FOREIGN POLICY OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Pattern and process of USFP: Goals of American foreign policy in historical

perspective
“America is a shining city upon a hill whose beacon light guides freedom-loving people
everywhere”

1776 – 1941: From Isolationism to Expansionism and Imperialism

ISOLATIONISM
George Washington’s “Farewell Address”
“The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial
relation to have with them as little political connection as possible” Rejected participating in the
balance of power
John Adams
“We should separate ourselves, as far as possible and as long as possible, from all European
politics and wars.”
Continentalism: Achieving Greatness Alexander Hamilton
Conflict was the law of life. States no less than men were bound to collide over those ancient
objects of ambition: Wealth and Glory. Thus US needs to be “ascendant in the system of US
affairs… and able to dictate terms of the connection between the old and the new world.
Thomas Jefferson
Preservation of liberty. Isolationism was the best way to preserve and develop the nation
Recognized the importance of trade Negotiate commercial treaties with others to protect the
nation’s ability to trade.
“for that a country needed no more than few diplomats and a small navy. To aim at such a navy
as the greater nations of Europe possess, would be a foolish and wicked waste of energies of our
countrymen.”

Expansionism: Manifest destiny?

Monroe Doctrine: 1823
“The new world should not be subject to colonization” The Monroe Doctrine consists of four
main points:
Monroe Doctrine, (December 2, 1823), cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy enunciated by Pres.
James Monroe in his annual message to Congress.
(1) The United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of or the wars between European
powers;
(2) The United States recognized and would not interfere with existing colonies and
dependencies in the Western Hemisphere;
(3) The Western Hemisphere was closed to future colonization;
(4) Any attempt by a European power to oppress or control any nation in the Western
Hemisphere would be viewed as a hostile act against the United States. Role ad responsibility of
the United States to its hemispheric neighbors were being shaped.

Importance of Monroe doctrine

 The Monroe Doctrine became a mainstay of U.S. foreign policy. In 1823 U.S. President
James Monroe proclaimed the U.S. role as protector of the Western Hemisphere by
forbidding European powers from colonizing additional territories in the Americas.
In return, Monroe committed to not interfere with the affairs, conflicts, and extant
colonial enterprises of European states.
 Although initially a distant approach to foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine—and the
1904 Roosevelt Corollary, which supplemented it—laid the groundwork for U.S.
expansionist and interventionist practices in the decades to come.

Manifest Destiny
A phrase coined in 1845, expressed the philosophy that drove 19th-century U.S. territorial
expansion. Manifest Destiny held that the United States thought that they are destined—by God,
its advocates believed—to expand its dominion and spread democracy and capitalism across the
entire North American continent.
1846: William H. Seward --“I will engage to give you the possession of the American continent
and the control of the world
Louisiana Purchase
American birth rate was high- from around 5 million people in 1800 to more than 23 million by
1850. Such rapid growth—as well as two economic depressions in 1819 and 1839—would drive
millions of Americans westward in search of new land and new opportunities.
The Louisiana Territory had been the object of Old World interest for many years before 1803. It
was under French rule when Napoleon was in power the purchase happened. President Thomas
Jefferson kicked off the country’s westward expansion in 1803 with the Louisiana Purchase,
which at some 828,000 square miles nearly doubled the size of the United States. In addition to
sponsoring the western expedition of Lewis and Clark of 1805-07, Jefferson also set his sights on
Spanish Florida, a process that was finally concluded in 1819 under President James Monroe.
But critics of that treaty faulted Monroe and his secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, for
yielding to Spain what they considered legitimate claims on Texas, where many Americans
continued to settle.
Texas Independence
Cries for the “re-annexation” of Texas increased after Mexico, having won its independence
from Spain, passed a law suspending U.S. immigration into Texas in 1830. Nonetheless, there
were still more Anglo settlers in Texas than Hispanic ones, and in 1836, after Texas won its own
independence, its new leaders sought to join the United States. The administrations of both
Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren resisted such calls, fearing both war with Mexico and
opposition from Americans who believed calls for annexation were linked with the desire to
expand slavery in the Southwest.
But John Tyler, who won the presidency in 1840, was determined to proceed with the
annexation. An agreement concluded in April 1844 made Texas eligible for admission as a U.S.
territory, and possibly later as one or more states.
The Coining of 'Manifest Destiny' By the time Texas was admitted to the Union as a state in
December 1845, the idea that the United States must inevitably expand westward, all the way to
the Pacific Ocean, had taken firm hold among people from different regions, classes and political
persuasions. The phrase “Manifest Destiny,” which emerged as the best-known expression of
this mindset, first appeared in an editorial published in the July-August 1845 issue of the
Democratic Review.
Oregon Territory
An 1842 treaty between Great Britain and the United States partially resolved the question of
where to draw the Canadian border, but left open the question of the Oregon Territory. Polk, an
ardent proponent of Manifest Destiny, had won election with the slogan “54˚ 40’ or fight!” (a
reference to the potential northern boundary of Oregon as latitude 54˚ 40’) and called U.S.
claims to Oregon “clear and unquestionable” in his inaugural address.
But as president, Polk wanted to get the issue resolved so the United States could move on to
acquiring California from Mexico. In mid-1846, his administration agreed to a compromise
whereby Oregon would be split along the 49th parallel, narrowly avoiding a crisis with Britain.
Impact of Manifest Destiny
By the time the Oregon question was settled, the United States had entered into all-out war with
Mexico, driven by the spirit of Manifest Destiny and territorial expansion.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-American War in 1848, added an
additional 525,000 square miles of U.S. territory, including all or parts of what is now California,
Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming.
Despite the lofty idealism of Manifest Destiny, the rapid territorial expansion over the first half
of the 19th century resulted not only in war with Mexico, but in the dislocation and brutal
mistreatment of Native American, Hispanic and other non-European occupants of the territories
now being occupied by the United States.
Expansionist mission continued – Alaska
The Spanish-American War
The Spanish-American War of 1898 ended Spain’s colonial empire in the Western Hemisphere
and secured the position of the United States as a Pacific power. U.S. victory in the war produced
a peace treaty that compelled the Spanish to relinquish claims on Cuba, and to cede
sovereignty over Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to the United States. The United
States also annexed the independent state of Hawaii during the conflict. Thus, the war enabled
the United States to establish its predominance in the Caribbean region and to pursue its strategic
and economic interests in Asia.
President Mckinley was in power then. The war originated in the Cuban struggle for
independence from Spain, which began in February 1895. Spain’s brutally repressive measures
to halt the rebellion were graphically portrayed for the U.S. public by several sensational
newspapers, and American sympathy for the Cuban rebels rose. The growing popular demand
for U.S. intervention became an insistent chorus after the still-unexplained sinking in Havana
harbor of the American battleship USS Maine, which had been sent to protect U.S. citizens and
property after anti-Spanish rioting in Havana.
War Is Declared
Spain declared war on the United States on April 24, followed by a U.S. declaration of war on
the 25th, which was made backdated to April 21.
Spanish-American War Begins
The ensuing war was pathetically one-sided, since Spain had readied neither its army nor its navy
for a distant war with the formidable power of the United States.
Treaty of Paris
By the Treaty of Paris (signed Dec. 10, 1898), Spain surrendered all claim to Cuba, ceded Guam
and Puerto Rico to the United States, and transferred sovereignty over the Philippines to the
United States for $20 million.
The Spanish-American War was an important turning point in the history of both antagonists.
Spain’s defeat decisively turned the nation’s attention away from its overseas colonial adventures
and inward upon its domestic needs, a process that led to both a cultural and a literary
renaissance and two decades of much-needed economic development in Spain.
The United States also annexed the independent state of Hawaii during the conflict.

