Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rift
Valley
Institute
Meeting
Report
Nairobi
Forum,
6
December
2012
Negotiated
Statehood
social
cohesion—and
in
Somaliland
that
was
the
clan.
But,
he
added,
traditional
authorities
are
limited
in
Anna
Schmidt
European
Union;
Mohamed
Nur
Mohamud
their
capacities.
He
recalled
that
soon
after
brokering
National
Democratic
Institute,
Somalia;
Quman
Akli
a
ceasefire
in
Somaliland,
clan
elders
complained
that
Somaliland
Focus,
UK;
Ulf
Terlinden
European
Union
too
much
was
being
asked
of
them.
The
difficulties
The
second
panel
considered
the
question
of
how
a
and
dangers
of
taking
elders
out
of
their
traditional
common
vision
of
statehood
could
be
achieved
in
a
roles
and
asking
them
to
take
on
state
authority
country
fractured
by
years
of
conflict,
and
examined
recurred
frequently
in
discussions.
Should
elders
be
the
significance
of
Somaliland’s
experience
in
the
extracted
and
placed
in
Hargeisa
or
Mogadishu
and
context
of
the
challenges
facing
Somalia
today.
asked
to
define
a
state
that
would
be
exported
and
Anna
Schmidt
suggested
that
in
Somalia,
different
globalized,
he
asked,
and
what
vacuum
would
be
left
ways
of
negotiating
a
common
vision
of
statehood
at
the
local
level
if
this
occurred?
Terlinden
are
available.
War
might
shape
or
destroy
a
vision,
concluded
by
asking
a
simple
question:
what
state?
It
she
said,
while
contract-‐making
offers
another
is
easy,
he
observed,
to
agree
on
the
notion
of
the
possible
means
for
state-‐ state,
but
the
questions
of
what
building.
On
the
question
of
how
sort
of
state,
provided
by
whom,
There
can
be
no
equitable
and
serving
what
ends
are
all
the
writing
of
a
constitution
contributes
to
an
evolving
vision
or
sustainable
state-‐ complicated
theoretical
and
practical
problems.
of
the
state,
she
noted
that
there
building
in
the
region
until
is
agreement
in
Mogadishu
on
One
discussant
suggested
that
the
enactment
of
the
idea
of
the
policy-‐makers
accept
and
that
African
elites
have
failed
to
state—but
the
substance
of
that
understand
the
interactions
imagine
a
state
that
corresponds
idea
remains
undecided
and
more
intimately
with
African
between
formal
and
open
to
negotiation.
desires
and
identities
than
the
informal
institutions,
and
Western
model.
The
challenge
Negotiation,
though,
is
always
an
unequal
process,
said
Mohamed
state
and
non-‐state.
then
for
the
new
government
in
Nur
Mohamud.
He
pointed
out
Somalia
must
be
to
create
its
the
limits
of
hybrid
political
order
own
road-‐map
for
state
and
by
suggesting
that
clan
elders
have
repeatedly
failed
nationhood,
independent
of
the
international
community.
to
go
beyond
crisis
resolution.
He
argued
that
for
Somalis,
real
statehood
in
the
twenty-‐first
century
means
more
than
a
hybrid
mix
of
local
and
formal
Representation
and
accountability
institutions,
and
must
include
law
and
order,
citizens’
rights
and
competitive
politics.
Angi
Yoder-‐Maina
Independent
consultant;
Adbullahi
Shirwa
Somali
Peace
Line;
Erik
Landemalm
Association
of
Quman
Akli
considered
the
question
of
Somaliland
European
Parliamentarians
for
Africa
(AWEPA);
Nuradin
statehood
vis-‐à-‐vis
Somalia.
She
asked
whether
a
Dirie
Horn
of
Africa
analyst
unified
vision
of
statehood
is
needed
or
helpful
at
Returning
to
the
theme
of
checks
and
balances,
the
this
moment.
She
reminded
panellists
of
the
two
third
panel
was
asked
to
consider
the
question
of
competing
visions:
an
independent
and
how
clan-‐based
institutions
can
negotiate
a
internationally
recognised
Somaliland
versus
a
relationship
with
state
and
sub-‐state
institutions
to
unified
Somalia.
By
starting
with
this
contentious
ensure
appropriate
representation
and
political
point,
however,
an
opportunity
might
be
accountability.
