Utilities Policy 80 (2023) 101469

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Utilities Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jup

Full-length article

Assessing the public-private partnership handover: Experience from China’s

water sector
Fengyu Bao a, Igor Martek b, Albert P.C. Chan c, Chuan Chen d, *, Yang Yang c, Heng Yu a
a
School of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Chengdu University, No. 2025, Chengluo Avenue, Chengdu, Sichuan, China
b
School of Architecture and Built Environment, Deakin University, Geelong, VIC, 3220, Australia
c
Department of Building and Real Estate, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
d
Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu, Sichuan, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Most infrastructure public-private partnerships (PPPs) are returned to the government once the contract term
Public-private partnerships expires. Before the handover, a preparatory period, known as the “handover stage (HS),” is needed to determine
PPP whether the project is fit for handover. However, to date, no means to assess the performance status of the
Handover stage
handover management has been established. This study addresses this practical demand by establishing a
Project success
Key performance measurement indicators
definition of handover success and identifying and evaluating criteria for the measurement of handover success,
Water sector which contributes to a better understanding of HS management.
China

1. Introduction
Compared with traditional public procurement of infrastructure
projects, the public-private partnership (PPP) mode is more complex
and characterized by a lengthy concession period (EIB, 2012; Kim and
Thuc, 2021). The last stage of the concession period, known as the
handover stage (HS), is where the project assets revert to government
control, which should be a smooth transition (Bao et al., 2018a; World
Bank, 2014). Nevertheless, the transition is challenging because the HS
occurs over a comparatively short period (usually no more than two
years) compared with the decades of operation under the concession­
aire. Moreover, given that the government has been kept at arms-length
during project operation, the private sector tends to opportunistically
run down project assets during the last years of operation, resulting in
the returned project operating sub-optimally (World Bank, 2016a; Yuan
et al., 2018). Consequently, returned projects run the risk of exacerbated
maintenance, safety, and failure issues, even compromising service de­
livery to the citizenry (Bao et al., 2019).
Given the private party’s asymmetric informational advantage, it is
incumbent on governments to strengthen their knowledge of a project’s
operational status. However, governments remain unclear whether
project handover has been accomplished satisfactorily, even after the
completion of the HS (Abdul-Aziz, 2001; Bao et al., 2018a). Thus, this
study aims to identify criteria pertinent to measuring handover success,
specifically by (1) defining handover success, (2) identifying and eval­
uating criteria for handover success, and (3) proposing managerial
recommendations and a regime for handover performance
measurement.
This study focuses on HS when the concession period expires, which
is the usual scenario for most PPPs. For the other scenario, when the
contract terminates earlier, HS still exists but may be beset by unique
issues that would not occur in a normal situation (e.g., compensation
payments issues) (Marques, 2021). Due to the concentrated research
purposes, HS resulting from early termination is not included in the
research scope of this study.
China’s PPP water sector is chosen as the object of study because the
Chengdu No. 6 Water Plant B Project (hereafter referred to as the B-
project) is the first Chinese project to have completed the entirety of the
HS (Bao et al., 2018b). The B-project was developed in the late 1990s
through a national PPP experimental program, which the central gov­
ernment of China initiated to attract more foreign investments into
China’s infrastructure market. After an 18-year debatable concession
period, the B-project was handed over to the local government in 2018.
This study aims to investigate the handover performance of PPPs

* Corresponding author. Chuan Chen Business School, Sichuan University, 29 Jiuyanqiao Wangjiang Road, Chengdu, 610065, China.
E-mail addresses: baofengyu@cdu.edu.cn (F. Bao), igormartek@yahoo.com (I. Martek), albert.chan@polyu.edu.hk (A.P.C. Chan), chenchuan.scu@qq.com
(C. Chen), jackie.yyang@polyu.edu.hk (Y. Yang), yuheng@cdu.edu.cn (H. Yu).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2022.101469
Received 23 March 2022; Received in revised form 22 November 2022; Accepted 22 November 2022
Available online 24 November 2022
0957-1787/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
F. Bao et al. Utilities Policy 80 (2023) 101469

empirically. China’s water sector, where practitioners have experienced
the entire HS, emerged as a suitable empirical research object because
empirical evidence was collected from direct participants of the HS of
the B-project and other experienced professionals and researchers with
constant observations on this project and China’s PPP water sector.
The research methods include a literature review, qualitative in­
terviews, a questionnaire survey, and statistical analysis. The innovation
of this study lies in establishing a practical performance measurement
framework for the long-neglected handover process of water PPPs. This
study extends the range of literature on PPP performance measurement
to the end of the project life cycle, partly bridging the missing link be­
tween the concession period and the post-handover stages. Research
findings provide researchers with a more comprehensive understanding
of phase-based performance measurement of PPPs. Practitioners, espe­
cially those in developing economies’ water PPP sector, can benefit from
the managerial recommendations and the applicable handover perfor­
mance measurement method when making handover-related decisions.
This study proceeds with a brief literature review on the performance
measurement of PPPs, research methodology, research results, and
discussion, and closes with a conclusion.
framework that can be used across all the levels enumerated above
(Yang et al., 2010).
When assessing the performance of PPP, many PPP initiatives avoid
going through careful monitoring or evaluation of the execution,
including countries with a mature PPP system (Shrestha et al., 2017b).
This scenario creates issues concerning implementing PPPs across
different sectors (Liu et al. (2015d). Moreover, this PPP performance
evaluation is reasonably challenging because the process requires the
complex participation of multiple stakeholders with profound conflicts
throughout the different levels (EIB, 2012). Accordingly, researchers
have recommended numerous assessment angles, such as stage-based
(project span) perspectives and stakeholder and procedure-centered
standpoints (Liu et al., 2015b, 2016a, 2021; Liyanage and
Villalba-Romero, 2015; Yuan et al., 2009a). Among the performance
measurement frameworks suggested, the KPIs model surfaces as the
most resilient. Subsequently, after recognizing this pattern, the current
research embraces the KPIs model when constructing a performance
measurement framework of the HS.
3. Research methodology

