PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Research Article
ARE REAL MOODS REQUIRED TO REVEAL
MOOD-CONGRUENT AND MOOD-DEPENDENT MEMORY?
Eric Eich and Dawn Macaulay
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

Abstract—While simulating, or acting as if, they were either happy
or sad, university students recounted emotionally positive, neutral, or
negative events from their personal past. Two days later, subjects
were asked to freely recall the gist of all of these events, and they did
so while simulating a mood that either did or did not match the one
they had feigned before. By comparing the present results with those
of a previous study, in which affectively realistic and subjectively
convincing states of happiness and sadness had been engendered
experimentally, we searched for—and found—striking differences be-
tween simulated and actual moods in their impact on autobiographi-
cal memory. In particular, it appears that the mood-congruent effects
elicited by simulated moods are qualitatively different from those
evoked by induced moods, and that only authentic affects have the
power to produce mood-dependent effects.
Recent years have seen a surge of research interest in the interplay
between cognitive and emotional processes (for reasons and reviews,
see Eich, Kihlstrom, Bower, Forgas, & Niedenthal, 2000). Much of
this interest has centered on two phenomena of memory: mood-
congruent memory (MCM)—the observation that a given mood tends
to enhance the encoding or retrieval of target events that share the
same affective tone or valence—and mood-dependent memory
(MDM)—the observation that events encoded in a certain mood are
most retrievable in that mood, irrespective of the events’ valence.
One of our previous studies (Eich, Macaulay, & Ryan, 1994, Ex-
periment 2) provides an example of both phenomena. During the
encoding session, university students recollected or generated as many
as 16 different autobiographical events when prompted with neutral-
noun probes (e.g., ship and street). Subjects described every event in
detail and rated it along several dimensions, including its affective
valence (positive, neutral, or negative) when it occurred. During the
retrieval session, held 2 days later, subjects freely recalled the gist of
as many of their previously generated events as possible.
Superimposed on these procedures was a 2 × 2 factorial design:
mood at encoding—either happy or sad—crossed with these same two
moods at retrieval, creating two conditions in which encoding and
retrieval moods matched and two in which they mismatched. Moods
were induced via the continuous music technique (CMT), whereby
subjects entertain elating or depressing thoughts while listening to
lively or languorous music. Evidence (reviewed by Eich, 1995b) in-
dicates that this technique produces large and lasting changes in sub-
jects’ ratings of both pleasure and arousal, the two dimensions
underlying Russell’s (1980) circumplex model of affect, and that most
participants perceive their CMT-induced moods to be highly authentic
or affectively real.
Replicating prior research (see Blaney, 1986), results of the en-
Address correspondence to Eric Eich, Department of Psychology, Univer-
sity of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4; e-mail: ee@
cortex.psych.ubc.ca.
coding session revealed MCM. In comparison with their sad-mood
counterparts, happy subjects generated more positive events (11.1 vs.
6.7), fewer negative events (3.3 vs. 6.8), and a similar number of
neutral events (1.2 vs. 2.0).
Results of the retrieval session demonstrated MDM. Relative to
subjects whose encoding and retrieval moods matched, those whose
moods mismatched recalled a significantly smaller percentage of their
previously generated positive events (26% vs. 37%), negative events
(27% vs. 37%), and neutral events (17% vs. 32%). Similar outcomes
have been obtained in six other studies (Eich, 1995a, Experiments
1–3; Eich et al., 1994, Experiments 1 and 3; Eich, Macaulay, & Lam,
1997), suggesting that mood dependence in the free recall of previ-
ously generated autobiographical events is a robust and reliable result.
The new research reported here deals with both mood congruence
and mood dependence, and asks whether it is possible to demonstrate
these phenomena in the absence of any actual mood. Put another way,
do MCM and MDM occur when subjects simulate, or act as if, they
are feeling happy or sad, without their actually experiencing either
affect? Though the question may seem pointless—after all, the initial
“M” in either acronym stands for “mood”—a pair of studies by Perrig
and Perrig (1988) provides a good reason for raising it.