1900-1941: Interventionism, wartime idealism ,Isolationism sieged

By 1900 US was ready to assume the role of global hegemon
Foreign policy issues figured prominently in the election of 1900. William Jennings Bryan, the
Democratic Party candidate and later Woodrow Wilson’s secretary of state, carried the anti-
imperialist banner. Theodore (Teddy) Roosevelt, McKinley’s vice presidential running mate,
was the champion of imperialism. Roosevelt had served in the Navy Department early in the
McKinley administration and, with Captain Alfred Mahan, an early geopolitical strategic
thinker, had promoted the development of sea power as a route to American greatness.

Roosevelt Corollary:
President Theodore Roosevelt’s extension of the Monroe Doctrine that justified the use of
American power, including military force, to oppose Latin American revolutions and to bring
hemispheric economic affairs under U.S. control.

 The United States now oppose Latin American Revolutions, not support them
 It would not only oppose European intervention into hemispheric affairs but support its
own
 It would use American power to bring hemispheric economic affairs under its tutelage
 It would now use military force to set hemispheric affairs straight.

Woodrow Wilson: Interventionism and Dollar diplomacy

New Idea: Call for a new collective security system that and for reforms in international system.
Although intervention was indeed characteristic of this era, the term dollar diplomacy best
describes the period from 1900 to 1913. As American business interests in the Caribbean and
Central America mushroomed, the United States flexed its Roosevelt Corollary principles and
corresponding muscles to protect them. Roosevelt’s interventionist tactics were continued by
his successor, William Howard Taft, who at one point described his administration’s policies as
‘‘substituting dollars for bullets’’ (hence the term ‘‘dollar diplomacy’’).
Little changed with Woodrow Wilson’s election in 1912. Until the outbreak of war in Europe,
Wilson was consumed by foreign policy challenges in China, Mexico, and the Caribbean,
often resorting to military intervention to achieve his ends.
Military intervention during wilsonism and ww1 by US
1912 Turkey. U.S. forces guard the American legation at Constantinople during the Balkan War.
1913 Mexico. U.S. Marines evacuate American citizens and others.
1914 Haiti. U.S. forces protect American nationals.
1914 Dominican Republic. U.S. forces protect Puerto Plata and Santo Domingo City.
1914–1917 Mexico. Undeclared Mexican American hostilities.
1917–1918 Germany and Austria-Hungary. World War I.
1918–1919 Mexico. U.S. troops enter Mexico pursuing bandits and fight Mexican troops at
Nogales.
1918–1920 Soviet Russia. U.S. troops protect the American consulate at Vladivostok and remain
part of an allied occupation force; later America troops intervene at Archangel in response to the
Bolshevik revolution.
1920–1922 Russia (Siberia). U.S. Marines sent to protect U.S. radio station and property on
Russian Island, Bay of Vladivostok.
After intervening in WW1 and gaining the victory, Wilson began to call for a new collective
security system to replace the war-prone balance of power and for other fundamental reforms in
international relations. Wilson’s efforts to implement his vision failed during his lifetime,
however. The refusal of the United States Senate to approve the Versailles peace settlement and
U.S. membership in the League of Nations was a particularly devastating personal defeat for
Wilson. Without American participation, the League was doomed to failure.
Still, the principles of Wilsonian idealism have never been extinguished. Indeed, La- Feber
writes that Wilson was the first American president ‘‘to face the full blast of twentieth-century
revolutions,’’ and that his ‘‘responses made his policies the most influential in twentieth-century
American foreign policy. ‘Wilsonianism’ became a term to describe later policies that
emphasized internationalism and moralism and that were dedicated to extending democracy.’’

