218 PART IV • FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1930-l94
CHA^rE
applicatiom
Functionalism May Be Down, But lt
Surely Is Not Out
Another Point of View for Family Therapists
and Policy Analysts
Joe F. Pittman
There can be little doubt that the functional model has passed lts heyday. In Burr, Hill,
Nye, and Reiss (1979b), the functional model was not considered as a major orienta-
tion for the family field. Rather, it was discussed as a variation on the theme of
interactionism, which stressed the objective and structured aspects of family relations
and family-society dynamics (Burr et al., 1979a).
Currently, Kingsbury and Scanzoni show strong leanings favoring the assump-
tions of the interactionist model. If policy makers and therapists are to utilize a func­
tionalist framework, however, some assumptions presented in this chapter must be
reconsidered. For instance, does functionalism require a consensus orientation? While
this approach focused originally on the problem of social organization (the Hobbesian
question), the point would be moot if the answer were simply that preexisting stan-
dards, designed to support the whole against the parts, produced conformity in actors.
Immediately one wonders, “How are disharmony and strife possible?” Functionalism
assumes a dynamic tension between the interests of social actors and the social
systems to which they belong. Alexander (1985) asserts that “Functionalism posits the
distinctions between personality, culture and society as vital to social structure, and
the tensions produced by their interpenetration as a continuous source of change and
contrei" (p. 10).
Kingsbury and Scanzoni rightly associate functionalism with homeostatic and
organic metaphors. A metaphor, however, is only a tooi, not the thing itself. If meta-
phors facilitate thought about how families are organized by both culture and indi-
vidual, or how social structure affects behavior, they are useful. The organic metaphor
conceptualizes social systems as similar to organic systems and prompts func-
tionalists to consider patterns of family interaction as social structures that exist and
operate at a different level of analysis than individual actors. While families do not think
or behave, their structures serve as more abstract variables than the acts of members.*
Joe F. Pittman • Department of Family and Child Development, Auburn University, Auburn, Ala-
bama 36849.
rR 9 • STRUCTU RAL—FUNCTIONALISM 219
Homeostasis is another metaphor. Equating equilibration with the status quo, as
do Kingsbury and Scanzoni, is valid only if the point of equilibrium cannot change. A
moving equilibrium helps explain both dynamic process and social stability. Alexander
(1985) claims that the concept of equilibrium serves as a reference point for human
systems, not for the participants in these systems. The homeostatic metaphor is useful
in conceptualizing system-level, self-correcting processes, such as the assimilation of
role changes following the addition or removal of system members. There is no reason
to assume that such self-correction implies a return to status quo. In fact, growth,
change, and development are all concepts that benefit from the application of the
homeostatic concept.
One factor that differentiates the functional model from others is its epis-
temological orientation. In a functional model, structures and functions are assumed to
have some degree of objective reality. Rather than being social constructions or
phenomenological projections, structures are presumed to have some externality visi-
ble to different observers. The functions or consequences of structures are also con­
sidered relatively reliable, contingent phenomena, not idiosyncratic. In other words,
the functional model tends toward a realistic epistemology.
My purpose in these opening comments is to suggest that perhaps functionalism
continues to have potential as an orientation to guide family research and application.
The reemergence of functional thinking in the 1980s (while not reaching the family field
as yet) is certainly suggestive of its perceived value in the discipline of sociology.
[Representatives of this revival include Alexander (1983), Munch (1981, 1982), and
Bershady (1973).] Below I will illustrate how family therapists and policy makers might
use a functionalist approach. I will begin with Vogel and Bell’s (1960) classic concep-
tualization of the “family scapegoat.” Then 1 will take a policy maker’s perspective to a
work-family issue, focusing on child care policy.
Vogel and Bell (1960) describe a process by which families create “problem
children” and then utilize them as family scapegoats. They suggest that scapegoats
are products of stressful family conditions. The stress is typically social (between
family members, usually parents) and chronic (unresolved or poorly managed). Ac-
cording to Vogel and Bell, children are the usual “recruits” and are made into
scapegoats by way of a three-phase process: (1) selection, (2) induction, and (3)
rationalization.1 The selected child might have an emotional or physical problem that
draws attention or could be perceived by one or both parents to reflect their interper-
sonal conflict. For instance, if parents often fight about financial stress, they might
choose for scapegoating the child who places the greatest financial demands on family
resources.
“Induction,” the process by which designated scapegoats are taught to be prob-
lems, is said to occur largely outside of the parent’s awareness. Vogel and Bell claim
parental inconsistency is the primary inductive mechanism, exemplified by incompati-
ble explicit versus implicit rules, mercurial consequences for misbehavior, or extremes
of disciplinary severity. Research supports the idea that parental inconsistency would
be effective in the development of problem children (Patterson, 1982; Wahler et al.,
1990).
When (if) the child responds to the induction, family members have a scapegoat
or a lightning rod upon which they can turn their wrath when stress levels are high.
However, family members may experience guilt about, or embarrassment with, the
1The scapegoat role does not demand children. In fact, the nonresident parent in a bi-nuclear family
(Ahrons, 1980) would be ideally suited to the role of scapegoat. But for consistency with Vogel and
Bell’s analysis, the scapegoat will be considered a child. If a nonresident parent were treated as a
family scapegoat, the functions would be similar, but the process of induction would probably be quite
different than that described here.
220 PART IV FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGLNG Dl]RING 1930
scapegoat’s behavior, necessitating rationalization. Family excuses tend to focus on
the scapegoat's actual behavior, which, by all accounts, is deviant.
At the heart of the functionalist orientation is an interest in asking what might
seem an odd question, “How does an observed process serve the larger social
group?” Vogel and Bell identify several “functions" of family scapegoats. First, the
parents are able to divert their attention away from their interpersonal stress, at least to
some degree. In addition, they have a common orientation to the scapegoat; they
agree that the child is (or has) a problem. This opportunity for agreement effects a type
of stability or integration in the marital and family systems that had not been possible in
the earlier tension-ridden family. Finally, the scapegoat draws the community’s atten­
tion, preventing scrutiny of the “fragile” family.
To reiterate, a functional analysis examines the effects of system structures on the
behavior of system elements, as well as the consequences of this behavior for the
social group(s) to which actors belong. It is common, therefore, for functional analyses
to involve different units and levels of analysis. To illustrate, both work and family
contexts have implications for workers and work organizations, as well as families and
family members. It should be clear that a “functional’’ consequence may not be desir-
able. While functionalism has been accused of sporting a conservative value orienta­
tion with a status quo ideological bias, the scapegoat concept is obviously a poor
illustration of this criticism. Indeed, it shows how the primary institution of socialization
can undermine its own mandate in a self-serving fashion and produce social deviance.
It also reveals the tension between the “interests” of the levels of a system. While
there may be “functional" consequences for the system, the consequences for the
scapegoat may be devastating.
The point has been made and stressed that there is no necessary value orienta­
tion to the functionalist approach. Flowever, policy makers cannot operate without
drawing upon some value system. The basic value neutrality of functionalism is proba-
biy best illustrated by the ease with which liberal or conservative family policy can be
generated and justified when beginning with the same structural conditions and the
same apparent consequences. The debate about public-sponsored child care is a
good case study.
Kamerman and Kahn (1981) discuss the family benefits implemented by several
European countries with regard to child care. While they do not claim to use a func­
tional model, their work is consistent with a functional approach to policy analysis,
First, they note changing structural conditions in Western societies, for example, more
women in the labor market, more divorce, and smaller family sizes. Next they ask the
logical, functional question, “can adults manage productive roles in the labor force at
the same time as they fulfill productive roles within the family—at home” (p. 2). They
discuss how five countries applied differing cultural values and national goals for labor
force participation and family fertility to similar structural patterns and developed vary-
ing interventions. All were designed to support the dual roles of worker and parent and
included (depending on the sponsoring country) paid parental leave, high-quality child
(and infant) care services, and even a family allowance that increased with the number
of children in the family.
Kamerman and Kahn’s analysis could be considered Progressive or liberal. Alter-
natively, a paper entitled “The Family: Preserving America’s Future,” written in 1986 by
the Working Group on the Family, appointed by President Reagan’s White Flouse
Domestic Policy Council, reveals how a value structure, rather than the theory em-
ployed, drives the policy machine. Their statement asserts,
We must guard against abusing and misusing the pro-family label... for instance, Social
Democrats in several European nations purported to “save” the family by socializing the costs
of child rearing. State funded day care, child allowances, national health systems, school feed­
CHAPTER9 STRUCTURAL—FUNCTIONALISM
ing programs and other welfare programs were put in place, but at tremendous expense.
Government grew and taxed, pinching pocketbooks and forcing mothers into the work place.
Birth rates declined. All this has been done elsewhere in the name of the family. It must be
avoided here, (pp. 7-8)
This report maintains (wrongly) that the very policies implemented to ease the stress of
multiple roles are their cause! While functional policy analyses begin with structural
conditions and their presumed consequences, the interventions proposed are as de-
pendent on the value system of the analysts as they are on the objective qualities of
the problem.
In sum, the functional model places emphasis on existing, relatively objective
elements of system structure that have reliable consequences eitherforthe system, its
constituent elements, or the larger system to which it belongs. The interest in examin-
ing phenomena at different levels of analysis (suprasystem, system, subsystem, sys­
tem element) is another common theme in the application of functionalism. A realistic
epistemology, which has extensively and productively utilized an organic metaphor,
also marks the functional approach. However, the presumed moralism allegedly un-
dergirding functionalism with a conservative, consensus-based, status quo bias, is
almost certainly the product of the period of theory development (1940s and 1950s)
rather than inherent to the theory itself.
References
Ahrons, C. (1980). Divorce: A crisis of family transition and change. Family Relations, 29, 533-540.
Alexander, J. C. (1983). Theoretical logic in socioiogy: Vol. 4. The modern reconstruction of classic
thought: Talcott Parsons. Berkeley: University of California.
Alexander, J. C. (1985). Introduction. In J. C, Alexander (Ed.), Neofunctionalism. Beverly Mills, CA:
Sage.
Bershady, H, J. (1973). Ideology and soda! knowledge. New York: Wiley,
Burr, W. R., Leigh, G. K., Day, R. D,, & Constantine, J. (1979a). Symbolic interaction and the family. In
W, R. Burr, R. Hill, F. I. Nye, & I. L. Reiss (Eds.), Contemporary theohes about the family (Vol. 2, pp.
42-111). New York: Free Press.
Burr, W, R,, Hill, R., Nye, F. I., & Reiss, I. L. (1979b). Contemporary theories about the family (Vol. 2).
New York: Free Press.
Kamerman, S. B., & Kahn, A. J. (1981). Child care, family benefits, and working parents: A study in
comparative policy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Munch, R. (1981). Talcott Parsons and the theory of action. I. The structure of the Kantian core.
American Journal of Socioiogy, 86, 709-739.
Munch, R. (1982). Talcott Parsons and the theory of action. II. The continuity of the development.
American Journal of Socioiogy, 87, 771-826.
Patterson, G. R. (1982). A social learning approach to family intervention: Vol. 3. Coercive family
process. Eugene, OR: Castalia.
Vogel, E. F., & Bell, N. W. (1960). The emotlonally disturbed child as the family scapegoat. In N. W. Bell
& E. F. Vogel (Eds.), A modem introduction to the family (pp. 382-397). Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Wahler, R. G., Williams, A. J„ & Cerezo, A, (1990). The compliance and predictability hypotheses;
Sequential and correlational analyses of coercive mother-child interactions, Behavioral Assess-
ment, 12, 391-407.
Working Group on the Family. (1986). The family: Preserving America's future. Washington D.C.;
United States Department of Education.
 CHAPTER 10
Family Development Theory
Roy H. Rodgers and James M. White
Family development theory has many things in
common with other theoretical traditions dis-
cussed in this volume. Indeed, thcorists working
in the area have consciously “borrowed” from
other theories over the years in order to glean the
best of what those other theories had to offer. It is
distinctive, however, in one important way. This
can be stated in no better way than by quoting
one of the modern founders of the theory, Reuben
HUI, and his collaborator, Paul Mattessich:
Family development . . . has uniquely pioneered the
effort to describe and cxplain the processes of
changc in families. Family time—the scqucnce of
stages precipitated internally by the demands of fam-
ily members (e g., biological, psychological, and so-
cial nceds) and externaily by the larger society (c.g.,
soeial expectations and ccological constraints)—is
the most significant focal point of the family dcvel-
opment perspective (Mattessich & Hill, 1987, p.
437)
This chapter will focus on how the incorporation
of historica! and developmental processes into
family theory has given those working in the area
both special challenges and exciting promises of
greater explanatory power.
Over the years the theoretical tradition that
Roy H. Rodgers and James M. White • University of
British Columbia, School of Family and Nutritiona) Sciences,
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1W5.
Sourcebook of Family Theories and Methods: A Contextual
Approach. Edited by P.G. Boss, W.J. Dohcrty, R I-aRossa,
^ R- Schumm, & S.K. Steinmetz. New York: Plenum Press,
New York, 1993.
225
has carried the label “family development” has
meant different things to different people. From
almost their first contact with family study, stu-
dents wUl have been introduced to the idea of
“family life cycle stages”—probably the classic
eight stages usually attributed to Evelyn Duvall
(1957).1 Despite all of the criticism of this basic
set of stages over the years, family development
remains in many minds this elementary descrip-
tive cataloging of the family over its history. How­
ever, some family theorists have dug deeper and,
true to the spirit of both Paul Glick’s (1947, 1955,
1957) and Evelyn Duvall’s work, have gained an
analytical understanding of the changing charac-
teristics of families as they move through these
stages. Other scholars have begun to delve system-
atically into the potential that family development
theory has for longitudinal understanding of the
interrelationships and processes among several
levels of family analysis—individual, dyadic,
group, and societal. Multilevel analysis is a theme
that has been present in the approach for a consid-
erable period, but only recently has it received
renewed and concentrated attention. As will be-
1 Fully ten years earlier, Paul Click (1947) had published
the first analysis of census raaterials in which he divided
the family cycle into seven stages. A year later, Duvall and
Hill (1948) used a seven-stage division in a report on the
work of a committee at the National Conference on Family
Life. By the time of the first publication ot Family Develop­
ment, Duvall (1957) had split the second stage, childbear-
ing families, into two distinct stages: families with infants
and families with preschool children.
