Dynamics of Diversity,

Challenges of Conflict:
Mindanao’s Multiple
Realities and Multi-sectoral
Responses
Prepared by:
Rufa Cagoco-Guiam
Director, Campus Institute for Peace and Development in
Mindanao (C-IPDM)
Mindanao State University – General Santos City, Philippines
Asian Public Intellectual (API) Senior Fellow, Year 8
(2008-2009)
Land Area : 10,199,886 hectares
Political Subdivisions:
27 cities
25 provinces
6 regions
404 municipalities Caraga
10,206 barangays

Northern Mda

Zamboanga Peninsula

Davao Region

SOCCSKSARGEN
 P opulati on
• 2005 Mda Population: 20.23 M
24.1 % of Phil. population
estimated at 84.2 million
2.44
CARAGA* • Female: 50.01%

3.99 • Davao Region: largest population

Region 10 with 4.09 million

3.17 4.09 • CARAGA: Region with lowest

Region 9 2.72 Region 11 population, 2.44 million people

ARMM
Source: National Statistics Office , 2005
3.88 data
Region 12

*Created into a region under RA No. 7901, dated

23 Feb. 1995, and taken from Regions 10 and 11.
 D i ver se P eopl es and Cultur es
Indigenous Peoples
(10-15% of Mda population) Bangsa Moro –
Islamized
-15-20%
1. Subanon
1. Banwaon 1. Iranun
2. Mandaya/Mansaka
2. Tagakaolo 2. Tausug
3. Manobo
3. Dibabawon 3. Maguindanao
4. B’laan
4. Talaandig 4. Maranao
5. T’boli
5. Ubo 5. Yakan
6. Higaonon
6. Manguangan 6. Kalibugan
7. Tiruray
7. Mamanwa 7. Sanguil
8. Bagobo
8. Kalagan 8. Sama
9. Bukidnon
9. Ata 9. Badjao*
10. Jama Mapun
11. Molbog*
12. Kalagan*
13. Palawani*
* Partly Muslim & partly non-Muslim
1. H i gh P over ty I nci dence
Region Annual Per Capita Poverty Incidence
Poverty Threshold of Families (in %)
(in pesos)

2003 2006 2003 2006

Philippines 12,267 15,057 24.7 26.9

Region IX 10,414 13,219 44.1 40.2
Region X 11,609 14,199 37.9 36.1
Region XI 11,276 14,942 28.1 30.6
Region XII 11,303 14,225 32.0 33.8
CARAGA 12,000 15,249 47.3 45.5
ARMM 12,739 15,533 45.7 55.3

Source: National Statistical Coordination Board website as of 19 July 2005, 2006

M agni tude of P over ty
• 2000: Mindanao contributed 32% to the nation’s poor
• 2003: Mindanao contributed 35.5% to the nation’s poor
•2006: Mindanao contributed 40.25% to the nation’s poor

M ost poor pr ovi nces i n the P hi li ppi nes, 2006

• Basilan – 26.9%
•Lanao del Sur – 28.9% “severe deprivation of basic human needs,
including food, safe drinking water, sanitation
•Sarangani – 44.8% facilities, health, shelter, education and
•Sulu – 33.3% information. It depends not only on income but
•Maguindanao – 33.4% also on access to social services."
•Tawi-tawi – 42.4% - Copenhagen Declaration
 25%

ESTRADA ARROYO
20%
Mda: 22.7%

NCR: 20.7%
15%
Bal. Luzon: 18.3%

Visayas: 15.3%
10%

5%

0%
* 1998 * 1999 * 2000 * 2001 * 2002 * 2003 * 2004 * 2005 * 2006 * 2007

SW S Sur veys on H unger

Note: Don’t Know and Refused responses are not shown.
Q: Nitong nakaraang 3 buwan, nangyari po ba kahit minsan na ang inyong pamilya ay nakaranas
ng gutom at wala kayong makain? KUNG OO: Nangyari po ba ‘yan ng MINSAN LAMANG, MGA
ILANG BESES, MADALAS, o PALAGI?
 Mindanao has among the
lowest life expectancy in 2006
Provinces in Mindanao Years
Agusan del Norte 63.6
Lanao del Sur 58.7
Maguindanao 57.6
Sulu 55.5
Tawi-tawi 53.4
Life expectancy is an estimate of the average
number of additional years a person can expect
to live, based on the age-specific death rates for
a given year
 Challenges of Conflict
• Inter-and intra-ethnic conflict (e.g. Rido)
• Weak and/or absent governance mechanisms
• Uncontrolled logging/threatened loss of biodiversity
• Slow implementation of agrarian reform program, VOS
schemes in Maguindanao
• Conflicting laws and overlapping claims on ancestral domain
• Displacement of indigenous people’s from their ancestral
domain and loss of cultural heritage
• Social Issues e.g. increased exportation of human labor
• Human right violations: killings of farmer-activists, journalists,
political leaders
– Most notorious: Massacre of 58 people in Ampatuan town, Maguindanao
• Loose firearms: at least 500,000 in Cotabato City and
Maguindanao, conservative estimate
• Narco-politics: intoxicating and deadly cocktail mix
• Children involved in armed conflict/child soldiers
• Increasing malnutrition among young children, even in
urbanized areas like Gensan
• Increasing number of children and youth becoming victims of
rape or sexual molestation (Gensan – Sarangani areas)
 Historical Overview
• Age of the Sultanates – Maguindanaw and Sulu and the
Pat-a-Pangampong a Ranao (four principalities of
Lanao) – quasi-nation states with political and economic
systems
• Spanish colonial period – middle of 16th century up to
1898, spanning 3 centuries
• American colonial government – more than 4 decades,
from Dec. 1898 to July 4, 1946 (grant of independence)
• Philippine Commonwealth government (embedded within
American colonial government; preparation for self-rule
• Philippine Republic – 1946 to the present
 Conflict dynamics: the roots of conflict and
evolution of strained Muslim-Christian relations

