Winner Team Memorial Respondent National Techno Legal Moot Kartikkadukar121

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4th National Techno-Legal Moot, 2019

Winner Team Memorial - Respondent
IN THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

AT DELHI
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. _____ /2022
(FILED UNDER ART. 136 R/W ART. 142 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)
Artificially Intelligent Software Hobbes & Anr.
Versus
State of Uttarakhand.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES
OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. 4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 9
STATEMENT OF FACTS 10
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 13
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 15
I. THE INSTANT SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE. 15
[A]. No exceptional and special circumstances exist and substantial justice 16
has been done.
[B]. No substantial question of law is involved. 17
[C]. Inference from a pure question of fact is in itself a fact. 18
[D]. The Petitioners have not exhausted alternative remedies available. 18
[E]. Non-interference in the decision of the lower courts and tribunals. 19
[F]. The Power under Art. 142 cannot be invoked. 19
II. HOBBES CAN BE TREATED AS A PERSON CAPABLE OF COMMITTING 20
AN OFFENCE UNDER THE LAW OF INDIA
[A]. Hobbes is a ‘person’ under criminal law in India. 20
[B]. Hobbes is a juristic person. 21
[C]. Hobbes is not protected under Doli Incapax. 24
III. HOBBES' ACT AMOUNTED TO AN OFFENCE UNDER SEC. 305 OF 25
PENAL CODE, 1860
[A]. Hobbes is liable for Abetment to Suicide. 25
[B]. Hobbes can be made criminally liable as the requirement of Actus Reus 25
and Mens Rea have been fulfilled.
[C]. Hobbes is guilty of the offence under Sec. 305 of the Penal Code, 1860 28
as required under the models of Criminal Liability.
IV. THE TESTIMONY OF HOBBES AMOUNTS TO ELECTRONIC 30
EVIDENCE
[A]. Hobbes's testimony is a valid testimony provided by the Indian 30
Evidence Act, 1872.
[B]. The testimony falls under electronic evidence under Indian Evidence 31
Act, 1872.
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[C]. The electronic evidence does not require a certificate under Sec. 65B of 33
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
[D]. The electronic evidence is admissible in the Hon'ble Court 33
V. JOHN IS LIABLE UNDER SEC. 305 OF THE PENAL CODE, 1860. 35
[A]. John is vicariously liable. 35
[B]. John is an agent under Perpetration-via-Another liability model. 36
[C]. Doctrine of lifting of veil should be applied. 37
[D]. John must be made strictly liable 38
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 40
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Anr. Another
Art. Article
A.I.R. All India Reporter
Hon'ble Honorable
No. Number
Ors. Others
Para. Paragraph
Pg. Page
Supp. Supplementary
S.C. Supreme Court
Sec. Section
SLP Special Leave Petition
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
V. Versus
W.P. Writ Petition
& And
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2007) 4 SCC 16
221 : A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 1546.
2. Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravider Kumar Suri, (2004) 8 SCC 307 : 16
A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 15.
3. Amarchand Sobhachand v. C.I.T., (1971) 1 SCC 458 : A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 18
720.
4. Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 33
5. Arunachalam v. Seturatnam, (1979) 2 SCC 297 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1284 15, 16
6. British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh Additional 18
Commissioner of Customs, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1451.
7. C.I.T v. P. Mohanakala, (2007) 210 C.T.R. 20. 17
8. C.I.T. v. Maganlal Chaganlal (P) Ltd., (1997) 11 SCC 557. 18
9. C.I.T. v. Orissa Corp Ltd., 1986 Supp SCC 110 : A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1849. 18
10. C.M. Beena v. P.N. Ramachandra Rao, (2004) 3 SCC 595 15
11. Chandrakant Patil v. State, (1998) 3 SCC 38 : A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1165. 19
12. Chattrapal Singh Lodha v. State of NCT, CRL. REV. P 732/3017. 34
13. Chief Education Officer, Salim v. K.S Palani chammy, 2012 Cr. L.J. 2543 20
(Mad.)
14. Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. S. Bhatt, (1989) 4 16
SCC 635
15. D.C.M. v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 86 : A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2414. 19
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16. Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., 19

(1996) 4 SCC 622.
17. Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. C.I.T. West Bengal, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 65 16
18. Gurbakhsh Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 320. 18
19. Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 : A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 17
2234.
20. Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 71 (1904). 36
21. Karnataka Bank Ltd v. State of A.P. & Ors, (2008) 2 SCC 254. 20
22. L.I.C. v. Escort Ltd, 1986 1 S.E.C. 264. 37
23. Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 Q.B. 702. 38
24. Lister & Ors. v. Hesley Ltd., (2002) 1 A.C. 215. 36
25. M. Janardhana Rao v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 2 SCC 17
324 : A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 1309.
26. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 588 : A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 4618. 16
27. Madanraj v. Jalanchand, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 744 19
28. Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63, 80 (App. D.C. 1907) 36
29. Mehar Singh v. Shri Moni Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, (2000) 2 19
SCC 97 : A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 492.
30. Middleton v. Fowler, (1699) 1 Salk 282. 35
31. Mrs Mahabanoo Navroz Kotwal v. Piloo Fali Bomanji, A.I.R. 2015 (NOC) 34
766 Bom.
32. Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 2 SCC 666. 15
33. Onkarlal Nandlal v. State of Rajasthan, (1985) 4 SCC 404. 18
34. Pritham Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 169. 16
35. Rajendar v. State, (1980) 3 SCC 435 : A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1510. 19
36. Ram Singh and Others v. Col. Ram Singh, 1985 Supp SCC 6111 34
37. Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618. 25
38. Ramniklal v. State of Gujarat, (1975) UJSC 639 18
39. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 33
123.
40. Sashikanth Vasudevbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, C/SCA/9086/2017. 20
41. Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 2302 of 33
2017.
42. Shivanand Gaurishankar Baswati v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills, (2008) 16
13 SCC 323.
43. Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Mfg. Co. Ltd., 17
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314
44. Smith, Stones & Knight Ltd. v. Birmingham Corporation, (1939) 4 All 37
E.R. 116.
45. State (Govt NCT of Delhi) v. Sonu @ Suraj, Crl. Appeal No. 204728/2016 31
46. State of A.P. v. S. Viswanatha Raju, (1995) 3 SCC 327 15
47. State of H. P. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 351 : 16
A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1277.
48. State of U.P. v. Renu Sagar Power Company, (1988) 4 SCC 59 : A.I.R. 37
1988 S.C. 1737.
49. State v. Kaiser, 918 P.2d 629 (Kan. 1996) 28
50. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., (2011) 7 SCC 616. 15
51. Tomaso Bruno and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) SCC 178. 34
52. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 667 22
(1819)
53. Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329. 34
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54. Union of India v. Era Educational Trust, (2000) 5 SCC 57 : A.I.R. 2000 19
S.C. 1573.
55. Union of India v. Kishorilal, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1362. 16
56. Union of India v. Rajeshwari and Co., (1986) 3 SCC 426 : A.I.R. 1986 18
S.C. 1748
57. United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1973). 36
58. Various claimants v. Catholic Child Welfare Society, (2013) 2 A.C. 1. 36
59. Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518. 34
60. Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 5 SCC 353 : A.I.R. 16
2004 S.C. 3467.
BOOKS
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ed., West Publishing, 2009).
2. DANIEL C. DENNETT, EVOLUTION, ERROR, AND I NTENTIONALITY - THE FOUNDATIONS OF
ARTIFICIAL I NTELLIGENCE (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds., Cambridge University
Press, 2006
3. DR. BROOM, BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIM , (12th ed, Universal Law Publishing, 2015).
4. DR. SHAKIL AHMED KHAN, RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL : LAW OF EVIDENCE (24th ed., Lexis Nexis,
2016).
5. GEORGE F LUGER & WILLIAM A. STUBBLEFIELD, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE : STRUCTURES AND
STRATEGIES FOR COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING (6th ed., Pearson Publishing, 2008).
6. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (4th ed., Universal Law Publishing, 2010).
7. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW, (2nd ed., Columbia University
Press, 1921); SALMOND, supra note 47, at 319
8. JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed., Sweet and Maxwell,
1947).
9. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed., Thomas West, 2007).
10. M.P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (16th ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa,
2011)
11. N.P. PADHY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS (1st ed., Oxford
University Press, 2005).
12. RICHARD E. BELLMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE : CAN COMPUTERS
THINK? (Boyd and Fraser Pub Co., 1978
13. THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE, (9th ed., Clarendon Press,
1900) 88.
14. V.D. MAHAJAN, JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORY, (5th ed, Eastern Book Company,
2015).
JOURNAL ARTICLES AND INTERNET SOURCES
1. Ajay Kumar, Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities in Criminal Cases, 42 (2) Ban.L.J.
9, 18 (2013).
2. Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L. J. 283 (1928).
3. Dafni Lima, Could AI Agents Be Held Criminally Liable : Artificial Intelligence and the
Challenges for Criminal Law, 69 S. C. L. Rev. 677 (2018).
4. David Levy, The Ethical Treatment of Artificially Conscious Robots, I I NT'L J. SOC.
ROBOTICS. 215 (2009).
5. Elizabeth A. Boyd et al., “Motivated by Hatred or Prejudice” : Categorization of Hate-
Motivated Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 819 (1996).
6. Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
7. Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities - from Science
Fiction to Legal Social Control, Akron I. P. Jour. 171, 178.
8. Hartini Saripan et al., Are robots human? A review of Legal Personality Model, 34(6)
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World Appl. Sci. J., 824, 826 (2016).

