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BY
Ever since antiquity the gods of the Iliad have been a stumbling
block: in the view of Homer's ancient admirers the behaviour of
his gods, especially Zeus, ought to have a moral basis, since oth-
erwise they would not feel comfortable about their admiration for
the poems. Plato sacrificed his admiration on the altar of his indig-
nation, and banned Homer from his ideal state. Allegorizing inter-
preters solved the problem by arguing that Homer's gods were not
meant to be gods; if Apollo is actually the heat of the sun, we need
not be bothered by his morals.1) Christian readers were sometimes
willing to forgive Homer because he was not actually at fault, hav-
ing been born too early to be a Christian.2) Down through the ages
Homer has been
alternately attacked and defended on this point,
and I am convinced that the desire to justify the ways of the Homeric
gods has not died out. Otherwise I cannot explain why a number
of scholars, in discussing the gods and their reasons for dealing with
men as they do, consistently ignore the narrator, disregarding what
he tells us and filling in what he does not.
This striving to justify the actions of the
gods appears to be
related to a desire for poetic justice. This desire would be satisfied
if, in the Iliad, men were punished for their evil deeds or their
morally wrong decisions, but did not suffer for reasons that were
inexplicable or morally neutral. The existence of human guilt and
divine justice would take the sting out of the poem, and render it
less disturbing: we might even come to the conclusion that nothing
bad will befall us as long as we make the right decisions and com-
mit no evil. But are we justified in attributing to Homer such a
Troy will indeed fall in the end and that the present setback is only
temporary. Later this will be clear to Agamemnon, too; the will of
the gods is expressed in events. There are cases, however, in which
we are told about things the human characters will never know,
and obviously we cannot ignore such information.
One of the most striking examples of information that is revealed
'My lord Zeus, grant that I may punish the man who wronged me
unprovoked, noble Alexandros, and subdue him under my hands, so
that many a man, in the future also, will shrink from wronging his
host, who shows him kindness.' (3.351-4)
And indeed, it is only natural for him to expect Zeus to detest the
man who so flagrandy violated the laws of hospitality, not only the
man himself, but also his fellow citizens, who condoned what he did.
Likewise, it is only natural that Agamemnon is convinced that
Zeus, who was called upon when the oath was sworn, will not tol-
erate its violation:
4) I am not sure about ?pe?. The translation 'when' may be wrong, since tem-
poral ?pe? is not, as a rule, followed by an imperfect tense. Janko prefers 'since',
but I do not quite understand his explanation: "There is irony in 'you went away
taking my wife for no reason (???), since she gave you hospitality' ".
And once again, when he urges his troops forward into battle, he
exclaims:
'Argives, do not cease from the tempestuous battle, for father Zeus
will be in truth our helper, and they who were first to violate the
truce, their tender flesh the vultures will devour, and their wives and
their young children we shall carry off on our ships, when we have
captured their town.' (4.234-239)
Tor I gave you this, voluntarily, but with unwilling heart. For from
all the towns of earth-dwelling men that are situated beneath the sun
and the sky, holy Ilios was by far the most honoured by me in my
heart, and so were Priam and the people of Priam with the good
ashen spear. For never has my altar lacked a fairly-shared meal and
drink-offerings and the savour of burnt sacrifice. For this is the gift
of honour that is due to us.' (4.43-49)
for precisely this man among the Trojans; apparendy she expects
him to be a willing victim, but his "freie Selbstbestimmung" is in
no way abrogated by her promptings. He is free to say no.6) However,
the narrator does not tell us why Athena selected Pandaros, and
since the 'core of his being* is unknown to us, such arguments are
somewhat circular: Athena selected him for this treacherous act
because, as is clear from
the act, his disposition was vile and fool-
ish. Admittedly, the narrator calls him ?f???, but this judgement
rests on his present actions, and is hardly a generad characteristic.
A more obvious reason for Athena's preference is the fact that she
needs a good archer and his skill in this area is known to us. We
are told about it in 2.827:
'Pandaros, who had received his bow as a gift from Apollo himself.'