 226 PART V • FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-1%0 CHAl’TER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY 227

come clear, we think that this latter view of family many of the competing theories about families tion can be made with complete accuracy. Only is the notion of stage of the family life cycle. Some
development thcory is the one that promises to Furthermore, we think its explanatory power can ignorance and measurement error prevent com­ developmental scholars, perhaps more focused on
produce the most insight into family behavior. now be demonstrated in several important areas plete understanding of a phenomenon. On the empirical description than on logical adequacy,
“Family development” has also had a number First, however, we want to examine what we con- other hand, the stochastic view holds that, even if developed criteria for stages that allowed for
of descriptlve modifiers; perspective, analytical sider to be the basis for the current lack of confi- all values were known, prediction still would be “fuzzy” boundaries between stages or what were
approach, conceptual framework, and, of course, dence in the explanatory potential of develop. only probabilistic. From this perspective, the sometimes called “overlapping” stages. Family
theory. Family social scientists have disagreed as mental theory as opposed to mere description of world changes in a manner that involves no eter- stages were justly criticized for not supplying cat-
to whether it should be considered a theory, with family behavior over the family career. The nal and immutable equations—only probabilities. egories that were mutually exclusive and ex-
all the attendant characteristics related to explana- grounds for these doubts seem to lie in certain The deterministic assumptions led the early haustive of the possible family forms, such as sin-
tory power and the like, or simply a useful de- basic assumptions of the theory. theorists to the mistaken view that if certain con- gle-parent families. A dynamic stochastic explana-
scriptive framework. In 1973, Burr expressed se­ ditions and tasks were met in a stage, then the tion of family development is impossible unless
rieus reservations about the theoretical standing family would successfully move to the next “nor- the variables (stages) are precisely defined.
of family development: “At the present time the tnative” stage. This created the dual claims that These four assumptions have shaped a domi­
Basic Assumptions nant part of the worldview that is largely “taken
theoretical ideas that have been generaled in the stages and developmental tasks had causal elficacy
developmental approach have been minimal and and that there is a correct and successful way to for granted” in the existing statements of the theo­
As a theory receives critical attention from
only a small number of concepts in this frame­ researchers and scholars, its implicit assumptions proceed. Thus, determinism was to makc claims ry. They have given rise to some of the best known
work have been used in these theoretical ideas” become more plainly exposed. For the theory of regarding causality that bordered on moral righ- and simultaneously most problematic ideas in the
(p. 218). Throughout the decade, several critics family development, we see four critical the­ teousness. This led some scholars to reject the theory. For example, the assumptions regarding
(Nock, 1979; Schram, 1979; Spanier et al., 1979; oretical assumptions that seem to us to have mis- theory as more value-laden in character than so­ teleology and determinism are tied to notions
Trost, 1974, 1977) continued to raise questions— directed the theory down what have proven to be cial sclentific. As Mattessich and Hill (1987) point such as “family developmental tasks,” which we
though there were certainly responses to these blind avenues of formulation. These assumptions out, the empirical work tied to the theory has think must be critically reexamined. We are not at
critics (Klein & Aldous, 1979)! Then, in 1980, are related to (1) teleology, (2) determinism, produced rather low and unimpressive correla- all sure that there is an inherent set of these that
Holman and Burr explicitly stated that the family (3) levels of analysis, and (4) logical criteria. tions. On the other hand, the aspects of the theory the family must master at each stage in the family
career. This is not to say that a given set of stage
development approach should be labeled a From the outset the notion of family develop­ I that could be seen as value-laden have evoked circumstances will not create certain relatively
“minor” approach because it had fallen into disuse ment was infused with teleological assumptions. much criticism from other scholars,
in the previous decade. While in 1987, Mattessich Perhaps it was only natural that the influence from A third misleading assumption is that the indi­ common family patterns that the theory may be
and Hill (p. 456) responded with a spirited de- child developmental psychology led theorists to vidual is the ultimate reality to which theory must called on to explain. Furthermore, on the basis of
fense against this and other attacks, they them- assume that the process of family development address itself and establish its relevance. Yet, from knowledge about such common patterns, we
selves consistently referred to family development had some end or goal. After all, child development the beginning, family developmental theory was a think the theory should also be able to predict the
as a “perspective” and to its “unfinished” state. seemed to be marked by increasing levels of differ- multilevel theory concerned with individuals, rc- probabilities for the transitions between family
Their own chapter appears to do very little to- entiation both morally and cognitively. Thus, Hill lationships, the family group, and the institution of stages, But, does this require the further conclu-
ward further theoretical development beyond that and Mattessich define the process of family devel­ the family. However, it was very difficult to avoid sion that there are specified “tasks” to be mas-
accomplished in their 1979 publication (Hill & opment as a process of “progressive structural dif- confusing these distinct levels of analysis. Some- tered before the family may move on “successful­
Mattessich, 1979). We can only conclude at this ferentiation” (1979, p. 174). The fact that many times a process such as individual development ly” to that next stage? From our perspective such a
writing (1990) that little has changed in the de­ individual life course theorists are abandoning the was presumed aulomatically to have effects on the conclusion implies notions of “success” and
cade of the 1980s. family. Often it was not clear which processes and “failure” that go well beyond social scientific
teleological assumption in their field should alert
In the past we have shared many of the crit­ family developmental theorists in this regard. It is concepts were aimed at the individual and which boundaries.
ics’ doubts. Neither would we have been particu- difflcult to imagine a family group that begins, were aimed at the family. For example, family We sense that the theory as it now stands is
larly dismayed had the family development ap­ grows, shrinks, and ends being explained by some stress was supposed to be measured by question­ immobilized in a kind of theoretical gridlock. The
proach been proven incapable of the kind of notion of final purpose without appealing to high- naire scales measuring individual stress (Hill & major reconceptualization we propose is based on
explanatory power scholars expect from a strong er-order metaphysical principles. The invocation Rodgers, 1964). Now, in hindsight, it seems quite a nonteleological, stochastic, and dynamic the­
theory.2 *However,
*** we will hold that, with some of such a metaphysical goal would be incompati- apparent that processes occurring at one levcl oretical formulation that requires multilevel analy­
revisions in conceptualization, family develop­ ble with the tenets of Science as we understand may not be equivalent to processes at another sis based on logically and methodologically sound
ment is indeed as well formulated a theory as them. I level. So, for example, the individual development principles. We are aware that what we are propos-
process should not be assumed to be identical to ing will be seen as quite controversial by some.
Goal orientation is closely associated with
2Indeed, the first author of this chapter anticipated that a or necessarily have an effect on the development However, we find the current state of theory
some deterministic assumptions found in some
vigorous exploration of the approach might indeed lead to of the group. building in family development to be unaccept-
such an outcomc: “It is possible, of course, that when all of
earlier versions of family development theory, as
The last theoretical assumption that we think able. Before presenting the reconceptualization,
the pieces [of the puzzle] have been put into place, there contrasted with stochastic assumptions. A deter­
was implicit in early family development theory' is however, we want to set the stage by describing
will not be a picture at all. It may be that the theory does ministic assumption is guided by the view that if
that theoretical concepts need not meet strict log­ the early historical setting and some of the early
not explain family behavior in the way that it purports to” the values of all the relevant variables are known
(Rodgers, 1973, p. 249). ical criteria. The clearest example of this problem roots of family developmental theory.
in any equation predicting family behavior, predic-
228 PART V • FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-1960
Origins and Initial Sociocultural
Milieu
Depression, War, and Recovery:
The 1930s and 1940s
Like much of the rest of modern social Sci­
ence, the seeds of family development theory
were sown in the Great Depression of the 1930s,
the ground having been prepared even before by
the early pioneers of social and psychological
thought.3 Social scientists of that era in the United
States lived in the midst of a great natural social
experiment—the “New Deal” of the Franklin De-
lano Roosevelt Administration. It was the time of
the NRA, WPA, PWA, TVA, and CCC. (These ini-
tials, in order, stand for the National Recovery Act,
the Works Progress Administration, the Public
Works Administration, the Tennessee Yalley Au-
thority, and the Civilian Conservation Corps.) So-
ciologists, often funded by government grants,
studied the impact of the Depression on the popu-
lation (Angell, 1936; Cavan & Ranck, 1938;
Koraarovsky, 1940; Koos, 1946). There was, as
well, a host of programs assoclated with the De­
partment of Agriculture designed to sustain rural
life during this difficult time that, besides the gen-
eral economie problems, also included several
years of severe drought—the “dust bowl” years. It
was in this period that Agricultural Experiment
Stations at many land-grant universities began the
program of social scientific research that con-
tinues to this day. Indeed, it is in papers published
out of Agricultural Experiment Station research
that the terms “family life cycle” and “family de­
velopment” flrst appear (Blackwell, 1942; Dun-
can, 1941; Kirkpatrick et al, 1934; Lively, 1932;
Loomis, 1934, 1936; Loomis & Hamilton, 1936;
Nelson, 1955; Sorokin et al, 1931).
With the onset of World War II, traumatic as
that experience was in many respects, the econo-
my of the United States began to turn around.
During the war, social scientists were enlisted to
assist in many aspects of the war mission, both in
and out of uniform. While these activities held the
immediate objective of defeating the enemy, there
3Other chapters in this volume present in detail these early
foundations. Aside from these, we think some of the better
treatments—some recent and some older—include
Adams (1988), Broderick (1988), Christensen (1964),
Glick (1988), Komarovsky and Wallet (1945), Nye
(1988), and Thomas and Wilcox (1987).
were many benefits for behavioral Science theory
and research methods. At the end of the war in
1945, the United States began the process of re-
turning to “normal.” Thousands of military per.
sonnel, most of them men who had been “draft-
ed,” returned home to marry, produce children
take up previously held or new jobs, and in many
cases to begin or return to college and university.4
The “GI Bill” for assistance with educational pur-
suits, as well as the “GI Loan” program for home
purchases, were designed to ease the strain of
these experiences for many. AU of this had a major
impact on the economy of the country in the form
of major demands for consumer goods and
housing.
And, of course, the norms of the industrial era
nuclear family unit that emphasized the role of
provider for the husband and of homemaker for
the wife were in full control. Thus, while many
women had engaged in gainful employment dur­
ing wartime, as well as during the preceding De­
pression years, a return to “normal” meant an em-
phasis on these more traditional roles. AU of this
“normality” was not without its strains in the fami­
ly and in many other areas of the society. Social
scientists who had been part of the müitary effort
returned to the colleges and universities to teach
and do research. They did not delay long in
launching examinations of these postwar condi-
tions. It was the beginning of what would become
a modern explosion in social Science research.
And, it was the beginning of a new sophistication
in both theory and method of which famüy devel­
opment theory would prove to be a major
beneficiary.
Intellectual Foundations of the
Developmental Perspective
A number of the scholars who have contrib-
uted to family development theory were not fami­
ly sociologists—indeed, they were not so-
ciologists at all! Psychologists (academie and
clinical), economists, demographers, historians,
and human development scholars have had impor­
tant influence. Much of the early work originated
in seminars or workshops attended by scholars
4Lest we forget, they also returned to divorce in significant
numbers. The year 1946 produced peaks in marriage, fer-
tility, and divorce statistics higher than ever reported to
that point in history by the U.S. Census Bureau.
CHARTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY
from these several different disciplines because
(frey did not ordinarily see each other at their own
disciphnary scholarly meetings.5 Before systemat-
ic famUy development theory buüding began in
the 1950s (chieUy by sociologists), therefore,
S some important foundations had been laid.
There were several bridging events in the
postwar years that in effect brought to a close the
primitive period of family development thinking
Wi and foretold a more sophisticated approach,
% namely, Duvall’s (1946) article on conceptions of
■
: parenthood, Rachel Ann Elder’s (1947) M.A. the­
iS|g: sis on traditional and developmental conceptions
of fatherhood, Glick’s (1947) article on the family
cycle, Duvall and Hill’s (1948) report to the Na­
tional Conference on Family Life, and Hill’s
||
(1949) study of wartime family separation and
reunification. HiU’s (1951) report on the inter-
iii
disciplinary workshop on research in marriage
and the family in a sense marked the beginning of
the new era. Our arbitrary dividing line, therefore,
is 1951.
Soon after completing the Families Under
Stress research, but before its publication in 1949,
Reuben HUI moved from lowa State University to
* the University of North Carolina where he estab-
lished a series of ongoing graduale seminars in
family theory building. Family development theo­
ry held a prominent place in these seminars that
continued after HUI moved to the University of
Minnesota in 1957 and until his retirement. It was
r in these seminars that many of the basic concep-
tual issues were addressed and the early modern
formulation of family development theory was
forged.6 As these intense efforts to improve the
5 sciously explored the melding of the symbolic in­
5This is also certainly one of the reasons that these scholars
bandeel together with others a little over 50 years ago to
hold the fitst National Conference on Family Relations. For
I
IliïT4 more on the history and development of the NCFR, see
ii Walters and Jewson (1988).
«The seminars were highly productive, not only for ideas
11 about family development theory, but for genera) theory
building as well. And, or course, a number of still active
family scientists participated in these seminars over the
Ii years and went on to make major contributions to family
theory building. We will not attempt to list them all, since
I we are sure to commit a number of major sins of omission.
However, in chronological order, the names of Alvin Katz,
Richard Simpson, Roy H. Rodgers, Donald Hansen, Joan
Aldous, Wesley Burr, David Klein, and Paul Mattessich re
quire specific mention because each of them has contrib-
Wed to family development theory in one or more direct
ways.
229
sophistication of the theory were under way,
meanwhUe, the original publication and the sever­
al revisions of Duvall’s (1957) book made the
basic ideas of famüy development a familiar ap­
proach to thousands of undergraduate students of
the family across North America.