Return to normalcy: Isolation

The League of Nations as an American foreign policy program died in the presidential election
of, 1920. Warren G. Harding defeated James M. Cox, after wilson’s departure from the earth.
Harding’s foreign policy program called for a return to normalcy, effectively one that sought
‘‘relief from the burdens that international engagement brings’’.
This indicate the return of isolationism through 1930s. Initially, however, idealism was still
accepted, perhaps out of popular indifference. Military intervention in Latin America and China
also perpetuated the one-sided thrust of American foreign policy evident even before the turn of
the century.
Although the United States practiced interventionism during the 1920s, thus perpetuating a
now firmly established policy pattern, American policy makers also enthusiastically pursued
key ele- ments of the idealist paradigm. With the Wash- ington Naval Conference of 1921, the
United States sought, through arms limitations, to curb a trian- gular naval arms race involving
the United States, Japan, and Britain. A series of treaties designed to maintain the status quo in
the Far East followed. The program conformed to idealist precepts, but no enforcement
provisions were included. Thus realists argue that ‘‘the transient thrill afforded by the
Washington Conference was miserable preparation for the test of political leadership provided by
the ominous events that undermined the Far Eastern settlement a decade later’
Washington Naval Conference 1921
With the Washington Naval Conference of 1921, the United States sought, through arms
limitations, to curb a triangular naval arms race involving the United States, Japan, and Britain.
A series of treaties designed to maintain the status quo in the Far East followed. The program
conformed to idealist precepts, but no enforcement provisions were included.
Kellogg-Briand pact 1928 – declared war illegal. 1928 Pact of Paris, popularly known as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact (after the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, and the French Foreign
Minister, Aristide Briand, who negotiated it). The agreement sought to deal with the problem of
war by making it illegal. Realists thus regard it as the perfect expression of the utopian
idealism which dominated America’s attempts to compose international conflicts and banish
the threat of war in the interwar period. The Pact of Paris simply declared that its signatories
renounced war as an instrument of national policy. It contained absolutely no obligation for
any nation to do anything under any circumstances
Renewed militarism in 1930s and economic nationalism
As fascism rose during the 1930s and the world political economy fell into deep depression,
neither the outlawry of war nor the principle of collective security stemmed the onslaught
of renewed militarism. Germany, Italy, and Japan repeatedly challenged the post–World War
I order, Britain and France seemed powerless to stop them, and the United States retreated into
an isolationist shell. Congress passed a series of neutrality acts between 1935 and 1937 whose
purpose was to steer America clear of the emerging European conflict. The immediate
application came in Spain, where, with the help of Hitler, General Francisco Franco sought to
overthrow the Spanish republic and replace it with a fascist regime. The neutrality acts
effectively barred the United States from assisting the antifascist forces.
The Great Depression reinforced isolationist sentiments in the United States. As noted earlier,
Britain was the world’s preeminent economic power in the nineteenth century. As the
preponderant power in politics as well as economics—a global hegemon—it promoted an open
international economic system based on free trade. Its power began to wane in the late
nineteenth century, however. Following World War I, Britain’s ability to exercise the leadership
role necessary to maintain the open world political economy was severely strained. The
United States was the logical candidate to assume this role, but it refused. Britain’s inability to
exercise leadership and the United States’ unwillingness to do so were primary causes of the
Great Depression.
Economic nationalism now became the norm. Tariffs erected by one state to protect its economy
from foreign inroads led to retaliation by others. The volume of international trade contracted
dramatically, causing reduced living standards and rising economic hardship. Policy makers
who sought to create a new world order following World War II would conclude that economic
nationalism was a major cause of the break- down of international peace. Indeed, the perceived
connectedness of peace and prosperity is one of the major lessons of the 1930s that
continues to inform American foreign policy even today.
Learning from the Munich Conference – 1938-1939 – WW II
Another lesson was learned when Britain’s policy of trying to appease Hitler failed. In
September 1938—meeting in Munich, Germany—Britain and France made an agreement with
Hitler that permit- ted Nazi Germany to annex a large part of Czechoslovakia in return for what
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain called ‘‘peace in our time.’’ Instead, on September
1, 1939, Hitler attacked Po- land. Britain and France, honoring their pledge to defend the Poles,
declared war on Germany two days later. World War II had begun. The lesson drawn from the
1938 Munich Conference—that aggressors cannot be appeased—would also inform
policy makers’ thinking for decades to come.
The Franklin D Roosevelt came
In the two years that followed Hitler’s initial onslaught against Poland—years that saw German
attacks on France, Britain, and the Soviet Union— President Franklin D. Roosevelt deftly
nudged the United States away from its isolationist policies in support of the Western
democracies. Germany’s blatant exercise of machtpolitik (power politics) challenged the
precepts of idealism and the isolationism of the 1930s. Still, Roosevelt was careful not to
abandon idealism as he prepared the nation for the coming conflict. He understood that only a
threat to their security could motivate [the American people] to support military preparedness.
Lend-Lease Act 1941: Military aid to any country whose defense was vital to the security of
the United States. In the spring of 1941, Congress passed and Roosevelt signed the Lend-
Lease Act. The act permitted the United States to assist others deemed vital to U.S. security,
thus committing the United States to the Allied cause against the Axis powers, Germany and
Italy. The proposal provoked a bitter controversy in the United States. Senator Arthur
Vandenberg, then a staunch isolationist (converted to internationalism after the war), remarked
that Lend-Lease was the death-knell of isolationism:
‘‘We have tossed Washington’s Farewell Address into the discard,’’ he wrote in his diary. ‘‘We
have thrown ourselves squarely into the power politics and the power wars of Europe, Asia, and
Africa. We have taken a first step upon a course from which we can never hereafter retreat’’.
The next step occurred when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. No longer
could America’s geographic isolation from the world support its political isolation. With the
onset of World War II the United States began to reject its isolationist past.
Liberal internationalism
The ethos of liberal internationalism—‘‘the intellectual and political tradition that believes in
the necessity of leadership by liberal democracies in the construction of a peaceful world order
through multilateral co- operation and effective international organizations’’ (Gardner 1990)—
now animated the American people and their leaders as they embarked on a new era of
unprecedented global activism.
"sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government
[whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States] any defense
article."
Global Activism Anti Communism or countering Communism and containment (1946-
1981)
‘‘Every war in American history,’’ writes historian Arthur Schlesinger (1986), ‘‘has been
followed in due course by skeptical reassessments of supposedly sacred assumptions.’’ World
War II, more than any other, served such a purpose. It crystallized a mood and acted as a
catalyst for it, resolved contradictions and helped clarify values, and produced a consensus about
the nation’s world role. Most American leaders were now convinced that the United States
should not, and could not, retreat from world affairs as it had after World War I. The
isolationist heritage was pushed aside as policy makers enthusiastically plunged into the task of
shaping the world to American preferences. Thus a new epoch in American diplomacy unfolded
as— with missionary zeal—the United States once more sought to build a new world order on
the ashes of Dresden and Berlin, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
In 1947 President Harry S. Truman set the tone of postwar American policy in the doctrine that
bears his name: ‘‘The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their
freedoms…If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall
surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.’’ Later policy pronouncements prescribed
America’s missionary role.
‘‘Our nation,’’ John F. Kennedy asserted in 1962, was ‘‘commissioned by history to be either
an ob- server of freedom’s failure or the cause of its success.’’
Ronald Reagan echoed that sentiment nearly two decades later: ‘‘We in this country, in this
generation, are, by destiny rather than choice, the watchmen on the walls of world freedom.’’
 1941-1985: Global Activism Anti-Communism or countering Communism
and containment
Global activism is the first of three tenets uppermost in the minds of American policy makers
following World War II. The others focused on the post–World War II challenge of Soviet
communism. Together the three tenets defined a new orthodoxy that not only replaced the
isolationist mood of the 1930s but also shaped a half-century of American foreign policy. The
trilogy summarized below describes the new orthodoxy:
■ The United States must reject isolationism and embrace an active responsibility for the
direction of international affairs.
■ Communism represents a dangerous ideological force in the world, and the United States
should combat its spread.
■ Because the Soviet Union is the spearhead of the communist challenge, American foreign
policy must contain Soviet expansionism and influence.

