1216109

research-article2023
MHSXXX10.1177/23315024231216109Journal on Migration and Human SecurityPries et al.

Original Article
Journal on Migration and Human Security
2024, Vol. 12(1) 39­–53
Trajectories of Forced Migration: Central © The Author(s) 2023
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American Migrants on Their Way Toward sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/23315024231216109
https://doi.org/10.1177/23315024231216109

the USA
journals.sagepub.com/home/mhs

Ludger Pries
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Oscar Calderón Morillón

Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla

Brandon Amir Estrada Ceron

Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla

Executive Summary
Mexico is increasingly important as a country of transit migration between the Global South and the
Global North. Migration dynamics from Central America to and through Mexico are mainly considered as
economic or mixed migration of people looking for work and a better life in the USA. Nevertheless, since
the 2010s the number of asylum applications in Mexico has sky rocketed. Based on a survey of Central
American migrants in Mexico we demonstrate that some kind of (organized) violence was a crucial driver
for leaving and a constant companion during their journey. After contextualizing the migration route from
the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) toward Mexico, we present the design
of the study, describe sociodemographic and general contexts of the 350 interviewees, and present the
migration trajectories as long-lasting sequences of events and stays, where violence in quite different forms
always is at play.

Keywords
forced migration, transit migration, organized violence, Central America, Mexico, USA, migration courses

Forced Migration on the Rise1 the Russian war against Ukraine, which by March
2023 had resulted in 5.3 million internally displaced
The number of people of concern to UNHCR (2023)
persons, 8.1 million externally displaced persons, and
approached 110 million by the end of 2022, the high-
17.6 million people in need of humanitarian assistance
est number since these figures have been formally (EUAA 2022, 2; UNHCR 2023a, 2023b). Between
reported. These figures do not include the impact of 2010 and 2020, the volume of forced migration more
than doubled (to 90 million in 2020), growing faster
1
We very much appreciate the comments and suggestions of than the overall world population (7.8 billion in 2020)
Donald Kerwin and the anonymous reviewers. and the volume of international migration in general
Corresponding Author:
Ludger Pries, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, Bochum 44801, Germany.
Email: ludger.pries@rub.de
40 Journal on Migration and Human Security 12(1)

Figure 1. Development of World Population and (Forced) Migrants 1990–2020.

Source: The authors’ elaboration based on the data of UNFPA (for world population, https://www.unfpa.org/world-population-
trends), UNDESA (for international migration stock, https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-
stock), and UNHCR (for people of concern, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=60FXCw).

(281 million in 2020). Figure 1 shows the growth of millions of people. Countries of origin do not want to
the world population (according to the United Nations be blamed for violence, lack of security, or weak pub-
Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)), the stock of lic administration. Destination countries often close
international migrants (according to United Nations their borders, and shift responsibility for refugee pro-
Department of Economic and Social Affairs tection to transit and other countries.
(UNDESA)), and of the number of persons of concern Central and North America are no different, with
(according to UNHCR, including refugees, asylum people from Central America, and from Venezuela,
seekers, returnees, displaced persons, and stateless Cuba, Haiti, and African countries attempting to
persons).2 It shows that while the world population cross Mexico and to enter the United States
grew almost linearly, the stock of migrants and, in par- (Bojorquez et al. 2020; Drotbohm and Winters 2021;
ticular, the number of persons of concern (as a proxy REDODEM 2022). Much of the migration from
for forced migration) grew exponentially. Including Mexico’s southern border is considered economic or
the families of the persons of concern, forced migra- mixed migration. As a result, the United States is
tion in its various forms negatively affects hundreds of pressuring the Mexican government to tighten access
to its southern and northern borders in order to pre-
2
Not all these categories were included in UNHCR count-