We divide the conceptual history of the theo­
ry into two distinct eras. First, the time period
from 1951 to 1980 contains the original statement
and elaboration of the concepts in works such as
those by Duvall (1957), HUI and Rodgers (1964),
Rodgers (1962, 1964, 1973), Aldous (1978), HUI
and Mattessich (1979), and Mattessich and HUI
(1987).7 *Most of the authors of this era shared a
common frame of reference and assumptions. This
phase of the theory could be viewed as the consol-
idation of the framework, as well as a time when
critics were especially vocal.
Then, in the 1980s, a number of develop-
ments—methodological advances in the social
Sciences, new definitions of some very basic terms
such as development, as well as some pointed cri-
tiques (Holman & Burr, 1980; Scanzoni, 1988;
Scanzoni et al, 1989)—have prompted a reex-
amination of several aspects of the theory. In the
discussion to follow, we wül attempt to bring the
various early statements of the theory and these
more recent developments together in a systemat-
ic restatement.
Theoretical Reformulation
The graduale seminars directed by HUI at the
Universities of North Carolina and Minnesota con-
teractionist, structurc-functional, social System,
and human development theoretical perspectives.
An explicit conceptual framework was being pur-
sued and a number of theoretical and meth­
odological issues were identifled that have con­
tinued to demand the attention of developmental
theorists. It remained for Rodgers (1962, 1964),
serving as a kind of recorder and reporter of those
7Whilc it was published in 1987, we would place the chap-
ter by Mattessich and Hill among those basic statements of
the developmental theory that we have placed in the ‘'ear­
ly period” of theory building. Indeed, it appears to us to be
a systematic restatement of the theory as it had stood since
the 1970s without any major theoretical revision.
230 PAKT V FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-I96o
seminar discussions, to make them more widely
available in published form.8
The seminars and early writers had labored
over the issue of the sources of change in family
careers. Part of the problem was that development
was understood to mean all change in the family.
It included normative and role changes, and, in
addition, included physical maturation, emergent
interaction effects [interacting personalities or Al-
dous’ (1978, p. 81) idea of “morphogenic” family
change], and many other such changes. Conse-
quently, the theory had confused very different
levels of analysis—the individual, the relationship,
the group, and the institution of marriage and the
family. A theoretical discussion aimed at explicat-
ing the process of change in the family System
demands a full discussion of changes at each level
of analysis. Another problematic element was that
the theory did not carefully describe the nature of
developmental change as opposed to other types
of changes within the family, individual, or institu­
tion. So the process itself remained elusive and
vague simply because it was not precisely defined
and identified.
Beyond these issues, several influences
emerged in the 1980s, There was an increased
interest among scholars in event analysis. Event
analyses have often resulted in empirical findings
that may be analyzed in terms very similar to
those of developmental theory. This has led to the
obvious and, we think, productive question of the
relationship between the theory and this type of
analysis. Another factor is that some of the original
concepts have been so amply discussed and de-
bated that we are now more aware of the implica-
tions of certain formulations compared to others.
8As a participant in the seminars at both universities from
1955 to 1959, Rodgers’s 1962 dissertation (supervised by
Hill) and the 1964 Journal article that arose from it served
as a consolidation and report of the work of the seminars
up to that point, along with his own formulation and ex-
tension of it. The chapter with Hill on family development
in the Christensen Handbook (1964) gave an opportunity
to synthesize and develop the theoretical work in more
detail as it stood at that time. It must be emphasized, there-
fore, that in these publications Rodgers was heavily indebt-
ed to the work of the seminars. Among his contributions
were more clearly stated labels for concepts, formalized
definitions, and documentation of the sources of the ideas
with which the seminars had been struggling. Many of
these sources, of course, were not published in journals or
books, hut were available only in mimeographed “working
papers” or other documents with limited circulation.
A fmal factor is that, 20 years later, methodologiCaj
and scientlfic sophistication has generally in.
creased our awareness of what is demanded for a
series of statements to “explain” rather than de­
scribe phenomena.
One other reason—and we think a compel-
ling one—for pursuing a revision of the theory at
this time is the call by some scholars for a paradig­
matic shift (Scanzoni, 1988; Scanzoni et al., 1989)
Indeed, we agrce with those critiques focusing on
the inadequacy of family development theory to
incorporate ethnic, racial, and gender dilferences
as well as its failure to embody the full variability
of family forms. Certainly, Mattessich and Hill
(1987, pp. 461—465) recognized these and other
valid concerns as well. We also agree regrettably
with Holman and Burr (1980) that the theory has
proved to be of only “minor” importance among
those theories used by researchers in recent years.
However, we see these critiques as testimony to
the logical problems of the theory. We do not see
them as supplying sufficiënt cause to abandon the
construct of the “family” nor to focus exclusively
on the construct of “personal relationships” as the
solution to the problems with the study of the
family (Scanzoni et ai, 1989). We reiterate, rela­
tionships represent only one among several levels
of analysis in family theory. Thus, we see these
critiques as a challenge to which we must respond
if family development theory is to remain a vital
element in family scholarship.
In the discussion to follow, thcn, the rccon-
ceptualization of the theory is divided into five
parts. First, we redefine the family concept and set
out the idea of levels of analysis. Second, we rest-
ate what we regard as the static concepts in the
theory. Third, we reformulate what we identify as
the dynamic concepts in the theory. Fourth, we
respecify the process of development. Finally, we
provide cxamples of theoretical propositions de-
rived from the theory.
Family
The seminars had struggled with the concept
of family as it should be defined developmentally
They began with Burgess’s classic symbolic in­
teractionist definition of the family as “a unity of
interacting personalities” (Burgess, 1926). Hill
had carried this central idea a bit further in his
revision of Waller’s family text by introducing the
chapter 10 FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY 231
system nature of the family (Waller & Hill, 1951, tions. “Is a relationship within the family group
p 25)- In His dissertation, Rodgers drew on the properiy the subject matter of the theory of family
seminar discussions that continued to wrestle development?” “Is an individual family member’s
^.jth the system characteristics of the family, es- growth and maturation properiy within the do-
pecially the issue of the degree to which families main of the theory?” The answer to these ques-
were open or closed systems (Rodgers, 1964, p. tions is essential to the understanding and the ap-
264). Hill and Mattessich (1979, p. 174) ad- plication of the theory.
dressed the developmental nature of families by One reason that ambiguities remain is that
setting out a separate definition of family develop- the theory actually encompasses many levels of
ment. Aldous, perhaps wisely, avoided the explicit analysis. A level of analysis refers to the genera!
definition of the family, dcferring to the descrip- construct for units of analysis. Thus a level of anal­
nve listing of the system characteristics of families ysis is the more general and abstract construct for
set out by Hill in 1971: interdependence, selective a particular set of units of analysis. There are at
boundary maintenance, modification of structurc least four levels of analysis relevant in family de­
(abifity to adapt to change), and task performance velopment: the individual family member, family
(Aldous, 1978, pp. 26-27). Similarly, Mattessich relationships, the family group, and the institu­
and Hill (1987, p. 441) skirt the definitional issue tion of the family.9 Table 1 may assist in separating
by repeating these fout systemic characteristics. these levels and gives some examples of the con­
Sufflce it to say that developmental theory in this cepts appropriate for each level.
early period carried as a central focus the impact While this table demonstrates that the theory
of past history, as well as future expectations, on of family development is a multileveled theory, it
the family. Further, it dealt with the impact of the does not show the coherent body of concepts that
developmental nature of its members, as well as the theory uses to address these four levels of
the developmental characteristics of the family as analysis. The principal concept for explaining the
a group. In this respect, it appears to be unique behavior of individual family members as well as a
among the theoretical approaches extant in family family group is the concept of norm. We would
Science. emphasize as we begin this discussion that the
While continuing to struggle with the defini­ theory is intended to explain both normative be­
tional issue, developmental theory traditionally havior and behavior that deviates from the institu­
has been fairly clear about the components of a tional norms of marriage and the family.
definition of a family. First, the family is a social
group—a fairly noncontroversial idea. Second, a
family social group is part of the institution of Static Concepts
marriage and the family (Rodgers, 1973. pp. 11— Given that they were drawn from among the
16). A family’s rolcs and role relationships are long-standing concepts in behavioral science, it
constructed by institutional norms. Each social should not be surprising that certain basic con­
system has a somewhat different set of institu­
cepts detailed by Rodgers (1962, 1973) have sur-
tional norms framing these family relationships.
vived to the present. Despite being concepts that
And, even some of the norms are relatively univer-
are in daily use by sociologists, there are a variety
sal, such as the incest taboo. In view of these con- of definitions used for them, depending on
siderations, we think that the initial ingredients of whether they are used in a social psychological or
a reasonable definition of the family should in- social structural context. In defining these con­
cludc (1) the sector of social lifc that is organized, cepts, developmental theory was attempting to
(2) the institutional nature of organizing norms, emphasize the structural aspect of the family. The
ar|d (3) the nature of the group being organized. graduale seminars at North Carolina turned to
On the basis of these criteria, White (1991, p. 7) “one of their own” for two of these conceptual
has suggcsted the following basic definition of the
definitions (Bates, 1956).
family: “A family is an intergenerational social
group organized and governed by social norms 9While Scanzoni and his colleagues find the concept of rela­
tegarding descent and afflnity, reproduction, and tionship adequate for the analysis of the family, we find
•He nurturant socialization of the young.” How- that it is more fruitfiil to view relationships as only one of
ever, this definition still leaves unanswered ques- several levels of analysis that must be considered.
232 PART V FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-1960
Table 1. I.cvels of Analysis analysis of aggregate behaviors using institutional
and Example Concepts" norms and deviations from institutional norms as
explanatory concepts (e.g., Hogan, 1978) does
Measures and not fit very well into Rodgers’s concept.11 Most
Level of units of
event analyses rely on institutional norms to ex-
analysis observation Concepts
plain aggregate behavior (e.g., Morgan & Rindfuss,
Individual Individual family Marital status 1985). However, what is needed is a return to the
members traditional notion of norm (Davis, 1949; Tinton,
Relationships Minimum unit is Consensus 1936).
the dyad (e.g., The traditional concept of norm encom-
cohabitation)
passes both social expectations and behavior. Fol-
Group Minimum unit is a Cohesion, stability
lowing Bierstedt (1957, pp. 140-145), we define
relationship
regulated by a social norm as a social rule for the behavior of an
social norms of incumbent of a social position. Such social rules
marriage and may prohibit, permit, prefer, or prescribe a specif-
family ic behavior or set of behaviors for incumbents of a
Institution Unit is aggregate Institutional norms social position. For example, the position of “fa­
behavior regulating
ther” in North American culture is associated with
(raarriages and marriage and
the rule that incumbents are to provide for their
families) family
offspring. This norm has the two dimensions of
«Adapted from White (1988, Table 1). behavior and expectation. Many social scientists
have mistakenly come to believe that the only real
dimension of norms is the expectational dimen­
Norm
sion (Marini, 1984). However, we would point out
A norm is “a patterned or commonly held that the essence of a rule is that it be followed by
behavior expectation. A learned response, held in most people. Indeed, a social expectation is as
common by members of a group” (Bates, 1956, p. much founded on our observation of behavioral
314). Thus, norms are the basic structural build­ regularities as it is on “should” or “ought” dimen­
ing blocks for all groups, including the family sion of mies. Returning to the example of provider
group. norms for fathers, if fathers behaviorally defaulted
This deflnition caused some problems for the on this expectation in great numbers, it would
early theorists. Rodgers (1962, 1973) notcd that soon cease to be an expectation even though
common usage of the social role concept con- some persons would religiously ding to the no­
tion that father “should” behave in such a way.
tained the two dimensions of (1) a social expecta­
tion and (2) behavior. His approach was to divide Indeed, this view, along with the empirical work
of Modell (1980), suggests to us that changes in
normative role analyses into these two dimen­
sions, preferring to call the behavioral dimension social norms largely come about as a result of
aggregate changes in behavior preceding aggre­
“role behavior.” However, the idea of role perfor­
gate changes in expectations. Later, we discuss the
mance contained in Rodgers’s term “role behav­
ior” was most appropriate for the individual level
of analysis.10 11
The resurgence of interest in the notc that this was not an issue of deviance, but one of
variation in meeting behavioral expectations.
10Rodgers focused on a problem that vexed the develop- In specifying and extending the conceptual frame-
mental approach and with which Bates had not dealt. The work, Rodgers turned to a then recently published work
role concept was often used to mean both the structural by Neal Gross and his colleagues (1958), who defined the
expectations and the actual behavior. It was clear that concept as follows: “An actual performance of an incum­
actors did not always exactly meet the expectations set bent of a position which can be referred to as an expecta­
for them in their various roles. Indeed, anyone observing tion for an incumbent of that position” (p. 64).
the way in which the role of father was played out by 11 Marini (1984 ) provides a detailed critique of the research
various actors in any given society could not help but see on institutional norms that would include the perspective
somewhat different behaviors, while at the same time rec- taken by the theory of family development. White (1988)
ognizing that all were playing that role. It is important to has responded to this critique.
CHARTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY
implications of such a view for family develop-
rnent theory.
Types of Norms. There are several different
types of norms, Since mies can be “made up” by
social groups, we may find norms that are speciflc
and relatively uhique to one particular social
group. For example, the Jones family might have
created a mie that all children must be in bed at
eight o’clock, For the most part, however, social
norms of interest to social Science are more gener-
al and less idiosyncratic.12 *This
* type of more gen-
eral norm can either be an institutional norm or a
cross-institutional norm.
Rodgers (1973) followed Bierstedt’s (1957,
pp. 298—306) definition of a social institution as a
set of social norms regulating a relatively coherent
sector of social life. Some of the sectors of social
life that are usually viewed as social institutions
are polity, education, religion, work, and family.
Each of these institutions is composed of a set of
norms that provide guidance and direction for be­
havior in that area of social life.