In the Perrigs’ first experiment, participants were asked to act as if
they were extremely happy or extremely sad while they studied, and
then immediately recalled, a mixed list of positive, neutral, and nega-
tive words (e.g., graduation, grass, and guilt). Though there was no
sizable difference between simulated-mood conditions in the recall of
neutral items, subjects feigning happiness recalled more positive
words, and fewer negative words, than did pseudosad subjects. This is
MCM—but in the absence of actual mood!
In their second experiment, the Perrigs again had happy and sad
simulators study a mixed list of unrelated words. This time, however,
subjects were tested for free recall in either the original or the alter-
native sham state. Though the Perrigs saw no sign of mood depen-
dence—performance was the same under matched versus mismatched
study and test conditions—they again found mood congruence—
subjects feigning happiness at both study and test recalled more posi-
tive words, and fewer negative words, than did subjects feigning
sadness at both study and test.
Considered collectively, the Perrigs’ results lead to the remarkable
conclusion that real moods are sufficient but not necessary for dem-
onstrating MCM. Rather than ascribing these results to task demands
or expectation effects, the Perrigs argued that the data are better
understood in terms of people’s knowledge “about doing what they
think they would do if they were actually in [a particular] mood” (p.
103).
The Perrigs’ research provided the incentive for the present study,
which sought to answer three questions. The first question is, do
simulated states of happiness or sadness give rise to mood-congruent
effects in the generation of autobiographical events—a task that has
already been shown to be sensitive to actual moods induced by vari-
ous means, including the CMT?

244 Copyright © 2000 American Psychological Society VOL. 11, NO. 3, MAY 2000
Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 5, 2016
 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
The second question, which presupposes an affirmative answer to
the first, is whether the mood-congruent effects evoked by simulated
moods differ qualitatively from those elicited by induced moods. In
both of the Perrigs’ studies, simulated happiness enhanced the recall
of positive words to the same extent as simulated sadness elevated the
recall of negative words—a pattern indicative of symmetric mood
congruence. However, in studies involving induced moods, the typical
finding has been one of asymmetric mood congruence—happy sub-
jects remember more positive than negative items, but sad subjects
remember both types equally well (see Blaney, 1986). A case in point
is our aforementioned study (Eich et al., 1994, Experiment 2): The
ratio of positive-to-negative events generated was 3:1 among subjects
who felt happy (means of 11.1 vs. 3.3), but only 1:1 among those who
were sad (means of 6.7 vs. 6.8).
According to Isen (1984), asymmetric mood congruence may arise
as a consequence of mood repair—a process by which people try to
feel better when they are feeling bad, but tend not to take themselves
down when they are feeling up (also see Clark & Isen, 1982; Ellis &
Hertel, 1993). Though this intuitively appealing account can be chal-
lenged (see Parrott, 1993), the important point is that simulated and
induced moods may produce distinctly different profiles of mood
congruence.
The third issue of interest is whether simulated moods have the
power to produce mood dependence in a test of autobiographical-
event recall. Though the Perrigs failed to find MDM with simulated
moods, it is by no means certain that they would have succeeded had
they used induced moods, given that their study task simply required
subjects to learn a list of unrelated words. Today, more than a decade
after the Perrigs published their seminal report, it is known that MDM
is more apt to occur when subjects produce the target events them-
selves—as they do in a task of autobiographical-event generation—
than when the events are provided to them by the experimenter—as in
the list-learning paradigm used by the Perrigs (see Bower & Forgas,
2000; Eich & Macaulay, 2000). Because it is also known, from the
work reviewed earlier, that shifts in induced moods reliably reduce
recall of autobiographical events, it is logical to ask whether shifts in
simulated moods do likewise.
