TECHNICAL NOTE 13

Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

September 2014

SCI, Silwood Park, Ascot, Berkshire, SL5 7QN, UK

Tel: +44 (0) 1344 636525, Fax: +44 (0) 1344 636570
Email: fabig@steel-sci.com, Website: www.fabig.com
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

This document is a deliverable of the Fire and Blast Information Group (FABIG),
published in September 2014.

FABIG would like to encourage comment and feedback from its membership. If you have any comments
on this Technical Note or any other FABIG activities please address them to the FABIG Project Manager
at The Steel Construction Institute.

© 2014 The Steel Construction Institute

Neither this publication nor any part thereof may be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by
any means – electronic, photocopy or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing of the Steel
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This publication is provided for use by FABIG members and shall not be lent, re-sold, hired out or
otherwise circulated without the prior written consent of the publishers.

Although care has been taken to ensure, to the best of our knowledge, that all data and information
contained herein are accurate to the extent that they relate to either matters of fact or accepted practice
or matters of opinion at the time of publication, the Steel Construction Institute, the authors and the
reviewers assume no responsibility for any errors in or misinterpretations of such data and/or
information or any loss or damage arising from or related to their use.

This publication is supplied to the members of the Fire and Blast Information Group.

FABIG Technical Note 13 i

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

FABIG Technical Note 13 ii

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

CONTENTS
Page
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Scope 1
2 FIRE SCENARIOS AND FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 2
2.1 Event parameters 2
2.2 Fuel types 3
2.3 Platform inventories 3
2.4 Releases 4
2.5 Fire hazard location 4
2.6 Fire hazard management 6
3 POOL FIRES 8
3.1 Nature and characteristics 8
3.2 Effect of confinement (Compartment Pool fires) 10
3.3 Measurement of heat loads from pool fires to engulfed objects 11
3.4 Methanol pool fires 13
3.5 LNG pool fires 13
3.6 Pool fires on the sea 13
3.7 Tabulated guidance 15
4 JET FIRES 17
4.1 Gas jet fires - nature and characteristics 17
4.2 Effect of confinement on gas jet fires (Compartment gas jet fires) 20
4.3 Thermal load to engulfed objects from gas jet fires 21
4.4 Tabulated guidance 21
4.5 Liquid jet fires - Nature and characteristics 23
4.6 Effect of confinement on liquid jet fires (compartment liquid jet fires) 24
4.7 Thermal loads to engulfed objects from two-phase jet fires 25
4.8 Tabulated guidance for two-phase jet fires 27
5 HEAT TRANSFER AND TEMPERATURE DEVELOPMENT 31
5.1 Introduction 31
5.2 Predictive modelling 31
5.3 Heat transfer to non-engulfed objects 32
5.4 Temperature rise of non-engulfed objects 34
5.5 Heat transfer to and temperature rise of engulfed objects 34
5.6 Heat transfer by attachments to protected structural steelwork 35
6 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION 36
6.1 Objectives of passive fire protection (PFP) 36
6.2 Passive fire protection systems 36
6.3 Testing and classification of PFP systems 36
6.4 PFP performance standards 38
6.5 Coatback of secondary and tertiary attachments 39
7 ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION 40
7.1 General 40
7.2 Effect of water deluge on pool fires 40
7.3 Effect of water deluge on jet fires 41
7.4 Variations on traditional deluge systems 42
7.5 Large bore deluge nozzles 44
7.6 Vulnerability to explosion 44
7.7 Hoses and monitors 44
7.8 Foam systems 44
7.9 Water sprays and mist systems 45
7.10 DIFFS system 46
7.11 Gaseous systems 46
7.12 Chemical fire suppression systems 47
8 EUROCODE APPROACH TO FIRE RESISTANT DESIGN 48
8.1 Designing with the Eurocodes 48
8.2 Verification by partial factor method 50
8.3 Scope of Eurocode for structural fire design of steel structures 52

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 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

8.4 Fire design procedures in the Eurocodes 53

8.5 Verification of member resistances in fire 54
9 EUROCODE SIMPLE DESIGN RULES FOR STRUCTURAL STEEL MEMBERS IN FIRE 55
9.1 Section classification 55
9.2 Critical temperature method 55
9.3 Design resistances of structural members 57
9.4 Resistance of tension members 57
9.5 Resistance of compression members 58
9.6 Resistance of restrained beams 58
9.7 Lateral-torsional buckling resistance 59
9.8 Members subject to combined bending and axial compression 59
9.9 Members with Class 4 cross sections 61
9.10 Stainless steel members 61
9.11 Design resistance of joints 62
10 REFERENCES 63
Appendix A PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT OF FIRE LOADS AND STRUCTURAL RESPONSE 67
Appendix B PROPERTIES OF STEEL AT ELEVATED TEMPERATURE 85
Appendix C DESIGN EXAMPLES 101
Heating of steel remote from fire source 102
Heat flux variation with location relative to fire 110
Heat conduction along a member 115
Design of a steel beam in fire using the critical temperature method 120
Design of a steel column in fire using the reduced resistance method 122

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 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

FABIG Technical Note 13 v


1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The Interim Guidance Notes (IGNs) [1], published
by The Steel Construction Institute in 1992,
provided design guidelines for the protection of
offshore structures against fires and explosions.
They summarised the state of knowledge
following completion of the Joint Industry Project
Blast and Fire Engineering for Topside Structures
Phase I [2]. A year later, FABIG Technical
Note 1 [3] was issued in order to give more
information on the loading, response and
protection of structures against fire, accompanied
by worked examples. FABIG Technical Note 6 [4]
was published in 2001 to provide material data on
structural carbon steels and stainless steels used
offshore. An update on developments in the fields
of fire loading, fire response, explosion loading
and explosion response was published by
UKOOA (now UK Oil and Gas) in 2007 [5].
The last twenty years have seen intensive activity
on the development of the structural Eurocodes. In
2005, the Eurocode dealing with structural fire
design of steel structures, EN 1993-1-2 [6], was
published as one of the many parts of the Eurocode
for the design of steel structures, EN 1993-1
(Eurocode 3 Part 1) [7]. Eurocode 3 replaced the
relevant parts of BS 5950 [8], the design standard
for steel framed buildings in the UK, which has
now been withdrawn. The Eurocodes have
similarly been adopted in other countries of the
European Union.
FABIG Technical Note 11 [9] updated and
expanded certain aspects of the guidance on fire
engineering given in the Interim Guidance Notes,
FABIG Technical Notes 1 and 6 and the UKOOA
guidance. In particular, TN11:
 Updated the state of the art guidance on
estimating hydrocarbon jet and pool fire loads.
 Discussed principles of passive fire protection
and the new European Standards describing the
testing and classification regimes.
 Provided new data for the mechanical
properties at elevated temperature for
structural stainless steels.
 Gave guidance on the application of the
Eurocode approach to structural steel fire
resistant design.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
1.2 Scope
This Technical Note updates and brings together
into a single source the available guidance on fire
loading and structural response in fire. In addition,
new tabulated guidance on the effect of
confinement on jet fires has been included and
new elevated temperature material data for certain
high strength steels and stainless steels have been
added. This document therefore now supersedes
Section 4 of the original Interim Guidance
Notes [1], Technical Note 1 [3], Section 3 of
Technical Note 6 [4] and Technical Note 11 [9].
In this Technical Note:
 Section 2 describes the range of possible fire
scenarios, the parameters that affect the nature
of these scenarios, possible locations of fire
hazards on offshore structures and provides
guidance on fire hazard management
strategies.
 Section 3 covers hydrocarbon pool fires, giving
simplified guidance on estimating fire loads for
design.
 Section 4 covers hydrocarbon jet fires, giving
simplified guidance on estimating fire loads for
design.
 Section 5 gives guidance on heat transfer and
temperature development in steel members.
 Section 6 summarises general principles of
passive fire protection, noting key standards.
 Section 7 discusses active mitigation systems
and their effect on pool and jet fires.
 Sections 8 and 9 describe the Eurocode basis of
design and the process for determining the fire
resistance of structural steel members in
accordance with Eurocode 3.
 Appendix A describes a probabilistic approach
for determining offshore fire loads.
 Appendix B gives properties of carbon and
stainless steel at elevated temperatures.
 Appendix C gives a range of design examples
to illustrate the calculation of heat transfer and
temperature rise as well as the application of
the Eurocode.
1

2 FIRE SCENARIOS AND FIRE HAZARD MANAGEMENT
There are numerous examples of events that could
involve fire hazards, ranging from a minor oily rag
fire to a major gas riser rupture. The outcome is
either a pool fire or jet fire. These fires may be
preceded by transient events such as cloud fires,
fireballs, or explosions.
The two principal fire types (pool and jet) may be
grouped into a number of generic fire scenarios:
1. Pool fire within a module.
2. Pool fire on an open deck area.
3. Pool fire on the sea.
4. Pool fires at the bottom of a concrete platform
leg (internal).
5. Jet fires within a module.
6. Jet fires below the lower deck level i.e., riser
failure.
7. Wellhead blow-out.
8. Instantaneous release of inventory i.e., fireball.
It can be seen from the list above that fires can
either be in the open or within modules or enclosed
areas. These fires are therefore generally
categorised as either open fires or confined fires.
Open fires occur where there are no confining
influences on the combustion process. However,
few of the fire events on an offshore platform will
be genuinely open. Confined fires occur where
walls, ceilings, etc. disrupt the open combustion.
Confinement of fires leads to a number of
additional hazards. These include external flaming
from compartment openings, impaired visibility
along escape routes, increased CO hazard,
explosion hazard from unburnt fuel (if the fire is
extinguished due to lack of oxygen) and possible
increased thermal loading to objects due to greater
amounts of hot soot.
A fire hazard assessment should address the
following aspects:
 the fire type, size and duration taking into
account the effect of confinement.
 the fire severity in terms of internal heat
fluxes for engulfed objects, and external
radiation for threats to personnel and heating
up of external objects.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
 the potential for engulfed objects or objects
external to the fire to fail and escalate the fire
or lead to other consequences.
 the obscuration of escape routes by smoke and
fire, and the toxic effects of smoke.
2.1 Event parameters
To establish the fire scenarios, it is necessary to
review the range of incidents that may lead to the
uncontrolled release of flammable material, and
the types of fire that would follow if ignition
occurred. It should be recognised that a fire may
be immediately preceded by an explosion. Initially
it is helpful if only single events are considered,
i.e. with no consideration being given to the
escalation of the event by further releases/
complications caused by the initial event. It will
be for the operators in their hazard analysis to
identify possible multiple events for analysis. One
objective of this multi-event analysis must be to
identify possible secondary hazards, so enabling
the engineers to take appropriate steps to prevent
their occurrence and hence break an escalation
chain.
When setting out to establish a particular fire
scenario, a methodology is necessary that
includes, from the outset, certain basic parameters.
These are:
 What could be released? (the type of released
product)
 Where? (location of release)
 Under what conditions? (release conditions)
 Quantity and duration of release
When establishing the type of release the
following parameters need to be considered:
 the range of flammable hydrocarbons
– Gas
– Condensate and process fluids
– Crude (both live and dead)
It should be remembered that stored fuels
can include diesel, aviation fuel, glycol,
methanol, pressurised gases and others.
 how the flammable hydrocarbons arrive at and
leave the platform.
 where the flammable hydrocarbons are
processed, stored and used.
2
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

 pressure and temperature within the transfer 2.2 Fuel types

system.
 processing and storage conditions.
 the total inventory at risk.
 typical release rates.
The engineer must decide where releases could
occur. Possible locations include:
The following fluids are produced on platforms or
are imported via wellheads or through risers from
other installations:
 gas containing condensate and water
 gas containing condensate without water
 unstable condensate

 around a well conductor  stable condensate

 at areas of drilling/workover (e.g. shallow  natural gas (predominantly C1)

gas)  associated gas (C2 –C4)
 production system  live crude
 HP manifold  dead crude.
 export/import risers Hydrocarbons are also used in service roles and
 separators and vessels these liquids arrive from a supply vessel and are
transferred either in containers by crane or
 gas compression plant pumped directly into storage tanks. They are:
 condensate system
 aviation fuel, C8-C16
 platform fuel systems, etc.  diesel, C10-C15
The type of release (and the associated conditions)
 methanol
needs to be defined; it may be one of the
following:  ethylene glycol

 leaking vessels/tanks  lubricants

 pressurised /non-pressurised gravity feed  hydraulic fluids

system 2.3 Platform inventories
 leaking pipework Fuels are stored in pressure vessels, tanks,
 pipeline flanges pipework, pipelines, risers, etc. Storage tanks
usually contain liquids at atmospheric pressure. A
 process equipment platform inventory lists the chemicals stored, fuel
 spills types and total volumes on board an installation.

 blow-outs, etc. The inventory will often define an appropriate

Other information required includes:
 location and control of ESD isolation valves
 size of inventory between relevant ESD
valves
 release size and detail
 release pressure / temperature / duration /
composition
 release surroundings
 release detection/response.
worst case for the size of a particular release. In
general, isolated inventories (e.g., between
ESDV’s) do not exceed 5-10 tonnes for gas, 15-25
tonnes for liquids. This excludes the inventories
associated with the well and the risers. It also
excludes utility inventories such as diesel fuel and
methanol.
When considering isolated inventories it is
important to include the total volume, i.e. both
vessels and pipes, between isolation valves and,
where appropriate, ESDV’s. In addition,
consideration should be given to isolation valve
failure, especially if damaged during an explosion.

Most platforms are fitted with a flare or cold vent

system whereby the gas inventory can be
depressurised. Generally there are no similar

FABIG Technical Note 13 3


facilities for disposal of the liquid inventory in an
emergency. Consequently the majority of the
isolated liquid inventories within the process
section may be available to fuel a fire. In contrast,
gas fuelled fires, where there is no associated
liquid inventory, may extinguish themselves
within 30 minutes, providing that emergency
isolation and depressurisation is efficient and
remains operational. Liquid inventories may be
available to fuel fires for longer periods.
It should be noted that effective drainage is most
important in the control of pool fires. Floor drains
beneath equipment containing hydrocarbon liquid
should be designed to limit the spread of any
spillage / leak and be sized such that the released
inventory will pass rapidly into the closed drain
system. The system must also be capable of
disposing safely of the full rate of water deluge. It
Table 2.1 The result of released flammable fluids after ignition
Release Immediate or early ignition
Gas Jet fire
LPG, associated gas Jet fire
Condensate, gasoline, live crude, Jet fire
methanol
Dead crude, diesel, kerosene, No ignition unless release is above
glycol. flash point, then jet and pool fire.
2.5 Fire hazard location
2.5.1 Top deck
There is a limited amount of hydrocarbon
processing carried out on top decks. The
consequence which must be identified with fires
on these decks is their effect on adjacent areas.
Cascading liquid fires may occur if there is
inadequate drainage. The top deck area may also
be exposed to severe radiation resulting from a
blow-out or major well incident.
A further top deck hazard which has been
recognised is liquid drop-out from flare systems.
It should be possible to eliminate this hazard by
process design. In the cases where dropout has
occurred it has resulted in minor pool fires in a
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
is important to ensure that any previously dumped
hydrocarbons in the drainage system cannot return
(by floatation) to fuel the fire.
2.4 Releases
The term “release” is used to describe the type and
quantity of fuel which can possibly be ignited in a
fire. The release from a containment vessel must
include fluids within pipework attached to the
vessel, i.e. up to the vessel’s isolating valves. In
calculating the quantity of fuel in a pipe or pipeline
system, the effect of shutting down part of the line
must be considered.
The consequences of the ignition of releases of
different platform fluids are summarised in
Table 2.1.
Delayed ignition
Vapour cloud explosion followed by jet
fire.
Vapour cloud explosion followed by jet
fire. Also, pool fire if pipework at release
and impinged objects cool sufficiently.
Vapour cloud explosion, possibly
enhanced by aerosol explosion if fully
atomised by high source pressure,
followed by jet fire and pool fire.
Aerosol explosion if fully atomised by
high source pressure. Pool fire. Jet fire
and pool fire if release is above flash
point.
number of locations on the deck and some damage
to the flare structure.
Helicopter crashes are also top deck hazards and
all platforms are provided with facilities for
fighting resultant fires on or within the helideck
area. The much less probable event of a helicopter
crashing onto top deck equipment should be
considered in the overall risk analysis.
2.5.2 Modules
With respect to fire modules can be classified as
totally enclosed, partially enclosed or freely
ventilated. It should be recognised there are a
variety of obstructions within the modules. In
most platforms, particularly the later generations,
more than one process operation exists in the same
module. As a result, a fire from one process could
4

cause escalation in another. Similarly, in stacked
platforms, it is possible to release further
inventory from one level to another, particularly if
structural failure occurs, or the fire penetrates the
floor above. Modules are often bounded by fire
walls with either the process, well-bay or utility
modules suitably interposed. Failure of these walls
could obviously lead to escalation or spread of the
fire.
The shape, content and ventilation of the module
will significantly affect the fire characteristics.
The ventilation will affect the rate with which
combustion takes place and the degree of external
burning associated with the fire.
The possibility exists that the fire will be preceded
by an explosion, particularly in partially and fully
enclosed modules. Each case must be examined
individually as the critical scenarios will vary
considerably with module type. For example, in a
gas compression area there may be a possibility of
explosion, but the subsequent fire· may only be of
short duration because of the small inventories
between the emergency shutdown valves. In the
case of a gas/oil separation area, where the
probability of explosion may be lower but still
exists, the subsequent fire may last for several
hours. The possibility of simultaneous release of
several process sections in one module following
an explosion must also be examined carefully.
2.5.3 Underdeck
The underdeck area is defined as the module
support frame (MSF) or module supporting
structure plus the top few metres of the jacket. A
MSF containing process/utility equipment and/or
having a separate floor is considered to be a
module. A severe fire hazard in this area is a riser
failure in which a pressurised release from a gas or
oil import or export riser occurs.
There may also be a fire hazard from burning
liquids cascading down from process areas. The
underdeck area may also be subject to radiation
and flame impingement from a sea pool fire.
2.5.4 Jacket
As discussed earlier, the possibility of a pool fire
on the sea exists and this would subject the jacket
to direct/indirect heating through radiation. The
jacket may also be subjected to fire exposure from
various well incidents or riser failure. Well
incidents could be associated with a well fluid
release around the casing, or a release from a
subsea wellhead or well flow-line. In these cases
the fire exposure would be a function of the well
fluid. Riser failure could be the result of corrosion
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
or impact from supply vessels or dropped objects.
Both well incidents and riser failure may result in
either a pool fire or a gaseous jet fire.
In all but the most disastrous of sea fires, the wind
and waves will tend to concentrate a sea fire on
one side of the jacket, so the effects of heating only
part of the structure should be analysed, as well as
the total engulfment scenario.
2.5.5 Floating Production, Storage and
Offloading Vessels (FPSO)
A number of features impact fire related hazards
on floating installations; for example, geometry
of the layout, compartmentalisation, operations,
fire scenarios, response characteristics of marine
construction to fires and the vulnerability of
marine systems associated with the motion, station
keeping and stability.
The process and utilities areas are normally
located above the vessel deck (and above the cargo
storage). They can be extensive and usually on one
or two levels. Segregation to avoid escalation of a
fire can be achieved by separation of process areas
and modules, occasionally further separated by
fire barriers. These benefits of fire control should
be carefully weighed against the effect on
explosion severity and the dispersion of released
hydrocarbons.
FPSOs tend to be used on oil fields in which the
crude can be stabilised fairly readily. FPSOs may
be required to hold stored product in their cargo
tanks for typically 3 to 7 days dependent upon
their geographic location. FPSO’s are therefore
less favoured for more volatile reservoirs.
FPSOs require specific consideration of major fire
hazard and release scenarios unique to their design
and operation. These hazards include:
 Oil storage tanks with either large scale storage
of stabilised crude or with empty storage tanks
containing potentially explosive mixtures.
 Non-process hydrocarbon inventories (diesel)
present to power the installation as these
vessels are generally designed to be “self-
sufficient” for extended periods in the event
that supply vessels cannot reach them.
 The process decks on FPSOs are often raised
clear of the cargo storage tank roof (a 5 m gap
is not uncommon). The space provided can
allow jet fires from the underside of the process
to reach other process or utility modules
without any impingement to reduce the effect
of the flame. Steps should be taken to reduce
5

the likelihood of jet fires by careful layout and
orientation of the higher pressure equipment.
 The turret contains a large number of swivel
joints in order to function. These are often at
the highest process pressure and pass the
reservoir fluids prior to any cleaning or
conditioning and are therefore subject to the
FPSO’s most onerous process duty.
 Offloading to shuttle tankers is a regular event
and poses a significant risk both on the FPSO
and the shuttle tanker. The risks comprise the
breakage or leakage of the transfer hoses and
the potentially flammable mixing of
hydrocarbon and air in the storage holds of
FPSO and shuttle tanker. During the offloading
operation, the shuttle tanker and FPSO are in
relative proximity and the risks on either vessel
are compounded by increased potential for
escalation to another vessel.
 Filling operations also have hazards associated
with hydrocarbon vapours released from the
inert gas vent of the storage tanks as the level
of heavier hydrocarbon vapours above the
stored liquid are discharged out of the inert gas
vent when higher fill levels are reached in the
tank. Inert gas (IG) is usually employed to
prevent hydrocarbon venting during filling
operations. Modern systems include volatile
organic compound (VOC) recovery from tank
breathing. Venting hydrocarbons during filling
is undesirable unless it can be done using IG
without causing a risk of flammable cloud
formation on the FPSO. However, volatile
hydrocarbon vapours settle at the surface of the
tank fill level and do not mix with the lighter
IG. Such venting systems may present a serious
hazard at low or no wind speed conditions.
 The atmosphere in FPSO tanks should be
maintained in a ‘non explosive’ condition and
cargo tank purging must be carried out before
introducing air into the tank to ensure that the
atmosphere will at no time enter the
flammability region. After purging, residual
inert gas must be removed from the tank and
replaced with a normal atmosphere containing
21% oxygen.
2.6 Fire hazard management
As part of a fire hazard management strategy, it is
necessary to identify and analyse all fire hazards
and their associated effects and ensure that the risk
corresponding to the fire hazards are as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP). This includes
the identification of additional risk reduction
measures and, where such measures are not
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
implemented, justification by the duty holder for
not implementing them [10]. The fire hazards
should be prioritised and a combination of
prevention, detection, control and mitigation
systems should be implemented. These systems
should be proportionate to the required risk
reduction and supported throughout the life cycle
of the structure.
Fire protection on onshore structures is generally
designed to ensure the structure survives the
conflagration. If a fire occurs on an offshore
structure, however, the priority is the safe
evacuation of personnel, with long-term damage
to the structure being of lesser importance. The
escape routes and Temporary Refuge must
therefore be designed to survive a fire for the time
required to evacuate the platform.
The performance standards relating to fire hazards
should be fully defined at the commencement of
design. For a structural member in an offshore
platform, the performance standard is typically
defined in terms of the length of time it is required
to retain its load-bearing capacity.
Offshore facilities have limited space and
therefore careful layout design is essential to the
overall safety of the installation. It is important
that fire hazards are considered at the earliest
stages of layout design. Key points are:
 Where it is not possible to separate personnel
from hazardous areas, protection by
segregation behind fire walls and attention to
escape routes is necessary.
 Keep living quarters and evacuation facilities
away from the process and provide a number
of escape routes from modules and access
platforms back to the Temporary Refuge or
provide a suitable protected muster point.
 Walkways and escape routes should be kept as
low as is reasonably possible. More than one
escape route should always be provided.
 A compartment design should be as open as
possible to avoid the build-up of hot gases,
leading to potential escalation. This also aids
natural ventilation and explosion venting.
 If some confinement is necessary, ventilation
openings should be near both the bottom and
the top sides of the compartment or in the roof,
to promote a chimney effect.
 Roof venting alone should be avoided as flame
extinguishment may occur leading to the
build-up of explosive gases. This may present
6

particular problems inside the legs of offshore
platforms, and any such scenario should be
carefully thought through.
 Vessels and pipework should be kept as low as
possible to avoid engulfment by hot gases.
 The use of gratings avoids the build-up of large
flammable pools. Grated floors also have
benefits for explosion venting.
 Tank vents should be located away from
ignition sources such as flares/flare stacks and
designed to ensure adequate dispersion of
exhaust gasses away from the installation.
Protection systems are not substitutes for well-
designed and maintained detection, warning and
shutdown systems. However, passive and active
fire protection systems can protect the structure
and process equipment, limit damage to these
facilities and prevent escalation of the fire. Whilst
they mitigate the effects of fire loads, protective
systems should only be specified when essential as
they carry serious maintenance burdens in the
offshore environment and it is possible their
performance will be impaired by a prior explosion.
The choice between active and passive systems (or
their combination) is influenced by the protection
philosophy, the fire type and duration, the
equipment or structure requiring protection, water
availability and the time required for evacuation.
In all cases, the specification must be matched to
the fire type and exposure. The following points
should be noted:
 Fire protection, if necessary, is most effectively
deployed near the tops of compartments where
the highest heat fluxes occur.
 Passive fire protection (PFP) is generally
preferred to deluge systems for protecting
primary structural members, since it is
immediately available and has no moving parts
to fail and prevent operation. However,
over-insulation of compartment walls will
increase the internal fire temperatures by over
200oC. A more detailed discussion of PFP
systems can be found in Section 6.
 Active fire protection (AFP) is commonly
provided by water deluge, although foam and,
on some existing installations, halon systems,
are used in special cases. Section 7 describes
the principal systems and comments on their
specification and use in practice.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
 AFP has the advantage that the action of an
active fire system can be included in the
computation. For example the total heat dose
could be reduced by a quantity which reflects
the probable water release during the fire.
 Conventional water deluge can lead to
extinguishment of gas jet fires, leading to the
build up of explosive gases. This is most likely
to occur where the release hole size is small
(near the flame stability limit), or where the
compartment is small compared to the flame,
or where there are few obstacles to act as bluff
body flame stabilisers.
 Conventional water deluge rates are effective
in controlling the spread of compartment two
phase or liquid jet fires if applied early in the
fire development, i.e. within the first 2 minutes.
Late application of deluge can also extinguish
these fires, leading to a potential explosion
hazard unless the source of fuel is isolated.
 Conventional deluge is very effective against
compartment pool fires. The pool fire burns at
reduced rates and smoke temperatures fall to
around 100oC within a minute of application.
 Appropriate tests should be carried out to
demonstrate adequate performance of
materials used for piping and nozzles in water
deluge systems when subject to jet/pool fires.
If metals are used, their melting points should
not be less than 1300oC.
In all cases, the specification must be matched to
the fire type and exposure. The extent of fire
protection will be defined by a fire consequence
analysis. For example, a beam subjected to a flame
exposure for longer than its unprotected failure
time would require protection if its failure had
unacceptable consequences. This protection may
be by deluge or passive systems. For deluge
protection systems, the application rate may be
theoretically designed to prevent failure
indefinitely, given the particular fire exposure and
assuming that no additional damage occurs to the
system (i.e., fire pumps, distribution pipework,
etc. stay operational). Passive protection systems
should be designed to prevent failure for as long
as the fire is expected to last or for the required
evacuation period. For further discussion and
guidance on fire hazard management, reference
should be made to BS EN ISO 13702 [11] and Oil
and Gas UK Fire and Explosion Guidance [5].
7

3 POOL FIRES
3.1 Nature and characteristics
A pool fire is a turbulent diffusion fire burning
above a pool of vaporising liquid fuel where the
fuel vapour has very low initial momentum. A
pressurised release of a hydrocarbon liquid which
is not sufficiently atomised or volatile to vaporise
and form a jet fire will form a pool. Similarly a
spillage from non-pressurised liquid storage will
result in a liquid pool being formed. Ignition of the
vapours evolving from the liquid can lead to a pool
fire.
A key feature of these fires is that heat transfer
back from the fire to the pool largely controls the
rate of evaporation and hence the fire size and
severity.
The fuel pool may not necessarily be static. It may
be spreading or contracting. Additional fuel could
be coming from a leak. Depletion of the local fuel
supply can occur via drainage or overflow to other
areas, perhaps giving rise to running liquid fires.
The fire has inertia in that it takes time to develop
and cannot be quickly eliminated by isolating the
fuel supply.
Running liquid fires are broadly similar to pool
fires in that they rely on thermal feedback from the
flame for their fuel vapour supply, but the liquid
fuel can be on surfaces of any orientation and in
motion.
The physical aspects of pool fires that determine
their potential for harm are:
 Pool spread and pool shape
 Rate of flame spread
 Mass burning rate
 Flame size and shape
 Thermal radiation field
 Properties of combustion products (smoke,
gases, thermal plumes)
 The temporal variation of all the above,
particularly the fire duration.
A spill of a flammable liquid spreads under gravity
until its vaporisation rate matches its spread rate
or until it is contained. For most pool fire hazards
analyses, there is a clearly identifiable area of
containment such as a tank, drain, bund or hollow.
A conservative assumption for the size of a
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
burning pool is to take the dimensions of the
unignited pool. Most pool fire models assume that
the pool is circular, at roughly the same level as
the surrounding terrain and of uniform depth. The
pool is taken to stay the same shape during the fire.
If the pool is not circular, it can be modelled as a
circular pool with a diameter D defined by:
(4  Area)
D
Perimeter
provided that the aspect ratio (largest dimension
divided by smallest dimension) is less than about
1.3. The centre of the circular “model” pool should
be chosen such that its edge coincides with the
edge of the real pool that is closest to the object of
interest (e.g. a structure outside the fire that would
receive radiation heat flux).
If the pool aspect ratio is greater than 2, empirical
correlations for the flame shape are no longer
valid. Then it is recommended that a trench pool
fire model, such as that developed by Rew et al.
[12], is applied.
If the pool is not of uniform depth, the fire
diameter will tend to be overestimated towards the
end of the fire and the fire duration will be
underestimated. Pools that get deeper towards the
centre may be approximated by a series of
concentric circular pools of increasing depth. The
time variation of the fire can then be modelled by
fires of decreasing diameter, with the diameter
estimated at a given time from the mass burning
rate.
For hydrocarbons such as condensate, the vapours
will evolve readily from a spillage and be easily
ignited. In the case of cryogenic liquid gases there
is an initial pulse of fire, as the flame propagates
through the gas that has already vaporised; this can
produce a larger flame and higher heat fluxes than
during the steady burning. For heavier
hydrocarbons, such as diesel or crude oil, little
vapour evolution occurs unless the fuel is heated
and hence initial ignition of a spillage may be
dependent on the presence of other fires in the
vicinity providing sufficient energy to initiate
vapour evolution. However, once ignited, the fire
itself radiates heat to the pool surface causing
more fuel to evaporate. The heat transfer from the
flame to the pool controls the vapour evolution
rate (and hence mass burning rate) and within
minutes the fire will reach a steady state condition
of flame size and mass burning rate. Larger fires
8

from larger pools will tend to result in higher mass
burning rates. However, an upper limit is reached
when the radiation to the pool surface is
independent of the flame thickness above it
(optically thick). This occurs for fires only one or
two metres in diameter for heavy hydrocarbons
due to the radiative emissions from soot. The mass
burning rate is also dependent on the fuel type and
for liquid hydrocarbons decreases with increasing
carbon number, typically ranging from
0.1 kg m-2 s-1 for light hydrocarbons to 0.03-
0.05 kg m-2 s-1 for some crude oils (Table 3.1).
The mass burning rate m b for fuels on solid
surfaces at ambient temperature is normally
expressed as:
 
 b  m  1  e  kD
m temperature and reduce the amount of vapour
where
m  is the maximum mass burning rate
k is a measure of the burning rate
dependent on the pool diameter D .
Some values for m  and k are given in Table 3.1.
The table shows that the maximum mass burning
rate decreases as the liquid boiling point increases.
The burning of other paraffinic hydrocarbons can
be approximated by choosing the fuel in the table
with the boiling range that is closest to that of the
fuel to be modelled. Crude oil has a very wide
boiling range but its burning characteristics are
closest to that of kerosene or diesel.
There are three cases when heat transfer from the
substrate has a significant effect on the mass
burning rate:
Table 3.1 Pool fire mass burning rate coefficients on solid substrates at ambient
temperature
Fuel m  (kg m-2 s-1) k (m-1)
LNG 0.141
LPG 0.13
Propane 0.13
Butane 0.078
Gasoline 0.055
Kerosene 0.06
Diesel 0.044
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
1) If the fuel is spilled on a metal deck which is a
good heat conductor, radiated heat transferred
from the flame to the decking outside the pool
may be conducted beneath and into the pool. A
similar enhancement may occur for fires in
storage tanks of a diameter less than about 5m,
whereby heat from the flame is conducted
through the tank shell into the liquid beneath.
2) If the fuel is a cryogenic liquid, heat transfer
from the substrate significantly enhances the
vaporisation rate. For spills on the sea, the heat
transfer from the water can equal the heat
radiated from the flame.
3) If fuels with boiling points above that of water
are spilled on water, convective heat losses
from the pool eventually lower the pool
driven off until a flame can sometimes no
longer be sustained. Thus, there is usually a
minimum fuel thickness (of the order of a few
mm) below which a fuel layer on water will not
burn.
Combustion of hydrocarbons inevitably leads to
the production of large quantities of soot,
particularly in large pool fires. The soot begins to
leave the flame before it is completely burnt and
appears as smoke.
Smoke can result in reduced thermal radiation to
the surroundings by screening the radiant flame.
Thus the fraction of heat radiated, F, and the
average surface emissive power, SEP, at first
increase with pool diameter and then decrease
again as more and more of the flame surface
becomes obscured.
Approximate boiling
temperature range, K
0.136 112
0.271 231-273
0.271 231
0.5 273
2.0 313-483
2.6 423-523
1.15 438-633
9