There are two types of norms within an in­
stitution. Each institution contains norms that are
static in character. These static norms regulate the
behavior and expectations within an age grouping
or stage. For example, the norm regarding marital
fldelity is relatively unchanging throughout mar-
riage. There are also static norms that concern
behavior at one point in time, such as for one age
or stage, for example, children may not have driv-
ing licenses.
The second type of norm within an institu­
tion is what we call process norms. Process norms
regulate the timing and sequencing of expecta­
tions and behavior. Indeed, these process norms
set the expected order for family events and
stages. The expectation that marriage comes be-
fore children is such a norm. This norm may be so
taken for granted in our society that we see it
most clearly when it is contrasted with societies
that do not share such a norm (e.g., Trobriand
Islanders, Kaingang of Brazil), Such process norms
establish the normative order for family develop­
ment.
Cross-institutional norms are constructed from
12It is for this reason that we did not include as basic con­
cepts of the theory Aldous’s use of Turner’s (1962) con­
cept of “role making" (Aldous, 1978, pp. 59-60) or her
idea of “family morphogenesis” (p. 81).
233
the conjunction of two or more norms from differ­
ent institutions. Cross-institutional norms are nec-
essarily process norms. There are many examples
of cross-institutional norms, for example, “finish
your education before you start a job” and “get a
good job before you get married.” These cross-
institutional norms establish the necessary articu-
iation between the various institutional individual
and family careers. This complex weave of norms
between institutions is essential if social insti­
tutions are not to pile up expectations on indi-
viduals and families all at one time, Rather, those
individuals who finish their education, get a job,
get married, and then have children, spread out
the normative demands of the various institutions
over a manageable period of time. Cross-insti­
tutional norms change over time (cohort) and
by gender. White’s (1991) research has shown
that although the modal sequencing patterns for
men and women are presently the same for the
events of “first job, first marriage, and first child,”
this was not the case prior to 1939 when wo-
men’s modal path was to get a job after marriage
and children. Women have experienced immense
change in cross-institutional sequencing of norms
between work and family, whereas the norms for
men have been relatively slab! e.'3
Role
Again, the early theorists turned to Bates,
who defined a role as “a part of a social position
consisting of a more or less integrated or related
subset of social norms which is distinguishable
from other sets of norms forming the same posi­
tion” (Bates, 1956, p. 314). As we have noted,
according to this formulation, roles are sets of ex­
pectations for behavior (prescribed, permitted,
preferred, or prohibited) that go together, not a
set of behaviors. Bates’s speciflcation provided fur-
ther difficulty for the theory, which was not read-
ily apparent at that time. It led to a general ap­
proach that took the view that an actor could
occupy only one position in a group, but that posi­
tion contained a cluster of roles. It has become
apparent that such a conceptualization makes it
difficult to meet several important requirements
for a logically defensible theoretical model. We
13See White (1987) for further discussion of measurement
issues and his attempt to develop a quasi-metric scale for
sequence conformity and deviance.
234 PARTY FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-1%0
prefer, then, a somewhat more straightforward
defmition for the social role concept.
A social role is defined as all the norms at-
tached to a given social position. Continuing with
an earlier example, the social position of “hus-
band” has many norms attached to it. Some of
these norms are static norms, such as prescribing
holding a job while other norms are process
norms, such as “finish your education before you
get married.” And some of the norms are stage-
graded, such as the different expectations on
wives with children versus wives without chil-
dren. At any one particular time, all of the norms
attached by the culture to a social position in a
particular social structure compose the role for
that position.14
We are often tempted to discuss family roles
such as the husband role as though it were one
consistent role over time, However, from our pre-
vious discussion of norms, it is apparent that this is
not the case. Norms and, by extension, the roles
they compose, change over time. The norms and
roles change with the age of the incumbent (age-
graded) and the interactional structure of the fam­
ily (stage-graded). An incumbent of a husband
role immersed in a family structure where chil­
dren are present has to deal with the articulation
of other norms and expectations associated with
the position of father. Thus, the role of husband
changes some of its normative content over time
whüe other norms regarding this position are rela-
tively invariant, for example, the North American
norms about raarital fidelity and monogamy. The
changes in normative content are tied to changes
in the interactional structure of the family group
and, hence, to stages of the family.
Position
As we have just seen, the term “position” had
been used by developmental scholars to mean all
the roles for an individual at a point in time. As we
noted earlier, however, one of the sources for this
deflnition (Gross et al., 1958) demonstrates the
ambiguity in the term by defining position as “the
14Readers should note that this revised conceptualization
effectively removes the idea that there are a cluster of
roles contained in one social position occupied by an
actor at one point in time, Instead, we are proposing that
there are a number of positions that an actor occupies,
each with its own role composed of culturally defined
norms. Thus, the concept of role cluster is misleading. It
is not included in the reformulation of the theory.
location of an actor or class of actors in a system of
relationships.” This deflnition raises the question
of whether the term “position” is (1) a location in
a social structure or ( 2 ) a set of roles. Sometimes
the two meanings do not conflict, However, when
we turn to cross-cultural research, there are fairly
clear examples of conflict. One example may be
seen in some matrilineal societies where the so­
cial role of father is played by the incumbent of
the position we might designate as mother’s
brother, rather than by the biological father, This
example offers complications for the original defi-
nition used by developmentalists.
In fact, when we turn to examples in the
IPfPPPf
study of kinship, other problems emerge. Both de-
scriptive and analytic studies of kinship (Schusky,
1965; White, 1963) suggest that we can and do
discuss structure and position independently of
roles played by incumbents. For instance, the
position of “husband” can be identifled by its rela-
tional location in a dyadic social structure. The
position of husband is a male connected by an
affinal relationship to a female, The role of hus­
band may change from one set of cultural norms
to another. And within a culture it may change
over time. However, comparative cross-cultural
study would be impossible if we could not define
position independently from the normatively
structured role.
Therefore, a position can be defined as a
point or location within a particular type of social
structure. For the study of the family, the social
structure in which positions are located is that of
kinship. Family positions are defined in rela­
tionship to other positions on several dimensions:
gender, generation, and affinal or consanguineal
relations. So, for example, the position of a hus­
band is given as a male affinally related to a female
of approximately the same generation.
Stage
Aldous (1978) has defined the stage concept
as follows:
A stage is a division within the lifetime of a family
that is distinctive enough from those that precede
and follow it to constitute a separate period. It pre-
supposes qualitative changes so readily discernible
that earlier interaction patterns cluster together in
clear distinction from later phenomena. (p. 80)
Over the years there has probably been no more
troublesome and controversial, yet enduring, con­
CHARTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY
cept than that of the family life cycle stages. Even
in the early years of the seminars, the debate
focused on at least three aspects of the idea: (1)
whether the term “cycle” was applicable to the
fafflUy history, (2) whether the term “stage” im-
plied a predetermined and invariant progression,
and (3) the criteria for selecting an appropriate
set of stages. These clements are not as discrete as
we have stated them, but are actually quite
intertwined.
Though the cyclical assumption carried with
it the comfort of a predictablc and regular pattern
to family histories, there was simply too much
evidence that families varied widely in the paths
that they took. Thus, just as the human develop-
ment theorists have adopted the term “life
course” to deal with the experience of individuals,
increasingly family development theorists have
adopted “career” in preference to “cycle.” The
idea of predetermination and invariance in stages
simply did not fit well with the view of develop­
mental theory that the present is both a conse-
quence of what has gone before and what is antici-
pated for the future. What the content of a given
stage will be under such conditions could not be
predetermined but became a consequence of pre-
vious career expcriences. Rodgers had struggled
with this idea but found it frustrating when trying
to put it into operation for research. In 1973, he
suggested a possible solution to this problem by
referring to some “new” statistical operations that
were beginning to appcar, namely, stochastic ana-
lytical techniques (Rodgers, 1973, pp. 253—
254).1,5 Since that time, statistical analysis of the-
oretically relevant data has appeared (Morgan &
Rindfuss, 1985; Teachman & Polonko, 1984), but
llttle progress has been made in tying this liter-
ature to the theory of family development. This is
principally due to the fact that the necessary rc-
conceptualization in the theory has laggcd behind
methodological progress.
The third issue of appropriate criteria for a
set of stages involved several aspects in the car-
lier years. Some scholars were willing to tolerate
“fuzzy” or “overlapping” boundaries for stages,
thus sacrificing the logical criterion that a family
15 The sources for these embryonic ideas for statistical mod­
els that might make sense for family developmental stage
analysis were the “game tree model” that Magrabi and
Marshall had publishcd in 1965 and the use of “Markov
Chain” analysis, which was only beginning to appcar in
hc literature at that time.
235
could be in only one stage at a given time (mutual
exclusivity). The implicit value orientation that
resided in the idea of the “normal” family life cy­
cle led scholars to ignore many family forms.16
This in turn led to a lack of exhaustiveness in the
stages. That is, the stages did not exhaust the pos­
sible family forms but ignored certain forms such
as single parents and cohabitation. This lack is, of
course, a transparent weakness of stage concep-
tions when applied to cross-cultural settings. One
consequence of this was that many scholars saw
the theory as wanting the requisite generality and
variety for effective cross-cultural research.
We could add that there has been a rather
general failure to tie the stages developed to any
systematic theoretical foundation. We are not
aware of a set of family stages that has been deline-
ated on the basis of qualitatively distinct role
structures and normative content. Nor have the
many events used to indicate stage transitions
been systematically linked to conceptions of
stages. Indeed, since the early work by Glick
(1947), the assumption has been that one particu­
lar event demarcates one particular stage, rather
than several different stages. The theory has failed
to effectively tie these diverse ideas together.17 *
When these critiques of stage schema are
16Such a view was certainly pro-marriage, pro-natal, pro-
nuclear family, tended toward a class and ethnic bias, and
failed to recognize divorce, “premature” deaths of chil­
dren and adults, remarriage, stepfamilies, or unemploy-
ment and other work life variations—not to mention the
clearly North American bias that it held. This may well
have been due to the period and context in which the
theory was initially formulated. We are aware. of course,
of the efïorts of Aldous (1978, pp. 86-93 ) and later of Hill
(1986) to set out stages for “nuclear” and “nonnuclear"
families. In Aldous’s formulation for “single-parent fami­
lies of divorced women,” the return to the work force is
used as a critical role transition. She presents no set of
stages for the single mother who does not return to work,
though she proposes that deaths of aging parents or resi-
dential moves might serve as critical transitions for them.
These suggestions fit well with our contention that cross-
generational and cross-institutional norms are important
family transitional events. For those who remarry, Aldous
suggests that “. . . the applicable nuclear family stages
can be reintroduced as guides." Given Fig. 2 and the dis­
cussion that accompanies it, we would tend to see the
analytical problem somewhat dlfferently. Her own discus­
sion indicates her dissatisfaction with the stages devel­
oped for precisely the two reasons we have discussed:
lack of exclusivity and lack of exhaustiveness.
17Cf. Aldous (1978, pp. 83-93) and Klein et al. (1979), for
more on the problem of sets of stages.
236 PART V • FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-1960
summarized, it becomes clear that there are three
criteria we should require of a set of family stages:
1. The set should be exhaustive and exclusive.
2. The set should be tied to the theory.
3. The set should have cross-cultural applicabil-
ity.
The theoretical definition of the family facilitates
the construction of stages. Recall that the family is
defmed as a social group regulated by the norms
of the institution of marriage and the family. In­
deed, most social groups that endure over time
are regulated by some set of institutional norms.
What is unusual about the norms regulating the
family is that these are the only institutional
norms that apply to afflnal and consanguineal rela-
tionships. The family, then, is a unique form of
social group because of the types of relationships
that create its group structure.
The implications for the theory of family de-
velopment are that family group structure can be
used to delineate a set of stages. For example,
common kinship diagrams (Schusky, 1965) can
readily be used to diagram various family forms.
Such diagrams have the distinct drawback that it is
not easy to separate who is “in” or “out” of the
household. This is a basic distinction for our own
culture in terms of “launching” but also for many
other cultures that do not practice neolocality. In
addition, family processes such as divorce and
separation continue to be family relationships
(Ahrons & Rodgers, 1987) and do not stop just
because some members are “out” of the house­
hold. We can thus add to our structural diagrams
the dimension of household.18 It becomes impor­
tant whether one is in or out of the household from
a perspective of potential transitions. The set of
stages would include some of those depicted in
Figure 1. The formulation of stages in Figure 1
appears to meet the criteria of cross-cultural appli-
cability, and they could be generaled as exclusive
and exhaustive for any flnite set of members.
How are the structures in Figure 1 connected
with the theory of family development? We be-
18In a personal communication after revlewing an early
draft of this chapter, Paul Glick pointed out that our use
of “household” here is not equivalent to the way the U.S.
Census Bureau uses the term. We are referring, of course,
only to a domicile occupied by members of a family af-
finally and/or consanguinally related. The Census Bureau
includes in the term “household” anyone living in a domi­
cile, related or not.
CHAPTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY 237
lieve that the connection is based on three as-
sumptions. First, the positions and relations be-
Time
tween positions (afflnal and consanguineal)
compose a family structure with qualitatively dif.
ferent patterns of interaction based on the as-
Event
sumption that additions and deletions of members
cohabitation f A O
are critical variables for interaction. For example
when the second child is added to a family, jt
becomes possible for sibling interaction to be pre­
sent. A second assumption is that interaction in a
common domicile is different from interaction be-
tween family members not sharing a common
domicile. Interacting with family members out-
side the domicile is just as important to establish- birth Ist child
ing the uniqueness of stages as is interaction with-
in a common domicile. The third assumption is
that changes in family structure are accompanied
by transition events. In many societies these
events are recognized as “rites of passage,” such as birth 2nd child
the marriage ceremony. As structures become
more frequent in a population and, hence, more
normative (Modell, 1980), the events attached to
the beginning and end of these stages become divorce
more widely acknowledged. So, as cohabitation
becomes more widely accepted as a premarital
stage of family formation, it can be expected that
the transition event of “moving day” could be­
come more commonly acknowledged as some-
thing akin to a “rite of passage.”