2. PPP performance measurement: a literature review The current study attained its objectives using multiple logic
framework methods (LFM), literature review, qualitative interview,
Literature has characterized performance measurement as a method questionnaire survey, and statistical analysis. First, LFM, a frequent tool
implemented by organizations or individuals to determine at what level employed to depict project success, was used to define handover success.
they have attained their targets via administrative executions (Bititci Then, the criteria of handover performance were recognized through a
et al., 1997; Kagioglou et al., 2001; Neely et al., 2002). Therefore, literature review and viewpoints of masters in China’s water PPP sector.
determining the success criteria first lays the groundwork for the per­ A questionnaire survey later assessed the effectiveness of these original
formance measurement of a PPP (Al-Tmeemy et al., 2011). The subse­ handover success criteria. Finally, suitable statistical analysis techniques
quent section examines PPP performance criteria and popular processed the data gathered. The overall research methodology used in
frameworks for measuring PPP performance. this study is summarized in Fig. 1 and reported in detail in subsequent
sections.
2.1. PPP success criteria
3.1. Defining handover success using LFM
Determining project success tends to be vague, given the numerous
stakeholders’ varying expectations. In addition, the several stages of a
LFM grants that the different targets of a particular project can be
project expect variations in their objectives (Sanvido et al., 1992). Thus,
generated using a tiered arrangement with causal links among various
previous research has scrutinized PPP success criteria by focusing on the
targets (Baccarini, 1999). Specifically, two elements constitute the
unique junctures. Aziz (2007) briefly described the eight principles for
success of projects: product success and project management success.
the program-level application of PPP. Leviäkangas et al. (2016) pro­
Product success is linked with project goals. The goal leans toward
posed a three-level model that assesses PPP projects in their early stages.
continuing ends, whereas the purpose denotes the interim ends. Project
Meanwhile, Ng et al. (2012) discovered significant critical success fac­
tors (CSFs) in judging viability. Other researchers have examined CSFs
contributing to procurement success (Jefferies, 2006; Tiong, 1996;
Zhang, 2005). Yuan et al. (2009b) established performance objectives
and indicators. Osei-Kyei et al. (2017) underlined and distinguished
between CSFs and KPIs and offered additional PPP performance criteria
based on a global study.
Extant research concerning the success of PPP projects contains two
principal limitations: (1) most prevailing success criteria are uneven and
mistaken as CSFs, and (2) research has scarcely developed a systematic
study on the success of the HS.

2.2. Frameworks for measuring PPP performance

Measuring performance is crucial when targeting management effi­

cacy (Bassioni et al., 2004; Neely, 1999). Accordingly, specific perfor­
mance measurement frameworks have been developed for the
construction industry. Yang et al. (2010) determined three of these
frameworks: (1) the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) model, (2) the European
Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) excellence model, and (3)
the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) model. However, performance
effects occur at different levels: (1) the project, (2) the organization, and
(3) the stakeholders (Yang et al., 2010). Therefore, the BSC model em­
phasizes the administrative level, the EFQM model applies to the level of
projects and organizations, and the KPIs model is notably the sole Fig. 1. Research framework.

2
F. Bao et al. Utilities Policy 80 (2023) 101469

management success underlines the course of the project, highlighting
the requirements in the process and the manner of carrying out the
process. Therefore, product success generally has more urgency than
project management courses (Baccarini, 1999). Researchers have
employed LFM in defining the success of PPPs (Al-Tmeemy et al., 2011;
Liu et al., 2015c). Because of the above, the current research defines the
handover success of China’s water PPPs by implementing the indicated
procedure.
success criteria for PPPs to address the HS and 2) forward the established
items of the handover success criteria to specialists in the Chinese PPP
water field for appraisal. The specialists assessed the suitability of the
enumerated criteria and amended the itemized steps (amendment,
extension, or deletion) according to their interpretation if necessary.
The procedure mentioned above resulted in 14-item criteria during
the final handover success list, as shown in Table 1. Thirteen were
revised from pertinent works and aptly rearticulated (Chan and Chan,