Figure 3.1 shows the variation of SEP with pool
diameter. There is a peak SEP for each class of
fuels. The peak occurs earlier for heavier
hydrocarbons because the flames contain higher
soot concentrations. Note that the SEP in
Figure 3.1 is a model average value. The model
average SEP is the SEP used in conjunction with
simple geometric model flame shapes, such as the
tilted cylinder. Model flame shapes tend to have
greater surface areas than the visible flame surface
and this SEP is generally lower than both the spot
measured SEP and average measured SEP from
the bright part of the flame. Great care must be
taken when comparing model average SEPs, since
they are model dependent.
The most widely used models for open pool fires
assume that the flame shape can be represented by
a cylinder tilted by the wind [13]. Normally it is
assumed that the visible fire plume height is not
affected by the wind and that the surface emissive
power is uniform over the tilted cylinder. The
outcome is a radiation field that under-predicts the
Pool Fire model average SEP
180
160
140
120
100
80
60 LPG, propane
40 Butane, gasoline, kerosene
20
0
0 20 40 60
Pool diameter, m
Figure 3.1 Variation of model average SEP with pool diameter for different fuels
3.2 Effect of confinement
(Compartment Pool fires)
When a pool fire burns inside a compartment, the
combustion starts as though the fire were in the
open. There is enough air already present to satisfy
the stoichiometric requirement for complete
combustion and the fire at this stage is fuel-
controlled. The hot combustion products rise to
the ceiling and spread out as a ceiling jet. There is
a net outflow of (cold) gases through the
compartment openings as the combustion
proceeds. After a short time, a hot gas layer of
combustion products builds up in the upper part of
the compartment and it grows and descends as
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
radiation hazard close to the flame in the near
field, although the far field values (greater than
1 flame length) are reasonably valid. The origin of
this discrepancy lies in the observation that the
flame is clearly visible in its lower regions and
becomes increasingly more obscured by smoke
towards the top of the plume. Pool fire models that
describe the flame as two zones – a bright lower
zone and a part soot-obscured upper zone – are
less prone to this anomaly (see for example [12]).
With increasing fire size the smoke hazard may
increase. In measurements in the smoke
downstream of 16 m2 open diesel pool fires, the
obscuration factor over a 200 mm path length, as
a result of the soot, was found to be typically 30%
corresponding to a visibility distance of about 7 m.
CO levels measured at the same location were in
the range 100-200 ppm v/v. However, at the end
of an open flame a worst case level of about
(5000 ppm) 0.5% v/v is recommended. Soot levels
in the range 0.5 g m-3 to 2.5 g m-3 can be expected.
LNG
80 100
combusted gases continue to flow into the
compartment. A relatively well defined interface
normally forms between the upper hot layer and
cool air below. When this interface descends
below an opening, there is a sudden outflow of
smoke, combustion products or flame.
Equilibrium is soon established whereby hot
combustion products flow out of the confinement
and cold combustion air flows in. This bi-
directional flow at vent openings is separated by a
so-called neutral plane where it is reasonable to
assume that there is no flow. After several minutes
a quasi-steady state fire is established and
guidance on fire severity refers to this state.
10

Sometimes the emergence of flame at the vent is
delayed until the local composition and
temperature of partial combustion products reach
levels of flammability such that a flame can
propagate from the original flame along the
air/smoke interface. The external smoke then
suddenly bursts into flame. This is sometimes
called a flashover, but should not be confused with
the flashover when internal contents suddenly
catch fire, as in domestic compartment fires.
A useful correlating parameter in compartment
fire behaviour is the equivalence ratio (  ). This is
the ratio of mass of air required for complete
stoichiometric combustion to the mass of air
entrained into the compartment. If  < 1 then the
fire is well ventilated (also termed ‘fuel-
controlled’) and if  > 1 the fire is
under-ventilated (or ‘ventilation-controlled’).
The behaviour of confined pool fires depends on
the degree of ventilation and whether the
confining structure becomes hot and re-radiates
heat to the fire. The first step therefore is to
determine whether the fire is fuel or ventilation-
controlled. The “A root H” equation (see below) is
useful for estimating the maximum mass burning
rate m b and hence net heat release from
compartment pool fires. Under-ventilated pool
fires settle in the regime where,
m b
  1.1 and   r , so
m a
1.1  0.5  A H
m b   0.037A H kg s-1
15
where A is the vent area (m), H is the vent height
(m), r is the mass ratio of air to fuel required for
stoichiometric burning (≈15), 𝑚̇𝑎 is the mass flow
of air (kg/s) and 𝑚̇𝑏 is the mass burning rate of
fuel. Fuel-controlled pool fires have values of 𝑚̇ 𝑏
less than 𝑚̇𝑎 . The A root H equation may be used
in simple geometries where the vent(s) are either
single openings or multiple openings of the same
height and distance from the floor. Multiple
openings at different levels must be accounted for
using a more sophisticated version of the
equations used to derive A root H [14,15,16].
In the case of adequate ventilation for combustion,
the fire is fuel-controlled and the mass burning
rate and fire behaviour will be similar to that of a
pool fire in an unconfined area. However, if the
compartment is small relative to the fire, some
combustion may still occur outside any vent
openings. In such cases a check should be made to
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
estimate the length of the ceiling jet relative to the
ceiling area.
Furthermore, if the walls become hot due to
insulation, such as excessive passive fire
protection, flame temperatures may rise
significantly. The average internal temperature
increases by 21/4 (assuming radiative heat loss
from the outside surface) or by a factor of 1.2 in
absolute temperature (about 200-400ºC),
compared to that for a non-insulated compartment.
Hence the heat fluxes to objects within and near
the flame will rise. The extra heat is associated
with soot combustion and leads to less smoke
being evolved. Internal heat fluxes can then reach
350 kW m-2 in fuel-controlled compartments. In a
non-insulated compartment, the smoke
temperatures may never be high enough for soot
oxidation to “switch on” and the escalation to
higher temperatures is unlikely to occur [17,18].
If the ventilation is less than that required for full
combustion, the fire becomes ventilation-
controlled and the mass burning rate decreases to
match available air flow. Tests have shown that
the fire settles in the slightly fuel rich regime. The
equivalence ratio stays close to 1.1, as noted
above. Due to the reduced burning rate, the flame
size and heat fluxes to objects from ventilation-
controlled pool fires may be lower than from
unconfined fires unless re-radiation from hot
compartment walls increases flame temperatures.
In insulated compartments, ventilation-controlled
pool fires reach 1200-1300oC and maximum heat
fluxes around 230 kW m-2, nearly 100% radiative.
The restricted air flow results in an external fire at
the vent openings and so areas not previously
exposed to fire outside the compartment may now
be exposed to flame engulfment and thermal
radiation.
In under-ventilated conditions both the CO and
soot levels increase. CO up to 5% v/v may be
measured at a vent prior to the onset of external
flaming although at the end of an external flame
the levels are likely to fall to less than 0.5% v/v.
Soot levels up to 3 g m-3 at the vent opening have
been measured [14,15].
3.3 Measurement of heat loads
from pool fires to engulfed
objects
For pool fires the radiative component dominates
over convection, because flow velocities within
the flame are generally less than about 10 m s-1 and
the radiation intensity is high due to copious
amounts of hot soot. As the molecular weight of
the fuel decreases, the gases and soot particles in
11
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

the flame become much hotter. The soot
concentration in lighter molecular weight
hydrocarbon flames is also much lower than in
heavier hydrocarbon flames, thus they achieve
their maximum radiative transfer at much longer
emitting path lengths than for heavier hydrocarbon
fuels. Therefore, the heat transfer to objects
Table 3.2 Experimentally measured heat fluxes in pool fires
engulfed in natural gas flames, for example, will
continue to increase with the size of the fire much
longer than the time at which the heat transfer in
kerosene fires, for example, reaches its maximum.
Table 3.2 shows various experimentally measured
heat fluxes.

Organisation Reference Pool size, m Fuel Total heat flux, kW m-2

AEA Winfrith 1 0.5 x 9.5 kerosene 150

US Dept of Transportation 2 see reference kerosene 138

US Coast Guard 3 see reference kerosene 110-142

US Dept of Transportation 4 see reference kerosene 136-159

Sandia 5 see reference kerosene 113-150

HSE Buxton 6 see reference kerosene 130

Shell Research 7 4x7 kerosene 94-112

Hagglund 8 see reference JP-4 120-150

Sandia 9 9 x 18 JP-4 90-164

Sandia 10 9 x 18 JP-4 80-120

Shell Research 11 35 LNG 250-300

Shell Research 12 12.5 x 15.5 Refrigerated 230-270

Propane & Butane

References
1. C.J. Fry, "Pool Fire Testing at AEA Winfrith.” CONF-8906331 PATRAM '89, 3, pp 1587-1594, 1989.
2 W. Townsend, C. Anderson, J. Cook, & G. Cowgill, "Comparison of Thermal Coated and Uninsulated Rail Tank Cars
Filled with LPG Subjected to a Fire Environment", US Dept of Transportation Report No. FRA-OR&D, pp 75-32, December,
1974.
3 R.C. Richards and R.G. Vorthman, "Full-Scale Ship's Hull Exposure Fire Tests. Dept. of Transport US Coast Guard
Report No. CG-D-97-76, June 1976.
4 T.I. Eklund, "Pool Fire Radiation Through a Door in a Simulated Aircraft Fuselage", US Dept of Transportation FAA,
December, 1978.
5 J.A. Canfield & L.H. Russell, "Measurements of the Heat Flux within a Luminous Avaition Fuel Flame", Presented at the
September Meeting of the Easter Section of the Combustion Institute, 1969.
6 K. Moodie, K. Billinge, & D.P. Culter, "The Fire Engulfment of LPG Storage Tanks", I. Chem E. Symp. Series no. 93, pp
87-106.
7 K. Moodie, L.T. Cowley, R.B. Denny, L.M. Small and I. Williams, "Engulfment Tests on a 5 Tonne LPG Tank", J.
Hazardous Materials, 20, pp 55-71, 1988.
8 B. Hagglund and L. Persson, "The Heat Radiation from Petroleum Fires", FOA Raport, Forvarets, Forskningsanstalt,
Stockholm, 1976.
9 J.J. Gregory, N.R. Keltner & R. Mata, Jr., "Thermal Measurements in Large Pool Fires", Trans ASME, J of Heat Transfer,
Vol 111, pp 446-455, May 1989.
10 M.E. Schneider & L.A. Kent, "Measurement of Gas Velocities and Temperatures in a Large Open Pool Fire", Fire
Technology, pp 51-80, Feb 1989.
11 D. Nedelka, J. Moorhouse and R.F. Tucker, "The Montoir 35m diameter LNG Pool Fire Experiments", Presented at 9th
Int. Congress and Exposition of Liquified Natural Gas, LNG9, 17-20 October, Nice, France.
12 F.D. Wayne & K. Kinsella, "Spectral Emission Characteristics of Large Hydrocarbon Pool Fires", American Soc. of Mech.
Engineers, 84-WA/HT-74, 1984.

FABIG Technical Note 13 12


3.4 Methanol pool fires
Methanol differs significantly from the
hydrocarbon fuels discussed above. It burns with
a non-luminous invisible flame. No soot is
produced and the thermal emissions are dominated
by the molecular emissions associated with the
production of CO2 and water vapour. The flame
height is about one third that expected from an
equivalent sized hydrocarbon pool. The mass
burning rate increases with increasing pool size
and a value of 0.03 kg m-2 s-1 has been measured
for a 10 m diameter pool. It is not known if the
flame has reached ‘optical thickness’ at this scale
and hence whether this would increase further for
larger fires. The low radiative emissions of the
flame results in a low fraction of heat radiated, F,
and low heat fluxes to engulfed objects. An
important hazard may be to personnel entering the
flame unwittingly, due to its invisibility.
Methanol will only emit radiation in the gaseous
emission bands. Since the gases in the atmosphere
have absorption bands very close to the flame
gases' emission bands, the radiation from a
methanol fire rapidly becomes attenuated at
increasing distances from the fire.
3.5 LNG pool fires
The flame brightness, or surface emissive power
(SEP), of LNG pool fires appears to have reached
a plateau for the largest diameter tested so far
(35 m). There is uncertainty how the SEP might
vary thereafter for bigger pools, but there is strong
theoretical evidence that there would be no further
increase in SEP and indeed the SEP might start to
decrease given that the extreme lower limit for
SEP is that of hot smoke, with a value of
20 kW m-2.
The burning rate is somewhat uncertain for large
LNG spills on water. In the 35 m diameter
tests [19], the LNG burning rate was found to be
0.14 kg m-2 s-1 or 0.00035 m s-1, given the density
of LNG is 411 kg m-3. However this test series was
on land. Smaller LNG pool fires on land had
burning rates between 0.00021 and 0.00024 m s-1.
Given that the mass burning rate is 0.14 kg m-2 s-1
on land and that the evaporation rate is around
0.08 kg m-2 s-1, the burning rate on water is likely
to be around 0.22 kg m-2 s-1 or about 0.0005 m s-1,
which is within the reported experimental range
[20,21].
3.6 Pool fires on the sea
A sub-sea release of gas and oil or a spill of
hydrocarbon liquid onto the sea surface, once
ignited, will create a pool fire on the sea. The size
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
and characteristics of the sea fire will both develop
with time, depending on the type and location of
the release, the prevailing wind, sea-state and
surface current conditions, and the mass flow rates
of oil and gas, which will themselves change with
time.
Fires on the sea are generally shorter, cooler and
emit less radiation than equivalent fires on dry
land, due mainly to the presence of water in the
fuel source. Thus predictions for radiative heat
flux are lower, and last for less time because of
pool spreading.
Once established, a hydrocarbon pool fire on the
sea will behave in a similar manner to an
unconfined pool fire. Engulfment of an
installation’s legs and the underside of a platform
or jetty are possibilities. Flame temperatures of
typically 900 to 1200ºC can be expected and heat
fluxes from large pool fires to engulfed objects of
up to 250 kW m-2.
Liquid spills on the sea are unlikely to ignite,
especially for less volatile hydrocarbons such as
crude oil. The likelihood of ignition also decreases
with time following a spill, sometimes rapidly, so
spills where immediate ignition could occur (or
ignition has already occurred) are likely to be the
main focus of attention.
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the
likelihood of an ignition source being present near
the sea surface would generally be low. Assuming
an ignition source is present, there are three main
factors that influence the ignitability of liquid
spills on the sea, all of which are time dependent.
Their significance in inhibiting ignition increases
with time resulting in lower ignition probabilities.
These are: (i) pool thickness, (ii) fuel flashpoint
and (iii) emulsification.
Following an initial spillage, the pool will spread
out quickly, reaching an equilibrium thickness
within a few hours, even for a large spillage. This
equilibrium thickness depends upon fuel type with
typical values of less than 0.1 mm for light crude
oils and 0.05-0.5 mm for heavy crude oils.
However, there is a minimum pool thickness
which is capable of supporting a stable flame:
about 0.5 mm for condensate; 1 mm for light crude
(0.5 mm for Dansk crude); and 1-3 mm for heavier
oils (3 mm for Brent crude).
The fuel flashpoint is also a factor in determining
the likelihood of ignition. Fuels with a flashpoint
lower than the ambient temperature will ignite
readily but those with a flashpoint over 100ºC
(such as stabilised crude oil) will require the
13

presence of a major heat source to achieve
ignition, such as a pre-existing fire. Therefore, the
likelihood of ignition of a liquid spill reduces with
time as the lighter fractions evaporate.
Emulsification of a hydrocarbon fuel with sea
water will reduce significantly its flammability.
For crude oils, emulsions with over 25% water are
considered to be not ignitable. The cut-off point
for condensate is unknown, but is likely to be
higher. Breaking waves and wind speeds over
15 m s-1 will promote emulsification and result in
a low probability of ignition. The wave action will
also cause fluctuations in the pool thickness and
may result in breaking up of the pool and thereby
prevent sustained burning. If spills which plunge
into the sea from the platform are burning, they
may be extinguished in the process and are likely
to break up and begin to emulsify. The least
emulsification is likely to result if spills run down
an installation leg or occur close to the sea surface.
In the case of sub-sea oil pipeline failures in
shallow water (<200 m), the oil plume widens as
it rises through the water. Live crude tends to form
oil droplets and to break the surface above the leak
location and then to spread rapidly. The pool may
also be carried along by tidal currents and wind.
This process provides significant opportunity for
emulsification and reduces the ignitability of any
resulting pool.
Stabilised crude is more affected by tidal currents
and the oil may reach the surface at a location
some way from the original leak site. A similar
situation occurs for live crude in deep water, in
which the gaseous components may form hydrates
thereby reducing the initial upward velocity for the
leak, leaving the oil droplets to rise purely as a
result of their buoyancy. Significant
emulsification will have occurred resulting in very
low ignition probabilities.
Brent and Dansk oil blends burn at a regression
rate of 3 mm/min once the fire becomes
established [22]. Burning ceases abruptly when a
minimum layer thickness is reached (3 mm for
Brent, 0.5 mm for Dansk).
Experiments have shown that the maximum
intermittent flame length closely follows the
correlation:
L / D  2.5(Q* )2 / 3
Where Q* is given by,
Q
Q* 
 a C p Ta D 2 gD
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
in which:
Q is the theoretical heat release rate ( m b
H, where m b is the mass rate of
burning in kg s-1),
a is the density of air (1.2 kg m-3),
Ta is the ambient temperature (288 K),
Cp is the heat capacity of air
(1000 J kg-1 K-1),
D is the pool diameter,
g is the acceleration due to gravity
(9.81 m s-2 ),
The calculated SEP is 53 kW m-2, reducing to
37 kW m-2 when the flame hisses violently just
before extinction. Instantaneous temperatures are
close to 1100oC, corresponding to a black body
flux of 200 kW m-2. However, the mean
temperature is close to 900oC, corresponding to a
flux of 110 kW m-2.
The presence of even a small amount of methane
gas in the fire column substantially altered the oil
fires, improving combustion, generating less soot,
and reducing the radiative feed-back to the
surface.
In tests of 10 m and 40 m crude oil pool fires on
the sea surface [23], the larger pool generated
intermittent flames up to about 60 m high. A
correlation of the form,
L / D  3.3(Q* )2 / 3 0.15 < Q* < 1
seems more appropriate for these large fires [24].
Temperatures of above 1200oC and time-averaged
heat fluxes between 220 and 260 kW m-2 were
recorded in the 10m tests.
In summary, a low velocity, ignited, large volume
spillage of a volatile liquid hydrocarbon close to
the sea surface near to the installation in calm or
moderate conditions represents the worst case
scenario in terms of a pool fire on the sea. Most
other scenarios have a low likelihood of producing
a pool fire.
14
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

3.7 Tabulated guidance can be used as input in a risk assessment as well as

providing guidance for design.
The guidance in Table 3.3, Table 3.4 and Table 3.5
should be used in the context of the preceding
Sections. The tables give worst case values, which

Table 3.3 Guidance on hydrocarbon pool fires on land

Type Small hydrocarbon pool Large hydrocarbon pool Effect of confinement

Typical pool <5 >5 Any

diameter (m)

Flame length L (m) Twice pool diameter Up to twice pool diameter

Mass burning rate Crude: 0.045-0.06 Crude: 0.045-0.06 Take values as per large
(kg m-2 s-1) Diesel: 0.055 Diesel: 0.055 hydrocarbon pool fire for worst case.
Kerosene: 0.06 Kerosene: 0.06 If confinement is severe then mass
Condensate: 0.09 Condensate: 0.1 burning rate will decrease to match
C3/C4s: 0.09 C3/C4s: 0.12 available air flow and large external
fire at vent expected.
Fraction of heat 0.25 0.15
radiated, F

CO level (% v/v) CO < 0.5 CO < 0.5 Increased CO up to about 5% v/v at

and smoke Soot 0.5 – 2.5 Soot 0.5 – 2.5 a vent prior to external flaming, but
concentration after external flaming about 0.5 %
(g m-3) v/v at the end of the flame. Soot
levels up to 3 g m-3.

Initial total heat flux 125 250

(kW m-2)

Radiative flux 125 230

(kW m-2)
Take values as per large
Initial convective 0 20 hydrocarbon pool fire.
flux (kW m-2) For fuel-controlled pool fire in
insulated compartments, total heat
Flame temperature 1250 1460 flux can be 350 kW/m2 and flame
(K) temperatures >1600K.

Flame emissivity,  0.9 0.9

Convective heat - 0.02

transfer, h
coefficient
(kW m-2 K-1)

Effect of deluge Considerable fire control and potential extinguishment Expect reduced flame temperatures
can be achieved. Expect a reduction in flame coverage and reduced or no external flaming.
(and hence flame size) of up to 90% within 10 minutes. Mass burning rate reduces to match
Rapid extinguishment with AFFF. available air flow.
Up to 50 % reduction in radiative heat flux to engulfed Fire does not extinguish but
objects. continues to burn at much reduced
In far field take F1 = 0.8F for 1 row of water sprays, rate.
F1 = 0.5F for 2 rows and F1 = 0.4F for >2 rows at Smoke temperatures steady to
12 litres min-1 m-2. around 100oC

FABIG Technical Note 13 15

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table 3.4 Guidance on methanol pool fires

Type Methanol Pool

Typical pool diameter (m) 5

Flame length L (m) Equal to pool diameter

Mass burning rate, (kg m-2 s-1) 0.03

Fraction of heat radiated, F 0.15

CO level (% v/v) and smoke concentration (g m-3) Negligible

Initial total heat flux (kW m-2) 35

Radiative flux (kW m-2) 35

Initial convective flux (kW m-2) 0

Flame temperature (K) 1250

Flame emissivity,  0.25

Convective heat transfer coefficient, h (kW m-2 K-1) -

Effect of deluge Extinguishable using AFFF.

Water soluble but effect of water deluge unknown.

Table 3.5 Guidance on pool fires on the sea

Type Pools < 9 m Large pools ( >9 m)

Flame Length (m) L/D = 2.5 (Q*)2/3 L/D = 3.3 (Q*)2/3 proposed.

Mass Burning Rate, 0.042 (Brent and Dansk) Take values for large pool fires on land.
(kg m-2 s-1)

Minimum thickness before fire 3 (Brent), 0.5 (Dansk) 0.5 (condensate),

extinction, mm 1 (light crude),
1-3 (heavy crude)

Surface emissive power (based on 53 -

tilted cylinder plus end discs)
(kW m-2)

Initial total heat flux (kW m-2) Kerosene: 150 mean (250 peak) 220-260
Brent: 110 mean (150 peak)
Dansk: 110 mean (200 peak)

Radiative flux (kW m-2) 110 230

Initial convective flux (kW m-2) 0 20

Flame temperature (K) 1200 1460

Flame emissivity,  0.9 0.9

FABIG Technical Note 13 16


4 JET FIRES
Jet fires can be produced following the
pressurized release of a variety of fuel types. The
simplest case is a pressurised gas giving rise to a
gas jet fire. A pressurised liquid/gas mixture
(such as ‘live crude’ or gas dissolved in a liquid)
will give rise to a two-phase jet fire. However, a
pressurised release of a liquid can also give rise
to a two-phase jet fire if the liquid is able to
vaporise quickly. This is most likely to occur
when a liquid has a degree of superheat, i.e. it is
released from containment at a temperature
above its boiling point at ambient conditions,
whereupon flash evaporation occurs and a
flashing liquid jet fire results. Examples are
releases of propane or butane. Non-volatile
liquids (for example, kerosene, diesel, or
stabilised crude) are unlikely to be able to sustain
a two-phase jet fire, unless permanently piloted
by an adjacent fire; even so, some liquid
drop-out is likely and hence the formation of a
pool.
4.1 Gas jet fires - nature and
characteristics
At containment pressures of greater than about
2 bara the flow of an accidental pressurised gas
release into the atmosphere will be choked,
having a velocity on release equal to the local
speed of sound in the fluid. After expansion into
the atmosphere a flame can stabilise in the
subsonic region as a turbulent diffusion fire.
Figure 1: Stability of Natural Gas Jet Fires
100
Absolute Pressure (bar)
10
Unstable
region
1
0 10 20 30
Diameter (mm)
Figure 4.1 Stability of natural gas jet fires (points on the graph indicate the pressure
and diameter where the flames blow themselves out)
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
In the absence of impact onto an object, these
fires are characteristically long and thin and
highly directional, and are relatively unaffected
by the wind, except towards the tail of the fire.
By contrast, the lower exit velocities from flares
or from containment pressures less than about
2 bara produce more buoyant jet fires. The lower
velocities result in jet fires that are more wind
affected, and generally more luminous owing to
less efficient soot burn-out.
Whether or not a stable jet fire will arise
following the release of a pressurised
hydrocarbon gas will depend principally upon
the nature of the fuel, the size of the hole from
which the release occurs and the geometry of the
surroundings. In the case of natural gas free
(non-impacting) jets, some combinations of hole
size and pressure cannot produce stable flames
[25,26,27]. Figure 4.1 shows that, for hole sizes
under 30 mm diameter, there is a pressure regime
which natural gas releases must avoid to produce
stable jet fires. In practice, this means that most
small leaks will be inherently unstable and will
not support a flame without some form of flame
stabilisation, such as the presence of another fire
to provide a permanent pilot or as a result of
impact onto an object such as pipework, vessels,
the surrounding structure, or by the wake of a
wind-blown release [28].
Vertical
Horizontal
Horizontal with deluge
at 12 l/m2/min
Horizontal with deluge
at 24 l/m2/min
40 50
17

Figure 4.1 also includes data from horizontal free
jet fires without deluge and with general area
deluge at two different deluge rates, from which it
can be seen that deluge increases flame instability.
However, in a highly congested environment,
impact within a short distance is likely, and hence
small leaks may stabilise on the nearest point of
impact.
Thus, accidental damage to small bore high
pressure fittings might reasonably be expected not
to result in a stable flame, except that the
likelihood of flame stabilisation by impact on
adjacent surfaces in a process unit is possible. The
flame stability curve shown in Figure 4.1 refers
only to natural gas. The increased burning velocity
associated with higher hydrocarbon gases results
in greater stability and smaller critical diameters.
For example, the critical diameter for propane
vapour jet flames is about 12 mm, whereas for
hydrogen it is 2 mm.
Impact onto an obstacle may modify the shape of
a jet fire. Objects that are smaller than the flame
half-width at the point of impact are unlikely to
modify the shape or length of the flame. Impact
onto a large vessel may significantly shorten the
1000
100
Length L (m)
10
1
1 10 100
Natural Gas Propane Butane Crude
Figure 4.2 Jet fire flame length
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
jet fire. Impact onto a wall or roof could transform
the jet into a radial wall jet, where the location and
direction of the fire is determined by the surface
onto which it impacts and its distance from the
release point.
In the case of high pressure natural gas jet fires,
little or no smoke is produced (typically
<0.01 g m-3). CO concentrations in the region of 5
to 17% v/v have been measured within a jet fire
flame but this drops to less than 0.1% v/v by the
end of the flame, as it is converted to CO2.
Figure 4.2 shows jet fire lengths for a range of
fuels plotted against the net power of combustion
in megawatts, Q (= mass release rate  net
calorific value). Figure 4.2 includes a correlation
based on the majority of the natural gas data,
which is:
L  2. 8893Q 0. 3728
where
Q is the net power of combustion (MW)
L is the jet fire length (m)
L = 2.8893Q0.3728
1000 10000 100000 1000000
Power Q (MW)
Butane/NG mix Kerosene/NG mix Crude/NG mix Correlation
18
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table 4.1 Rules of thumb for estimating jet fire flame length
Assuming a constant value for the net calorific value of hydrocarbons, then the jet fire flame length L (m) is
 kg s-1 given by,
roughly related to the mass release rate m

L  A m 0.4
where A is a constant with units of m(s/kg)0.4
A = 12 m(s/kg)0.4 for the 50% flame occurrence, recommended for risk analysis where impingement and heat-up
of equipment is concerned.
Note: The maximum heat flux is located around the centre of the flame. The edge of a 50% flame has a heat flux
of approximately 100 kWm-2. The 50% flame has been derived from image analysis of multiple frames of the
steady state flames which is then used to describe the flame size given here. The 100 kW m-2 value can be regarded
as an approximate figure for the radiation received by an object very close to the flame.
A = 15 m(s/kg)0.4 for the 1% flame occurrence recommended for use in risk analysis where engulfment and
exposure of persons is concerned. Then assume 100% fatality.
Useful benchmark values for the 50% flames from the test data, for horizontally released flames in moderate
winds, liquid or gas, are:
 3 kg s-1 release of hydrocarbon gives a 22 m flame.
 10 kg s-1 release of hydrocarbon gives a 34 m flame.
 50 kg s-1 release of hydrocarbon gives a 50 m flame.

Rules of thumb for jet fire flame length are given
in Table 4.1. These correlations may be used as
consistency checks on more sophisticated
calculations, or as part of a preliminary risk
assessment.
by the conservation of momentum and confirmed
in CFD analyses of jet flames. These results show
that a near stoichiometric amount of air has been
entrained and support the observation that sonic
jet flames combust cleanly with little smoke.

Large releases, such as from full bore pipelines,
have initial flame lengths that are well outside the
experimental observations that are built into the
correlations given above. The predictions of flame
length based on the initial mass release rates can
be excessively long and unrealistic. Since it takes
a finite time for the flammable fluid to travel the
length of the jet, it is possible to make a correction
to the flame length.
The momentum dominated part of the (gas) jet is
about half the flame length. After that, the flame
becomes increasingly buoyancy-dominated. For
horizontal jets, that means the end of the flame can
be significantly higher than the release point
(especially in two-phase jet flames). The initial
velocity of a choked (gas) jet flame is the speed of
sound in the unburnt gas, about 400 m s-1 for
methane and 240 m s-1 for propane. The velocity
at the end of the flame is about 20 m s-1, calculated
Radiation emissions from natural gas jet fires arise
mostly from water vapour and carbon dioxide,
except for very large releases where soot
production starts to enhance the process. The long
thin shape may also result in a flame that is not
optically thick. The net result is that the radiative
heat transfer to the surroundings is lower than for
comparable higher hydrocarbon jet fires and
two-phase fires. This is reflected in the fraction of
heat radiated, F, for such fires, as can be seen in
Figure 4.3.
Here F is defined as (power released as radiation
from the flame surface QR)/(net power of
combustion Q). F increases with carbon number,
reflecting the increased radiative emissions from
soot within higher hydrocarbon jet fires.

FABIG Technical Note 13 19


Figure 3: Fraction of Heat Radiated
1000
(MW)
R
100
Radiative Power Q
10
1
10 100
Total Power, Q (MW)
Figure 4.3 Radiative power vs total power [29] (Gradient is the fraction of heat radiated, F)
4.2 Effect of confinement on gas jet
fires (Compartment gas
jet fires)
The evolution of a gas jet fire inside a
compartment is identical to that of a compartment
pool fire, described in Section 3.2, except that:
 A jet fire can point out of the compartment and
behave as if in the open.
 The fuel mass flow rate determines the burning
rate of the jet fire in both fuel- and ventilation-
controlled conditions, whereas the pool fire can
adjust its burning rate in ventilation-controlled
conditions.
 The momentum of gas jet fires leads to higher
heat fluxes on engulfed objects.
If the fire is well ventilated or the jet is directed
out of a confined region through a vent, then there
may be little difference in jet fire characteristics
compared to an unconfined fire. The fire is fuel-
controlled (  < 1). However, if the mass release
rate is large relative to the size of the confinement,
or the ventilation openings are small then the fire
may not be able to entrain enough air for complete
combustion inside the compartment. The fire is
then ventilation-controlled (  > 1), and excess
fuel burns at the vent opening.
It should be noted that certain ventilation
patterns and deluge strategies could lead to
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Natural Gas
Propane
Butane
Crude Oil
F = 0.13
F=0.24
F=0.32
F=0.5
1000 10000
flame instability and extinguishment. Instances
where these conditions occur are:
 When the ventilation is restricted to a partially
open roof [30]. This condition may be relevant
for jet fires inside platform legs.
 When a water deluge, at typically
10 litres m-2 min-1, is applied. Flame extinction
occurs within seconds of the deluge being
activated, particularly when the fire is well
developed (i.e. when deluge activation is
delayed by more than about one minute),
irrespective of whether the flame is fuel- or
ventilation-controlled, sonic or subsonic [31].
However, note that the flame is less rapidly
extinguished when the deluge is applied early
or when the flame is subsonic.
A ventilation-controlled jet fire is likely to result
in increased levels of incomplete combustion
products such as CO, increased levels of smoke
(soot) and increased flame temperatures,
particularly in regions close to the flame/air
interface or close to the ceiling of a compartment
where hot combustion products may be trapped
and recirculate. This leads to increased heat fluxes
to objects and surfaces compared to an unconfined
fire [14,30,32].
The location where combustion occurs and the
flame is hottest may also shift due to the
confinement. Horizontal jet fires in which the jet
was directed away from the vent increased
temperatures to >1400oC at the interface between
the smoke layer leaving the compartment and the
air layer entering the compartment, most
particularly in the area furthest from the vent [30].
20

Unlike unconfined fires, the behaviour of
under-ventilated confined fires changes with time
as the air initially available within the
compartment is consumed, and this may lead to
‘external flaming’ after a period of time, when the
body of flame moves through the vent in order to
find the oxygen required for combustion. CO
levels of up to 5% v/v at the vent may occur but
after the onset of external combustion the CO
levels drop to typically less than 0.5% v/v by the
end of the flame. Soot production is related to the
equivalence ratio  and hence to the degree of
ventilation and may range from about 0.1 g m-3 at
 = 1.3 to up to 2.5 g m-3 at  = 2 [30,32].
The worst-case condition in terms of fire severity
is likely to occur if the jet fire is near
stoichiometric but slightly under-ventilated, as
this leads to high heat release rates and enhanced
soot production. For example, gaseous 0.3 kg/s
propane jet fires burning in this ventilation regime
produced a heat flux of about 350 kW m-2, which
was about 50% radiative in the impingement zone.
The heat flux well away from the impingement
zone was nearly 100% radiative [30].
In ventilation-controlled fires in well insulated
compartments, measured gas temperatures in the
smoke layer were between 1100 and 1200oC.
There is only a weak overall dependency on
fuel/air ratio. In non-insulated compartments a
reduction in average gas temperatures of up to
200oC can be expected.
For release rates up to 10 kg/s in fuel-controlled
partially open compartments, the flames are
deflected and hence ‘thicker’ than open flames.
The total heat fluxes therefore are higher and 300
kW/m2 is recommended for engulfed objects (180
kW/m2 radiative, 120 kW/m2 convective). Larger
releases could be even more radiative.
As for compartment pool fires, the ‘A root H’
equation can be used in simple analyses to
estimate the stoichiometry of the flame. For
reference, the ‘constant’ in this equation became
0.45 kg s-1 m-2.5 when derived from the Blast and
Fire Engineering for Topside Structures (BFETS)
Phase II series of tests [15].
Vents that are split between lower and upper levels
in a wall greatly increase the air flow to the fire,
producing a ‘chimney’ effect, whereby the jet fire
can entrain sufficient air for normal burning.
Simple models based on the ‘A root H’
approximation for air inflow are invalid for these
geometries. The height of the jet release has no
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
significant effect on fire behaviour, even if the
release point becomes engulfed by the combustion
gases.
4.3 Thermal load to engulfed
objects from gas jet fires
The thermal load to an engulfed object in a jet fire
is a combination of radiative load and convective
load from the hot combustion products passing
over the surface. The total heat flux imparted to an
engulfed object varies over the surface of the
object. In addition, the relative proportions of
convective and radiative heat flux vary over the
surface, with the highest convective component
where the highest flame velocities occur. The
highest radiative heat load is experienced towards
the end of the flame [33]. Thus, engulfed objects:
 less than halfway along the flame experience
the highest overall heat fluxes on their rear
surface;
 around the middle of the flame experience
fairly uniform fluxes over the region of impact
on their front and rear surfaces;
 near the end of the flame experience highest
heat fluxes on their front surface.
Flame temperatures remain roughly constant at
around 1200-1300oC, but the maximum radiative
component increases with optical thickness from
around 80 kW/m2 for the smallest flames to
around 200 kW/m2 for large flames.
For a given location of an object within a flame as
a proportion of flame length, the maximum
convective component is more or less constant
with increasing size of release. Hence the relative
proportion of convective to radiative flux varies
with fire size.
4.4 Tabulated guidance
Table 4.2 gives worst case values which can be
used as input in a risk assessment as well as
providing guidance for design.
Some general guidelines on the properties of
compartment gas jet fires are given in Table 4.3
and Table 4.4. The values assume quasi-steady
state, reached after about 10 minutes, and are
based on extrapolations from tests with propane at
nominally 0.3 and 1 kg/s. Some account has been
taken of an increase in flame emissivity with scale
of release.
21
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table 4.2 Guidance on the behaviour of gas jet fires

Mass release rate (kg s-1) 0.1 1.0 10 >30 Effect of confinement

Flame length L (m), 1% 5 15 40 65 Affected by enclosure shape and openings

flame

Fraction of heat radiated, 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.13

F

CO level (% v/v) and CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 Increased CO up to about 5% v/v at a vent
smoke concentration Soot Soot Soot Soot prior to external flaming, but after external
(g m-3) ~0.01 ~0.01 ~0.01 ~0.01 flaming <0.5 % v/v exiting the flame. Soot
levels depend on equivalence ratio from
about
0.1 g m-3 at  =1.3 to 2.5 g m-3 at  =2.0
Initial total heat flux on 180 250 300 350 For ventilation-controlled large jet fires
engulfed object (kW m-2) typical values are around 300-350 kw m-2 in
the impingement zone. For fuel-controlled
jet fires with flowrates up to 10kgs-1 the
values for open jet fires with flowrates
10kg s-1 or greater are typical due to
deflected and hence thicker flames. Outside
the impingement zone, heat flux is nearly
100% radiative.