If stages are formulated as suggested, how do geradH
they meet the criteria laid out at the beginning of
this discussion on stages? This formulation of fami­ | • consanguineal relation
ly stages is tied to the theory of family develop­ ■- • affinal (marital)
ment by three assumptions regarding the kind of A • male
parameters that make interaction within the O • fcmale
* • divorce
group qualitatively distinct. Since the structures
are based on the positions and relations in the
group, family stages are mutually exclusive. That IO • domicile
is, a family containing the positions of a mother
consanguineally related to a daughter is not the
same as any other structure. This formulation of Figure 10-1. Family stages and events [adapted from White (1991, Table 11.1, p. 222)].
stages can be exhaustive of all possible stages.19 * *
Last, the criteria of cross-cultural applicability of
the stages appears to have been met. There is lit-
tle, if any, specific normative content to this for­ set of stages. Rather, these stages focus on the norms of fldelity and monogaray are attached to
mulation that would result in a culturally biased positions that may occur in all cultures and to this position may vary from culture to culture.
which each culture may attach their own cultural
19However, a computer would be needed to generale all of norms to construct their own cultural roles.
Event
the possible stages, even if the stages to be produced Hence, the position of husband may be defmed as
were restricted to a relatively small number of positions. a male affinally attached to a female marked by the Developmental scholars have used events as
For most researchers, this probably means a judicious beginning event of a wedding and the ending measures for family transitions. For example, the
placing of many stages in a residual category of “other
stages.” Doxng so, nonetheless, insures exhaustiveness.
event of death or divorce. However, whether the event of the birth of the first child separates the
238 PART V FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURLNG 1946-196o
marital dyad from the new family. However, sel-
dom have scholars treated the idea of event as
anything other than an “operationalization” of the
stage. We believe that events are indeed opera-
tionalizations, hut that the linkage between events
and stages has theoretical as well as empirical im-
portance. Returning to Figure 1, it can be seen that
events are important clements in the diagram of
stages and are inextricably tied to the notion of
stage. White (1991) cites Allison’s deflnition of an
event:
. . . an event consists of some qualitative change that
occurs at a specific point in time. One would not
ordinarily use the term "event" to describe a gradual
change in some quantitative variable. The change
must consist of a relatively Sharp disjunction be­
tween what precedes and what follows. (Allison,
1984, p. 9)
White goes on to say: “This deflnition of event
clearly has many similarities to the deflnition of
stage. These similarities suggest that events are
the transition points between stages” (1991, p.
42).
But, let us be cautious. The commonsense
meaning of “event” could lead us astray. There are
many events that most certainly have an impact on
individuals and families—wars, depressions, earth-
quakes, illnesses, sudden wealth, and so on. These
are not events that have developmental implica-
tions. A developmental event carries with it the
implication that there will be qualitatively differ­
ent normative expectations in the role content of
family relationships as a result of the event. For
example, when two peoplc marry (an event),
there are family institutional norms about changes
in the role content of their relationship after the
wedding, On the other hand, there is no similar
set of normative expectations about a couple who
wins the lottery. A number of possible role rela­
tionships could result from such an event, but
winning the lottery does not initiale a normatively
deflned stage. Thus, says White, “A stage is a nec-
essary condition for there being an event” (1991,
p. 43). In other words, the kind of event that con­
cerns us is an event that marks a transition be­
tween two stages containing qualitatively different
norms and, without the stages, the event would
have no developmental signiflcance. For this rea-
son, we choose to be more specific and call such
developmental events transitional events.
Notion of the Family Career
We come, at last, to the capstone concept jn
the earlier formulations of family development
theory. The view of Bernard Farber (1961) that
the family was a set of “mutually contingent ca-
reers” along with the revision and formal state­
ment by Rodgers of several other concepts pro-
vided an extensive conceptual foundation, h was a
logica! step for Rodgers to formulate the idea of
family career. Just as positions had carcers com-
posed of the sequential linking of roles (role clus­
ters in the older formulation), there was a similar
linking of role complexes (Rodgers, 1962, p. 43)
However, given the reconceptualization thus
far, it seems apparent that it would be more appro-
priate to redefine this concept by substituting the
term “family stages” for the term “role complex­
es.” Consequently, family career bccomes the se­
quential linking of family stages over the life histo-
ry of the family system. We thus avoid the
confusion that might be created by directly equat-
ing the family structure as depicted by sets of be-
haviors (role complexes) with the structure de­
picted by sets of positions (stages). In addition,
family career becomes a concept that can be used
cross-culturally without carrying society specific
normative content. Comparative diagrams similar
to those presented in Figure 1, then, could be
produced for differing societies. This would assist
in understanding the similarities and differences in
family development between two or more
cultures.
Dynamic Concepts
Transitions
The concept of family transitions20 combines
the concepts of stage and event and time. A transi­
tion occurs when a family moves from one
qualitatively distinct stage to another stage. The
stages represent intervals or periods of time. How-
20The concept of transitions has been a part of the family
developmental approach for a long time. The seminar
participants were aware of the work of the Rapoports
even before they published their two influential articles
(Rapoport, 1964; Rapoport & Rapoport, 1964). And, of
course, Aldous (1978) used it as central in her discussion.
We think it deserves an explicit and central place in our
reconceptualization.
ever, the event that marks the transition is treated
35 a point in time. Even though all of our dynamic
concepts are concerned with families over time,
in the final analysis we measure points in time and
infer continuity between those points.
The theoretical importance of family transi­
tions is that they are regulated by the process
norms (as opposed to static norms) of the institu-
tion of marriage and family. The static norms regu-
late what goes on inside a particular stage whereas
the process norms regulate transitions between
stages.21
There are several different subtypes of pro­
cess norms. One type of process norm regulatcs
the sequence or order in which events or stages
should be traversed by individuals, relationships,
and families, Another type of process norm regu-
lates the timing of events and stages. There are
two forms of timing norms—those that are based
on age of an individual, relationship, or family, and
those based on the duration (interval or period)
of time within a specific stage for an individual,
relationship, or family. Each of these constructs
merits a more detailed discussion.
Timing
Timing must be viewed as a general concept.
Indeed, we think that in the study of family and
individuals, the term “timing” should be replaced
by the more precise types of timing. Timing in
general refers to one of the many ways that we can
locale an individual, relationship, or group in
time.
Timing is a multidimensional notion. Are
these dimensions independent? For the most part
they are not. For example, dimensions such as age
of a marriage (marital cohort) and the duration of
a marital stage are related. The longer the mar-
2lln a highly stimulating analysis of the social psychology
of intergenerational relations, Hagestad (1981, pp. 19-
T viduals in the family. And an especially important
20) identifics the important fact that family transitions
often have intergenerational effects. “Marriage in one
I gencration creates in-laws in another. Parenthood ere-
1 f ates grandparenthood. Voluntary childlessness may
create involuntary grandchildlessness." Clearly there is
more involved than the vested intcrests of the individual
or relationship participants in many family transitions.
Nearly ten years later this appears to continue to be an
onderresearehed area of family careers (Though it
should be noted that Hagestad would probably prefer
the term “family lineages”!)
riage has lasted, the greater the potential amount
of time for the marriage to experience any given
stage. From a methodological point of view, these
measures cannot be considered to be independent
from one another. More specifically, this presents
problems in simultaneously separating out their
individual influences (Glenn, 1977; Tuma & Hann-
an, 1984).
Timing as Normative. There is an impor­
tant measure used in developmental studies that
relates to all three levels of analysis: family, rela­
tionship, or individual. It is whether the unit of
analysis is “on time.”22 *It is extremely important
to note that this is not really a measure of time or
chronology but is a measure of following timing
norms. A timing norm is one that States that when
an individual, relationship, or family is at a certain
age, particular events or accomplishments are
both expected and behaviorally followed in the
society. So the notion of “on time” and “off time”
is part of the concept of timing norms rather than
a measure of time.
Age Timing. Age is both the simplest mea­
sure of time and the most confusing. The confu­
sion results from the common misperception that
only individuals have the attribute of age. Every
individual has a beginning, but then so do rela­
tionships and families. The event that marks the
beginning event for the individual is birth. The
events that mark the beginning of a relationship
include meeting an attractive person (daling rela­
tionship) and the birth of a child (parental and,
perhaps, sibling relationships). The event that
marks the beginning of the family group, rather
than the marital dyad, is the birth of the first child.
So families, relationships, and individuals all can
be described by their age. Individual age, for ex­
ample, is often measured by birth cohort, whereas
marital age is measured by marriage cohort. Fur-
thermore, we can cross levels of analysis and talk
about the ages for different relationships and indi­
crossover for event analysis is that we can talk
about the age of the family in which an individual
is a member even though that individual might
not have been born when the family began.
22Bernice Neugarten (Neugarten et al, 1965; Neugarten &
Datan, 1973) introduced the idea of being “on-time” and
“off-time” in the life cycle and produced some insightful
analyses of their consequences.
240 PART V • FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-19g0
Event and Stage Sequences. Event and stage
sequencing is another kind of family development
normative timing. And, again, it has family process
implications. The order of events and stages has
very important family consequences. Marriage —*>
birth of child —-> divorce is different in family sig-
nificance from birth ^ marriage —> divorce or
marriage —» divorce —-> birth. Although events sig-
nal the beginning and end of a family or rela-
tionship stage, events alone cannot be used as a
sufficiënt indicator for a stage. This is simply be-
cause the same event might mark the beginning of
quite different family stages. For example, divorce
is an often-used event. However, the family or rela-
tionship stage that it marks as a beginning varies
according to the family or relationship stage prior
to the event (e.g,, the presence of children).
Family developmental sequencing becomes
further complicated by cross-institutional nor­
mative sequences. Thus, expectations that one
will finish school and get a job before marrying
and/or having a baby involves combining se­
quencing norms that are not family developmental
ones with sequencing norms that are. One of the
problems in family development theory has been
the failure to distinguish between various kinds of
timing.
The concept of sequence is a long-standing
one in the theory. However, only recently has the
distinctively normative nature of developmental
sequences been emphasized. Let us return to the
example of the couple winning the lottery. There
was nothing in the normative characteristics of
the stage that the couple occupied before winning
the lottery that would predict the event. Nor was
there anything about either the stage or the event
that would predict a following stage. Thus, the
event was not dependent on either the preceding
stage or the following stage.
Developmental stage dependency has two cl­
ements. First, there is the normative component of
what a given stage implies about the event that
follows and about the stage that will follow the
event; that is, the sequence of stages and events.
The old playground rhyme says it well:
Bill and Suzie sitting in a tree,
K-I-S-S-I-N-G.
First comes love, then comes marriage,
then comes Suzie with a baby carriage.
This implies both normative sequences and transi-
tional events. Therefore, in order to be develop­
mental, there is a specified normative order to the
sequence of stages and events, First comes love
then comes marriage, then comes Suzie with a
baby carriage. First one completes one’s educa-
tion, then one gets a job, then one gets married
then one has a child. There are important implica­
tions to the idea of normative order. We shall dis-
cuss these in greater detail below,
Event and stage sequence are also measures
of time. An individual, relationship, or family can­
not experience stages or events without the pas­
sage of time. Since stages are usually measured as
the period between two events, stage sequences
can be viewed as the theoretical inference front
event sequences. This brings up an interesting and
researchable dimension to family development.
There are possibly three effects that might be ana-
lyzed in a transition. There is the unique effect of
the event regardless of the stage from which the
transition is occurring or the resulting stage. This
unique contribution can only be analyzed as sepa­
rate from the stage of origin and destination by
searching for common variancc across stages of
origin and destination. There would also be sepa-
rable effects for the stage of origin and for the
stage of destination. Thus, for example, the analy-
sis of the effects of divorce frcquently confounds
three distinct clements: a divorce may be analyzed
as (1) the effect of the event of divorce on the
family regardless of the stage in which it occurs or
the stage to which the family moves after divorce;
(2) the effect of the specific previous stage on the
divorced family regardless of the destination stage;
and (3) the effect of the specific destination stage
on the divorced family regardless of the stage of
origin. In the First case the question for analysis is,
'What characteristics do all divorced families
have in common?” In the second case the ques­
tion might be, “What do all divorced families who
divorced with one infant in the household have in
common regardless of whether they moved to
joint custody, father custody, mother custody, co-
habitation with a new partner, etc ?” In the third
case the question could be, “What do all divorced
families who moved to cohabiting with a new
partner after divorce have in common, regardless
of the stage in which they were prior to the di­
vorce?” As far as we know, such an analysis has not
be done.
Stage üuration. The duration of a stage is
measured by the duration of time between an
event that begins the stage and one that marks the
CHAPTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY
end23 and, sometimes, the beginning of another
stage- S°, for example, the birth of the second
child in a family marks a change in group struc-
pjj-e, a new sibling relationship begins, and often a
cross-sex parental relationship begins for one of
(jie parents. This event also marks the end of the
only-child family. New norms are added along
with the new position, So, although stage duration
is a timing measure, it also carries a normative
element.
Part of this normative element is the expecta-
tion that a stage will endurc for a period of time
before which the transitional event and its follow­
ing stage is inappropriate and unlikely and beyond
which the current stage is increasingly inappropri­
ate and unlikely. That is, the duration in a given
stage determines the probability of a given transi­
ii' tion event and, of course, the following stage. So,
for Bill and Suzie there are expectations about
how long the K-I-S-S-I-N-G will go on before they
declare their love for each other. And, of course,
1 those expectations involve both there being too
brief a time as well as too long a time. And there is
then a period expected after the declaration of
love before the marriage, again with short and
long limits, Finally, there is a minimum and max­
;
11 imum period of time expected from marriage to
the baby carriage.
Noticc that not only does the duration of the
stage change the probabilities of a given event, but
also it changes the probabilities of alternative pos-
« sible events. Thus, we might speculate (and our
speculation is subject to empirical verlfication)
that the longer the being in love stage endures
beyond a certain optimum time, the less likely
that the event marriage will take place, and the
more likely that one of the alternative events—
break-up, moving in together, or birth of first
child—will occur. Note that each of these events
fakes the couple into quite different next family
career stages.