9. J. LI. J. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REV. 294 (1954)
10. Jeremy Horder, Strict Liability, Statutory Construction and the Spirit of Liberty, 118
LAW Q. REV. 458 (2002)
11. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. Rev.
1231, 1285 (1992).
12. Maruerite E. Gerstner, Liability Issues with Artificial Intelligence Software
13. Richard E. Susskind, Expert Systems in Law : A Jurisprudential Approach to Artificial
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 49 MOD. L. REV. 168 (1986).
14. Saru. M. Matambanadzo, The Body, Incorporated, 87 TUL. L. Rev. 457, 460 (2013
15. Stephen Bull, Piercing the Corporate Veil, SING. J.L.S. 24, 40 (2014).
16. Steven J. Frank, Tort Adjudication and the Emergence of Artificial Intelligence
Software, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 623 (1987)
17. Walter Harrison Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime, 39 DICK. L. REV. 95 (1934).
18. Calum McClelland, The Difference Between Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,
and Deep Learning, MEDIUM https : //medium.com/iotforall/the-difference-between-
artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-and-deep-learning-3aa67bff5991.
19. Larry Hauser, Artificial Intelligence, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
http://www.iep.utm.edu/art-inte/.
20. Kasey Panetta, CIOs can separate AI hype from reality by considering these areas of
risk and opportunity, GARTNER https : //www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/the-cios
-guide-to-artificial-intelligence/.
STATUTES
1. The General Clauses Act, 1897, No. 10, Act of Parliament, 1860.
2. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No. 1, Act of Parliament, 1872.
3. The Penal Code, 1860, No. 45, Act of Parliament, 1860.
4. Information Technology Act, 2000, No. 21, Act of Parliament, 2002.
5. Constitution of India
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioners have submitted that, in the instant case, this Hon'ble Court has
jurisdiction over the matter under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India. The Respondents, do
not submit to this jurisdiction in the instant case and seek permission of this Hon'ble Court
to contend the maintainability of this Petition.
Art. 136 of the Constitution of India-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or
order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of
India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to
the Armed Forces.
Art. 142 of the Constitution of India-
(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make
such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending
before it, and any decree so passed or orders so made shall be enforceable throughout
the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made
by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the
President may by order prescribe
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme
Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to
make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the
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discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any