The Communist Challenge to American Ideas and Ideals

Fear of communism—and an unequivocal rejection of it—played a major part in shaping the way
the United States perceived the world throughout the Cold War. Communism was widely seen as
a inflexible belief system opposed to ‘‘the American way of life,’’ one intent on converting the
entire world to its own vision. Because communism was perceived as inherently totalitarian,
antidemocratic, and anticapitalist, it also was perceived as a potent threat to freedom, liberty,
and prosperity throughout the world.

The domino theory

Monolithic means massive
For this communism, American foreign policy itself became ideological (Commager 1983;
Parenti 1969). The perception of communism as a global monolith was a driving force behind
America’s Soviet-centric foreign policy. A related conviction saw communism as endowed
with powers and appeals that would encourage its continued spread. The view of communism
as an expansionist, crusading force intent on converting the entire world to its beliefs, whose
doctrines, however evil, might command wide- spread appeal was a potent argument. The
domino theory, a popular metaphor in the 1960s, asserted that one country’s fall to communism
would stimulate the fall of those adjacent to it. Like a row of falling dominoes, an unstoppable
chain reaction would unfold, bringing increasing portions of the world’s population under the
domination of totalitarian, communist governments.
Anticommunist goal in Vietnam war
The anticommunist goal became a bedrock of the foreign policy consensus that emerged after
World War II. From the late 1940s until the United States became mired in the Vietnam War,
few in the American foreign policy establishment challenged this consensus. Policy debates
centered largely on how to implement the anticommunist drive, not on whether communism
posed a threat.

The Containment of Soviet Influence

As the physically strongest and the most vocal Marxist-Leninist state, the Soviet Union stood
at the vanguard of the communist challenge. Hence the third tenet of the new orthodoxy
emergent after World War II: The United States must contain Soviet expansionism and
influence.
Four corollary beliefs supported the determination to contain Soviet communism:
■ The Soviet Union is an expansionist power, intent on maximizing communist power
through military conquest and ‘‘exported’’ revolutions.
■ The Soviet goal of world domination is permanent and will succeed unless blocked by
vigorous counteraction.
■ The United States, leader of the ‘‘free world,’’ is the only state able to repel Soviet
aggression.
■ Appeasement will not work: Force must be met with force if Soviet expansionism is to be
stopped.
A Soviet-centric foreign policy flowed from this interrelated set of beliefs, whose durability
persisted for decades.

The Origins of the Cold War: Competing Hypotheses

 a conflict of interests
 ideological incompatibilities
 Misperceptions.