METHOD
Subjects and Design
Forty-eight undergraduates (36 women and 12 men; mean age ⳱
19.6 years), skilled in English, received extra credit in return for their
participation. Subjects were tested individually throughout the course
of the study, which comprised two sessions and conformed to a 2 × 2
factorial design. One factor was the simulated mood—either happy
(H) or sad (S)—in which subjects generated autobiographical events
(during the encoding session), and the other factor was the simulated
mood—again, H versus S—in which they freely recalled these events
2 days later (during the retrieval session). The crossing of these factors
created four encoding/retrieval conditions (simulated H/H, H/S, S/H,
and S/S), each of which was represented by 12 randomly assigned
subjects.
Encoding Session
Every participant was apprised at the outset that
This study follows up on an earlier experiment in which students completed
VOL. 11, NO. 3, MAY 2000
Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 5, 2016
Eric Eich and Dawn Macaulay
several cognitive tasks while feeling either happy or sad—moods that we had
induced through a combination of music and thought. Though you will under-
take these same tasks, no attempt will be made to alter your mood. Instead, we
will ask you to perform these tasks as if you were in a particular mood, the
exact nature of which will be explained shortly. By doing so, we hope to
discover whether the cognitive effects of simulated moods are similar to, or
different from, those produced by actual moods.
Subsequently, subjects were given a copy of the affect grid: a 9 × 9
matrix of squares in which the columns connote varying levels of
pleasure—ranging from extremely unpleasant feelings on the far left
(scored as −4) through neutral in the center (0) to extremely pleasant
feelings on the far right (4)—and the rows represent differing degrees
of arousal—ranging from extremely high arousal at the top (4) to
extremely low arousal at the bottom (−4). On receiving instructions on
the grid’s form and function (see Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn,
1989), subjects checked the one square that best captured the actual
levels of pleasure and arousal they were currently experiencing.
Subjects were then introduced to the task of autobiographical-
event generation. Mirroring the methods we used previously (Eich et
al., 1994, Experiment 2), subjects were read a list of 16 neutral-noun
probes, each of which was intended to trigger the recollection of a
particular event from any time in the personal past. Upon hearing a
given probe, subjects were instructed to say “okay” as soon as a
specific autobiographical event came to mind. If the subjects failed to
generate such an event within 1 min, then that probe was skipped and
the next one was presented. If they succeeded, then the research
assistant, after logging generation latency (in seconds), asked the sub-
jects to recount the gist of the event (what happened, who was in-
volved, etc.).
Next, subjects rated the event’s (a) affective valence at the time it
transpired, (b) personal importance when it occurred, and (c) vivid-
ness with which it was recollected. Whereas original affective valence
was rated on a 9-point scale, ranging from extremely negative (−4)
through neutral (0) to extremely positive (4), original importance and
current vividness were rated on 5-point scales, ranging from not at all
important or vivid (1) to extremely important or vivid (5).
Immediately preceding presentation of the first probe, the assistant
instructed half of the subjects to perform all aspects of the event-
generation task as if they were happy, and instructed the other half to
do so as if they were sad; every participant was cautioned against
letting his or her true feelings drift in the direction of the specified
pseudomood. To make matters clearer, the assistant showed every
subject a clean copy of the affect grid. Depending on which mood the
subject was to simulate, the assistant marked an X either in the (upper
right) square corresponding to the combination of very pleasant feel-
ings and moderately high arousal or in the (lower left) square repre-
senting very unpleasant feelings in tandem with moderately low
arousal. These squares were selected because they typified the mean
pretask ratings of pleasure and arousal recorded by happy and sad
subjects in our study of induced moods (Eich et al., 1994). The intent
here was to enable the present subjects to simulate the same moods
that their predecessors had actually experienced.
Following the event-generation task, subjects were asked to cease
their mood simulation and to indicate their true current feelings on a
new affect grid. Subjects then departed, knowing that they should
return in 2 days for further testing, the exact nature of which would be
explained at that time.
245
 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Mood and Memory

Retrieval Session
After rating their actual current mood on an affect grid, subjects
were reminded that they had previously generated as many as 16
different autobiographical events in response to probe words. Now the
subjects’ task was to freely recall these probes aloud or, failing that,
the gist of the events they had triggered.