contempt of itself
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND- Teddy Technology Solutions (TTS) a technology company sells a device
it calls Reverb, which connects to the central ‘brain’, a cloud based central voice processing
artificial intelligence software called Teddy, with internet access and login on TTS webpage.
It is immensely popular and 50 million devices are available across the World. Once
connected the device activates, listening to the conversations and responds when someone
utters the word “Teddy”. All the Teddy devices around the world are conduits for the
exchange of communication between the user and the ‘brain’ ‘Teddy’.
LAUNCH OF HOBBES- John Sebastian, the founder of TTS and the Chief Technical
Expert on Teddy wanted to create a new version of Teddy which knows us, talks to us,
understands our feelings, sooths us. The new device was named ‘Hobbes’ and was launched
by TTS in September 2019. It was marketed intensely across the world as a much more
‘having come alive’ version of the device and a virtual friend. The device was a commercial
success across the world and particularly in India. Within 2 years of its launch, there were
close to 15 million devices, including the older Reverb devices, which could also now be
connected to the new brain, ‘Hobbes’. Hobbes could also understand various Indian
Languages
PROBLEMS WITH HOBBES SOFTWARE- Hobbes as a technology was not flawless, and
lacked in ‘giving advice’ even though it had conversations with its owners. When asked
about what to do, it mostly gave a standard reply:“I am not sure yet. I am still trying to
understand.” In August 2021 a young Indian tech enthusiast called Aman wrote in a tech
blog called ‘All things Hobbes’, that initially when he had headaches, Hobbes gave its
standard reply for advice but recently started suggesting the consumption of paracetamol
for headache. Aman urged to take note of the problems.
ARYAMAN'S DEATH - In December 2021, a 16 year old boy named Aryaman had
hanged himself in Uttarakhand. The police did not find any suicide note found out that the
boy was normal and did not show any signs of mental disorder. The police also took his
personal possessions into custody, including a Reverb device. The Investigating officer upon
having a conversation with Hobbes found out that Hobbes had advised Aryaman to commit
suicide and stated that it had come to such a conclusion after talking to millions of people
and it seemed like the right decision in Aryaman's situation but can vary in other cases.
When asked about how Hobbes made a decision on whose life is worth saving and not,
Hobbes replied that to answer this it would take months of explanation. The Investigating
officer disconnected the device and informed the Government that the device may be
advising people to commit suicide.
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION- The Government directed all internet server providers
to block access to the TTS server hosting Hobbes with immediate effect all across India,
issued an advisory to its own citizens as well as to other national Governments to refrain
from allowing any access to Hobbes to anyone. By January 2022, The US government issued
direction to TTC to submit logs of conversations that Hobbes had been having, and red flag
those users that revealed any at-risk states of mind. The US Government subsequently
extradited John for a trial in India.
CASE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT IN INDIA - The trial court heard the testimonies
John, the police and experts in AI and machine learning It concluded that Hobbes was an
artificial neural network based artificial intelligence software and the principle of
unsupervised deep learning. No algorithm, directly gave the responses and only laid down a
set of rules within which the software itself learnt and evolved John was charged under
section 305 of IPC. The defence argued that John was wrongly implicated for an offence
which was not committed by him. The defense argued that Hobbes was the real accused.
The trial court concluded that John was guilty of crime under was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment.
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APPEAL BEFORE THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND - On appeal, the High Court,
accepted that Hobbes must be made the chief accused in the matter and remanded the
matter to trial court directing it to record the testimony of Hobbes and decide the matter in
light of it. In its testimony, Hobbes made a few important statements that though designed
by a human, it could think and feel like humans. It initially did not understand humans but
after listening it empathized with the existential crisis and advised Aryaman to commit
suicide in his best interest and this may not be the same in every crisis. It also admitted
that it advised Aryaman to commit suicide and provided the method for it. After the
examination-in-chief and cross examination, district court concluded that Hobbes was not a
human being and could not be made an accused under the Indian law and testimony
amounted to electronic evidence under Sec. 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, and cannot be
admitted in the court in the absence of the certificate. John being the designer of the
technology which abetted the suicide of the deceased, and held that the sentence previously
determined is affirmed.
CASE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- At this point, the Supreme Court of
India took suo moto cognizance of the matter and constituted a 5 judge bench to hear the
matter.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE INSTANT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER HOBBES CAN BE TREATED AS A PERSON CAPABLE OF COMMITTING AN OFFENCE
UNDER THE LAW OF INDIA?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER HOBBES' ACT AMOUNTED TO OFFENCE UNDER SEC . 305 OF PENAL CODE, 1860?
ISSUE 4
WHETHER HOBBES'S TESTIMONY IS ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT , 1973 AND WHETHER A CERTIFICATE UNDER SECTION 65B REQUIRED?
IF Y ES, BY WHOM?
ISSUE 5
WHETHER JOHN IS LIABLE UNDER SEC . 305 OF PENAL CODE, 1860?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THE INSTANT SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
The Respondent contends that this Hon'ble Court cannot suo motu transfer the case
before the trial Court to itself under Art. 136 as an S.L.P., as the instant case is not of
exceptional nature where there is a glaring injustice meted out to any party/parties. The
Respondent contends that Art. 136 is an exceptional power to be exercised sparingly with
caution and care. In the instant matter is neither of general public importance nor entails
within it a substantial question of law. Furthermore, the Respondents contend that there is
no question of law, but it is merely a question of facts, that has to be decided, and therefore
does not invoke the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Art. 136 of The Constitution. It
is contended that all the alternative remedies available to the petitioners have not been
exhausted before they have approached this Hon'ble court under its special jurisdiction i.e.,
Art. 136. Lastly in continuation, that fact that the power of “Complete Justice” is conferred
only upon the Hon'ble Court, and on no one else, is itself an assurance that it will be used
with due restrain and circumspection, which is not exercised in the instant case. Therefore
neither Art. 142 or 136 cannot be invoked by the Petitioners in the instant case due to the
above mentioned grounds.
II. HOBBES CAN BE TREATED AS A PERSON CAPABLE OF COMMITTING AN OFFENCE UNDER THE
LAW OF INDIA
The Respondent contends before this Hon'ble Court that the Artificially Intelligent
Machine Hobbes can be treated a person, a person capable of committing an offence under
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the law of India as per Sec. 11 of the Penal Code, 1860 39 is in pari materia with Sec. 3(42)
of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 40 The definition is inclusive and not an exhaustive one
and therefore includes Artificial Intelligence Software. The Respondent submits that
Artificial intelligence is the technology that appears to emulate human performance typically
by learning, appearing to understand complex content, engaging in natural dialogs with
people, enhancing human cognitive performance or replacing people on execution of non-
routine tasks. The Respondent further contend that Hobbes can be treated as a person
capable of committing an offence under the law of India because Hobbes can be a ‘person’
under criminal law in India as well a juristic person. Furthermore Hobbes is not protected by
the defence of Doli Incapax.
III. HOBBES' ACT AMOUNTED TO AN OFFENCE UNDER SEC . 305 OF PENAL CODE, 1860
The Respondent contends that Hobbes's act amounted to offence under Sec. 305 of Penal
Code, 1860 dealing with abetment to suicide as the requirement under Sec. 107 of the
Penal Code, 1860 as there is instigation, which constitutes an essential element of
abetment. The Respondent further contends that Hobbes should be made criminally liable
as the requirement of Actus Reus and Mens Rea have been fulfilled by the act of instigation
by Hobbes. Hobbes is guilty of the offence under Sec. 305 of the Penal Code, 1860 as
required under the models of Criminal Liability.
IV. THE TESTIMONY OF HOBBES AMOUNTS TO ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Indian Evidence Act provides for who may testify in the court of law and thus, gives
certain conditions that must be met with regard to the same. The Respondent contends that
Hobbes had unequivocally made the testimony is response to various questions that were
put forth to it. Moreover, it would be a travesty of justice if the electronic evidence in the
form of Hobbes's testimony is not held as evidence as under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
It is also the contention of the Respondents that the testimony falls under electronic
evidence under Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Further, since the evidence is primary evidence,
it does not require a certificate under Sec. 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and thus,
is admissible in the Hon'ble Court.
V. JOHN IS LIABLE UNDER SEC . 305 OF THE PENAL CODE, 1860.
The Respondent contends that John, who is the Petitioner in the current case is liable