vent access to US territory. Given the pressure on
ing until 2000, therefore, the considerable increase in POC Mexico to harden its borders, researchers began to
in Figure 1 includes both actual growth in social reality and describe Mexico as a vertical border (“frontera verti-
actual increase in sensible perception according to the Thomas- cal,” Torre-Cantalapiedra and Yee Quintero 2018),
Theorem “If men define situations as real, they are real in their and as plug country (“país tapón,” Varela 2019).
consequences.” (Thomas and Thomas 1928, 572); see https:// Consequently, in 2011 the Mexican government
www.unhcr.org/ph/persons-concern-unhcr. enacted a new law regulating migration, asylum,
Pries et al.
and refugee protection (Law on Refugees,
Complementary Protection and Political Asylum).
Despite several amendments in its legal provisions,
Mexico still lacks adequate instruments and stable
policies to manage refugee protection in the face of
“a stratospheric rise in migrants seeking asylum
within its refugee protection system” (Meyer and
Isacson 2019, 33).3 Like the Barack Obama admin-
istration, the government of Andrés Manuel López
Obrador in Mexico is characterized by “a discourse
relatively less against migrants that contrasts with a
record number of deportations” (Torre-Cantalapiedra
2020, 139). Moreover, “bilateral securitization
agreements with the United States related to the
2014 surge of unaccompanied Central American
children and the 2018 migrant caravans have pres-
sured Mexico into implementing migration gover-
nance schemes grounded in border enforcement,
deterrence, and removal, significantly affecting the
process for seeking refuge in Mexico (Chavez and
Voisine 2021, 286).
Despite the violent communities they flee, Central
Americans are often seen as purely economic
migrants or migrants with mixed motives (Bojorquez
et al. 2020; Gómez Johnson and Espinosa Moreno
2020). The report of the Network of Documentation
of the Organizations Defending Migrants
(REDODEM in Spanish) criticizes the use of the
concept of mixed migration:
Although the concept of mixed flows is frequently used,
it tends to be a more abstract notion that can sometimes
depersonalize and make invisible the particularities of
populations in mobility. This concept emphasizes the
differences between populations requiring international
protection and so-called economic migrants. However,
this line drawn to distinguish between the two is
sometimes problematic in the case of populations in
mobility in the region (REDODEM 2022, 164).
Though the governments of El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala have, at different times, made efforts
3
or world population see UNFPA (https://www.unfpa.org/
F the migrants’ own narratives.
world-population-trends), for international migration stock
see UNDESA (https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/
content/international-migrant-stock) and for people of con-
cern see UNHCR (https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/
download/?url=60FXCw).
41
to reduce violence and criminal gangs, the high lev-
els of organized violence distinguish them from the
countries of origin of forced migrants in Turkey
(Figure 2). As Figure 2 shows, the homicide rates for
all three countries have been significantly higher in
recent years than the world average and in the
Americas in general. Mexico also has a high level of
intentional homicide, reaching 30 homicides per
100,000 inhabitants in recent years. Our study exam-
ines how this pervasive violence manifests itself in
the experience of migrants in Mexico. It asks whether
the concept of mixed migration adequately describes
their experiences, or whether the term forced migra-
tion better characterizes the dynamics of migration
in Mexico.
Conceptualizing Violence in the
Social Practice of Forced Migration
The use of the term “mixed migration” aims to
address the increasingly blurred boundaries between
migrants seeking asylum as refugees, migrants who
feel threatened by high levels of armed conflict and
violence in their daily lives, migrants fleeing intoler-
able conditions due to disasters, catastrophes, and
other conditions caused by climate change, and
migrants seeking better jobs and higher incomes.4
For migrants from the Northern Triangle, violence is
present in all of these migration scenarios. We believe
that the term mixed migration obscures crucial
aspects of the migration experience, that are better
reflected in the concept of forced migration. The
mixed migration perspective is biased toward a gen-
eral narrative that a substantial part of this migration
is “voluntary,” and migrants are attracted by expecta-
tions of better living and working conditions in the
United States and Canada. We find that violence,
especially organized violence, is part of the everyday
life of people migrating from the Northern Triangle.
Violence is a taken-for-granted and an integral part
of their experience — before, during, and after
migration — although it is often not emphasized in
4
 or legal provisions and the practice of the law see, for exam-
F
ple, https://cis.org/Luna/Mexicos-Refugee-Law; https://www.
refugeesinternational.org/mexico.
42
Figure 2. Intentional Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants: 1990–2020.
Source: The authors’ elaboration based on https://dataunodc.un.org/dp-intentional-homicide-victims.
These considerations lead to an understanding of
forced migration as an ongoing social practice and
agency in existentially threatening contexts. In such a
broader, but specific sociological perspective, we can
understand forced migration as a change in residence
that is driven by a considerable degree of coercion and
life-threatening circumstances. This coercion is due to
a great extent to perceived persecution on racial, reli-
gious, ethnic, political, national, or gender grounds or
due to life-threatening disasters or catastrophes. A
common condition is organized violence as a collec-
tive action that causes physical and/or psychological
harm to individuals or groups.
In the Central American context, the role of vio-
lence is crucial and often underestimated. Climate
change-related events such as hurricanes, droughts,
and floods are examples of the second context of
forced migration. In both cases, forced migration
should be approached from a dual perspective: (1) as
an objective social situation that has “a life of its
own” and threatens the lives of individuals or groups
according to humanitarian standards, and (2) as a
matter of subjective perception and interpretation of
social situations for the migrants themselves as well
Journal on Migration and Human Security 12(1)