White summarizes the relationships between
events, stages, sequences, and duration this way;
Norms construct relatively unique and homoge-
neous periods in family life (stages), bounded by
events. . . . The concept of a career, whether family
or individual, entails a sequence of events (or stages)
over time. . . . Thus, family development is the pro-
23Time of measurement might artificially tnmeate or “right
censor” duration in a stage. That is, at the time of data
gathering, a stage may not have been completed. For a
forther discussion, see Tuma and Hannan (1984).
■■f
241
cess whereby stages of family life are sequenced so
that the probability of any stage is determined by the
time duration in the previous stage. (1991, p. 42)
This definition, as compared with the Mat-
tessich and Hill definition quoted earlier, makes it
quite clear what precipitates change in the family
career. And it distinguishes family changes that are
developmental from those that are consequences
of other kinds of events. For example, only some
of the adaptations “to recurring life stresses” of
the family system referred to by Mattessich and
Hill would be family developmental according to
White’s definition. But others would not qualify.24 *
This is not to say that these are any less significant
in the dynamics of the family. It is to say that
family development theory has theoretical bound-
aries that limit its power to explain family career
patterns. Confusing variables that are not family
developmental with those that are only introducés
error into the analysis.
The Process of Development
There is general concurrence that the theory
of family development is concerned with how
families change over time. Indeed, one advantage
and strength of the theory when compared to
other theories about the family is its focus on fami­
ly change. However, this strength has also been a
major weakness of the theory. Developmental the-
orists have been negligent in pointing out the pre-
cise type of change on which the theory focuses
and discriminating that type of change (develop­
mental change) from the many other forms of
change that take place in the family. This has led to
the misleading perception that developmental
24This distinction is particularly important since a nuraber
of family processes have been characterized as being “de­
velopmental,” which in fact may not be so. Rodgers
(Ahrons & Rodgers, 1987; Rodgers, 1987), for example,
has argued that the separation, divorce, remarriage pro­
cess is a developmental one. In making this argument, he
has attempted to incorporate his ideas into those of Mc-
Cubbin and Patterson (1983) concerning the impact of
stress on the family. Both he and McCubbin and Patterson
argue that this is a developmental process. With this defi­
nition, it will now be possible to return to those formula-
tions and sort out which familial consequences of stress
are in fact developmental and which are not. A recent
book edited by Klein and Aldous (1988) deals in consid-
erable detail with the joining of family development and
family stress theory.
242 PART V FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-1%0
theory was responsible for explaining all forms of
change in the family. Of course, when it failed
to do so, some scholars feit the theory was in­
adequate. This section identifies developmental
change and some other types of changes that take
place in families.
Defining the Process
Deflning the process of development has not
been an easy task for developmentalists. After the
early phase of thought about the process of devel­
opment (Aldous, 1978; Magrabi & Marshall, 1965;
Rodgers, 1973), subsequent work began to focus
on the array of models of the process. Klein,
Borne, Jache, and Sederberg (1979) suggest three
alternative versions of the developmental process,
They suggest it could be a discrete stage process, a
process based on a transition period, or a continu-
ous dynamic process. Although Klein and his col-
leagues did not expressly develop the notion that
the process was stochastic rather than determin-
istic, nonetheless that theme runs throughout
their discussion.25 Finally, however, in 1984,
White and Reid identified the process as being
similar to a discrete-stage, discrete-time Markov
process. However, their work was incomplete.
First, they only dealt with the first of the three
models developed by Klein and his colleagues,
Second, and perhaps more important, the notion
of time making discrete jumps of equal duration
for all families clearly did not fit with what we
know about family transitions.
Earlier we noted the Hill and Mattessich
(1979) definition of the process of development.
Recall that their definition contained the idea that
family development is a “process of Progressive
structural differentiation and transformation over
the family’s history” (1979, p. 174). The notion of
structural differentiation went largely undeflned.
Rather, the Hill and Mattessich discussion bor-
rowed heavily from the field of developmental
psychology and, as such, entered into a perilous
liaison with concepts such as “ontogenetic deter-
mination.” In some ways, the Hill and Mattessich
definition denies the decades of thought leading
to the conclusion that the process is a nondeter-
ministic one. Indeed, Featherman (1985) sug-
gested to developmental scholars in both so-
ciology and psychology that development is a
25For a fulier discussion of these alternative models, see
Mattessich and Hill (1987. pp. 463-465).
particular type of process that is dependent on
both stage and the duration of time spent in a
stage. This definition of development is both clear
and precise. Furthermore, it is complemented by
more recent work on “semi-Markov” models
However, Featherman did not go on to a specific
application of his definition to the process of famp
ly development nor did he cite these mathe-
matical models as possible models for the process
White (1991) attempts to tie several themes
together. The process is a probabilistic or
stochastic process.26 This means that the process
may contain some dependencies, but even if au
these dependencies were known, the process
would still not be strictly determined. Second, the
exact family stage occupied by a family affects the
probability of their transition to any specific next
stage (discrete stage). Thus, if a young family has
one child, being in this stage affects the proba-
bility of a move to a second child or a divorce and
so on. And, last, the duration of time spent in a
stage affects the probability of a transition to an-
other stage. Perhaps this is most clearly illustrated
by the example of couples in first marriages and
the probability of their having a child. The longer
they are married, the greater the probability of
having a child, until a threshold point is reached
after which the longer the marriage, the less the
probability of having a child. This is what is meant
by the duration in a stage partially determining
the probabilities of a transition. These three points
are what we mean by the process of family devel­
opment. However, it remains to differentiate this
form of developmental change from other types of
change in families.
Other Types of Change
Not all family change is family development.
It is important for both the clarity of the concept
26Whitc uses the work on the semi-Markov models (Col-
eman, 1981; Tuma & Hannan, 1984) to incorporatc these
themes into a systematic view of the process of dcvclop-
ment in families. This view includes the stage as a discrete
state, the duration in a stage as a transition period, and the
continuous transition rate from one stage to another as a
continuous dynamic process. This orientation does not
contain the notion of “Progressive structural differentia­
tion” proposed by Hill and Mattessich, however. The gen-
eral model is
q/ft) = Um ^ J (Coleman, 1981, P- 9)
CHAPTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY
“family development” and for our later discussion
to distinguish two basic kinds of change. All
change is either systematic change or random
change. Systematic change has a pattern or reg-
ularity to it, whereas random change does not.
Within systematic change it is possible to dis­
tinguish at least two other forms of family change
besides family developmental change; matura-
tional change and adaptational change.
Maturational changes are contained within
the substance of the organism and as such are
properly labeled “ontogenetic” change. Matura-
tion, since it is ontogenetic in nature, does not
seem very applicable to the family group. It is
tnuch more applicable at the individual level of
analysis. The notion of maturation even at the in­
dividual level is ambiguous in that it contains the
ideas of duration dependence and age depen-
dence. For example, we might say that a child who
masters a “conservation of energy task” (such as
discerning that the amount of water poured be-
tween two glasses of unequal size is nonetheless
the same quantity of water) has matured. How­
ever, we could mean either of three different
things here. We could mean that the total history
of the child from the day of birth is tied to the
transition. Or, we could mean that some subset
(but not all) of previous States explain the transi­
tion. Or, we could mean that the transition is due
to the duration of time spent in the immediately
prior stage (such as Piaget’s “preoperational”
stage).
This last meaning is equivalent to the process
of development for the individual since a transi­
tion is stage and duration dependent. So that we
do not confuse development as a process with
maturation, we will treat maturation as referring
only to the other two meanings. These other two
meanings of maturation are captured in the con-
structs of the individual’s chronological age (all
history) and some of the individual’s experience
(subset of history). These two, however, are not
completely distinct from each other, since both
are related by the underlying dimension of time.
Nevertheless, we need not confuse these forms of
maturation with the process of development.
Adaptational change occurs when a family, re-
lationship, or individual changes so as to bring
itself into alignment with its environment. In pop-
ulation ecology, “adaptation” is one of the two
Processes (adaptation and mutation) by which
uatural selection takes place for a population.
243
However, it is quite possible to discuss adaptive
changes for an individual, relationship, or family
without recourse to population ecology. For the
theory of family development, adaptational
change is most useful in explaining why and how
the current stages of family development are not
the same stages observed three centuries ago and,
perhaps, not the same found in other social Sys­
tems today. In other words, adaptation of the in-
stitution of marriage and the family to the changes
in other institutions, such as work and education,
account for some of the changes in the norms
governing family development.
Finally, we should briefly characterize ran­
dom change. A random change exists when any
conditional probability for an event or stage is the
same as the unconditional probability. In other
words, we can detect no systematic character to
this form of change. It should be emphasized that
a random process is quite different from a
stochastic process such as development. All of the
sources of variation in a stochastic process may
not be identified but, nonetheless, the process is
systematic. A random process simply has no order
or systematic character.
Having presented the reconceptualization of
the theory of family development in some detail,
we turn next to a presentation of some of the
theoretical propositions that we see generaled
from the new formulation.
Examples of Theoretical Propositions
To some extent, theoretical propositions are
derivations from the definltions and axioms (as-
sumptions) of a theory. In addition to derivations,
a theory also contains some statements of em-
pirical regularities as propositions. In this section
we attempt to identify some of the major deflni-
tions, axioms, and propositions of the theory of
family development. We have already encoun-
tered a number of definltions for essential con­
cepts. It is now time to place these in the context
of the entire theoretical structure. Although the
propositions in Table 2 are by no means ex-
haustive of the ones we can generale, they are
among the most basic propositions in the theory.
In Table 2, an axiom refers to a proposition
that is assumed to be true. A derived proposition
follows from definitions and axioms, Propositions
that are neither definitions, axioms, or derived
244 PART V FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DUR1NG 1946-1%0
Table 2. Some Defmitions, Axioms, and
Derived Propositions from the Theory of
Family Development
Definitions
D l. A family stage is a qualitative periüd in the
iife of a family with lts own unique group
structure.
D.2. Transition events are separating points
between family stages.
D.3. The institution of marriagc and the family
contains all the norms regulating this
particular area of social life.
D.4. A position is a location or a point in a social
structure; a family position is a location or
point in a kinship structure,
D.5. A norm is a social rule that has the two
dimensions of a social expectation and
behavior.
D.6. A role is coraposed of all of the norms
attached to a specific position.
D.7. A timing norm is a processual norm for when
an event or stage is to be experienced by an
individual, relationship, or family group. (This
is in general measured by comparing the age
and stage expectations and behavior for the
individual, relationship, and family to
establish whether the unit is "on-time” or
“off-time.”)
D.8. A sequencing norm is a processual norm for
the order in which events and stages are to
be experienced by an individual, relationship,
or family. (This is measured by the
conformity or deviance for a sequence of
events or stages from the modal sequence.)
D.9. Other institutions are composed of the norms
regulating specific areas of social life such as
work, rclighion, education, polity, etc.
D.10. The conjunction of one institution s timing
norms with another institution’s are called
cross-institutional timing norms.
D. 11. The conjunction of one institution’s
sequencing norms with another institution’s
are called cross-institutional sequencing
norms.
D, 12. Institutional normative adaptation is when
the norms of one institution are brought into
alignment and articulation with the norms of
some other institution(s).
Axioms
A.l. The process of family development is
modeled by a semi-Markov model (see Note
26).
A.2. When an institution’s timing and sequencing
norms do not articulate with those of other
institutions (cross-institutional), then:
A.2.1. Individuals experience contradictory
{continued)
Table 2. {Continued)
normative demands and, in conforming
to one institution’s set of norms,
deviate from the norms in another
institution (strain).
A.2.2. Contradictory timing and sequencing
norms for family stages lead to greater
deviation from the normative paths.
A.2.3- Systematic individual and group
deviance places pressure on an
institution to adapt or align itself with
the sequencing and timing norms of
other institutions.
Propositions
P. 1. Family development is stage dependent
because there exists institutional sequencing
norms. (D.l, 2, 3, 8; A.l)
P.2. Role relationships within the family change
with the family stage. (D.l, 5, 6,)
P.3. Family development is duration dependent
because there exists institutional timing
norms. (D.l, 3, 7; A.1)
P.4. Role relationships develop over time, in part,
as a function of family stages. (D. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8; P. 2)
P.5. The normative demands of any given
institution must be in line with
the maturation of the individual. (D.7, 8, 9;
A.2, A.2.1)
P6. The normative demands of any given
institution must be in line with the stage of
the family, otherwise the family is strained.
(D.7, 8, 9; A.2, A.2.2, A.2.3)
P7. The sum total of normative demands for all
institutions at any one point in time cannot
overload the capacity of individuals or groups
without creating social deviance (cross-
normative strain). (A.2, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3;
D.9, 10, 11)
P8. Institutional normative adaptation is preceded
by systematic behavioral deviance. (A.2, A.2.1,
A.2.3; D.12) (Modell, 1980)
propositions are empirical propositions based on
both an empirical regularity and logical consisten-
cy with the theory. There are few such empirical
propositions stated since the goal here is to pre­
sent the most basic propositions of the theory that
are necessarily mainly definitions, axioms, and de­
rived propositions. In addition, readers should
take special note of the level of analysis for which
the proposition is intended as appropriate. Deriva-
tions may move from one level to another, but this
is usually a rcsult of a major premise about institu­
tions and there being deductions to lower levels
CHAPTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY
0f analysis on the basis of the application of in­
stitutional norms to those lower levels of analysis.
There are many other propositions that fit
jjicely into the theory. For example, the em-
pirically based propositions cited by Burr and his
collcagues (Burr, 1973; Burr et al., 1979) regard-
ing ease of role transitions could be consistently
derived from this theory, since roles change with
family stage. And the work by Pearlin and Schooi­
er (1978) and Menaghan ( 1983) suggest that the
effects of anticipatory socialization should be in-
cludcd in the theory. The propositions in this
table are illustrative of the type and extent of pos-
sible derivations from the theory', This illustration
is a starting point, not a finishing one.