3.1.1. Constructing handover success definition framework

In keeping with the LFM model, the current research describes the Table 1
handover success of China’s water PPPs at two tiered levels: handover Handover success criteria of China’s water PPP projects (data from Chan and
product success (HPS) and handover management success (HMS), as Chan (2004); Liyanage and Villalba-Romero (2015); Liu et al. (2015); Osei-Kyei
shown in Fig. 1. HPS refers to the ultimate result of the handover pro­ et al. (2017) and the viewpoints of the specialist interviewees).
cess, which suggests the goal and purpose of the handover. For a long- Performance Success criteria Definitions
term aim, in the case of the water sector, the handover goal entails aims
guaranteeing the nonstop supply of clean water once the handover HPS Entire technology Technological knowledge,
process is completed (Zhong et al., 2008). As a short-term aim, the handover operation guidance, and expertise
handover purpose facilitates the handover goal by ensuring the handing are handed over to the successor in
their entirety.
over of the project is a vigorously enduring, successfully preserved, and
Absence of environmental Handover does not harm people’s
functioning procedure (EIB, 2012). destruction health or the environment.
HMS refers to the process of handover management. Baccarini Protracted cooperation Both parties can undertake the due
(1999) described the project management process as having key obligations of their own during the
quality warranty period.
three-part aspects: (1) time, cost, and quality; (2) quality of the project
Acceptable asset condition Assets received to meet the demand
management process; and (3) stakeholders’ requirements. Numerous on residual value and function.
researchers have embraced these three perspectives that highlight PPP Consecutive water Regular water service is not
success (e.g., Liu et al. (2015c); Liyanage and Villalba-Romero (2015). production interrupted by the handover.
Concerning the handover of PPP water projects, the meaning of HMS Steady profit Handover does not influence the
project’s income stability.
parallels these three perspectives but requires further revision. Distinct
Consecutive economic Handover does not interrupt
from the earlier stages with tangible productions (e.g., the construction contribution economic contributions, such as tax
stage with physical structures and the operational stage with potable revenues and employment
water), the handover process creates no new physical product. Conse­ opportunities.
Well-timed assignment of a Qualified succeeding operator is
quently, the “quality” of the “time, cost, and quality” aspect is elimi­
qualified succeeding assigned timely.
nated to adapt to the nature of HS. Thus, the HMS in the present case operator
could be established as (1) time and cost standards, (2) efficacy of the HMS Decreased changes and PPP contract alterations and
handover procedure, and (3) stakeholder contentment (see Fig. 2). disputes conflicts are curtailed over the
In keeping with the logic framework of handover success, the current handover procedure.
Decreased staff oppositions Staff opposition concerning breach
study establishes two handover performance aims: HPS and HMS. Then,
of self-benefit is decreased.
determining particular success criteria that belong to each of the two Decreased public public oppositions concerning
aims is the next important step in defining handover success. The next oppositions breach of public benefit are
part details the course for categorizing these criteria and their outcomes. decreased.
Operative risk mitigation Risks pertinent to handover are
effectively mitigated.
3.1.2. Identifying criteria for measuring handover success Observance of a financial The handover stage is
Literature on PPP fails to form a checklist of the HS success criteria. plan accomplished according to the
Consequently, the current research uses a broader analysis of previous financial plan.
research and qualitative interview to identify the criteria through the Observance of timetable The handover stage is
accomplished according to the
following processes: 1) perform a rigorous examination of pertinent
timetable.
research done earlier, including determining and reconfiguring broad

Fig. 2. Definition of handover success via logic framework method (adapted from Al-Tmeemy et al. (2011); Liu et al. (2015)).