A Conflict of Interests Rivalry between the emergent superpowers following World War II was
in- escapable. During World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union had both
demonstrated an ability to sub- ordinate their ideological differences and competition for power
to larger purposes—the destruction of Hitler’s Germany.
Ideological Incompatibilities Another interpretation holds that the Cold War was simply an
extension of the superpowers’ mutual disdain for each other’s political system and way of life—
in short, ideological incompatibilities.
Misperceptions -A third explanation sees the Cold War rooted in psychological factors,
particularly the superpowers’ misperceptions of each other’s motives, which their conflicting
interests and ideologies reinforced. Mistrustful parties see in their own actions only virtue and in
those of their adversaries only malice. Hostility is inevitable in the face of such ‘‘we-they,’’
‘‘we’re OK, you’re not’’ mirror images. Moreover, as a state’s perceptions of its adversary’s
evil intentions become accepted as dogma, its prophecies also become self-fulfilling (White
1984).
America’s Containment Strategies: Evolutionary Phases
The history of American foreign policy since World War II is largely the story of how the
containment doctrine was interpreted and applied.
1. Conflict was the characteristic mode of Soviet- American interactions.
2. The acts of conflict and cooperation directed by one power toward the other were typically
responded to in kind.
Cold War Confrontation, 1947–1962
In February 1946, Stalin gave a speech in which he spoke of the inevitability of conflict with
the capitalist powers. Urging the Soviet people not to be deluded that the end of the war with
Germany meant the state could relax, he called for intensified efforts by the Soviet people to
strengthen and de- fend their homeland. Many Western leaders saw Stalin’s first major postwar
address as a declaration of World War III.
Long Telegram
Shortly after this, George F. Kennan, then a U.S. diplomat in Moscow, sent to Washington his
famous ‘‘long telegram’’ assessing the sources of Soviet conduct. Kennan’s conclusions were
ominous: ‘‘We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with [the]
United States there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that
the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the
international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.’’
Kennan’s ideas were circulated widely when, in 1947, the influential journal Foreign Affairs
published them in an anonymous article Kennan signed ‘‘X.’’ In it, he argued that Soviet leaders
would forever feel insecure about their political ability to maintain power against forces both
within Soviet society and the outside world.
Kennan concluded, ‘‘it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the
Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies’’ (Kennan 1947, emphasis added).

Truman Doctrine
Harry Truman made this prescription the cornerstone of American postwar policy.
Provoked in part by domestic turmoil in Turkey and Greece—which he and others believed to be
communist inspired—Truman responded: ‘‘I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting at- tempted subjugation by armed minorities or
by outside pressures.’’
Few declarations in American history were as powerful and important as this one, which
eventually became known as the Truman Doctrine. ‘‘In a single sentence Truman had defined
American policy for the next generation and beyond. Whenever and wherever an anti-
Communist government was threatened, by indigenous insurgents, foreign invasion, or even
diplomatic pressure ... , the United States would supply political, economic, and, most of all,
military aid’’.
NATO AND WARSAW
Europe, where the Cold War first erupted, was the focal point of the jockeying for influence. The
principal European allies of the superpowers divided into NATO and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization. These military alliances became the cornerstones of the superpowers’ external
policies, as the European members of the Eastern and Western alliances willingly acceded to
the leadership of their respective patrons.

Krushchev and Eisenhower: Cuba, spyplane..

‘‘‘We can never rest,’ Eisenhower swore in the 1952 presidential campaign, ‘until the enslaved
nations of the world have in the fullness of freedom the right to choose their own path.’ But rest
they did, except in their speeches’’ (Ambrose 1993).
Nikita Khrushchev assumed the top Soviet leadership position after Stalin’s death in 1953. He
claimed to accept peaceful coexistence with capitalism, and in 1955 the two superpowers met at
the Geneva summit in a first, tentative step toward a mutual discussion of world problems. But
the Soviet Union also continued, however cautiously, to exploit op- portunities for advancing
Soviet power wherever it perceived them to exist, as in Cuba in the early 1960s. Thus the period
following Stalin’s death was punctuated by continuing crises and confrontations. Now—in
addition to Hungary—Cuba, Egypt, and Berlin became the flash points.
Moreover, a crisis resulted from the downing of an American U-2 spy plane deep over Soviet
territory in 1960. Nuclear brinkmanship and massive retaliation were symptomatic of the
strategies of containment through which the United States at this time hoped to balance Soviet
power and perhaps force the Soviets into submission.

Competitive Coexistence, 1962–1969

The Soviets’ surreptitious placement of missiles in Cuba in 1962, the onset of the Vietnam War
at about the same time, and the beginning of a seemingly unrestrained arms race cast a shadow
over the possibility of superpower coexistence. The most serious test of the ability of the United
States and the Soviet Union to avert catastrophe and to manage confrontation peacefully was the
1962 Cuban missile crisis—a catalytic event that transformed thinking about how the Cold War
could be waged and expanded awareness of the suicidal consequences of a nuclear war. The
superpowers stood eyeball to eyeball, in the words of then Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
Fortunately, one blinked.

Geneva camp and David camp and Hot link

As the growing parity of American and Soviet military capabilities made coexistence or
nonexistence the alternatives, finding ways to adjust their differences became compelling. This
alleviated the danger posed by some issues and opened the door for new initiatives in other areas.
For example, the Geneva (1955) and Camp David (1959) experiments in summit diplomacy
set precedents for other tension-reduction activities. Installation of the ‘‘hot line,’’ a direct
communication link between the White House and the Kremlin, followed in 1963. So did the
1967 Glassboro summit and several negotiated agreements, including the 1963 Partial Test Ban
Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

De´tente, 1969–1979
With the inauguration of Richard Nixon as president and the appointment of Henry Kissinger as
his national security adviser, the United States tried a new approach toward containment,
officially labeled de´tente. In Kissinger’s words, de´tente sought to create ‘‘a vested interest in
cooperation and restraint,’’ ‘‘an environment in which competitors can regulate and restrain
their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation.’’
To engineer the relaxation of superpower tensions, Nixon and Kissinger fashioned the
linkage theory. Predicated on the expectation that the development of economic, political, and
strategic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union would bind the two in a common
fate, linkage would foster mutually rewarding exchanges.
As both a goal of and a strategy for expanding the superpowers’ mutual interest in restraint, de´-
tente symbolized an important shift in their global relationship. In diplomatic jargon, relations
between the Soviets and Americans were ‘‘normalized,’’ as the expectation of war receded. In
terms of containment, on the other hand, the strategy now shifted more toward self-
containment on the Soviets’ part than American militant containment.