Radiative flux on engulfed 80 130 180 230 230 for large ventilation-controlled fires.
object (kW m-2)

Initial convective flux on 100 120 120 120 120 in the impingement zone
engulfed object (kW m-2)

Flame temperature, Tf (K) 1560 1560 1560 1560 1525 for large ventilation-controlled fires.

Flame emissivity, f 0.25 0.4 0.55 0.7 0.75

Convective heat transfer 0.08 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095

coefficient, h
(kW m-2 K-1)

Effect of deluge No effect on heat loadings to engulfed Risk of extinguishment and explosion
objects. hazard if deluge activation is delayed.
In far field, take
F1 = 0.8F for 1 row of water sprays,
F1 = 0.7F for 2 rows,
F1 = 0.5F for >2 rows at 12 litres m-2 min-1.
May improve combustion efficiency and
reduce CO levels within flame.

FABIG Technical Note 13 22

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table 4.3 Behaviour of fuel-controlled compartment gas jet fires

GAS JET FIRE 1 kg/s 10 kg/s >>10kg/s Comments

Initial total flux to impinged 290 300 350

object, kW m-2
Radiative flux, kW m-2 170 180 230
Initial convective flux, kW m-2 120 120 120 Object in optimum location to receive
maximum initial convective flux.
Flame temperature, K 1450 1450 1450
Flame emissivity 0.68 0.72 0.92
Total flux to non-impinged 170 180 230
object inside the fire, kW m-2

Table 4.4 Behaviour of ventilation-controlled compartment gas jet fires

GAS JET FIRE 1 kg s-1 10 kg s-1 >>10 kg s-1 Comments

Initial total flux to impinged 320 350 350

object, kWm2
Radiative flux, kW m-2 200 230 230
Initial convective flux, kW m-2 120 120 120 Object in optimum location to receive
maximum initial convective flux.
Flame temperature, K 1500 1525 1525
Flame emissivity 0.68 0.75 0.75
Total flux to non-impinged 200 230 230 Highest fluxes just above the fire/air
object inside the fire, kW m-2 interface.

4.5 Liquid jet fires - Nature and
characteristics
Ignited pressure releases of liquids can be of two
types: flashing liquid jet fires, e.g. propane and
butane, and two-phase jet fires, e.g. ‘live’ crude oil
and condensate.
In contrast to gas jet fires, the generally lower exit
velocities from flashing liquid releases lead to
more buoyant flames. The lower velocities result
in fires that are more wind affected, whilst the
higher hydrocarbon content of these fuels
increases the flame luminosity. However, releases
involving gas dissolved in, or mixed with, a liquid
can result in a two-phase jet fire, which combines
the worst aspects of both the gas jet fire and the
flashing liquid jet fire, that is, high velocities and
high flame luminosity.
More fuel is pyrolysed to soot within the flame
than in gas jet fires. So the radiative heat transfer
to the surroundings is greater. This is reflected in
the fraction of heat radiated, F, for such fires, as
can be seen in Figure 4.4.
Limited measurements in the smoke downstream
of a live crude jet fire determined a percentage
obscuration of typically 10% over a 200 mm path
length [34]. This corresponds to a visibility
distance of about 5 m [35].
A special case of interest at some installations is
live crude, which includes a significant quantity of
water. Mixtures with a ‘water cut’ (defined as
[(mass of water)/(mass of fuel)]  100%) of up to
125% remain flammable, although not necessarily
capable of supporting a stable flame in the absence
of some other supporting mechanism [36]. The
inclusion of water also slightly increases flame
length and flame buoyancy, and significantly
reduces the amount of smoke produced. For water
cuts less than about 50% there is little impact on
the fraction of heat radiated but for higher water
cuts the fraction of heat radiated is reduced
(Figure 4.5).

FABIG Technical Note 13 23

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Figure 4: Fraction of Heat radiated for Fuel Mixtures

0.45

0.40
Fraction of Heat Radiated F

0.35

0.30

0.25

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.05

0.00
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage Butane in Natural Gas/Butane Mix (m ass%)

Figure 4.4 Fraction of heat radiated for fuel mixtures

Figure 5: Effect of Water Cut on Fraction of Heat Radiated

0.45
Fraction of Heat Radiated, F

0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Water Cut (%)

Figure 4.5 Effect of water cut on fraction of heat radiated in live crude jet fires

4.6 Effect of confinement on liquid The general behaviour of confined gas jet fires can
jet fires (compartment liquid jet be extended to liquid jet fires [15,16]. However, it
fires) is difficult to give general definitive guidance on
confined liquid jet fires because of differences in
The evolution of a liquid jet fire inside a phase behaviour depending on whether they are
compartment is identical to that of a compartment flashing (e.g. propane, live crude oil) or
pool fire, described in Section 3.2, except that: evaporating (e.g. condensate, gasoline) fluids.
 A jet fire can point out of the compartment and Furthermore, the jets can be either single
behave as if in the open. component (e.g. propane) or multi-component
(e.g. live crude). The only relevant tests have been
 The fuel mass flow rate determines the burning performed with nominally 0.3 kg s-1 liquid
rate of the jet fire in both fuel and ventilation- propane [30,32] and 0.3 and 1 kg s-1 condensate
controlled conditions, whereas the pool fire can [14]. No larger scale tests have been carried out
adjust its burning rate in ventilation-controlled and none at all with flashing mixtures such as live
conditions. crude oil. Nevertheless, the tests showed that there

FABIG Technical Note 13 24


is no significant dependency on scale for
condensate type jets.
There is no significant difference between gas jet
and condensate liquid jet fires except within the jet
impingement zone. The release pressure has a
large effect on the temperature rise of the
impinged object. At low release pressure
(1-2 barg) liquid jets can produce a relatively ‘cold
spot’ on objects at short impingement distances
owing to evaporation of large droplets. At higher
pressures atomisation produces smaller droplets
with shorter burn out times. A ‘cold spot’ may still
occur but at shorter impingement distances.
For fuel-controlled liquid jet fires of condensate at
nominally 1 kg s-1, total heat fluxes between 120-
200 kW m-2 were measured in the impingement
zone, but this range may not be representative of
maximum values because of incomplete droplet
evaporation in the test conditions. The convective
component is likely to be significantly smaller
than if the fuel droplets had fully evaporated. The
measured range may, therefore, be more
representative of radiative flux alone. It is
recommended therefore that the radiative flux is
160 kW m-2 (giving a flame emissivity of 0.6 at a
smoke/flame temperature of 1200oC). The
convective component is expected to lie close to
that of flashing propane jets (about 70 kW m-2). A
total heat flux in the impingement zone of around
230 kW m-2 is therefore implied as a worst case for
releases around kg s-1.
Releases of multi-component liquids with a
considerable fraction of gaseous lighter
components would have higher velocities and
hence increased convection. The worst case would
be around 120 kW m-2, leading to a total heat flux
of around 280-300 kW m-2 in the impingement
zone. Larger fuel-controlled releases are expected
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
to have total heat fluxes of 300-400 kW m-2,
similar to unconfined jet fires. Gas temperatures in
the smoke layer are between 1100 and 1300oC,
with a tendency for the layer to become hotter just
above the air/fire interface.
Ventilation-controlled 1 kg s-1 condensate jet
flames tend to be slightly hotter than their fuel-
controlled counterparts, possible as a result of
greater optical thickness. Assuming a convective
heat flux of 70 kW m-2, as before, a total heat flux
of around 250 kW m-2 is recommended as a worst
case. For larger releases the radiative flux is
expected to rise as the flame reaches maximum
optical thickness, but the convective component
would remain roughly constant. A maximum total
heat flux of around 300 kW m-2 is therefore
recommended.
As with confined gas jet fires, horizontal jet fires
in which the jet was directed away from the vent,
increased temperatures to >1400oC at the interface
between the smoke layer leaving the compartment
and the air layer entering the compartment, most
particularly in the area furthest from the vent.
4.7 Thermal loads to engulfed
objects from two-phase jet fires
Radiant soot emissions generally promote greater
radiative heat transfer from liquid hydrocarbon jet
fires than from natural gas flames. The generally
lower velocities arising from flashing liquid
releases (such as propane or butane) result in a
lower convective flux to engulfed objects.
For the rear surface of an engulfed object,
Figure 4.6 shows that the fraction of the heat flux
which is radiative increases with higher
hydrocarbon content from about 0.5 for natural
gas to about 0.8 for liquid fuels [37,38,39,40].
25
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Figure 7: Fraction of Radiative Heat Flux of Total Heat Flux to Rear

of Engulfed Object

1.0
Radiative Fraction of Total Heat

0.8

0.6
Flux

0.4

0.2

0.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentage Liquid (Mass %)

Figure 4.6 Fraction of radiative heat flux of total heat flux to the rear of an object engulfed
by a two phase jet fire

Figure 8: Maximum Heat Fluxes to an Engulfed Object

for Gas-Liquid Mixtures
450
Max Heat Flux (kW m-2)

400

350
300

250
200 Butane Mix
Kersosene Mix
150
Oil Mix
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage Liquid (Mass %)

Figure 4.7 Maximum heat fluxes to an engulfed object for gas liquid mixtures

In the case of a pressurised gas-liquid mixture fires, the flame temperature is dominated by the
(such as live crude), the high gas velocities may gas content but the flame emissivity is also
still occur and result in a high convective enhanced by the higher hydrocarbon content
contribution, whilst the higher hydrocarbon leading to overall higher radiative fluxes for such
content maintains a high radiative contribution; mixtures.
making these type of jet fires a ‘worst case’ in
terms of total heat flux to engulfed obstacles. The Figure 4.8 includes data with mass flowrates
maximum combined fluxes occur for gas-liquid between 2.5 and 5 kg s-1 and shows that for a
mixtures which are about 60-80% by mass of flashing liquid fuel the maximum heat flux is
liquid (Figure 4.7). generally around 200 kW m-2 whereas for gas only
(0% liquid), the maximum heat flux is typically
Figure 4.8 shows the maximum time-averaged 250-275 kW m-2.
flame temperatures for gas jet fires (on average
1280oC), compared to flashing liquid fires For fuels containing water, water cuts under 50%
(typically 1050oC). In the case of two-phase jet result in no significant reduction in heat fluxes to

FABIG Technical Note 13 26

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

engulfed objects (<10%). However, over 50%, the overall heat flux to an obstacle can be reduced by
Figureless
flames are significantly 9: radiative,
Maximum and Flame
the Temperatures
40% or more (Figure 4.9).
Maximum Temperature (C)

1600 Natural Gas

1400
1200 Propane
1000 Butane
800
600 Butane/NG
400 (10-60%)
Butane/NG
200 (60-80%)
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Flowrate (kg/s)

Figure 10: Effect of Water Cut in the Fuel on Maximum Heat Fluxes
Figure 4.8 Maximum flame temperature
to an Engulfed Object

400

350
Maximum Heat Flux (kW/m2)

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Water Cut (%)

Figure 4.9 Effect of water cut in the fuel on maximum heat fluxes to an engulfed object in
live crude jet fires

4.8 Tabulated guidance for Thus, the guidance in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7
two-phase jet fires refers to condensate type jets and some worst case
values are given. For mixed gas/liquid jets that
The guidance in Table 4.5 should be used in the have significant momentum the guidance given in
context of the preceding sections. The table gives Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 is estimated from a
worst case values which can be used as input in a combination of the behaviour of the unconfined
risk assessment as well as providing guidance for jets and allowance for increases in flame
design. emissivity with optical thickness.

FABIG Technical Note 13 27

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table 4.5 Guidance on the behaviour of liquid jet fires

Mass release rate (kg s-1) 0.1 1.0 10 30 Effect of confinement (see also
Table 4.6- Table 4.9)

Flame length L (m) 5 13 35 60 Affected by enclosure shape and

openings
Fraction of heat radiated, Fm See below

CO level (% v/v) and smoke CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 CO < 0.1 Increased CO up to about 5% v/v at
concentration (g m-3) Soot Soot Soot Soot a vent prior to external flaming, but
~0.01 ~0.01 ~0.01 ~0.01 after external flaming < 0.5% v/v
exiting the flame. Soot levels depend
on equivalence ratio from about 0.1 g
m-3 at  =1.3 to 2.5 g m-3 at  =2.0

Initial total heat flux on 200 300 350 400 See Note 2 below, and Table 4.6-
engulfed object Table 4.9. Outside the impingement
zone, heat flux is nearly 100%
(kW m-2)
radiative.

Initial radiative flux (kW m-2) 100 180 230 280

Initial convective flux on 100 120 120 120

engulfed object (kW m-2)

Flame temperature (K) 1560 1560 1560 1560

Flame emissivity, f 0.3 0.55 0.7 0.85

Convective heat transfer 0.08 0.095 0.095 0.095

coefficient, h (kW m-2 K-1)

Effect of deluge Some benefit to engulfed objects but
temperature may still rise although at a
slower rate. Combined area and dedicated
deluge may prevent temperature rise if
effectively applied.
Take F1 as per gas jet fires.
Risk of extinguishment if the
compartment is already hot and
potential formation of pool and
explosion hazard. Effective cooling of
compartment if deluge applied early.

For Fraction of Heat Radiated, Fm of mixture involving x% liquid by mass:

Use F   x .(F F )  F where FG is the fraction of heat radiated for natural gas and FL is the fraction of heat
m L G G
 100 
radiated for the liquid fuel involved.
Take FL = 0.24 for C3; 0.32 for C4, 0.45 for C6-C25 (including condensate and diesel); and 0.5 for crude oil.

IMPORTANT NOTES:
1. The heat flux data relate to a worst case condition of 30% gas, 70% liquid by mass mixture. For flashing liquid
fires (such as propane or butane) a lower flame temperature of about 1300 K is likely with an emissivity of 1,
giving a radiative flux of about 160 kW m-2. A convective heat transfer coefficient of about 0.07 kW m-2 K-1 is
suggested giving a convective flux of about 70 kW m-2 and a total flux of about 230 kW m-2.
2. The only experimental data on confined two-phase jet fires relate to condensate jet fires of 1 kg/s. There is a
lack of data on larger confined flashing and pressurised multi-component two-phase jet fires.

FABIG Technical Note 13 28

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table 4.6 Guidance on the behaviour of confined fuel-controlled evaporating liquid jet
fires (quasi-steady state assumed)
Evaporating liquid jet (e.g. condensate, 1 kg s-1 >10 kg s-1 Comments
gasoline)
Initial total flux to impinged object, kWm-2 230 250
Radiative flux, kWm-2 160 180
Initial convective flux, kWm-2 70 70 Object in optimum location to receive
maximum initial convective flux.
Flame temperature, K 1450 1450
Flame emissivity 0.60 0.72
Total flux to non-impinged object inside the fire, 160 180
kWm-2

Table 4.7 Guidance on the behaviour of confined ventilation-controlled evaporating

liquid jet fires (quasi-steady state assumed)
Evaporating liquid jet (e.g. condensate, 1 kg s-1 >10 kg s-1 Comments
gasoline)
Initial total flux to impinged object, kW m-2 250 300
Radiative flux, kW m-2 180 230
Initial convective flux, kW m-2 70 70 Object in optimum location to receive
maximum initial convective flux.
Flame temperature, K 1450 1450 Horizontal jets pointing away from
vents reach >1700 K at the air/smoke
interface.
Flame emissivity 0.72 0.92
Total flux to non-impinged object inside the fire, 180 230
kWm-2

Table 4.8 Guidance on the behaviour of confined fuel-controlled mixed gas/liquid jet
fires (quasi-steady state assumed)
Gas/liquid jet (e.g. live crude) 1 kg s-1 10 kg s-1 >>10 kg s-1 Comments
Initial total flux to impinged object, 300 350 400
kWm-2
Radiative flux, kW m-2 180 230 280
Initial convective flux, kW m-2 120 120 120 Object in optimum location to
receive maximum initial convective
flux.
Flame temperature, K 1500 1560 1560
Flame emissivity 0.63 0.7 0.85
Total flux to non-impinged object inside 180 230 280
the fire, kW m-2

FABIG Technical Note 13 29

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table 4.9 Guidance on the behaviour of confined ventilation-controlled mixed

gas/liquid jet fires (quasi-steady state assumed)
Gas/liquid jet (e.g. live crude) 1 kg s-1 10 kg s-1 >>10 kg s-1 Comments
Initial total flux to impinged object, 300 350 350
kW m-2
Radiative flux, kW m-2 180 230 230
Initial convective flux, kW m-2 120 120 120 Object in optimum location to
receive maximum initial convective
flux.
Flame temperature, K 1450 1450 1450 Horizontal jets pointing away from
vents are anticipated to reach
>1700 K at the air/smoke interface.
Flame emissivity 0.72 0.92 0.92
Total flux to non-impinged object inside 180 230 230
the fire, kW m-2

FABIG Technical Note 13 30


5 HEAT TRANSFER AND TEMPERATURE DEVELOPMENT
5.1 Introduction
When an object such as a structural member,
pressure vessel or pipeline is exposed to fire, the
subsequent rate of temperature rise determines the
time to failure. In those scenarios where failure
can be associated with a critical temperature, for
example when the hoop stress generated by a fluid
inside a pipeline or vessel exceeds the yield stress
of the steel at a specific temperature, then the
problem reduces to one of predicting the
temperature rise of the object with time. At the
heart of the problem is the heat transfer between
the fire and the object, which is by radiation for a
non-impinging fire and by both radiation and
convection for an impinging or engulfing fire.
Heat is lost from the outside surface by radiation
during an impinging fire, and by both radiation
and forced convection (wind) for a non-impinging
fire. In the presence of wind, natural convection
heat loss from the outer wall surface is small and
can usually be neglected.
For conservative predictions of the temperature
rise of an object (referred to as a wall) receiving
heat loading from a flame, it can be assumed that
the inner wall surface is perfectly insulated so that
all the heat absorbed from the fire goes into
heating up the wall itself. This assumption is
appropriate for bare steel structures and the region
of a vessel or pipework containing gas/vapour.
However, the assumption is not appropriate for
vessel walls in contact with liquid inventory.
5.2 Predictive modelling
In general, to avoid erroneous application, models
of all types should be supported by essential
quality features for hazard prediction, such as:
 full documentation
 stated ranges of applicability
 published validation for range of applications
 statements of what should not be modelled
 precise definitions of the terminology
 stated accuracy
 clear distinction between numerical precision
and predictive accuracy.
5.2.1 Model types
Three model types are used to determine the heat
flux available from the fire:
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Empirical Models contain, to varying degrees, a
physical basis combined with correlation with
experimental measurements.
These models provide accurate and reliable
predictions of flame size, shape and radiation to
external objects, provided that they are applied to
situations for which the models were
experimentally validated.
Empirical models are the most commonly used
type. They include:
 Point source models: all heat flux emanates
from a single point.
 Multi-point models: the heat flux is
distributed over a number of points which
themselves are distributed to approximate the
flame geometry.
 Surface emitter model: the heat flux is
distributed over an assumed flame surface.
Numerical Models, also called CFD or field
models, consist of a main framework of equations
that describe time averaged fluid flow coupled
with sub-models, which may be empirical,
describing turbulence, combustion processes and
flame radiation.
Numerical models attempt to model in
3 dimensions the time-varying processes within a
fire such as the fluid flow and combustion
processes. In principle, numerical modelling
provides a rigorous framework for solving
combustion problems because all the interacting
processes, if known and capable of accurate
quantitative description, can be included. This
physical basis enables these models to study
complex geometries and conditions far removed
from the experimental data used to validate them.
These mathematical procedures should account
for the transmissivity of the atmosphere, which
attenuates the radiation, and the location and
orientation of the receiving surface relative to the
heat flux source.
These models generally require ‘expert’ users and
take several hours to set up and run. Sensitivity
studies are generally not practical because of long
run times. For these reasons, CFD codes are not
routinely used for general risk assessments.
However, they can be useful to study in detail a
particular fire scenario of interest due to its
severity. The impact of potential design changes
31

(such as increased ventilation) can then compared
and provide at least qualitative guidance on how
to reduce the hazard. The CFD predictions use
more realistic geometry and dynamics and may
require the risk assessment to take into account
new parameters such as the leak jet direction, leak
location, and the dynamic behaviour of the fire.
Current models are still under development and
attention is focussed on descriptions of gaseous
combustion, soot characteristics and radiative
transfer.
Present numerical / field models are used within
limitations to predict:
 air and smoke movement
 ventilation problems in complicated
geometries
 flame trajectory and radiative emission
However, internal heat transfer is of limited
accuracy.
In the absence of published direct and relevant
validation data, field models cannot yet be
recommended generally for quantitative hazard
prediction. Further progress, combined with
proper published validation may, in due course,
provide the industry with versatile, widely
applicable predictive tools.
Integral (phenomenological) Models are based
on numerical / field model approaches but the
equations are made one-dimensional. This entails
assumption of transverse fire property profiles and
use of empirical air entrainment correlations.
Many of the sub-models used within integral
models are empirically derived and have only been
validated against laboratory scale data.
Nevertheless, integral models provide an effective
method for predicting fire characteristics and are
generally easy to use. As with numerical models,
integral models should account for the
transmissivity of the atmosphere and the location
and orientation of the receiving surface relative to
the heat flux source. They should only be applied
to the range of circumstances for which they have
been validated by experimental data.
There are no comprehensive, commercially
available integral models for large scale jet or
large pool fires.
5.2.2 Engulfed and non-engulfed objects
Determining whether an object is engulfed or non-
engulfed by a fire, the geometry of the flame must
be established. Numerical (CFD) models, as well
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
as many of the fire loading models described in
Sections 3 and 4, may be used for this purpose.
If it is established that an object is engulfed, then
it is in practice difficult to predict accurately the
received heat flux. Numerical (CFD) models show
some promise for accurate engulfed flux
determination. However, guidance based on
experimental measurements of heat flux loading to
engulfed objects is more practical and is
recommended for routine hazard analysis.
For objects external to the fire, models of all three
types (empirical, numerical and integral) have
been developed and refined over the years to
predict the incident radiation received by a
surface.
The heat flux associated with a fire will in practice
comprise two elements; radiation and convection.
The convective component for external objects is
normally cooling by a wind or by natural
convection from the heated surface.
5.3 Heat transfer to non-engulfed
objects
The main hazard to an object at a distance from a
fire is thermal radiation. Common approaches for
estimating external radiation from jet and pool
fires are:
 a point source model, or
 multiple point source model, or
 an idealised flame shape with assigned surface
emissive power.
5.3.1 Point source model
The point source model (see for example,
ISO 23251 [41]) idealises the fire as emanating
from a single point, usually the estimated
mid-point of the visible flame. The radiation q
(kW m-2) received at a location outside the fire is
given by:
QR
q
4 d 2
where
QR is the rate of heat radiated from the
flame = FQ where F is the fraction of
combustion heat release and Q is the
net combustive power
τ is the atmospheric transmissivity
d is the distance of the object from the
point source
32

Q = m b H c for gas jet fires, where m is
the mass release rate
Q =m  b AH c for pool fires where m b is
the mass burning rate and A is the pool
area
H c is the net heat of combustion (= net
calorific value)
The atmospheric transmissivity depends on the
prevailing atmospheric conditions (absolute
humidity and partial pressure of carbon dioxide)
and the path length, but might typically be 0.8 on
a dry day. However, water mists significantly
reduce this value.
Where the point emitter does not lie on a line
which is normal to the receiving surface the
radiation received must be corrected by
multiplying the received radiation by cos β, where
β is the angle between the normal to the surface
and a line connecting the surface with the emitter
point. Hence,
𝑄𝑅 𝜏
𝑞= 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛽
𝜋𝑑2
The point source model cannot be used at
locations close to the flame and certainly not
within one flame length of the edge of the flame.
However, it can be especially useful for
determining radiation levels in the far field (more
than two flame lengths away).
5.3.2 Multiple point source model
A multiple point source model takes a similar
approach, but represents the fire using a series of
point sources along the flame trajectory, each
point contributing a proportion of the total radiant
energy, e.g. [42]. Better predictions are likely, as
this approach will account for different parts of the
flame being at different distances from the
receiver and different parts of the flame emitting
at different intensities. However, multiple point
source approaches to determining incident
radiation should not be used within one flame
length of the fire.
5.3.3 Surface emitter models
The surface emitter model involves an idealised
flame shape that represents the visible flame. In
these models, the thermal radiation received at a
location outside the flame is given by:
q   V SEP
where
τ is the atmospheric transmissivity,
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
V is the view factor of the flame by the
receiver, and
SEP is the surface emissive power of the
flame.
The view factor describes how much of the field
of view of the receiver is occupied by the flame
and is a function of the shape assumed to represent
the flame. There are various methods for
calculating view factors. For simple geometries
exact algebraic relationships exist (see Annex G of
EN 1991-1-2 [6]); for more complex geometries
numerical techniques are necessary. Note that the
view factor V is called the configuration factor 
in Eurocodes.
Surface emissive powers are dependent on the
dimensions of the geometrical shape of flame
chosen and consequently cannot be compared with
values within other models using a different shape.
The surface emissive power also attempts to
represent the whole flame, which includes areas
where the flame is radiating strongly and other
areas where smoke obscuration significantly
reduces the radiant emissions. Hence, it is not
necessarily representative of measured spot
surface emissive powers.
The surface emissive power is given by the
fraction of heat radiated from the flame surface Fs:
SEP  Fs Q / A s
where
Q is the net power of combustion, and
As is the total surface area of the idealised
flame shape.
Fs is related to, but is not equivalent to, the F factor
derived for use in the point source models.
In the case of jet fires, a commonly used flame
shape is the frustum of a cone, see for example
[43,44]. The base of the frustum represents the
location of the base of the visible flame,
accounting for any flame lift-off. The extent to the
end of the frustum from the release point is the
flame length. The frustum may also be tilted to
account for the orientation of the release and to
allow for the effects of wind. The frustum is ideal
for representing high momentum jet fires released
vertically or horizontally with the wind, but is not
so representative of horizontal two-phase jet fires.
These fires have low velocity and soon become
buoyancy-dominated, so that the end of the flame
can be considerably higher than the
momentum-dominated flame near the release
point. Consequently, such flames have been
represented as a frustum, for the
33

momentum-dominated part, connected to a tilted
cylinder, for the buoyancy-dominated part [45].
In the case of pool fires, a cylinder tilted by the
wind is often used to represent the flame, see for
example [46]. The cylinder can be assumed to
have uniform brightness over its surface, or
divided into zones representing a bright lower part
and smoky upper part with intermittent bright
flame.
Models using an idealised flame shape should be
capable of providing reasonable predictions of
incident radiation within one flame length of the
fire and their use is recommended instead of point
source models. However, they may be unreliable
for near-impingement situations.
5.4 Temperature rise of non-
engulfed objects
A surface exposed to thermal radiation will rise in
temperature and reach a steady final temperature
after long time exposures. A steady state heat
balance equation that accounts for heat gain by
absorbed radiation and heat losses by re-radiation,
wind cooling and conduction is,
ℎ 𝐾
𝑞 = 𝜎(𝑇𝑠4 − 𝑇𝑎4 ) + (𝑇𝑠 − 𝑇𝑎 ) + (𝑇𝑠 − 𝑇𝑏 )
𝜀𝑠 𝐿 The expression for the total heat flux absorbed by
where
q is the incident radiation heat flux
(kW m-2),
 is the Stefan-Boltzman constant (5.67 x
10-11 kW m-2 K-4),
s is the emissivity of the surface
(typically 0.9),
Ts and Ta are the object surface and air
temperatures respectively (K)
Tb is the object temperature at a distance L
along which heat is conducted
h is a convective heat transfer coefficient
(kW m-2 K-1) due to wind cooling,
velocity u (m s-1), for example, [47]
gives h  0. 007377  0. 0113u 0. 45 .
Other expressions used for h in fire
safety engineering are [48]:
𝛼(𝑇𝑠 − 𝑇𝑎 )1/3 for convection on the
fire side of an insulating barrier and α
varies between 1.0 to 0.6 within fire
temperatures of 400-1100°C.
𝛼(𝑇𝑠 − 𝑇𝑎 )1/4 ; for convection on the
non-fire side of an insulating barrier
and α is approximately 2.2.
K is the coefficient of thermal
conductivity
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
L is the length (or thickness) of the
element (of unit area) through which
conduction is taking place.
This equation assumes that the non-receiving back
surface is perfectly insulated and that the material
thermal conductivity within the relevant
temperature range may be approximated as a
constant. The conduction part of the equation is
often negligible and is ignored. The value for Ts
calculated from this expression is, therefore,
equivalent to a (conservative) steady temperature.
5.5 Heat transfer to and
temperature rise of engulfed
objects
The heat transfer to an object engulfed in flames is
the sum of two components, a convective
component from the boundary layer of hot gases
and combustion products flowing over the object,
and a radiative component from the hot gases and
combustion products distributed throughout the
fire. Note however that it is difficult to calculate
accurately the heat transfer in a flame because of
the need to know temperature, velocities and
chemical species distributions in a turbulent
reacting flow.
an engulfed object is:
qa  qr  qc   s  ( f Tf4  Ts4 )  h (Tf  Ts )
where
qa is the total heat load absorbed by a
surface per unit area (kWm-2)
qr and qc are the radiative and convective heat
fluxes absorbed respectively.
Tf and Ts are the temperature of the flame and
surface of the object respectively
f and s are the emissivity of the flame and
surface respectively
h is the convective heat transfer
coefficient
The very small radiation exchange of the surface
with the surrounding ambient atmosphere has
been ignored. It has been assumed that both the
flame and surface can be considered as diffuse
grey bodies, meaning that absorptivity and
emissivity can be assumed equivalent. Many
materials, including steel and most PFP materials,
approximate to diffuse grey surfaces. A diffuse
grey surface is one which absorbs a fixed fraction
of incident radiation from any direction at any
wavelength. It also emits radiation that is a
fraction of blackbody radiation in all directions
over all wavelengths. Hence, for thermal response
34

purposes, the hemispherical total absorptivity/
emissivity of the target material is assumed to be
independent of the nature of incident radiation and
the spectral properties of the fire.
The convective heat transfer coefficient h is a
surface-averaged convective heat transfer
coefficient that is generally a function of the mean
film temperature and is therefore variable. Typical
values for jet fires are in the order
80-90 W m-2 K-1, as given in Table 4.2 - Table 4.9
and generally diminishes as the object heats up.
For guidance, emissivities for most objects are
around 0.9, but carbon steel inside the fire
impingement zone has been found to have an
emissivity around 0.65 [49].
When considering an actual object engulfed by a
fire, the flame temperature at different parts of the
object surface may vary; similarly the flame
velocities (and hence convective heat transfer
coefficient) may vary. Hence, to determine the
total heat load absorbed by an object, the equation
above should be summed over the area of the
object. The equation is particularly useful,
however, for estimating the steady local hot spot
temperature, where conduction to other parts of
the surface can be ignored.
As an object engulfed in the flame heats up, the
absorbed heat will reduce. This is particularly the
case with the convection term, which reduces
linearly with increasing object temperature.
Therefore, for an accurate transient calculation of
temperature rise of an object, the parameters
Tf ,  f and h and emissivity of the surface are
required. The emissivity may change as the
surface heats up. Typical values of these
parameters are given in Sections 3.7, 4.4, 4.8 for
different fire types and sizes.
The temperature rise T (oC) of an object of over
a length L in a small time interval t (s) is
approximated by:
∆𝑡
∆𝑇 = (𝑞 − 𝑞𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 )
𝜌𝑐𝐿 𝑎
where
 is the wall density (kg m-3),
c is the wall specific heat capacity
(J kg-1 K-1),
qa is the absorbed heat flux as before, and
qloss is the net heat loss from the object’s
back surface, which can be taken as
zero for pipes and vessels containing
vapour that are fully engulfed and for
back-insulated steel walls.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
In analyses of unprotected steel members (e.g.
beams or columns), it is useful to replace the
thickness by an average thickness V/Am where V
and Am are the volume per unit length (m2) and
surface area per unit length (m) of the fire engulfed
steel member, in which case the expression
becomes:
t Am
T  qa  qloss 
c V
The above equation can be solved numerically
using a spreadsheet and a selected time step, t ,
using the equations:
Ti+1 = Ti + Ti for i  0
where
t Am
Ti  qai  and
c V
qai   s  ( f Tf4  Tsi4 )  h (Tf  Tsi )
The conclusion from the determination of
temperature rise from a given fire scenario may be
a requirement to install passive fire protection
(PFP) to reduce the rate of temperature rise. In this
case, the outer surface of the PFP quickly reaches
the flame temperature and the steel temperature
rise is reduced by virtue of the low thermal
conductivity of the PFP. See Section 6 for general
principles of PFP.
Some PFP designs include layers of different
materials with varying physical properties which
may also vary with temperature. Intumescent
coatings swell during flame impact forming a hard
char, so the thickness of the coating changes with
time as well as its physical properties. These
factors make calculation of the required thickness
of PFP non-trivial and expert guidance should be
sought from suppliers.
5.6 Heat transfer by attachments to
protected structural steelwork
Unprotected attachments to protected structural
steelwork can conduct heat into the structural
member, thus introducing localised hot spots at the
connection with the structural steel member. The
extent of the hot spot depends on the relative
geometries of the structural member and the
attachment. It is therefore generally accepted
industry practice to extend the passive fire
protection on a primary member onto an
attachment for a given length known as the
coatback length (see Section 6.5).
35