While we cannot present research to demon-
strate the strength of our reconccptualization, we
feel obligated, nevertheless, to provide some indi-
cation of how we envision the application of the
revised theory Space prohibits a detailed discus-
sion of all of the many aspccts of the family career
that are revealed by the theoretical formulation.
Nevertheless, recalling the criteria that guided our
revision—a nonteleological, stochastic, and dy-
namic model allowing multilevel analysis of mutu-
ally exclusivc and exhaustive family career
stages—we will attempt to sketch an approach to
a specific sequence of family career stages that
will show' what we intend to accomplish.
The Divorce Developmental
Sequence: An Analytical Sketch
Since institutional procedures for the sever-
ance of the marital bond are so nearly universal,
divorce (or its equivalent) while not popular is
normative. This is so in both senscs—as an expec­
tation and as a behavior. Thus, even where there
exist variations on the theme that marriage should
continue “until death do us part,” there also exist
explicit normative structures for the dissolution of
marriage. Divorce may not be prescribed or even
preferred, but neither is it gcnerally prohibited.
Indeed, divorce is an excellent example of a nor­
mative structure that permits a certain outcome
under clearly understood normative conditions.
We think the explanation of the cause of di­
vorce—in an individual relationship or in a soci-
ety-—takes a secondary place to an explanation of
how the family moves through the family stage
sequences related to divorce. We emphasize that
'his sketch will take a stochastic probability form,
245
rather than a simply descriptive one. Thus, we
satisfy another of our criteria for the restated theo­
ry, And, as we have observed, this places very ex-
pllcit limits on what developmental theory can
and cannot say about divorce in the family career.
Divorce is more than an experience of two
individuals in a relationship. It must be examined
at all four of the levels of analysis, In addition, the
dependent variable to be explained, divorce, is
different at each level of analysis. Divorce for the
individual level poses the question, “Have you ex­
perienced a divorce?” For the relationship (dyad)
level the question is, “Has the marital relationship
split up?” For the group level the question ad-
dressed is, “Has divorce taken place in this fami­
ly?” (versus a previous family of procreation, such
as the flrst marriage). For the institutional level
one asks, “What norms and roles apply to indi­
viduals, relationships, and families who have expe-
rienced divorce?” (normative expectations). But
institutional level questions also include ones
about aggregate data in a society such as, “What is
the divorce rate among childless couples?” (nor­
mative behavior).
Transitional Events and Stages
Our point of departure in tracing this devel­
opmental sequence is the family stage that pre-
cedes the transitional event leading to divorce.
Our concern about mutually exclusive stage cate-
gories arises at once. While divorce applies to
only one relationship—the marital relationship—
it may occur in a number of family stages. Figure 2
presents some divorce family stage sequences.
There could be others, for example, those associ-
ated with divorce in second or subsequent raar-
riages or in other plurality patterns.
There are three transitional events that come
to mind immediately as relevant to the divorce
developmental sequence; marital separation, rec-
onciliation, and divorce. The key point to notice
at this juncture is that each stage following a tran­
sitional event represents a different family struc­
ture than the one preceding the transitional event.
Essentially all other aspects of the process are as-
sociated with one or more of the levels of analysis
to which we now turn.
Institutional Level
Recall that the institution of marriage and the
family contains process and static norms about
 Bi:
f CHAPTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY 247

a seminar directed by the

farnily life. Some of these norms are antithetical to may well be cumulative so that the long-term ef­
■P divorce such as “until death do us part.” Other fect is later marital disruption, as suggested by
■r
Mptv less formalized norms contain expectations about Hogan (1978), Morgan and Rindfuss (1985), and
dje reasonable amount of time before having chil- White (1987).
m f
dren or the reasonable amount of time to stay

i wdth an alcoholic spouse. These norms supply tim­

ing expectations given contingencies in the fami-
Group Level

Figure 10-2. Some examples of separation and divorce stage sequences. [This flgure was developed independendy as a result of discussions in
B ' ly. Often, complex sets of these norms must be
constructed in order to understand divorce. For
example, should one get divorced (a generally un-
f:
l|
favorable outcome) if one’s spouse is a chronic
(duration) alcoholic, a child abuser, and no longer
a farnily provider? These contingency norms are
what all farnily members appeal to in justifying (as
m *
IJl well as interpreting) divorce to others, that is, that
it is indeed a normative and expected event. This
discussion suggests that under some conditions
3ÊSS divorce is an expectation and a behavioral pattern.
i Indeed, normative deviance supplies an cffec-
tive explanation for divorce as an aggregate phe-
nomenon. The sequencing and timing of farnily,
relationship, or individual stages might be off-time
The structural aspects of the role relation-
ships are succinctly captured in the structural dia­
gram of farnily stages set out above. First, there is
not just one stage from which all divorces ema-
nate. All farnily stages where there is a marital
relationship have some probability of divorce. We
think the probability depends, in part, on the ex­
act stage and the duration in that stage. Second,
there is not just one stage that follows the event of
a divorce. Rather, divorce as a farnily event may
change the structure of the farnily in a myriad of
ways. For example, one farnily may practice joint
custody and another sole custody. Recall in the
discussion of relationships that such stage struc-
tures indicate the degree to which certain norms

I
I
: £ k
or out of sequence due to either a random event
or prolonged duration in stage. For example, Mor­
'■ gan and Rindfuss (1985) report that the sequenc­
and roles may be followed. Furthermore, the
norms that apply to the incumbents in each stage
are largely responsible for the relationship he­
ing of conception, birth, and wedding has an effect rween divorce and stage variables. For example,
on later marital disruptions. In this case, the se­ the norms in a farnily who have launched their
I: quencing of these events has both an immediate
nonnormative (deviance) effect suggested by the
children, but are not yet reinforced by the grand-
parental roles, are somewhat similar to the struc­
| norms against out-of-wedlock births and a longer- ture of the early marital dyad. However, there are
term effect of throwing off other farnily, rela­ process norms that reinforce the view that this is
t
authors. For a similar approach, see Eichler (1988, Fig. 4, p. 29)1

oo
r tionship, and individual stage sequences and tim­
ing later in life.
Another important aspect to farnily norms is
K the effect of cross-institutional norms. Sometimes
I a group or individual may find that the norms
; ; from one institution contradict the norms from
15 another institution, such as the expectation that
iï.
children come after a few years of marriage and
the expectation that a prolonged educational
commitment and a First job be completed before
having children. In such cases, satisfying one set of
expectations is counter to satisfying the other set.
Indeed, where such contrary cross-institutional
norms are the case, we would expect a greater
number of divorces. Furthermore, it might also be
IS mat cross-institutional timing norms delay the
I■ M
S' 3 timing of farnily stages or occupational career
13 ; 5m stages, thus putting the farnily, relationship, or in­
dividual out of synchrony (off-time) with other
! eross-institutional or institutional demands. The
T effect of such off-time farnily or individual careers
l: I
indeed a transitional stage for the farnily and con-
tinued interaction with the children may serve to
further reinforce both the old farnily roles as well
as promise the ascendancy of the grandparental
roles. Thus, the process norms may in part con­
struct a more stable dyad than in early marriage
because they are more fully immersed in the fami-
ly normative context and farnily history.
Relationship Level
It is worth recalling that the analysis is
focused on events (divorce and separation) rather
than stages. Divorce, like separation or reconcilia-
tion, is an event that is a transition point from one
stage to another. At the relationship level of analy­
sis, these events mark the transition from one
stage to another for the marital relationship. The
duration in the particular marital relationship is
related to the event of divorce in that the proba­
bility for a divorce is greatest during the early

m 246
|
I
248 PART V • FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-1%0
CHAPTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY 249

years of marriage. However, this fact, although as- tially for the mother—son, mother—daughter ment, history, and experience. So, for example, tal approach as providing important insights for
sociated with individual measures such as the mar- father-son, father—daughter, and sibling relation­ the ages of the children may assist in understand- their work. We believe that our reformulation can
ital satisfaction of the individuals or individual re­ ships. We can deal with all of these simultaneously mg their individual feelings about the separation, continue to do so; indeed, it does so with consid-
sources, is not explained by these factors at the with the family stage (group level). However, it is reconciliation, and divorce transitions, since erably more precision and potential insight. We
dyadic relationship level. Rather, what the high also possible to analyze the stage changes for each something will be known of their cognitive, emo- would recommend a general approach of the fol­
divorce rate for shorter-duration marriages sug- dyad, triad, and so on up to level of the family tional, and socia) developmental characteristics. It lowing kind.
gests is that there is something about the particu- group, The identification of coalitions with the will also help explain feelings of parents vis a vis We have emphasized that all transitions are
lar relationship stage of marriage from which divorcing father or with the mother shed light on their children’s responses to these events. And, of not family developmental transitions. Thus, at the
these people are exiting. The marital relationship the changes in interaction in these relationships. course. if the ages of the individual parents are outset it seems important to us for the practi-
added to the data, the explanatory ability is ex- tioner to determine whether the “presenting
has stages as does the family group. However, the The ability of incumbents in the various role rela­
panded. It would make a difference, presumably, if problem” is in fact one that falls within the con-
identification of these stages of marriage has been tionships to interact in ways that follow the norms
less emphasized by scholars than those of the fam­ for these relationships is affected by the degree of the parents were 19 and 18 years of age and their fines of family development. That is, they should
ily group. In part, this has been due to a rcliance physical access (domicile). Thus, custody and ac- children were 2 and 1 compared with parents begin by looking for either a developmental tran­
on static marital typologies rather than dynamic cess enter as structural variables into these dyadic who were 45 and 44 with children 18 and 16. sitional event or family stage as the context within
These kinds of variables are the stuff of indi­ which the problem can be located. Having done
analyses. and triadic relationships and, in part, structure
vidual psychological theory and practice more this, three basic questions appear to us to follow
We cannot fully describe the marital stages. how anomie these relationships become in post-
However, we can at least characterize these early divorce relationship stages. than they are of a social psychological or so- from developmental theory:
marriages. One possible way of depicting early ciological understanding. The kinds of cxplana-
1. Is the event or stage out of sequence?
marriage as a relationship stage is as the qualita- tions available at the individual level that are rele­
Individual Level 2. Is the event or stage off-time (either in terms
tively distinct period between the events of the vant to family development theory appear to us to
of duration—too short or too long—or
wedding and the birth or adoption of the first The principal concepts for analyzing divorce be quite limited. This may only be because we are
being early or late)?
child. Early marriage would be a stage delineated at the individual level of analysis from the the- not competent in the field of psychology. We are
3. Is there some cross-institutional misalign-
by structural variables and qualitatively distinct oretical perspective of family development are the aware, of course, that the thcrapeutic professional
ment involved in the event or stage
interactional variables. The early marriage stage is individual’s perception of his or her role enact- community has spent a great deal more effort in
circumstance?
a dyad. It may be argued [following Caplow ment, perception of the spouse’s role enactment, thinking through the conceptual and treatment
(1968) and others] that the dyad is inherently and pcrceptions of norms favoring divorce and approaches to these maners. Consequently, they And, of course, the practitioner must ask at what
unstable. Since there is no possibility for coali- those antithetical to divorce. These variables con- are in a much better position to suggest explana- level or levels of analysis the “problem” is being
tions, only negotiations can resolve disputes. So tain many bidden normative dimensions, such as tions of this behavior than are we. In that regard, exhibited. We are quite aware that there are other
the first factor predisposing early marriages to di­ the duration of time one will tolerate an abusive we would note there has been increasing interest implications for the applied professions to our re­
vorce and separation is the structure of this rela­ relationship or the duration of time one will toler­ in family development theory in that field, es- formulation. We shall be quite anxious to see what
tionship stage, ate the perception that the relationship is un- pecially in the clinical branch. Writers such as Car­ sorts of thinking in these communities our work
A second factor is the complex set of norms gratifying. Many such analyses have already been ter and McGoldrick (1988), Combrinck-Graham may precipitate.
applicable to the relationship at this stage. The completed under the rubric of event transitions (1985), Golan (1983), and most recently Falicov
relationship in North America is expected to be and marital satisfaction (e g., Belsky & Rovine, (1988) have used family eyele ideas to address Summary
romantic, yet traditional role relationships are 1990; Belsky et al., 1985; Menaghan, 1983, 1989) psychotherapeutic issues—and not only at the in­
clearly defined by the society. In addition, the nor- and individual life course contingencies (Aldous, dividual level. Falicov’s (1988, pp. 3—51) attempt The preceding sketch does not attempt to
to integrale family sociological and family thera- address all the variables that might explain di­
mative content for this marital stage requires neo- 1978). Such analyses are typificd by their exam-
locality and contains a strong preference that it ination of variables over the individual’s life peutic approaches to family development is es- vorce at the various levels of analysis. This sketch
lead to having children. In the past few decades, course or a sequence of individual events not ncc- pecially stimulating. Her discussion, along with does attempt to identify some of the ways that the
these norms have been effectively challenged by cssarily shared by the other spouse. Many of these chapters by other authors, promises to make more theory of family development would explain di­
changes in other institutions such as education variables might explain why an individual reaches therapists aware of this approach to family under­ vorce at each level. The theory can provide the
standing. Our reading of that book, however, ieads most complete explanation when all of these lev­
and work. The result of this challenge has meant a decision to separate or divorce a spouse.
In order to locate our family member more us to observe that there are a number of confu- els are tied together in a complete picture. The
that the most structurally vulnerable marital stage
has also lost much of its normative buttressing. In prccisely in the family context, a piece of indi­ sions in the levels of analysis that we believe will present sketch does not do this but should suggest
not assist the comprehension of this complex some of the richness that a multileveled stochastic
effect, for many early marriages the relationship vidual Information assists us: the ages of the chil­
process. theory can provide family scholars.
state approached anomie. Whether or not this is dren (as contrasted with the age of a relationship
While we recognizc our expertise in the ther-
cohort specific or a lasting change is yet to be or duration of a family stage). The children’s ages
will assist us in explaining a number of individual apeutic and family life education areas is severely
determined.