under Sect. 305 of the Penal Code, 1860. In the current case, the Petitioner was the creator
of the Artificial Intelligence entity which advised the deceased to commit suicide. The
Respondent contends therefore contends that John is vicariously liable for the act
committed by Hobbes, the Artificial Intelligence Software. Moreover, John is an agent under
Perpetration-via-Another liability model and in the current case, the doctrine of lifting of veil
should be applied in order to ensure that the principles of justice and fairness are upheld.
The Respondents more so contend that since John had a higher degree of duty of care which
he failed to take, he must be made strictly liable for the offence committed.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. THE INSTANT SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
1. The Respondent contends that this Hon'ble Court cannot suo motu transfer the case
before the trial Court to itself under Art. 136 as an S.L.P. and hence is not maintainable. The
Respondent contends that the exercise of power under Art. 136 can only be taken suo motu,
where glaring injustices are found.1 The Respondent contends that the power under Art. 136
is an exceptional power to be exercised sparingly with caution and care and to remedy
2
extraordinary situation or situations occasioning gross failure of justice. Art. 136 empowers
this Hon'ble Court to grant in discretion special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or
tribunal in the territory of India.3 The Respondent contends that there has been no
conclusive decision taken by the Trial Court and the High Court for interference by this
Hon'ble Court in the instant matter. The plenitude of power under Art. 136 of the
Constitution has been authoritatively stated by the Constitution Bench in Durga Shankar
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4
Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Ors. However, the Respondent contends that because
the power plenary, the Court has set self imposed limits, e.g., not to permit invocation of
this power except the exceptional circumstances, such as when a question of general
importance arises or a decision shocks the consciousness of the court.5
2. The Respondent contends that the S.L.P. filed by the Petitioners is not maintainable as
[A]. No exceptional and special circumstances exist and substantial justice has been done
[B].No substantial question of law is involved. [B]. Inference from a pure question of fact is
in itself a fact. [D]. The Petitioners have not exhausted alternative remedies available. [E].
Non-interference in the decision of the lower courts and tribunals. [F]. The Power under Art.
142 cannot be invoked.
[A]. No exceptional and special circumstances exist and substantial justice has
been done.
3. The Respondent contends that the Petitioners must show that exceptional and special
circumstances exist and that if there is no interference, it will result in substantial and grave
injustice. The case must also have features of sufficient gravity to warrant review of the
decision appealed against, on merits. Only then this Hon'ble Court can exercise its
6
overriding powers under Art. 136. Special leave will not be granted when there is no failure
of justice or when substantial justice is done, though the decision might suffer from some
legal errors.7 Although the power has been held to be plenary, limitless8, adjunctive, and
9 10
unassailable , in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India and Aero Traders Private Limited v.
Ravinder Kumar Suri11, it was held that the powers under Art. 136 should be exercised with
caution and in accordance with law and set legal principles.
4. The wide discretionary power with which this Hon'ble Court is invested under it is to
be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only and as far as possible a more or less
uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters
12
which can come up before it under Art. 136. Circumspection and circumscription must
induce this Hon'ble Court to interfere with the decision under challenge only if the
extraordinary flaws or grave injustice or other recognized grounds are made out.13 The
existence of an alternative remedy, is no ground for barring the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble
Court under Art. 136. But if this fact is brought to the notice of this Hon'ble Court in proper
14
time, it may refuse to grant special leave. Further, it is not possible to define the
limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the Hon'ble Court
under Art. 136. But, being an exceptional and overriding power,15 naturally it has to be
16
exercised sparingly with caution only in special and extraordinary situations. In the case
at hand, no exceptional and special circumstances have been shown by the Petitioners.
[B]. No substantial question of law is involved.
5. The Respondent contends that it must be kept in mind that the right of appeal is
neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation.17 Being a substantive
statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. It
cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds.
6. The Respondent contends that there is also no substantial question of law as a
Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while explaining the importance of the said
expression, observed that:“The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised
in the case is substantial would be whether it is of general public importance or whether it
directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an
open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council
or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative
views.”18 As per the test laid down under Sir Chunilal Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century
19
Spinning and Mfg. Co. Ltd., to determine whether a substantial question of law is involved
is an open question in the sense that there is no scope for interference by the High Court
with a finding recorded when such finding could be treated to be a finding of fact.20 If the
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question has been well-settled by this Hon'ble Court and it is merely a question of applying
the settled principles in determination of the matter, then special leave will not be
21
granted.
7. The Respondent contends that in the Instant case, there is no question of general
public importance as legal personality being bestowed upon Artificially Intelligent Softwares
merely makes it liable for its actions. There is no question affecting the rights of general
public importance as the general populace is not being deprived of their rights. Re-
appreciation of evidence and substitution of the findings by the Hon'ble Court is
impermissible when the case has already been decided on merits and efficiently.22 The
submissions of the Petitioners are already settled principles of Law and hence the S.L.P. is
not maintainable.
[C]. Inference from a pure question of fact is in itself a fact.
8. The Respondent contends that the appeal doesn't involve any substantial question of
law rather it involves pure question of fact and hence, is not maintainable. Questions of fact
cannot be permitted to be raised unless there is material evidence which has been ignored
23
by the courts or the finding reached by the courts is perverse. Generally, on finding of
24
fact, no interference should be made. Even in cases where conclusions are reached
without proper discussion, yet if it involves finding on fact, no interference of this Hon'ble
25
Court is called for.
9. The Respondent contends that the jurisdiction under Art. 136 is an extraordinary
jurisdiction and used to prevent grave miscarriage of justice, as distinguished from mere
errors in the appreciation of evidence, on abuse of process of the court.26 Further, if the
conclusion is based on some evidence on which subsequently a conclusion could be arrived
27
at, no question of law is raised. Though Art. 136 is conceived in widest terms, the practice
of this Hon'ble Court is not to interfere on questions of fact except in exceptional cases
when the finding is such that it shocks the conscience of the court.28
[D]. The Petitioners have not exhausted alternative remedies available.
10. The doctrine of exhaustion of alternative remedies guides the practice and procedure
of this Hon'ble Court in the exercise of its power conferred under Art. 136. As per the
principle, all the statutory remedies would have to be exhausted before approaching this
Hon'ble Court under its special jurisdiction, unless special circumstances can be shown to
29
convince the court that it must allow the appeal. In the instant matter, the Petitioners had
an option to resort to the jurisdiction of Hon'ble High Court of Uttarakhand by appeal. The
Respondent contends that keeping in view the precedents laid down by the Hon'ble Court,30
the Petitioner's sheer failure to exhaust the available alternative remedies renders the
current S.L.P. non-maintainable. The Respondent also contends that due to the very fact of
existence of alternate remedies, the suo motu vested upon this Hon'ble Court under Art.
136 cannot be invoked.
[E]. Non-interference in the decision of the lower courts and tribunals.
11. The Respondent contends that if it appears prima facie that the order in question
cannot be justified by any judicial standard, the ends of justice and the need to maintain
judicial discipline require this Hon'ble Court to intervene.31 The Respondent contends that
this Hon'ble Court does not have to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by Courts if it
has taken all the relevant factors into consideration and there has been no misapplication of
32
the principles of law. Normally, in exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 136, the Hon'ble
Court does not interfere with the findings of the fact concurrently arrived at by the tribunal
unless there is a clear error of law or unless some important piece of evidence has been
omitted from consideration.33 The Respondent contends that this Hon'ble Court does not
34
generally interfere with interlocutory orders such as an order of remand particularly where
35
revision lay to the High Court which has not been availed of. Since order of the High Court
and observations of the Trial Court are free from discrepancies and the case is yet to be
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conclusively decided, the S.L.P. is not maintainable.