as for wider communities and societies in countries of
origin, transit, and arrival.5 In short, it can be difficult
to draw a clear line between voluntary and involun-
tary migration: for the affected people themselves
and the broader societal context, the perception and
definition of the degree of coercion, and life-threaten-
ing conditions must be jointly managed and negoti-
ated for the migrants themselves and for the wider
social context. Bartram (2015) highlights the subjec-
tive and interpretive context of forced migration:
“dignity will surely play a key role in further efforts
to determine when it is reasonable for individuals to
reject certain alternatives to migration” (p. 20).
5
 he international regime of refugee protection established
T
after the more than 60 million military and civilian deaths and
tens of millions of displaced and expelled persons of World
War II in the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the subse-
quent Protocols of 1967 and 1977 (Elie 2014, 28f). As a cru-
cial achievement of the international governance structure, it
should be defended and extended; nevertheless, it covers an
ever-decreasing part of people forced to leave their residence,
for example, Goodwin-Gill 2013; for climate change and
forced migration see, for example, McCarney/Kent 2020.
Pries et al.
Qualitative research on the migration corridor from
Central America through Mexico to the United States
and Canada underlines the importance of violence and
insecurity for migrants within Mexico, particularly in
relation to the drug wars and human trafficking activi-
ties of drug cartels (Rios Contreras 2014), as well as
political violence in driving internal migration (París
Pombo 2014). Other studies have found that drug car-
tels use Central American migrants passing through
Mexico as targets of kidnapping and for drug smug-
gling (Izcara Palacios 2015). Vogt (2013) showed how
different articulations of criminal, political, and struc-
tural violence transform the bodies of migrants in tran-
sit into commodities for criminal business. The violent
trafficking of migrant bodies across borders has also
received some scholarly attention, particularly in rela-
tion the US-Mexican border (García et al. 2007), where
a media driven “culture of fear” has provoked violent
politics (Correa-Cabrera 2013). Recent ethnographic
studies of transit migration in Mexico have also
explored gendered violence (Mancillas López 2015),
and distrust, violence, and insecurity on the migrant
trail (Díaz de León 2021, 2023). Escamilla García
(2021) visited 21 migrant shelters and interviewed 86
young Central Americans (between 11 and 21 years).
He found that they primarily try to relocate within the
borders of their country of origin before attempting the
dangerous journey to the United States. The reason for
attempting to migrate to the United States is a mixture
of fear of gangs, lack of educational and employment
opportunities, and pervasive poverty.
While anthropological micro-studies focus on spe-
cific groups, places, or events, there is little analysis
based on mass data or broader surveys. Research
based on data generated by governments (such as
that of the National Migration Institute (INM)), usu-
ally considers Central American migrants through
Mexico as economic or labor migrants. Based on a
secondary analysis of mass data (from the Mexican
Commission for Aid to Refugees (COMAR)) and
available research reports, as well as 30 semi-struc-
tured interviews, Gómez Johnson and Espinosa
Moreno (2020) highlight the pervasiveness of vio-
lence and conclude: “For now, the increase in vio-
lence both in the country of origin and in transit
through Mexico has been a fundamental trigger for
the emergence of the ‘migrant caravans’. [. . .] It is a
43
strategy of visibility and protection in the face of risk
situations” (p. 14).
There are also studies based on official govern-
ment registers. The Mexican Ministry of the Interior
(SEGOB 2022) estimates the number of transit
migrants from the Northern Triangle based on the
number of deportations of migrants published by US
authorities. About 75,000 deportations were reported
for 2010, about 114,000 for 2014, and around 108,000
for 2019. Transit migration through Mexico could
also be estimated based on apprehension data (from
the INM) for those persons found in an irregular
migration situation in Mexico. This number was
about 182,000 in 2019, fell to 82,000 in 2020 as a
result of COVID-19, and rose again in 2021 to
185,000, reaching around 250,000 in 2022 — show-
ing undiminished momentum.6 Finally, the dimen-
sion of forced migration in Mexico could be suggested
by the number of applicants for recognition of refu-
gee status registered with the Mexican Commission
for Aid to Refugees. Approximately 30,000 appli-
cants were reported for 2018, rising to 70,000 in
2019, falling (due to COVID-19) to 40,000 in 2020,
and increasing to some 131,000 in 2021 (COMAR
2022; REDODEM 2022, 20). In addition, the non-
governmental network REDODEM reported serving
approximately 15,000 migrants in 2020 with some
63 percent from Honduras, 15 percent from
Venezuela, 6 percent from Guatemala, 4 percent from
El Salvador, 4 percent from Mexico, and about 8 per-
cent from 47 other countries (REDODEM 2022, 39).
These studies provide valuable insights into the
amount of migration that passes through Mexico and
highlight the increase in violence that occurs along
the migration route. We used a mixed-methods, life-
course-oriented approach of doing biographical
interviews, and an extensive survey of 360 inter-
views. In both the qualitative life-history narratives
and the survey of migration trajectories, we focused
on the contexts before leaving home and during the
migration journey, especially on the experiences of
violence. Our aim was to give voice to the forced
migrants themselves and to identify options for cre-
ating safer and more secure environments for them.
6
 his relates to the Thomas-Theorem already mentioned in
T
footnote two.
44
Our mixed-methods approach is innovative, as most
studies focus either on case-oriented qualitative
methods or on quantitative analysis of few mass data.
Study Design and General Survey
Data
Experiences of violence and migration are typically
not one-off events but components of ongoing social
practice. Thus, a concept of life courses seems most
adequate for analyzing the relation of (organized)
violence and forced migration. In a life-course
approach, we understand forced migration as a long
term, iterative, and collective process of social prac-
tice with explicit decisions and everyday actions;
during this process, there are constant changes in
