The Role of the African Union in the Mediation Process in Ethiopia

On 24 August, fighting resumed between the federal government of Ethiopia and

Tigrayan forces, ending the five month long humanitarian truce. There are at
least three sticking points preventing the peace process from making headways.

On 24 August, fighting resumed between the federal government of Ethiopia and Tigrayan
forces, ending the five month long humanitarian truce. It was on 24 March that the Ethiopian
government declared an ‘indefinite humanitarian truce’ to improve the dire humanitarian
situation in the northern part of the country and to give peace a chance. The Tigray People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF) reciprocated by expressing willingness to respect the truce and
cessation of hostilities on condition of an adequate and timely humanitarian assistance. The truce
largely held for five months, paving the way for some positive measures towards ending the
conflict that first broke out on 4 November 2020.

@_AfricanUnion should pay attention to the regional dynamics that are adding an additional
layer of complexity to the internal armed conflict in Ethiopia.

On 27 June, the Ethiopian government announced the names of a seven member negotiating
team led by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Demeke Meknoennen, in a bid
to find a resolution to the conflict. On 28 July, Redwan Hussien, member of the negotiating team
and national security advisor to the Ethiopian Prime Minster, tweeted his government’s readiness
for peace talks ‘anytime anywhere’ and ‘without preconditions’. Earlier in June, the leadership of
Tigray also issued a statement expressing willingness to participate in a ‘credible, impartial, and
principled peace process’.

Meanwhile, the African Union (AU) High-Representative for the Horn of Africa, former
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, as well as US, European Union (EU), and the United
Nations (UN) envoys to the region, engaged in shuttle diplomacy trying to bring parties to the
negotiating table. However, such efforts did not register major results.

There are at least three sticking points preventing the peace process from making headways. The
first is the diverging positions on who should lead the peace process. Tigray regional
government, in its 13 June open letter, flagged up its concern over the ‘proximity’ of Obasanjo to
the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The regional government also seeks to have the
peace talks facilitated by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta with the support of international
partners, including US, EU, United Arab Emirates (UAE), UN, and the AU – relegating the AU
to a supportive role. The federal government on the other hand, stands by its position that the AU
should be responsible for the mediation under the leadership of Obasanjo who was appointed by
the Chairperson of AU Commission as the High Representative for the Horn of Africa on 26
August 2021 for a period of one year renewable at the discretion of the Chairperson of the
Commission.
The second sticking point is the lifting of the blockade and restoration of basic services to the
Tigray region, which has been cut off from electricity, telecom, banking, and other basic utilities
since the withdrawal of federal troops from the region in June 2021. The regional government
demands restoration of basic services before talks begin while the federal government wants to
see an ‘enabling environment’ upon the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement for basic services to
resume.

The third and perhaps the most challenging hurdle remains the status of the contested areas of the
so called ‘Western Tigray’ (Welkait, Tegede, Telemt, Humera)—a strategic hotspot bordering
Sudan and Eritrea. Both Tigray and Amhara regions make historical claim over these areas that
were under the administration of Tigray until the Amhara took over control of the areas
following the federal force’s advance into the Tigray region in November 2020. The TPLF wants
a return to the ‘prewar status quo ante’ but withdrawal from the contested areas seems to be a
deal breaker for the federal government as that would mean opening up a weapons supply line
for Tigray forces and putting Abiy’s government on a collision course with the Amhara and
Eritrean forces.

Several weeks ago, there were high hopes that the two sides would meet in Nairobi, Kenya, to
start the negotiation under the AU’s auspices. That hope is now quickly fading as conflict has
significantly escalated with fronts expanding from the south of Tigray towards the west of
Tigray, as well as along the Ethiopia-Eritrea and Ethiopia-Sudan borders. Lack of effective
engagement on the part of the different Special Envoys and other actors to address these sticking
points and steer the humanitarian truce towards a negotiated permanent ceasefire and
comprehensive peace agreement contributed to the return of full-scale conflict.

On 7 September, the President of Tigray regional state, Debretsion Gebremichael, wrote an open
letter to the UN Security Council proposing a cessation of hostilities with four conditions: lifting
of the blockade on essential services, unfettered humanitarian access, withdrawal of Eritrean
forces under international monitoring, and a return to pre-war borders of Tigray. In addition, it
proposed the appointment of ‘a credible panel of high-level international mediators’, further
highlighting the reservation over the AU High Representative.

The federal government of Ethiopia has expressed its firm stand that any peace initiative should
be within the AU framework anchored on the ‘African solutions to African problems’.

As fighting escalated, diplomatic engagement also intensified with the return of US and AU
special envoys back to Addis Ababa in a bid to silence the guns. The engagement reportedly
succeeded in bringing federal government and TPLF together for a direct talk in Djibouti, but
neither side have confirmed this meeting. On the Ethiopian new year, which falls on September
11, the regional government of Tigray issued a statement offering ‘an immediate and mutually
agreed cessation of hostilities’. In a clear departure from its 7 September letter, Tigray regional
state agreed to ‘a credible AU-led peace process’, which includes ‘mutually acceptable
mediators’, ‘international observers’, and ‘international experts’. The federal government has
not responded yet to the offer, and fighting has continued on multiple fronts. Whilst the ongoing
fighting may delay the process, eventually the conflict will have to be settled through a
negotiation.
Key actors such as the US and the EU that have significant leverage on both parties seem to be
backing a peace process under the AU’s auspice. The federal government of Ethiopia has
expressed its firm stand that any peace initiative should be within the AU framework anchored
on the ‘African solutions to African problems’. TPLF were reluctant but has now accepted the
AU’s mediation role of the peace process. The AU has also asserted its leadership role in the
peace talks claiming the AU-led mediation process as the ‘only viable and effective approach’
towards finding a lasting solution to the situation in Ethiopia. While this context highlights the
continued role of the AU as a mediator, there is also a need for the Union to use more effort and
robust engagement to avoid the risk of a protracted conflict in Ethiopia with serious
repercussions to the peace and stability in the wider region. In this regard, taking the following
steps may help the AU to recalibrate the mediation process.

First, AU’s Peace and Security Council, which is a fifteen-member standing decision-making
organ of the organisation with a primary responsibility for promoting and maintaining peace,
security, and stability in the continent, should place the conflict in Ethiopia high on its agenda,
and consider the situation more regularly and substantively. Previous engagements by the PSC
have been notably low even though the gravity of the conflict demands a high level of attention.
The PSC has only met three times (8 November 2021, 10 February 2022, and 4 August 2022) on
Ethiopia since the outbreak of the conflict in November 2020, which is in stark contrast to its UN
counterpart that has held around 14 meetings. Obasanjo has briefed the PSC three times so far,
but none of the briefings except the last one in August extended to interactive engagement with
PSC members. In addition to formal engagements, the PSC may also explore other avenues for
interactions including through quiet diplomacy. The PSC should also coordinate its efforts with
other partners to exercise more leverage on the parties. In this regard, it may consider inviting the
Special Envoys of UN, EU, and US for the Horn of Africa to its briefing sessions on the conflict
in northern part of Ethiopia for a substantive engagement.

Second, the AU should address concerns raised by the TPLF over the credibility of its High
Representative for the Horn of Africa. Most recently, on September 10, the Chairperson of the
Commission renewed the mandate of the High Representative, which indicates that President
Obasanjo will remain in his position. In this context, one viable option to address the trust issue
and take the mediation process forward could be to add more African leaders and experts to the
mediation team, that are acceptable to both the federal government and TPLF, in order to build
more confidence in Obasanjo’s mediation efforts.

Third, the AU should pay attention to the regional dynamics that are adding an additional layer
of complexity to the internal armed conflict in Ethiopia. Eritrea’s reported involvement in the
conflict, border tension between Ethiopia and Sudan, and the controversy between Ethiopia,
Egypt, and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) are further compounding
the conflict situation. Hence, the AU should contextualize its intervention in light of these
considerations and explore ways to address these broader regional issues as well.

Zekarias Beshah Abebe is a research and training coordinator at Amani Africa Media and
Research Services. The opinions expressed in this blog piece are mine and do not reflect the view
of Amani Africa.
Conflict Resolution, Peace & Security

The African Union leads policy making and implementation of decisions aimed at ensuring that
Africa achieves Aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063 which aspires for “ A peaceful and secure Africa”
through the use of mechanisms that promote a dialogue-centred approach to conflict prevention
and resolution of conflicts and establishing of a culture of peace and tolerance nurtured in
Africa’s children and youth through peace education. The Agenda 2063 flagship initiative of
Silencing the Guns by 2020 is at the core of activities being put in place to ensure Africa is a
more peaceful and stable continent.

The key AU Organ for promoting peace and security on the continent is the Peace & Security
Council (PSC) which is the standing decision-making organ of the AU for the prevention,
management and resolution of conflicts. It is a collective security and early warning arrangement
intended to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. It is
also the key pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is the
framework for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.

The Department of Peace and Security of the African Union Commission (AUC) supports the
PSC in carrying out its responsibilities under the PSC Protocol and leads the AUC activities
related to peace, security and stability across the continent. The Department supports various
peace and security offices and missions and works with special representatives appointed by the
AUC Chairperson in the area of peace and security.