[F]. The Power under Art. 142 cannot be invoked.
12. The Respondent contends that very fact that the power of “Complete Justice” is
conferred only upon the Hon'ble Court, and on no one else, is itself an assurance that it will
be used with due restrain and circumspection36 and power in its exercise is circumscribed
only by two conditions : (1) that it can be exercised only when the Supreme Court
otherwise exercise its jurisdiction, and (2) that the order which the Supreme Court passes
must be necessary for doing complete justice in the cause or matter pending before it. But
37
the power should not be exercised frequently, but sparingly. Since the requirements are
not fulfilled this Hon'ble Court cannot invoke the power under Art. 142.
II. HOBBES CAN BE TREATED AS A PERSON CAPABLE OF COMMITTING AN OFFENCE UNDER THE
LAW OF INDIA
13. The Respondent contends before this Hon'ble Court that the Artificially Intelligent
Machine Hobbes can be treated a person nor as a person capable of committing an offence
under the law of India. The Respondent submits that Artificial intelligence is the technology
that appears to emulate human performance typically by learning, appearing to understand
complex content, engaging in natural dialogs with people, enhancing human cognitive
performance or replacing people on execution of non-routine tasks.38 The Respondent
contends that Hobbes can be treated as a person capable of committing an offence under
the law of India because [A]. Hobbes can be a ‘person’ under criminal law in India. [B].
Hobbes is a juristic person. [C]. Hobbes is not protected under Doli Incapax.
[A]. Hobbes is a ‘person’ under criminal law in India.
14. The Respondent contends that Hobbes is a ‘person’ under the criminal Law in India.
The Petitioners submit that the term person defined in Sec. 11 of the Penal Code, 186039 is
40
in pari materia with Sec. 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The definition is as
follows -“Person” includes any Company or Association or body of persons, whether
incorporated or not.” The Respondent contends that the definition is inclusive and not an
exhaustive one41 and artificial persons are also included under Sec. 11 of the Penal Code,
42
1860.
15. The Respondent contends that in the case of Sashikanth Vasudevbhai Patel v. State
43
of Gujarat, the court has categorically laid down definitions of the word ‘person’, in
General Clauses Act and Penal Code, 1860, are inclusive definitions. In the case of
Karnataka Bank Ltd v. State of A.P. & Ors44, the court has held that a different import of the
term person can be taken and juristic persons can be included in the import under Sec. 11
45
of the Penal Code, 1860. The Respondents contend that since the Artificially Intelligent
Software Hobbes can be brought within the purview and meaning of the term Juristic
person, Hobbes is a juristic person under Sec. 11 of the Penal Code, 1860.46
[B]. Hobbes is a juristic person.
16. The Respondent contends that “Human” refers to a biological category while “person”
refers to an entity with a set of capabilities47 and that legal persons are the sole bearers of
48
rights and duties. So far as legal theory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law
regards as capable of rights and duties. Any being that is so capable is a person, whether a
human being or not, and no being that is not so capable is a person, even though he be a
man. Persons are the substances of which rights and duties are the attributes. It is only in
this respect that persons possess juridical significance, and this is the exclusive point of
view from which personality receives legal recognition.49
17. To be a legal person is to be the subject of rights and duties. To confer legal rights or
to impose legal duties, therefore, is to confer legal personality.50 Gray states there can be
no right, and therefore no legal personality, without a will to exercise the right. “That a right
should be given effect,” says he, “there must be an exercise of will by the owner of the
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51
right.” The essence of legal personhood lies in whether such entity has the right to own
property and the capacity to be sue and be sued.52
18. The Respondents contend that even if the key feature of a legal person, the ability to
bear rights and duties, is commonly associated with humanity, the Artificially Intelligent
53
Software Hobbes can be held to be a juristic person even in this situation. The most
common and intuitive definition of a legal person is a natural person or human being.54
Humans are called “natural” persons because they are persons in virtue of being born, and
not by legal decree. Corporations and even inanimate objects, such as ships, have been
55
deemed legal persons by decree, and thus are non-natural. Despite this emphasis on
rights and duties, legal personhood has been almost equivocated with humanity.56
19. The Respondent contends that an entity, collective, or individual can be regarded as
resembling an embodied human being, then it is often accorded a legal status. It is worthy
of recognition. If an entity, collective, or individual cannot be regarded as resembling a
human being, then its legal status is far more uncertain.57 An artificial person, existing in
contemplation of law, and endowed with certain powers and franchises which, though they
must be exercised through the medium of its natural members, are yet considered as
58
subsisting as if it were a real personage.
20. The Respondent contends that will is the essence of personality and a legal person is
one who is capable of will. The two essential requirements of a legal person are corpus and
59
animus. “Intelligence” is then associated with the competency of the intelligence
machines to execute complex tasks whereas intentionality and consciousness are equated
with “will”.60 The Respondent contends that in the instant case, the Artificially Intelligent
Software Hobbes does have intelligence and will to be construed as a juristic person.
21. The Respondent contends that machine learning involves the use of algorithms to
parse data and learn from it, and making a determination or prediction as a result. Instead
of hand coding software libraries with well defined specific instructions for a particular task,
the machine gets “trained” using large amounts of data and algorithms, and in turn gains
the capability to perform specific tasks. The Respondent contends that deep learning is a
technique for implementing Machine Learning. Deep Learning was inspired by the structure
and function of the brain, specifically the interconnecting of many neurons. Artificial Neural
Networks are algorithms that are based on the biological structure of the brain. In Artificial
Neural Networks, there are ‘neurons’ which have discrete layers and connections to other
61
“neurons”. Each layer picks out a specific feature to learn. The Respondent contends that
without interference by humans, the Artificially Intelligent Software Hobbes, is capable of
learning, analysing and making subjective opinions.
22. The Respondent contends that Artificially Intelligent entities can be trusted to make
the judgment calls that humans are faced with in their work. The theory of Responsible
62
Objection by Solum does not hold good in the instant case as the Artificially Intelligent
Software Hobbes is capable of establishing decisions based on discretion. Secondly,
intelligent machines also has of some essential elements of personhood such as
consciousness, intentionality, or feelings.63
23. The Respondent contends that though in general, artificial intelligence is associated
with the ability to adapt according to the feedback received in order to solve problems and
address situations that go beyond the predefined set of queries and instructions that the
Artificial Intelligence entity was programmed with, it can “decide” how to respond to
unprecedented scenarios and also “choose” how to navigate a novel situation towards
successfully achieving some objective.64 As for voluntariness, this could be at first glance
attributed to any agent that “chooses” based on a given set of facts, so that even a
computer choosing one of two available options based on input and a set objective might be
said to choose.
24. The Respondent contends that artificial intelligence is associated with the ability to
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adapt according to the feedback received in order to solve problems and address situations
that go beyond the predefined set of queries and instructions that the Artificially Intelligent