time horizons, target countries, reasons, goals, and
networks. We combine trajectories as sequences of
social positions and events in time, with biographies
as subjectively experienced and remembered flow of
social practice and incidents. Herein, a general focus
is on (1) the period in the life course before moving,
(2) the period of migration itself as often a long-last-
ing part of the life course, and (3) the phase of the life
course after (preliminary) arrival. Refugees’ arrival
at certain places, their integration and participation
in social life and possible moving further is strongly
influenced by their biographical projects (as subjec-
tive integration of their social relations), their pro-
cessed experiences, their socialized norms and
values, their preferences, their expectations, and
their resources at hand. Capturing and comparing
individual life-courses permits researchers to develop
typologies and to reconstruct general structural and
institutional factors of forced migration.
We conducted a survey with 360 interviewees
capturing sociodemographic and family data as well
as the complete trajectories of spatial mobility dur-
ing the life-course.7 As the overall population of for-
eign migrants in Mexico is highly dynamic and to a
great extent informal and undocumented, there are
no reliable representative data of forced migrants.
For this reason, analyzing individual life-courses
permits us to identify the role of (organized) vio-
lence in each of the stages of migration, and also
7
See the Annual Reports of SEGOB (2019-2022).
Journal on Migration and Human Security 12(1)
allows us to reconstruct the factors: (1) inducing
migration (like economic crisis, organized violence,
and the effects of climate change); (2) structuring it
(like border regimes and externalization strategies);
and (3) assisting migrants (like NGOs and networks
of civil society). Concentrating on (organized) vio-
lence, we will first describe different forms of vio-
lence that were reported at the beginning of and
causing forced migration and during the migration
process until the stay in Mexico (at the time of the
survey). As our questionnaire was quite complex for
an online survey and we needed to establish a level
of trust with the interviewees, we organized an
onsite paper-pencil survey along the main routes
and means of transportation.
The survey was conducted from September to
December 2020 in various locations in Mexico along
the usual migratory routes with 360 people in an irreg-
ular migratory situation. Although the respondents’
migratory experiences show a series of similarities, the
contextual conditions during the fieldwork were vari-
able and changing, since COVID-19 modified the situ-
ation of transit for migrants and led to a slight decrease
in the migratory flow. In addition, there were sanitary
restrictions in shelters and canteens, and the health of
the interviewers and interviewees during this time also
had to be considered. The interviews were conducted
in five different zones: Puebla-Tlaxcala, Valley of
Mexico, North-western, North-eastern, and Southern
Border, these zones were both, urban and rural, the
northern zones were predominantly urban, the south-
ern zones rural, and the center of the country, where the
Puebla-Tlaxcala zone and the Valley of Mexico are
located, were a mixture of both (see Figure 3).
We chose these locations considering the common
routes followed by migrants to the United States.
Although there are several routes, the most common
ones follow the railroads that connect it. The research-
ers identified the (fewer) places (such as Nazareth,
Chalchicomula de Sesma in Puebla) that, due to the dis-
ruption of the pandemic, the predominantly Central
American migrants were forced to use.8 The knowledge
8
 dditionally, we conducted 15 qualitative interviews, mainly
A
biographical narrations of migrants in transit in Mexico; for
details of the comparative study of Mexico and Turkey see
Pries et al. (2024).
Pries et al.
Figure 3. Places and Numbers of Survey in Mexico.
Source: The authors’ own elaboration based on ForMOVE data.
of the different zones allowed access to key informants
that facilitated the gathering of information and pro-
vided access to interviewees under conditions of mutual
trust. In all places, we asked migrants randomly if they
were willing to participate in an interview.
We aimed at gathering information of a high diver-
sity of cases varying by gender, age, place of origin,
and sexual orientation. However, the vast majority
were men of Honduran origin. Although official
national and international data refer to the increasing
presence of both women and children (accompanied
or unaccompanied), the conditions generated by
COVID-19 influenced the selection of surveyed per-
sons. Migrants were reluctant to answer the survey
because, on the one hand, it was extensive and, on the
other, experience had taught them to answer as little
as possible for fear of being detained or extorted. As
mentioned above, the appearance of key informants
allowed access to a larger number of migrants by
helping to overcome this barrier of distrust. Also, as
far as possible, we offered food and bottled water,
which helped to build relationships between the sur-
vey team and the migrants. This was part of creating
an atmosphere of trust and empathy, but without
45
conditioning our food assistance on participation in
the survey. In the first few days, the average duration
of the survey was approximately 45 minutes. Although
the questionnaire was assessed before and there was a
daily session to interchange experiences, the applica-
tion was not always easy. With increasing experiences
of the interviewers and depending on the specificities
of the place, interview time reduced to 30 minutes in
favorable conditions (particularly in shelters) and to
15–25 minutes when conditions demanded it, as in
the case of Nazareth in Puebla, where surveys were
done alongside a train track.
In the southern border area, specifically Tapachula/
Chiapas, data gathering took place, first, nearby the
“Siglo XXI” Migratory Station with migrants recently
released from the station and interviewed in the street,
and second, in a public square in the same city. In the
city of Ixtepec/Oaxaca, the survey was administered
to migrants in their workspace, which was part of a
federal program to “return to the community.” In the
same city, we went to the “Hermanos en el Camino”
shelter, where survey conditions were more favorable.
Most of interviews in the central zone took place out-
doors, particularly in Nazareth on the side of the train
46 Journal on Migration and Human Security 12(1)