The Department oversees the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism and also
advocates for the signing and ratification by member states of the various AU treaties in the areas
of peace and security

Find out more about the work of the AU on conflict resolution and maintaining peace on the
continent by visiting Peace & Security Department

Main successes of the AU in Peace and Security, challenges and

mitigation measures in place

AU Peace and Security: the foundation for the Continent’s continued progress and socio-
economic transformation

During the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) in
May 2013, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a landmark declaration.
They vowed that Africa would not bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation and
made a commitment to end violent conflict on the continent by 2020. This was translated into the
AU initiative: Silencing the Guns by 2020.

In fulfillment of this, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), at its 648th meeting held on 16
January 2017, considered the Draft African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence
the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020. The roadmap guides the fulfillment of this mandate
through focusing on initiatives and practical steps for ‘Silencing the guns by 2020’. Council
further decides to submit the Master Roadmap to the AU Assembly of Heads of States and
Government during its 28th Ordinary Session to be held from 30 to 31 January 2017, in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, for endorsement.

With continued AU engagement with Member States on conflict prevention, management,

resolution and post conflict reconstruction and development as well as peace-building initiatives,
progress is being made in the signing and implementation of peace agreements between
countries not at peace, or those emerging from decades of conflict and instability. The human
and economic costs of these conflicts had adverse national and cross-border consequences:
Increased numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons; the proliferation of small arms
and light weapons, and many more.

In response, and in line with the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol), the
AU assumed political responsibility to address these challenges and developed its African Peace
and Security Architecture (APSA). Over the last decade, the extent of violent conflict on the
continent has reduced, despite the emergence of new security threats.

The Commission has recently published the APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020, a strategic document,
which builds on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the
previous APSA Roadmaps (2011-2013). The Roadmap manifests the continued determination to
ensure further progress, and paves the way for future collaboration between the AU, the Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to effectively address security
issues and contribute to a more peaceful Africa.

Even though the key components of APSA are now more or less fully operational and the
number of violent conflicts has been significantly reduced in the past few years, a number of
countries still remain trapped in a vicious cycle of violent conflict and its deadly consequences.

With a view to realizing the goal of a conflict-free Africa, the discussion during the Summit will
focus on conflict and crisis situations in Africa namely, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central
African Republic, Somalia, Sahel/Mali, South Sudan, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Libya among
others.

A continued strong engagement in support of implementation of peace agreements in Member

States emerging from conflict and the fight against terrorism, will remain the priorities for the
AU. Somalia could be sighted as an example that has made significant progress against Al
Shabaab with support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). On its part,
AMISOM continues to provide guidance on capacity building, and sensitisation of communities
on countering violent extremism, as part of its comprehensive strategy for reviving policing
activities in Somalia.

In the context of conflict prevention, the AU and its sub-regional organizations have developed
significant institutional capacity over the past decade to undertake early warning analysis and
conflict prevention. In this regard, the AU has built up an impressive toolbox for prevention and
peacemaking. These include the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise,
Special Envoys, and ad hoc mediation panels, often comprised of sitting and former Heads of
State. The AU also has experience in deploying liaison offices and "special political missions" in
countries at risk of, or emerging from, conflict. The Commission has focused on operational
conflict prevention with regular Horizon Scanning briefings provided to the AUPSC on potential
threats and emerging peace and security challenges on the continent; production of early warning
reports and the conduct of preventive diplomacy missions in Member States at risk of conflict.
The Commission has also continued to provide technical assistance to Member States in the
establishment and strengthening of national infrastructures for peace, including early warning
systems and Situation Rooms.

In the context of post-conflict reconstruction and support of countries, the Commission deploys
mission to assess the priority needs of the country in need. These include identification of joint
activities in support of implementation of peace agreements in Member States emerging from
conflict; conducting needs assessment missions; consolidating and scaling up security sector
reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives; technical and operational
support to control the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and sustained
collaboration with RECs/RMs and civil society organizations. The engagements have also been
geared towards developing and implementing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace
Strengthening Projects (PSPs) in areas of deployment of AU Peace Support Operations, and
through the AU Liaison Offices. Furthermore, the AU took a number of initiatives to prevent the
post-electoral situation from degenerating into a generalized crisis through the deployment of
observers.

The AU Commission also provides strategic, political, technical, and planning support to
operations authorized by the Peace and Security Council and carried out by regional coalitions of
Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), or Regional Mechanisms for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs).
Such support includes: The Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army
(RCI-LRA) and the operation against Boko Haram undertaken by the Lake Chad Basin
Commission and Benin- the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

It is important to highlight the critical nature of the partnerships the AU has developed within the
framework of APSA. The European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and bilateral partners
have all played a key role. There has been significant innovation and creative problem solving,
which has been pivotal in meeting the continent’s peace and security challenges.

Challenges

Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) and peace building are some of the most
important challenges facing African countries emerging from conflicts. As the African Union
continues to make progress in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, the imperative for
comprehensive and integrated actions and plans for the recovery, reconstruction and
development of societies recovering from conflicts becomes paramount.
The major challenge facing the African Union is the lack of funds. The financing challenges the
AU is faced with has important unintended consequences. High levels of donor dependency have
weakened ownership in this critical area of the AU’s mandate and led to strategic drift, as the AU
Commission increasingly focused on externally financed activities.

There is general agreement that the current financing arrangements for peace support operations
are neither reliable nor predictable, especially in the context of high-tempo combat operations.
While partners have demonstrated much flexibility and innovation, there is consensus that the
current financing arrangements are unsustainable.

Mitigation

Financing peace and security in Africa on a sustainable basis is not only an African priority but a
global strategic imperative, given the complex and interconnected nature of threats to
international peace and security today.

The African Union and its Member States are already taking the lead in confronting challenges
which other institutions are not able to address. With an AU Peace Fund fit for purpose, the
Continent, together with its partners, will establish a foundation for creating a more responsive
international peace and security architecture. The July 2016 AU Assembly Decisions on the
Peace Fund are a powerful demonstration of the determination and commitment of the AU and
its members to assume primary responsibility to fund the Organization’s peace activities. This
provides the opportunity to build new partnerships with traditional and emerging partners,
International Organizations, the private sector and civil society, and to pool our strengths in order
to meet the emerging global threats. The complexity of the issues, ranging from funding, to
crafting new partnerships with the UN, cannot be underestimated and will demand political will
and a paradigm shift. A journey of a thousand miles begins with one step. It is now time to take
that step.
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article contains several patronymic names rather than family names. These persons are
addressed by their given name, and not by their inherited name.
Tigray War
Part of the Ethiopian civil conflict (2018–present)
 Territorial control in Ethiopia as of February 2023
(for a more detailed, up-to-date, interactive map, see here)
Pro-federal government troops
Ethiopian federal government and regional allies
Eritrean Defence Forces
Ethiopian federal government and Eritrean Defence Forces

Anti-federal government rebels

Tigray Defense Forces

Oromo Liberation Army
3 November 2020[a] – 3 November 2022
(2 years)

 Full-scale war:
3 November 2020 – 24 March 2022
Date
 Ceasefire:
24 March – 24 August 2022
 War re-escalates:
24 August – 3 November 2022

Tigray Region, Amhara Region, and Afar Region,

Location Ethiopia; Central Region, Eritrea; Eritrea–Ethiopia
border; Spillovers in Al Qadarif, Sudan
Result The government and the TPLF formally agreed to
a cessation of hostilities and systematic, verifiable
 disarmament (2 November 2022)[21][22][23]

 Second agreement for implementing the

peace deal signed by both parties (12
November 2022)[24][25][26]

Belligerents

Ethiopia UFEFCF (2021–2022)

[12][13]

 Amhara
 Tigray
 Afar[1]
 OLA (2021–
 Benishangul- 2022)[14][15]
Gumuz (2021–2022)[2]
 Agew
 Dire Dawa Liberation Front
(2021–2022)[3] (2021–2022)[16]
 Gambela  SNLF (2021–
(2021–2022)[2] 2022)[17]
 Harari (2021–
 Somali State
2022)[2]
Resistance (2021–
 Oromia (2021– 2022)[13]
2022) [4]  Kimant Democratic
Party (2021–2022)[13]
 Sidama (2021–
2022) [4]  Gambella
People’s Liberation
 Somali Region Army (2021–2022)[18]
(2021–2022)[2]
 ARDUF (2021–
[19]
 SNNPR (2021– 22)
[5][6]
2022)
 BPLM (2021–
[20]
Eritrea[7][8] 22)

Arms suppliers:

 United Arab
Emirates[9][10]

 Turkey[10]
  Iran[10]

 China[11]

Commanders and leaders

Abiy Ahmed
Birhanu Jula
Abebaw Tadesse
Kenea Yadeta (2020– Debretsion
21) Gebremichael
Abraham Belay Fetlework
Tiruneh Temesgen Gebregziabher
(2020) Tsadkan
Agegnehu Teshager Gebretensae[27][28]
(2020–21) Tadesse Werede
Yilikal Kefale (2021– Getachew Reda
2022) Jaal Marroo[14]
Awol Arba
Isaias Afewerki
Filipos Woldeyohannes
Units involved
ENDF