3
F. Bao et al.
2004; Liu et al., 2015c; Liyanage and Villalba-Romero, 2015; Osei-Kyei
et al., 2017). Various researchers have often debated these criteria, and
international PPP experts have also verified their effectiveness in
gauging the success of PPP (Osei-Kyei et al., 2017). Additionally, experts
put forward one further criterion, the well-timed assignment of a qualified
succeeding operator, as essential simultaneously to the procedure after
the handover and the effortless implementation of the HS. Subsequently,
the criteria were classified into two types: eight were HPS, and six were
HMS. Table 1 presents the details of the criteria definitions and classi­
fications, with further discussions after that.
3.1.3. Criteria for HPS
HPS has an effect on handover management, characterized by
handover goal and handover purpose. HPS is judged more vital than
HMS (Baccarini, 1999) as the government must accept the PPP project
even with sub-par performance (Abdul-Aziz, 2001). In measuring HPS, 8
of the 14 criteria require attention because they are linked to the
continuing project ends (Table 2), comprising three items for the
handover goal and five for the handover purpose.
Handover goal. The handover marks the conclusion of the PPP
contract and the beginning of operation after the concession period (Bao
et al., 2018a). This HS feature demonstrates the distinction between the
handover goal and the purpose. The handover goal or the continuing
aim of the handover represents the procedure after the concession
period. In contrast, the handover purpose suggests the comparatively
interim aim of concluding the partnership period. Hence, the criteria
signifying the handover goal are those aims aligned with the initial
targets of acquiring the PPP project. For example, for water PPPs, the
local governments target efficient, high-quality water provision
(Romano et al., 2017). In addition, China’s local governments also want
to utilize the PPP model to cut administrative costs, thereby allowing
public funds to be diverted to other financing needs (Chan et al., 2009).
Nonetheless, all such efforts are unrealistic if the private sector does
not show active involvement. Accordingly, water PPPs must generate
steady profit for a sustained concession period if they are to be a magnet
for private investment. Thus, in the longer term, three handover success
criteria narrowly connected with the original project end establish the
handover goal:
● Consecutive water production;
● Steady profit; and
● Consecutive economic contribution.
Handover purpose. Handover purpose represents the method of
realizing the handover goal. From a near-term view, the HS must lead to
a vigorous received business. Additionally, the state of the received
business is revealed in the instantaneous outcomes of the handover
operation (Fig. 1). Therefore, the criteria appropriate to the handover
purpose are the ones from the direct outcomes of handover manage­
ment. A complete comparison is possible by considering the key prod­
ucts of the HS and determining which of the handover success criterion
can be associated with the handover purpose. To illustrate, Bao et al.
(2019) indicated that enhanced public assets are among some of the
Table 2
Professional information of the 52 expert respondents.
Professional areas Profession titles Working Involved sectors
experience
(yrs)
Private sector 35% Senior 58% >10 19% Water
Public sector 20% Middle 29% 8 to 37% Municipal
10
Academic 20 Frontline 9% 4 to 7 13% Transport
institute
Consultancy 17% Others 4% 1 to 3 31% Energy
Others 8% Others
Utilities Policy 80 (2023) 101469
instantaneous HS outcomes.
Meanwhile, a criterion named acceptable asset condition is incorpo­
rated into the list of handover success criteria. The apparent link be­
tween the product, public assets, and the acceptable asset condition
criterion allows the criterion to be added to the handover purpose
classification. Correspondingly, many additional couplings were docu­
mented, namely, entire technology handover and knowledge handover,
protracted cooperation and public assets, and well-timed assignment of
qualified succeeding operator and succeeding operator. Moreover, the
absence of environmental destruction was categorized into the handover
purpose (Chan et al., 2005). Overall, five handover performance criteria
can be classified into handover purposes:
● Acceptable asset condition.
● Entire technology handover.
● Absence of environmental destruction
● Protracted cooperation.
● Well-timed assignment of a qualified succeeding operator.
3.1.4. HMS criteria
HMS highlights the operation of the handover procedure of water
PPPs (Liu et al., 2015c) as measured by time and cost standards, the
efficacy of the handover procedure, and stakeholder contentment (see
Fig. 2). In conformity with this designation, the current study catego­
rized the remaining six criteria.
Time and cost. Systematically arranging the handover process is
essential given that many tasks, such as renovation and asset evaluation,
require completion in a relatively short period of one to two years (EIB,
2012). Failure to follow the set deadline would mean a breach of the
concession agreement. Apart from the timetable, project handover needs
financial investment in undertaking the desired maintenance and
overhaul assumed by the private sector (Bao et al., 2018a). Therefore,
planning and enforcing are necessary for the budget for the handover
management. Consequently, to measure HMS, two criteria require
consideration:
● Observance of financial plan and
● Observance of timetable.
Efficacy. While the time and cost standards appraise the handover
procedure’s performance, the process’ efficacy also requires delibera­
tion (de Wit, 1988). The issues affecting the efficacy of the project
operation procedure differ and include various items from resources
through liaison between stakeholders over unforeseen deviations (Bac­
carini, 1999). Crucial changes may prompt renegotiation, which could
negatively affect the efficacy of the project operation procedure (de
Brux, 2010; Javed et al., 2014). Regrettably, the intricacy of PPPs
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2002) renders the changes highly inevitable. This
scenario demands operative risk mitigation throughout the enduring
collaboration between the public and private parties. A crucial tactic to
deal with PPP risks successfully is compartmentalizing project stages
because each step needs individualized risk management tactics
(Shrestha et al., 2017a). Following the scrutiny above, the current
research categorizes two criteria judging the efficacy of HMS:
● Decreased changes and disputes and
● Operative risk mitigation.
Stakeholder contentment. Stakeholder resistance primarily ex­
plains the failure of PPPs (El-Gohary et al., 2006). While different
42 stakeholders engage in PPP projects with diverse intentions, these un­
30
dertakings are all completed through the same project operation course
25 (Yuan et al., 2010). In this case, balancing the interests of relevant
stakeholders for a win-win scenario is significant for PPP success
12 (Carbonara et al., 2014; Carbonara and Pellegrino, 2018; Eshun et al.,
6
2021). Throughout the partnership duration of PPP water projects,
4
F. Bao et al.
stakeholders may have positively met their goals. At the HS construc­
tion, subcontractors and creditors may contemplate withdrawing their
participation (Bao et al., 2018b), and they may consider the handover
process to have little influence. By contrast, handover effects can be
significant for other stakeholders, such as project employees and the
public, with persistent interest. For instance, employees may fail to