Table 1. Age at Date and Place of Interview by Citizenship.

Age (years) at interview date Place of interview
Puebla/ Valley of North- Southern
Citizenship <18 18–21 22–25 26–31 >31 Tlaxcala Mexico west Northeast border
Honduras 34 64 48 51 58 99 23 64 48 21
Guatemala 21 3 10 12 9 1 2 8 16 28
El Salvador 9 6 5 7 9 0 1 16 12 7
Total (absolute) 64 73 63 70 76 100 26 88 76 56
Source: Own elaboration based on ForMOVE data.

tracks. In both, the Southern border and the NazarethStates as soon as possible (Meyer and Isacson 2019,
trackside, a constant factor was the presence of police
19). In general, their stay in various parts of the coun-
agents, both local and federal. This made it harder to
try was counted in days rather than weeks. However,
approach the migrants; although the police allowed over the last decade, although the primary intention
the interviews, results were better once they withdrew.
for most migrants remains to reach the United States,
In the Northern areas of the country, interviews tookmore migrants see Mexico as a place to earn money
place mostly in different migrant shelters along the for onward migration or to improve their economic
border. Here the presence of organized crime is felt conditions by staying for longer periods. We noted
more strongly than in the center or south of the coun-
these migrant strategies during the survey, particu-
try. Migrants, in turn, often fear falling into an orga-
larly in the case of those who were interviewed in the
nized crime network. Especially in Caborca, a small central zone or on the southern border, and especially
city nearby Altar in the state of Sonora, organized when it was the first migration event.
criminal groups (of drug cartels or smugglers) decide Due to the conditions of both the migrants and the
who leaves the region. The latent insecurity for inter-
different localities, in our survey the length of stay in
viewers and interviewees was slightly compensated any single location is measured in months and rarely
thanks to the invitation of a priest. surpasses more than six or seven months. Table 2
Regarding basic socio-demographic information, includes all periods, where the interviewees stayed
interviewees were distributed almost equally among for a minimum of one month after having left their
the age groups as indicated in Table 1. Nevertheless,place of normal residence. These could be events in
differentiating for countries of citizenship, Hondurans
Mexico or in other transit countries before arriving in
and Guatemalans vary especially in the group 18– Mexico. Almost all interviewed migrants (96.4 per-
21 years of age, also as demonstrated in Table 1, high
cent or 346 out of 359) indicated a first stay of more
numbers of interviews were done in the two zones of than a month of duration. Its average is about half a
central Mexico (Puebla/Tlaxcala and Valley of year (0.47 of a year or six months rounding up). The
Mexico) and in the Northwest of the country. The standard deviation of the first (and for the then fol-
interviews were conducted primarily with Hondurans, lowing stays) is quite high (more than a year, some
and with men. Our sampling applied random walking 1.67). As Table 2 reveals, even some 93 percent (332
methods according to the specific places and migrant out of 356) of the interviewed persons indicated a
populations therein, which means that we did not fol-second longer stay during their journey and the same
low certain demographic quotas sampling. share a third. From the fourth stay onwards, the share
of interviewees decreases continuously, and only
Migration Trajectories as Intricate 2.5 percent reported minimum nine stays on their
journey. According to the survey, even for those who
Sequences of Stay wish to remain in Mexico, the hope is to remain on
Before the 2010s, once migrants entered Mexican the road to Nuevo Leon or Baja California because
territory in an unregistered manner, their quest was of the opportunities offered by the different indus-
to reach the Northern border and enter the United trial sectors found there.
Pries et al.
Table 2. Duration of First to Ninth Stay During Migration Trajectory.
Stay Mean (years) N SD
1 0.4723 346 1.66680
2 0.3706 332 1.66369
3 0.5012 292 1.79519
4 0.5043 212 2.16030
5 0.5185 129 2.53486
6 0.3309 81 1.40417
7 0.6242 41 1.81318
8 0.0912 22 0.23126
9 1.1489 9 2.40185
Source: The authors’ elaboration based on ForMOVE data.
Moreover, migrants’ routes are quite complex and
extending over several periods of stays in various
places, just as the migrant population crossing the
country is heterogeneous, so are their periods of stay-
ing in various places. However, once they are in