6 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION
6.1 Objectives of passive fire
protection (PFP)
Passive fire protection materials (PFP) comprise
various forms of fire resistant insulation products
that are either used to envelope structural elements
or to form fire walls that contain or exclude fuel
from compartments. PFP materials and systems
are used to protect structures and separating
elements (firewalls, bulkheads, decks, etc.)
against the effects of fire by limiting heat transfer
from the fire source and hence maintaining their
stability/integrity/ insulation.
The PFP delays the rise in temperature to critical
levels, reduces the risk of escalation and buys time
in which safe evacuation of personnel, blow-down
of vessels, control and fire-fighting measures can
be brought into operation. On exposure to fire,
PFP is effective for a finite time, which is, to an
extent, dependent on the severity of the fire. The
general principles of PFP are detailed in
EN ISO 13702 [50]. Correct application of PFP is
very important for its effective functioning and it
is difficult to exercise control over application in
the offshore environment, especially in exposed
areas and below main deck levels. This is true for
all types of PFP, and in particular coatings.
Therefore, wherever possible for new designs,
coatings should be installed onshore under
controlled conditions.
6.2 Passive fire protection systems
There are a number of different types of PFP used
such as cementitious and intumescent coatings,
phenolic foam, composites, blankets and wrap
around systems. Those systems most commonly
used on structural steel members are cementitious
and intumescent coatings and are described below.
6.2.1 Cementitious materials
Cementitious compounds use a hydraulically
setting cement, such as Portland cement, as a
binder with a filler of good insulation properties,
e.g., vermiculite, perlite, etc. They are usually
sprayed or trowelled directly onto the surface to be
protected but may also be cast to preformed shapes
or sections. A wire mesh is required to ensure
adherence to the surface. The cementitious
material must then be sealed to prevent absorption
of water or oil.
These materials are widely used for the protection
of structural steel and for sealing/protecting
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
penetrations through panelled firewalls. The
thickness of the coating principally determines the
time it takes to transfer the heat through the
coating and the mechanical strength of the
compound determines whether the coating will
withstand the physical impact of the fire, for
example erosion from jet fire impingement or
pressure waves from explosions.
Historically, the biggest problem with use of these
coatings was that the offshore installation process
was carried out poorly, with the result that
coatings fell off or disintegrated in time or deluge
water found its way beneath coatings, leading to
corrosion problems. Products have improved
significantly since the early 1990s and recent
experience has demonstrated that, provided these
systems are installed in full compliance with the
manufacturers’ instructions, there are few
problems.
6.2.2 Intumescent coatings
Intumescent coatings have an organic base which,
when subjected to fire will expand producing a
stable 'char' with good thermal insulation
properties. Their main advantages are that they use
a thinner coating and hence are lighter in weight;
they are also less prone to water or oil absorption.
Proper preparation of surfaces to be coated with
intumescent PFP is essential for long-term
performance. Application is generally by spray
and touch-up of damaged areas is possible. Use in
underdeck or other exposed areas and particularly
in the splash zone usually requires a thin neoprene
layer under the coating and another on top to
prevent external corrosion and protect the coating.
Such thick or multi-layer coatings make
subsequent NDT inspection results extremely
difficult to interpret unless sample pieces of steel
had been taken and kept (coated and uncoated), for
calibration purposes.
Intumescent coatings are widely used, mostly for
protection of steelwork, floors, bulkheads, etc. In
areas where the coating is likely to be subjected to
powerful jets of water or hydrocarbon there are
some reservations on the resistance of the char to
erosion.
6.3 Testing and classification of
PFP systems
A critical factor in the performance of any PFP
coating is its ability to remain undamaged and in
36

position such that its ability to provide fire
protection is not impaired for the defined range of
deformations, fire, substrate temperatures, and
blast response. Substrate preparation is also very
important for satisfactory performance of PFP.
Note also that LNG introduces the hazard of
cryogenic embrittlement of steel. The very low
temperatures of LNG can cause steel to crack and
may also have an adverse effect on the
performance of PFP systems. In the event of a fire,
the temperature shock on the steel and any PFP is
much greater – firstly being super chilled during a
spill then rapidly heated on ignition of the LNG.
PFP systems are continually changing and
developing. Performance details are best obtained
directly from the manufacturer, and these should
be supported by appropriate test certificates.
6.3.1 Hydrocarbon pool fires
Heat fluxes within a pool fire range typically from
around 100 kW m-2 to peaks of 250 kWm-2
dependent on fuel type, pool size, amount of soot
produced, surface emissive power, interaction
with obstructions and environmental effects. PFP
systems to protect against pool fires must have
been tested to a recognised hydrocarbon fire test
procedure against a hydrocarbon time-
temperature curve. Acceptable test procedures
include:
 ISO/TR 834-3 [51]
 BS 476 (Parts 20, 21 and 22 – Appendix D)
[52]
The testing and assessment should be carried out
to standards such as prEN 13381-4 [53], BS 476
Part 20 [52] or equivalent.
6.3.2 Hydrocarbon jet fires
Significantly higher rates of burning are likely in
jet fires than in pool fires due to turbulent fuel/air
mixing resulting in higher heat fluxes.
Additionally, the velocity and turbulence of the jet
may be highly erosive to certain types of PFP
systems. These effects may lead to rapid and
intense localised damage and subsequent
knock-on effects such as structural collapse, loss
of containment and escalation.
Although all hydrocarbon fires generate a high
heat flux, overall, the jet fire has potentially the
greatest impact due to the combined heat fluxes
and erosive effects. Thus it represents the most
severe fire scenario that a PFP system could be
required to resist.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Heat fluxes within a jet fire range typically from
around 100 kW m-2 to 350 kW m-2 with peaks of
up to 400 kW m-2 dependent on fuel type, flow
rate, pressure turbulence, interaction with
obstructions and environmental effects.
The potential response issues of PFP materials
exposed to a jet fire can be summarised as follows:
 Cracking due to thermal shock,
 Spalling due to rapid vaporisation of any
absorbed water,
 Erosion of original materials or the char of
intumescents,
 Inhibition of the expansion of intumescents,
 Fusion of base materials, reinforcement or
fixings,
 Failure of joints and fixings.
The ability of a PFP system to withstand a jet fire
should be demonstrated by testing in accordance
with ISO 22899-1 [54] at an internationally
recognised test facility. Preparation of the test
samples and the jet fire test are normally witnessed
by independent Certification Authorities. The
specimens should resemble the intended
construction as closely as possible and include,
where appropriate, at least one joint.
Three test procedures for different configurations
of items being protected are given:
 Structural Steelwork Test - The structural
steelwork test should be used to represent the
application of PFP material to steelwork with
corners or edge features, for example I beams.
 Tubular Section Test - The tubular specimen
test should be used to represent the application
of PFP material to cylindrical vessels, pipes
and tubular sections of up to 0.50 m outside
diameter. If the outside diameter is more than
0.50 m but less than 1.00 m, then it will be
necessary to perform both the tubular section
test and the panel test.
 Panel Test - The panel test should be used to
represent applications involving panel
materials, for example cast panels used for PFP
enclosures around ESD valves and actuators.
The specimens should resemble the intended
construction as closely as possible and include,
where appropriate, at least one joint.
It is essential that the PFP system has been tested
in accordance with the test method most
representative of the specific item being protected.
37

6.3.3 Explosion resistance
It must be ensured, as far as reasonably
practicable, that PFP systems have a level of
resistance to a shock wave, overpressure, negative
pressure pulse, and the vibration associated with
an explosion. The PFP system should resist
damage that would be detrimental to its fire
protection capabilities due to deformation in a
blast.
Explosion resistance should be demonstrated by
means of real time, dynamic blast testing at an
internationally recognised testing facility on test
specimens that are representative of the specific
item being protected.
6.3.4 Weathering resistance
The PFP system should be designed and suitable
for the minimum design life of the installation. In
particular, the PFP system should be suitable for
continuous service in an offshore saliferous
marine environment in the following conditions:
 Temperature: -20°C ( or minimum
ambient local to the installation)
+30°C (or maximum ambient local to the
installation)
 Humidity: Up to 100% in highly saliferous
conditions.
 Fire Deluge: When deluged with seawater
from an active fire protection system at a
density of 12.2 litre min-1 m-2.
The PFP system should be designed to prevent the
entrapment or ponding of moisture, rainwater or
seawater from the deluge system. It should also be
capable of maintaining the fire performance over
the design life of the installation with minimum
maintenance.
Testing to a standard such as NORSOK M-501
(system 5) [55], that incorporates both weathering
and fire testing, can be used to establish the
coating system’s ability to withstand weathering
without detriment to its fire performance.
Consideration should be made for the complete
system that is tested (primer, PFP coating and any
top coat). Where a top coat is required to pass the
test, then its condition should be considered as
critical to the performance of the whole system
and it will need to be maintained over the life of
the installation.
6.3.5 Fire approvals
It is normal for the PFP manufacturer to have the
system fully assessed and certificates of Fire
Approval issued by Certifying Authorities such as
American Bureau of Shipping, Bureau Veritas,
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Det Norsk Veritas, Germanischer Lloyd and
Lloyds Register.
Certificates of Fire Approval must be appropriate
for the specific application identified. In
particular, the Certificates of Fire Approval must
be provided for the following:
 Type of structure being protected (e.g.
I-sections, hollow sections, vertical divisions
(bulkheads, firewalls), horizontal divisions
(decks).
 Type of fire the system is expected to withstand
(e.g. hydrocarbon pool fire, jet fire or
combination of both), detailing additional
thickness required (if any) to withstand the
effects of jet fire.
 Type of mesh reinforcement to be used,
including the requirements for any retention
weld pins or fixings and details of overlaps.
The thickness of the PFP system for the range of
steel section factors, duration of fire protection
and critical steel temperature limit, as specified on
project PFP drawings and schedules, should be
recorded in the certificates.
6.4 PFP performance standards
Correctly specifying the performance standard of
PFP is critical to ensuring the right level of
protection. As a minimum, the following aspects
need to be clearly identified, to allow correct
selection and specification of PFP:
 Section details
 Type – Hollow (CHS, RHS, SHS) or open
sections (I-sections, channels, angles, etc).
 Dimensions – size, mass and thicknesses to
allow section factors to be calculated.
 Sides exposed to fire – identifies whether all
sides will be exposed to fire (often referred
to as 4-sided) or if one or more sides is
unexposed, for example where top face of
beam is covered with deck plate (often
referred to as 3-sided).
 Critical temperature
Defines the maximum acceptable temperature
rise for the item being fire protected.
 Fire type and duration
It is important to identify clearly jet fire and
pool fire durations and total overall fire
duration.
 Explosion overpressures
38
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Defined in terms of overpressure, duration and
any expected deflections.
 Corrosion protection
Modern PFP coatings, properly specified and
correctly installed, act as excellent corrosion
protection barrier systems. However it is
essential that the system is considered as a
whole including primer and top coat.
Demonstration of corrosion protection should
be provided by testing to standards such as
NORSOK M-501 [55].
Guidance on the assessment of acceptance criteria
for damaged PFP coatings is available from HSE
[56].
6.5 Coatback of secondary and
tertiary attachments
Secondary and tertiary steelwork (e.g. bracing,
deck stringers and equipment supports) and steel
plate (e.g. decks or walls) which do not require
PFP but are attached to protected primary
structural steel are potential heat bridges. Flame
impingement on these items can result in heat
conduction reaching welded joints, causing a
weakening of those joints and local heating of the
primary structure which may reduce its fire
resistance. The extent of this heating and the
temperatures reached depend on the relative
geometries of the primary member and the
attachment.
Coatback is the extension of the PFP coating from
the protected primary members along secondary,
tertiary members or plate to limit local heating of
the protected member at the attachment point and
hence reduce the potential of premature failure.
Industry practice has been to apply coatback on all
secondary members and attachments, including
plate steel, for a minimum distance of 450mm
from the joint with a primary member or
separating element being protected with PFP (see
Figure 6.1).
The PFP thickness of the coatback is normally
applied at the same rating as the primary steel
member or divisional rating it is attached to; this
simplifies application and inspection as it is
generally not practicable to identify all connection
combinations at design stage. For small
attachments such as brackets for cable trays,
instrument piping and handrails, the cross
sectional area will be small and the resultant heat
transfer is not significant. Therefore, assuming
these do not cumulatively exceed 3000 mm² cross
sectional area per metre length of primary steel
section or per square metre of surface area, then
they generally do not need to be coated.
Further details can be found in the final report of a
Joint Industry Project [57], which studied the
effects of coatback on primary member
temperature using finite element analysis.

Deck Plate Coat Back

Coating thickness
same as primary
Secondary member
Attachment
Coating thickness Secondary
same as primary Attachment
member Coating thickness
Primary Member Primary Member same as primary Primary Member
Coating thickness Coating thickness member Coating thickness
Coating may follow
based on section factor based on section based on section factor
profile of primary
(A/V), fire type, fire factor (A/V), fire (A/V), fire type, fire
member or be
duration and allowable type, fire duration duration and allowable
finished off square.
critrical core and allowable critrical core
temperature critrical core temperature
temperature

Figure 6.1 Typical coatback details

FABIG Technical Note 13 39


7 ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION
7.1 General
The modern approach to active fire protection
(AFP) system design is scenario based – i.e.
designing to protect against realistic fire scenarios
(although there are still prescriptive legislative
requirements which must be complied with
depending on locale).
For a scenario based approach to work, designers
should be able to assess accurately the
performance of active water spray systems in
hydrocarbon fire situations. Water has two main
fire-fighting mechanisms which are both related to
the evaporation of water; cooling and inerting.
Blanket application of water at an arbitrary
prescribed rate is probably inefficient in most
areas and potentially ineffective in others. A more
effective approach is to concentrate the available
water in those areas of greatest hazard, and to try
and design systems “fit for purpose”.
The following sections provide guidance on the
effectiveness of water deluge in controlling or
extinguishing different fire types based on recent
experimental research.
7.2 Effect of water deluge on pool
fires
General area deluge can be effective in controlling
hydrocarbon pool fires and mitigating their
consequences. If the water reaches the liquid pool,
then:
 cooling the fuel reduces vapour evolution.
 this reduces the size of the flame, and hence the
radiative heat transfer from the flame to the
fuel surface, thereby reducing further vapour
evolution.
 the fire size is reduced.
Complete extinguishment is unlikely but
sufficient control may be achieved that manual
fire-fighting may be safely undertaken.
Deluge on the upwind side of the pool, where the
thickness of the flame is least, is more effective. In
tests involving condensate, after 10 minutes, the
flame size was reduced to a pool less than 10% of
the original area. The introduction of a small
percentage (1%) aqueous film forming foam
(AFFF) into this deluge system significantly
increased the rapidity of achieving fire control and
extinguishment.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
It should be recognised that initial activation of
deluge may cause the fuel to foam and to increase
the fuel supply to the flame, resulting in a transient
fireball. Water beneath the fuel will also tend to
make the pool spread. Spreading over surfaces,
sills and into drains increases the pool area and the
size of the fire.
Foam deluge has three main effects on liquid fuel
behaviour:
 Water in the foam acts as a heat sink, taking
heat out of the flame and the pool.
 Foam floats on the fuel surface and acts as a
barrier to heat transfer and to the flow of
vapours out of the pool, thus reducing the fire
size.
 The oxygen supply is cut-off.
Water deluge on a pool fire significantly reduces
the amount of smoke. Measurements of the
obscuration factor over a 200 mm path length in
the combustion products from a diesel pool fire
dropped from typically 20-30% to negligible
levels when the fire was deluged. CO levels at the
same location dropped from over 100 ppm v/v to
typically 10 ppm v/v.
There is no evidence that, if the water only mixes
with the smoke, the deluge ‘washes’ soot out of
the smoke, nor that the toxicity (such as CO level)
is reduced. However, the cooling effect of deluge
may reduce the smoke buoyancy and possibly
result in smoke being present at lower heights
where it may hinder the visibility for personnel
trying to escape.
The heat loading on objects engulfed in a pool fire
may be reduced by the activation of deluge,
particularly on the surfaces where a water film can
be maintained. The vulnerable areas are the
underside, where the water cannot provide
coverage, and the downwind side, where the flame
is likely to be thickest. Nevertheless, in these areas
the rate of temperature rise is likely to be reduced.
The use of dedicated vessel deluge would be
expected to protect an object engulfed in a pool
fire, especially in combination with general area
deluge which will, simultaneously, reduce the
degree of fire attack.
Water deluge also provides benefit to objects not
engulfed by the fire, by attenuating the thermal
radiation.
40

When deluge is activated over a pool fire in a
confined space, water droplets evaporate inside
the flame and at hot walls, and significantly reduce
flame temperatures. Radiation back to the pool
surface is reduced and a lower mass burning rate
results. In tests [17], a diesel pool fire initially
burning at 0.044 kg m-2 s-1 fell to 0.031 kg m-2 s-1,
a reduction of about 30%. An initially ventilation-
controlled pool fire may then become fuel-
controlled at this lower burning rate and any
external flaming is most likely to cease entirely.
The pool fire does not extinguish but continues to
burn at this lower rate and manual fire fighting
may then be a possibility.
7.3 Effect of water deluge on jet
fires
The most usual forms of active water deluge are:
 water curtains, used to protect an escape
corridor
 general area deluge
 dedicated vessel deluge
The success or otherwise of active water deluge in
mitigating the effect of jet fires depends upon:
 the nature of the jet fire (gas, liquid or
two-phase)
 the surrounding environment (confined or
open)
 the objective to be achieved (reduction of
incident thermal radiation or protection of
engulfed objects).
The activation of a general area deluge can
adversely affect the stability of high pressure gas
jet fires. However, in most practical cases, at the
industry standard deluge rate of 12 litres m-2 min-1,
this undesirable effect is unlikely to occur because
impact onto obstacles provides adequate flame
stabilisation.
Deluge has little effect on the size, shape and
thermal characteristics of a high pressure gas jet
fire. Therefore, the heat loading to engulfed
obstacles is not diminished. The same is true for
dedicated vessel deluge systems. The water is
unable to form a film over the vessel in the
presence of the high velocity jet. Dry patches form
where the temperature rise remains undiminished
[58].
The major benefit of area deluge and water
curtains is the suppression of incident thermal
radiation to the surroundings, for the protection of
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
adjacent plant and personnel. Nozzles producing
small droplet sizes can have an enhanced
mitigation effect, but there is an increased risk that
the droplets will be blown away by the wind.
The mitigation of incident radiation is due to
attenuation of radiation by the water droplets in
the atmosphere, effectively reducing the
atmospheric transmissivity. This can be
characterised by the water volume fraction, Wf,
given by:
N VW
Wf 
60000AW U W
where
N is the number of nozzles in deluge area
VW is the water flowrate through each
nozzle (litres/min)
AW is the area deluged (m2)
UW is the water droplet velocity (m s-1)
Note that as smaller droplets will have a lower
terminal velocity than large droplets, the water
volume fraction will be comparatively higher for
small droplets. Multiplying Wf by the pathlength
through the deluged area (that is, the ‘thickness’ of
the water curtain Cw) gives a measure of the
average water pathlength.
Figure 7.1 presents data on the reduction in
incident radiation as a function of average water
pathlength for a range of nozzles types: TF12-170,
producing low velocity droplets with a Sauter
mean diameter of 300 micron; HV60, producing
droplets in the range 670-750 micron depending
on the operating pressure; MV57, producing
droplets 640-870 micron; and a prototype Large
Droplet Nozzle (LDN), producing droplets about
1890 micron. The equation fitted to the data is:
1005W f C w
Reduction in radiation = 100(1  e )
Deluge of confined jet fires at typical offshore
application rates (10-12 litres m-2 min-1) may lead
to flame extinguishment and hence a serious
explosion hazard from the continuing release
[15,31]. In the case of a two-phase jet fire,
extinguishment may result in a mist-air explosion
hazard and/or the formation of a liquid pool. The
likelihood of flame extinguishment is significantly
increased if the surroundings are already hot at the
time the deluge is activated as the main
mechanism which results in extinguishment of the
jet fire is ‘inerting’, that is evaporation of the water
droplets, leading to a confined mixture of
41

vapour/air/steam that is outside the flammable
limits. The water vapour may also contribute to
flame instability by reducing the burning velocity.
However, if the deluge is activated at an early
stage, i.e. within one or two minutes, before the
compartment walls and contents heat up, then the
fire is unlikely to be extinguished, but flame
temperatures are significantly reduced. For
example, in tests the average smoke layer
temperature fell to below 200oC within 2 minutes,
and then steadied at around 100oC. External
flames become intermittent in the case of
fuel-controlled jet fires, but are otherwise
extinguished and are replaced by copious smoke
and steam.
Compared to the situation with a gas jet fire, the
use of dedicated vessel deluge to protect a vessel
against a flashing liquid jet fire (e.g. propane,
butane) can be more effective. The water interacts
with the flame to some extent; reducing the flame
luminosity and the amount of smoke produced.
Nevertheless, at typical application rates
(10-15 litres m-2 min-1) it cannot be relied upon to
maintain a water film over the vessel and hence to
prevent vessel temperature rise in areas where dry
Figure 13: Effectiveness of Water Deluge in Reducing Incident
100
90
Reduction in radiation (%)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 0.0005 0.001
Average Water Pathlength (m)
Figure 7.1 Effectiveness of water deluge in reducing incident radiation.
(The key shows nozzle type and deluge rate in l m-2 min-1)
7.4 Variations on traditional deluge
systems
7.4.1 General area deluge
For areas of perceived high risk, conventional
water spray deluge systems may be used with
increased application rates of 20-24 l min-1 m-2;
such high rates are most common in wellbay areas.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
patches form. Even so, the rate of rise may be
expected to reduce to 20-70% of the rate without
deluge for a propane jet fire. However, in tests
with an increased water application of
30 litres m-2 min-1, a 2 tonne LPG tank was
effectively protected when subjected to a 2 kg s-1
flashing propane jet fire [59].
For two-phase jet fires of ‘live’ crude, dedicated
deluge (at 10-12 litres m-2 min-1) offers limited
protection and no reduction in the rate of
temperature rise in the area where the fire impacts
the obstacle [34,60]. An area deluge rate of
24 litres m-2 min-1 results in water interacting with
the flame. The flame is shorter and heat fluxes are
reduced to the engulfed object, particularly to the
front (where flame impact occurs) and top areas.
Thus, the combination of area deluge (at the high
rate) and dedicated vessel deluge can be effective
in reducing overall heat fluxes to a vessel such that
the temperature rise is halted or at least is reduced.
This may prevent vessel failure, especially if
combined with a blow-down strategy.
Radiation
MV57 @ 12
MV57 @ 18
MV57 @ 24
HV60 @ 12
TF12 @ 12
TF12 @ 18
LDN @ 12
LDN @ 24
0.0015 0.002 0.0025 0.003
Unquantifiable benefits which may arise from the
high-level general area deluge systems are:
 high-level sprays may ‘knock down’ high-level
fire plumes from pool fires, reducing ceiling
temperatures to around 450°C. This effect will
be dependent on the fuel, air supply,
obstructions and turbulence of the up-draught.
42

No procedure is available to assess this effect
at present.
 the even application of water to the surface of
a vaporising pool of hydrocarbon will reduce
the rate of vaporisation, but again the effect is
difficult to quantify. High water application
rates to dead crude or non-vaporising oils can
cool and may even extinguish a pool fire.
However, perhaps of more general benefit,
they will flush the oil into the drainage system,
so disposing part of the release. Clearly in areas
where pool fires are possible, the drainage
system must be designed to cope with the full
rate of deluge, plus a margin for additional
hoses and the oil inventory.
7.4.2 Specific deluge
A second variation is the use of specific deluge
instead of, or to augment, the general area
protection. In this case, individual items of plant,
such as vessels, heat exchangers, etc., are
protected as described in BS EN ISO 13702 [11]
NFPA 15 [17]. These designs surround the
equipment with a network of medium velocity
nozzles spaced at 2-2.5 m and some 0.6 m from
the surface. Complex packages may be treated in
a similar way by directing the sprays to the
surfaces of an imaginary box enclosing the
package. Application rates from 10-15 l min-1 m-2
are used.
For the specific protection of items of plant some
operators have chosen to arrange the deluge as a
series of smaller systems. These can be used
individually for a small fire, or a group can be used
simultaneously for a large conflagration. This is
the ‘scenario’ approach that has enabled the ‘open
module’ philosophy to be used rather than the
‘reference area’ method. Fire pumps are sized to
accommodate the worst of a series of perceived
scenarios in which a number of the smaller
systems are used. At present these scenarios are
based on the designer's perception of the scale of
the fire and the flame spread. This method could
continue to be used when more accurate fire
models are available; as could the multiple deluge
approach.
7.4.3 Jet fires deluge
Jet fires fed either by liquid or gas are very
difficult if not impossible to extinguish. Isolation
of the source and depressurisation are the primary
actions to be employed. Once the pressure has
been reduced, the fire will revert to a running
and/or pool fire if the source is liquid. The fire can
then be extinguished using fire-fighting foam, dry
powder or Dual Agent. In the case of high pressure
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
jet fires it may be important to consider the
effectiveness of deluge because gaps in
knowledge do exist; e.g. due to the kinetic energy
of the jet a situation may arise were the jet fire
penetrates the deluge. Under such circumstances,
heat transfer to engulfed objects will not be
mitigated and the deluge will possibly be
ineffective.
Recent theoretical study in this area of activity has
centred on the investigation of water spray
requirements for protecting structures exposed to
impinging jet fires [36]. Results based on a range
of conditions across those anticipated inside LPG
jet fires suggest that:
 water mass fluxes far in excess of current
requirement for cooling installations may be
required for jet fire protection.
 the time delay for system activation should be
minimised.
 consideration should particularly be given to
in-flight evaporation and cross-stream losses
particularly for initial water droplet sizes of
less than 0.5 mm in diameter.
Model results indicate the use of high velocity
nozzles or portable water monitors may be the
most appropriate for combating jet fire
impingement. The high velocity nozzles are
capable of delivering the required flow rates and
producing droplets larger than 1 mm in diameter.
In the case of water monitors, although the
envisaged flow rates can be achieved, further
investigation is required, in particular concerning
minimum approach distance and area to be
covered.
7.4.4 Wellhead deluge
Recently, wellheads have been protected by
specific deluge at rates up to 400 l min-1 using 3-4
nozzles located around each wellhead, directed to
spray up onto the christmas tree. All drilled and
completed wellheads should be protected and
fire-water pump capacity should be such that spare
capacity is available for proposed or non-
producing wellheads.
7.4.5 Wall deluge
Spray cooling has been applied to firewalls to
enhance their inherent passive fire protection. This
has been applied in three ways:
 a single row of 'window drenchers', having a
flat wide spray, at a rate of 10-20 l min-1 m-2 of
wall. This usually breaks to form rivulets
43

within 3-4 m and is therefore not effective for
high walls.
 medium velocity nozzles directed at the wall
on a 2 m horizontal and 3 m vertical pitch; this
gives a full, even, coverage of the wall.
 utilising a deliberate overspray from the
adjacent general area; it is not effective on high
walls.
The main disadvantage of such systems at present
is that there is no accepted procedure of estimating
the improvement of fire-resistance of the-firewall.
7.5 Large bore deluge nozzles
In an attempt to minimise the problems of nozzle
clogging, larger bore nozzles (having flows of
200-450 litres/min) and free-flow nozzles have
been used, particularly for specific deluge systems
aimed at packages such as pumps, compressors,
manifolds, etc.
In general, these nozzles have higher application
rates, together with larger droplet sizes. As a
consequence, a more effective system may result.
However, there is no scientific evidence to support
this approach.
7.5.1 Water deluge system blockage,
shock and explosion damage
There has been increasing concern over the
blockage of fixed water deluge systems. Like
hoses, they have small bore nozzles and piping.
Although most systems are normally dry beyond
the deluge valve set, the use of seawater-for the
periodic testing leads to corrosion and scale
formation, which can build up and cause
blockages.
Earlier platforms used galvanized or even plain
steel pipes for the ring mains and range piping.
More recently, Kunifer, or similar alloys resistant
to seawater corrosion, have become widely used
for the firewater mains, but less commonly for the
small bore range piping where galvanising is still
most common. GFRP and GFRE is also being
considered/used in current applications.
Elastomeric piping systems may also be used.
Hydraulic shocks arise from the initial filling of
the dry system. Pressure shocks generated need to
be calculated and the results considered in the
design of the piping system and its supports.
Throttling the flow and allowing a slower pressure
build-up will minimise shock effects, but this may
be unacceptable, as it would delay the firewater
system in reaching operational pressure.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
7.6 Vulnerability to explosion
The vulnerability of the deluge system to
explosion must be considered. The system must be
able to retain its operational capacity in the event
of overpressures. This of course applies to all parts
of the system wherever they may be located. Siting
of the firewater pumps and their protection is
critical.
7.7 Hoses and monitors
Legislation requires that, in addition to the fixed
spray systems, hydrants be provided such that any
part of the module can be reached by a hose from
two different directions. These can supply
considerably greater volumes of water than the
comparatively small diameter 'live' hoses which
are usually sited close to a point of exit and are
provided to allow manual intervention to a small
fire which might not justify the operation of the
full deluge system.
Flat hoses may be useful in providing assistance to
the deluge, as their jets can be directed to the point
of greatest need. In the hands of a trained fire-
fighting team, a hose with its variable jet/spray,
and perhaps foam capability, is potentially a very
efficient tool in fighting certain types of fire.
However, for large module fires, fire-fighting
using platform based hoses is unlikely to have a
significant effect.
There are some areas on a platform where
overhead deluge systems cannot be installed, e.g.,
the helideck. In these cases, it is normal to use
‘monitors’ or fixed hoses, which may be fitted
with an automatic oscillating mechanism as well
as manual control. Like hoses, they have the
advantage of adjusting the nozzle from a solid jet
to a fine spray and often foam may be used.
Monitors are also often installed for protection of
equipment on exposed upper decks where strong
winds may render deluge systems ineffective.
Generally, the number and positions of the
monitors is selected to give adequate two-
directional cover to all perceived hazards.
Some operators have used monitors in wellhead
areas where the ability to target high application
rates to individual wellheads has been preferred to
a general deluge.
7.8 Foam systems
Foams are widely used against liquid fires. The
foam initially acts as a smothering agent and then,
as the water drains away from the foam, as a
cooling agent.
44