This, however, is not the main point. I agree that, on the human
level, Pandaros is guilty: he could have said no. But what is the
upshot of this observation? Would Athena have been at her wit's
end if he had done so, and would she then have resigned herself
to peace and to the survival of Troy? By concentrating on Pandaros'
arrow shot, we are merely dealing with the method that is used by
the gods which, on the divine level, is of secondary importance.
Athena makes use of human only after the decision
beings has been
taken; the decision itself rests with
the gods alone.
Lesky, understandably, sees this as a case of 'Doppelte Motivation':
"Die Schuld der Troer besteht also in der Handlung einer der Ihren,
die durchaus von den G?ttern geplant und ausgel?st wurde. Trotzdem
haben sie die Folgen des Eidbruches bis zumletzten zu tragen" (43).
I cannot entirely concur with his formulation, since in my view
there is no 'trotzdem', either from the perspective of the human
characters, who are unaware of any divine interference and place
all the blame on the Trojans, or from our own perspective. We
6) Cf. Latacz 34: "Sie d?rfen dem Menschen?so haben es vor allem A. Heubeck
und H. Gundert in eindringlichen Analysen nahegelegt?eigentlich immer nur den
Gedanken, die Tat, das Verhalten in den Sinn legen, zu denen er selbst schon
disponiert war". He does not make it clear who it is who does not allow the gods
to act otherwise.
know that Troy must fall in any case, whatever the Trojans do or
do not do; not even perfect virtue can protect them from the ruth-
less vindictiveness of the goddesses.
But why this vindictiveness? Zeus asks Hera for her reasons, but
his question goes unanswered. The listeners probably realized, as
we do, that the narrator chose not to include the judgement of
Paris.7) As Reinhardt argues, this would have been too futile a rea-
son: "Heras Hass ist r?tselhaft, unheimlich, ungeheuerlich. . . . Von
so furchtbarem R?tselcharacter ist die Gottheit" (29). He is undoubt-
edly right: the introduction of such a frivolous topic would have
cancelled out the impact of the grim struggle for power between
Hera and Zeus. Nevertheless Reinhardt defends the authenticity of
24.29-30, although his argument, as Davies (57) observes, is not free
from a certain antinomy: if the narrator deemed the judgement of
Paris too futile a reason in 4, why then did he introduce it in 24?
The authenticity of 29-30 was called into question even in antiq-
uity, and doubts were not confined to these lines alone. According
to ZbT, an unnamed scholar wanted to athetize
altogether 23-30
and Aristarchos, though accepting 23,
rejected 24-30.8) The scho-
liast lists no fewer than eight objections; while not all of them are
valid, a number of them certainly are. I do not intend to examine
all of them here?the details are
by Richardson?but
discussed I
would like to add some observations, in particular in relation to the
hemistich ??e???d??? e?e?' at??. This is not the first time these
words occur in the Iliad?) and Richardson rightly observes that
"without 29-30 one would take this phrase as referring to Paris'
rape of Helen, as at 6.356 and 3.100 (if at?? is right there)".
7) The scholiast (S?? 23) infers from 4.31-32, 3.164, and other passages that
the poet did not know the story of the judgement, but this appears highly improbable.
8) According to Richardson (276, ad 23-30), Aristarchos "does not seem to have
rejected 24, since he is not said to have objected to the parallel 109 (although he
did regard 71-3 as an interpolation)". I am not convinced that this ex silentio
argument is valid, but since 24 is not the actual stumbling block, the question is
not particularly important.
9) The words are used in 3.100 by Menelaos and in 6.356 by Helen. It might
argue against 24.28 that the hemistich is used here, in contrast to the other two
examples, in narrator text, but this argument is not really decisive. In all three
cases there is the varia lectio ?????. In 3.100 it is only Zenodotos who, according
to ?A, proposes at??; in 6.356 most manuscripts have at?? and in 24.28 nearly
all of them. Most editors read at?? three times, righdy I think, but it does not really
influence our interpretation; ?????, too, must refer to Paris' abduction of Helen.
10) Nicolai, without even discussing the text of the passage, uses it twice, but
in different ways. On p. 150 he argues that Hera and Athena are enemies of
Aphrodite because of the judgement of Paris, while on p. 160 we read: "Dieser
G?ttertrug findet seine Rechtfertigung?die die Tragik freilich nicht aufhebt?
darin, dass Hektor und Troja infolge ihrer Solidarit?t mit dem Gastrechtsbrecher
Paris (mythologisch gesprochen) sich die Feindschaft Ath?nes und Heras zugezo-
gen haben,...". He does not seem to realize that the first statement is only valid
if 29-30 is retained, while the second one presupposes the athetizing of these lines,
since otherwise it is quite simply contrary to the text.
