosophical concepts, he granted special permission to Huiyuan to do so. And
Huiyuan began this pedagogy when he was twenty-four. See Huiyuan's biography in the
Gaoseng zhuan Sftil (Biographies of Eminent Monks), juan 6, T. 2059:(50).358a. 11-14.

34 For a general discussion of geyi fëfi Buddhism, see Fung Yu-lan, tr. by Derk Bodde, History
of Chinese Philosophy, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952-1953), 2:241-242.
A most detailed study of geyi Buddhism has been done by Lin Chuanfang Wi#5ür. See his "Ge-
yi fojiao sixiang zhi shi de kaizhan" tS^WÜCS^^^WÜS (The Historical Development
of Buddhist Thought in the Mode of Idea-matching), Huagang foxue xuebao ^I^IASSÍB, 2
(1972), pp. 45-96. Recently, Peter N. Gregory has examined the ideological context of the
application of expedient means in Chinese Buddhist hermeneutics, see his Tsung-mi and the
Siniflcation of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 93-114.

35 In the debate over the nature of the soul, it is very common for both parties to substantiate an
argument by citing a classical text. Oftentimes they even cited the same text to argue for mu-
tually incompatible positions. In Huiyuan's case, the wording and vocabulary he used to present
the candle and light analogy was unmistakably similar to the Zhuangzi passage. Hence, it ap-
pears that Huiyuan tried to co-opt the indigenous Chinese analogy into his understanding of
Buddhism. In fact, as will be shown at the end of this paper, Huiyuan not only co-opted the
Chinese analogy, but also reinterpreted the Buddhist version of the candle and light analogy in
order to reconcile his pursuit of an ultimate substance underlying all ephemeral changes.

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 152 Yuet Keung Lo

In fact, the Conftician Dai Kui Hc

Huiyuan, employed the candle and
an immortal soul. In a rhyme-pros
on Transmission of Fire), Dai Ku
transmit the flame, [similarly,] a m
As long as firewood and vital force
and a candle last forever?"36 Hui
analogy precisely aims at dissuadin
faith. Yet, Huiyuan uses the cand
to substantiate his argument in
claims, at the same time and perha
it comes from a Buddhist source.
sophical validity and authority is d
say, a philosophical proposition cou
philosopher and the tradition ins
which tradition has generally accep
it shares a particular tradition and t
proposition can be proved to be tru
or relevant issue. Thus, by acquiring
soul is immortal, Huiyuan also decl
legitimate and tenable doctrine. In
not only an intellectual game infor
it is also the non-political or non-i
deed the process of analogy to pr
clear that the whole process is gu
intrusion of value into an allegedly
terprise invalid.
Since philosophical validity and au
tion, it is then important to exam
mate. Huiyuan's opponents appar
sumably because the validity of t
tablished fact, even though Huiyua
Huiyuan indeed attempted to asser
particular Buddhist text(s) Huiyuan
analogy.
Modern Japanese scholars like Kimura Eiichi ^WH- have attempted to
identify these texts and Kimura makes two basic suggestions about Huiyuan's

36 Yan Kejun (ed.), Quart Jinwen ±9X , vol. 5, 137: la.

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 Chinese Mode of Knowledge 153

possible sources.37 The first is that the analogy is d

Kumarajïva's translation of Nagarjuna's Mulamãd
commentary attributed to a mysterious Qingmu |f
reads: "The continuum of the five skandhas is
Therefore, in the world [the continuum] neither h
end." And the commentary explains: "Therefor
sequential continuum, just like, when various con
flame of a lamp is formed. As long as the variou
the lamp will not be extinguished. When [they] are
extinguished."38 The second passage suggested a
from the Dazhidu lun jï^fëM {Mahãprajnãparam
without attaining the way, this man has various de
and thereby causation is established. When [he]
successively give birth to [another] five skandhas
other lamp."39 Fung Yu-lan (Feng Youlan MMWÙ
Chinese philosophy, also points to a passage from t
the one cited above. That passage says: "Burnin
burned is the (fire)wood."40 As far as the details of
seems we can correctly point to the passage cited
because it mentions both fire and firewood. How
the two passages cited by Kimura only refer to the
dues and there is no mention of the idea of the sou
the Zhonglun is to refute the very notion of perm
point the passage indicated by Fung tries to prove.
is perhaps implied there, but it is not obvious at al
probable that Huiyuan wrote his essay before Kum
into Chinese, there is no doubt that by that ti
Dazhidu lun. In the year of 414, probably already
wrote a preface to the Dazhidu lun chão ^lÉÎÊtîfÈ
the Dazhidu lun.41 It should be remembered tha