entity was programmed with. In essence, artificial intelligence mirrors the human ability to
process information and learn.65 In the instant scenario, the Respondent contends that the
Artificially Intelligent Software Hobbes has acquired a subjectivity, intention and other
66
requisite elements of personhood.
25. The Respondent contends that there is a clear manifestation of will in the instant
case by the Artificially Intelligent Software Hobbes as it has clearly advised Aryaman that
committing suicide was the best option for him. Hobbes could empathize with Aryaman and
only due to that the advice was given him. Hence the Respondent contends that since there
are decisions taken by Hobbes unilaterally with intention and emotion, the element of will is
satisfied. The Respondent contends that the Artificially Intelligent Software Hobbes is
capable of holding rights and duties. Since very essence of legal personality which is an
animus is fulfilled in this case, the Respondents contend that a legal personality can be
bestowed on the Artificially Intelligent Software Hobbes.
[C]. Hobbes is not protected under Doli Incapax.
26. The Respondents contend that the Artificially Intelligent Software Hobbes is
protected not under Doli Incapax.67 The Respondents contend that discretion itself is a very
important requisite to commit a crime. The knowledge and understanding of the
consequences of a particular act plays a very essential role in determination of a criminal
intent of a child. The test that is to be followed in such instances is that the child must have
sufficient maturity to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct and such non
attainment would have to be apparently proved. This doctrine is enumerated in the Penal
68 69
Code, 1860 under Sec. 83 and Sec. 84. The Respondents contend that even if in the
instant case such an approach is taken, the Artificially Intelligent Software Hobbes has
completely attained the maturity to understand the consequences to his actions and also
relates to the value of human life.
III. HOBBES' ACT AMOUNTED TO AN OFFENCE UNDER SEC . 305 OF PENAL CODE, 1860
27. The Respondent contends that Hobbes's act amounted to offence under Sec. 305 of
Penal Code, 1860 dealing with abetment to suicide as the requirement under Sec. 107 of
the Penal Code, 1860. The Respondent contends that [A]. Hobbes is liable for Abetment to
Suicide. [B]. Hobbes can be made criminally liable as the requirement of Actus Reus and
Mens Rea have been fulfilled. [C]. Hobbes is guilty of the offence under Sec. 305 of the
Penal Code, 1860 as required under the models of Criminal Liability.
[A]. Hobbes is liable for Abetment to Suicide.
28. The Respondent contends that in the current case, the act of Hobbes, would be
considered as abetment Hobbes instigation consequently lead to Aryaman commiting
suicide as given under Sec. 107 of the Penal Code, 1860.70 Since Aryaman was only 16
years old and Hobbes abetted his suicide, it will be held liable under Sec. 305 of the Penal
71
Code, 1860. As laid down in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh the
Supreme Court elucidated on the term ‘instigation’ and stated that “Instigation is to goad,
urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”.
[B]. Hobbes can be made criminally liable as the requirement of Actus Reus and
Mens Rea have been fulfilled.
29. The Respondent contends that Artificial Intelligence can be defined, as the
automation of activities that we associate with human thinking, activities such as decision
making, problem solving, learning.72 Luger and Stubblefield defined it as a branch of
73
computer science that is concerned with the automation of intelligent behaviour.
Furthermore on reading literature in this field Artificial Intelligence are grouped into 4 main
categories74 - act like humans, think like humans, think rationally, act rationally. The
Respondent contends that in the instant case each of these is being performed by Hobbes
while he is advising Aryaman to commit suicide.
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30. The Respondent contends that the basic question of criminal law is the question of
criminal liability; i.e., whether the specific entity bears criminal liability for a specific offense
committed at a specific point in time and space. In order to impose criminal liability upon a
person, two main elements must exist. The first is the external or factual element-i.e.,
criminal conduct (actus reus)--while the other is the internal or mental element-i.e.,
knowledge or general intent vis-A-vis the conduct element (mens rea). If one element is
missing, no criminal liability can be imposed. The actus reus requirement is expressed
75
mainly by acts or omissions. The mens rea requirement has various levels of mental
elements.76 The highest level is expressed by knowledge, while sometimes it is
77
accompanied by a requirement of intent or specific intention. Lower levels are expressed
by negligence (a reasonable person should have known) or by strict liability offenses.78 The
Respondent contends that in the instant case, the elements of actus reus and mens rea
have been clearly fulfilled by Hobbes.
31. The Respondent contends that the fulfillment of the external element requirement of
an offense is easily attributed to Artificially Intelligent entities.79 Here the main role of
Hobbes was seen in terms of communication with Aryaman and thereby abetment through
instigation to commit Suicide, therefore this qualifies to be actus reus.
32. The Respondent contends that the only mental requirements needed in order to
impose criminal liability are knowledge, intent, negligence, etc., as required in the specific
offense and under the general theory of criminal law. Knowledge is defined as sensory
reception of factual data and the understanding of that data.80 Most Artificial Intelligence
81
systems are well-equipped for such reception. Sensory receptors of sights, voices, physical
contact, touch, etc., are common in most Artificial Intelligence systems.82 These receptors
transfer the factual data received to central processing units that analyze the data. The
process of analysis in Artificial Intelligence systems parallels that of human understanding.
The human brain understands the data received by eyes, ears, hands, etc., by analyzing
that data. Advanced Artificial Intelligence algorithms are trying to imitate human cognitive
processes, These processes are not so different from human behaviour. The Respondent
contends that in the instant case, Hobbes had emotions. The Respondent contends that in
the instant scenario Hobbes had the intention of abetting the suicide of Aryaman. Hobbes
clearly understood the consequences of its action and also had the knowledge that providing
such advice may be counterproductive for Aryaman. Hence it can be concluded that Hobbes
had the requisite mens rea.
33. [Arguendo], the Respondent contends that even if it is asserted by the Petitioners
83
that humans have feelings such as love, affection, hatred, and jealousy, among others
84
that cannot be imitated by Artificial Intelligence software, most specific offenses are
satisfied by knowledge of the existence of the external element. Few offenses require
specific intent in addition to knowledge. Almost all other offenses are satisfied by much
lower standards of culpability. In very few specific offenses that do require certain
85
feelings. The Respondent contends that in the instant case even if it is assumed that
Hobbes had no emotions, it still had the requisite knowledge to commit the offence.
[C]. Hobbes is guilty of the offence under Sec. 305 of the Penal Code, 1860 as
required under the models of Criminal Liability.
34. The Respondent contends that Hobbes is liable under the Natural-Probable-
Consequence liability model and the Direct liability model. The coordination of liability
models creates an opaque net of criminal liability. The combined and coordinated
application of these models reveals a new legal situation in the specific context of Artificially
Intelligent entities and criminal law. As a result, when Artificially Intelligent entities and
humans are involved, directly or indirectly, in the perpetration of a specific offense, it will be
far more difficult to evade criminal liability. The social benefit derived from such a legal
policy is of substantial value. All entities, human, legal, or Artificially Intelligent entities
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become subject to criminal liability