11) See Janko, 364-366, ad 384-93 and 386-8. On 365 he notes: "The storm
shows Zeus's wrath at men's crooked judgements; this is stated in three verses, too
many for a redundant detail". However, it is not Zeus' wrath in itself that seems
un-Homeric, but only the reason behind it, stated in two verses. 386 is anchored
in the whole of the simile, but 387-8 can easily be left out.
thing to say about Zeus punishing mortals for their injustice. None-
theless, for the sake of argument, I am prepared to consider the
entire simile genuine and to discuss its possible implications.
After remarking on the explicit and implicit points of compari-
son and referring to 21.522-524, Janko comments: "here the Trojans
are linked with wrongdoing, and the poet comes near to an open
justification of Troy's fall, all the more persuasive because we are
left to infer it for ourselves". This comment is somewhat puzzling,
but the sentences which follow seem to offer some clarification:
"The Iliad's tragic vision emphasizes the amoral gods of myth, but
we sometimes glimpse 'an underlying conviction that these powers
are on the side of right (G.M. Calhoun
and justice' in Companion
449; cf. Lloyd-Jones, Justice of^eus Iff.). In such contexts 'Zeus' and
'the gods' are rarely distinct. Cf. Zeus' interest in the Abioi as
paragons of justice, Menelaos' faith that Zeus Xenios must punish
the Trojans, the muted criticism of Paris' morality or the gods'
wrath over an unburied body (13.4-7, 13.620-39, 13.660-72nn.,
22.358)" (365, ad 384-93). Apparently Janko is on the lookout for
any detail that might support the notion of divine justice, but these
examples will simply not do. 13.620-639 and 22.358 are spoken by
a human character and must for this reason be left out in this con-
nection.12) If we infer from 13.4-7 that Zeus is interested in the
Abioi because of their justice, we must, I am afraid, also infer that
he is interested in the Hippemolgoi because of their milk drinking.
The criticism of Paris' morality is so muted that
only an elaborate
construction devised by an interpreter can make
it heard.13) And
even if we are prepared to hear it, it has nothing to say about the
12) Despite his clairvoyance at the moment of death, Hector finds a connec-
tion that will prove to be non-existent. He prophesies exactly how Achilles will
die, but it will not be because of Hector's body; when Achilles has returned it to
Priam, it can no longer be a ?e?? ?????a. Achilles must die anyway.
13) Janko reasons as follows: "Paris.... is angered by the fall of his guest-friend
and shoots poor Eukhenor.... It is ironic that he is trying to defend xeniajust after
Menelaos reminds us of his fateful crime against it (624-7). Harpalion would still be
alive had Paris not stolen Helen in the first place; the criticism of his morality is
muted but unmistakable". If the text told us that Paris 'acts to defend xenia\ as if
the general principle were his concern, there might be some irony in this. But we
are only told: t?? de ????? ???a ????? ?p??ta?????? ?????? ??e??????? ?? e?? p???s??
?et? ?af?a???ess?? I do not think this is enough to support Janko's construction.
tify the Zeus of the simile with the Zeus of the story. Small won-
der then that Janko resorts to quite an astonishing ex silentio argu-
ment, an argument that amounts to: it is not there and precisely
for that reason it is convincingly present. Why is it that 'we must
infer it for ourselves'? It is not, in my view, the poet who imposes
this obligation on us.14)
As noted above, there is one more simile that is deployed in the
interests of demonstrating divine justice. In 21.522-525 we read:
Just as when smoke rises to the broad sky from a town that is burn-
ing; the wrath of the gods sends it upwards; it causes toil for all and
sorrow for many; just so Achilles caused toil and sorrow for the
Trojans.'