37 Other Japanese scholars basically followed Kimura' s co

exhaustive study on the HMJ, edited by Makita Tairyo $cEHf
% (Studies on the Hongmingji), 3 vols. (Tokyo: Kyoto Un
38 T. 1564:(30).38c.28-39a.3.
39 T. 1509:(25).149c.23-25. See Kimura Eiichi, Eon kenkyü
and Translations), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Kyoto University, 1960),

40 T. 1564:(30). 14c.6. See his Zhexueshi xinbian €r*£$rjg

41 See T. 2145:(55). 110b. 14-16. Huiyuan's preface is foun
critical edition of which can be found in Kimura, Eon, pp.

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 154 Yuet Keung Lo

hin" was written in 405, 42 afte

throne and tried to persuade Huiy
litical counselor to the new sover
Xuan and Huiyuan dates to the per
twelfth month of 402.43 On the ot
tion of the Dazhidu lun until 8 Feb
of 405. 44 Hence, it does not seem
passage in the Dazhidu lun when he
The late Richard Robinson note
other passages from five differen
"fire and fuel."46 It is not clear wh
sages to be the inspiration of Huiy
this. While some of the passages
see below that one is of great impo
the Tathãgataguhyasutra W^f
cites one passage [T. 312:(ll).732c.f
1278), removing it from considerat
earlier translation [Tathãgataci
same text by Dharmaraksa (fl. 2
question is not included in this earl
The second passage is cited fro
show above, was not yet translated
text should be ruled out as Huiyu
light analogy.
The third and fourth passages come from the Abhidharmasãra ßRHbH'l>ü, a
text translated by Sanghadeva at the suggestion of Huiyuan himself. Indeed, after
the text was translated, Huiyuan wrote a preface to it in 39 1.47 Hence, it is almost

42 Huiyuan himself stated at the end of his essay that it was written in 405. See T.
2102:(52).32b.9.

43 Cf. Kimura, Eon, Ibunhen, pp. 327-329.

44 See Chu sanzang ji ji ttSHÄfBÄ, 7«ολ 10, T. 2145:(55).75b. 11-13. One might argue that
Kumârajïva could have influenced Huiyuan's thinking via other channels than his translations of
Buddhist scriptures. Yet, Huiyuan did not begin his correspondence with Kumârajïva until the
year of 406 when he had already composed his treatise on the immortality of the soul. See Tian
Boyuan EBtf 7C , Lushan Huiyuan xueshu BOJASSE (Taibei: Wenjin, 1974), p. 36.
45 See T. 2145:(55).75b. 10-13. For the dating of Huiyuan's preface to the Dazhidu lun, cf. Walter
Liebenthal, "Shih Hui-yüan's Buddhism," Journal of American Oriental Society 70 (1950), p.
248.

46 Richard H. Robinson, Early Mãdhyamika in India and China (Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press, 1967), p. 278, n. 10.

47 Tian Boyuan, Lushan Huiyuan, pp. 21-22.

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 Chinese Mode of Knowledge 1 55

beyond doubt that Huiyuan read this text. This

for the theory that Huiyuan's candle and light ana
in the Abhidharmasãra. However, the two passag
of a single passage - cited by Robinson are problem
ing to Robinson's translation, the first part rea
samskara's firewood." Here, the fire refers to p
wisdom without predispositions, anãsravá) and the
Obviously, this analogy has nothing to do with
according to Robinson's translation, the second par
of all the passions, so it is stopping; it surpasses
Here, "it" refers to the Four Noble Truths. Alth
passage, firewood is missing. In other words, ther
ogy (or candle and light analogy) involved here.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh passages cited b
Majjhima Nikãya.49 But, again, the three passages i
any bearing on the candle and light analogy. The
different texts in Chinese translation. One passa
the Za ahan jing HßnpaM (Samyuktägama) which
between 435 and 443. 50 In the first passage the Ta
fire whose burning is dependent upon the conditio
as the fuel. As soon as the condition is gone, th
without being rekindled.51 Here, it is clear that
missing. Neither is the message of the analogy dir
the soul. Most importantly, the sutra was translat
The second passage comes from sutra no. 1
BOJIlIP^êM» a translation of the Samyuktãgama.52
no longer known, and traditionally the translation
in North China between 352 and 43 1.53 In other w
having read this sutra in the South are fairly slim.
196 is merely a variant of sutra no. 962 of San
Madhyamãgama. There is no candle and light an
either.

48 T. 1550:(28).818b.6-17.
Robinson cites the Pah canon, but of course Huiyuan could

50 T. 2151:(52).362b.4.
T. 99:(2).245c.25-246a.8. A similar passage also appears
Robinson cites two passages without mentioning this third

Oí T. 100:(2).445a-b.
53 T. 2157:(52).944a.27.