Half of the subjects were instructed to perform the recall task as if
they were happy—that is, feeling very pleasant and moderately
aroused—and the other half were instructed to do so as if they were
sad—that is, feeling very unpleasant and moderately unaroused.
Within each of these two recall conditions, half of the subjects simu-
lated the same mood they had feigned during event generation, and
half simulated the alternative sham state. All subject were advised not
to let the simulation affect their actual mood.
Following recall, but before they were debriefed, subjects were
asked to stop simulating and to mark a final affect grid to reflect their
actual current feelings.
RESULTS
Mood Ratings
Predictably, there were no significant differences among the four
encoding/retrieval conditions in how pleasant or aroused the subjects
felt before mood simulation began, Fs < 1. More important, the four
conditions were also equivalent in terms of the actual levels of plea-
sure and arousal experienced after mood simulation had ceased, Fs
< 1. Prior to either event generation or event recall, the average
pleasure rating was 1.14 and the average arousal rating was 0.31; at
the conclusion of these tasks, the corresponding means were 1.13 and
0.39, respectively. In actuality, then, the subjects were in a fairly
neutral mood at the start of the study as well as at its end, even though
they had feigned feeling otherwise in between.
Event Generation
To assess performance on this task, we derived six measures for
every subject. Two of these measures were (a) the number of gener-
ated events given a positive (1 to 4), neutral (0), or negative (−1 to −4)
rating of affective valence and (b) the mean intensity of positive and
negative events, scored on an absolute (1–4) scale; by definition,
neutral events had no discernible intensity. The other four measures,
which were computed for all three types of events, were (c) mean
event importance (range: 1–5), (d) mean event vividness (range: 1–5),
(e) median event age (months ago that the events occurred), and (f)
median generation latency (in seconds). The resulting scores were
then averaged over subjects in each simulated-mood condition to yield
the summary statistics shown on the left side of Table 1; for com-
parison purposes, the right side contains corresponding data from the
induced-mood conditions of Experiment 2 in our 1994 study (Eich et
al., 1994).
Three points merit comment in connection with the table. First,
neither the present study nor its precursor showed any sign of mood
congruence in terms of event importance, vividness, age, or genera-
tion latency; in no instance did the tell-tale interaction of event type
with generation mood (either simulated or induced) approach signifi-
cance, Fs(2, 60) < 2.12, ps > .10. However, each of these measures,

Table 1. Impact of simulated and induced moods on six measures of performance in the task of autobiographical-event generation

Simulated moods Induced moods

Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative
Measure and mood n events events events n events events events
Number of events generated
Happy 24 10.4 1.4 3.2 32 11.1 1.2 3.3
Sad 24 4.5 2.5 8.6 32 6.7 2.0 6.8
Intensity
Happy 21 2.5 — 2.2 32 2.6 — 2.2
Sad 21 1.9 — 2.3 31 2.2 — 2.3
Importance
Happy 12 2.5 1.8 2.9 24 2.6 1.8 2.7
Sad 20 2.1 1.9 2.7 27 2.5 1.9 2.9
Vividness
Happy 12 3.3 2.6 3.5 24 3.4 2.7 3.2
Sad 20 3.1 2.4 3.1 27 3.2 2.8 3.3
Age
Happy 12 24.0 25.0 32.8 24 33.7 50.6 39.4
Sad 20 49.1 54.9 34.8 27 52.6 57.1 48.3
Generation latency
Happy 12 8.6 13.9 10.8 24 9.7 13.3 12.6
Sad 20 9.1 13.3 10.3 27 10.5 16.3 12.0
Note. Results for simulated moods are from the present study; those for induced moods are from Eich, Macaulay, and Ryan (1994, Experiment 2).
n ⳱ number of subjects per mean score. Maximum number of events generated ⳱ 16. Event intensity was rated on a 4-point scale (1 ⳱ slightly;
4 ⳱ extremely); event importance and vividness were rated on 5-point scales (1 ⳱ not at all; 5 ⳱ extremely). Event age and generation latency
reflect median months and median seconds, respectively.