Foams are water-based and include:
 Chemical foam
 Protein-based mechanical foam
o Standard, low expansion foam
o High expansion foam
o Medium expansion foam
 Special foams
o Fluorochemical foam
o Fluoroprotein foam
o Detergent foam
The delivery of foam to a fire is by the same means
as water. Usually this is from fixed systems such
as foam-water spray. The basic method of foam
generation is by the aspiration of air into the
solution.
Foam is generally appropriate for fires of
flammable liquids. Low expansion foam is used
mainly to control and extinguish fires in storage
tank tops, bunds and on spills.
As the properties, aside from density, are very
similar to water, the compatibility of foam with
various hazardous areas is the same as water and
therefore is not suitable for fires of electrical
equipment or water reactive substances.
The surface of the hazard area must be horizontal.
The temperature must be below 100°C, to avoid
the generation of steam, which would result in the
potentially undesirable effect of further expanding
the foam.
Legislation requires that a foam system be
installed for protection of the helideck from an
aviation fuel fire. Many operators use similar
systems within modules, where the main fire
hazard is perceived to be a pool or running fire.
Plain water spray systems are not effective in
extinguishing pool fires, as the oil floats on the
water and continues to burn. If foam is introduced,
this has a lower density than the oil and will float
on the surface, thus starving it of oxygen and
eventually extinguishing it.
Many installations have a provision to add foam
concentrate into the deluge systems. In most cases,
this is applied to areas with a high inventory of
liquid hydrocarbons. Foam may be added either to
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
the individual deluge system from a specific foam
tank and introduction system, or there may be
provision to add foam concentrate at a
predetermined rate into the fire ring main. In both
cases, accurate control and metering of the foam
concentrate injection is essential, to give effective
performance. Note that foam may not always be
required and that it is therefore desirable to be able
to control foam generation independently from
water deluge.
In either case, there should be sufficient foam
concentrate to run the system at full flow for a
predetermined period, which may vary from 15 to
60 minutes dependent upon the designer's
appreciation of the fire hazard and his perception
of the way the system would be used. In practice,
extinguishment cannot be guaranteed unless fuel
source isolation and depressurisation has taken
place. Given that the application rates are twice
those used in onshore foam systems, there is a
good chance of extinguishing a running fire, as
well as a pool fire, provided that any dissolved gas
has been released and the oil stabilised. Although
foam systems are provided on condensate
platforms, it is recognised that extinguishment of
the fire, which will burn as a fire at low pressure,
is difficult.
Almost without exception, operators use AFFF
(Aqueous Film Forming Fluroprotein) type foam
concentrates. In general, very high deluge rates are
required, necessitating the use of large quantities
of foam with the associated weight penalty. Some
manufacturers now produce a 1 % concentrate to
reduce this storage capacity.
There is much published information on the
results of tests by the manufacturers of their
products, on the use of kerosene or petrol pool
fires in an open environment. This data should be
used with caution when considering an actual
platform scenario. Where direct foam injection is
not used, in the deluge systems, manual hose
facilities are normally provided. These allow the
application of aspirated foam to secure unignited
oil spills.
7.9 Water sprays and mist systems
Operationally water spray and water mist systems
are the same as water deluge, but with spray
patterns that are designed to protect a specific
hazard.
Generating a mist creates a larger total surface
area of water exposed to the fire, which better
facilitates the transfer of heat and reduces the
temperature of the flame. Water mist systems are
45

used primarily where water damage may be a
concern or where water supplies are limited. The
system uses compressed gas as an atomizing
medium which is pumped though the sprinkler.
Water sprays and mists have long been considered
as means of mitigation of fires and explosions and
water and foam are still the primary fire-fighting
agent. Their areas of application include;
 Liquid fuel pool fires;
 Storage tank cooling;
 Radiation barriers;
 Jet fires;
 Hydrocarbon mist/ coal mine explosions;
 Dilution of flammable mixtures;
 Vapour cloud explosions
In high pressure water mist systems, high pressure
mist is generated by constant pressure electric or
diesel pumps with pressures up to 140 bar or by
pressurised gas cylinders. Droplet sizes are below
200µm and penetration distance can be 7-8 m
horizontally and further vertically. This gives the
mist the superior property of being a replacement
for gaseous systems, especially as some gaseous
systems (e.g. CO2) are harmful to people. High
pressure mist systems have very high cooling,
inerting and radiant heat blocking efficiency. 90 %
of high pressure mist systems have droplet size of
under 10 µm.
7.10 DIFFS system
A Deck Integrated Fire Fighting System (DIFFS)
involves foam or water, which is piped to multiple
nozzles installed flush with the helideck surface.
In case of fire, these nozzles automatically
protrude and spray water or foam evenly onto the
deck. DIFF systems offer several advantages over
fixed monitors:
 Rescue crews can work concurrently instead of
being stuck behind monitors
 Automatic operation
 Uniform spray, more efficient and not affected
by wind
 The provision of multiple nozzles makes it less
likely for blockage to occur
The foam DIFFS system consists of an electric
operated deluge valve, pop-up spray nozzles,
remote manual stations, UV/IR flame detectors,
deluge valve release panel, foam storage tank
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
containing foam concentrate 1% or 3% AFFF and
a turbine foam proportioner.
The corrosion resistant spray nozzles are spaced
evenly across the helideck and sit flush with its
surface to provide an optimal and even coverage
of the helideck surface. The nozzles do not present
any trip hazard as they protrude only a few mm
above deck.
The unit is capable of being activated either
manually (by way of the remote manual stations)
or automatically (by way of UV/IR flame
detectors). All units have multiple activation
methods, with the most common being automatic
activation with remote, manual override buttons.
Upon detection of a fire via the UV/IR flame
detectors, or on manual activation, a foam-water
mixture will be released through the deluge valve-
foam inductor unit, through the firewater piping
network and to the pop-up spray nozzles. The
water spray will reach up to 7 m in height above
the deck in the shape of a semi-sphere, giving 3-
dimensional protection and providing coverage
for the helicopter engines, in case of an engine fire.
The nozzles are spaced evenly across the deck to
give a design density of 6.5 l min/m2 of the
helideck surface (other densities may be used).
When the system is shut down and reset, the
pipework will be drained and the nozzles will drop
back into the closed position, effectively closing
the nozzle to prevent dirt and debris from entering
the pipework.
7.11 Gaseous systems
7.11.1 Halon
Traditional gaseous fire suppression systems like
Halon 1301 and 1211 were decommissioned in
1994 under the Clean Air Act, due to the presence
of CFC’s.
7.11.2 Inert gas fire suppression systems
Inert gas fire suppression systems may have a
single location for cylinder storage. As inert gas
mixtures are non-fogging, they are ideal for
occupied spaces because escape routes remain
visible. Inert gas systems also pose no risk to
equipment and are a viable choice for areas where
electrical equipment is present and where deluge
systems would be less suitable. They work by
starving the fire of oxygen. They are potentially
more hazardous to personnel. However, if
designed into a platform from the outset, they are
an effective fire suppressant system.
46

7.11.3 Carbon dioxide systems
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is an inert, odourless and
colourless gas at room temperature. It acts by
reducing oxygen concentration in the area being
protected. Carbon dioxide was used as one of the
very first extinguishing agents within fixed
installations. It offers the advantage of being an
effective extinguisher for electrical fires,
flammable liquids and greasy substances
IG55 or “Argonite” is an argon/nitrogen mix in
50:50 ratio. It is used in branded systems such as
“Pyroshield”. The system can be used to reduce
oxygen concentration to below 15% to supress
fire.
INERGEN® (or IG541) is a mixture of nitrogen,
argon and carbon dioxide gases (50%:42%:8%)
and has been specially developed to provide fire
protection as a Halon 1301 replacement.
INERGEN extinguishes fire and prevents re-
ignition by reducing the oxygen level in a room to
below 15%, the point at which most combustibles
will no longer burn. INERGEN discharges
through specially designed nozzles with discharge
detectors to minimize turbulence in the protected
area.
Most inert gas systems discharge from the
containers at high pressure, and then use pressure
reducing valves further down the piping network
to reduce the pressure to 60/70 bar. This system
layout requires both high-pressure and low-
pressure piping to handle the gas as it travels to the
discharge nozzle.
The “ProInert” system contains a cylinder valve
that automatically reduces the pressure of the gas
at discharge. This provides an ideal discharge
pressure and maintains a constant flow rate of
argon/nitrogen mixtures throughout the system.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
7.12 Chemical fire suppression
systems
Chemical fire suppression systems work by
discharging molecules that absorb heat so that the
temperature of the flame falls to a point below
which it cannot propagate and the fire is
extinguished. There are generally two widely
available chemical agents for fire suppression:
FM200 (HFC277ea, 1,1,1,2,3,3,3-
heptafluoropopane) and
NOVEC 1230 (CF3C2C=OCF(CF3)2);
Alternative chemical fire suppression systems
include:
HFC-125 (pentafluoroethane) which works by
absorbing heat energy at a molecular level faster
than it can be generated Although it has zero ozone
depletion potential, it has high global warming
potential, reported by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as 3450
times that of carbon dioxide.
The Clean agent FS 49 C2 is an extinguishing gas
mixture that suppresses fire while maintaining
breathable concentrations of oxygen in the air.
This makes it possible to extinguish a fire with less
danger to people in the room than a pure carbon
dioxide (CO2) based fire suppression system,
which is deadly to humans when released. It is a
gaseous mixture of 60-80% trifluoroethane, 10-
30% pentafluoroethane and 10-30% CO2. Filling
the volume of an area 12% with FS 49 C2 is
sufficient to extinguish flames. Time taken for
discharge is 8 seconds on offshore installations
and 10 seconds onshore.
47

8 EUROCODE APPROACH TO FIRE RESISTANT DESIGN
8.1 Designing with the Eurocodes
The Structural Eurocodes are a set of structural
design standards, developed by the European
Standards body CEN to cover the design of all
types of structures in steel, concrete, timber,
masonry and aluminium. There are ten separate
Structural Eurocodes, the relevant ones to this
Technical Note are:
EN 1990 Eurocode: Basis of structural design
EN 1991 Eurocode 1: Actions on structures
EN 1993 Eurocode 3: Design of steel structures
EN 1990 [61] can be considered as the ‘core’
document of the Eurocode system as it establishes
the principles and requirements for the safety,
serviceability and durability of structures. It also
describes the basis for structural design and
verification. It includes Requirements, Principles
of limit state design, Basic variables, Structural
analysis and design assisted by testing, and
Verification by the partial safety factor method.
The general principle that was adopted in drafting
the Eurocodes was that there would be no
duplication of Principles or Application Rules in
the various parts. Thus the design basis in
EN 1990 applies irrespective of the construction
material and the type of structure.
Characteristic values of actions (the Eurocode
term used to describe loads) are given in the
various Parts of EN 1991. The design of building
structures is likely to need to make reference to
most, if not all, of the seven ‘General’ Parts:
EN 1991-1-1 General actions. Densities,
self-weight, imposed loads for
buildings
EN 1991-1-2 General actions. Actions on
structures exposed to fire
EN 1991-1-3 General actions. Snow loads
EN 1991-1-4 General actions. Wind actions
EN 1991-1-5 General actions. Thermal actions
EN 1991-1-6 General actions. Actions during
execution
EN 1991-1-7 General actions. Accidental actions
The methods given in EN 1991-1-2 [62] should be
used to determine the thermal and mechanical
actions that act on structures exposed to fire. The
values of these actions should be used when
carrying out fire engineering design to Part 1-2 of
the relevant material Eurocode (e.g EN 1993-1-2
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
for structural fire design of steel structures). The
actions are considered to be accidental actions.
EN 1993-1 Eurocode 3. Design of steel structures
gives generic design rules for use with the other
parts of EN 1993 for steel structures. EN 1993-1
comprises twelve parts (EN 1993-1-1 to
EN 1993-1-12). When designing a structure of
rolled sections and plate girders the following
parts of EN 1993-1 will be required:
EN 1993-1-1 General rules and rules for buildings
EN 1993-1-2 Structural fire design
EN 1993-1-5 Plated structural elements
EN 1993-1-8 Design of joints
EN 1993-1-10 Material toughness and
through-thickness properties
Other Parts of EN 1993 include those relating to
(thin gauge) cold formed members and sheeting,
and to stainless steel members.
The Eurocode Parts contain two distinct types of
statement – ‘Principles’ and ‘Application Rules’.
The former must be followed, to achieve
compliance; the latter are rules that will achieve
compliance with the Principles but it is
permissible to use alternative design rules,
provided that they accord with the Principles.
Within the text of the Eurocode, provision is made
for national choice in the setting of some factors
and in the choice of some design methods (i.e. the
selection of particular Application Rules); the
choices are generally referred to as Nationally
Determined Parameters (NDP) and these are
published in the National Annex to the Part.
8.1.1 National Annexes
Each of the Eurocodes are published in several
Parts and each Part will be accompanied by a
National Annex that implements the
CEN document and adds certain country-specific
provisions. Where the opportunity is given in the text
of the Eurocode, the National Annex will:
 Specify the value of a factor
 Specify which design method to use
 State whether an informative annex may be
used
Although the NA may specify the value of partial
factors to be applied to actions and resistances, in
48
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

many cases it simply accepts the value moment, axial force, shear,
recommended in the Eurocode text. etc.

In addition, the National Annex may give “Verification” = check

references to publications that contain
non-contradictory complementary information “Execution” = construction (fabrication,
(NCCI) that will assist the designer (see below). erection, etc.)

The guidance given in a National Annex applies to 8.1.4 Eurocode symbols

structures that are to be constructed within that The Eurocode system uses the ISO convention for
country. National Annexes are likely to differ symbols and subscripts. Where multiple subscripts
between countries within Europe. occur, a comma is used to separate them. Four
main subscripts and their definitions are given
The National Annexes for the country where the below:
structure is to be constructed should always be
consulted in the design of a structure. Eurocode Definition Example
Subscript
8.1.2 Non-contradictory complementary Ed Design value of MEd Design bending
information (NCCI) an effect moment

Non-contradictory complementary information Rd Design resistance MRd Design resistance

for bending
(NCCI) is guidance that will assist the designer
el Elastic property Wel Elastic section
when designing a structure to the Eurocodes. modulus
According to CEN rules, a National Annex cannot
pl Plastic property Wpl Plastic section
contain NCCI, but references to publications modulus
containing NCCI may be given. As the name
suggests, any guidance that is referenced in the
Note also that Eurocodes use a comma in place of
National Annex must not contradict the principles
a decimal point.
of the Eurocode.
8.1.5 Geometrical axes
The Eurocodes omit some design guidance where
it is considered to be readily available in text The convention for member axes and section
books or other established sources. Publications dimensions used in the Eurocodes are shown in
that contain such design guidance may be Figure 8.1.
referenced in the National Annex as NCCI. b
z
Additionally, BSI is publishing NCCI guidance in
the form of ‘Published Documents’ (PDs). These tw Major axis y-y
documents are only informative and do not have Minor axis z-z
the status of a Standard. h d y y Longitudinal

8.1.3 Eurocode terminology axis of element x-x

Some of the terminology used in the Eurocodes r tf
will be new to UK designers, but terms have been
z
chosen carefully, for clarity and to facilitate
unambiguous translation into other languages. The
presentation of symbols has also been rigorously Figure 8.1 Axis convention and symbols for
defined (although not always consistently applied) principal dimensions
and some conventions are different.
8.1.6 Limit state design
The chief differences in terminology are: The principles of limit state design are set out in
“Actions” = loads, imposed displacements, EN 1990 and the relevant design situations are
thermal strains classified as:
Persistent Conditions of normal use.
“Effects” = internal bending moments,
axial forces etc. Transient Temporary conditions e.g. during
repair.
“Resistance” = capacity of a structural Accidental Exceptional conditions applicable to
element to resist bending the structure or to its exposure, e.g. to
fire, explosion or impact.

FABIG Technical Note 13 49


Seismic Conditions applicable to the structure
when subjected to seismic events.
Ultimate and serviceability limit states are defined
and the requirement that verifications (checks)
shall be carried out is stated.
8.1.7 Basic variables
Actions are classified as:
Permanent e.g. Self-weight of structural
actions members, fixed equipment and
indirect actions such as
shrinkage
Variable e.g. Imposed floor loads, wind
actions loads.
Accidental e.g. Explosions, vehicle impact.
actions
The definition of the characteristic value of an
action is given for each class of action, in relation
to its probability of occurrence. EN 1990 also
states that material and product properties are
represented by characteristic values.
Characteristic values are defined in the relevant
material Eurocode Parts, either based on statistical
values from test results or, more commonly, in
relation to values specified in a product standard.
8.2 Verification by partial factor
method
8.2.1 Design values
Design values of actions, material properties and
resistances are defined in relation to specific
partial factors applied to characteristic values.
EN 1990 generally refers to two classes of partial
factors:
F applied as a multiplier to the
characteristic value of an action
M applied as a divisor to the characteristic
value of a material property (member
resistance). Ultimate limit states
The following ultimate limit states are required to
be verified:
EQU Loss of static equilibrium of the
structure or a structural element
STR Failure or excessive deformation of a
structure or structural element
GEO Failure or excessive deformation of
the ground where the strengths of soil
or rock are significant in providing
resistance
FAT Fatigue failure of the structure or
structural elements.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Note: The EQU limit state does not normally need
to be considered for building structures (other
than for holding down bolts in some situations).
The combination of actions for the FAT limit state
are given in the material Eurocodes (EN 1992 to
EN 1999).
For the STR and GEO limit states, the basic
requirement is expressed generally as:
Ed  Rd
where:
Ed is the design value of the effect of actions
such as internal force, moment or a
vector representing several internal
forces or moments;
Rd is the design value of the corresponding
resistance.
The effects of actions depends on the
combinations of actions that can occur and
EN 1990 gives expressions for the effects for three
classes of combination of actions at the ultimate
limit state:
 Fundamental combinations (for persistent and
transient situations)
 Combinations for accidental situations
 Combinations for seismic situations.
8.2.2 Fundamental combinations of
actions
EN 1990 gives the two alternative methods to
determine the design value of the effects of
combined actions. Assuming prestressing actions
are not present, the design value may be
determined from either expression 6.10 in
EN 1990 or from the less favourable of
expressions 6.10a and 6.10b.
The first method is to express the combination of
actions as:
  G, j G k, j " "  Q,1 Q k,1 "  "   Q, i  0, i Q k, i
j 1 i 1
(6.10 in EN 1990)
The second method is to give two expressions for
the combination of actions:
  G, j G k, j "  "  Q,1  0,1 Q k,1 "  "   Q, i  0, i Q k, i
j 1 i 1
(6.10a in EN 1990)
  j  G, j G k, j "  "  Q,1 Q k,1 "  "   Q, i  0, i Q k, i
j 1 i 1
(6.10b in EN 1990)
50
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

where: second method (the use of expressions 6.10a and

“+” means “to be combined with”
 implies “the combined effect of”
Gk,j represents the characteristic value of the
j-th unfavourable permanent action
Qk,1 is the characteristic value of leading
variable action (‘main accompanying
action’ in 6.10a)
Qk,i represents the characteristic value of the
i-th accompanying variable actions (i >
1)
G Q are representations of the factor F
according to the type of action to which
they relate
6.10b) will produce the lower design values of the
effects of actions (and for buildings, 6.10b usually
gives the governing value).
When determining the most onerous combination
of actions for a design situation where more than
one independent variable action occurs, each
variable action in turn should be considered as
either the ‘leading’, or ‘main accompanying’
variable action. Further guidance on the
application of the load combination expressions is
given in [63].
Annex A of EN 1990 gives the following
recommended values of the factors  and  for the
STR and GEO limit states:

 is a factor applied to an accompanying G, j = 1.35 (for unfavourable effects)

action
 is a reduction factor applied to
unfavourable permanent actions (in
6.10b)
The National Annex for the country in which the
structure is to be constructed must be consulted for
guidance on which method to use. In the UK, the
National Annex allows either approach to be used.
However, in almost all situations the use of the
Q,1 = Q,i = 1.5 (for unfavourable effects)
ξ = 0.85
The UK NA gives identical values except
ξ = 0.925.
EN 1990 gives different ψ factors for various
variable loading categories (see Table 8.1). These
values are based on statistical data derived from
the load characteristics and variation on structures.

Table 8.1 Selection of recommended values of some  factors given in EN 1990

Action 0 1 2
Imposed loads in buildings, category (see EN 1991-1-1)
Category B: office areas 0.7 0.5 0.3
Category C: congregation (assembly) areas 0.7 0.7 0.6
Category E: storage areas 1.0 0.9 0.8
Category H: roofs 0 0 0
Snow loads on buildings (see EN 1991-1-3)*
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden 0.7 0.5 0.2
Remainder of CEN Member States, for sites located at altitude H>1000m.a.s.l. 0.7 0.5 0.2
Remainder of CEN Member States, for sites located at altitude H1000m.a.s.l. 0.5 0.2 0
Wind loads on buildings (see EN 1991-1-4) 0.6 0.2 0
Temperature (non-fire) in buildings (see EN 1991-1-5) 0.6 0.5 0
Note:  values may be set by the National Annex. The UK NA gives identical values to those above except:
0 = 0.7 for Category H roofs but see EN 1991-1-1, clause 3.3.2(1).
0 = 0.5 for wind loads
*For countries not mentioned above, see relevant local conditions

FABIG Technical Note 13 51


8.2.3 Accidental combinations of
actions
The occurrence of a fire is considered to be an
accidental design situation, commonly referred to
as the Fire Limit State. The actions to be
considered, and the partial factors applied to them,
reflect the probability that once a fire breaks out,
some variable loads decrease or vanish, e.g. live
loading due to evacuation of personnel.
Assuming prestressing actions are not present, the
following combination of actions applies at the
Fire Limit State:
G k, j "  " A d "  "  1 , 1 or  2 , 1  Q k , 1 "  "
j1
(based on 6.11b in EN 1990)
where
Ad is the indirect thermal action due to fire
Indirect actions (Ad) are caused by restrained
thermal expansions, thermal gradients through a
cross-section inducing thermal stresses, etc; they
can be ignored if simple calculation models are
being used to analyse the structure.
EN 1991-1-2 gives a choice between the use of the
1 factor (frequent value of variable action) or 2
factor (quasi-permanent value of variable action)
on the leading variable action, although it
recommends the use of the quasi-permanent factor
2. The UK National Annex recommends the use
of the more conservative frequent value 1.
Note that, where particular risks of fire arise as a
consequence of other accidental actions (i.e. a fire
following a gas explosion), then the overall risk
should be considered when determining the
overall safety concept of the structure.
8.2.4 Resistance of steel structures at
ultimate limit state (ULS)
EN 1993 uses several partial factors, M , that:
in the determination of design
resistance at ULS. The recommended
values of the most common factors are
given in Table 8.2.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Table 8.2 Recommended values of M in
EN 1993-1-1
For resistance of: Symbol Value
(EN 1993-1-1 and
UK NA)
Cross-sections to M0 1.0
excessive yielding
including buckling
Members to instability M1 1.0
assessed by member
checks
8.3 Scope of Eurocode for
 2 ,i Q k ,i
structural fire design of steel
i 1 structures
EN 1993-1-2 deals with the design of steel
structures for the accidental situation of fire
exposure and is intended to be used in conjunction
with EN 1991-1-2 (for determining fire actions).
The methods in EN 1993-1-2 are applicable to
structural steel grades S235, S275, S355, S420 and
S460 in EN 10025 [64] and all grades of
EN 10210 [65] and 10219 [66]. The methods
given are also applicable to cold-formed steel
members and sheeting, and also to stainless steel.
EN 1993-1-2 only identifies differences from, or
supplements to, normal temperature design, which
is covered in other parts of EN 1993-1. It also only
deals with passive methods of fire protection.
EN 1993-1-2 applies to steel structures that are
required to fulfil a load bearing function if
exposed to fire, in terms of avoiding premature
collapse of the structure. It does not include rules
for separating elements required to resist the
penetration of flames and hot gases, such as fire
walls.
Note that in addition to assessing the load-bearing
performance in a fire, preventing excessive
deformation of members on offshore platforms is
also important, for example it should be verified
 No part of the structure impinges on critical
operation equipment
 Deformations do not cause collapse of piping
and vessel supports
 Deformations do not cause collapse of any part
of the structure that supports the Temporary
Refuge (TR), escape routes and embarkation
points.
52

8.4 Fire design procedures in the
Eurocodes
To evaluate the fire performance of a structural
element involves four main steps, summarised
below:
1. Evaluate the thermal action, i.e. the intensity
of the fire to which the structural element
will be exposed.
2. Evaluate the thermal response, i.e. the
temperature-time history of the element for a
given thermal action.
3. Evaluate the mechanical action, i.e. the load
that the member is likely to have to support
during a fire.
4. Evaluate the mechanical response, i.e. the
resistance of the member given its
temperature-time history.
A full analytical procedure for structural fire
design would take into account the behaviour of
the structural system at elevated temperatures, the
potential heat exposure and the beneficial effects
of active and passive fire protection systems,
together with the uncertainties associated with
these three features and the importance of the
structure (i.e. consequences of failure). However,
such an analysis is beyond the scope of the
Eurocodes, although the principles the Eurocodes
contain may inform such an advanced analysis.
Design philosophies in Eurocode 3 are
sub-divided into two broad approaches:
1) Prescriptive approach, with nominal fires
used to generate thermal actions and associated
temperature rise in the structure. EN 1991-1-2
gives three nominal fire curves: the standard
temperature time curve, the external fire curve and
the hydrocarbon curve. These fire curves are the
time temperature relationships used to control the
furnace gas temperature in standard fire resistance
tests. The first two curves are related to cellulosic
fires in buildings and have no relevance to the
design of offshore structures. The nominal fire
curves do not represent an actual fire but form the
basis by which the fire performance in relation to
the load bearing, insulation and integrity criteria
are evaluated in National Regulations. (Note that
EN 1363-1 [67] gives general information about
conducting fire tests and EN 13381-4 and
EN 13381-8 [68] cover specific test procedures for
non-reactive fire protection and for intumescent
coatings respectively.) ISO 22899-1 [54] is the test
standard for a PFP system subject to jet fires (see
also Section 6.3)
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
2) Performance based approach, where simple
or advanced fire development models are used
to generate thermal actions based on physical
and chemical parameters. Guidance on the
evaluation of thermal actions using this approach
is given in Sections 3, 4, 7 and Appendix A.
Once the approach has been chosen, the type of
analysis which may be performed to determine the
structural response can be broadly categorized
under three headings as discussed below.
8.4.1 Member analysis
In this case, an individual member or joint is
selected for analysis. The effects of thermal loads
may be obtained from results of linear or
non-linear analysis of part of the structure or of the
entire structure. The main disadvantages of
member based methods are that they do not take
into account the effect of the fire on the supports,
the development of the fire and its distribution
within the structure, nor load shedding and load
redistribution that takes place between members
within the same frame and between frames.
8.4.2 Analysis of part of the structure
Isolated part of the structure, with appropriate
support and boundary conditions are selected for
analysis. When carrying out an analysis for parts
of the structure, the following should be
considered:
 The part of the structure to be analysed should
be selected such that its interaction with other
parts of the structure can be approximated by
time-independent support and boundary
conditions throughout the duration of the fire
exposure.
 Within the part of the structure to be analysed,
the temperature dependent material properties,
stiffness and thermal expansions and
deformations should be taken into account.
 The model of the part of the structure to be
analysed should have a sufficient degree of
accuracy to model the failure modes
corresponding to the fire exposure, as well as
load shedding and load redistribution.
8.4.3 Analysis of the entire structure
In the context of fire design for topsides on
offshore structures, this implies the whole topside
module or modules but not the topside and
substructure together. In this type of analysis it is
possible to assess the degree of redundancy of the
structure beyond first member failure and to
determine the manner in which load shedding and
load redistribution are taking place.
53
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

8.5 Verification of member time t = 0 and assumed to remain constant

resistances in fire throughout the fire exposure.
Because EN 1990 does not fully cover the basis of As a simplification, the value of Efi,d for member
design in fire situations, more specific analysis may be taken as:
requirements are given in EN 1993-1-2. These set
out the mechanical resistance and integrity criteria E fi, d   fi E d
that need to be satisfied under nominal fire
exposure and parametric fire exposure. where,
Additionally, they define the design values of Ed is the design value of the actions from
mechanical and thermal material properties in the fundamental combination (ultimate
relation to characteristic values and the partial limit state) as given in EN 1990
factor M,fi (although, since the value of M,fi = 1.0
is recommended and accepted by the National fi is a reduction factor for the design load
Annexes, thermal properties are usually referred level for the fire situation
to without any designation as characteristic or The value of the reduction factor fi will depend
design values). on whether Equation 6.10 or 6.10a and 6.10b,
given in EN 1990, was used for the fundamental
EN 1993-1-2 gives simple design models which
combination.
can be used to determine the resistance of
individual structural members subject to tension, If Equation 6.10 of EN 1990 were used for the
compression and bending. It also provides a fundamental combination the reduction factor fi
critical temperature method similar to the limiting is given by:
temperature method provided in BS 5950-8 [8].
More advanced calculation methods involving G k   1 , 1 Q k,1
sub-assemblies or whole frame analysis is  fi 
 G G K   Q,1 Q k,1
permitted by the Eurocodes although no in-depth
guidance on these methods is provided.
If Equations 6.10a and 6.10b were used for the
The verification is expressed as the requirement, fundamental combination the reduction factor fi
at time t during the fire exposure that: is given by the smaller value of the following two
expressions:
Efi,d  Rfi,d,t
G k   1, 1 Q k , 1
Efi,d is the design effect of actions for the  fi 
 G G K   Q , 1 0 , 1 Q k , 1
fire situation; determined in accordance
with EN 1991-1-2 G k   1 , 1 Q k,1
Rfi,d,t is the corresponding design resistance
 fi 
 G G K   Q,1 Q k,1
in the fire situation.
When indirect actions due to fire do not need to be Where all the parameters are as defined in
explicitly considered, the effects of actions (Efi,d) Section 8.1.
during a fire can be represented by the effects at

FABIG Technical Note 13 54


9 EUROCODE SIMPLE DESIGN RULES FOR
STRUCTURAL STEEL MEMBERS IN FIRE
This section presents simplified calculation
models to determine the fire resistance of steel
members in accordance with EN 1993-1-2,
clause 4.1. More guidance on the simplified
calculation models can be found in [69].
EN 1993-1-2 also permits advanced calculation
models but gives little guidance on them.
9.1 Section classification
As for normal temperature design, all members
which act wholly or partly in compression are
classified in order to establish the appropriate
design calculation methods to be used. This is
basically a check on the slenderness of the parts of
the cross-section which act in compression in
order to assess their vulnerability to local
buckling. As the strength and the elastic modulus
of steel reduce at different rates in fire conditions,
the section classification at elevated temperature
will differ from that for normal temperature
design. Rather than determine classification at
each elevated temperature, the classification is as
for normal temperature, using the guidance given
in EN 1993-1-1, except that the value of ε for fire
conditions is taken as:
235
  0. 85
fy
The coefficient 0.85 takes account of the variation
of material properties at elevated temperatures and
is an approximate value for k E, θ k y, θ . Note
that, where normal temperature parameters are
used, the value of  required in their evaluation is
the normal temperature value.
As stated in EN 1993-1-1, the definitions of the
four possible classes of member are as follows:
Class 1
Stocky cross-sections which can be used reliably
in plastic strength calculations.
Class 2
Whilst the member bending resistance may be
calculated on the basis of its plastic capacity, it is
not capable of sufficient extra rotation without the
occurrence of local buckling to allow other hinges
to form as part of a fully developed mechanism.
The frame should therefore be designed
elastically.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Class 3
The member bending resistance should be
calculated elastically as its initial yield capacity.
Class 4
Slender cross-sections whose resistance is
governed by elastic local buckling below the yield
strength of the material.
9.2 Critical temperature method
This is the simplest method of determining the fire
resistance of an isolated loaded member in fire
conditions. The method can be used only for
member types for which deformation criteria or
stability considerations do not have to be taken
into account. This allows its use for tension
members and restrained beams, but precludes its
use for both columns and unrestrained beams. It is
only applicable to steel grades S275, S355 and
S460 (and, presumably other steels with a similar
or better strength and stiffness retention
characteristics).
The critical temperature  cr of a member is the
temperature at which failure is expected to occur
for a given load level, assuming a uniform
temperature distribution. Its value is determined
from the degree of utilisation 0 of the member in
the fire design situation, according to
EN 1993-1-2, clause 4.2, using the expression:
 1 
 cr  39. 19 ln   1   482
 0. 9674 03. 833 
This expression is used for all except the very
slender Class 4 sections, for which a single
conservative critical temperature of 350°C is
specified.
The degree of utilisation 0 is basically the design
loading in fire as a proportion of the design
resistance, where the latter is calculated at normal
temperature (i.e. at time t = 0) but using the
material partial safety factors which apply in fire
design rather than in normal temperature design:
E fi, d
0 
R fi, d,0
A simple conservative version, which presumes
that the member is fully utilised under
55
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

fundamental ULS load combinations, is as a fire. Hence, limiting the temperature to a critical
follows: temperature based on the utilisation ratio of a
member at the time of the initiation of a fire may
  M, fi 
 0   fi   be over-conservative for some members and
  M0  unconservative for others.

Where EN 1993-1-2 permits additional guidance on

 fi is defined in Section 8.5
M0 is defined in Table 8.2.
M,fi is the partial safety factor for the relevant
material and thermal property for the fire situation;
EN 1993-1-2 recommends a value of 1.0, and this
value is also recommended in the UK National
Annex and, as noted in Section 8.5, has a
recommended value of 1.0.
Figure 9.1 shows that as the utilisation ratio at
ambient temperatures increases, the member can
withstand a smaller reduction in its capacity before
it fails. However, for offshore structures which
possess a higher degree of redundancy, load
shedding and load transfer will often occur during
critical temperatures to be provided in the National
Annex and Table 9.1 shows the critical
temperatures which are recommended by the UK
National Annex for compression and tension
members. The critical temperatures for axially
loaded members are tabulated with respect to the
non-dimensional slenderness,  calculated at
normal temperature in accordance with
EN 1993-1-1. The critical temperatures for
members in bending are calculated using the
simple design method described in Section 9.6.
Appendix C gives a design example illustrating
the critical temperature method for a beam.

Critical Temperature (°C)

800

700
Class 1, 2, 3 sections
600

500

400

300 Class 4 sections

200

100

0
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1

Degree of Utilisation 0

Figure 9.1 Critical temperature versus degree of utilisation

FABIG Technical Note 13 56

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table 9.1 Critical temperatures given in UK National Annex to EN 1993-1-2

Description of member Critical temperature (ºC ) for utilization factor 0
0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
Compression members:

Non-dimensional slenderness,  = 0.4

485 526 562 598 646 694

 = 0.6
470 518 554 590 637 686

 = 0.8
451 510 546 583 627 678

 = 1.0
434 505 541 577 619 672

 = 1.2
422 502 538 573 614 668

 = 1.4
415 500 536 572 611 666

 = 1.6
411 500 535 571 610 665

Tension members 526 558 590 629 671 725

Note: Section 9.5 defines  .