Mexican territory, specifically when unregistered,
they experience a general vulnerability. Given their
protracted stay in Mexico, the organizing element of
a migrant’s challenges is usually economic.
According to what migrants shared with the survey
team, most end up resorting to a lesser or greater
extent on the altruism of the people they meet along
the way. The latter is particularly true of those
migrants whose primary intention is to reach the
United States, since the bulk of their economic
resources is reserved for that purpose. According to
anecdotal evidence, people with a longer period
between migratory events within Mexico stayed for
an extended period because somewhere along the
way they found paid employment and, once their
work ended, they continued to try to reach the north-
ern border. According to the regional distribution of
the data presented in Table 2, the first and the second
stays tend to be more extended for persons surveyed
in the southern border area, indicating that once peo-
ple have entered the country, they must reorganize
themselves before continuing on their way. However,
it is in the southeast and central zone that most tend
to spend more time.
A significant literature has documented the pro-
tracted displacement of roughly three-quarters of the
world’s refugees and internally displaced persons
(Ferris and Kerwin 2023), including populations in
protracted displacement in Mexico (Gil-Everaert,
47
Rounded months Share of all (percent)
6 96.4
5 93.3
7 82.0
7 59.6
7 36.2
5 22.8
9 11.5
1 6.2
15 2.5
Masferrer, and Chávez 2023). This study comple-
ments that literature by pointing to the typically pro-
tracted journeys of forced migrants from Central
America, which of course had not come to an end at
the time of the survey.
Figure 4 demonstrates, how complex the spatial
movement of the interviewees is according to their
routes. It displays the distribution of the stays, with
emphasis on those who are originally from El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Figure 4 does
not track the 15 cases of persons, who started their
journey in the United States — as returned people
— or in other countries than the Northern Triangle).
Out of the total of 359 migrants, 56 originated their
journey from Guatemala (grey background), 36 from
El Salvador (white background), the majority of 254
from Honduras (black background), and 13 started
from other countries. Starting from the place of ori-
gin, the graph traces the trajectories of the biggest
groups of Guatemala and Honduras, each for the first
two stays. For instance, from the 56 interviewed
migrants, who started originally from Guatemala, 24
made their first stay in Chiapas, Tabasco, or Quintana
Roo (out of the total of 91 persons, who indicated
this region as their first stage). More than half of the
Guatemalans (n = 27) made their first stay of a mini-
mum of a month in Guatemala. Out of the total of
254 Hondurans, the biggest group (n = 99) made it to
Guatemala, meanwhile the second biggest group
(n = 60) moved inside Honduras. The rest of
Hondurans and Guatemalans migrated to the other
indicated regions. These patterns reflect the often
precarious and spontaneous context of many of the
interviewed migrants: they had to leave their places
48
Figure 4. Trajectories of Migrants by Country of Origin and Region in Mexico.
Source: Own elaboration based on ForMOVE-data.
of origin but lacked the necessary resources for
advancing directly and expeditiously to Mexico and
on to their final destination or they lost or were
robbed of resources during their protracted journeys.
The bolded numbers in each of the first six stays
indicate the region, where most of all migrants
remained. We see that for the first stage Guatemala
hosted the majority (n = 146), followed by Chiapas,
Tabasco, or Quintana Roo (n = 91) and Honduras
(n = 62). Only few migrants (n = 10 + 6 + 7 + 10 = 33)
made it directly up to the Southeast, Center,
Northwest, or Northeast.
Journal on Migration and Human Security 12(1)
Furthermore, the most frequently indicated region
of the second stage is Chiapas, Tabasco, or Quintana
Roo (n = 175). Here 33 of the Guatemalans, who
already had one stay in Guatemala, arrived, together
with 123 migrants from Honduras, who already had
one stay in Guatemala. The rest of migrants that indi-
cated Chiapas, Tabasco, or Quintana Roo as their
second station (n = 29 = 175 − 146) spent their former
stay in another region of the Northern Triangle, in
another place of Chiapas, Tabasco, or Quintana Roo
or in any of the other regions, for example, in case of
having been returned to the Southern border of
Pries et al. 49