• Spanish colonial policies: evangelization of indigenous

population; but failed in Bangsamoro dominated regions in
Mindanao
• Spanish use of naval blockades of long distance trade routes
– economic base of the sultanates
• Failure of Spain to include many parts of Mindanao among
its subjugated regions in the Philippines, but succeeded in
planting the seeds of prejudice of Christianized “Indios” vs.
Moro/Muslims. Indios drafted to pacify Moros. “Moros as
infidels/infieles”
• Americans used education as main tool of conquest
• “Defiant” and “compliant” sultans; the latter benefited from
American scholarships
• Americans perpetuated stereotypes of Moros: “A good Moro
is a dead Moro.” “Savage-looking Moros”; Christian Filipino
soldiers (constabularies) fought against defiant Moro
sultans
 The roots of conflict, continued…

• American colonial land laws and policies- Public Land Acts prejudicial to
Bangsamoro customary law (adat) on land stewardship (not absolute
ownership)
• Establishment of homesteads and agricultural colonies from 1913
– Migrants were entitled to double the entitlement of natives, i.e. 16 hectares for
migrants and only 8 for natives (Rodil, 1998)
– Government-sponsored migration was “smokescreen” to defuse growing
peasant unrest in Luzon and the Visayas
– Many migrants were among “undesirables” of Luzon and the Visayas

• Migrants later controlled much of Mindanao’s fertile agricultural lands (i.e.

Cotabato River Valley area, known as the rice granary of Central
Mindanao); and also wielded political control in many provinces
• Tensions and animosities soon developed as migrant communities
increased in number and later on caused irreversible changes in
Mindanao’s demographic profile.
• Native and Muslim communities continued to lag behind in economic
terms; Moro leaders only controlled a fraction of the areas of influence of
the old sultanates
 Roots of conflict…

• Philippine central government’s exclusivist policies – relegated the

Bangsamoro to the periphery
– Education: largely Christian-oriented, in curriculum, mechanics,
schedule of classes; Mindanao history is largely excluded in many
history classes in most parts of the country
– Jurisprudence: Code of Muslim Personal Law (CMPL) or Philippine
“version” of the Shari’ah was included as part of Philippine
jurisprudence only after 1971
– Cultures of the 13 ethno-linguistic groups of Islamized Mindanao
populations/Bangsamoro are only recently recognized and
acknowledged; but still not part of “mainstream” Filipino culture
– Majority Filipinos’ perceptions of what it is to be Filipino excludes
characteristics of Muslims (“maka-Diyos” concept is based on being
Christian)
– Philippine literary tradition, esp. folk and oral literature, is steeped in
anti-Muslim themes and stereotypes
 Contemporary history of the conflict
• Jabidah Massacre
• Armed struggle as the only way to assert the
Bangsamoro right to self-determination and redress of
Moro grievances against national, predominantly
Christian-led government
• Organization of the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) in 1968-69; training of Batch 90 in western
Malaysia. Founding chair: Nur Misuari
• Series of isolated uprisings that spread in scope and
size by early 1970s.
The Mindanao Peace Processes – Pre and
Post Tripoli –Phase 1
• Martial Law regime under Ferdinand Marcos and Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC) intervention
• Tripoli Agreement, 1976
• Presidential Decree 1628, declaring autonomy in Regions IV-A
(Palawan), IX, (Zamboanga) and XII (Cotabato) (Minsupala
regions), 1977
• Presidential Decree 1618- Sangguniang Pampook, Lupong
Tagapaganap ng Pook (LTP) in Regions IX and XII – 1979
• Ouster of Marcos, 1986
• Jeddah Accord, Jan 3-4, 1987 – GRP and MNLF with
Quadripartite Ministerial commission and OIC Secretary General
• Signing of Organic Act for the ARMM – Republic Act 6734, Aug. 1,
1989
• Statement of understanding, bet. GRP and MNLF, first round of
GRP-MNLF exploratory talks in Tripoli, 4 October 1992
• 2nd round of talks and signing of Statement of Understanding,
Cipanas, Indonesia, 16 April, 1993
Updates on the MILF – GPH Peace Talks
- P-Noy government’s new panel and MILF newly
reorganized panel still have to resolve issue on facilitator
- Might resume 8 or 9 February (did not push through)
- Dissenting views: Philconsa (constitution experts)
propose MILF negotiates through the ARMM
- Issues related to Final Peace Agreement with MNLF
(signed in 1996) still need resolution; tripartite review of
1996 Peace Agreement within February
- No war; no peace
- International involvement: International Monitoring Team
(includes a non-military member from JICA); International
Contact Group (ICG) – The Asia Foundation,
Conciliation Resources (London),
Updates on the November 23, 2009
Massacre Case
- Relatives of victims still waiting for trial
proceedings to start
- Moves to plead for bail for two principal
suspects: Gov. Andal Ampatuan, Sr.; and
ARMM Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan (from one
informant: pay-off of PhP 200 million to be
allowed bail.)(around US $ 5 million)
- National Union of Journalists in the
Philippines (NUJP) spearheading efforts to
counter defendants’ to plead for bail
Current security challenges
- sporadic violence: killings, bombings, kidnapping in
broad daylight
- jailbreak of 15 inmates from Cotabato City jail
- “narco-politics” – some Ampatuan clan members
allegedly involved
- drug addiction: some leaders within MILF, in 2006,
estimates 500,000 addicts in the ARMM; largely
“promoted” by local “narco-political lords and ladies”
- loose firearms: in Cotabato City alone, police
estimates around 50,000 loose firearms, as of mid 2010
(conservative estimate)
- increasing number of car and motorcycle thefts and
killings attributed to Ampatuan followers
Most recent security challenge and possible
block to the current MILF-GPH peace
talks:

clashes in Al-barka, Basilan just two days

ago that resulted to the deaths of 25
soldiers? (conflicting claims of only 12 by
the Philippine military)
allegedly perpetrated by rogue elements
of MILF with tactical support from Abu
Sayyaf group
• Government stance:
– To continue with peace talks despite the
current clashes
– Dean Marvic Leonen: “the peace talks will
continue, the clash in Basilan was just an
isolated incident...”
– MILF proposal for a sub-state still
unacceptable for the GPH peace panel and
instead they have rejected the “rejection of
the MILF panel on the GPH proposal...”
Civil society initiatives/responses
- Consortium of Bangsamoro civil society groups
- Peace building among grassroots communities – through Barangay
Justice Advocates, Bangsamoro women
- Peace education in colleges and universities and among military
officers, i.e. Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute
- Proliferation of civil society groups to take “advantage” of ARMM as
favorite donor destination
- CSO groups sit as observers in the Track 1 Peace Process – peace
negotiations between MILF and GPH
- “Bantay Ceasefire” (Ceasefire Watch); Agong Network, Peace
Weavers
- Increasing membership of e-groups focused on discourses on
Mindanao peace process
- Peace through Technology project (Peace Tech)
- More media groups getting involved in trainings for peace reporting
or “peace-oriented”
Analysis – quo vadis, ARMM?
- Failures and tragedies in ARMM are reflections of the Philippines as a
“failing state”
- “bossism,” “patrinomialism” beyond ordinary patron-client benevolent
relationships between ARMM political warlords and national leaders
(GMArroyo)
- Collusion and collision (Lara, 2009) of malevolent political forces condoned
by the state and even by religious leaders
- Political Islam – still a “contentious” entity; ulama’s blind eye toward
corruption, massacre, and other anomalies associated with some “Muslim”
political clans
- Reforms still have not transformed institutions toward the welfare of
constituents
- The role of women in reforms still remain untapped, unrecognized; gender
discourses limited to participation of women in local governance as nominal
leaders
- Claim of Bangsamoro self-determination under challenge: if Moro clans try
to outfight each other and victimize other groups in the process, why should
they be given this right and exist as a separate entity or polity?
- CSOs have largely acted as service providers to donor assisted projects
instead of initiating social movements toward reforms
Conclusions
- The conflict areas in Mindanao are in the crossroads – no war no peace
could mean a volatile situation waiting for a wick to be lighted...
- Justice for the November 23, 2009 massacre victims needs to be
implemented, not only felt as a palpable gesture from the national
government.
- No fast and easy solutions to the deepening pit of poverty, insecurity,
powerlessness among ordinary people in the region.
- Definitely, the military solution does not hold any promise, as it has in the
past.
- Yet, the political solution (through government reforms, starting with the
national government) may not pave the way for basic changes. addressing
warlordism, narco-politics, greed for power still poses formidable challenge.
- The forthcoming resumption of the peace talks is welcome. But both panels
should frame their discussions not only on addressing past injustices but
also present-day problems of warlordism, narco-politics, loose firearms,
rising criminality, etc.
- Civil society groups need to be engaged and involved in continuing vigilance
over abuses of authority. But they themselves have to redirect efforts
toward social movement types of initiatives, and must prove to be beyond
reproach...
 THANK YOU!
Sapulu salamat!
Sukhran!