9.3 Design resistances of structural Appendix E gives a design example illustrating

members this approach for a column.
Clause 4.2.3 of EN 1993-1-2 describes simple 9.4 Resistance of tension members
calculation procedures for estimating the
resistance of structural members at elevated For a tension member under uniform
temperatures. The first step is to classify the cross-sectional temperature the design
section and calculate the material strength and resistance in fire is calculated simply by using the
stiffness reduction factors for a specific reduction factor ky, on yield strength at elevated
temperature. The reduced resistance of the temperature (see Appendix B), with an adjustment
member at that temperature is then calculated. for the different material safety factors in normal
design and fire design. The design resistance is
This approach presumes that a temperature given by EN 1993-1-2, clause 4.2.3.1 as:
relating to the desired period of fire exposure is
already known from a previously calculated  
time-temperature history. However, it is often the N fi,θ, Rd  k y,θ N Rd  M0 
 
case that the time-temperature history of a member  M,fi 
is not known, particularly for protected members.
This is because temperature- dependent material where
properties of the fire protection material are Nfi,,Rd is the tension design resistance for the
required to predict the time-temperature history of member at temperature , uniform
the member, and manufacturers of fire protection across its cross-section
are reluctant to make this data available. If this is
the case, the designer can simply use the reduced ky,θ is the strength retention factor applied
resistance expressions to calculate the failure to the yield strength of steel at
temperature, i.e. the temperature at which the temperature θ (Appendix B)
resistance equals the loading in fire: NRd is the design resistance of the cross
Efi,d = Rfi,d,t section for normal temperature design
M0 is the partial safety factor for the
For tension members and restrained beams, this is relevant material property for normal
a direct calculation, but for members susceptible temperature design (Table 8.2)
to buckling instabilities, iteration is required since
the expression for the non-dimensional M,fi is the partial safety factor for the
slenderness is related to temperature. relevant material property for the fire
situation (=1.0)

FABIG Technical Note 13 57

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

9.5 Resistance of compression Ncr is the elastic critical force for the
members relevant buckling mode based on the
gross cross sectional properties
The design buckling resistance of compression
members of Class 1, 2 or 3 is calculated according Lcr is the buckling length in the buckling
to EN 1993-1-2 as follows, allowing for a plane considered, determined taking
reduction in strength and an increase in into account the boundary conditions
non-dimensional slenderness at high i is the radius of gyration about the
temperatures. relevant axis, determined using the
fy properties of the gross cross section.
N b,fi, t,Rd   fi A k y,θ
 M, fi For Class 4 cross-sections, see Section 9.9.

Nb,fi,t,Rd is the design buckling resistance for a 9.6 Resistance of restrained beams
compression member with Class 1, 2 or 9.6.1 Beams with uniform temperature
3 cross-section
The design moment resistance in fire for Class 1
k y,θ is the reduction factor for the steel or 2 cross-sections with uniform cross-sectional
temperature  a reached at time t temperature is calculated from the plastic
resistance moment of the gross cross section for
The reduction factor for flexural buckling  fi is normal strength design, simply by using the
the lower of the values about the yy and zz axes reduction factor ky, on yield strength at elevated
determined as follows: temperature, with an adjustment for the different
material safety factors in normal design and fire
1 design. The design moment resistance is given by
 fi 
 θ   θ 2  θ 2 EN 1993-1-2, clause 4.2.3.3 as:
  M0 
With M fi, θ , Rd  k y, θ M Rd  
 
 M, fi 
θ 
1
1   θ  θ 2 
2 where
235 Mfi,θ,Rd is the design moment resistance with a
and   0. 65 uniform temperature, θa
fy
MRd is the plastic moment resistance for
The non-dimensional slenderness of the member normal temperature design, according
for temperature θ is given by: to EN 1993-1-1, reduced if necessary to
allow for the effects of shear.
k y, θ
θ   For a Class 3 cross-section, the same expression
k E, θ applies, but MRd = Mel,Rd, the elastic moment of
resistance. For Class 4, see Section 9.9.
where
9.6.2 Beams with non-uniform
Afy L cr 1 temperature
 =  A non-uniform temperature distribution may be
N cr i 1
accounted for analytically in calculating the
design moment resistance by dividing the
E cross-section into uniform-temperature elements,
1   = 93.9
fy reducing the strength of each according to its
temperature, and finding the resistance moment by
235 summation across the section. Alternatively it may
 be dealt with conservatively by the use of two
fy
empirical adaptation factors 1 and 2 to define
A is the gross cross-section area the moment resistance at time t as:
M fi, θ , Rd
M fi, t, Rd 
 1 2

FABIG Technical Note 13 58


where
1 is an adaption factor for non-uniform
temperature across the cross-section,
generally taken as 1.0 unless the beam
has one face protected by a concrete
slab
2 is an adaption factor for non-uniform
temperature along the beam, taken as
0.85 at the supports of a statically
indeterminate beam and 1.0 for all other
cases.
9.6.3 Shear resistance
Shear resistance is determined using the same
general approach as for bending and tension
resistance, with the same adaptation factors as
those above in cases for non-uniform temperature
distribution. The general expression, covering
uniform is:
  M0  and the imperfection factor is given by:
V fi, t, Rd  k y,θ, web V Rd  
  235
 M, fi    0.65
Where
Vfi,t,Rd is the design shear resistance at time t
of a Class 1, 2 or 3 cross-section.
ky,θ,web is the strength reduction factor
corresponding to the average
temperature of the web.
VRd is the shear resistance of the gross cross
section for normal temperature design,
according to EN 1993-1-1.
9.7 Lateral-torsional buckling
resistance
In cases where the compression flange is not
continuously restrained, the design
lateral-torsional buckling resistance moment is
calculated for Class 1 or 2 cross-sections
according to EN 1993-1-2 clause 4.2.3.3 as:
fy
M b,fi, t, Rd   LT, fiWpl,y k y,θ, com
 M, fi
Where
Mb,fi,t,Rd is the design lateral-torsional buckling
resistance moment, at time t, of a
laterally unrestrained beam with a
Class 1 or a Class 2 cross-section
 LT, fi is the reduction factor for
lateral-torsional buckling in the fire
design situation
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
k y,θ, com is the reduction factor at the maximum
temperature in the compression flange
 a, com at time t.
The lateral-torsional buckling reduction factor
 LT, fi is determined as in normal temperature
design, except that the non-dimensional
slenderness used is adjusted for the elevated
temperature steel properties and the imperfection
factor is modified. The slenderness is given by:
k y,θ, com
LT, θ, com  LT
k E, θ, com
where
k E, θ, com is the elastic modulus reduction factor
at the maximum compression flange
temperature, θa,com, at time t
as given in equation
fy
For Class 3 cross-sections, the same expressions
apply, except that Wpl,y is replaced by Wel,y in the
expression for the lateral-torsional buckling
resistance moment. For Class 4, see Section 9.9.
9.8 Members subject to combined
bending and axial compression
The verification of the design buckling resistance
of Classes 1, 2 or 3 members subjected to
combined uniaxial or biaxial bending and axial
compression is very similar to that used in normal
temperature design. Two cases need to be
considered:
 Members that can fail by flexural
buckling but which are restrained against
lateral-torsional buckling,
 Members that can fail in combined
flexural and lateral torsional buckling.
 In EN 1993-1-2, clause 4.2.3.5 separate
interaction expressions are given for Class
1/Class 2 and Class 3 cross-sections, for each
case, but these may be generalised to two
expressions. In the first case the member
should satisfy the interaction expression:
59
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

N fi, Ed k y M y,fi, Ed For Class 4, see Section 9.9.


fy f
 min,fi Aky,θ Wy k y,θ y k y and k z are amplification factors which express
 M, fi  M, fi
the increase of internal bending moments due to
kM compression force and flexural buckling, and are
 z z, fi, Ed  1.0
f calculated in similar fashion to the normal
Wz k y,θ y temperature process specified in EN 1993-1-1
 M, fi
with some small changes.
The minimum flexural buckling reduction factor  LT N fi, Ed
 min, fi is the lower of its values about the yy and k LT  1 1
fy
 z, fi A k y,θ
zz axes determined according to Section 9.5.  M, fi
In the second case, the member should satisfy the LT  0.15 z,   M, LT  0.15  0.9
interaction expression:
 y N fi, Ed
N fi, Ed

k LT M y,fi, Ed ky 1 3
fy
 z, fi Aky,θ
fy
 LTWy k y,θ y
f  y,fi A k y,θ
 M, fi  M, fi  M, fi

k z M z, fi, Ed  y  1.2 M, y  3 y,  0.44 M, y  0.29  0.8

  1.0
fy
Wz k y,θ
 M, fi  z N fi, Ed
kz 1 3
fy
The expression presumes that flexural buckling  z, fi A k y,θ
 M, fi
occurs in the same direction as lateral-torsional
buckling, so the reduction factor for buckling z  2 M, z  5 z,   0.44 M, z  0.29  0.8
about the zz axis,  z , fi is used.

For Class 1 and Class 2 sections, Wy  W pl, y and and  z,   1.1

Wz  W pl, z ; for Class 3 sections Wy  Wel , y and  M is an equivalent uniform moment factor, given
Wz  Wel , z in Figure 9.2.

FABIG Technical Note 13 60

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Moment diagram (i) Equivalent uniform moment factor M

End moments M, = 1.8 – 0.7

M1
 M1
-1    1
Moments due to in-plane lateral loads

M,Q = 1.3

MQ
M,Q = 1.4

MQ
Moments due to in-plane lateral loads plus
end moments

M1 M  M   M , 
MQ
M

 M , Q   M , 
MQ

M1 MQ = max M due to lateral load only

M
MQ

M1 M For moment diagram without change of sign:

M =max M
MQ
For moment diagram with change of sign:
M = max M+ min M
M1 M

MQ

Figure 9.2 Equivalent uniform moment factors,  M

9.9 Members with Class 4 cross 9.10 Stainless steel members

sections
Members with Class 4 cross-sections can be
assumed to satisfy their design function if their
temperature is kept below a critical temperature.
For those members, EN 1993-1-2 recommends the
use of a critical temperature of 350°C, which is
confirmed in the UK National Annex. An
alternative approach is offered where more
conservative strength reduction factors given in
Annex E of EN 1993-1-2 are substituted into the
member resistance expressions, used with the
corresponding effective area or section modulus
(calculated at normal temperature).
EN 1993-1-2 recommends that the fire resistant
design approach for carbon steel can be used for
stainless steel. This results in a rather conservative
solution for stainless steel. The Design manual for
structural stainless steel [70] gives slightly less
conservative rules for determining the structural
fire resistance of stainless steel members. The
expressions are generally identical to those for
carbon steel in EN 1993-1-2 except that the
normal temperature buckling curve is used for
unrestrained beams and columns and different
material strengths should be used in some cases
(Table 9.2). Additionally, section classification at
elevated temperature is not required (Section 9.1).

FABIG Technical Note 13 61


Table 9.2 Fire resistant design with
stainless steel members
Member Strength and buckling curve for use
in design
Columns f0,2proof, (all cross-section classes) and
the appropriate normal temperature
buckling curve
Restrained f2, (Class 1-3) and f0,2proof, (Class 4)
beams
Unrestrained
f0,2proof, (all cross-section classes) and
beams the appropriate normal temperature
lateral torsional buckling curve
Tension f2, (all cross-section classes)
members
9.11 Design resistance of joints
The design resistance of joints must be sufficient
to sustain the design effects at the joint at the Fire
Limit State. This means that beam-to-column
joints should be able to transmit the internal forces
when the joint is at its elevated temperature. When
passive fire protection is used on the members, this
requirement is generally considered to be fulfilled
if the same thickness of fire protection is applied
to the joints as to the member. As a simplification,
a uniform temperature distribution may be
assumed within the joint; this temperature may be
calculated using the maximum value of the section
factor (Am/V) of the connected steel members in
the vicinity of the joint. It is well known that joints
are not heated to the same degree as other parts of
the structure because they are shielded by the
incoming beams and columns and locally the mass
of steel is increased, and effectively the section
factor (Am/V) is reduced.
EN 1993-1-2 has relatively little to say about
joints in fire (in contrast to the highly advanced
treatment which is possible for joints at normal
temperature under EN 1993-1-8 [71]). Annex D of
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
EN 1993-1-2 is an “informative” section which
deals only with simplified connection temperature
calculation, and the reduced strength of bolts and
welds at elevated temperatures. It does not allow
any of the load-deflection behaviour to be
predicted and its use in not permitted by the UK
National Annex [72] and an alternative method
applies [73]
9.11.1 Butt welds
The design strength of a full penetration butt weld,
for temperatures not exceeding 700°C, should be
taken as equal to the strength of the weaker
member connected to the joint using the
appropriate reduction factors for structural steel.
For temperatures exceeding 700°C, the reduction
factors for fillet welds (see Appendix B) can also
be applied to butt welds.
9.11.2 Fillet welds
The design strength per unit length of a fillet weld
at elevated temperature is determined according to
EN 1993-1-2 Annex D as:
 M2
F w, t, Rd  F w, Rd k w, θ
 M, fi
where
kw, is the strength reduction factor for fillet
welds (Appendix B)
Fw,Rd is the strength per unit length in
accordance with EN 1993-1-8
M2 is the partial factor for resistance of
welds. EN 1993-1-8 recommends a
value of 1.25 which is also adopted by
the UK National Annex.
These methods were derived and validated for
regular steel grades referred to above. They can be
used on identical and similar grades used offshore.
However their use for high strength steels may
take them outside their validity limits and as such
needs further research and validation.
62

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43 Johnson AD, Brightwell HM, and Carsley
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47 McMurray, R, Flare radiation estimated,
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228, EUROTHERM, 1994.
64

50 EN ISO 13702: 1999 – Petroleum and
Natural Gas Industries – Control and
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Offshore Production Installations –
Requirements and Guidelines.
51 ISO/TR 834 3:1994 Fire resistance tests
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53 BS EN 13381 Test methods for determining
the contribution to the fire resistance of
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58 Shirvill LC and White GC, Effectiveness of
deluge systems in protecting plant and
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gas jet fires, International Symposium on
Heat and Mass Transfer in the Chemical
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59 Bennett JF, Cooke G and Roberts TA, Water
deluge protection against jet fires:
Effectiveness of industry recommended
application rates, HSL Internal Report
PS/98/09, 1998.
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Effectiveness of area and dedicated water
deluge in protecting objects impacted by
crude oil/gas jet fires on offshore
installations, Jnl of Loss Prevention in the
Process Industries, 17, 119 125, 2004.
61 EN 1990:2002, Eurocode. Basis of structural
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62 EN 1991-1-2:2002, Eurocode 1. Actions on
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66 EN 10219-1:2006. Cold formed welded
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fine grain steels. Part 1: Technical delivery
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contribution to the fire resistance of structural
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members, 2010.
69 Steel Building Design: Fire Resistance
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65
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

73 NCCI: Strength of bolts and welds in fire

72 UK National Annex to Eurocode 3: Design of situations, The Steel Construction Institute,
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2:2005, British Standards Institute, 2008.

FABIG Technical Note 13 66


Appendix A PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT OF
FIRE LOADS AND STRUCTURAL
RESPONSE
A.1 Introduction
The probabilistic assessment procedure for
estimating fire loads and structural response is
divided into two main sections as illustrated in the
flow diagram in Figure A.1.
Section 1 Determination of fire load
This section describes the approach for
establishing the Design Accidental Load (DAL)
fire based on a fire risk analysis. Representative
cases are screened via an initial fire risk analysis
where the leak frequencies, ignition probabilities
and inventories are combined to determine the
cases with the highest risk. These representative
cases are further considered in the consequence
assessment involving detailed fire load modelling
with CFD or values derived from Sections 3 or 4
of this Technical Note as appropriate. The fire risk
analysis is subsequently performed based on the
consequence results and the fire frequencies. The
output from the fire risk analysis is the fire
exceedance plot which is used to assess the DAL
fire scenario and load. The risk acceptance
criterion is then applied to determine the DAL fire
which is used to assess whether mitigating
measures such as improvements to the Emergency
Shut Down (ESD) and blow-down system are
required.
Section 2 Structural response analysis
In Section 2, the DAL fire is applied in a response
calculation of temperature and strain in the
structure so that the need for improved ESD and
blow-down can be established together with the
optimal Passive Fire protection (PFP) coverage.
The structure is modelled in a Finite Element (FE)
tool to obtain the temperature and strain response
based on the DAL fire. If the load results in a
collapse of the structure, mitigation measures such
as improved ESD and blow-down, or PFP should
be considered.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Procedures and guidelines exist for detailed
assessments of risk and fire response [1,2]. The
procedure described in this Technical Note bridges
the gap between these analyses to provide a
consistent approach to determine the Design
Accidental Loads (DAL) for fires. In the present
procedure, the DAL fire is defined by two different
representations of the fire:
 The common definition of the DAL fire is a
constant heat flux and duration and it is listed
in the Design Accidental Load specification.
The load is also given as a maximum local heat
load, and an average global heat load with
corresponding durations, as well as
information about the type of fire, primarily
gas jet and/or oil fires. The DAL fire is further
defined as the fire load which structure, and
piping and equipment, should at least
withstand.
 The DAL fire in the present procedure is also
defined by a given fire scenario and the
accompanying 3D transient temperature and
heat flux fields which can be used as input in
the structural response calculations. This “live”
DAL fire is included in the analysis as
computer files containing the 3D heat loads
with a time history showing the development
of the fire.
In FABIG Technical Note 8, the need for a
procedure to cover the accidental load for fires
was identified [3]. The aim of the procedure
described herein is also to include descriptions of
how CFD and FE methods can be integrated
directly in the fire risk and response analyses, and
to include results from latest research on fire
loading.
67
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Input Assessment Output

Start
Leak
Frequencies Fire Frequencies
Ignition Initial Fire Risk
Probabilities Assessment
Inventories Risk Rank Cases
Fire Location

Highest Ranked CFD Fire

CFDModelling
Fire Heat Flux for
or use Section 3 or 4
Cases Modeling cases

Section 1
of this TN

Fire
Frequencies
Fire Risk Fire Exceedance
Assessment Curves
Heat Flux

Risk Modify
Acceptance Risk DAL Fire and
mitigation
Criteria evaluation Load
measures

Structure
Temperature and
DAL Fire and temperature and
strain response in
Load strain response
structure
Simulation

Modify Section 2
PFP

Strain or Global
temperature Collapse? Minimum PFP
Criteria

End

Figure A.1 Schematic flow diagram of probabilistic fire load procedure

Note that the output, or intermediate results, from
the assessments (shown to the right as green in the
figure) are used as input (shown to the left as red)
to consecutive assessments.
Based on recent research and experiments, it is
evident that higher fire loads than what is often
prescribed in standards and guidelines can occur
[4]. Scaling effects indicate that fires can have
significantly higher heat loads for large fires than
for smaller fires. Small or medium size fires,
which are normally considered in experiments,
form the basis for the heat loads in current
guidelines. Also, it is evident that engulfing oil
fires can have as high heat load as gas fires [4],
and this is not the case in the current guidelines,
e.g. [2].
In order to account for higher heat loads in the
analysis, it becomes important to consider the fire
dynamics, as the hot spots move during a fire. In
addition, effects of feedback from the structure to
the fire and the effect of PFP on the structure can
be important. The probabilistic heat load

FABIG Technical Note 13 68


procedure described herein aims to include the
dynamic effects and feedback effects of fires in
process areas.
It is presumed that a DAL fire shall be defined as
an intermediate result from this probabilistic
analysis. One of the objectives of this current
procedure is to define common intermediate
results so that different analyses from different
consultants are comparable. One such result is the
DAL fire load. To include the complexity of the
fire including dynamic effects and feedback from
steel in a consistent way, common approaches and
assumptions are presented.
By including more realistic fires in the analyses,
an increased safety can be obtained, where
especially the larger fires will be accounted for in
an improved way. At the same time, performing
the analysis with a probabilistic approach, the high
risk contributors are found and efforts can be
concentrated on those, e.g. by improving segments
who gives high risk contributions, and improving
ESD and blow-down. The detailed 3D fire
modelling in the analysis is also required in order
to assess the optimal PFP coverage as, in general,
it is beneficial to reduce PFP coverage due to the
negative effects of PFP such as corrosion,
difficulties with inspection and maintenance,
higher cost, increased activity due to increased
inspection and maintenance, etc.
A.2 Section 1: Determination
of fire load
A.2.1 General
The main output form the first part of this
probabilistic procedure is the exceedance curve
and the DAL fire. This is determined by analysing
all probable fires in the module, and obtaining the
degree of severity (consequence) and the
frequency for each fire. Ideally, the dynamic fire
loads are calculated using CFD modelling and
include all probable fire scenarios. However, the
number of analyses required to do so will become
too large. In practice, a selection of critical fires
from the initial fire risk assessment can be applied
(see Section A.2.2). Such critical fires are called
cases in this procedure.
Fire modelling with CFD and fire risk analysis are
described in Sections A.2.3 and A.2.4,
respectively.
Accuracy of analytical tools
The use of detailed and accurate simulation
methods generally results in optimal design
solutions where only the required level of
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
coverage of PFP is applied, thereby improving
safety and reducing costs.
In general, one should apply the same level of
accuracy for all parts of the analysis i.e. for both
the determination of the loading and the response.
CFD modelling of the fire is to be performed when
the structural response analysis is also performed
with advanced tools such as the FE modelling of
temperature and stress response.
When a less detailed and simplified approach is
applied for the structural response analysis, a
simplified approach for the estimation of heat
loads is more appropriate. Guideline values as set
out in [2] or Sections 3 or 4 of this Technical Note
can be used for the heat load assessment.
Standardised intermediate results from
analysis
For comparative purposes, a common definition
for the intermediate results from the probabilistic
fire analysis needs to be established. The main
intermediate result is the exceedance curve (see
Figure A.5) where the severity on the x-axis is
defined as the total heat dose received during the
whole fire in MJ m-2.
The fire DAL is derived from the exceedance
curve and is represented by a peak heat flux load
(kW m-2) and duration (min).
The received heat dose (MJ m-2) is defined as the
time integral of the heat flux over the duration of
the fire at the given worst location. The location
which receives the largest heat dose will
eventually experience a local collapse of the
structure (or rupture in case of piping); therefore
this needs to be defined as a local load.
When comparing several scenarios, a ranking is
made based on the received heat dose. This ranked
list of scenarios represents the x-axis on the
exceedance plot. Since the heat dose is the
integrated heat flux over time, the dynamic
information is lost when performing the
integration. For example, a high heat flux during a
short time can be equivalent to a lower heat flux
over a longer period of time. For structures, this
equivalence is generally acceptable for the
purpose of deciding the fire load and when used
for reasonable variation in the heat fluxes and fire
durations. For this principle to be valid, the heat
flux needs to be significantly higher than the loss
of heat due to air cooling the structure, and the
duration typically needs to be less than one hour.
See also note in the next section for pipes and
equipment.
69

In the probabilistic fire procedure, data (maximum
heat flux histories, 3D heat flux fields) from CFD
simulations is collected and combined with a
probabilistic analysis to provide a complete
picture of all fires. When the fire loads from all
probable fire scenarios are found, an exceedance
curve is plotted. This can be done in a spreadsheet
program using look-up tables or in a Monte Carlo
routine.
It is also possible to convert/transfer CFD results
to continuous response surfaces which describe
the fire load as a function of the dependent
variables.
Note for pipes and equipment
This dynamic behaviour of the fire load is more
important for pipes and equipment than for
structures. This is because the pipe stress is
strongly dependent on the pressure in the pipes
and hence pipes are more vulnerable to high heat
loads at the start of the fires before the pressure is
relieved by blow-down. For pipes and equipment,
one can use a set of DAL fires which has the same
heat dose when performing the heat-up and
response calculations. The set can be selected
from the CFD simulations as realistic heat flux vs.
time curves. Separate exceedance curves for
different durations of the heat flux can also be
made so that the separate frequency for the
different durations can be found. The extent of the
fire and the average heat flux in the area is also
important for pipes and equipment as this
determines the general heating the piping and
equipment receives.
A.2.2 Initial fire risk assessment
The purpose of the initial fire risk assessment is to
get an overview of the fire cases and the potential
risks involved. This is used to obtain a preliminary
risk ranking of the cases which are used to select
representative cases for further detailed
consequence analysis.
This section describes how the representative fire
cases are found in a systematic way by considering
the different areas and process segments. It
involves estimation of leak frequencies, ignition
probabilities, segment inventories and types of
fires.
Note that if further fire risk analysis identifies a
need to improve ESD and blow-down
philosophies as part of the protection optimisation,
mitigating measures might be implemented
specifically on the fire cases. In such a case, it is
beneficial that the leak scenarios and segments are
defined in detail.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Definition of cases
Cases are normally defined in the Quantitative
Risk Assessment (QRA) and the same cases
should be applied as far as possible. A detailed
definition of the cases is given below.
A case is defined as a leak in a sub-segment where
the sub-segment is the part of a segment which is
located in one area. As a segment can be located
in more than one area, it is often necessary to
divide different segments into sub-segments. In
this particular case, an area is defined as the area
where a leak can have a direct influence. The area
is limited by solid walls and decks and borders to
free air. For larger areas e.g. a large area with
smaller modules within the area, it is necessary to
divide the area into sub areas.
It is a good practice to make a schematic diagram
showing the segments and the areas of the
platform. This diagram can be made by combining
the General Arrangement drawings and the
Process and Instrument/Process Flow drawings of
the main hydrocarbon carrying process
equipment. When all segments and sub-segments
are identified and located in the right area, a case
list can be made.
Often, a large segment has a small sub-segment in
one area e.g. a riser segment which ends with an
ESD valve in the import/export area. This small
sub-segment will have a large inventory and a
small leak frequency, hence the risk can be
significant and it is important to include it in the
analysis.
Leak frequencies and ignition
probabilities
Leak frequencies and ignition probabilities are
normally calculated as a part of a QRA and details
are described in guidelines and standards such as
references [1,3]. It should be noted that leak
frequencies need to be detailed for each
sub-segment.
Inventories
The inventory is defined as the mass of HC in the
segment (kg) and needs to be calculated for each
segment. The volume applied is the volume inside
the process equipment, bounded by the closed
ESD valves. The density is calculated at the
operating pressure. In a segment with different
pressures, the settle-out pressure should be
applied.
70
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Risk ranking of cases and experiments. The probabilistic procedure

When all cases are defined, the cases with the
highest combination of fire frequency and
inventory have the highest potential risk. These
are the cases which are applied as representative
for the detailed consequence analysis.
The parts of the fire case regarding location and
leak rates and wind conditions are considered in
the next section.
It is noted that the simplifications arising from
modelling only a few cases with CFD and using
those cases as a basis for representing all fires is
justified partly because the analysis method
applied leak rates and not hole sizes to represent
the cases. Using this approach, a case with a low
pressure and a large hole will be defined in a
similar way to a case with high pressure and
smaller leak hole.
A.2.3 Fire load modelling with CFD
General
Fire load modelling using a CFD tool is performed
after the initial fire risk analysis described above
and is an input to the probabilistic analysis. Heat
loads to be used in the analysis are obtained based
on CFD models that are validated against research
involves a finer distribution of heat flux as a
function of leak rate and time compared to
traditional methods. The procedure hence
accounts for higher heat loads for larger fires as
well as dynamic effects.
Leak rate categories
Leak rate categories which can be used are listed
in Table A.1. The leak rate groups should match
standard ranges applied in QRA. The “CFD
coarse” distribution in Table A.1 should normally
be used in a fire analysis when performing CFD
simulations. The “CFD fine” distribution can be
applied if a more detailed resolution is needed; it
is the same as that applied for explosion analysis
in Annex G of [1]. The upper cut-off should reflect
the maximum credible initial leak rates. Normally,
this would reflect a pipe rupture scenario. Note
that the full bore scenarios are in most cases of a
very transient nature, and the initial leak rate
should represent a typical, average leak rate which
occurs in the period before ESD valves are closed.
When the QRA gives leak frequencies in only
3 categories, the sub-division of the leak
frequency in the smaller categories should be
documented.

Table A.1 Typical leak rate categories applied for fire analysis and QRA
Small Medium Large
range 0.1-2 2-16 16 - >
QRA
value
0.5 5 50
(kg s-1)

range 0.1-1 1-2 2-8 8-16 16 - 32 32-64 64-256 256 ->

CFD
Coarse
value
0.5 1.25 5 10 25 50 100 500
(kg s-1)

CFD range 0.1-0. 0.5- 1-2 2-4 4-8 8-16 16-32 32-64 64-12 128- 256- 512- 1024-
Fine 5 1 8 256 512 102 2048
4

value 0.3 0.75 1.5 3 6 12 24 48 96 192 384 768 1536

(kg s-1)

Selecting fire scenarios cases have similar fluid properties and segment
locations, only one of them needs to be
From the initial fire risk assessment, a reduced
considered. The representative segment identifies
number of representative leak cases are identified.
the possible leak locations in the proximity of the
Often for smaller areas, there is only one dominant
pipes and equipment belonging to the segment. It
case i.e. a case with high risk. For larger areas, a
is most likely that the fire will take place where
number of cases can be found with high risk.
most of valves and flanges are present. The
Generally, cases which are different in fluid,
representative case also defines the leaking fluid
location, etc. should be selected. If two high risk
(gas or oil) and its composition and temperature.

FABIG Technical Note 13 71


It should be noted that the duration of the
representative case is not directly applied in the
CFD simulation, and hence it is not necessary to
select CFD cases with different durations.
Applying the representative cases, a number of
CFD fires should be simulated where the leak rate,
leak location, jet direction (in case of gas fire), jet
momentum, and wind conditions are varied.
Leak rate
For each leak location and jet direction, the full set
of leak rates in Table A.1 should be simulated. For
small process areas, the larger leak sizes (typically
above 50 kg s-1) are often air controlled and will
only partly burn inside the area. Therefore, the
maximum leak rate which needs to be simulated
can be reduced to a leak rate which gives a fuel-
controlled fire where most of the gas is burning
inside the area. An evaluation of which leak rate
causes an air controlled fire can be carried out to
decide the cut-off point for the largest leaks. The
consequence of larger fires than the fires simulated
can then estimated by using the same heat load as
the largest fires simulated.
Note that in cases where the fire impact outside the
area is of importance, this cut-off should not be
made.
Fire location
The number of fire locations depends on the size
of the process area. For an average sized process
area, two or three locations should be appropriate.
Typically, one location near the centre, and others
near the edges should be selected. In addition, the
leak location needs to be placed where there are
pipes and equipment belonging to the
representative cases.
Jet direction
The jet direction should be selected so that both
long jets and impinging jets are simulated. The
long jet needs to be directed in the horizontal
direction where it is not hitting large equipment
and where it is still within the process area.
Impinging jet directions are down/up into solid
decks, or horizontally hitting a firewall or a large
piece of equipment.
The impinging, diffusive gas fire could be
represented by a low velocity release, although the
most realistic diffusive fire is obtained with a high
speed release impinging on a solid structure. The
number of jet directions can be reduced by not
simulating jets where the jet fire will be directed
out of the area. Typically 2 or 3 jet directions need
to be simulated, one diffusive impinging jet, and
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
two non-impinging jets which cause the majority
of the flames to be located inside the area.
Wind conditions
Wind speed and wind direction have less influence
on the flame location and the extreme heat loads
than the previously mentioned parameters. The
strong momentum and buoyancy in the upstream
parts of a fire are dominating over the wind
momentum, hence wind conditions have a lesser
influence.
For diffusive, large fires the flames will generally
follow the wind direction through the process
area; hence, the wind direction should be selected
so that it blows the flames mostly into the process
area. The wind direction should be selected
together with the fire location and jet direction so
that most of the fire burns inside the process area.
Symmetry conditions can be utilised where
appropriate and simulations can be performed on
one side, applying the same results on the
symmetric opposite side without simulating it.
In cases where the wind speed and direction have
a significant influence on the fire loads, the wind
rose can be applied to assess the impact
probability.
Note that smoke movement is mostly driven by the
wind, and in cases where the fire simulations are
used for smoke dispersion patterns, the wind
conditions need also be considered.
How CFD cases are used
Results from the CFD cases are directly used both
in the probabilistic and in the structural response
analysis.
The CFD cases represent a set of “snapshots” of
fires with different locations, jet directions, and
fluids (jet and pool). The same set of snapshots can
be used in different scenarios with different
durations. The results are directly implemented
into the probabilistic analysis as described in
Section A.2.4 below. Further, one snapshot can be
used to either represent the initial leak rate, or a
leak rate at a given time after the leak started. For
example, the 1.25 kg s-1 snapshot is used in the
modelling of large, medium and small cases.
When the DAL fire is applied, the same CFD
snapshots can also be used to impose the 3D fire
load on the structure. This is further described in
Section A.3.2.
72

Modelling transient effects with CFD
Transient effects caused by the decay of leak rate
when the segment is emptied should be included.
Simplifications to the CFD model can be made
provided it does not cause significant impact on
the result. The effects of the simplifications should
be documented. The following simplifications are
identified:
Transient effects can be modelled by performing
simulations of specific “snapshots” during the fire
development. The leak rates in Table A.1 should
be applied and simulations run until a steady fire
is established. Results from each snapshot can be
combined to represent the complete development
of a dynamic fire.
If the transient scenario is modelled using a
“compressed” timescale, it should be documented
that the real-time fire is correctly represented.
Heat load definitions
A heat load is defined as a realistic 3D, transient
representation of the heat load, or the maximum
transient spot heat load at the worst location in the
area. The real, 3D, transient heat loading on the
structure can be calculated by the CFD program
and transferred directly to the structural heat-up
and response model as described in Section A.3.1.
The maximum transient spot heat load is also
output from the CFD simulations and applied in
the present probabilistic analysis. The following
definitions are given for the heat loads considered:
Heat flux, Q (kW m-2) is the net instantaneous flux
received at a given time and location. The heat
flux gets a component from radiation and one from
convection.
Radiation heat flux, Qr (kW m-2) is the net
instantaneous radiation received at a given time
and location. The radiative flux is dependent on
the orientation of the face which is receiving the
heat relative to the fire.
-2
Convective heat flux, Qc (kW m ) is the net
instantaneous convective heat received at a given
time and location. The convective heat is
dependent on the orientation of the face in relation
to the flow velocity, as well as the dimensions of
the pipe or equipment.
Heat dose, D (MJ m-2) is the total heat received at
a given time after the fire started. It is defined as
the integrated net heat flux over time.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Effect of orientation of receiving structure
For the probabilistic analysis, the maximum
representative spot heat flux as a function of time
should be obtained from the CFD simulations.
This spot heat flux should include both radiative
and convective heat. For the radiative heat, the
optimal “worst” angle should be applied as
representative, and the surface of the structure
should be kept at ambient. For the convective heat,
a representative dimension of the structural
elements should be applied when setting the heat
transfer coefficient.
The convective heat flux should be obtained at the
same location and face direction as the radiative
heat flux. It is not necessary to use the worst case
for both radiation and convection, but use the
worst combination.
Effect of feedback
The effect of feedback from the structure and
process equipment should be implemented as a
correction during the transient development
applied in the probabilistic assessment. At the start
of the fire, the steel is cold, and the flames are
cooled causing reduced heat loads. After a while,
when the steel gets heated by the fire, the general
heat loading can get higher due to feedback from
the hot steel. This effect can be important for
congested areas, and long lasting fires. The effect
is a delay of the high heat loads, and an increased
heat load for long lasting fires. The effect can be
implemented after the CFD simulations are
performed as a correction in the probabilistic
analysis. Where the CFD codes can include the
feedback effect of long lasting fires, it can be
implemented directly into the CFD simulations.
The feedback effect can also be influenced by the
amount of PFP on the structure. With more PFP,
the feedback effects are smaller and vice versa.
The effects of feedback should be included and
documented.
Finding maximum dose
Heat fluxes from a 3D, detailed resolution in the
area of interest need to be recorded. The resolution
where heat fluxes are recorded could be on a
regular grid in the domain, or on the actual
structural elements obtained from a CAD model
including the structure. Further, the maximum
heat flux over the total duration of the fire needs
to be integrated for each point to give the received
heat doses at all points at the end of the fire. The
location with the highest heat dose is then sorted
out to give the representative maximum heat load.
73