benefit if the succeeding operator declines to keep them (Bao et al.,
2019), while the public will expect the sustained provision of the PPP
utility, adequate low-cost, sanitary water. Therefore, the handover may
receive doubts from these two groups in the HS. Thus, two criteria
associated with two vital stakeholders of the HS are classified into the
HMS:
● Decreased staff opposition and
● Decreased public opposition.
3.2. Evaluating handover success criteria
3.2.1. Collection of research data
The current study assessed the efficacy of the original handover
success criteria through a questionnaire survey. Thus, to minimize
possible subjectivity of the survey results, this study first determined the
experts who were closely involved in China’s water PPP sector as the
scope for respondent selection, that is, professional respondents in the
PPP water sector of China from four areas: public sector, private entity,
consulting industry, and academic institution (Bao et al., 2019). Then, a
survey started with formal communication with the respondent to
elaborate on the contents of the survey and answer any questions from
the respondent. During the survey, the research team maintained reg­
ular communications with respondents to provide timely assistance.
Respondents were instructed to score the efficacy of each handover
success criterion on a five-point scale taken from the popularly
employed measuring scale proposed by Likert (1932). The scale is rated
from 1 to 5, with 1 denoting very low, 2 low, 3 moderate, 4 high, and 5
very high. The current study describes criteria with high efficacy in
gauging handover success as key handover performance indicators
(KHPIs).
The research team conducted the surveys between August 2017 and
February 2018 during the handover process of the B-project. For ease of
access, questionnaires were distributed via the Internet, specifically
email, QQ, and WeChat. The researchers disseminated the online
questionnaire on a snowballing basis, with participants asked to endorse
the subsequent respondents with suitable expertise and experience.
Fifty-two respondents from eight provinces of China answered the
online questionnaire survey, and they represented all four primarily
chosen sectors. Table 2 details the following: 35% of respondents came
from the private entity, 20% from the public sector, and 20% from ac­
ademic/research institutes, with a final 17% from consultancies. More
than 80% of respondents assumed middle or senior management posi­
tions; all had engaged in at least five PPP projects in China and most
possessed cross-sector experience. Therefore, the sample population was
demonstrated to be the most suitable.
3.2.2. One-sample t-test
Processing the data gathered through the questionnaire survey was
made possible using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS)
software for quantitative analysis. The current research conducted a
one-sample t-test as the primary statistical technique. The one-sample t-
test is a parametric inferential statistical method to check the theory that
a sample is extracted from a population with an identifiable mean
(Duignan, 2016). This procedure was extensively utilized to detect
certain factors with statistical significance, such as CSFs and critical risk
factors (Hwang et al., 2013). Furthermore, this method is forecasted to
obtain efficacy despite a small sample size of 30 cases (Abu-Bader,
2011). Therefore, keeping in mind the research goals and sample size,
the one-sample t-test was chosen as the appropriate method to detect
5
Utilities Policy 80 (2023) 101469
KHPIs.
The current research defined the two parameters, test value, and
significance level, following the standard recognized in similar research
(Chan et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016b). The test value for detecting KHPIs
was fixed at 3, with 0.05 set for the significance level for the test.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Summary of data analysis outcomes
Table 3 presents the mean scores and rankings under different expert
groups for the effectiveness of handover success criteria, numbered from
SC1 to SC14. The mean scores of experts were from 3.83 to 3.15. SC5,
consecutive water production, obtained the highest score at 3.83, and
SC1, entire technology handover, follows at 3.81. The third and fourth
rankings are taken by SC4 and SC8, with the two acquiring mean scores
over 3.70 (3.79 and 3.73). The other three criteria, SC2, SC14, and SC12,
recorded scores from 3.60 to 3.70 and are ranked in the fifth, sixth, and
seventh places. SC3 placed eighth with a score of 3.58, while the
remaining criteria, SC9, SC11, SC13, SC10, SC6, and SC7, recorded
scores less than 3.50, successively taking the final six places of the ef­
ficacy measure of the 14 handover success criteria.
As to the highest five effective criteria for measuring handover suc­
cess, a pattern could be seen; that is, evaluations of the academic and
private entity respondents are analogous with respect to the arrange­
ment of the positions, with one exception, SC10. Respondents ranked
“Decreased staff oppositions” (SC10) in fifth place from the private
sector and 14th from academia. Fig. 3 also displays higher mean scores
from academics and private investors than those from government and
consultancies, indicating possible lesser attention from these two groups
on handover success criteria. This result may prompt the local admin­
istrative units of the state and the consulting industry to join the con­
struction of water PPPs to strengthen communicative bonds with PPP
scholars and private participants when addressing the issues affecting
the handover procedure.
4.2. Identifying the KHPIs
This study carried out a one-sample t-test to establish the KHPIs. As
stated earlier, it investigated the whole means of the handover success
criteria to check whether they have statistical significance at a confi­
dence level of 95% and a p-value of 0.05, alongside a test value set at
3.00. This study defines the null hypothesis, H0, as the mean score has no
statistical significance, while the other hypothesis, H1, has the opposite
result. Should the p-value of the test result be below 0.05, the null hy­
pothesis ought to be overruled. Thus, the pertinent criteria may be
considered one KHPI. Table 4 summarizes the test findings of the
comparative efficacy of the handover success criteria. From the table,
only SC6 and SC7 have p-values above 0.05, whereas the remaining
values gain significance levels below 0.05. Finally, 12 of the 14 hand­
over success criteria are crucial to effectively gauge the success of the HS
of PPP water projects in China and have the potential to take the defi­
nition of KHPIs. The exclusion of SC6, steady profit, and SC7, consecu­
tive economic contribution, outside KHPIs indicates the distinctiveness
of the HS. For PPP lifecycle stages before HS, pursuing stable income and
support to the local finance of PPPs shall be deemed essential in gauging
performance (Osei-Kyei et al., 2017); however, variation may exist in
the case of the HS in China’s water PPPs. The B-project is an example
because profitability was never an issue for the private sector, which
obtained monthly fixed revenue from the public sector because of the
“take-or-pay” principle specified in the concession agreement (Chen,
2009). In practice, the majority of current Chinese water PPPs somewhat
utilized the criterion given by the B-project, with the agreement set up
and risk mitigation arrangement as examples (Chen, 2009). It implies
that the profit of the private party in China’s water PPP sector should not
be a significant problem because the government primarily handles the
F. Bao et al. Utilities Policy 80 (2023) 101469