Moulton comments: "These lines, together with the great d??? simile
at XVI.384f., are the closest the poet comes to an explicit justifi-
cation of the Trojans' destruction through the plan of Zeus. It is
not explicidy stated here that the burning city is Troy, or that
its people have been unjust; it is only said that the city has been
afflicted by the gods' wrath. Yet divine anger is not generally arbi-
trary in Homer, whether or not it conforms to the requirements of
modern notions of retributive justice. And the Trojans, at XVI.393
and XXI.525, are
explicitly linked with cities that have incurred
the gods' displeasure" (110-111). It will be clear from this comment
that Moulton is in two minds about the question, but because he
does not actually say so, his argument is rather confused. He begins
14) It is not only Janko, of course, who makes the most of this simile. It arises
time and again when divine justice is discussed. Erbse, for instance, argues: "Zeus
kann die Partei der Frevler (d.h. der Troer) nicht l?nger triumphieren lassen. Mit
seiner Umkehr bekundet er doch wohl dass er sich verpflichtet f?hlt, der gesch?digten
Partei zum Siege zu verhelfen, d.h. die ?belt?ter zu strafen (wie das in dem
Gleichnis ? 384-393 als sein Grundsatz zum Ausdruck kommt)" (229-230). Although
he does not explicitly connect the men in the simile with the Trojans, the simile
is nevertheless the foundation of the words 'doch wohl', which indicate that Zeus
does not actually say so. Here, too, the Zeus of the story is automatically identified
with the Zeus of the simile.
15) Lloyd Jones discusses the justice of Zeus in relation to the Trojans on pp.
7-8. First he concedes that on the divine level questions of right and wrong play
no role. Next he reminds us of the convictions of Agamemnon and Menelaos con-
cerning Zeus Horkios and Zeus Xeinios and subsequently he asks: "Can we really
feel certain that the eventual triumph of the Greeks has no connection with the
undoubted truth that Paris provoked the quarrel by abducting Helen? That is
hinted in the last book of the Iliad, and the old fashion of dismissing the passage
as an 'interpolation' is now less popular than it once was". Here, too, the phras-
ing betrays a desire to find what is not there. In real life nobody can feel certain
of the motives of the divine power or powers, but in the case of the Iliad we have
a narrator to inform us. And if we retain 24.23-30, we still have no proof what-
soever, since in that case the goddesses are angry because of the judgement and
not because of Helen's abduction. When Lloydjones concludes his discussion of
the subject, he asserts: "In terms of human action, his decision is in accord with
the basic principle of justice, that the aggressor must be punished. Is this accord
merely a coincidence? Anyone who accepts the argument I have put forward to
show that the protection of justice must have been one of Zeus' attributes from
the earliest times will hardly think so". However, this reasoning is unsound, since
it amounts to: in Homer's time Zeus was regarded as the protector of justice, and
therefore he must be the protector of justice in the Iliad also, although the nar-
rator does not represent him this way. Lloyd-Jones is clearly confusing the reality
of life and the reality within the poem. Yamagata, on the contrary, is very care-
ful in this respect. She does not reject 11. 387-8, but argues that we are concerned
with 'two levels of moral climate' (92). According to this view there is no relation
between the Zeus of the simile and the Zeus of the story proper.
might be to suppose that the simile implies that Troy, too, will be
the victim of divine wrath. But this is something we knew all along;
we were told in book 4 about the wrath of Hera and Athena. And
since ?e?? is not specified and no reason is given for their wrath,
there is nothing here that points to divine justice and nothing that
runs counter to the story.
As I said at the beginning, it is interesting to see how scholars
supply their readers with explanations that are not provided by the
narrator himself. I quote a few examples.