 Ethiopian Ground
Forces
 ETAF[29]
 Tigray Defense
EPF Forces
Amhara Special Forces
Amhara Police Force  Oromo
Afar Special Forces Liberation Army
Afar Police Force (2021–2022)
EDF[8]

 Eritrean Army
 ERAF

Strength
~500,000 (Oct. ~200,000 (Oct. 2022)
[30] [30]
2022)
Casualties and losses

10,383+ killed[31] 10,668+ killed[40]

8,000 captured[32][33] 2,000 captured[41]
2 MiG-23 lost[34][35]
2 Mi-35 lost[36][37][38]
1 C-130 lost[39]
Exact casualty figures are disputed
3 UN guards and 23 aid workers killed[42]
875,879+ refugees[43] (20,000 missing)[44]
2,750,000 internally displaced[43]
13,000,000 in need of food aid[45]

Total Deaths:
385,000–600,000+ (per Ghent University)[46]
700,000–800,000 (per analyst Abdurahman Sayed)[30]

 v
 t
 e

Post–1960 conflicts
in the Horn of Africa

 v
 t
 e

Tigray War

The Tigray War[b] was an armed conflict that lasted from 3 November 2020[a] to 3 November
2022.[51][52] The war was primarily fought in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia between the Ethiopian
federal government and Eritrea on one side, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) on
the other.[53][54]

After years of increased tensions and hostilities between the TPLF and the governments of
Ethiopia and Eritrea, fighting began when Tigrayan security forces attacked the Northern
Command headquarters of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), alongside a number of
other bases in Tigray.[55] The ENDF counterattacked from the south – while Eritrean Defence
Forces (EDF) began launching attacks from the north – which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed
described as "law enforcement operations."[56][57] Federal allied forces captured Mekelle, the
capital of the Tigray Region, on 28 November, after which Abiy declared the operation "over." [58]
[59]
However, the TPLF stated soon afterwards that it would continue fighting until the "invaders"
were out,[60][61] and on 28 June 2021, the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) retook Mekelle; by July
the same year, they had also advanced into the Amhara and Afar regions.[62] In early November
2021, the TDF, together with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), took control of several towns
on the highway south from Tigray Region towards Addis Ababa, and the TPLF stated that it
considered "marching on [the capital]."[63][64] Together with seven smaller rebel groups, the TPLF
and OLA declared a coalition aiming to "dismantle Abiy's government by force or by
negotiations, and then form a transitional authority."[65]

After a successful government counter-offensive in response, and then a series of negotiations

with the TPLF, Ethiopia declared an indefinite humanitarian truce on 24 March 2022, in order to
allow the delivery of humanitarian aid into Tigray.[66] However, fighting dramatically re-
escalated in late August 2022, after peace talks broke down.[67] Rapid mobilization of troops soon
followed, with Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray reportedly organizing hundreds of thousands of
troops against each other by October the same year.[30] After a number of peace and mediation
proposals in the intervening years, Ethiopia and the Tigrayan rebel forces agreed to a cessation of
hostilities on 2 November, which went into effect the day after;[52] Eritrea was not a party to the
agreement, however, and their status has remained unclear.[68]

All sides, particularly the ENDF, EDF, and TDF, have committed war crimes during the conflict.
[69][70][71][72]
Mass extrajudicial killings of civilians have taken place throughout, including in
Axum,[73] Bora,[74] Chenna,[75][76] Kobo,[77][78] the Hitsats refugee camp,[79] Humera,[80] Mai Kadra,
[71][81]
the Debre Abay monastery,[74][82] and Zalambessa.[83] An estimated 385,000–600,000 people
have been killed,[46] and war rape became a "daily" occurrence, with girls as young as 8 and
women as old as 72 being raped, often in front of their families.[84][85] A major humanitarian crisis
has developed as a result of the war,[43] with famine becoming widespread.[86][45] It also inflicted
immense economic damage on the region, with the cost of rebuilding alone estimated to be
roughly $20 billion.[87][88][89]

Background
Historical and political context

Further information: 2014–2016 Oromo protests and Eritrean–Ethiopian border conflict

See also: Eritrean involvement in the Tigray War

Following the end of the Ethiopian Civil War in 1991, Ethiopia became a dominant-party state
under the rule of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of
four ethnically based parties dominated by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).[90] The
founding and most influential member was the TPLF and the chairman was Meles Zenawi, who
was the prime minister of Ethiopia until his death in 2012.[91][92] He was succeeded by Deputy
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, the chairman of the Southern Ethiopian People's
Democratic Movement (SEPDM), a coalition member.[93] On 15 February 2018, Hailemariam
announced his resignation as both prime minister and chairman of the EPRDF, owing to a
growing discontent within the public, fueled by a reaction to 27 years of repression.[94][95][96]

On 28 March 2018, in a closed-door election to chair the EPRDF, executive committee members
elected the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organisation (OPDO) chairman Abiy Ahmed.[97] On 2
April 2018, Ethiopian parliament elected Abiy as prime minister.[98] One of Abiy's first actions
after his election was to initiate a warming of relations with Eritrea, a long-time rival of the
TPLF, to end a 20-year long border conflict.[99] While this decision was considered a cause of
celebration at the time,[100][101] many within the Tigray Region were heavily critical of this, seeing
it as a betrayal of those who died in the 1998–2000 war.[102] The TPLF condemned the peace
initiatives, saying they were hastily made, had "fundamental flaws," and also claimed it was
decided on without consulting long-time TPLF members.[103]

On 1 December 2019, Abiy merged the ethnic and region-based parties of the EPRDF (which
had governed Ethiopia for 28 years) and several opposition parties into his new Prosperity Party.
[104][105]
The TPLF, which had long dominated Ethiopian politics, refused to join this new party.
[106][107]
After losing the election and being ousted from the federal government, TPLF officials
relocated to the Tigray Region, continuing to administer control there while frequently clashing
with the federal government.[90][108] In one instance, the Tigray regional government was reported
to have defied the federal government and refused to allow Ethiopian Federal Police to arrest
Getachew Assefa, the former chief of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) of
Ethiopia and executive member of the TPLF.[109]

The Ethiopian government and its supporters have accused the TPLF of trying to re-establish
their rule over the country through violence and force.[110] In turn, the TPLF has accused the
federal government of accumulating too much power for itself, and that it was engaging in ethnic
discrimination of Tigrayans.[111][112]

Lead-up to the war

Throughout 2020, tensions between the federal government and the TPLF escalated in the
months leading up to November.[107] In March, the National Election Board of Ethiopia delayed
the general elections – originally scheduled for 29 August 2020 – to a then-undetermined date,
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[113] The terms of federal and regional lawmakers, as well as the
executive branch, were then extended by federal parliament beyond the October 2020
constitutional mandates.[114][115]

The TPLF, led by its chairman Debretsion Gebremichael, rejected these measures, arguing that
they were unconstitutional, and held its own regional election on 9 September, in defiance of the
federal government.[116][117][118] Several journalists were barred by the Ethiopian government from
travelling to cover Tigray's regional election.[119][120] Ethiopia considered the Tigray election to be
illegal, and responded by slashing federal funding to the region, a decision the TPLF described
as "tantamount to declaration of war."[121][55]

In late September 2020, the TPLF stated that the constitutional term limit of the House of
Federation, the House of Peoples' Representatives, the prime minister, and the Council of
Ministers was 5 October 2020 and that for this reason, it would consider "the incumbent"
constitutionally illegitimate after 5 October; they proposed replacing the government with a
technocratic caretaker government, as detailed in a plan posted on Facebook by the Coalition of
Ethiopian Federalist Forces.[122] Ethiopian elite units were transported to Gherghera base near
Asmara, as part of an alleged pact between Prime Minister Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias
Afwerki to "strike out of existence the TPLF," according to former Eritrean Minister of Defence
Mesfin Hagos.[123]
In late October 2020, the Ethiopian Reconciliation Commission stated that it was trying to
mediate between the federal government and the TPLF, as well as the other regional
governments, but that the pre-conditions set by all sides were blocking progress.[124] As tension
continued to grow, a brigadier general appointed by Abiy was prevented by the Tigray
government from taking up his military post.[125] The same day before the Tigray forces launched
the Northern Command attacks, the federal parliament of Ethiopia had suggested designating the
TPLF as a terrorist organization.[107]

Constitutional context

The 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia states in Article 39.1, "Every Nation, Nationality, and People
in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession."
Article 62.9 grants the House of Federation the right to "order Federal intervention if any State
[government], in violation of [the] Constitution, endangers the constitutional order."[126]

Course of the war

Main article: Timeline of the Tigray War

Initial fighting (3–28 November 2020)

Northern Command attacks

Main article: Northern Command attacks (Ethiopia)

A map showing the Ethiopian-allied forces' Tigray offensive, 4–28 November 2020.