Nixon Doctrine
President Nixon’s declaration in 1970 (later known as the Nixon Doctrine) that the United States
would provide military and economic assistance to its friends and allies but would hold these
states responsible for protecting their own security took cognizance of a resurgent isolationist
mood at home.

SALT I II ABM
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) became the test of de´tente’s viability. Initiated
in 1969, the SALT negotiations sought to restrain the threatening, expensive, and spiraling arms
race. They produced two sets of agreements. The SALT I agreement limiting offensive
strategic weapons and the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty were signed in 1972. The second
pact, SALT II, was concluded in 1979. With their signing, each of the superpowers gained the
principal objective it had sought in de´ tente. The Soviet Union gained recognition of its status
as the United States’ equal; the United States gained a commitment from the Soviet Union to
moderate its quest for preeminent power in the world. The SALT II agreement was not brought
to fruition, however. It was signed but never ratified by the United States. The failure
underscored the real differences that still separated the superpowers. By the end of the 1970s, de
´tente lost nearly all of its momentum and much of the hope it had symbolized only a few years
earlier. During the SALT II treaty ratification hearings, the U.S. Senate ex- pressed concern
about an agreement with a rival that continued high levels of military spending, that sent arms to
states outside its traditional sphere of influence (Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia,
Syria, Vietnam, and elsewhere), and that stationed military forces in Cuba. These complaints all
spoke to the persistence of Americans’ deep- seated distrust of the Soviet Union and their
understandable concern about Soviet intentions.

Renewed Confrontation, 1979–1985-Soviet-Afghan, Carter Doctrine

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 ended the Senate’s consideration of SALT II—and
de´tente. ‘‘Soviet aggression in Afghanistan—unless checked— confronts all the world with
the most serious strategic challenge since the Cold War began,’’ declared President Jimmy
Carter. In response the United States initiated a series of countermoves, including enunciation of
the Carter Doctrine declaring the willingness of the United States to use military force to
protect its security interests in the Persian Gulf region. Thus antagonism and hostility once more
dominated Soviet-American relations. And once more the pursuit of power dictated the
appropriate strategy of containment as Eisenhower’s tough talk, Kennedy’s competitiveness,
and even Truman’s belligerence were rekindled.
The superpowers also extended their confrontation to new territory, such as Central America,
and renewed their public diplomacy (propaganda) efforts to extol the ascribed virtues of their
respective systems throughout the world. A series of events punctuated the renewal of conflict:
■ The Soviets destroyed Korean Airlines flight 007 in 1983.
■ Shortly thereafter the United States invaded Grenada.
■ Arms control talks then ruptured.
■ The Soviets boycotted the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles (in retaliation for
the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics).

Reagan Doctrine
The Reagan administration also embarked on a new program, the Reagan Doctrine, which
pledged U.S. support of anticommunist insurgents (described as ‘‘freedom fighters’’) who
sought to overthrow Soviet-supported governments in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. The
strategy ‘‘expressed the conviction that communism could be defeated, not merely contained.’’
Thus ‘‘Reagan took wilsonianism to its ultimate conclusion. America would not wait passively
for free institutions to evolve, nor would it confine itself to resisting direct threats to its
security. In- stead, it would actively promote democracy’’ (Kissinger 1994a).

Renewed Dialogue and the End of the Cold War, 1985–1991

Prospects for a more constructive phase improved measurably under Gorbachev. At first his
goals were hard to discern, but it soon became clear that he felt it imperative for the Soviet
Union to reconcile its differences with the capitalist West if it wanted any chance of reversing
the deterioration of its economy and international position. In Gorbachev’s words, these goals
dictated ‘‘the need for a fundamental break with many customary approaches to foreign policy.’’

Gorbachev’s new thinking

Shortly thereafter, he chose the path of domestic reform, one marked by political
democratization and a transition to a market economy. And he proclaimed the need for ‘‘new
thinking’’ in foreign and defense policy to relax superpower tensions.