Hot spots
The spot where the maximum heat flux or dose is
recorded is not finite, but represented by a small
volume of the size of the computational grid. A
smaller volume often gives a higher heat flux. To
avoid very localised and short lived “hot spots”,
the volume where the heat flux is measured needs
to be above a critical size. When small grid cells
are used, the hottest spot used in the probabilistic
analysis can be defined as an average over a set of
cells. The volume to be used to calculate the
average heat flux should be associated with a
probability of hitting the structure.
Size of fire used in the probabilistic
analysis
The size of the fire and the flames will influence
the probability of hitting the structure with the
hottest spot.
A distribution of average maximum heat doses at
different volumes can be applied with
corresponding probability.
A.2.4 Fire risk analysis
General
The fire risk analysis is performed by applying
heat loads from the CFD fire modelling, with
corresponding probabilities for jet direction, wind,
etc. Ignition probabilities and leak frequencies are
required as input data.
In this section, the effects included in the risk
analysis related to the fire and the fire dynamics
are described. The effects include ESD and
blow-down, oil and gas fires, wind, feedback from
steel and existing PFP, hit probability (the
probability of the local area with the highest heat
load hitting a critical part of the structure) and
ventilation conditions.
The CFD analysis produces a representative set of
deterministic cases. The representative scenarios
can be selected from the initial fire risk analysis.
The results from the CFD analysis hence
represents a sub-set of all scenarios and need to be
analysed and combined to represent all scenarios.
ESD and blow-down
The effect of ESD and blow-down are included in
the leak profile calculations. The leak profile
calculations should account for the actual time to
gas or fire detection, time to close ESD valve and
time to start blow-down as well as blow-down
duration.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
The actual number of gas and fire detectors and
their arrangement can be considered to calculate
the time to gas/fire detection. Time to shut down
of ESD includes the actual valve closure time.
Time to start blow-down is dependent on whether
it is automatic or manual blow-down. If it is
manual blow-down, a realistic time until
blow-down starts should be assumed. If automatic
blow-down is specified to occur after a certain
time delay, this can be assumed to be the time to
start blow-down.
The fire modelled in the probabilistic analysis can
be assumed to start when the gas is ignited. The
detection times, segment volumes, ESD closure
times, time to start blow-down and the blow-down
time should all be improved if the risk analysis
concludes a fire DAL which will result in
excessive use of PFP. Sensitivity runs with the risk
analysis model should be performed to
demonstrate the reduced DAL fire with improved
ESD and blow-down settings. The latter settings
should be improved as much as possible in order
to avoid excessive use of PFP.
Oil and gas fires
Oil and gas leaks are represented by pool fires and
jet fires, respectively. High pressure multiphase
and condensate leaks can be modelled as a gas jet.
Oil fires are represented by a pool in the CFD
simulations. It can be assumed that there is
equilibrium between the burning rate and the leak
rate during the pool fire which is modelled with
CFD.
In the probabilistic analysis, oil and gas fires need
to be considered separately so that the contribution
from each of them is found. In some cases, the
mitigating measures are different for oil and gas
fires, hence it is necessary to produce separate risk
results for oil and gas.
A.2.5 Fire exceedance plot
Establishing the fire exceedance plot involves the
combination of consequences, probabilities and
frequencies to determine the fire risk. The fire
exceedance plot is the main result from the
probabilistic fire analysis. The generation of the
plot for a complex process area and dynamic fires
is described. Results from the above sections are
used. The fire load to be used on the x-axis of the
plot is defined as the heat dose (MJ m-2) received
at a spot value. The fire exceedance plot is also
used to pick the representative dynamic fire
scenario which is used in the structural response
analysis.
74

The requirement for the x-axis is that all fires with
a lower x-value than the DAL fire value must be
considered in the design. Fires with a higher
x-value than the DAL fire need not be designed
against because these have too low frequency.
When the x-axis is defined correctly, it will be
enough to design the mitigating measures using
the DAL fire only, and it is not necessary to design
against any fires with smaller severity.
The probabilistic procedure collects data from the
CFD simulations, and combines it with a
probabilistic analysis to provide a complete
picture of all fires. When the fire doses from all
the probable fire scenarios are found, an
exceedance curve is calculated. This can be done
in a spreadsheet program using look-up tables (see
Section A.4) or in a Monte Carlo routine. It is
possible to convert/transfer CFD results to
continuous response surfaces which describe the
fire load as a function of the dependent variables.
A.2.6 Guidance on the acceptance
criteria and how to select the
design fire
A consistent approach to select a risk level and a
corresponding DAL fire scenario and DAL fire
load should be applied. The acceptance criteria
can be defined as a frequency for accepting loss of
integrity of the structure. The DAL for fires and
the design fire case are obtained from different fire
exceedance plots.
DAL for fires
The results for the severity and frequency of each
fire are plotted in a cumulative exceedance plot
with the severity (heat dose) on the x-axis and the
cumulative frequency on the y-axis. The
acceptance criteria can then be used to select the
fire DAL. In Figure A.5, an acceptance criterion
of 10-4 per year is used to illustrate how the DAL
fire can be found.
The acceptance frequency is used to select the
DAL for fires in the accumulated fire exceedance
plot by finding the fire dose which corresponds to
the acceptance frequency. This gives a DAL fire
dose in MJ m-2. This dose can be represented by a
heat flux and duration.
Design fire case
On the x-axis the fire cases can also be plotted in
a bar diagram, sorted so that the case with the
highest dose is to the far right, and accumulated
frequency on the y-axis.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
The fire scenario which represents the case when
the frequency curve crosses the acceptance criteria
level can be used as a representative, credible
design fire case (see Figure A.6). This is further
applied in the structure response calculations in
Section A.4.2.
A.3 Section 2: Structural
response analysis
A.3.1 Combined CFD and FE
analyses
The DAL fire derived from the probabilistic fire
load analysis described in Section A.2 is applied
in the structural response analysis. An integrated
CFD and FE analysis is performed representing a
realistic fire accident scenario where 3D dynamic
models are applied for the fire, structure heat-up,
and structural response. The software tools KFX,
(from ComputIT), FAHTS and USFOS (from
USFOS AS and DNV Software) are applied as
reference tools for fire, structure heat-up and
response analyses, respectively.
The probabilistic analysis is used to determine
which fire case is to be applied as the DAL fire in
terms of fire size (leak rate), leak profile and
duration. From the consequence analysis
described in Section A.2.3, several realistic fires
are obtained, and these can be assembled to
represent the DAL fire.
A.3.2 How to apply the DAL fire
The DAL fire represents one leak scenario, and it
can occur at different locations, as well as having
different jet directions and subject to different
wind conditions. Hence, it is necessary to run a set
of fire and structural response analyses with the
flames at different locations.
The flames should initially be located at the most
vulnerable areas for the structure. In particular,
structural elements and joints with high utilisation
ratios or areas where the gravity loads are highest
and the structure has the least redundancy should
be analysed as a first step. If collapse occurs at
those areas, it can be concluded that the structure
would need to be strengthened via application of
PFP.
Other vulnerable areas should be subject to the
same fire and the response analysed should be
performed until the bare material does not
collapse. If initially the structure fails, then PFP is
applied and the structural analysis carried out
again. Further, if initial PFP applied is not
sufficient, coverage is increased calculations
repeated until the condition of no collapse.
75

If the results from the structural analyses show that
a part of the structure can sustain the fire load (and
hence does not need PFP), it can be deduced that
other parts of the structure with lower utilisation
ratios will also not need PFP. This systematic
approach can lead to a reduction in the number of
structural response analyses required.
A.3.3 Simplified analysis with
temperature criteria
When a temperature response analysis only is
performed, the criteria for collapse are set by a
temperature in the structure. Conservatively, a
structure strength reduction of 50% implies
collapse. For common carbon steels, this is
typically reached at temperatures around 500C
[2], though historically the offshore industry has
conservatively used 400C.
A.3.4 Advanced analysis with strain
response criteria
The only load to be considered in combination
with the fire load on the structure is the gravity
loading. Low-frequency loads such as wave or
wind loads need not be included with gravity
loads. Structural models need to take account of
the degradation of the material when exposed to
elevated temperatures. Data for the behaviour of
steel at elevated temperatures is given in [2 and
Appendix B].
It is acceptable to reach up to the yield stress of the
material locally in parts of the structure. In a
framework structure, single element collapse is
also acceptable provided that the loads are
redistributed to other elements and a global
collapse is avoided. Generally, the criterion for
global collapse is when a critical part of the
structure breaks down leading to an escalation of
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
the fire caused by a rupture of pipes or equipment
with hydrocarbons, or spread of the fire to another
fire zone in e.g. the deck above or neighbouring
modules.
A.4 Case study: a
probabilistic assessment
of fire load in a Cooler
area
A worked example of a “Cooler area” with gas
scrubbers and coolers is given below. This area is
a part of a compressor module on a typical jacket
platform, see Figure A.2. The segments in the
Cooler area go up to the level where the
compressors are located. A solid plate separates
the top and bottom deck areas where the
compressor and the cooler are located,
respectively. A solid firewall on one side separates
the area from the rest of the platform and three of
the sides are open to free air. The Cooler area can
hence be considered as a separate area where a gas
leak and a fire cannot directly impact on the rest
of the platform. Such an area is well suited for a
separate analysis as it can experience the same
risks in terms of explosion DAL and fire DAL
over the whole area.
All parts of the segments which are located in the
Cooler area are considered in the subsequent
analysis. For simplification, this example
considers only the separate Cooler area in detail.
The same approach can be used for other areas.
The method described in Section A.2 is best suited
to a larger area with several segments of oil and
gas. For simplicity, in the present example, only
two segments are considered to illustrate the
application of the method. It should be noted that
the method can be easily set up on a spreadsheet.
76

Solid decks
Grated deck
Figure A.2 Elevation drawing of compressor module with cooler area seen from the
open side
A.4.2 Initial fire risk assessment
The initial fire risk assessment is performed to
provide an overview of the process, segments, and
modules/areas as well as selecting representative
segments for fire modelling. Representative
segments are typically those that have high risks
with significant leak frequencies and durations.
Case definitions
Leak cases are defined as the occurrence of leak
from a segment or sub-segment in a module. All
segments or sub-segments in the module represent
individual “cases”. In this example, only two cases
are given for simplicity. In larger modules, the list
of cases can be extensive, and it is then necessary
to handle all the cases in the present formalized
way.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Compressor
Cooler area
The first step involves determining the inventory
and leak frequency for each case Table A.2). The
leak frequency is counted for the segment or the
sub-segment in the module. The inventory of the
segment contains the mass of hydrocarbon in the
segment after the ESD valves are closed.
This example has only two gas cases. If there were
oil cases, these would be organised in a similar
way and treated separately from the gas cases.
Small, medium and large leaks are defined in
Table A.3. The pressures in the segments are
applied as the settle-out pressure in case the
segment has a variable pressure.
77
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table A.2 Case definitions with inventory and leak frequencies

Inventory of Leak frequency (per year)

Inventory of
Case Leak gas in
Case name oil in segment
number Medium segment Small Medium Large
(kg)
(kg)
Case 1 LP stages gas 558 0 1.04E-02 1.10E-02 7.24E-03
Case 2 HP stage gas 1342 0 1.18E-02 1.21E-02 7.35E-03
-1
Table A.3 Leak rates applied as representative for each leak size (kgs )

Leak category Small Medium Large

Leak rate range (kg s-1) 0.1-2 2-15 >15
-1
Representative initial rates (kg s ) 1.25 and 0.5* 5 20
*0.5 kg s-1 is applied in the risk assessment

Table A.4 Fire frequency (the product of leak frequency and ignition probability)

Ignition probability Fire frequency (per year) Total Fire

Case Case frequency
number name Small Medium Large Small Medium Large (per year)
Case 1 LP stages 1.50E-03 5.19E-03 1.43E-02 1.56E-05 5.71E-05 1.04E-04 1.61E-04
Case 2 HP stage 9.52E-04 5.32E-03 1.46E-02 1.12E-05 6.44E-05 1.07E-04 1.72E-04

Initial risk assessment pressures as well as oil segments can be

represented by the same definition. The inventory
An initial risk assessment is performed by finding
mass is defined as the volume of the internals of
the combination of fire frequency and inventory
the segments after the ESD valves are closed
for each case as shown in Table A.3. It is noted
multiplied by the density at the settle out operating
that the fire frequency represents the frequency
pressure.
part of the risk assessment (Table A.4), and the
inventory represents the consequence part The combination of fire frequency and inventory
Table A.2) represents the risk as illustrated in Figure A.3. It is
seen from the latter figure that the cases with
The fire duration is strongly linked to the
combined high inventory and high fire frequency
inventory mass (increasing inventory gives
have high risks. The figure is applied to select
increasing fire duration) and is hence a good
representative cases for further detailed
indicator of the severity of the fire. It is
assessment of consequences in terms of fire
noteworthy to observe that the consequences are
calculations, etc. In this example, Case 2 with HP
represented by the inventory mass, and not the
stage is applied as representative due to the higher
volume of the segment. This ensures that the
risk (higher combination of frequency and
consequence from gas segments with different
inventory).

FABIG Technical Note 13 78


Left axis, Mass of gas (kg)
2000
1800
Mass of gas in segment (kg)
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0 0.0E+00
LP stages, Case1
Left axis, Mass of gas (kg)
Right axis, Fire freq (per year)
Figure A.3 Inventory and frequencies for each case
A.4.3 Fire load modelling
The fire load is found by a detailed CFD
simulation of the fire in the module (alternatively,
if a CFD model is not applied for the response
assessment, typical values as given in [2] or
Sections 3 or 4 of this Technical Note can be used).
The representative fire scenario from the initial
fire risk assessment is applied. The maximum
“spot averaged” heat fluxes, Qbar, in the module
are listed in Table A.5. The spot averaged heat
fluxes are the heat fluxes at the worst point during
the fire, averaged over time and leak directions.
Qbar can be determined as follows:
1. Run separate fire simulations for 4 different
leak rates for each leak location and leak
direction. The 4 leak rates in Table A.3 are
applied. Two leak directions were applied in
this example, namely a leak pointing south
and a leak pointing down.
2. 3D CFD results from the 4 different leak
rates (all with the same leak location and
leak direction) are assembled to form one
scenario, representing 4 snapshots during the
leak scenario for large leaks. Similarly, for
medium and small leaks, the result files are
assembled applying 3 and 2 files,
respectively.
3. A grid of 1  1  1 m is applied on the 3D
CFD results with the optimal (worst
direction) heat flux recorded at all points.
The heat flux history is shown in Table A.4
for 3 points which have the highest dose
during the fire.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Right axis, Fire freq (per year)
2.0E-04
1.8E-04
1.6E-04
Fire frequency (per year)
1.4E-04
1.2E-04
1.0E-04
8.0E-05
6.0E-05
4.0E-05
2.0E-05
HP stages, Case 2
558 1342
1.61E-04 1.72E-04
4. A time integration of the true heat flux is
carried out at all points in the module. A
trapezoidal time integration is performed
applying the 4 snapshots which are
simulated (for large leaks).
5. The maximum integral is subsequently
sorted on the basis of the worst, hottest,
points in the module over the duration of the
fire. This sorted out integral gives the
maximum heat dose per square metre
(MJ m-2).
6. The same procedure is followed for both
leak directions and a combined average for
the results for all the leak directions is
determined.
7. This heat dose is further divided by the
duration of the representative fire to obtain
the maximum spot average heat flux, Qbar
(kW m-2).
The calculations of Qmax are performed after the
CFD simulations are completed by applying a
separate FORTRAN program. The transient heat
flux on the worst points for one of the large fires
is illustrated in Figure A.4. The heat flux becomes
higher than 400 kW m-2 after some time. Note that
in Figure A.4, a dimensionless time is applied,
which is defined by the natural logarithm to the
leak rate. The heat load is low in the initial phase
of the fire because it burns outside the module, and
after some time, the most intense flames are inside
the module. Results from the integration from
each of the jet directions are combined to give the
results in Table A.5.
79
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table A.5 Average heat flux, Qbar, at the point receiving the worst heat dose in the fire
(Results from fires combining South and downward directed jets.)

Initial rate (kg s-1) Fire size Max spot average heat flux, Qbar (kW m-2)
20 Large 260
5 Medium 240
1.25
Small 197
0.5

500

Qmax_L1
Qmax_L2
400
Qmax_L3
Qmax_L4

300
Q (kW/m2)

200

100

0
0 1 2 3 4
Tbar (-)

Figure A.4 Heat flux, Q, on 4 points which have the highest heat dose during the fire
(Tbar is a non-dimensional time which is defined as Tbar=-In(m/m0), where m is the actual leak rate
and m0 is the initial leak rate (m0=20 kg s-1 for large fire.)

Table A.6 Determination of heat dose for representative cases

(Heat dose is the product of leak duration and heat flux)

Leak duration (s) Heat dose (MJ m-2)

Mass of
Case gas in Small Medium Large
Case name
number segment Small Medium Large Flux (kW m-2)
(kg)
197 240 260
Case 1 LP stages 558 720 450 78 142 108 20
Case 2 HP stage 1342 900 528 198 177 127 51

A.4.4 Leak duration and heat dose
calculation
The heat dose is found for each case and size as
shown in Table A.6. The leak duration is first
found using a depressurization calculation for gas.
Fire duration is set from the time the leak starts
until the leak rate is reduced to 0.1 kg s-1 for all
scenarios. The time to ESD is closed is assumed to
be 30 s and time to blow-down starts is 5 minutes.
The pressure is reduced to 6.9 barG in 15 minutes,
or half the design pressure during a normal
blow-down if the system is designed in
accordance with the API guidelines.
The heat dose is subsequently computed for each
scenario as the product of the leak duration and the
average heat flux for the case.

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 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

A.4.5 Impact probability assessment A.4.6 Risk assessment: Fire

This section provides an overview of the exceedance plot
procedure for determining the probability of The fire exceedance plot is developed based on the
structural collapse under a fire. The initial steps described below:
assessment is based on the assumption that there
is no PFP. Three effects are said to influence the 1. Collect heat dose and total collapse frequency
probability of impact: (Table A.6).

1. Duration of the fire: If the fire is short
enough, the impact probability is set to zero.
In this example, all cases are assumed to have
the potential to cause an impact and therefore
they are set to 1.0.
2. Jet leak direction: If the leak is located near
the module openings, it is assumed that there
is a probability for the jet to point outwards
from the module and thereby not threaten
the module. In this case, the jet direction
probability is 5/6 as only 5 of the 6
directions can cause collapse. In the current
example, the leaks are located near the
centre and hence all directions can cause
collapse. The jet direction probability is 1.
3. Fire size: The size of the flames can also
influence the probability of collapse. A large
flame has higher probability of hitting vital
equipment. In the present example, for
simplicity, it is assumed that all fire sizes
have the same probability of hitting vital
equipment.
These 3 probabilities are multiplied to get the total
collapse probability. Further, the total collapse
frequency is obtained by multiplying the fire
frequency with the collapse probability as shown
in Table A.6.
2. Make one line for each leak size and case
number and organise all cases under each
other as in Table A.8.
3. Sort the table in ascending order of heat
dose with the highest dose at the bottom of
the table as shown in Table A.9. All the 5
first columns in the table are included when
sorting, and the cumulative last column is
calculated at the end.
4. Add up frequencies from the bottom up in
order to obtain the cumulative frequency.
The cumulative frequency is shown in the
last column in Table A.9.
5. Plot the cumulative frequency vs. the heat
dose to obtain the fire exceedance plot
illustrated in Figure A.5. The DAL dose can
be obtained on the x-axis for a given
acceptance frequency criteria. For example,
with 10-4 per year as the acceptance
frequency, the DAL dose becomes 125
MJ m-2. This can further be applied to find
the DAL fire duration, given a DAL heat
flux. If the DAL heat flux is 250 kW m-2,
then the DAL fire duration is 500 s (8.3
min).
6. Plot the cumulative frequency in a bar chart
for all the cases as in Figure A.6. The design
fire scenario can now be picked as the one
where the cumulative frequency is closest to
the acceptance frequency. In this example,
Case 2, medium becomes the design fire
scenario. This scenario can be applied when
using a CFD fire scenario in the structural
response analysis.

Table A.7 Main results input to risk assessment.

Collapse probability due
Total collapse frequency
Heat dose (MJ m-2) Fire freq (per year) to duration, jet and wind
(per year)
direction, flame size
Case
Case Small Med Large
name
Flux: Flux: Flux:
S M L S M L S M L
197 240 260
kW m-2 kW m-2 kW m-2
Case LP
142 108 20 1.6E-05 5.7E-05 1.0E-04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.6E-05 5.7E-05 1.0E-04
1 stages
Case HP
177 127 51 1.1E-05 6.4E-05 1.1E-04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.1E-05 6.4E-05 1.1E-04
2 stage

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 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table A.8 List of cases and main results

Heat dose Collapse frequency (per

Phase size
(MJ m-2) year)
Case 1, LP stages gas Small 142 1.56E-05
Case 2, HP stage gas Small 177 1.12E-05
Case 1, LP stages gas Medium 108 5.71E-05
Case 2, HP stage gas Medium 127 6.44E-05
Case 1, LP stages gas Large 20 1.04E-04
Case 2, HP stage gas Large 51 1.07E-04
Table A.9 Main results sorted with increasing dose and cumulative fire frequency
(The DAL fire case closest to acceptance criteria of 10-4 per year is highlighted.)

Sorted Cumulative
Collapse frequency frequency
Heat dose
Case number and name Phase Size (per year)
(kW s m-2) (per year)
Case 1, LP stages gas Large 20 1.04E-04 3.59E-04
Case 2, HP stage gas Large 51 1.07E-04 2.56E-04
Case 1, LP stages gas Medium 108 5.71E-05 1.48E-04
Case 2, HP stage gas Medium 127 6.44E-05 9.12E-05
Case 1, LP stages gas Small 142 1.56E-05 2.68E-05
Case 2, HP stage gas Small 177 1.12E-05 1.12E-05
Accumulated fire impact frequency (per year)

1.0E-03

1.0E-04

1.0E-05
10 100 1000
Heat dose received by structure (MJ/m2)

Figure A.5 Fire exceedance plot

(Plot is used to decide the DAL dose e.g. the 10-4 dose is 125 MJ m-2)

FABIG Technical Note 13 82

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Accumulated impact frequency (per year)

1.E-03

1.E-04

1.E-05

1.E-06
Large Large Medium Medium Small Small

gas gas gas gas gas gas

Case 1, LP Case 2, HP Case 1, LP Case 2, HP Case 1, LP Case 2, HP

stages stage stages stage stages stage
Sorted after heat dose received by structure (MJ/m2)

Figure A.6 Fire exceedance plot showing all cases

(The case names and sizes are used to identify the actual scenario to be applied as a DAL fire. The
yellow bar is the first bar crossing or closest to the acceptance criteria of 10 -4 per year and hence the
DAL fire.)

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 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

A.5 References
1. NORSOK Standard Z-013: 2001 Risk and emergency preparedness analysis, rev. 2.
2. Scandpower Risk Management AS, Report no. 27.207.291/R1 – Version 2, Guidelines for the
Protection of Pressurized Systems Exposed to Fire, 2004.
3. FABIG Technical Note 8, Protection of Piping Systems subject to Fires and Explosions, The Steel
Construction Institute, FABIG, 2005.
4. Ragnar Wighus, Brannlaster – Resultater fra nyere forskning, Presentation held at the conference:
Brann- og explosjonssikring I Petroleumsindustrien, Tekna – Molde 2008.

FABIG Technical Note 13 84

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Appendix B PROPERTIES OF STEEL AT ELEVATED

TEMPERATURE

B.1 Carbon Steel

B.1.1 Mechanical properties of Ea, the modulus of elasticity at temperature 
common carbon steel grades
where
EN 1993-1-2 [1] recommends a stress-strain
relationship for structural carbon steel at elevated fy is given by EN1993-1-1 for the
temperatures which is divided into four segments, particular grade.
the limits and characteristics of which vary with Ea is is given by EN1993-1-1
temperature. For temperatures below 400°C, as 210,000 N mm-2
EN 1993-1-2 allows the use of an alternative
model with strain hardening. According to EN 1993-1-2 this model applies to
structural steel grades S235, S275, S355, S420 and
The reduction factors for the stress-strain S460 to EN 10025-2 (see [2] for a list of all parts
relationship of steel at elevated temperatures, θa of EN 10025) and all grades of EN 10210 [3] and
are defined in the Eurocode as: EN 10219 [4].

ky, The effective yield strength relative to
the yield strength at 20°C (yield strength
reduction factor) i.e. fy,/fy (used for
design of class 1, 2 and 3 sections)
kE, he slope of linear elastic range relative
to slope at 20°C i.e. Ea,/Ea
kp0.2,θ design yield strength relative to yield
strength at 20ºC C (yield strength
reduction factor) i.e. f0.2,/fy (used for
design of class 4 sections)
The variation of these factors with temperature is
shown in Figure B.1. Full details of the model are
given in EN 1993-1-2.
For ease of use in design, tabulated values of the
factors, at 2°C intervals are presented in
Table B.1, Table B.2 and Table B.3 (Linear
interpolation was used to determine the values).

k i, 
1

0,9

0,8 k y, 

0,7

0,6 k p0,2, 
k E,
0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

a ,°C
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200

Figure B.1 Reduction factors for carbon steel at elevated temperature

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 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table B.1 Reduction factors for carbon steel at elevated temperatures 200°C to 400°C
Steel Reduction factor for Steel Reduction factor for
temp. Effective yield Modulus of Design yield temp. Effective yield Modulus of Design yield
a strength elasticity strength a strength elasticity strength
(°C) ky, kE, k0.2p, (°C) ky, kE, k0.2p,
200 1.00 0.90 0.89 300 1.00 0.80 0.78
202 1.000 0.898 0.888 302 1.000 0.798 0.777
204 1.000 0.896 0.886 304 1.000 0.796 0.775
206 1.000 0.894 0.883 306 1.000 0.794 0.772
208 1.000 0.892 0.881 308 1.000 0.792 0.770
210 1.000 0.890 0.879 310 1.000 0.790 0.767
212 1.000 0.888 0.877 312 1.000 0.788 0.764
214 1.000 0.886 0.875 314 1.000 0.786 0.762
216 1.000 0.884 0.872 316 1.000 0.784 0.759
218 1.000 0.882 0.870 318 1.000 0.782 0.757
220 1.000 0.880 0.868 320 1.000 0.780 0.754
222 1.000 0.878 0.866 322 1.000 0.778 0.751
224 1.000 0.876 0.864 324 1.000 0.776 0.749
226 1.000 0.874 0.861 326 1.000 0.774 0.746
228 1.000 0.872 0.859 328 1.000 0.772 0.744
230 1.000 0.870 0.857 330 1.000 0.770 0.741
232 1.000 0.868 0.855 332 1.000 0.768 0.738
234 1.000 0.866 0.853 334 1.000 0.766 0.736
236 1.000 0.864 0.850 336 1.000 0.764 0.733
238 1.000 0.862 0.848 338 1.000 0.762 0.731
240 1.000 0.860 0.846 340 1.000 0.760 0.728
242 1.000 0.858 0.844 342 1.000 0.758 0.725
244 1.000 0.856 0.842 344 1.000 0.756 0.723
246 1.000 0.854 0.839 346 1.000 0.754 0.720
248 1.000 0.852 0.837 348 1.000 0.752 0.718
250 1.000 0.850 0.835 350 1.000 0.750 0.715
252 1.000 0.848 0.833 352 1.000 0.748 0.712
254 1.000 0.846 0.831 354 1.000 0.746 0.710
256 1.000 0.844 0.828 356 1.000 0.744 0.707
258 1.000 0.842 0.826 358 1.000 0.742 0.705
260 1.000 0.840 0.824 360 1.000 0.740 0.702
262 1.000 0.838 0.822 362 1.000 0.738 0.699
264 1.000 0.836 0.820 364 1.000 0.736 0.697
266 1.000 0.834 0.817 366 1.000 0.734 0.694
268 1.000 0.832 0.815 368 1.000 0.732 0.692
270 1.000 0.830 0.813 370 1.000 0.730 0.689
272 1.000 0.828 0.811 372 1.000 0.728 0.686
274 1.000 0.826 0.809 374 1.000 0.726 0.684
276 1.000 0.824 0.806 376 1.000 0.724 0.681
278 1.000 0.822 0.804 378 1.000 0.722 0.679
280 1.000 0.820 0.802 380 1.000 0.720 0.676
282 1.000 0.818 0.800 382 1.000 0.718 0.673
284 1.000 0.816 0.798 384 1.000 0.716 0.671
286 1.000 0.814 0.795 386 1.000 0.714 0.668
288 1.000 0.812 0.793 388 1.000 0.712 0.666
290 1.000 0.810 0.791 390 1.000 0.710 0.663
292 1.000 0.808 0.789 392 1.000 0.708 0.660
294 1.000 0.806 0.787 394 1.000 0.706 0.658
296 1.000 0.804 0.784 396 1.000 0.704 0.655
298 1.000 0.802 0.782 398 1.000 0.702 0.653
300 1.00 0.80 0.78 400 1.00 0.70 0.65

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 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table B.2 Reduction factors for carbon steel at elevated temperatures 400°C to 600°C
Steel Reduction factor for Steel Reduction factor for
temp. Effective yield Modulus of Design yield temp. Effective yield Modulus of Design yield
a strength elasticity strength a strength elasticity strength
(°C) ky, kE, k0.2p, (°C) ky, kE, k0.2p,
400 1.00 0.70 0.65 500 0.78 0.6 0.53
402 0.996 0.698 0.648 502 0.774 0.594 0.525
404 0.991 0.696 0.645 504 0.768 0.588 0.521
406 0.987 0.694 0.643 506 0.761 0.583 0.516
408 0.982 0.692 0.640 508 0.755 0.577 0.512
410 0.978 0.690 0.638 510 0.749 0.571 0.507
412 0.974 0.688 0.636 512 0.743 0.565 0.502
414 0.969 0.686 0.633 514 0.737 0.559 0.498
416 0.965 0.684 0.631 516 0.730 0.554 0.493
418 0.960 0.682 0.628 518 0.724 0.548 0.489
420 0.956 0.680 0.626 520 0.718 0.542 0.484
422 0.952 0.678 0.624 522 0.712 0.536 0.479
424 0.947 0.676 0.621 524 0.706 0.530 0.475
426 0.943 0.674 0.619 526 0.699 0.525 0.470
428 0.938 0.672 0.616 528 0.693 0.519 0.466
430 0.934 0.670 0.614 530 0.687 0.513 0.461
432 0.930 0.668 0.612 532 0.681 0.507 0.456
434 0.925 0.666 0.609 534 0.675 0.501 0.452
436 0.921 0.664 0.607 536 0.668 0.496 0.447
438 0.916 0.662 0.604 538 0.662 0.490 0.443
440 0.912 0.660 0.602 540 0.656 0.484 0.438
442 0.908 0.658 0.600 542 0.650 0.478 0.433
444 0.903 0.656 0.597 544 0.644 0.472 0.429
446 0.899 0.654 0.595 546 0.637 0.467 0.424
448 0.894 0.652 0.592 548 0.631 0.461 0.420
450 0.890 0.650 0.590 550 0.625 0.455 0.415
452 0.886 0.648 0.588 552 0.619 0.449 0.410
454 0.881 0.646 0.585 554 0.613 0.443 0.406
456 0.877 0.644 0.583 556 0.606 0.438 0.401
458 0.872 0.642 0.580 558 0.600 0.432 0.397
460 0.868 0.640 0.578 560 0.594 0.426 0.392
462 0.864 0.638 0.576 562 0.588 0.420 0.387
464 0.859 0.636 0.573 564 0.582 0.414 0.383
466 0.855 0.634 0.571 566 0.575 0.409 0.378
468 0.850 0.632 0.568 568 0.569 0.403 0.374
470 0.846 0.630 0.566 570 0.563 0.397 0.369
472 0.842 0.628 0.564 572 0.557 0.391 0.364
474 0.837 0.626 0.561 574 0.551 0.385 0.360
476 0.833 0.624 0.559 576 0.544 0.380 0.355
478 0.828 0.622 0.556 578 0.538 0.374 0.351
480 0.824 0.620 0.554 580 0.532 0.368 0.346
482 0.820 0.618 0.552 582 0.526 0.362 0.341
484 0.815 0.616 0.549 584 0.520 0.356 0.337
486 0.811 0.614 0.547 586 0.513 0.351 0.332
488 0.806 0.612 0.544 588 0.507 0.345 0.328
490 0.802 0.610 0.542 590 0.501 0.339 0.323
492 0.798 0.608 0.540 592 0.495 0.333 0.318
494 0.793 0.606 0.537 594 0.489 0.327 0.314
496 0.789 0.604 0.535 596 0.482 0.322 0.309
498 0.784 0.602 0.532 598 0.476 0.316 0.305
500 0.78 0.60 0.53 600 0.47 0.31 0.30

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 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table B.3 Reduction factors for carbon steel at elevated temperatures 600°C to 800°C
Steel Reduction factor for Steel Reduction factor for
temp. Effective yield Modulus of Design yield temp. Effective yield Modulus of Design yield
a strength elasticity strength a strength elasticity strength
(°C) ky, kE, k0.2p, (°C) ky, kE, k0.2p,
600 0.47 0.31 0.30 700 0.23 0.13 0.13
602 0.465 0.306 0.297 702 0.228 0.129 0.129
604 0.460 0.303 0.293 704 0.225 0.128 0.128
606 0.456 0.299 0.290 706 0.223 0.128 0.126
608 0.451 0.296 0.286 708 0.220 0.127 0.125
610 0.446 0.292 0.283 710 0.218 0.126 0.124
612 0.441 0.288 0.280 712 0.216 0.125 0.123
614 0.436 0.285 0.276 714 0.213 0.124 0.122
616 0.432 0.281 0.273 716 0.211 0.124 0.120
618 0.427 0.278 0.269 718 0.208 0.123 0.119
620 0.422 0.274 0.266 720 0.206 0.122 0.118
622 0.417 0.270 0.263 722 0.204 0.121 0.117
624 0.412 0.267 0.259 724 0.201 0.120 0.116
626 0.408 0.263 0.256 726 0.199 0.120 0.114
628 0.403 0.260 0.252 728 0.196 0.119 0.113
630 0.398 0.256 0.249 730 0.194 0.118 0.112
632 0.393 0.252 0.246 732 0.192 0.117 0.111
634 0.388 0.249 0.242 734 0.189 0.116 0.110
636 0.384 0.245 0.239 736 0.187 0.116 0.108
638 0.379 0.242 0.235 738 0.184 0.115 0.107
640 0.374 0.238 0.232 740 0.182 0.114 0.106
642 0.369 0.234 0.229 742 0.180 0.113 0.105
644 0.364 0.231 0.225 744 0.177 0.112 0.104
646 0.360 0.227 0.222 746 0.175 0.112 0.102
648 0.355 0.224 0.218 748 0.172 0.111 0.101
650 0.350 0.220 0.215 750 0.170 0.110 0.100
652 0.345 0.216 0.212 752 0.168 0.109 0.099
654 0.340 0.213 0.208 754 0.165 0.108 0.098
656 0.336 0.209 0.205 756 0.163 0.108 0.096
658 0.331 0.206 0.201 758 0.160 0.107 0.095
660 0.326 0.202 0.198 760 0.158 0.106 0.094
662 0.321 0.198 0.195 762 0.156 0.105 0.093
664 0.316 0.195 0.191 764 0.153 0.104 0.092
666 0.312 0.191 0.188 766 0.151 0.104 0.090
668 0.307 0.188 0.184 768 0.148 0.103 0.089
670 0.302 0.184 0.181 770 0.146 0.102 0.088
672 0.297 0.180 0.178 772 0.144 0.101 0.087
674 0.292 0.177 0.174 774 0.141 0.100 0.086
676 0.288 0.173 0.171 776 0.139 0.100 0.084
678 0.283 0.170 0.167 778 0.136 0.099 0.083
680 0.278 0.166 0.164 780 0.134 0.098 0.082
682 0.273 0.162 0.161 782 0.132 0.097 0.081
684 0.268 0.159 0.157 784 0.129 0.096 0.080
686 0.264 0.155 0.154 786 0.127 0.096 0.078
688 0.259 0.152 0.150 788 0.124 0.095 0.077
690 0.254 0.148 0.147 790 0.122 0.094 0.076
692 0.249 0.144 0.144 792 0.120 0.093 0.075
694 0.244 0.141 0.140 794 0.117 0.092 0.074
696 0.240 0.137 0.137 796 0.115 0.092 0.072
698 0.235 0.134 0.133 798 0.112 0.091 0.071
700 0.23 0.13 0.13 800 0.11 0.09 0.07

FABIG Technical Note 13 88


B.1.2 Mechanical properties of
thermo-mechanically rolled
steels to EN10025-4
In the case of thermo-mechanically rolled steels to
EN 10025-4 [2] (e.g. S355M, S420M, S460M),
there is evidence that these grades tend to lose
strength more rapidly at temperatures below
400°C and to lose stiffness less rapidly at
temperatures above 500°C compared to the
material model in EN 1993-1-2.
Figure B.2 Reduction factors for Steel Grade S460M at elevated temperatures [5]
Figure B.3 Reduction factors for Steel Grade S460M at elevated temperatures [6,7]
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
Grade S460
Figure B.2 shows the reduction in effective yield
strength and elastic modulus for S460M steel
(based on a series of 60 transient tests [5])
compared with the EN 1993-1-2 model.
More recent work on grade S460M at elevated
temperature was carried out by Schneider and
Lange [6,7] and showed that the reduction in
effective yield strength of four S460M steels to
EN 10025-4 with different chemical compositions
was only slightly greater than predicted by the
EN 1993-1-2 model.
89
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Grade S420 Table B.4 gives the strength factors, relative to the
A comparison of strength reduction factors for appropriate value at 20oC, based on the above
grade S420 steel with the EN 1993-1-2 model is relationships.
shown in Figure B.4 [8].