Rift
Valley
Institute
|
Meeting
Report
|
Nairobi
Forum
|
Rethinking
state-‐building
in
Somalia
|
6
December
2012
|
Page
3
of
4
Abdullahi
Shirwa
began
by
stressing
that
elders’
were
identified
to
fill
the
committee
of
135
accountability
is
essential
for
sustainable
that
would
select
new
parliamentarians.
Becoming
an
development
and
stability.
Somalia,
he
said,
needs
to
elder
itself,
therefore,
was
the
product
of
invention
develop
systems
to
guarantee
accountability
on
the
and
manipulation
by
the
media,
political
parties
and
part
of
government
and
all
the
other
non-‐state
actors
the
international
community.
Can
elders
borne
out
that
constitute
its
hybrid
political
order:
the
private
of
this
process,
it
was
asked,
truly
be
accountable
to
sector,
civil
society,
traditional
leaders,
the
the
communities
they
are
supposed
to
represent?
international
community,
and
the
diaspora.
But
On
the
issue
of
representation,
Nuradin
Dirie
accountable
leadership
in
both
formal
and
informal
outlined
some
of
the
difficulties
faced
by
Somali
spheres,
he
noted,
will
be
difficult
to
secure
in
the
women,
minorities,
and
young
people.
He
suggested
absence
of
a
functioning
judiciary,
watchdog
groups,
that
while
the
clan
system
complicates
the
process
of
and
a
developed
media
industry.
nominating
female
MPs—did
a
woman,
for
example,
In
discussion,
the
question
was
raised
as
to
whom
belong
to
the
clan
of
her
birth
or
of
her
husband?—
MPs
are
accountable.
If
it
is
to
the
fact
that
the
new
parliament
the
clan
elders
who
nominated
of
Somalia
has
an
18%
female
them,
then
who
are
those
elders
‘The
elders
have
been
representation
is
nonetheless
accountable
to?
This
led
to
institutionalized,
their
cause
for
celebration.
He
noted,
comparisons
between
the
however,
that
the
participation
political
role
and
local
positions
p oliticized,
a nd
of
youth
in
politics
in
general
foundations
of
elders
in
Somalia
their
independence
and
in
the
administration
in
and
Somaliland.
curtailed.
This
has
particular
was
limited
by
Somalia’s
present
constitution,
Erik
Landemalm
discussed
the
diminished
their
capacity
to
which
bars
those
aged
under
35
role
of
the
Somaliland
Guurti,
asking
what
role
the
upper
house
negotiate
and
build
from
serving.
Given
that
45%
of
the
population
is
under
14,
he
of
elders
should
perform
today
consensus,
with
the
result
observed,
young
people
are
the
and
whether
they
should
act
as
that
many
[people
in
most
significant
stakeholders
in
an
advisory
body
(as
they
do
in
Somaliland]
…
view
the
Somalia’s
future—and
ways
Puntland)
or
continue
to
have
to
be
found
to
involve
constitute
an
upper
house
in
Guurti
as
unaccountable’
them
when
attempting
to
forge
parliament.
In
the
early
1990s,
a
common
vision
of
the
state.
He
this
body
of
elders
was
also
expressed
concern
about
instrumental
in
negotiating
peace
through
the
representation
of
minorities
under
a
possible
consensus-‐building
at
a
local
level;
in
the
years
since
future
‘one
man,
one
vote’
system.
During
the
then,
their
function
had
been
institutionalized,
their
transition,
the
so-‐called
4.5
clan
power-‐sharing
positions
politicized,
and
their
independence
formula—apportioning
equal
representation
to
each
curtailed.
This
had
diminished
their
capacity
to
of
the
four
major
Somali
clans,
with
an
additional
negotiate
and
build
consensus,
with
the
result
that
‘half-‐share’
for
minorities—had
indeed,
for
the
first
many
in
civil
society
and
the
international
community
time
in
Somalia's
history,
given
minority
clans
some
today
view
the
Guurti
as
unaccountable—particularly
political
representation
in
central
government.
as
its
membership
had
not
been
elected
or
selected
Whether
this
should
be
maintained
is
a
question
for
since
1997.
future
deliberation.
Landemalm
asked
whether
a
more
positive
role
for