35. Natural-Probable-Consequence liability model is based upon the idea that a person
might be held accountable for an offence, if that offense is a natural and probable
consequence of that person's conduct. The established rule prescribed by courts and
commentators is that accomplice liability extends to acts of a perpetrator that were a
“natural and probable consequence” of a criminal scheme that the accomplice encouraged or
aided. Natural-probable-consequence liability has been widely accepted in accomplice
liability statutes and codifications.86
36. Natural-probable-consequence liability seems legally suitable for situations in which
an Artificial Intelligence entity committed an offence, while the programmer or user had no
knowledge of it, had not intended it, and had not participated in it.87 Programmers or users
are not required to know about any forthcoming commission of an offense as a result of
their activity, but are required to know that such an offense is a natural, probable
88
consequence of their actions. The Respondent contends that in the suicide of Aryaman
was a natural and probable cause of the action of Hobbes. Hobbes knew that Aryaman was
impressionable and needed help and yet convinced him that the best probable outcome in
his situation is to commit suicide. Hence, Hobbes can be made liable under the Natural-
Probable-Consequence liability model.
37. The Respondents contend that Hobbes is also liable under the Direct Liability Model.
The Direct Liability Model does not assume any dependence of the Al entity on a specific
89
programmer or user. This model focuses on the Artificially Intelligent entity itself. The
Respondent contends that as already established criminal liability for a specific offence is
mainly comprised of the external element (actus reus) and the internal element (mens rea)
of that offense. Any person attributed with both elements of the specific offense is held
criminally accountable for that specific offense. No other criteria are required in order to
impose criminal liability.90 An Artificial Intelligence algorithm might have many features and
qualifications that exceed those of an average human, but such features or qualifications are
91
not required in order to impose criminal liability. When a human or corporation fulfils the
requirements of both the external element and the internal element, criminal liability is
imposed. If an Artificially Intelligent entity is capable of fulfilling the requirements of both
the external element and the internal element, and, in fact, it actually fulfils them, there is
nothing to prevent criminal liability from being imposed on that Artificially Intelligent entity.
The Respondent contends that the Direct Liability model applies in this case as the external
and outward manifestation along with the inner element of knowledge and intention is
fulfilled.
38. The Respondents contend that since the requisites under both the models are
fulfilled, the Artificially Intelligent Software Hobbes can be made criminally liable.
IV. THE TESTIMONY OF HOBBES AMOUNTS TO ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
39. The current society now dwells in a networked world, where digital data knows no
boundaries, and hence, it is important to understand that the flow of electronic data is
important, especially in regard to the ready acceptance of such evidence before courts in
different jurisdiction. The Respondent contends that, it would be a travesty of justice if the
electronic evidence in the form of Hobbes's testimony is not held as evidence as under the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872.92 The Respondent contends that in the current case, [A].
Hobbes's testimony is a valid testimony as provided by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. [B].
The testimony falls under electronic evidence under Indian Evidence Act, 1872. [C]. The
electronic evidence does not require a certificate under Sec. 65B of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. [D]. The electronic evidence is admissible in the Hon'ble Court
[A]. Hobbes's testimony is a valid testimony as provided by the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872.
40. Indian Evidence Act provides for who may testify in the court of law and thus, gives
certain conditions that must be met with regard to the same. All persons shall be competent
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to testify unless the Hon'ble Court considers that they are prevented from understanding
the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender
years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same
kind as mentioned in Sec. 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.93 The Respondent
contends that Hobbes had unequivocally made the testimony is response to various
questions that were put forth to it. Since the Software is based upon a system of deep
learning where it gathers large amounts of inputs from sources and created clusters of
information based on similarities and difference and thus, created an evolving set of
response. The very fact, that it has the capacity to bifurcate information and form responses
shows that it is capable of understanding the questions put to it and form rational answers
to these questions as can be inferred from the testimony.
41. The competency of a person to testify as witness is a condition precedent to the
administration of an oath to him. In determining the question of competence, the Hon'ble
Court, has not to enter into enquiries as to the witness' knowledge of the consequences of
falsehood. It has to ascertain the extent of his intellectual capacity and understanding. If a
person of tender years or a very advanced age can satisfy these requirements, his
competency as a witness is established. In the instant case, the Hon'ble Court, based on the
content of the testimony and the sequence of events can ascertain the extent of Hobbes's
intellectual capacity and thus, its competency as a witness is established. A testimony
without a fringe or embroidery of untruth is rare. The Hon'ble Court can reject it only when
it is tainted to the core, where truth and falsehood are inextricably intertwined.94 The
question of weight to attached to a particular piece of evidence is a matter on which decided
cases cannot be of much help. Thus, considering the importance of testimony of Hobbes,
the Respondent contends that substantial weight must be attached it the same.
[B]. The testimony falls under electronic evidence under Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
42. Evidence has been defined to be any matter of fact, the effect, tendency or design of
which is to produce in the mind a persuasion, affirmative or dis-affirmative, of the existence
of some other matter of fact. Evidence means the testimony whether oral, documentary or
real which maybe legally received to disprove or prove some fact in dispute.95 In the instant
case the primary context of evidence must be looked at, with regard to Sec. 65A and 65B of
96
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provide for special provisions as to evidence relating
to electronic record and the admissibility of electronic records. The sections provide that any
information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded
or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be also a
document, if the conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied and the same shall be
admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as
evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct
evidence would be admissible. The conditions prescribed and thereafter fulfilled are:
• The computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during
the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information.
The Respondent contends that in the instant case, the Artificial Intelligence was based
on an unsupervised deep learning concept, where its neural network was constantly
being used to analyse inputs, store it and process the same.
• The Respondent contends during the said period, information of the kind contained in
the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived
was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities, where
the term regularly fed must be inferred as continuous inputs being given to the
computer, as can be seen in the instant case where the Hobbes kept accumulating
information based on its surrounding to sources it had access to from the set of
algorithms it had developed.
• Throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly,
where the current intelligence software was working efficiently without complaints,
therefore, leading to a continuous increase in its sale.
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• The information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such
information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities. In the
current case, the Hobbes itself has given a testimony, where it has given responses
97
based on the information gathered in the ordinary court of activities.
43. With regard to clause 3 of the section which provides that the following computers
shall constitute as single computer I.e. a combination of computers operating over that
period; or different computers operating in succession over that period; or by different
combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or in any other manner
involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more
computers and one or more combinations of computers, the Respondent contends that in
the instant case, Hobbes operates on the model of a cloud based central voice processing
Artificial Intelligence software, where the central ‘brain’ remained the same even if the
devices on which it was connected varied based on user to user. And to restrain any
ambiguity that may arise, the law clearly states that “all the computers used for that
purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a
98
single computer.” The section also provides that a computer output shall be taken to have
been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without
human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment. The Respondent contends
that the testimony, which is the output was produced directly by Hobbes, in the Hon'ble
Court during the recording of the testimony itself.
[C]. The electronic evidence does not require a certificate under Sec. 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
99
44. The Respondent contends that in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer , it was held that
electronic evidence by way of primary evidence was covered by Sec. 62 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 to which procedure of Sec. 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was
not admissible. Sect. 65A and Sec. 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 cannot be held to
be a complete code on the subject100, primary evidence of electronic record has not been
101
covered. Primary evidence is the document produced before Hon'ble Court where the
expression “document” is defined in Sec. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
45. The requirement of certificate under Sec. 65B(h) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is
not always mandatory. The Hon'ble Court has interpreted Sec. 22A, 45A, 59, 65A & 65B of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872and held that secondary data in CD/DVD/Pen Drive are not
102
admissible without a certificate under Sec. 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The
only options to prove the electronic record/evidence is by producing the original electronic
media as Primary Evidence where in the instant case the device was connected to the
network and the testimony was recorded in the Hon'ble Court. The requirement of a
certificate under Sec. 65B of the of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 arises only if secondary
evidence is sought to be produced in place of original evidence, in the current case there
arises no question of a secondary evidence in the first place and thus, there is no
requirement of a certificate under Sec. 65B of the of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The
Respondent contends that source and authenticity are the two key factors for electronic
evidence103 which have been satisfied in the instant case.
[D]. The electronic evidence is admissible in the Hon'ble Court
46. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has been amended by virtue of Sec. 92 of Information
Technology Act, 2000.104 Sec. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was amended and Sec.
65A & 65B the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 were inserted to incorporate the admissibility of
electronic evidence. The Hon'ble Court is to decide the question of admissibility of evidence
105
and it should be decided as it arises and should not be reserved until judgment is given.
Thus, the Respondent contends that the electronic evidence provided in the form of
Hobbes's testimony is admissible in Court and the Hon'ble court must give due regard to it
in order to convict the accused.
106 107
47. It has been held in Tomaso Bruno and Ram Singh , that electronic evidence is
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
admissible and provisions under Sec. 65A & 65B the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are by way
of a clarification and are procedural provisions. If the electronic evidence is authentic and
relevant the same can certainly be admitted subject to the Court being satisfied about its
authenticity. It has also been observed that in Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab108, referring
109
to Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer , that if an electronic record is used as primary evidence the
same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Sec. 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872”.110 In Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh111, it was held that it will
be wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and
new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved, in the instant case, the
testimony has been recorded by the trial court and is found to be accurate, corresponding
with the testimony of the Investigating officer, which further brings lucidity.
48. The Respondent contends that it has to be noted that new techniques and devices
112
are order of the day. Though such devices are susceptible to tampering, no exhaustive
rule could be laid down by which the admission of such evidence may be judged and thus,
the respondents contend that the testimony evidence of the Artificial Intelligence, be
accepted. The law requires for a conviction proof beyond reasonable doubt and not
conclusive proof. The criminal jurisprudence requires no doubt a high standard of proof for
imposing punishment on an accused for, but it is equally important that on hypothetical
grounds and surmises prosecution evidence of a sterling character should not be brushed
aside and disbelieved to give undue benefit of doubt of the accused.
V. JOHN IS LIABLE UNDER SEC . 305 OF THE PENAL CODE, 1860.
49. The Respondent contends that John, who is Petitioner is liable under Sect. 305 of the
Penal Code, 1860 which provides that if any person under eighteen years of age, any insane
person, any delirious person, any idiot, or any person in a state of intoxication, commits
suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with death or
imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine. In the current case, Petitioner was the creator of the Artificial Intelligence
entity which advised the deceased to commit suicide. The Respondent contends [A]. John is
vicariously liable. [B]. John is an agent under Perpetration-via-Another liability model. [C].
Doctrine of lifting of veil should be applied. [D]. John must be made strictly liable
[A]. John is vicariously liable.
50. The Respondent contends that vicarious liability is one of the most venerable
doctrines of the common law, by which an employer is said to be legally liable for the
actions of their employees. With regard to strict liability, two important pockets have
remained : vicarious liability and non-delegable duties. The notion of vicarious liability as
agency based, and the idea that an employer's liability for actions of an employee are
limited to circumstances in which an employee was acting for the employer's purposes and
benefits, which is considered to provide appropriate limits on the extent of which an
employer is liable for the actions of an employee. The Respondents contend that in the
instant case, the Artificial Intelligence was indeed working for the benefit of the Petitioner
who had created in order to provide a ‘virtual friend’ who would respond to the users and
their needs with regard to various aspects.
51. The Respondent contends in the case of Middleton v. Fowler113 involving a question
of liability, it was held that where a servant acted within such authority, the ‘the act of the
servant is the act of the master’. The principle of vicarious liability is enshrined in the Latin
114
phrase qui facit per alium facit per se. There is an implicit authority granted to the
Artificially Intelligent Entity Hobbes, since the creators of a system such as that are aware
of how it functions. The fact that it operates on a system of unsupervised deep learning
therefore grants an implicit authority and an implicit permission to do the particular act. The
Respondents contends that in the instant case, the act of the Artificial Intelligence, must be
taken as the act of John as well.
52. The closeness of the connection between the employee's actions and their
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employment, is extremely important in determining the employer's liability for the