246 VOL. 11, NO. 3, MAY 2000

Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 5, 2016
 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
except age, revealed a reliable main effect of event type, Fs(2, 60) >
8.80, ps < .01: Compared with either positive or negative events,
neutral events were less important, less vivid, and slower to recollect.
Second, both studies succeeded in demonstrating mood congru-
ence in terms of both the number of events generated and ratings of
event intensity; in either case, the critical interaction of event type
with induced or simulated mood was significant, Fs(1–2, 40–124) >
7.11, ps < .01.
Third, the mood-congruent effects seen in the present study were
unlike those found in the earlier experiment. Consider the first two
rows of data in Table 1. Regardless of whether moods were simulated
or induced, happy subjects generated more positive than negative
events, Fs(1, 46–62) > 48.99, ps < .01. However, whereas subjects
simulating sadness showed a strong bias in the opposite direction,
generating significantly more negative than positive events, F(1, 46)
⳱ 15.40, p < .01, subjects induced to feel sad showed no bias, one
way or the other, F < 1.
Ratings of event intensity, summarized in the next two rows of the
table, showed the same pattern. When moods were simulated, happy
subjects rated positive events as being more intense than negative
events, F(1, 40) ⳱ 4.39, p < .05, whereas sad subjects did just the
opposite, F(1, 40) ⳱ 5.35, p < .05. When moods were induced,
however, happy subjects ascribed greater intensity to positive than to
negative events, F(1, 61) ⳱ 13.79, p < .01, but sad subjects saw them
the same, F < 1. In short, the mood-congruent effects elicited by
simulated moods were symmetric in form, whereas those associated
with induced moods were asymmetric.
Event Recall
Figure 1 illustrates the mean percentage of total events recalled
(i.e., positive, neutral, and negative events averaged together) in each
of the four encoding/retrieval conditions. The black bars represent
results from the present study of simulated moods, and the white bars
depict data from the previous study of induced moods (Eich et al.,
1994, Experiment 2).
Fig. 1. Total-event recall as a function of encoding/retrieval moods
(H ⳱ happy, S ⳱ sad). Black bars represent results from the present
study of simulated moods, and white bars depict data from a previous
study of induced moods (Eich, Macaulay, & Ryan, 1994, Experi-
ment 2).
VOL. 11, NO. 3, MAY 2000
Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 5, 2016
Eric Eich and Dawn Macaulay
Comparison of the two sets of results suggests two conclusions.
First, even when encoding and retrieval moods matched (as they did
in conditions H/H and S/S), recall was higher when moods were
simulated (mean ⳱ 46%) than when they were induced (mean ⳱
35%).
Second, the marked MDM effect seen with induced moods was
altogether absent with simulated moods. In the former case, the criti-
cal interaction between encoding and retrieval moods was significant,
F(1, 60) ⳱ 7.87, p < .01: Matched-mood subjects outperformed their
mismatched-mood peers by a reliable margin (means ⳱ 35% vs.
26%). In the latter case, however, the interaction was insignificant, F
< 1: Recall was no better when moods matched (mean ⳱ 46%) than
when they mismatched (mean ⳱ 49%).
Additional support for both of these conclusions was secured by
analyzing the percentages of positive, neutral, and negative events
recalled by a given subject who had generated at least one event of
each type. In the earlier experiment on induced moods, a 2 × 2 × 3
(Encoding Mood × Retrieval Mood × Event Type) analysis evinced
only one higher-order effect, that being the interaction between in-
duced moods at encoding and retrieval, F(1, 47) ⳱ 6.59, p < .01.
Relative to their mismatched-mood counterparts, subjects tested under
matched-mood conditions recalled more positive events (37% vs.
26%), neutral events (32% vs. 17%), and negative events (37% vs.
27%).