Just before midnight on 3 November 2020, Tigray Special Forces and allied local militia
attacked the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) Northern Command headquarters in
Mekelle, the Fifth Battalion barracks in Dansha, and other Northern Command bases.[127][128][49][107]
Several people were killed and the TPLF claimed the attack was carried out in self-defence [129][109]
or preemptive self-defense.[55]

In retaliation,[130] an Ethiopian offensive was launched on 4 November, which was accompanied

by the declaration of a state of emergency, the creation of the State of Emergency Inquiry
Board[131] and a shutdown of government services in the Tigray Region.[132][133] During the
subsequent days, skirmishes continued and the Ethiopian federal parliament declared the creation
of an interim government for Tigray.[134] Ethiopian offensives in the north were accompanied
with airstrikes and several towns and cities were retaken.[135]
Early massacres
Main articles: Mai Kadra massacre, Humera massacres (2020), and Battle of Humera
Mass graves (centre) and funeral services (left and right) for the victims of the Mai Kadra
massacre
Reported conflict incidents in the first 7 months of the war, including battles, ambushes,
airstrikes, drone attacks and shelling.

On the night of 9 to 10 November 2020, 600 civilians, mostly Amharas and Welkait, were killed
in a massacre in the town of Mai Kadra with machetes and knives used by local militias and
police loyal to the TPLF, according to preliminary investigations by Amnesty International and
the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission;[136][71] other refugees, interviewed by the Financial
Times and Reuters, said it was the Amhara militia who were the perpetrators and Tigrayans who
were the victims.[137][138] Two days later, refugees interviewed by the Daily Telegraph, The
Guardian and The New York Times stated that Amhara militias, including Fano,[139][140] and the
ENDF[80] carried out beatings and massacres of 92 Tigrayans in Humera.[141] Humera was shelled
from the direction of the Eritrean–Ethiopian border for two days around 9–11 November. The
ENDF gained control of the town one day later.[142]

Offensives of joint ENDF-Amhara Region-Eritrean forces into Tigray were facilitated by the
intervention of "Pterosaurus" drones, launched by the United Arab Emirates from its base in
Assab, Eritrea. The Chinese-made, armed drones bombed Tigrayan artillery and weapons depots.
[143][144][c][145]
In the late hours of 13 November 2020, Tigray forces fired a rocket towards the
airports of Bahir Dar and Gondar in the Amhara Region.[146] On 14 November, Tigray forces
launched rockets at the Eritrean capital of Asmara, but the missiles missed.[147] The Tigray
government claimed these locations contained military terminals that served as bases to carry out
airstrikes.[148]

Mekelle offensive
Main article: Mekelle offensive (2020)

The aftermath of an airstrike on Mekelle

From 17 to 19 November, Ethiopian forces captured the Raya district and the towns of Shire,
Alamata, Adwa, and Axum,[149][150] and began moving towards Adigrat.[151] Fighting between
Tigray and Eritrea took place in Adi Quala, Zalembesa, Taruna, Ali Tina, Wadqomdi, and
Badme.[152] On 23 November, Ethiopian forces reached the regional capital of Mekelle and
encircled it. A military spokesperson for Ethiopia, Colonel Dejene Tsegaye, announced that
Mekelle would be shelled, and told Tigray civilians to flee the city because Ethiopian forces
would show no mercy.[153][129]
Though TPLF leaders and special forces had already left the city, Ethiopian forces continued
their direct assault on Mekelle on the morning of 28 November, and started heavily shelling the
city. By the evening, Prime Minister Abiy declared Ethiopian forces had taken full control of the
city. In total, 27 civilians were killed and 100 others were injured.[69][154] The Tigray government
vowed to continue fighting.[60][155]

Tigrayan guerrilla warfare (November 2020 – June 2021)

Formation of the Tigray Defense Forces

After Ethiopian federal forces and their allies captured Mekelle and other major cities, forces
loyal to the Tigray government began to regroup into mountainous areas of the region and
reorganized under the banner of the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF).[156][55] This retreat was
partially caused by the fact that a large portion of the TDF's artillery had been destroyed by air
strikes.[157] The TDF also began to dig into their positions in rural Tigray,[158] marking the start of
a guerrilla campaign against Ethiopian-allied forces from the mountains.[55]

Eritrean occupation of the northeast

On 28 and 29 November, witnesses and survivors, including refugees in Sudan, reported that the
Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) carried out the Axum massacre of about 720 to 800 civilians.[73]
[159][160][161]
The Eritrean government stated that it was angered by Amnesty International's report
on the massacre, calling it "transparently unprofessional" and "politically motivated" and
accusing Amnesty of fabricating evidence.[162] However, refugees also spoke of the EDF killing
80–150 people in Idaga Hamus on 30 November, as part of a larger series of extrajudicial
killings known as the Adigrat massacres.[163]

A witness told Al Jazeera that, on 4 December, Eritrean troops entered her town in southeastern
Tigray and attempted to rape her; this statement is corroborated by other survivors and witnesses,
who spoke of rampant sexual violence, massacres and destruction of civilian infrastructure
committed by the EDF.[164]

In February 2021, the UN chief coordinator of humanitarian efforts Mark Lowcock said that up
to 40% of Tigray was not controlled by Ethiopian troops. Aside from Tigrayan rebel forces, he
said that much of that area was under the control of the EDF, pursuing their own objectives
independent of Ethiopian command.[165] By early March, residents said that the number of
Eritrean soldiers in Tigray was in the thousands.[164]
The Tigray insurgency, 28 November 2020 – 18 June 2021
Continued insurgency

By mid-December, fighting had reached Hagere Selam, Samre, Dogu’a, Kolla Tembien, May
Tsemre and localities around Maychew.[166] During this time, a violently enforced curfew was set
up by Ethiopian forces along with Eritrean soldiers.[166] According to the Europe External
Programme with Africa (EEPA), in Wukro over 200 people were killed and the town was left
deserted. The Ethiopian government denied involvement in the killing.[166]

On 9 January 2021, Ethiopian TV reported that 300 refugees in Hitsats camp were executed by
the TPLF.[79] According to refugees, pro-TPLF forces used Hitsats as a base for several weeks in
November 2020, killing several refugees who wanted to leave the camp to get food and, in one
incident, killed nine young Eritrean men in revenge for having lost a battle against the EDF. [167]
On 18 February, unidentified militiamen ambushed a passenger bus in Adi Mesino, killing six
and injuring 10.[168]

Ultimately, the early gains made by the ENDF and EDF against Tigrayan forces did not lead to a
decisive defeat of the re-organized and invigorated TDF.[169] In late January, the TDF had rallied
and were intensifying their insurgency against Ethiopian forces despite the initial setbacks and
heavy losses.[156] During this time fighting was reported to have taken place around Mekelle, and
the ENDF had retreated from rural positions towards the city.[170] Several of these clashes took
place in mid-February at Samre, a small town 45 km (28 mi) south-west of Mekelle. Thousands
of Ethiopian troops supported by artillery, tanks, and airstrikes fought dug-in forces loyal to the
Tigray regional government.[156]

According to a report by Ghent University, massacres of civilians continued into March,

including around 250 in Humera over the course of three days by unconfirmed perpetrators, and
13 in Grizana by the EDF.[171] That same month, an undated video surfaced that purported to
show Ethiopian troops executing 11 unarmed men before throwing their bodies off a cliff near
Mahibere Dego.[172]
Estimated territorial control on 23 April 2021

A Chinese built Type 89 AFV destroyed by fighting in Hawzen

TDF regains territory

Fighting intensified in early April;[156] by this point, the TDF was in control of the rural areas of
central and southern Tigray along with parts of eastern and south-eastern Tigray, while the
ENDF was in control of the main roads and urban areas. Amhara and Eritrean forces also
controlled parts of Tigray in the west and north, respectively. All sides wished to secure a
military victory, but they lacked the ability to do so in the near term, and so they began to
prepare for a prolonged conflict.[158] The Tigray Defense Forces were engaged in a war of
attrition with popular support from the people of Tigray, who were infuriated by war crimes
committed by Eritrean and Ethiopian soldiers and worried about a potential decrease in the
region's autonomy.[173][55] This resulted in the TDF growing in strength and the concept of
secession from Ethiopia gaining popularity in Tigray, a stance which was considered likely to
inflame Amhara-Tigray territorial disputes.[158]

On 6 May, Ethiopia's House of Peoples’ Representatives declared the TPLF as a terrorist

organization.[174] On 21 May, Ethiopia's military prosecutors convicted 3 soldiers of rape and
pressed charges against over 50 others suspected of killing civilians in Tigray or committing rape
and other forms of sexual violence.[175] The statement also confirmed reports of two massacres in
Tigray, stating that 229 civilians were killed in the town of Mai Kadra at the beginning of
November 2020, and accusing Eritrean forces of killing 110 civilians in Axum later that same
month.[175][176]

Tigrayan counter-offensive (June – November 2021)

Retaking of Mekelle
Main article: Operation Alula
Letay Girmay, 50, says she and other Hawzen residents buried the bodies of many civilians after
battles in their town.