Table 3
Means and ranks for the efficacy of handover success criteria.
Success criteria Overall results Academic circle Public sector Private entity Consulting industry

N Mean Rank N Mean Rank N Mean Rank N Mean Rank N Mean Rank

SC1: Entire technology handover 52 3.81 2 11 4.18 3 9 3.78 1 18 3.94 3 11 3.45 1

SC2: Absence of environmental destruction 52 3.65 5 11 4.00 6 9 3.78 1 18 3.61 11 11 3.45 1
SC3: Protracted cooperation 52 3.58 8 11 3.91 8 9 3.56 3 18 3.72 8 11 3.18 8
SC4: Acceptable asset condition 52 3.79 3 11 4.27 2 9 3.56 3 18 4.11 2 11 3.09 10
SC5: Consecutive water production 52 3.83 1 11 4.36 1 9 3.44 5 18 4.22 1 11 3.18 8
SC6: Steady profit 52 3.19 13 11 3.73 11 9 3.11 9 18 3.33 13 11 2.55 14
SC7: Consecutive economic contribution 52 3.15 14 11 3.73 12 9 3.00 12 18 3.33 13 11 2.64 13
SC8: Well-timed assignment of qualified succeeding 52 3.73 4 11 4.18 4 9 3.33 6 18 3.94 4 11 3.45 1
operator
SC9: Decreased changes and disputes 52 3.46 9 11 3.64 13 9 3.33 6 18 3.50 12 11 3.45 1
SC10: Decreased staff opposition 52 3.33 12 11 3.64 14 9 3.00 12 18 3.83 5 11 2.82 11
SC11: Decreased public opposition 52 3.46 9 11 3.91 9 9 3.11 9 18 3.72 8 11 3.27 7
SC12: Operative risk mitigation 52 3.62 7 11 4.00 7 9 3.33 6 18 3.78 7 11 3.36 5
SC13: Observance of a financial plan 52 3.35 11 11 3.82 10 9 3.00 12 18 3.67 10 11 2.82 11
SC14: Observance of timetable 52 3.65 5 11 4.18 5 9 3.11 9 18 3.83 5 11 3.36 5

the current research that the HPS has more significance than the HMS.
With the overall mean of individual KHPI, the means of the HPS and
HMS groups could be acquired as 3.73 and 3.48, respectively. Further­
more, the mean of each factor group can designate the comparative
significance of the said group (Ozorhon and Karahan, 2017). Accord­
ingly, the computed means of the HPS and HMS groups, 3.73 against
3.48, confirm the conjecture regarding the variances. In addition to the
result above, data investigation generated further evidence that estab­
lished the efficacy distinction of the KHPIs among numerous handover
aims (see Fig. 4). The following section discusses the details.
Fig. 4 illustrates that HPS has two aims: handover goal and purpose.
From LFM theory, the first has an upper ladder of efficacy in gauging
handover performance. The data investigation results suggest that
consecutive water production (SC5), recognized as the single KHPI
belonging to the handover goal, placed first among all the 12 KHPIs,
Fig. 3. Line diagram of the efficacy scores of the handover success criteria. having a mean of 3.83. This top score effectively validates the theory
linked with the handover goal and purpose. To gauge the success of the
PPP lifecycle before the HS, earlier research, such as Osei-Kyei et al.
Table 4 (2017), recognized dependable and superior product delivery as the
Results of the one-sample t-test of the handover success criteria. vital success criterion. With regard to handover success, consecutive
Success criteria N Mean Rank t df Sig. (2-tailed) water production is placed first among all criteria, given that the target
SC1 52 3.81 2 5.554 51 0.000 is anticipated to meet considerable obstacles in the HS (Chan et al.,
SC2 52 3.65 5 4.217 51 0.000 2005). This finding suggests that when crafting a project handover
SC3 52 3.58 8 3.814 51 0.000 scheme, the government should primarily arrange the consistency of
SC4 52 3.79 3 4.900 51 0.000
steady and superior product deliveries during the handover procedure.
SC5 52 3.83 1 5.619 51 0.000
SC6 52 3.19 13 1.399 51 0.168* All the five criteria in the handover purpose group, i.e., SC1, SC4,
SC7 52 3.15 14 1.158 51 0.252* SC8, SC2, and SC3, with scores ranging from 3.58 to 3.81, were classi­
SC8 52 3.73 4 4.849 51 0.000 fied as KHPIs. Following LFM, the above five criteria are deemed stra­
SC9 52 3.46 9 3.096 51 0.003 tegies to obtain the handover goal. In particular, the entire technology
SC10 52 3.33 12 2.148 51 0.037
SC11 52 3.46 9 3.045 51 0.004
handover (SC1) had the top efficacy among the five criteria, with an
SC12 52 3.62 7 4.081 51 0.000 adjacent rating to SC5. As for the water industry, the technology benefit
SC13 52 3.35 11 2.306 51 0.025 of the private investor, such as explicit expertise, is one of the chief
SC14 52 3.65 5 3.975 51 0.000 government concerns regarding whether to apply the PPP model (Cheng
Note: * The result of the one-sample t-test is insignificant. and Tiong, 2005; Lima et al., 2021). Nevertheless, at the end of the HS,
the private investor’s technological edge must end such dependence
revenue risk (Bao et al., 2018b). Therefore, expert respondents because the public sector must occupy the task. Against such a backdrop,
well-informed of this practice are anticipated to provide a poor rating for technological matters associated with the operation process necessitate
the criterion of steady profit. Regarding criterion SC7, its poor rating handover from the private party to the succeeding operator designated
cannot obtain the status as proof of its irrelevance in the HS. As a sub­ by the public sector through the HS to maintain continuous product
stitute, evaluating the effect of the project success criteria, such as SC7, delivery. In addition to the intrinsic importance of the technology, fac­
appears difficult (Frey, 2013) and a task beyond the brief stage of the HS. tors highly associated with the technology are also necessary, such as
perfectly functioning assets (see SC4), which is the object of the tech­
nology application, and the qualified successor (see SC8), who utilizes
4.3. KHPI discourse that technology.
Regarding PPP water projects, ecological problems such as fresh­
Product success is arguably more significant than project manage­ water contamination are profound threats worsening the complications
ment success (Baccarini, 1999). This theory matches the conjecture of of the project procedure, expressly from the side of the public sector

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F. Bao et al. Utilities Policy 80 (2023) 101469

Fig. 4. Efficacy of KHPIs under handover aims with different hierarchies.