However, in the current investigation of simulated moods, a 2 × 2
× 3 analysis revealed no reliable effects, whether simple or interactive
(ps > .10). Taking the simulated H/H and S/S conditions together, the
recall of positive, neutral, and negative events averaged 48%, 33%,
and 42%, respectively. Though these figures exceeded the averages
found for the induced H/H and S/S conditions of the previous study
(cited in the previous paragraph), they were not significantly different
from the means obtained for the simulated H/S and S/H conditions of
the present study (50%, 48%, and 40%, respectively).
DISCUSSION
This study was prompted by three questions, two of which pertain
to MCM. First, in order to demonstrate mood congruence in a task of
autobiographical-event generation, is it sufficient for subjects to act as
if they are happy or sad, without their actually experiencing either
affect? Second, assuming that simulated MCM occurs, do the results
reveal a different pattern from that found for actual moods, such as
those induced via the CMT?
The answer to both questions is “yes.” Asked to recount incidents
from their personal past, happy subjects generated more emotionally
positive than negative events, and rated the former as being more
intense than the latter. Whether subjects felt happy, as they did in our
study of induced moods (Eich et al., 1994, Experiment 2), or whether
subjects feigned happiness instead, as they did in the present study of
simulated moods, made no difference.
There was, however, a striking difference between actual and
simulated sadness. In the earlier experiment, subjects induced to feel
sad generated the same number of positive and negative events, and
perceived them as equally intense. In contrast, the current study
showed that when subjects simulated sadness, negative events not
only outnumbered positive events by a two-to-one margin, but also
outscored them significantly in terms of emotional intensity. Thus, it
seems that although simulated MCM occurs, it is a qualitatively dif-
247
 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Mood and Memory
ferent phenomenon from induced MCM: Whereas the mood-congru-
ent effects elicited by simulated states of happiness and sadness are
symmetric in nature, those evoked by actual moods are asymmetric.
This difference makes sense in terms of Isen’s (1984) idea that
asymmetry stems from a process of mood repair in the case of sadness
but not happiness; that is, although people routinely strive to make a
bad mood better (e.g., by searching autobiographical memory for
pleasant events), they seldom try to make a good mood worse. Note
that this reasoning assumes that sadness is not only a bothersome
state, but a bona fide one as well. But if sadness is merely feigned
rather than truly felt, then there is no motive to engage in mood repair.
Hence, subjects who act as if they are sad show a strong bias toward
recollecting intensely negative events that is held in check by those
who are really sad.
Regarding the third question of current concern—do simulated
moods share with induced moods the power to produce mood depen-
dence in a test of autobiographical-event recall?—the answer is “no.”
Unlike our prior work with induced moods (Eich et al., 1994, Experi-
ment 2), the present research revealed no impairment in test perfor-
mance due to a mismatch between simulated encoding and retrieval
moods. Curiously, however, the overall level of recall observed in the
matched-mood conditions of the current study was substantially
higher than that found in the earlier experiment. One plausible reason
is suggested by the research of Ellis and his associates (e.g., Ellis &
Ashbrook, 1988; Seibert & Ellis, 1991). Their work implies that the
experience of a mood—good or bad—begets two effects that can
interfere with cognitive-task performance: a decrease in attentional
resources and an increase in the production of stray or task-irrelevant
thoughts. Provided they stay in a neutral state, subjects who simulate
happiness or sadness should be exempt from these effects, and hence
they should outperform their induced-mood peers.
Earlier we remarked that moods instilled by means of the CMT are
perceived by most subjects as having a high degree of authenticity or
affective realism. In view of the finding (Eich, 1995b) that subjects
who are most sincerely “moved” by the CMT show the strongest
mood-dependent effects, it is understandable that simulated moods
should fail to foster these effects.