On 22 June 2021, an Ethiopian military cargo plane was shot down over Samre, marking a turn
of the war in the TDF's favor.[177] On 28 June 2021, the Tigray Defense Forces retook the city of
Mekelle. People celebrated in the streets of Mekelle as the TDF took the city.[178][179] Ethiopian
soldiers, police and administrators were seen leaving, ahead of the occupation by the TDF.
Shortly after hearing news of the TDF advance, the Ethiopian government declared an immediate
unilateral ceasefire across the Tigray Region.[180] BBC News reporter Vivienne Nunis
characterised the ceasefire as an attempt by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to save face, the
government having little other option.[181]

On 29 June, Tigrayan forces vowed to continue their offensive and drive into Eritrea or the
Amhara Region if necessary, and said that Mekelle was 100% under the control of Tigrayan
forces.[182] On 30 June 2021, the TDF had entered the town of Shire, some 140 kilometres (87 mi)
northwest of Mekelle, after it had been abandoned by Eritrean troops. The International Crisis
Group claimed that the TDF now controlled most of the Tigray region.[181] The Ethiopian
government claimed, on 30 June, that it could re-enter Mekelle in less than three weeks if it
wanted to. In the same announcement, the Ethiopian government stated that all Eritrean forces
had withdrawn from the region, though this was not confirmed by the Eritrean government.[183]

Tigray push in Afar and Amhara

A map showing the TDF's Gondar-Bahir Dar offensive, 6 July – 20 August 2021.

On 6 July 2021, the Tigrayan government mobilised to retake western Tigray from Amhara
forces.[184] A TDF offensive starting on 12 July resulted in Tigrayan forces capturing southern
Tigray, including the towns of Alamata and Korem.[185] The TDF subsequently crossed the
Tekezé River and advanced westward, capturing the town of Mai Tsebri in the Tselemti district,
and prompting Amhara officials to call on its militias to arm themselves and mobilise. [186]
Following the TDF's rapid advances, Abiy threatened to resume war with Tigray and crush the
rebels, raising fears of genocide.[187] He called on other regions of Ethiopia to mobilise their
special forces. The Oromia, Sidama, and SNNPR regions answered the call and mobilised.[188]

From 17 to 19 July, the TDF began launching attacks in the Afar Region to its east, prompting
the Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Harari and Somali regions to join the war.[2] Heavy fighting
in western Afar displaced over 54,000 people, and resulted in the TDF reportedly capturing three
districts in the region.[189]

While the Tigray government claimed it only entered Afar to target federal forces, experts
believe their aim was to sever a portion of National Highway A1, a vital trade route for
landlocked Ethiopia, linking the capital of Addis Ababa to the Port of Djibouti, from which most
of its petroleum products are imported.[190][191] Following the TDF's counter-attack on two
districts of his region, the Amhara regional President, Agegnehu Teshager, called for the total
mobilisation of all people of all ages who are armed in the region to fight against the Tigrayans.
A similar call was made in Afar.[3] Meanwhile, the city of Weldiya was captured by the TDF on
12 August 2021.[192]

On 4 August 2021, some Agew people declared themselves independent from the Amhara
Region and formed the Agew Liberation Front (ALF).[193] The next day, Lalibela was reported to
have been seized by Tigrayan forces.[194][195] On 9 August, UNICEF executive director Henrietta
Fore expressed concern about reports that over 200 people, including 100 children, had been
killed in attacks on displaced families sheltering at a health facility and a school in the Afar
Region.[196] On 11 August, the TDF and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) announced an
alliance to overthrow Abiy Ahmed's government, saying they were also in talks with other rebel
groups to establish a "grand coalition."[197] With the TDF advancing deeper into Amhara, various
cities across the region began enforcing curfews.[198]

On 9 September 2021, the Ethiopian government claimed Tigrayan forces had been "routed" and
heavily defeated in the Afar Region. Tigrayan spokesperson Getachew Reda said its forces had
seen no fighting in Afar and had redeployed to the adjoining Amhara Region.[199] On 30
September, amid UN concerns about a blockade of aid deliveries to Tigray, the Ethiopian
government expelled 7 top UN officials, reportedly because of "meddling" in its internal affairs,
giving the officials 72 hours to leave the country.[200][201]

October 2021 government-allied offensive

Main article: 2021 Tigray offensive

On 8 October 2021, the TPLF said that an intensive air campaign by the Ethiopian Air Force
began against TDF positions in the North Wollo and North Gondar zones of the Amhara Region,
mostly around the towns of Wegeltena, Wurgessa and Haro.[202] He also stated there was a
"massive build up of forces on all fronts."[202] The federal government and Amhara regional
government did not respond to the claim.[202] On 11 October, Ethiopian-allied forces launched
coordinated ground attacks "on all fronts" against the TDF with combined arms including tanks,
helicopters, heavy artillery, warplanes, and drones according to the Tigrayan government.[203][204]
General Tsadkan Gebretensae, member of the central command of the TDF said both sides had
been preparing for the offensive for months, and predicted that battle would be "decisive."[157]
The new offensive effectively ended the unilateral ceasefire declared by the federal government
in June[205] and further deepened fears of the developing famine in Tigray, with a federal
government blockade still preventing most aid from arriving.[157] Meanwhile, the continued war
prompted regional leaders, including Kenyan President Kenyatta, to voice their concerns and
urge peace, while US Secretary of State Blinken met with the AU envoy to Ethiopia, former
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, to discuss the crisis.[157]

On 13 October, Getachew claimed fighting continued intensifying with "staggering" casualties.

He also claimed clashes were taking place near Weldiya and that fighting had resumed in Afar,
within the Awra and Chifra districts near the Amhara border.[206][207] A humanitarian worker
citing witnesses said the EDF were fighting the TDF in Berhale, a town in Afar 71 kilometres
(44 mi) northeast of Mekelle.[207]

TDF-OLA joint offensive (October – December 2021)

Main article: TDF–OLA joint offensive

Further information: OLA insurgency
Fall of Dessie and Kombolcha

On 30 October, it was reported that Dessie had fallen to the TDF. However, control over the city
was not immediately certain, with the federal government denying its capture and reports of
fierce fighting coming from the town.[208] On 31 October, the TDF claimed to have captured
Kombolcha, a town 21 km (13 mi) east of Dessie, and the Ethiopian government accused the
TDF of massacring over 100 youths in the town.[209] On the same day, the Amhara regional
government declared a state of emergency, which included a region-wide curfew.[210]

South of Kombolcha, the OLA claimed to have seized control over Kemise on the A2 Highway
which links Mekelle to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa,[63] and later declared they were
considering an offensive towards the capital.[64] The TDF claimed they also linked up with the
OLA.[211] Meanwhile, it was reported that a new roundup of ethnic Tigrayans had occurred in
Addis Ababa.[211]

A map showing the TDF-OLA's Addis Ababa offensive, 16 October – 1 December 2021.
State of emergency and rebel coalition
Further information: 2021–2022 Ethiopian state of emergency
On 2 November 2021, as the counter-offensive came deeper into federal-controlled territory, the
Ethiopian government declared a six-month state of emergency, which envisages the possibility
to arrest and detain critics of the government without a court warrant, impose curfews, institute
censorship, restrict freedom of movement as well as to call any adult person to fight in the war,
for fear of serving from three to ten years in prison.[212][213] Authorities in Addis Ababa also told
residents to register their weapons in order to fend off the anticipated offensive. Four other
regional governments also made a call to arms.[214][64] On 5 November, the TPLF, OLA and other
rebel groups declared the creation of a nine-group coalition, called the United Front of Ethiopian
Federalist and Confederalist Forces.[215]

On 22 November, Prime Minister Abiy stated that he will be leading the fight against the rebels
from the battlefront after the TDF claimed to have captured Shewa Robit,[216][217] saying; "We are
now in the final stages of saving Ethiopia."[218] Many countries also urged citizens to leave the
country.[218]

Government-allied counter-offensive (November 2021 – March 2022)

Main article: ENDF National Unity Offensive

From 26 November to 6 December 2021, Ethiopian allied forces recaptured several towns in the
Amhara and Afar regions including Lalibela and Shewa Robit, according to the Ethiopian
government.[219][220][221][222] On 6 December, government forces claimed to have recaptured the
strategic cities of Dessie and Kombolcha.[223] This was later confirmed by TPLF spokesman
Getachew Reda; however, he claimed this was a strategic withdrawal, which was "part of their
plan."[224] On 12 December, Reuters reported that forces loyal to the TPLF had recaptured the
town of Lalibela less than two weeks after government forces and their allies had recaptured
control of the town for themselves.[225] Nevertheless, by the end of the month, the federal
government had successfully repelled the incursion towards Addis Ababa, and Tigrayan forces
were pushed back to Tigray.