(Shrestha et al., 2017a). Therefore, the present study reinforced the idea concerns would be valuable to practitioners, especially with respect to
of the public sector’s mandate to prioritize the conservation of the the equitable settlement of employees, given the possible sensitivity of
environment (see SC2) in the HS. Furthermore, to secure unwavering employee-related issues in the area of China’s water PPP (Bao et al.,
and superior product delivery after handover, an alternative operative 2018b).
strategy is to establish a schedule, such as a quality warrant period, that
will compel private investors to guarantee to the public sector that they
4.4. Recommendations for improving handover management
will fulfill their handover obligation (World Bank, 2016b). In brief,
cooperation between the two sectors should be protracted beyond the
The above discourse on KHPIs reveals room for improving handover
HS (refer to SC3).
management in China’s PPP water industry. However, industry stake­
Fig. 4 details the three classifications of HMS aims, referring to six
holders need to work mutually to materialize possible improvements.
criteria. The efficacy of such criteria is typically below that of the criteria
Therefore, to facilitate further actions of the industry, some relevant
belonging to HPS aims, according to the theory of LFM. Under the hi­
recommendations are presented herein.
erarchy of the definition of the handover success, the six criteria of the
First, this research emphasizes the government’s role in accom­
HMS gauge the operation procedure of the handover and act as a process
plishing handover success, as the private sector tends to act opportu­
in attaining the five handover purposes. Handover timetable (SC14) and
nistically in this final stage. Therefore, the foremost recommendation is
handover risk mitigation (SC12), which are part of time and cost and
given to governments that must be more proactive and rational when
handover efficacy classifications, were judged the chief two criteria in
dealing with the HS of water PPPs. To be proactive means that gov­
successfully measuring the handover procedure, having nearly equiva­
ernments should be aware of the difficulty in achieving a successful HS
lent values of 3.65 and 3.62, respectively. Such an outcome confirms
because of its long-term absence through the entire project operation
that the respondents highlight the agreement’s termination period and
stage, and thus should make early preparation, such as a collection of
managing risks during the handover procedure. Time parameters have
project data and arrangement of personnel and schedules before the
consistently received recognition as the primary measure of project
formal start of the HS. The government must logically pursue the hier­
success in the construction domain (Chan and Chan, 2004). Further­
archical handover objectives to be rational. In particular, people’s need
more, risk mitigation is underscored in gauging the efficacy of PPP,
for superior water products should always be the top priority among a
given that PPPs invite higher risks than traditional construction projects
batch of handover objectives.
(Jin and Zhang, 2011). Particular risks at HS of water PPPs in China, for
Second, a better functioning institutional system relating to the HS
example, may relate to overhaul performance, contract adaptation,
should be established. A mature institutional system consists of multiple
post-handover operation, residual value, political changes, and so on
components, such as cultural, legal, and administrative facets, which
(Bao et al., 2022).
could be very impactful in developing the PPP mode (Ruiz Diaz, 2017;
Experts also underlined decreased changes and disputes (SC9) and
Zhang et al., 2015). Furthermore, the effect of the institutional system
decreased public oppositions (SC11), two criteria classified in handover
could also be reflected in the case of the HS, in which uncertainties about
efficacy and stakeholder contentment groups, respectively. In the present
the asset condition, for example, mainly originate from the lack of
study, “decreased changes and disputes” were rated the ninth out of 12
specific technological criteria for overhaul tasks (Bao et al., 2019). In
identified KHPIs. Notably, Osei-Kyei et al. (2017) discovered that the
other words, to improve handover management performance, the
indicator also placed ninth in gauging the performance of the PPP
maturity of related institutional systems containing industrial laws and
project cycle before HS. “Decreased public oppositions” ranked 10th;
regulations, technological criteria, and contractual guidelines should be
however, it ranked at the bottom in Osei-Kyei et al. (2017)’s outcomes,
acquired as soon as possible (Marques, 2017). However, this is a sys­
suggesting that the likelihood of public protests may intensify at the HS.
tematic engineering for which governments, academia, and industrial
The last two criteria, observance of the financial plan (SC13) and
entities must work collaboratively.
decreased staff opposition (SC10), obtained relatively poor ratings. In
Furthermore, the public and project staff roles could be employed
the HS, the financial plan is not as crucial as during the construction
more effectively during the HS. The public is often sensitive to issues
period (Chan and Chan, 2004). Staff oppositions are unlikely to happen,
associated with their health and environment (Wan et al., 2015), while
according to the research findings. Nonetheless, considering these
several performance indicators of the handover of water PPPs happen to