What is hard to explain, however, is why the simulators showed no
sign of mood dependence, and yet exhibited an exaggerated, symmet-
ric form of mood congruence. Perhaps people have a better intuitive
understanding of the latter phenomenon than of the former. Alterna-
tively, it may be that they know that a match between encoding and
retrieval moods should improve memory performance, but cannot put
this knowledge into practice. In this regard, recall that every partici-
pant in the present study served in only one of the four encoding/
retrieval conditions. Even if the subject had a good grasp of the
concept of MDM, he or she would have been hard pressed to predict
how well (or poorly) subjects in any of the other conditions would fare
248
Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 5, 2016
in the test of event recall. Consequently, it would have been difficult
for the simulated-mood subject to put his or her knowledge of MDM
into practice, and act in a way that accurately mimicked the behavior
of induced-mood individuals.
Whatever the reason, the key point is that there seems to be some-
thing special about actual moods that give them the power to produce
mood dependence. A fundamental challenge for future MDM research
is to figure out just what this something is.
Acknowledgments—This research was funded by grants to the first author
from the (American) National Institute of Mental Health (MH59636) and
the (Canadian) Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
(37335), and it profited from the cogent advice and expert assistance
provided by Sherry Eich, Dale Affleck, and Leo Mitsiadis.
REFERENCES
Blaney, P.H. (1986). Affect and memory: A review. Psychological Bulletin, 99, 229–246.
Bower, G.H., & Forgas, J.P. (2000). Affect, memory, and social cognition. In E. Eich, J.F.
Kihlstrom, G.H. Bower, J.P. Forgas, & P.M. Niedenthal, Cognition and emotion
(pp. 100–189). New York: Oxford University Press.
Clark, M.S., & Isen, A.M. (1982). Toward understanding the relationship between feeling
states and social behavior. In A.H. Hastorf & A.M. Isen (Eds.), Cognitive social
psychology (pp. 73–108). New York: Elsevier.
Eich, E. (1995a). Mood as a mediator of place dependent memory. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: General, 124, 293–308.
Eich, E. (1995b). Searching for mood dependent memory. Psychological Science, 6,
67–75.
Eich, E., Kihlstrom, J.F., Bower, G.H., Forgas, J.P., & Niedenthal, P.M. (2000). Cognition
and emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Eich, E., & Macaulay, D. (2000). Fundamental factors in mood dependent memory. In J.P.
Forgas (Ed.), The role of affect in social cognition (pp. 109–130). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Eich, E., Macaulay, D., & Lam, R.W. (1997). Mania, depression, and mood dependent
memory. Cognition and Emotion, 11, 607–618.
Eich, E., Macaulay, D., & Ryan, L. (1994). Mood dependent memory for events of the
personal past. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 123, 201–215.
Ellis, H.C., & Ashbrook, P.W. (1988). Resource allocation model of the effects of de-
pressed mood states on memory. In K. Fiedler & J. Forgas (Eds.), Affect, cognition
and social behavior (pp. 25–43). Toronto: Hogrefe.
Ellis, H.C., & Hertel, P.T. (1993). Cognition, emotion, and memory: Some applications
and issues. In C. Izawa (Ed.), Cognitive psychology applied (pp. 199–215).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Isen, A.M. (1984). Toward understanding the role of affect in cognition. In R.S. Wyer &
T.K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 179–230). Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Parrott, W.G. (1993). Beyond hedonism: Motives for inhibiting good moods and for
maintaining bad moods. In D.M. Wegner & J.W. Pennebaker (Eds.), Handbook of
mental control (pp. 278–305). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Perrig, W.J., & Perrig, P. (1988). Mood and memory: Mood-congruity effects in absence
of mood. Memory & Cognition, 16, 102–109.
Russell, J.A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 39, 1161–1178.
Russell, J.A., Weiss, A., & Mendelsohn, G.A. (1989). Affect grid: A single-item scale of
pleasure and arousal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 493–502.
Seibert, P.S., & Ellis, H.C. (1991). Irrelevant thoughts, emotional mood states, and cog-
nitive task performance. Memory & Cognition, 19, 507–513.
(RECEIVED 7/29/99; ACCEPTED 11/30/99)
VOL. 11, NO. 3, MAY 2000