Fighting slows down

On 20 December 2021, the TPLF announced they had withdrawn their troops from Amhara and
Afar, saying they were hoping to create, as stated by TPLF chairman Debretsion Gebremichael,
"a decisive opening for peace." Debretsion also requested the establishment of a no-fly zone over
Tigray, as well as a weapons embargo against Ethiopia and Eritrea.[226][227] Following these
developments, the ENDF stated that it would not advance any deeper into the Tigray region. [228]
However, in January 2022, the Ethiopian Air Force began launching a bombing campaign in the
Tigray Region, killing 108 people, including at least 56 from an airstrike targeting an IDP camp
in Dedebit.[229][230]

On 7 January – the same day as the Dedebit airstrike – Ethiopia released a number of opposition
leaders from prison, including some from the TPLF, and said they desired to have a dialogue
with the Tigrayan leadership.[231] On 26 January, the Ethiopian council of ministers also proposed
to end the state of emergency.[232]
Ceasefire period (March – August 2022)

Further information: Tigrayan peace process § Ceasefire period (March 2022–August 2022)

On 24 March 2022, the Ethiopian government declared an indefinite humanitarian truce, in order
to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid into Tigray.[66] During the ceasefire, both Ethiopia and
the TPLF agreed to have talks about an official end to the war. A number of outstanding issues –
in particular, the presence of pro-government troops in Tigray's Western Zone and restoring
access to basic public service to Tigray – were topics of discussion throughout.[233][234] Though
there were initial hopes of finding a peaceful solution to ending the war, the talks soon became
characterized by steadily increasing hostilities between the negotiation parties. [235] By August,
talks started to break down, with both the Ethiopian government and the TPLF accusing each
other of refusing to make peace.[236][237]

Resurgence of fighting (August – November 2022)

In late August 2022, after months of ceasefire, fighting resumed. Both sides blamed each other
for initiating the fighting, and both also expressed frustration "for a lack of progress towards
negotiations to end the 21-month conflict."[67] The fighting itself concentrated in the border area
connecting Tigray, Amhara and Afar. Allegations emerged that the Tigray were smuggling in
weapons, leading to the Ethiopian Air Force shooting down a plane, claiming it was carrying
weapons for the TPLF; meanwhile, the government was accused of indiscriminate air
bombardments on civilian targets.[238] Civilians reported that pro-government militias, such as
FANO, had gotten involved as well.[239] Exacerbating tensions were severe food shortages, an
issue that remained unsolved have particularly affected the Tigray region.[240][239][241]

Joint Eritrean–Ethiopian offensive

On 27 August, the TDF captured the town of Kobo, following the ENDF's withdrawal.[242]
Ethiopia and Eritrea subsequently announced an offensive in North Tigray on 1 September. [243]
On 13 September 2022, the TPLF said Eritrea had taken Sheraro.[244] The town's capture by
Eritrea and the fighting in nearby areas displaced around 210,000 people, most of whom fled to
the city of Shire.[245] A day later Ethiopian airstrikes on Mekelle killed at least ten people.[246] By
mid-September, reports emerged of Eritrea engaging in mass mobilization of the country's
reservists to be sent to Tigray.[247]

On 20 September, the government of Tigray said Eritrea had invaded the region, and that heavy
fighting was taking place across northern Tigray.[248][249][250] The TDF had, thus far, largely
resisted the offensive, and reportedly launched a counterattack to retake Sheraro. Meanwhile,
Ethiopian and Eritrean forces began massing in Abala and Berhale in the Afar Region, within
striking distance of Mekelle.[251] On September 27, an airstrike – allegedly carried out by Eritrea
– struck the northern town of Adi Dairo while it was celebrating Meskel, killing at least six
civilians and injured 19 more.[252] On 2 October, the TPLF announced it had withdrawn troops
from Amhara's North Wollo Zone, including Kobo, to be redeployed north to reinforce lines
under heavy Eritrean attack but warned it would return if their southern border is threatened. [253]
Three days later, a second airstrike hit Adi Dairo, killing between 50 and 65 people according to
aid workers in the town.[254]

Full-scale mobilization

On 10 October, the TPLF claimed that Eritrea was escalating its offensive, sending more forces
towards Rama, Tserona, and Zalambessa in the far north, with one aid worker saying it is the
heaviest fighting since hostilities resumed.[255] Later reports confirmed that Eritrea was
intensifying its efforts to mobilize more troops for the war; it detained "elderly mothers and
fathers," and sought draft-dodgers.[256] Tigray mobilized its citizens too, calling on every able-
bodied person to join the fight.[257] Amidst the three-front offensive launched by Ethiopia and
Eritrea, estimates put the number of Ethiopian casualties at over 90,000 in a single month, while
Tigrayan casualties were also deemed incredibly high.[258] According to peace and conflict
studies researcher Kjetil Tronvoll, it is likely that 100,000 people had been killed over the
preceding few weeks, and alleged that Eritrea and Ethiopia were using human wave attacks to
overwhelm Tigrayan defenses.[259]

On 17 October, Ethiopia said that it would seize every airport and other key infrastructure in the
region;[260] that same day, the strategic city of Shire was taken by Eritrea and Ethiopia, leading to
the evacuation of thousands of its inhabitants.[261][262] Ethiopian forces then took Alamata and
Korem in the south.[263] By 22 October, ENDF and EDF-allied forces had also captured Adwa
and Axum, even as peace talks with the TPLF were about to commence in South Africa.[264][265]
[266]
Witnesses from a number of towns told the Associated Press that Eritrean forces were
regularly killing civilians between 23 and 29 October.[267]

Second ceasefire (November 2022 – present)

Main article: Ethiopia–Tigray peace agreement

On 25 October 2022, AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki, announced that peace talks
involving the Ethiopian government and the TPLF had commenced in Pretoria, South Africa.[111]
[268]
Hopes that these talks could definitively stop the war, however, remained low, as fighting did
not appear to slow down, and Ethiopia vocalized their distrust about the peace process.[112][269]
Still, negotiations continued onward, and on 2 November, Ethiopia and the TPLF announced that
they had signed an agreement for a cessation of hostilities (made effective the next day on 3
November, marking the two-year anniversary of the war);[52] however, Eritrea and other warring
parties were not involved in the agreement, leaving their status ambiguous.[68] On 12 November,
both parties signed a deal to allow humanitarian aid into Tigray.[270] By 29 December, federal
police were reported to have returned to Tigray,[271] while flights and internet access had also
been restored.[272]

Despite important steps towards peace and deescalation being made between the government and
the TPLF, Amhara and Eritrean forces continued to launch attacks on Tigrayans throughout
November and December.[273][274][275] From 17 to 25 November alone, Eritrea was reported to have
destroyed 241 houses and killed at least 111 people.[276]
Spillover
Main article: Spillover of the Tigray War
Further information: 2020–2022 Ethiopian–Sudanese clashes

The intensity of the war has led to spillover effects on the surrounding countries in the region,
especially in Sudan.

By the end of November 2020, thousands of people were believed to have been killed in the
conflict and around 44,000 fled to Sudan. On 15 December 2020, four Sudanese soldiers were
killed, and 27 others were injured near the Ethiopia–Sudan border,[277] in what Sudan claimed to
be an ambush by Ethiopian forces and militias. A Sudanese soldier later claimed that Ethiopian
forces had launched artillery attacks on them and intruded into the Jebel al-Teyyour area, located
7 kilometres inside Sudan. Other soldiers claimed that the attackers were Amhara Region
militias. Ethiopia claimed the clashes were Ethiopia trying to stop a Sudanese militia which had
tried to cross into Ethiopian territory and seize farmlands. In response to the killings, Sudan
started to build up its military along the border with Ethiopia.[278][279][280]

International involvement
Further information: Eritrean involvement in the Tigray War

Since the war began, both regional and international powers have been actively involved in the
conflict. A number of reports have been made alleging that China, Iran, Turkey and the United
Arab Emirates were all providing military support for the Ethiopian government via the sale of
weaponized drones.[11][281][282][283][284] As early as December 2020, there were unconfirmed rumors
that Emirati drones were being stationed in the Eritrean port city of Assab.[285] The victory of
Ethiopian forces over Dessie and Kombolcha in December 2021 was partly due to the drones
supplied by Ethiopia's allies.[citation needed] In Debretsion Gebremichael’s order to withdraw all his
forces from Tigray borders in December 2021, he mentioned "the drones provided by foreign
powers" as a major factor that prompted his decision.[282]

Alleged Somali involvement

There have been multiple unconfirmed reports of Somali troops being sent from a secret training
base in Eritrea run by the National Intelligence and Security Agency to fight against the newly
formed TDF.[155] The first of these reports came in January 2021 from unverified social media
accounts.[163] The same month, Somalia's information minister, Osman Abukar Dubbe, confirmed
Somali soldiers were training in Eritrea, but denied any of these troops had been sent to Tigray.
According to the Voice of America, several sources with direct knowledge of the program,
including three Somali officials and a foreign diplomat, confirmed to them that Somali troops
have been training in neighbouring Eritrea.[163] In January 2022, The Globe and Mail reported
evidence of Somali troops were involved and they had committed atrocities in Tigray. The report
noted that before the war began, Somali forces under the leadership of the Eritrean Army had
been stationed in trenches along the border.[286]
A small group of parents also protested in Mogadishu about what they said was the government's
mismanagement of the issue. They demanded information on their loved ones who they say they
haven't seen in a year.[163][155] The head of Somalia's parliamentary committee on foreign affairs
asked the Somali president to investigate claims by family members that their sons had gone off
to fight in Ethiopia and are now missing.[287] On 19 January 2021, the Somali government denied
the claim that Somali troops had trained in Eritrea and then deployed in the Tigray Region of
Ethiopia.[288][289]

Former head of the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency, Abdilsalan Guld, [290]
claimed that Somali troops were sent to Tigray. Guld stated that the soldiers, aged from 20 to 30
years old, were secretly taken from Mogadishu and sent to Asmara for military training. Guld
stated that 370 of the Somali troops trained by Eritrea were killed in Tigray, and hundreds of
others were wounded.[291][289]

War crimes and human rights violations

Main articles: Casualties of the Tigray War and War crimes in the Tigray War

A mass grave of civilian victims in Hawzen, Tigray.[176][292]