In addition to his comment on the simile in 16, Janko also assures
us that Zeus "is concerned to punish perjurers and those who wrong
suppliants and xenoi (strangers/hosts/guests); Paris' crime against
Menelaos explains why he must ultimately back the Greeks against
the Trojans. But there are signs that he cares about justice in a
wider sense (16.384-93n.), and his will can be taken to represent
that of his entire family, since the
gods collectively are omniscient
and omnipotent" (5). Zanker, although he discusses the discrepancy
between Agamemnon's expectations and the behaviour of Zeus, never-
theless affirms that the gods are "ultimately prompted by feelings
of outrage and
by some conviction about the independent value of
protecting things like oaths,. .." (32). And on the next page we read:
"Odysseus' words to Polyphemos in the Odyssey are commonly and
rightly quoted as valid for the Iliad as well: "Zeus is the agent who
confers time upon suppliants and guests, Zeus the god of hospital-
ity [xetnios], who accompanies revered guests," so Polyphemos should
"have shame before the gods," or "respect," for Odysseus is his
suppliant (Od. 9,269-71)". Morrison argues that "it is surely one of
Zeus' larger goals to punish those who violate the code of hospi-
tality" (291). Schein holds that the Trojans are consistently repre-
sented as "transgressors, who are morally responsible for their own
ruin" (20). Erbse observes: "Der Gedanke dass Zeus das Recht be-
sch?tzt und das Unrecht
bestraft, steht in der Ilias nicht so im
Vordergrund wie in der Odyssee, er ist aber auch nicht, wie bisweilen
behauptet wird, auf das Gleichnis ? 384?T. beschr?nkt. Man denke
vor allem an den Ausgangspunkt der ganzen Erz?hlung, an Paris'
Vergehen gegen Zeus Xeinios,. . ." (221). And as we know, accord-
ing to Schmitt the gods are certainly not unjust: "Es widerfahrt
jedem von den Menschen nur das was er sich selbst verdient hat
16) Zanker's comparison with the Odysseyis somewhat unfortunate, since Odysseus
is also mistaken about Zeus' ways. He may well expect Zeus to applaud his deed,
but actually the highest god does not obstruct the fulfilment of the Cyclops' curse.
17) "Der Ausgang des Trojanischen Krieges ist f?r den Dichter durch Paris'
anf?ngliches Unrecht an Menelaos vorgezeichnet" (152).
they are fighting. But the Greeks, who are after all the aggressors,
need a motive, an acceptable justification. A great epic war cannot
be fought for the sake of booty alone. Thus on the Greek side the
war is justified by Paris' misdemeanour which, within the Iliad,
is re-enacted by Pandaros' treachery. And, as we have seen, they
expect the gods to be on their side because they consider it self-
evident that the gods?in any case Zeus?defend the law of hospital-
ity and the sacrosanct nature of oaths. However, the gods do not
meet the expectations of the human characters. They do support
the Greeks, but for reasons that have nothing to do with morality.
They love and they hate, but they never talk about justice. Thus
the narrator gives us the impression Troy that must in any case
fall, that the Trojans are victims of a power that men, however vir-
tous, cannot conquer.
It has often been observed that the poet of the Iliad does not
strive to evoke among his hearers feelings of antagonism towards
the Trojans. We do not see the Greeks as the 'good guys' fighting
the 'bad guys'. The sufferings of the Trojans and the death of
Hector do not inspire feelings of triumph but rather pity. Gould
(42) calls this "part of the lasting legacy of the Homeric imagina-
tion", and I am fairly sure that it is one of the reasons?perhaps
even the main reason?for the lasting emotional impact of the Iliad.
I am also convinced that it is for this reason that the poet made
his gods as he did. From the human point of view, the war must
inevitably be justified, otherwise the Greeks would be guilty of naked
aggression. But if the gods acted for the same reasons and con-
demned the Trojans because of their moral faults, and if Zeus sealed
the fate of Troy as the inevitable consequence of Paris' guilt, then
the balance of sympathy would undoubtedly be disturbed. As it is,
we feel that ultimately the guilt of the Trojans does not matter. As
Redfield (133) observes: "The Homeric theology is a poet's theology".
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Malcolm Davies, The Judgementof Pans and Iliad Book XXIV, JHS 101 (1981), 56-62.
Hartmut Erbse, Untersuchungen zur Funktionder G?tterim HomerischenEpos (Berlin 1986).
Egon Flaich, Konsenspnnzip im homerischenOlymp: ?berlegungenzum g?ttlichen Ent-
scheidungsprozess Utas ? 1-72, Hermes 122 (1994), 13-31.
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Murray, K.W. Gramsden (ed.), Aspects of the Epic (London 1983), 32-45.
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1985); Vol. 4 (13-16), R. Janko (1992); Vol. 6 (21-24), N. Richardson (1993).
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Albin Lesky, G?ttlicheund menschlicheMotivationim HomerischenEpos (Heidelberg 1961).
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