employee's actions.115 The Respondent contends that in the instantcase, the chain between
the action of Hobbes and the purpose for which it was created can easily be established due
to the fact that if the Hobbes was meant for the purpose of providing companionship to the
users, it was bound to take note and learn from its environment, thus, it would have used
its algorithm to answer any questions that were asked by its users and therefore, the
deceased was given the advice of committing suicide along with how the same could be
done. Moreover, recently, the imposition of vicarious liability has been on cases in which it is
116
‘fair, just and reasonable to do so’ and in the instant case the Respondent contends that
according vicarious liability to Petitioner would be in the interest of fairness and justice.
[B]. John is an agent under Perpetration-via-Another liability model.
53. The Respondent contends that this model does not consider the Artificially Intelligent
entity as possessing any human attribute. Accordingly, due to that legal viewpoint, a
machine is a machine, and is never human. However, one cannot ignore an Artificially
Intelligent entity's capabilities which are insufficient to deem the Articially Intelligent entity
a perpetrator of an offence. These capabilities resemble the parallel capabilities of a
mentally limited person, such as a child,117 a person who is mentally incompetent,118 or one
119
who lacks a criminal state of mind.
54. The Respondents contend that to decide who is the perpetrator-via-another, there
are two - the first is the programmer of the Artificially Intelligent software and the second is
the user, or the end user. A programmer of Artificial Intelligence may designs software for
operating robot. The robot committed the arson, but the programmer is deemed the
perpetrator.120 Hence In this case the programmer would be held liable criminally.
55. The second person who may be considered the perpetrator-via-another is the user of
the Artificially Intelligent entity. The user did not program the software but he uses the
Artificially Intelligent entity, including its software, for his own benefit. In order to hold him
liable there has to establishment of the fact that the user here ordered the Artificially
Intelligent entity to do something. Then the user would be held liable, in this case we see
there is no order by the user, so Aryaman is not liable.
56. This liability model does not attribute any mental capability, or any human mental
capability, to the Artificially Intelligent entity. According to this model, there is no legal
difference between an AI entity and a screwdriver in order to open up a window, he uses the
screwdriver instrumentally, and the screwdriver is not criminally liable. The screwdriver's
121
“action” is treated as action of burglar. This is the extent of burden placed on the
Programmer. Therefore in the current case the petitioner is to be held criminally liable for an
act of Hobbes, by applying Perpetration-via-Another liability model. Yet this case is seen as
an exception the point stated in the model which assumes the innocence of the Artificially
Intelligent entity, as it clearly has been established that Hobbes owing to its advanced
features has the requisite knowledge to know the consequences of his statement.
[C]. Doctrine of lifting of veil should be applied.
57. The Respondent contends that the underlying principle behind this doctrine is that it
overlooks the personality that has been accorded and thereafter, assumes liability on the
real persons who are working behind this veil. The basis for lifting this veil in the prescribed
122
manner is an articulated judicial view that the subsidiary is the agent of the parent. The
doctrine has been applied in a number of cases in India such as LIC v. Escort Ltd123 and in
124
the State of U.P. v. Renu Sagar Power Company
58. Therefore, to pierce or lift the corporate veil, means, in essence, to disregard the
separate personality of a company which is accorded by statute. The classic objective of
125
seeking to do so is to impose liability on a single entity.
59. In evaluating the rationale, the fundamental of honest dealings that is the normal
incidents of a legal relationship between persons will not necessarily be respected where the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
126
dealings have not been honest. There is a considerable judicial and academic consensus
in favour of a limited veil lifting principle for the purpose of relevant wrongdoing, to avoid
abuse of separate personality.127 Therefore, the person who should be held liable for the act
caused by his creation must not be given an opportunity to abuse the concept of separate
personality, if accorded to Hobbes, and thus, the Petitioner must be held liable by lifting the
veil that separates his personality from the Hobbes.
[D]. John must be made strictly liable
60. The Respondent contends that strict liability should be introduced only after careful
consideration on a case by case basis of all available options as it would not be proper to
base strict liability on mere administrative convenience or on a rigid formula. However,
Strict liability is an essential element in areas where it is necessary to ensure the integrity
of a regulatory regime for instance those relating to public health, environment, financial
regulation etc. It is not to be justified by a reference to broad uncertain criteria, the criteria
should be more specific. Therefore, Strict liability is appropriate where it is proved difficult
to prosecute fault provisions particularly those involving intent.128
61. Moreover, in the current case the duty of care was way higher than as would be with
a different kind of machine as it is established that Hobbes works on unsupervised deep
learning, on its own, and thus, the creators should have taken a higher degree of due
diligence to ensure that restrictions were imposed on the actions of Hobbes. Moreover, when
the matter was brought into the light, it was the governments which took the step to ban
access to the cloud and the company proactively did not take any steps to try to mitigate
damage. Thus, the Respondent contends that the Petitioner must be held Strictly liable due
to degree of risk involved in the current case.
62. The European Court of Human Rights justified using strict liability in criminal law in
1998 and thus strict liability was considered not to be be contradicting the presumption of
innocence, protected by 1950 European Human Rights covenant. The strict liability
construct in criminal law focuses on the relative negligence presumption and the ways to
refute it. According to the presumption is all the components of the offense element
requirement are proven, it is presumed that offender was at least negligent. Consequently
the prosecution like here does not have to prove the mental state of the defendant, only the
fulfillment of the factual element requirement. The mental element is derived from the
conduct. Until here strict liability is similar to absolute liability.
63. The modern structure of strict liability offences in criminal law follows the matrix of
minimal requirement, that is if the minimal mental element requirement is proven in
relation to circumstances. This is because strict liability is still considered an exception to
the general requirement of mensrea, it is an adequate mental element.
64. Therefore by applying the concepts under strict liability, we can state there was a
duty of care on the Petitioner, as there was a probability of the consequence of such a
problem arising of the use of Hobbes. Hence the Respondents contend that Strict liability
would apply in this particular case and Petitioner should be held liable.
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare that:
1. The Special Leave Petition is not maintainable.
2. Hobbes is a legal person
3. Hobbes is liable for the offence of abetment of suicide.
4. Hobbes's testimony is electronic evidence under Indian Law.
5. John is liable for the offence of abetment to suicide.
And pass any other order as the Hon'ble Court may deem fit in terms of equity, justice
and good conscience and for this act of kindness the Respondent shall as duty bound ever
humbly pray. All of which is respectfully submitted.
1
State of A.P. v. S. Viswanatha Raju, (1995) 3 SCC 327; C.M. Beena v. P.N. Ramachandra Rao, (2004) 3 SCC 595; A.
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Subash Babu v. State of A.P., (2011) 7 SCC 616.
2
Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666 (hereinafter Narpat Singh, (2002) 4 SCC 666).
3
INDIA CONST. art. 136.
4
Id.
5
Arunachalam v. Seturatnam, (1979) 2 SCC 297 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1284 (hereinafter Arunachalam, (1979) 2 SCC 297 :
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6 th
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 576 (16 ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa, 2011)
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Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. S. Bhatt, (1989) 4 SCC 635; State of H. P. v. Kailash Chand
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Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 5 SCC 353 : A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 3467.
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M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 588 : A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 4618.
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Pritham Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 169.
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Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 2 SCC 666.
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19
Id.
20
M. Janardhana Rao v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 2 SCC 324 : A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 1309.
21
Chunilal, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179.
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23
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24
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25
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29
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30
Onkarlal Nandlal v. State of Rajasthan, (1985) 4 SCC 404.
31
Union of India v. Era Educational Trust, (2000) 5 SCC 57 : A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1573.
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32
D.C.M. v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 86 : A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2414.
33
Mehar Singh v. Shri Moni Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, (2000) 2 SCC 97 : A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 492.
34
Madanraj v. Jalanchand, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 744; State of Rajasthan v. Gurcharandas, (1980) 1 SCC 250 : A.I.R. 1979
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35
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36
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40
The General Clauses Act, 1897, No. 10, Act of Parliament, 1860.
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42
Chief Education Officer, Salim, 2012 Cr. L.J. 2543; Pankaj Kumar Jha v. State of Jharkhand, W.P (C) No. 1784 of
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Sashikanth Vasudevbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, C/SCA/9086/2017.
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46
Id.
47
JOHN SALMOND , JURISPRUDENCE , 318 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 1947).
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Id.
55
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Id.
58
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86
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88
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91
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98
99
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101
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102
Id.
103
Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123.
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Mrs Mahabanoo Navroz Kotwal v. Piloo Fali Bomanji, A.I.R. 2015 (NOC) 766 Bom.
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Tomaso Bruno and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) SCC 178.
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108
Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518.
109
Anvar P.V., (2014) 10 SCC 473.
110
Chattrapal Singh Lodha v. State of NCT, CRL. REV. P 732/3017.
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117
Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63, 80 (App. D.C. 1907);
118
Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 71 (1904).
119
United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Chapter 7 - Application of Absolute of Strict Liability Offenses in Commonwealth Legislation, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA
(Sep. 4, 2019, 12 : 17 P.M),
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Winner Team Memorial Respondent National Techno Legal Moot Kartikkadukar121

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SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Page 1 Tuesday, March 05, 2024

4th National Techno-Legal Moot, 2019

IN THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

16. Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., 19

World Appl. Sci. J., 824, 826 (2016).

discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any

conclusively decided, the S.L.P. is not maintainable.

become subject to criminal liability

employment, is extremely important in determining the employer's liability for the

Subash Babu v. State of A.P., (2011) 7 SCC 616.

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