All sides in the conflict have been accused of violating international human rights law, with
evidence of unlawful killings, torture and sexual violence being committed.[293][294][295][296] As of
late 2022, the combined impact of wartime violence, famine and a lack of medical access had
killed an estimated 385,000-600,000 people,[46] with other reported estimates reaching numbers
as high as 700,000-800,000 killed.[30]

Crimes against humanity and genocide

Main article: War crimes in the Tigray War § Crimes against humanity
See also: Predictions of a genocide in Ethiopia

Many sources have accused the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments of engaging in crimes
against humanity via ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans.[297][298][299] The Ethiopian and Eritrean
governments have also been accused of genocide.[300][301][302][303] According to the EU's special
envoy to Ethiopia, Pekka Haavisto, senior members of the Ethiopian government called for
"wip[ing] out" all Tigrayans for 100 years.[304][305][306] The Ethiopian Government denied the
allegations.[307]
On 4 June 2021, the non-profit Genocide Watch classified the events in Tigray as step 9 of
genocide (eradication), as well as step 10 (denial).[308] They issued another emergency alert on 20
November 2021, stating that "both sides are committing genocide," referring to detentions of
thousands of people based on Oromo or Tigrayan ethnic identity, and arguing that "Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed's hate speech and calls for war" together with attacks by the ENDF and
TPLF put Ethiopia into stages 4 (dehumanization), 6 (polarization), 8 (persecution), and 9
(extermination) of the ten stages of genocide.[309]

Ethnic profiling of Tigrayans

Main article: Ethnic discrimination in Ethiopia § Tigray War

Ethnic profiling against Tigrayans occurred during the Tigray War, with Ethiopians of Tigrayan
ethnicity being put on indefinite leave from Ethiopian Airlines or refused permission to board,[310]
prevented from overseas travel,[311] and an "order of identifying ethnic Tigrayans from all
government agencies and NGOs" being used by federal police to request a list of ethnic
Tigrayans from an office of the World Food Programme.[312] Tigrayans' houses were arbitrarily
searched and Tigrayans' bank accounts suspended.[311] During the conflict, many Tigrayans were
profiled both professionally and socially, with many fired or called names when out in public as
a result of the conflict, such as Tigrayan military members having their weapons confiscated or
dismissed from duty.[313] A hotspot for this form of profiling took place in Addis Ababa,
including disappearances of major Ethiopian officials and arrests of Tigrayans on the grounds
that they supported the TPLF, which was designated as a terrorist organisation in May 2021 by
Ethiopian parliament.[314]

Ethnic Tigrayan members of Ethiopian components of United Nations peacekeeping missions

were disarmed and some forcibly flown back to Ethiopia, at the risk of torture or execution,
according to United Nations officials. The State of Emergency Taskforce stated that the Tigrayan
peacekeepers were returned to Ethiopia because of "infiltration of TPLF elements in various
entities."[315][316] On 1 November 2021, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stated that "we should
closely follow those who work for the enemy and live amongst us," as reports of a new roundup
of ethnic Tigrayans came out of Addis Ababa.[211]

Sexual violence

Main article: Sexual violence in the Tigray War

See also: Hawzen in the Tigray War

Wartime rape and sexual violence was also widespread, being perpetrated by virtually all sides.
[317]
There were "deeply distressing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, extrajudicial
killings, [and the] widespread destruction and looting of public and private property by all
parties" according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. More than 136 cases of
rape were reported in hospitals in Mekelle, Ayder, Adigrat and Wukro in eastern Tigray between
December 2020 and January 2021, with indications that there are many more such unreported
cases.[318] As of August 2021, there were 512 to 514 rape victims registered with Ethiopian
hospitals;[319][320] however, the real number is probably much larger than that and can be as large
as 120,000 by some estimations,[321] and many sources believe the sexual violence in Tigray was
intentionally committed with the purpose of destroying the morale of the enemy, to genocide and
genetically cleanse certain populations, and to spread STIs as a form of biological warfare.[322][317]
[320][323]

Often, soldiers, and militias subjected Tigrayan women and girls, including pregnant women and
young girls, to rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, sexual mutilation, and other forms of sexual
torture.[324][325] Such sexual violence is often accompanied with other forms of physical and
mental abuse, including burning their victims with hot iron or cigarettes, forcing metal rods or
nails into their victim's genitals,[325][317] raping their victim in front of their family members,
forcing their victims to rape their family members, calling their victims by derogatory words and
ethnic slurs, etc.[326][325] There were also reports that Tigrayan forces had gang-raped dozens of
women and underage girls in at least two towns in the Amhara Region,[327] and girls – some as
young as 14 – were identified as victims of rape in the towns of Chenna and Kobo in August and
September 2021.[328][329][330]

After being subjected to sexual violence, many women become infected with STIs like HIV, who
face difficulty getting treatment due to a sense of shame, as well as the collapse of medical
infrastructure caused by the war.[324]

Attacks on humanitarian workers

There have been several reported attacks on humanitarian workers, including attacks by
Ethiopian government soldiers.[331][332][333][334] The Danish Refugee Council and the International
Rescue Committee reported killings of their staff in early December 2020.[334] Although the
Ethiopian federal government claimed to have given "full and unhindered access for
humanitarian actors to operate in all parts of the region," many humanitarian agencies reported
having been repulsed at army checkpoints and blocked from entry to various regions. There were
accusations by US officials that armed forces were specifically singling out humanitarian
workers for an attack.[335]

On 23 March 2021, a driver from Médecins Sans Frontières was beaten by Ethiopian soldiers
after witnessing extrajudicial killings by Ethiopian government soldiers.[331] Following the 23
June bombing of Togoga, there were reports of Ethiopian government soldiers firing on
ambulances to prevent them from reaching the injured.[336] On 25 June 2021, three Médecins Sans
Frontières workers were found murdered near their car in Tigray.[337][338]

Investigations

This section needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or
newly available information. (October 2022)

Investigations into the war crimes include the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) joint
investigation,[339] and the ACHPR Tigray investigation by the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR).[340][341]
Humanitarian crisis
Humanitarian aid

Main article: Famine in northern Ethiopia (2020–present)

The percentage of people in need reached with food aid as at 31 May 2021. White=0% shading
to Black at 100%

Restricted humanitarian access due to the ongoing conflict (March 2021)

According to the United Nations (UN), some 2.3 million children have been cut off from
desperately needed aid and humanitarian assistance. Since the start of the conflict, the Ethiopian
federal government has strictly controlled access to the Tigray Region, and the UN has said it is
frustrated that talks with the Ethiopian government had not yet secured adequate humanitarian
access for "food, including ready-to-use therapeutic food for the treatment of child malnutrition,
medicines, water, fuel, and other essentials that are running low" said UNICEF.[342][343][344][345][346]
By 13 March 2021, the UN and its partners reached about 0.9 million people with complete food
baskets, and 0.7 million people with clean water. Despite the progress made, many are still hard
to reach due to ongoing fighting. About 4.5 million people of are still in need of aid and about 1
million of that are not in accessible areas due to ongoing fighting.[347]

There has been limited access to clean water due to hygiene and sanitation services largely being
disrupted across Tigray. The Tigray Regional Water Bureau reported that out of 36 villages it
assessed, only 4 had partially functioning water sources. Along with that, an estimated 250
motorized water pumping systems have been out of order, and the status of 11,000 hand pumps
in rural areas was unknown. Because of this, there has been a heightened risk of outbreaks of
water-borne diseases and COVID-19.[347]
In February 2021, GOAL Ethiopia, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), MCMDO, MSF-
Spain, and World Vision, found that nearly one in seven children in 16 woredas and town
administrations across Tigray were acutely malnourished. While in Enderta, Abi Adi and Shire,
GOAL and IRC reported that 16.6% of children screened had acute malnutrition with 3.5%
suffering from severe acute malnutrition.[347]

According to the UN, in March 2021, out of more than 260 health centres in Tigray before the
war, only 31 were fully functional, while 7 were partially functional. According to the World
Health Organization (WHO), all of the functioning hospitals and health centres in Tigray had a
lack of medical supplies, drugs, and equipment. UN partners reported continued looting of health
facilities. Only 16% of the health facilities had vaccination services and only 17% had maternal
services (antenatal care, birth delivery, etc.).[347]

On 31 August 2021, USAID's mission director in Ethiopia, Sean Jones said: "We do have proof
that several of our warehouses have been looted and completely emptied in the areas, particularly
in Amhara, where TPLF soldiers have gone into, I do believe that the TPLF has been very
opportunistic," in a televised interview with state broadcaster EBC in Addis Ababa.[348][349] All
parties to the conflict have been accused by USAID of looting aid shipments.[348]

By the summer of 2022, the government blockade of essential services to Tigray was still in
place, and the humanitarian situation remained severe, with roughly 13 million people being in
need of food aid.[350] According to the World Food Programme, while international aid had
technically been allowed into the region during the 2022 ceasefire, in practice, very little aid was
reaching the people that needed it most, largely due to fuel not being made available in these
area.[351][240] On 25 August (one day after the war resumed), the WFP accused the TPLF of
stealing 570,000 liters of fuel meant to transport humanitarian aid.[352][353]