Mexico. For the subsequent third, fourth, fifth and residence in the country of origin. Table 3 shows the
sixth stages, it is highly significant that the Southeast
answers to these multiple response questions with
of Mexico always is the region covering the majority three options each (“not important,” “somewhat
for each of these stays. As the survey data and our important,” and “very important”). More than half of
qualitative interviews demonstrate, this is not where all respondents (51 percent) indicated “fear of violent
people wanted to arrive and settle, but the migrants conflict or war” was a somewhat or especially impor-
were unable to move forward immediately, for exam- tant reason for leaving their country of origin. The
ple, due to strong control and surveillance of routes, reason “fear of forced subscription to military/armed
climate conditions, or the need to earn additional organizations” was indicated by almost one-third of
money. After these stays, we see a preference from all interviewees; this response reflects fear of the
Honduras to migrate to the Mexican north-western official armies in the corresponding countries, but
border region, while Guatemalans tended to migrate also fear of being recruited to one of the multiple
to the north-eastern region. gangs and groups of organized violence in the
Lastly, Figure 4 indicates that more than half of all
Northern Triangle like Mara Salvatrucha (Meyer and
interviewees, a total of 58 percent (n = 209) had up toIsacson 2019). “Fear of criminality/violence” was
four stays of a minimum of one month in their path indicated as somewhat or especially important rea-
toward the Northern Border. Even in the seventh and son by 58.8 percent of all migrants — reflecting the
eighth stay each we find 42 surveyed persons, mean- generalized climate of violence in the countries of
ing that they were on their journey for minimum origin. In other possible reasons, there are substantial
eight months. Considering the average time spent in ingredients of violence (domestic violence, persecu-
each stage according to Table 2, those migrants indi- tion/discrimination, religion, ethnicity, sexuality,
cating a sequence of minimum eight stays had been gender identification, and political engagements).
on the move for an average of almost four years. Out But somewhat at odds with qualitative literature
of the total of interviewed migrants, only 30 percent (Medrano 2013), sexuality or gender identification
(n = 109) had applied formally for asylum in Mexico. were mentioned by less than 10 percent of respon-
Given the unregistered status of the more than two- dents as important, whereas religion and ethnicity
thirds of all interviewees (n = 246), we can conclude were mentioned to a greater degree.
that all these migrants lived in a highly precarious The reason most frequently identified for leaving
situation. Those who registered for asylum were their country of origin was “poor economic life con-
restricted in their mobility, and could not count on ditions.” This could be an argument to strengthen
substantial social assistance. Those with an unregis- the “mixed migration” view of Central American
tered status in Mexico had difficulties finding jobs, migration. But a deeper data analysis demonstrates
much less decent work; and criminal enterprises tar- that out of all 290 respondents who indicated
get them for extortion, kidnapping, rape and violent economic reasons as important for beginning their
assault. But what exactly were the reported experi- journey, more than one-half also mentioned vio-
ences of violence of these migrants? lence-related reasons as somewhat or especially
important: 51.4 percent of this subgroup specified
Violence as an Everyday Part of “fear of violent conflict or war,” and 59 percent indi-
cated “fear of criminality/violence.” These data
Migrants’ Trajectory indicate that mixed migration flows do not mean
The role of violence in migrants’ trajectories seems that some migrants move only for economic reasons
to be a constant throughout the journey. As demon- and others only for other reasons; rather, for these
strated in Figure 2, the rate of intentional homicides migrants there might be economic concerns, but
is extremely high in the Northern Triangle and, since violence is also a concern.
2008, also in Mexico. These trends are additionally Therefore, the term forced migration seems much
reflected in the individual experiences of interview- more adequate for the total population under consider-
ees. In the survey we asked about the importance of ation than that of mixed migration. This argument can
a broad range of reasons for leaving the place of be strengthened by a closer look at the reasons for
50 Journal on Migration and Human Security 12(1)