Reagan’s Arms control START

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration began to moderate its hard-line posture toward the new
Soviet regime. Reagan himself would eventually call Gorbachev ‘‘my friend.’’ Arms control
was a centerpiece of the new partnership. In 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union
agreed to eliminate an entire class of weapons (intermediate- range nuclear missiles) from
Europe. Building on this momentum and fueled by high-level summitry, Reagan and Gorbachev
agreed to a new START treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) that called for deep cuts in the
strategic nuclear arms arsenals of the two sides. That treaty has since gone through two
additional restatements that call for even more cuts in the world’s most lethal weapons, although
final approval has been stalled in the Russian parliament.
The End of the Cold War: Competing Hypotheses
With the end of the Cold War, the proposition that George Kennan advanced in his famous
1947 ‘‘X’’ article appeared prophetic.
Reagan administration’s anti-ballistic-missile ‘‘Star Wars’’ program—officially known as the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—arguably convinced Gorbachev and his advisers that they
could not compete with the United States (Fitzgerald 2000). From this perspective, power played
a key role in causing the end of the Cold War. People on the conservative side of the political
spectrum in them. United States were quick to embrace this view, thus crediting Ronald
Reagan and his policies with having ‘‘won’’ the Cold War.
Others, particularly on the liberal side of the spectrum, placed greater emphasis elsewhere. They
saw Soviet leaders succumbing to the inherent political and economic weaknesses of their
own system, which left them unable to conduct an imperial policy abroad or retain
communist control at home. This is much like the demise of Soviet power Kennan envisioned
decades earlier.
Decade of 9/11
The decade preceding 9/11 proved to be a transitional one for American foreign policy. It began
with hope and ended in tragedy. A reprioritized American foreign policy agenda followed. At the
conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, President George H. W. Bush proclaimed
highlighted the necessity of American leadership:
‘‘In a world where we are the only remaining superpower, it is the role of the United States to
marshal its moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our
responsibility ... to lead.’’ Thus ‘‘Bush anticipated American dominance that would be both
legitimate and, to some extent, welcomed by the global community’’. In short, this would be a
new world order.
William Jefferson Clinton went to Washington on the strength of his domestic policy program,
but his foreign policy agenda was also ambitious. It included ‘‘preventing aggression, stopping
nuclear proliferation, vigorously promoting human rights and democracy, redressing the
humanitarian dis- asters that normally attend civil wars,’’ virtually the entire ‘‘wish-list of
contemporary American inter- nationalism’’ (Hendrickson 1994). Wilsonian idealism was at the
core of the agenda.
Clinton left to George W. Bush, his more conservative successor, a liberal legacy regarding
democracy promotion, trade liberalization, stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruc- tion, and the promotion of human rights and international values that would help shape
the policies of the forty-third president.
Transnational terrorism became the defining element of the new administration’s foreign
policy
By the end of his administration Clinton had also elevated international terrorism to the
forefront of his concerns (Clarke 2004). Although he launched a cruise missile attack on Osama
bin Laden’s terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, his administration apparently missed other
opportunities to ‘‘eliminate’’ (i.e., kill) the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic fundamentalist.
Following September 11, 2001, transnational terrorism became the defining element of the new
administration’s foreign policy.
The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Uniquely Unilateralist?
Bush Doctrine of 2002 and profoundly colored the administration’s approach to the threat of
transnational terrorism. Before Bush’s controversial victory in the 2000 election, Condoleezza
Rice, Bush’s first-term national security adviser and second-term secretary of state, hinted at a
foreign policy approach based squarely on the tenets of realism.
According to Rice (2000), the Bush administration would ‘‘refocus the United States on the
national interest and the pursuit of key priorities.’’ Bush began to flesh out these interests and
priories in his first inaugural address, where he also made clear he would protect and promote the
enduring values of the United States.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks initially pushed Bush toward the Clinton legacy of multilateralism.
‘‘Allies are essential for success in the war on terrorism,’’ observed one policy analyst (Posen
2001/2002). That, he said, explained the determination of the Bush administration ‘‘to build a
broad coalition [of supporters].’’ One result is that Russia, China, and Pakistan soon enjoyed
warmer relations with the United States than they had in years, as the administration
concentrated its policy efforts on the anti-terror campaign.
Bush Doctrine
On September 20, 2001, the president promulgated what initially became known as the Bush
Doctrine when he declared before a joint session of Congress that the United States ‘‘will
pursue nations that provide aid or a safe haven for terrorism.’’
USA PATRIOT ACT
In addition to preemptive war and other key elements of the Bush foreign policy, the war on
terror embraces a distinctive domestic component. President Bush often said it is preferable to
fight the terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere than to fight them in the United States.
Winning congressional approval of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, known as the
USA PATRIOT Act, or simply as the Patriot Act, was one of Bush’s first post-9/11 moves.
CIA
Shortly after the 2004 election, Congress passed another law with a provision that further
expanded the government’s right to engage in domestic surveillance of Americans’ activities.
The provision was part of a sweeping reorganization of the foreign intelligence community
consisting of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and more than a dozen other civilian and
military organizations, such as the Defense Department’s National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), responsible for intelligence collection using space- based satellites.
The intelligence reorganization law with its domestic ‘‘spying’’ provisions grew directly from
9/11. Several inquiries were launched soon after the terrorist attacks that asked what caused the
evident breakdown of security leading to the events of that fateful day.
Homeland Security
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is another government reorganization project
flowing directly from 9/11. Like the CIA, central- ization was the theme, but this time it focused
on bringing together domestic counterintelligence and law enforcement information about
potential terrorists and otherwise protecting the security of the territorial United States. A
product of congressional initiatives, the department groups under a single bureaucratic roof a
broad range of agencies responsible for policies related to emergency management,
immigration, travel and transportation security, and threat protection, among others. Its charge
includes continuation of priorities the Clinton administration attached to new challenges to U.S.
security, such as cyberterrorism. Worms, viruses, and other evidence of the work of computer
hackers are familiar to any computer user. The havoc they could wreak on the country’s