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156 Yuet Keung Lo

The last passage comes from the

which was translated by Sangh
Monastery in South China.54 It is c
this sutra before he wrote his essay
(shi,skt. vijnãná) is compared to a f
of wood. Clearly what is being co
However, since it is probable that
the soul, we may grant that Huiyu
not clear that a candle and light an
the body to the soul in the passage.
Finally, Robinson cites two pas
translated into Chinese as the Na
by an unknown translator.55 One p
candle wick and light,56 and the oth
the analogy of flames.57 Althoug
candle and light analogy is unclea
locus classicus of the candle and lig
translation and the translator are un
Huiyuan had read the sutra at all.
Now, it appears that most attemp
classicus of Huiyuan' s candle and
cess. Does this mean that Huiyuan w
Buddhist origin for his analogy? Ra
like to suggest several other poss
known, many Chinese Buddhist sut
dieval period, and thus it is not un
ally cited the candle and light an
through all the extant Buddhist scr
wrote his essay on the immortality
assume that written scriptures w
learned of the candle and light anal
many different sutras from diverse
shows that the analogy must have b
poses, and thus it is probable that t

54 T. 154:(52).505a.2.
55 T. 2157:(52).956b.6. There are two dif
biqiujing in the Taishõ tripitaka.

56 T. 1670a:(32).700a.8-ll.
57 Ibid., 698b.8-14.

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 Chinese Mode of Knowledge 1 57

ted by word of mouth. Therefore, Huiyuan coul

candle and light analogy from the monks he knew
sutra from which the analogy came. Yet, assum
his analogy from a Buddhist text, I would suggest
to Huiyuan, which might have served as his inspir
First is the Bojing chao ^MÉ4' a Buddhist tex
between 222 and 254. A passage in this text says:
The good deeds and evildoings man practices wil
shadow. In spite of his death, his karmic impulse
like the case of planting millet, although the seed d
roots will give birth to the stem and the leaves, and
above. [Similarly,] the karmic impulses are activated
candle light being burned successively. Although th
the flame goes on without being extinguished.58

Despite its similarity to the Zhonglun passage c

talking about the transmission of karmic residues,
Bojing chao was intended to be a refutation of t
perishes with the body.59 Finally, my argument t
analogy is indeed a candle and light analogy will al
chao passage, if the passage is indeed the source fo
Second, in Chapter 37 of the Dharmapada &&
Vighna in 224,60 a verse reads, "The soul (sheri) ta
like fire accompanies a physical shape (xingyu ]&ψ
candle, it becomes a candle flame. [Eventually,]
and join the rank of manure."62 In this passage, th
as two distinct entities, and the soul takes on th
while the body will perish, it is not clear whether
pate. Yet, the summary statement in the begin
chapter on life and death (i.e., Chapter 37) pre
ting), namely, their departed souls (wangshen ö
will be reborn in accord with their behavior."63 T
Huiyuan refers to this passage when he cites the c
rate, in light of the passages from the Bojing c

58 See T. 790:(17).735b.9-13.
59 /toL 730b.2ff, 735b. 18ff.

60 T. 210:(4).566c.5-9.
61 Emend zi Ψ· into yu ψ.
62 Ibid., 574a.26-27.
63 Ibid., 574a.6-7.

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 158 YuetKeungLo

yuan' s advocacy of an immor

as he claims.
One additional passage which can be brought into consideration was trans-
lated right before Huiyuan wrote his essay on the immortality of the soul. This is
the Jianzheng jing MIEM, translated by Dharmaranka between 381 and 395, in
which a passage says that as a consequence of its agent's good and bad deeds, the
soul (shisheri) acquires its form, just like the fire manifests itself in firewood.
When the firewood is exhausted, the fire will accordingly expire.64 Thus, Hui-
yuan might have borrowed his analogy from this source as well. However, it
must be pointed out that in the Jianzheng jing passage, right after the fire and
firewood analogy, the text concludes that if one's mental discernment or con-
sciousness (yishi MWi, skt. manasl) does not activate any good and evil, karmic
impulses in the form of soul will also dissipate.65 In other words, the text does
teach, at least implicitly, the doctrine of the destructibility of the soul.
There is no way to know if Huiyuan had read the Bojing chao or the
Jianzheng jing before he composed his essay, but even if he had it would appear
that he interpreted the candle and light analogy or fire and firewood analogy to
support the argument for rather than against an immortal soul. In fact, Huiyuan's
belief in the immortality of the soul was motivated by his persistent quest for a
timeless substance, alias Buddhahood or dharmatã, which, according to Huiyuan,
underlies all ephemeral changes in the transitory world. It was precisely this fun-
damental quest that had led him to adhere to the doctrine of an immortal soul
despite the canonical teachings in which he allegedly found the candle and light
analogy.

64 See Γ. 796:(17).741c.28-742a.l.
65 Ibid., 742a. 1-2.

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