7
F. Bao et al.
do with their points of interest, such as environmental conservation and
service quality. The staff of the project companies is directly involved in
the HS of water PPPs. Indeed, their daily work significantly determines
the handover performance, which could be displayed by indicators such
as water quality and asset conditions. As a result, these two groups of
stakeholders can provide valuable contributions to measuring the
handover performance of PPP water projects.
4.5. Measuring handover performance through HS
Following the outcomes associated with handover success and its
KHPIs in China’s water PPP sector, this research suggests an assessment
method centered on executing the process to advance the applicability
of the research findings.
Overall, the performance assessment of a project contains two stages:
ex-ante and ex-post assessments. The former targets the appraisal of the
financial viability of a project in expediting the judgment of investment
behavior, while the latter focuses on measuring the ultimate results
(Bulathsinhala, 2015). Apart from these two assessments at the two ends
of a project cycle, extending the assessment nodes in between the project
cycle is assumed beneficial for the evolving development of PPP projects
(Liu et al., 2015a). At various assessment nodes, success criteria in­
dicators are subjected to analyses and assessments to detect issues in
real-time, with management strategy promptly adjusted. Correspond­
ingly, this study suggests a process-based handover performance
assessment mode comprising evaluations 1, 2, and 3.
Evaluation 1 is performed before formally starting the HS and acts as
an ex-ante assessment of the impending handover of PPP water projects.
However, the distinct characteristics of HS prevent this evaluation node
from focusing on the project’s economic sustainability. As an alterna­
tive, it primarily aims to holistically investigate the project status,
guaranteeing that the critical information on the handover is accessible
beforehand. For example, suppose the government shall perform this
evaluation node. In that case, the primary procedure is to establish a
rigorous investigation of the KHPIs of the HS following the chronolog­
ical records documented throughout the prolonged operation stage.
Juxtaposing the retained information of the project operations and the
projected outcomes of the handover procedure allows the involvers to
make their initial judgments regarding the situation of the project and,
in turn, present their assessment to individual KHPI. Furthermore, the
performance information would serve as a guide in preparing the entire
handover plan and determining effective ways to utilize the restricted
schedule and resources in alleviating potential flaws of the handover
procedure.
Evaluation 2 happens after finalizing the assessment of the renovated
project assets. This point requires appraisal under the assumption that
the government must make sensible decisions about whether to accept
the project based on the outputs of the performance evaluation (Bao
et al., 2019). By performing this evaluation node, the government can
guarantee that all concerns detected in evaluation 1 have reached a
favorable resolution and that the project metrics satisfy the expectation
levels. It can then proceed to the remaining steps of the HS. The gov­
ernment would choose actions grounded on evaluation results. For
example, the project company may be required to carry on with reno­
vation effort or offer monetary recompense should services fail to meet
the standards in terms of performance.
Evaluation 3 is performed after completing all handover aims,
thereby proposing replicating the whole handover procedure and
sharing helpful information for later handover operations. Notably,
evaluation 3 focuses on the execution of the handover management.
That is to say, viewing it as an ex-post assessment of the entire lifecycle
performance of PPP projects is not possible. Consequently, aims that
consider the total PPP lifespan, such as lucrativeness and monetary
input, are omitted in this assessment but require measurement using a
rigorous standpoint and another set of criteria. A comparative analysis
of the outcomes with the findings of the earlier two assessments deduces
8
Utilities Policy 80 (2023) 101469
complex understanding and practice relevant to the PPP handover
procedure, thereby expediting the flawless handover of water PPPs in
China today and in the subsequent periods.
5. Conclusion
For many PPP infrastructure projects, the final stage of their
concession period refers to the HS. Through this stage, the entire project
will be handed from the private party to the government. For the gov­
ernment, evaluating the degree to which all tasks pertinent to the HS
have been satisfactorily completed is challenging. This insecurity
threatens that returned project assets might be fraught with sub-par
performance or restricted by scant maintenance legacies. The current
research attempts to address the challenge by establishing a perfor­
mance evaluation framework that adequately covers handover success
amplified by a series of effective success criteria.
Following the standard recognized by earlier parallel research, this
study selected the LFM and KPIs to be operational tools to describe and
gauge handover success. Utilizing the idea of LFM, handover success was
described as a tiered arrangement with HPS set as a higher-level aim and
HMS set under it. HPS involves two parameters; the handover goal and
purpose. HMS encompasses time and cost, efficacy, and stakeholder
contentment. With the conduct of a combined literature analysis and
gathering expert respondents’ perspectives, the present study identified
and assimilated 14 handover success criteria within these five mea­
surements. When combined, these criteria encompass the definition of
handover success. Experts further tested the efficacy of these 14 success
criteria in measuring handover success via a questionnaire survey.
Analytical results confirmed that 12 of the 14 criteria had statistical
significance and thus were denoted as KHPIs. Research findings also
proved the better efficacy of HPS in assessing the handover performance
compared with the HMS. Finally, utilizing the advanced data concerning
the handover success and its KHPIs, this study presented recommenda­
tions for improving handover management and established a process-
based handover performance evaluation mode.
The findings of this study offer theoretical and practical contribu­
tions. First, the hierarchical definitions of handover success and its
KHPIs fill a gap in the body of knowledge regarding the final stage of the
PPP life cycle. It also offers a reference for developing theory under
limited support from existing literature. For practitioners within the PPP
industry, especially water PPPs in developing economies, the outcomes
of this study serve as a timely reminder of the challenges in dealing with
project handover. With the help of the performance evaluation mode
developed in this study, the HS will be better served, providing the
stakeholder citizenry with better, continuous access to water, following
the community expectations of government PPP projects.
This study is limited because it concentrates on the PPP water sector
in China. With this limitation, the generality of the research findings
may be affected because of regional or industrial differences. Accord­
ingly, researchers are advised to consider future investigations into the
handover success of PPPs in other contexts. Additionally, although this
study has laid a foundation for the handover performance evaluation of
PPPs, other issues, such as quantification of the evaluation results, could
benefit from further study. Finally, this study examined handover at the
end of the concession period without considering the scenario when the
partnership has to cease earlier for particular reasons. In the latter sce­
nario, whatever new issues may occur over the handover process de­
serves more attention in future research.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
F. Bao et al. Utilities Policy 80 (2023) 101469

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