Table 3. Reasons for Leaving the Country of Origin (n = 359, Multiple Response).
Importance for leaving Not important Somewhat important Especially important
Fear of violent conflict or war 47.0 19.2 31.8
Fear of forced subscription to military/ 67.7 14.5 17.8
armed organs
Fear of criminality/violence 41.5 20.3 38.2
Fear of domestic violence 85.5 8.9 5.6
Poor economic life conditions 19.2 8.4 72.4
Persecution/discrimination 83.8 4.5 11.7
Religion 86.9 9.5 3.6
Ethnicity 80.8 13.9 5.3
Sexuality 92.5 5.3 2.2
Gender identification 93.3 4.7 1.9
Political engagements 93.6 3.6 2.8
Wanting to see family members/being sent 83.0 8.6 8.4
by them
Source: The authors’ elaboration based on ForMOVE-data (frequencies include multiple responses).

leaving each of the sequential stays (Figure 5). For
each station of the migration trajectory, we asked for
the main reason for leaving from there. In Figure 3 we
grouped the answers into five categories. The most
frequently mentioned reason was “other,” meaning to
continue the journey. Looking for work or suffering
bad working conditions was the second most men-
tioned reason. Then, with shares from 10 to 26 percent
follows the experience or fear of violence as the third
most common motive for leaving. This underlines the
relevance of violence in its different forms as a crucial
cause and companion of migrants’ movement into and
through Mexico.
Toward an Integrative Approach of
Violence in Migration Studies
This paper offers a closer look at the trajectories of
forced migrants from Central America who reach
Mexico on their way to the United States or Canada,
with a special focus on organized violence. It con-
cludes that fear of violence is relevant at almost each
stage of the migration journey, a fact not commonly
acknowledged in scientific publications and public
discourse. Although the migration in question is
often characterized as “mixed migration,” our results
suggest that this should not be interpreted as “some
migrants are economic or labor migrants, and others
migrate for other reasons.” First, in many of the cases
experiences of household violence and of organized
violence are a central driver for leaving home. At the
same time, even when violence was not at play when
starting, it became a crucial component of migrants’
experiences and motives for moving on in the jour-
neys. Also considering our biographical interviews
and qualitative field observations, violence is often
understated because it is experienced by many as a
“natural part of everyday life” or sociologically
speaking as part of the everyday life in the social
practice of forced migration.
As results of our empirical outcomes, we under-
line the understanding of forced migration as ongo-
ing social practice and agency in situations of
existentially threatening limitations. Violence and
organized violence are regularly narrated and
reported as “natural parts” of their taken-for-granted
everyday life, they are part of their routinized social
practice. Enforcement, coercion, and life threatening
experiences do not lead migrants automatically to
apply for asylum or to ask for other kinds of protec-
tion. Often unaware of their fundamental human
rights, but aware of the everyday social practices of
state authorities, most of the interviewed migrants
preferred to enter other countries like Guatemala or
Mexico on their way north without formal registra-
tion. These results put into question security
responses to forced migration. Migrants in general
search for living conditions that offer at least a
Pries et al. 51

levels of violence vary at different stages of the migra-

tion process. This migration is often characterized as
unconstrained labor migration, not pushed by violence,
but pulled by the promise of a better life in the United
States. Our data suggest that forms of violence are rel-
evant before and during the movement through Mexico.
National authorities in Mexico (like the COMAR) and
the United States (like the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) and Resettlement
Support Centers (RSCs)), as well as international orga-
Figure 5. Reasons for Leaving Consecutive Stays. nizations such as IOM and UNHCR, should be wary of
Source: The authors’ elaboration based on ForMOVE-data. characterizing this type of migration as mixed (in the
sense that many people move voluntarily and some
involuntarily) when it is in fact forced migration.
minimum level of dignity. The data indicate how
Central American migrants see violence as part of
they manage and make their way in social and geo-
their everyday lives and not always as a catalyst for
graphic spaces under restrictive conditions and limi-
irregular international movement. Thus, it becomes
tations, including organized violence.
imperative to reassess the way we define “forced”
In conclusion our findings underline the need to
and to analyze the migration phenomena accord-
integrate a view on the “objective” social situation in
ingly. For situations of forced mixed migration, we
each of the relevant stays as events, with an analysis
propose replacing the simple push-pull-model with a
of the “subjective” experiences of social situations.
more complex approach of the six dimensions
Specific incidents and perceptions at one stay in the
(entanglements, experiences, socialization, prefer-
migration course might change motives, preferences
ences, expectations, and resources). This seems nec-
and even frame of interpretation. Further analysis of
essary to develop adequate criteria for ascribing
our combined qualitative and quantitative data will
migrant statuses and suitable action programs.
shed light on this interplay, based on six different
Violence and public security require more attention
dimensions as part of this social practice in migration:
in developmental and state policies — without adopt-
(1) the specific social entanglements and relations in
ing undemocratic practices of authoritarian militari-
countries of origin, transit and arrival, (2) the pro-
zation of societies. UNHCR, together with state
cessed and constantly reconstructed experiences dur-
agencies and NGOs, should intensify information
ing the migration course, (3) the socialized norms and
campaigns in countries of origin and transit on the
values of migrants that also might change based on
challenges during possible journeys and strengthen
substantial new occurrences, (4) their long-term pref-
the network of shelters on the main routes.
erences, (5) the expectations of future life, and (6) the
cultural, social and economic resources at hand.9 Data Availability Statement
Eventually integrating such an approach with longitu-
Research data available in 2024.
dinal analysis of migrants’ trajectories and biogra-
phies might improve our understanding of migration.
The paper suggests the need to reconsider the term Declaration of Conflicting Interests
mixed migration. For migration from Central America The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest
to and through Mexico, there may be different reasons with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.
and motives for leaving, but violence is always
involved. This forced migration could be considered Funding
mixed forced migration in the sense that the forms and
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial
support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
9
 or an overview of routes see, for example, REDODEM 2022,
F this article: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, grant
184, Meyer and Isacson 2019, 3 and 21ff. PR-637_14-1
52
ORCID iD
Ludger Pries https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0972-5177
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