In late October 2022, it was revealed that the Tigray Region was running out of medical supplies,
with the CEO of their largest hospital saying it was "doomed to collapse soon."[354][355] WHO
officials stated that childhood vaccination rates had plummeted from 90% (before the war) to
under 10%.[356] On 29 October, UNICEF reported that around 29.7 million people in Ethiopia
were in need of humanitarian assistance.[43]

Internal and forced displacement

See also: Shire in the Tigray War and Hamdayet Border Reception Centre
Family in a crowded IDP camp in Shire, Tigray.[357]

In December 2020, the UN estimated more than one million people had been internally displaced
by the fighting.[358] More than 50,000 people have fled to Sudan due to the conflict.[359][311]
Communications and travel links were still blocked, and Human Rights Watch warned that
"actions that deliberately impede relief supplies" would violate international humanitarian law.
[358]
Possible COVID-19 outbreaks were feared as refugees fleeing the Tigray conflict sheltered in
crowded camps.[360] By March 2021, Shire had become a major centre for internally displaced
people and humanitarian aid distribution.[361]
In September 2021, the humanitarian situation continued to worsen in Tigray, Afar and Amhara
Regions, due both to the armed conflict itself and due to bureaucratic obstruction. Two thousand
displaced people returned to the Fantí Rasu zone in Afar Region after the ENDF and Afar
Special Forces regained control and OCHA partner organisations' access to improved.[362]

UNICEF stated that by the end of September 2022, around 574,000 more people in Afar,
Amhara and Tigray were left displaced after fighting resumed in August 2022; they also reported
that over 870,000 had become refugees.[43][363]

Western Zone of Tigray

Internal migration due to the Tigray War; red is a decrease in population while green is an
increase

In November 2020, the Amhara Region Special Force[364] and Amhara militias loyal to the
Amhara regional government[55] took control of the western zone of Tigray in order to settle a
decades-old land dispute. They claim the area was taken from them by force in 1992 after TPLF
forces overthrew the communist PDRE government and divided the country into ethnic regional
states. They have also claimed the woredas (districts) of Welkait, Tegede, Kafta Humera,
Tselemti, and Raya to be theirs.[365]

Since then, the area has been under the de facto control of Amhara regional authorities. Their
control has been marked by reports of ethnically motivated violence and forced displacement. By
February 2021, about 45,000 civilians had been forced to leave the zone due to extrajudicial
killings, arbitrary detentions, and the disappearances of people, especially young men.[364] One
refugee interviewed by Reuters said that if they didn't leave when they did, they would have been
killed by Amhara forces. 41 other refugees interviewed have also described attacks, looting, and
threats by Amhara forces.[366]

In March 2021, Mulu Nega, then leader of the federal-government-appointed Transitional

Government of Tigray, stated that Amhara de facto administrators of Western Tigray used
violence against ethnic Tigrayans and forcibly displaced them. Yabsira Eshetie, the administrator
of the area, denied the claims. The Amhara government also denied the reports of forced
displacement and asked the Ethiopian government to modify the border between the Amhara and
Tigray regions. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that there had been acts of ethnic
cleansing in Tigray.[366]

Eritrean refugees

Further information: Refoulement of Eritrean refugees

In November 2020, the UN warned of "very critical" supply shortages for the nearly 100,000
Eritrean refugees who, prior to the war, were registered in four camps in Tigray region.[358][367]
Later that same month, the UN reported that people in Tigray were fleeing Mekelle. The federal
government had warned of "no mercy" if Tigray forces and residents remained intermingled.[358]
[368]
As of 2 February 2021, 20,000 of the Eritrean refugees in Tigray, mostly from the Hitsats
and Shimelba camps, remained unaccounted for, according to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.[369]

Internet and media

Role of online social networks

Main article: Mass media in Ethiopia

Claire Wilmot, writing in The Washington Post, found that a significant number of new, single-
issue Twitter accounts were opened in the immediate aftermath of the Northern Command
attacks. Most appeared to be authentic accounts from people seeking to raise international
awareness of the conflict in the midst of a communications blackout in Tigray.[370] The Ethiopian
government cited disinformation and hate speech to justify communications blackouts.
Researchers suggested that reducing access to information could help to create contexts where
misinformation can thrive because it reduces the ability to verify information. [370][371] In late July
2021, a report emerged that there was coordination in social media messaging and media
reportage of the conflict in Ethiopia, to an extent it mirrored an earlier Syrian hybrid information
campaign designated as Project Basma.[372]

The Ethiopian government tried to control the information environment by positioning itself as
the sole provider of reliable information.[371] In February, pro-government groups called on their
supporters in Ethiopia and the diaspora to combat what they called "TPLF fake news" online. [373]
Pro-government groups used tactics similar to those of pro-Tigray groups to push their narrative
of the conflict, though as of 5 February, pro-government campaigns had produced fewer Tweets
overall.[371] Both Agence France-Presse and BBC News have documented examples of old or
manipulated photos, which misleadingly endorsed either the federal Ethiopian government or the
TPLF.[374][375]

Researchers found that groups use tactics such as "copy and paste" campaigns hosted on
websites, which include instructions for opening new accounts, copying and pasting pre-written
tweets, and tagging influencers. Both campaigns produced disinformation and misinformation,
though the majority of content produced was activist in nature.[371] Wilmot suggested that the
lines between authentic political activity and deliberate manipulation of online content during the
conflict were increasingly blurred.[370]

Facebook

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (October 2022)

Facebook has been heavily criticized for its perceived role in fuelling ethnic tensions during the
war, and has faced accusations that, in choosing not to crack down on hate speech being spread
by Ethiopian users, it is complicit in cases of ethnic cleansing in the country.[376][377][378][379][380]

Restriction of media coverage

Further information: Democratic backsliding in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian government had engaged in repeated crackdowns on media coverage throughout
the war.[381] In November 2021 (during the 2021–2022 state of emergency), the Ethiopian Media
Authority (EMA) threatened to cancel the media licences of BBC News, Reuters, CNN and
Associated Press, accusing the news organisations of having "consistently disseminated news
that sowed seeds of animosity among people and compromised the sovereignty of the country."
The EMA cited "reporting the Law enforcement operation as a genocidal campaign" as an
example of misleading information aiming to "undermin[e] the [federal] government's efforts to
address the humanitarian crisis in the Tigray region."[382]

On 20 May 2022, Ethiopian law enforcement began arresting journalists en masse, with 4,500
people in the Amhara Region alone being taken into custody. One Amhara law enforcement
official described this as a way to maintain "law and order" and "get rid of outside enemies."[383]

The media restrictions resulted in what has been described as an "information blackout."[384]
Many journalists, both local and international, have noted the difficulty they face in trying to
report on the war, as they risk the possibility of getting either killed or imprisoned by
government forces.[385][386] By December 2021, the Committee to Protect Journalists described
both Ethiopia and Eritrea as the worst "jailers of journalists" in sub-Saharan Africa.[387]

Peace process
Main article: Tigrayan peace process

Several proposals for peace negotiations and mediation were made involving some of the main
groups involved in the war. Of these, this includes: an emergency Intergovernmental Authority
on Development summit in December 2020;[388] a joint statement by the National Congress of
Great Tigray, the Tigray Independence Party, and Salsay Weyane Tigray describing their eight
pre-conditions for peace in February 2021;[389] a mediation group called "A3+1," (consisting of
three African countries, Kenya, Niger and Tunisia, and one non-African country, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines) in July–August 2021;[390] and a March–August 2022 ceasefire wherein
Ethiopian and Tigrayan officials attempted to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict. [235]

Although, the war had not yet fully concluded, on 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian government
and Tigrayan leaders signed a peace accord, with the African Union as a mediator, and agreed on
"orderly, smooth and coordinated disarmament".[391][392] The agreement was made effective the
next day on 3 November, marking the two-year anniversary of the war.[52]

As part of this process, Prime minister Abiy Ahmed appointed TPLF's Getachew Reda as head
of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray and the Ethiopian parlament removed the
TPLF from it's terrorism list.[393]

Reactions
Main article: Reactions to the Tigray War

The Tigray War has been the subject of numerous reactions and protests worldwide.

See also

 Africa portal

 War portal

 2020 in Eritrea
 2020 in Ethiopia
 Eritrean–Ethiopian War
o Eritrean–Ethiopian border conflict
 Ethiopian civil conflict (2018–present)
 Ethiopian Civil War (1974–1991)
 List of civil wars

Notes
1.

 Some articles state that the war began on 4 November;[47] however, the earliest instances of
fighting are reported to have taken place during the very late hours of 3 November, EAT
(UTC+03:00).[48][49][50]
  Tigrinya: ኲናት ትግራይ, romanized: Quinat Tĭgray; Amharic: ትግራይ ጦርነት, romanized: Tigrāy
t’Orinet; Afar: Tigray Qeebi.

3.  A few EEPA articles begin with the following injunction: "Unconfirmed report".

 Lashitew, Addisu (8 November 2019). "Ethiopia Will Explode if It Doesn't Move Beyond
Ethnic-Based Politics". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 4 October 2020.
Retrieved 22 November 2020.
 Gilbert, David (14 September 2020). "Hate Speech on Facebook Is Pushing Ethiopia
Dangerously Close to a Genocide". Vice. Archived from the original on 14 October 2020.
Retrieved 22 November 2020.

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