A good many divorces occur in marriages where responses of family members to the transitional
lirnited, we have some suggestions for practi- Conclusion
fioners in both of these communities who may
there are other sets of relationships so that the events of interest. Note, however, that these re­
view with some dismay our reconceptualization, We said at the outset that we believed family
event of the divorce represents a change of stage sponses are characteristics less associated with
Many of them have come to view the devclopmen- development was in a state of gridlock. In the past
not only for the marital relationship but poten- family development than with individual develop-
250 PART V • FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-1%()
the theory of family development did not supply
the contemporary family scholar with a systematic
set of ideas that could be used to analyze and
cxplain family developmental processes. Two con­
sistent problems have plagued research uslng a
family development perspective. One is that the
resulting correlations with dependent variables
are modest at best (Mattessich & Hill, 1987). The
second problem has been that the theory failed to
offer any theoretical deductions or predictive
power and, hence, explanatory power. Further, in
the last two decades the theory of family develop­
ment, in addition to its traditional confusion with
child development ideas, became confused with
several other time-oriented approaches such as in-
dividual life course, event history analyses, and
cohort analyses.
More importantly, however, what compels us
to believe that the criticisms can no longer be
ignored is the more recent suggestion of Scanzoni
and his colleagues (Scanzoni, 1988; Scanzoni et al,
1989) that the study of the “family” as a group or
institution be revlsed as the study of personal or
close relationships. Although these authors envi-
sion a “developmental” perspective on primary
relationships, they see the family development ap-
proach as essentially useless. In many respects, we
agree with their critique of these concepts, but
believe that the solution they propose essentially
throws out the baby with the bathwater. Our revi-
sion attempts to address these issues without sacri-
ficing some of the rudimentary insights contained
in the original family development approach.
Substantively, the rcvised theory suggests
that not all family change is developmental. In
addition, change needs to be viewed in substan-
tially different ways at each level of analysis: the
individual, the relationship, the family group, and
the institution of the family. Indeed, the structures
of each of these levels are distinctly different. Fam­
ily development is deflned as the process where
the probability of a transition to a family stage
depends on both the current stage and the dura-
tion of time spent in that stage. Family develop­
ment is stage dependent because there are institu-
tional sequencing norms. The process is duration
dependent because there are institutional timing
norms. These processual norms change over time
to align themselves with the processual norms in
other institutions. The degree of articulation with-
in this cross-institutional normative fabric is
largely responsible for the ease or stress which
individuals, relationships, and families encounter
when following normative paths and transitions
The systematic behavioral nonconformity to pro-
cessual or static norms by a suffïciently large ag-
gregate of people brings about changes in the ex-
pectations about positions, roles, relationships
and family stages. Hence, family development is a
process that is regulated by the norms within the
institution of the family but is affected by the artic­
ulation between family and other social insti­
tutions.
With the revisions we propose, we think that
the family development framework meets the cri­
teria of a social scientiflc theory. We have taken
considerable care to provide a consistent set of
definitions on which to build the basic assump-
tions of the theory. Decades of critiques have sen-
sitized us to the implications of certain assump-
tions of the older theory, such as those of a
teleological and deterministic nature. The result­
ing assumptions and derivative propositions are at
least clear and disconfirmable. Most importantly,
we have identifled a mathematical model as iso-
morphic with our theoretical notion of family de­
velopment. The stage conception we suggest is
both exhaustive and exclusive and therefore can
be used in testing the model of family develop­
ment. The next step is for researchers to establish
the parameters of this model and to carefully ex-
amine the claim that we can predict the proba-
bilities for stage transitions.
Empirically, there is much to be done. How­
ever, it is important that theoretical propositions
are correctly operationalized. First, it is necessary
that the unit of observation correspond to the ap-
propriate level of analysis in the theory. The family
level offers some difficulties. We do not recom-
mend the approach that in some way sums indi­
vidual family members’ scores into a family score
(Wakers et al., 1984; White, 1984), Although
such approaches may be predictive of occur-
rences to family members, these predictions have
the weakness of being the result of individual
scores composing the summative score (multi-
colinearity) and common living conditions of fam­
ily members (spuriousness). Individual histories
are often used as proxies for family histories (Bur-
ch, 1985; Sweet et al, 1988). We think it is wise to
use at least two family members as “reporters” on
the family’s career and assess their retrospective
CHARTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY
observatiens for interobserver reliability as we
would do with any other two observers of a
phenomenon.
In the past, many scholars have viewed the
operationalization of family stages as being largely
the choice of the researcher (Rodgers, 1973). This
has led to a multitude of stage conceptions lacking
true comparability and frustrating the accumula-
tion of flndings (e.g., four stages in Olson et al,
1988; five in Anderson et al, 1983; and seven for
Spanier et al, 1979). This also means that we nev-
er know whether variance between flndings is due
to methodological artifacts or to some non-
methodologlcal effect. Some important reasons for
using the proposed stage conception include:
1. The presence or absence of a family position
helps us deduce the roles and norms that
may be operating within a stage (clearly, if
there is no incumbent in a family position,
dien the norms, roles, and relationships at-
tached to that position are not opera-
tional).27
2. These stages are not only comparable be­
tween researchers but are applicable cross-
culturally.
3. This stage conception avoids the pitfall of
assuming that one event indicates one stage
(cf. Fig. 2 for a clear demonstration of this).
This reconceptualization on flrst impression
may appear to be complex and unnecessarily de-
tailed. However, the process that we are attempt-
ing to model is complex and requires a detailed
formulation to capture it. The model does not pre­
sent a precisely determined world moving for-
ward in a lockstep march that can be easily ap-
prehended. At the same time, the reconceptualiza­
tion is somewhat more modest in its claims. It
does not offer an explanation for all family group,
relationship, and member behavior, but prin-
cipally directs attention to the process of family
development. It is recognized in the reconcep­
tualization that there are other types and sources
27Boss’s (Boss, 1980a,b, 1983, 1987; Boss & Greenberg,
1984) analyses with regard to “psychological presence”
and “psychological absence,” for example, are enhanced
by this conceptualization. We should be able to deter-
mine more clearly which aspects of family stress under
such circumstances are truiy a developmental conse-
quence and which are the consequence of other vari­
ables. In addition, see Menaghan (1989).
251
for change that are exogenous to the scope of the
theory. In the end, we believe that trading global
applicability for explanatory power is good scien­
tiflc strategy.
All of these changes provide family develop­
mental scholars with challenges. However, the ul-
timate challenge is to determine if today’s family
scholars are prepared to put the same effort into
family development theory as were those early
scholars who so carefully cultivated and nurtured
the ideas that we continue to believe can bear
much explanatory fruit. We are optimistic.
Acknowledgments. The authors gratefiilly ac-
knowledge the critical comments on an earlier
version of this chapter from students in the Family
Development Seminar at the University of British
Columbia as wek as the comments from anony-
mous reviewers. We would also like to acknowl-
edge the encouragement and support we received
from the editors of this volume and speciflcally
from the editor with whom we worked most
closely, William Doherty. Finally, we would like to
thank our wives, Maria and Robin, who serve as
both gentle critics and stalwart supporters.
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• FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY 255
APPLICATION
Family Development Theory as
Revlsed by Rodgers and White
ImpSications for Practice
Candyce S. Russel!
Rodgers and White have described the impact of family development theory on em-
pirical research to date as “minimal.” Admittedly, the percent of variance in dependent
variables explained by the family life cycle concept has not been impressive, generally
less than 10%. Yet practitioners have used concepts from the family development
approach to normalize stressful family expehence and to think about continuity and
change across time. Developmental concepts have an innate appeal to clients and
offer an acceptable alternative frame for many problems in family relationships (Carter
& McGoldrick, 1989; Falicov, 1988).
Themes of continuity and discontinuity across time offer a context for forgiveness
(we aren’t the only ones who have faced this) and for hopefulness (development
involves “ups” as well as “downs”). Yet frequently the stressful transitions with which
applied family professionals are most concerned do not appear in the classic family life
cycle categories, especially transitions involving separation, divorce, and the incorpor-
tion of adult children (and possibly their children) into the household of the family of
origin. Nor are the significant “players" always the ones identified in the earlier version
of family development theory.
The revision of family development theory offered by Rodgers and White allows
for variations in family life that more closely parallel the experiences of a culturally
diverse population. The genogram-type notation used by Rodgers and White is a
familiar one to family therapists (e.g., McGoldrick & Gearson, 1985). By focusing on
both household and kinship ties, this notation system allows us to identify such im­
portant players as stepparents, noncustodial parents, and former spouses. However,
the expehence of family therapists regarding the significant role frequently played
by “nonevolved grandmothers,” fictive kin, and boyfriends (Boyd-Franklin, 1980;
McGoldrick & Carter, 1982) would point to the usefulness of expanding the notation
system to three generations and to including persons who function in important ways
within the family even though they may not live in one household or be related by blood
or marriage.
Candyce S. Russell • Department of Human Development and Family Studies, Kansas State
University, Manhattan, Kansas 66506.
256 PART V • FAMILY THEORIES AND METHODS EMERGING DURING 1946-1960
The earlier focus on stages and developmental tasks has given way to a focus on
transitions and transitional events that, regardless of institutional norms, may occur in
an unspecified order. Rodgers’ and White’s revision of family deveiopment theory
suggests a shift to a less deterministic understanding of famiiy deveiopment. They
have introduced the concept of “stochastic processes” to the family deveiopment
model. Bateson (1972) defines a stochastic process as a sequence of events that
combine a “random component with a selective process, so that only certain out-
comes of the random are allowed to endure” (p. 253). In this instance, what is “selec­
tive” is contribuled by that which family deveiopment theory attempts to explain and
predict: transitions and transitional events.
Using this new theory of family deveiopment, certain variables, such as years
married and age of the partners, may help us predict the likelihood of some transition
occurring. Family therapist Combrinck-Graham (1985, 1988) suggests that the family
spirals through a pattern of centripetal and centrifugal movement. Furthermore, when
three generations are included in that picture, the coincidence of transitions (such as
adolescence, midlife reevaluation, and retirement) suggests some commonality
across the generations within one family system. The constraints offered by the simul-
taneous “spiraling” in the three-generational system may be an additional factor that
presses toward and helps to select the timing of a new transition in family life.
The work of Rodgers and White suggests that variables such as the ones de-
scribed above may play a role in timing transitions and transitional events. However, it
would appear that Rodgers and White are less likely to try to predict the specific
outcome of a family transition. Inherent in this shift is an acceptance of a certain level
of unpredictability in family life that wilt not be unfamiliar to family therapists (e.g.,
Boscolo, et al., 1987; Hoffman, 1990; White & Epston, 1990). This shift from a focus on
sequencing to a focus on timing suggests an increasing interest in understanding the
process that eventuates in any one of several outcomes.
To date, applied professionals working from the family deveiopment approach
have been much more likely to take their cues from the age of children in the family
than to think about the process that evolves from being a couple of “x” years’ duration
or that evolves from being an intergenerational family group that is coexperiencing
certain life challenges. Family deveiopment theory has not really had the tools to study
deveiopment within marriage or the intergenerational system in a way that does not
overfocus on the maturation of children. Hopefully, future research inspired by family
deveiopment theory will help us to understand more about the process of change in
marriage and family groups that is not necessarily dependen! on the age of children but
is developmental in nature.
Rodgers and White are clear that the level of analysis in family deveiopment
theory is not the individual, but the relationship. The Creative use of family deveiop­
ment theory together with family systems theory may help us make progress toward
understanding more about the relationship process involved in developmental change.
By integrating famiiy deveiopment theory and systems theory, we may be able to
understand more about symptoms as attempts to “jump start,” “slow down,” or other-
wise regulate the process of developmental change within the system (e.g., Carter &
McGoldrick, 1989; Falicov, 1988; Russell, 1988).
The shift to a less deterministic, more stochastic model of family deveiopment will
assist the family life professional in assuming the role of consultant and resisting a
tendency to anticipate a specific sequence in the deveiopment of marriages and fami­
lies. The helper becomes an expert on the process of negotiating transitions, but is
less oriented toward a specific outcome. The family practitioner thereby assumes a
role that is respectful of the family within its own developmental and cultural context.
Increasing acceptance for a certain level of unpredictability may be more difficult
CHARTER 10 • FAMILY DEVELOPMENT THEORY 257
for family life educators than for family therapists, though it is rarely easy for any
helper. Clients come to family therapists because something has gone wrong; some-
11 ï
one in the family has a symptom and/or relationships have become unsatisfying.
These families have learned something about the unpredictability of life. They know
that even though they work hard and are well-intentioned, things may not turn out as
1 they wish. Family life educators serve a different population—one that has yet to define
and own a problem. The clients of family life educators are interested in preparing for
the future. The clients of family life educators want to believe in predictability. They
want to believe that they can plan for a specific outcome, if only they work hard enough
at it.
Helping inexperienced couples and families to accept a realistic level of unpredict­
ability in family life may be the biggest challenge of the family life educator using
Rodgers’s and White’s reformulation of family deveiopment theory. It will mean replac-
ing the comfort provided by a finite list of “developmental tasks” to accomplish with an
appreciation for the challenge inherent in confronting a number of hurdles that are both
similar to and different from those confronted by other families. Family life educators
will need to work first on shifting the expectations of clients and then will need to focus
on those relationship skills that will assist partners in working toward temporary end
points that are difficult to define. This puts the family life educator in a position of
offering less in the way of content but more in the way of “expectational set” and
problem-solving skills. Any model of family deveiopment that accepts a large degree of
unpredictability will confront the practitioner with the limits of his or her own ability to
help. It will confront each of us with our tendency to “overfunction” as helpers and will
I ;
force us to find ways to shift the locus of responsibility to our dient families.
ïi j|# I
1. References
|
f i.
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i
;
€
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I