security, energy, transportation, and other sophisticated computer-driven systems is
unimaginable. Assuring homeland security is thus a daunting task.
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a central theme in the
prelude to the war against Iraq, as we have noted. Likewise it was a central feature of the Bush
administration’s national security posture and its doctrine of anticipatory military action.
Counter proliferation, a concept that implies the United States itself will act as the sole global
arbiter and destroyer of weapons of mass destruction, is a long-standing goal of American
foreign policy.
Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who began his career in the Netherlands, recently
highlighted the immediacy of the nuclear threat all too clearly. Architect of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons capability, which is designed to counter India’s, Khan is now regarded as a Pakistani
national hero.
For years Pakistan’s military sought to build a nuclear weapon and a missile delivery system to
counter India’s nuclear program. This soured U.S.- Pakistani relations. The United States
imposed sanctions on Pakistan and in other ways tried to derail Pakistan’s aspirations and
efforts. In the end its policies failed.
While other states that once pursued the nuclear option, such as Argentina, Brazil, South Africa,
and Libya, abandoned their ambitions, India and Pakistan pushed forward. Both refused to sign
the NPT, and their own rivalry combined with India’s fear of China propelled their nuclear
programs forward. India first tested a nuclear device in 1974. By the mid-1980s it was clear that
Pakistan also enjoyed a nuclear capability built through largely clandestine means. Then, in May
1998, both carried out a series of underground nuclear tests, shocking the world.
North Korea and Iran are particularly trouble- some proliferation threats. Iran has an
acknowledged nuclear program that has long been suspected of receiving equipment and other
assistance from Russia, China, North Korea— and now Pakistan’s Dr. Khan. It insists its
nuclear program is designed for peaceful purposes only but has refused to cease production of
weapons-grade materials. Furthermore, in late 2004 reports surfaced that Iran was seeking to
adapt its existing missile system to carry a nuclear weapon. Iranian missiles have ranges capable
of reaching anywhere in the Middle East, including Israel. The missile threat added new fuel to
the international debate on proliferation issues. Intense pressure by the IAEA and several
European states nonetheless failed to convince Iran to abandon its nuclear efforts. The United
States, meanwhile, often found itself at loggerheads with both the international watchdog agency
and its European allies. The threat of punitive sanctions or aggressive military action against the
Persian state loomed large as the Bush administration entered its second term, causing concern
among analysts that Iran could be the next U.S. Iraq.
Promoting Democracy
The centrality of democracy promotion rested squarely on the belief that democracies are more
peaceful than other political systems. That conviction, a bedrock of Wilsonian idealism, enjoys
a long heritage going back at least to Immanuel Kant’s eighteenth-century treatise Perpetual
Peace.
During the Clinton era, interventions in Haiti and Bosnia designed to promote democracy
quickly confronted the realities of grinding poverty and ethnic animosities that had prevented
democracy and civil society in the first place. In the Middle East, the United States faced the
uncomfortable fact that its security and economic interests were closely linked to authoritarian
states, where democracy promotion might produce instability, not peace. In Africa, a region
where democracy promotion ac- tivities were often emphasized, the otherwise low priority
assigned to the region worked against sub- stantial efforts or expenditures toward realizing the
goal of liberal democracy.
Despite earlier setbacks and disappointments, democracy promotion remained a foreign policy
priority when George W. Bush first took over the Oval Office. The highest profile applications
of the theme came in Afghanistan immediately following 9/11 and later in Iraq. In both cases,
however, it was difficult to separate the goals of promoting democracy with those of the war on
terror.
Protecting Human Rights and Promoting International Values
The boundaries of the Bush approach to nation- building are illustrated by its lack of attention to
the failed state of Sudan. Like its predecessor’s (non)- response to the Rwandan genocide in the
1990s, the Bush administration refrained from getting involved in the decades-long Sudanese
civil war, even though some estimates put the number of casualties of the fighting at more than
two million
But even though the rationale for military intervention took on a different tone from that of
Clinton’s approach in Bosnia and Kosovo, it is interesting to note that the military difficulties
confronted by bush administration in implementing its policies were similar. In short, the Bush
administration had as many difficulties in executing its value promotion policies in both
Afghanistan and Iraq as the Clinton team did in its two major interventions. Oddly, the
similarities between these two sets of experiences may provide more explanation about the
effectiveness of military solutions to contemporary foreign policy problems than they provide
about the policy guidelines themselves.
Promoting Open Markets
Clinton’s 1992 drive for the White House emphasized economics. Clinton’s foreign economic
agenda focused on four general categories of issues.
First, he worked to build an overall ‘‘archi- tecture’’ of rules and institutions through renewal
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which included provisions for a new
World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as ad- ditional efforts toward financial coordination.
He also worked toward regional trade arrangements to expand U.S. markets, reduce barriers to
trade, and integrate economies through such efforts as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) linking the United States, Canada, and Mexico in a free trade zone and
initiatives toward free trade zones in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific Basin. The Clinton
administration also focused on bilateral approaches toward specific trade partners, including
Japan, Europe, China, and aggressively pursued a Big Emerging Markets (BEM) strategy
around the world. In addition to tough negotiating postures toward Japan, and the European
Union on salient trade issues, Clinton negotiated an agreement for Permanent Normal Trade
Relations (PNTR) with China and that country’s accession to the World Trade Organization.
In fact, by the time the Clinton administration ended, it could claim some three hundred market-
opening agreements with other countries. Finally, the Clinton administration also took steps to
improve the infrastructure and policies for U.S. exports and export promotion, streamlining
export assistance and licensing proce- dures and expanding government efforts to advocate for
U.S. exporters overseas.
Not surprisingly, the Bush administration also remained committed to open markets and the
further expansion of global trade. It continued to support Clinton’s decision on China’s
accession to the WTO. Nonetheless, characteristic of the more aggressive and unilateralist tone
of the administration’s first-term foreign policy, China was viewed less as a ‘‘strategic
partner,’’ as during the Clinton administration, and more as a ‘‘strategic competitor’’ to the
United States in world markets. Even so, the United States continued to engage Chinese officials
in dialogue about monetary exchange rate issues and opening markets and free trade at such
forums as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Chile in 2004 as a way of
leading up to the WTO meetings planned for Hong Kong in 2005.