Figure B.4 Reduction factors for Steel Grade S420M at elevated temperatures

Table B.4 Strength reduction factors at elevated temperatures for S420M steel [8]
Steel temperature Reduction factor Reduction factor Reduction factor
(relative to fy) for (relative to fy) for (relative to Ea) for
effective yield proportional limit the slope of the
strength linear elastic
range
oC
ky, (=fy,/fy) kp, (= fp,/fy) kE, (= Ea, /Ea)
20 1.000 0.986 1.000
100 0.953 0.910 1.000
200 0.910 0.779 0.977
300 0.885 0.625 0.904
400 0.878 0.466 0.786
500 0.710 0.318 0.621
600 0.442 0.198 0.408
700 0.206 0.126 0.145

In addition, empirical relationships were given in fp, = kp, fy

[9] for calculating the elevated temperature
mechanical properties of S420M steel. where
k p,  9 10 9  3  2.9 10 6  2
The modulus of elasticity Ea, is given by
 0.00064  1.0
Ea, = kE,Ea
for 20oC    700oC
where
kE,  3.5  10 10  3  1.9  10 6  2 The yield strength fy, is given by
+ 0.00028 + 1.0 fy, = ky, fy
for 20oC    700oC

The proportional limit fp, is given by

FABIG Technical Note 13 90


where
ky,  9  10 7  2  0.0007  1.014
for 20oC    400oC
and
ky, = 2.2  10 –8  3 – 0.000038 2
+ 0.0191 - 2.09
for 400oC    700oC
B.1.3 Mechanical properties of
quenched and tempered steels
to EN 10025-6
Experimental data has been published on
BISPLATE 80 [9] manufactured in accordance
with AS/NZS 3597 Grade 700 [10]. It showed that
the reduction in yield strength at a strain level of
2% (ky,is slightly greater (circa 5%) than
predicted by EN 1993-1-2 at temperatures below
500°C but that the code is conservative above
500°C range. The elastic modulus (kE,) predicted
by the EN 1993-1-2 is conservative over the full
temperature range (Figure B.5). The steel used in
this study is reported as being equivalent to S690Q
Figure B.5 Reduction factors for Steel Grade S690Q at elevated temperatures
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
in EN 10025-6 [2]. More recently, Qiang [10]
performed a series of fire tests on S690Q grade
steel to EN 10025-6 [2]. These tests showed that
S690Q steel loses strength more rapidly than
predicted by EN 1993-1-2 but that the elevated
temperature elastic modulus is conservatively
predicted by the code. Qiang [10] derived the
following “best fit” expressions for the elevated
temperature reduction factors of the elastic
modulus, kE,and effective yield stress, ky,.
For 20 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 100,
𝑘𝐸,𝜃 = 1.005 − 2.25 × 10−4 𝜃
For 100 < 𝜃 ≤ 700,
𝑘𝐸,𝜃 = −3.66 × 10−9 𝜃 3 + 1.962 × 10−6 𝜃 2
− 9.12 × 10−4 𝜃 + 1.031
For 20 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 300,
𝑘𝑦,𝜃 = 0.991 − 6.038 × 10−5 𝜃
For 300 < 𝜃 ≤ 700,
𝑘𝑦,𝜃 = 7.355 × 10−9 𝜃 3 − 1.31 × 10−5 𝜃 2
+ 5.185 × 10−3 𝜃 + 0.4
91
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

B.1.4 Mechanical properties of S355G8

steels to EN10225
A number of other structural steel grades are also
used on offshore platforms, the majority of which
are now either within or equivalent to grades
covered by EN 10225 [12]. Table B.5 shows the
best grade equivalence between EN 10225 [13],
BS 7191 (now withdrawn and superseded by
EN 10225) and API [13].
Table B.6 gives the strength reduction factors,
relative to the appropriate (minimum specified)
values at 20oC for S355G8+N steel and is
applicable to plate thickness up to 63mm.
Table B.7 gives the strength reduction factors,
relative to the appropriate (specified minimum)
values at 20oC for S355G8+M steel and is
applicable to plate thickness up to 20 mm.

Elevated temperature tests on a series of BS 7191
grades are reported in [14]. The elevated
temperature material models derived from these
tests for use with the EN 1993-1-2 model are given
in the following sections.
The strength reduction factors in the tables can be
used in conjunction with codified design methods.
For advanced nonlinear analysis, the strength
reduction factors may be used together with the
EN 1993-1-2 model (with strain hardening) to
generate temperature dependent stress strain
curves.

Table B.5 Nearest equivalent grades in EN 10225, BS 7191 and API 1993
EN 10225:2009 BS 7191:1989 API 1993 Min average Charpy V-notch impact test value
S355G2+N
355D 50J at -20C
S355G5+M
S355G3+N
355E 50J at -40C
S355G6+M
S355G7+N
355EM 2H Grade 50
S355G7+M
2W Grade 50 50J at -40C
S355G8+N
355EMZ 2W Grade 50T
S355G8+M
S460G1+QT 450EM
2Y Grade 60 60J at -40C
S460G2+QT 450EMZ
N denotes nornalised condition
M denotes the thermomechanically rolled condition
QT denotes quenched and tempered condition

Table B.6 Strength reduction factors at elevated temperatures for S355G8+N steel
Steel Reduction factor Reduction factor (relative Reduction factor (relative
temperature (relative to fy) for to fy) for proportional limit to Ea) for the slope of the
effective yield strength linear elastic range
oC
ky, (= fy,/fy) kp, (= fp,/fy) kE, (= Ea,/Ea)
20 0.880 0.850 0.950
100 0.820 0.750 0.900
200 0.750 0.550 0.800
300 0.720 0.450 0.750
400 0.650 0.350 0.700
450 0.620 0.350 0.650
500 0.550 0.300 0.450
550 0.450 0.200 0.400
600 0.320 0.150 0.250
650 0.210 0.100 0.130
700 0.130 0.050 0.075

Table B.7 Strength reduction factors at elevated temperatures for S355G8+M steel
Steel Reduction factor Reduction factor (relative Reduction factor (relative
temperature (relative to fy) for to fy) for proportional limit to Ea) for the slope of the
effective yield strength linear elastic range

FABIG Technical Note 13 92

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

oC
ky, (= fy,/fy) kp. (= fp,/fp) kE, (= Ea,/Ea)
20 0.880 0.800 0.950
100 0.850 0.800 0.900
200 0.850 0.750 0.850
300 0.800 0.600 0.800
400 0.800 0.450 0.720
450 0.750 0.350 0.700
500 0.650 0.300 0.700
550 0.500 0.250 0.650
600 0.383 0.150 0.450
650 0.300 0.100 0.450
700 0.230 0.100 0.450

S460G2+QT the strength reduction factors presented in the

Table B.8 gives the strength reduction factors,
relative to the appropriate (specified minimum)
values at 20oC for S460G2+QT steel and is
applicable to plate thickness up to 75 mm. For use
in codified design methods, it is sufficient to use
tables while for advanced nonlinear analysis, the
strength reduction factors may be used together
with the EN 1993-1-2 model (with strain
hardening) to generate temperature dependent
stress strain curves.

Table B.8 Strength reduction factors at elevated temperatures for S460G2+QT steel
Steel temperature Reduction factor Reduction factor (relative to Reduction factor
(relative to fy) for fy) for proportional limit (relative to Ea) for the
effective yield slope of the linear
strength elastic range
o
C ky, (= fy,/fy) kp, (= fp,/fy) kE, (= Ea,/Ea)
20 0.85 0.80 0.95
100 0.82 0.75 0.90
200 0.80 0.70 0.80
300 0.80 0.65 0.75
400 0.80 0.65 0.65
500 0.75 0.60 0.65
600 0.70 0.50 0.55
700 0.62 0.40 0.50
800 0.48 0.30 0.35
900 0.32 0.20 0.20
1000 0.20 0.10 0.10

B.1.5 Thermal properties of carbon 750°C and 860°C shown in Figure B.6. This phase
steels change requires significant amounts of energy
causing a significant spike in the specific heat
Data from EN 1993-1-2 for thermal elongation,
capacity in this temperature range (see
specific heat and thermal conductivity as a
Figure B.7).
function of temperature is given in this section.
The data is applicable to structural grades Expressions for the nominal elongation, relative to
including S235, S275 and S355 of EN 10025. length at 20°C, specific heat of steel ca and thermal
Equivalent data for the high strength steels conductivity at elevated temperatures a, are given
S355M, S420M, S460M, S355G8 and S460G2 are in EN 1993-1-2.
not widely available and should be sought from
steel producers. For simple calculation models it is not necessary
to consider the variation of specific heat capacity
The properties of thermal elongation, specific heat or thermal conductivity with temperature;
capacity and thermal conductivity of steel are EN 1993-1-2 recommends values of 600 J kg-1 K-1
dependent on steel temperature (Figure B.6, and 45 W m-1 K-1 respectively.
Figure B.7 and Figure B.8). At a temperature of
approximately 730°C, steel undergoes a phase
change from ferrite-pearlite to austenite. This
phase change results in a denser molecular
structure and causes marked change in expansion
characteristics represented by a plateau between

FABIG Technical Note 13 93

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Elongation l/l [x10-3 ] B.2.1 Mechanical properties for

20 stainless steels
16 Annex C of EN 1993-1-2 gives a stress-strain
relationship at elevated temperatures for stainless
12 steel as well as reduction factors for six austenitic
8
and duplex grades. These data are derived from the
Design manual for structural stainless steel [15].
4 However, this is now superseded by reduction
factors derived from a more recent review of all
0
isothermal and anisothermal data available for
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
 [oC] stainless steel grades [16]. These more up-to-date
reduction factors are presented in this section.

Figure B.6 Thermal elongation of carbon The reduction factors cover eleven different
steel as a function of grades of stainless steel. These have been placed
temperature in six different groups based on their behaviour at
elevated temperature. The groups and grades
within each group are described in 0.

Specific heat [J/kg K] Table B.10 gives the reduction factors for each of
5000 the groups. The factors are defined as follows:
4000

3000 kE, The slope of linear elastic range at

2000 temperature a relative to slope at 20C,
i.e. E E
1000
k p 0.2, The 0.2% proof strength at temperature a
0 relative to design strength at 20 C,
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
 [oC] i.e. f 0.2p, f y
ku, The ultimate strength at temperature a
Figure B.7 Specific heat of carbon steel
as a function of temperature relative to ultimate strength at 20 C,
i.e. f u, f u
k2, A parameter used to calculate f2,, the
Thermal conductivity [W/m K] strength at 2% total strain at temperature
60 a, using the following expression
f 2,  f 0.2 p,  k2, ( f u,  f 0.2 p, )
50

40
30
where:
20 E is Young’s modulus at 20°C =
200,000 N mm-2
10
fy is the yield strength at 20°C
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 fu is the ultimate tensile strength at 20°C
 [oC]
Where full elevated temperature stress strain
Figure B.8 Thermal conductivity of curves are required (e.g. for use in advanced
carbon steel as a function of analysis) these can be derived from
temperature Table B.11 [1]. The reduction factors are given in
Table B.10.
B.2 Stainless Steel

FABIG Technical Note 13 94

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table B.9 Stainless steel grades covered

Group Grades Comments
Austenitic I 1.4301, 1.4318, 1.4301 is a very common grade used in a broad range of construction
1.4818 applications, although not in marine or industrial applications. It typically contains
alloying elements of at least 18% chromium and 8-10% nickel. It is a low strength
grade (0.2% proof strength of circa 200N/mm2 and low resistance to stress
corrosion cracking. 1.4318 is a higher strength austenitic steel (minimum proof
strength of 350 N/mm2) and similar corrosion resistance to 1.4301. Its mechanical
strength can be increased further by cold working. 1.4818 is also a variant of
1.4301, with increased contents of silicon and nitrogen and is used where
oxidation resistance at high operating temperature (up to 1100°C) is required.
Austenitic II 1.4401, 1.4404, Grade 1.4401 and 1.4404 are austenitic grades containing about 17-18%
1.4541 chromium and 8-11% nickel and are suitable for marine and industrial sites.
Grade 1.4541 is a titanium stabilised grade 1.4301. It has better corrosion
resistance than 1.4301 follwing heating in the temperature range 425-815C (e.g.
during welding).
Austenitic III 1.4571 This grade is essentially 1.4401 with titanium stabilisation The addition of titanium
is made to reduce the risk of intergranular corrosion follwing heating in the
temperature range 425-815C (e.g. during welding). 1.4571 also has better
mechanical strength, especially, at elevated temperatures above about 600 C.
Duplex I 1.4362 Grade 1.4362 (widely known as 2304) is a ‘lean’ duplex grade, stronger than the
austenitics (450 N mm-2 compared to 220 N mm-2) and with corrosion resistance
similar to 1.4401 and 1.4404.
Duplex II 1.4462, 1.4162 Grade 1.4462 (widely known as 2205) is a duplex grade with superior strength
and corrosion resistance to the austenitic grades. 1.4162 is a lean duplex grade
which has high mechanical strength (similar to other duplex grades) due to its
duplex microstructure and high nitrogen content. Its corrosion resistance is better
than that of 1.4301 and is close to 1.4404.
Ferritic I 1.4003

Table B.10 Reduction factors for determining strain and stiffness of stainless steel
grades at elevated temperatures
Reduction factor Reduction factor Reduction factor Reduction factor
Steel Temp C
kE, k0.2p, ku, k2%,
Austenitic I (1.4301, 1.4318, 1.4818)
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.23
100 0.96 0.78 0.81 0.21
200 0.92 0.65 0.72 0.22
300 0.88 0.60 0.68 0.22
400 0.84 0.55 0.66 0.23
500 0.80 0.50 0.61 0.25
600 0.76 0.46 0.54 0.27
700 0.71 0.38 0.40 0.28
800 0.63 0.25 0.25 0.30
900 0.45 0.15 0.13 0.17
1000 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.05
1100 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.13

FABIG Technical Note 13 95

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table B.10 (cont) Reduction factors for determining strain and stiffness of stainless
steel grades at elevated temperatures
Reduction factor Reduction factor Reduction factor Reduction factor
Steel Temp C
kE, k0.2p, ku, k2%,
Austenitic II (1.4401, 1.4404, 1.4541)
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.16
100 0.96 0.86 0.87 0.25
200 0.92 0.72 0.80 0.25
300 0.88 0.67 0.78 0.24
400 0.84 0.62 0.77 0.21
500 0.80 0.60 0.74 0.21
600 0.76 0.56 0.67 0.21
700 0.71 0.50 0.51 0.29
800 0.63 0.41 0.34 0.27
900 0.45 0.22 0.19 0.21
1000 0.20 0.14 0.10 -
1100 0.10 0.07 0.07 -
Austenitic III (1.4571)
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25
100 0.96 0.89 0.88 0.25
200 0.92 0.82 0.81 0.25
300 0.88 0.77 0.79 0.24
400 0.84 0.72 0.79 0.22
500 0.80 0.69 0.77 0.21
600 0.76 0.65 0.71 0.21
700 0.71 0.59 0.57 0.25
800 0.63 0.51 0.38 0.35
900 0.45 0.29 0.23 0.38
1000 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.40
1100 0.10 - - 0.40
Duplex I (1.4362)
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.46
100 0.96 0.83 0.94 0.26
200 0.92 0.75 0.87 0.18
300 0.88 0.69 0.79 0.23
400 0.84 0.58 0.70 0.35
500 0.80 0.43 0.59 0.47
600 0.76 0.27 0.47 0.52
700 0.71 0.14 0.33 0.49
800 0.63 0.07 0.20 0.35
900 0.45 0.04 0.09 0.12
1000 0.20 - 0.04 -
1100 0.10 - - -

FABIG Technical Note 13 96

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table B.10 (cont) Reduction factors for determining strain and stiffness of stainless
steel grades at elevated temperatures
Steel Temp C Reduction factor Reduction factor Reduction factor Reduction factor
kE, k0.2p, ku, k2%,
Duplex II (1.4462, 1.4162)
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33
100 0.96 0.82 0.96 0.28
200 0.92 0.70 0.91 0.29
300 0.88 0.65 0.88 0.31
400 0.84 0.60 0.82 0.30
500 0.80 0.53 0.71 0.31
600 0.76 0.42 0.56 0.37
700 0.71 0.27 0.38 0.42
800 0.63 0.15 0.22 0.41
900 0.45 0.07 0.14 0.36
1000 0.20 0.01 0.06 0.33
1100 0.10 - - -
Ferritic I (1.4003)
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37
100 0.96 1.00 0.94 0.37
200 0.92 1.00 0.88 0.37
300 0.88 0.98 0.86 0.37
400 0.84 0.91 0.83 0.42
500 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.40
600 0.76 0.45 0.42 0.45
700 0.71 0.19 0.21 0.46
800 0.63 0.13 0.12 0.47
900 0.45 0.10 0.11 0.47
1000 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.47
1100 0.10 - - 0.47

FABIG Technical Note 13 97

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Table B.11 Stress-strain relationship for stainless steel at elevated temperatures

Strain range  Stress  Tangent Modulus Et

 c E E ( 1  a b
 ab b
)
1  a b
( 1  a b
)2
c  u d  ( u   )
c   u   
d 2
f 0.2 p  e 
2

c c c 2   u    2
where:
( E  c  f 0.2 p ) (1  Ect  c / f 0.2 p ) E  c
a b
f 0.2 p  c
b
( E  c / f 0.2 p  1) f 0.2 p

 
d 2  e   u   c  E ct  e 2
e
c 2   u   c   u   c  
 
 E ct 

e
f u  f 0.2 p  2
 c  f 0.2p / E  0.002
 u   c  Ect  2 f u  f 0.2p 
with

B.2.2 Thermal properties of

stainless steel
The properties of thermal elongation, specific
heat capacity and thermal conductivity of
austenitic stainless steel are dependent on steel
temperature (Figure B.9, Figure B.10 and
Figure B.11).

Expressions for the nominal elongation relative to

length at 20°C, specific heat and thermal
conductivity at elevated temperatures for
austenitic stainless steels are given in Annex C of
EN 1993-1-2 [1].

No equivalent expressions are available for

Figure B.10 Specific heat of stainless steel
duplex or ferritic stainless steels; designers are
as a function of temperature
advised to contact the steel producer.

Figure B.9 Thermal elongation of Figure B.11 Thermal conductivity of

stainless steel as a function stainless steel as a function of
of temperature temperature

FABIG Technical Note 13 98

 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

B.3 Mechanical properties for Table B.12 Strength reduction factors for
bolts and welds
welds and bolts
Table B.12 shows the strength reduction factors Temperature Reduction Reduction
 factor for factor for
for bolts and welds given in Annex D of bolts, kb welds,
EN 1993-1-2 [1]. The factors for welds are based kw
on tests carried out on grades S275 and S355JR
20 1.000 1.000
steel and presumed to apply to welds for all
grades of steel covered in [1]. 100 0.968 1.000
150 0.952 1.000
200 0.935 1.000
300 0.903 1.000
400 0.775 0.876
500 0.550 0.627
600 0.220 0.778
700 0.100 0.130
800 0.067 0.074
900 0.033 0.018
1000 0.000 0.000

FABIG Technical Note 13 99


B.5 References
1. EN1993-1-2 Eurocode 3:2005 Design of
steel structures – Part 1-2: General rules –
Structural fire design.
2. EN 10025:2004 Hot rolled products of
structural steels
EN 10025-1 General technical delivery
conditions.
EN 10025-2 Technical delivery conditions
for non-alloy structural steels.
EN 10025-3 Technical delivery conditions
for normalized/normalized rolled weldable
fine grain structural steels
EN 10025-4 Technical delivery conditions
for thermomechanical rolled weldable fine
grain structural steels.
EN 10025-5 Technical delivery conditions
for structural steels with improved
atmospheric corrosion resistance.
EN 10025-6 Technical delivery conditions
for flat products of high yield strength
structural steels in the quenched and
tempered condition.
3. EN 10210-1:2006 Hot finished structural
hollow sections of non-alloy and fine grain
structural steels – Part 1: Technical
delivery requirements.
4. EN 10219-1:2006. Cold formed welded
structural hollow sections of non-alloy and
fine grain steels. Part 1: Technical delivery
conditions.
5. Outinen J., Mechanical properties of
structural steels at elevated temperatures
and after cooling down, Fire and Materials
Conference, San Francisco, USA,
Proceedings, Interscience Communications
Limited, 2006.
6. Schneider R. and Lange J. Constitutive
equations of structural steel S460 at high
temperatures. Proceedings of the Nordic
Steel Construction Conference, 2009.
7. Schneider R. and Lange J. Material and
creep behaviour of S460 in case of fire,
Experimental Investigation and Analytical
Modelling. Proceedings of the
International Conference on the
Application of Structural Fire Engineering,
Prague, Czech Republic, 29 April 2011.
FABIG Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
8. Mäkeläinen P., Outinen J., Kesti J. Fire
design models for structural steel S420M
based upon transient state tensile test results,
Journal of Constructional Steel Research,
Vol. 48, No.1, pp. 47-57, Elsevier Science
Ltd, 8/1998.
9. Chen, J., Young, B, and Uy, B. Behavior of
High Strength Structural Steel at Elevated
Temperatures, Research Online, Faculty of
Engineering, University of Wollongong,
2006.
10. Qiang X. Bijlaard F.S.K., Kolstein M.H.,
Dependence of mechanical properties of
high strength steel S690 on elevated
temperatures, Construction and Building
Materials, 30 (2012) 73–79.
11. AS 3597-2008. Australian Standard for
Structural and pressure vessel steel –
Quenched and tempered plate
12. EN 10225:2009, Weldable structural steels
for fixed offshore structures. Technical
delivery conditions.
13. Recommended Practice for Planning,
Designing and Constructing Fixed Offshore
Platforms, API RP 2A, 22nd Edition,
American Petroleum Institute, Washington,
D.C., 2000.
14. The Steel Construction Institute, Elevated
temperature and high strain rate properties
of offshore steels. HSE Books, Offshore
Technology Report 2001/020.
15. Design Manual for Structural Stainless
Steel, 3rd Edition, Euro Inox and The Steel
Construction Institute, 2006. (available at
www.steel-stainless.org/designmanual).
16. Gardner, L., Insausti, A., Ng, K.T. and
Ashraf, M. Elevated temperature material
properties of stainless steel alloys. Journal of
Constructional Steel Research 66 (2010).
100
 Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires

Appendix C DESIGN EXAMPLES

FABIG Technical Note 13 101

 Job No. OSH3485 Sheet 1 of 8 Rev 0

Title TN13 - Worked Example 1

Silwood Park, Ascot, Berks SL5 7QN Subject Heating of steel remote from fire source
Telephone: (01344) 636525
Fax: (01344) 636570
Made by Date
CALCULATION SHEET Client FABIG
Checked by Date

Heating of steel remote from fire source

An escape route from a temporary refuge is exposed to radiation from a flare. A quick
assessment is required to establish:
 Whether personnel can use the escape route, or whether radiation shielding is
necessary;
 The temperature of decking, walls and handrails after 1 hour.
The base of the flare is 60 m in horizontally and 30m elevated from the walkway. During
blowdown it will burn 20 kg/s of mixed hydrocarbon. It is estimated that personnel would
be exposed on the walkway for a period of 15 seconds.

The ambient temperature at the walkway can be assumed to be 30°C. Due to convective
flows, air velocity can be taken as 4 m/s.

Size of and heat generated from flare

Since mixed hydrocarbon, assume heat of combustion is 48,000 kJ/kg: Drysdale [Ref
C.1] Table 1.13

At 20 kg/s, total heat release = 𝑄 = 20 × 48000 = 960000 J/s = 960MW

The reduced heat will be assumed to emanate from 5 points located along the flame API521 (2007,
centreline. The API 521 model is used here to determine the flame length. This gives a Figure 7)
flame length of 60 m for a total heat release of 960 MW.

102
 Sheet of 8 Rev

Only a proportion of this heat will be released as radiation. Based on large scale tests, See Figure 4.3
and assuming mixed hydrocarbon results in a sooty flame, roughly 30% of the heat is
released as radiation i.e. F = 0.3.
Locate points at 6, 18, 30, 42 and 54 metres above flare tip. See sections 5.3.1
and 5.3.2
Radiation from each point:
960 × 0.3
𝐹𝑄 =
5
= 57.6, say 60 MW

The heat released will be further reduced by the transmissivity of the atmosphere.
Reductions of 20% have been noted over 20 m distances (i.e. τ = 0.8). Greater reductions
may occur over longer distances, but this is not proven.
Net heat from each point:
𝜏𝐹𝑄 = 60 × 0.8
= 48, say 50MW

Radiation received at a surface

The maximum heat flux to a receiving surface outside the flare is given by:

𝐹𝑄𝜏 Section 5.3.1

𝑞=
4𝜋𝑑2

In this multi-point model, there are 5 points. Furthermore, the surface may not be normal
to the line connecting the point with that surface.
Assuming an isotropic emitter:
5 𝐹𝑄𝜏
𝑞=∑ 2
cos 𝛽𝑖
𝑖=1 4𝜋𝑑

Where:
di = distance from point to surface (m)
βi = angle between normal to surface and the line connecting that surface to
point i
Use the above equation to calculate the variation in radiation for differently oriented
surfaces. The orientation of the surface to the vertical is denoted by θ.

103
 Angle of Point 1 d1 = 70 Point 2 d2 = 77 Point 3 d3 = 85 Point 4 d4 = 94 Point 5 d5 = 103 Total
surface to Production
vertical (θ) ∑qi (kW/m2)
βi qi βi qi βi qi βi qi βi qi

0 31 0.7 39 0.52 45 0.39 50 0.29 54 0.22 2.12

15 16 0.78 24 0.62 30 0.48 35 0.37 39 0.29 2.54

30 1 0.82 9 0.67 15 0.53 20 0.43 24 0.34 2.79

45 14 0.79 6 0.67 0 0.55 5 0.45 9 0.37 2.83

60 29 0.71 21 0.63 15 0.53 10 0.45 6 0.37 2.69

75 44 0.59 36 0.55 30 0.48 25 0.41 21 0.35 2.38

90 59 0.42 51 0.42 45 0.39 40 0.35 36 0.31 1.89

105 74 0.23 66 0.27 60 0.28 55 0.26 51 0.24 1.28

120 89 0.01 81 0.11 75 0.14 70 0.15 66 0.15 0.56

Sheet

135 104 0.20 96 0.07 90 0 85 0.04 81 0.06 0.37

of
8
Rev

104
 Sheet of 8 Rev

Endurance time for personnel

The received radiation is estimated to be 2.85 kW/m2. Note that according to ISO 23251, ISO 23251,
the maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting 2 min to 3 Table 9
min are required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing is
4.73 kW/m2. The figure for continuous exposure with appropriate clothing is
1.58 kW/m2. Exposure for only 15 seconds to 2.85kW/m2 is unlikely to cause harm.

Temperature of decking
Assume 8 mm plate, insulated underneath. See Ref [49] for
emissivity.
Emissivity of surface = 0.8 (assumed)
Local ambient temperature = 30°C (303K)
Determine maximum surface temperature possible by allowing for convective cooling
and re-radiation (θ = 90º).
Heat Gain = 1.89 × 0.8
Heat Gai = 1.512 kW/m2
Heat Loss = Heat gain, assuming steady state conditions are achieved
Convective loss equals:
𝑞𝑐 = ℎ𝑐 (𝑇𝑠 − 𝑇𝑎 )
Where:
hc = Convection coefficient (Wm-2K-1)
Ts = Surface Temperature (K)
Ta = Ambient Temperature (K)

105
 Sheet of 8 Rev

The convection coefficient is calculated using:

𝑣
ℎ𝑐 = 3.96√ ISO 12241(2008),
𝐷 Eq 26

Given air velocity v = 4 m/s and walkway width D = 1.6 m:

4
ℎ𝑐 = 3.96 × √
1.6
ℎ𝑐 = 6.3 𝑊𝑚−2 𝐾 −1
Radiation Loss = σ(𝜖𝑠 𝑇𝑠 4 − 𝑇𝑎 4 )

Where:
ϵs = Surface Emmisivity
σ = Stefan–Boltzmann constant (Wm-2K-4)
Ts = Surface Temperature (K)
Ta = Ambient Temperature (K)
The heat balance equation is: Section 5.4
1512 = 6.3 × (𝑇𝑠 − 303) + 5.67 × 10−8 × (0.8 × 𝑇𝑠 4 − 3034 )
Iteratively solving for surface temperature gives:
𝑇𝑠 = 412K (139°𝐶)
Determine the heat required to raise temperature of plate from 303K to 412K (109K).

𝐸 = 𝐶𝑠 𝑀∆𝑇
Where:
Cs = specific heat of steel (520 J/kg°C)
M = Mass of material
∆𝑇 = temperature rise
Mass of plate per m2 = 0.008×ρs = 63 kg
where ρs = 7850 kg/m3
E = 520 × 109 × 63 = 3.571 MJ/m2

Determine the length of time to heat the plate, assuming no losses:

3.571 × 106
𝑡= = 2361 seconds
1512
It is therefore conceivable that with heat losses the plate may reach 412K in an hour.
However, step through in 600 second intervals to determine a better estimate of
temperature after 1 hour.
Time (s) Heat in Heat loss Heat loss Net End
(radiation) (convection) Heat Temp
rate total rate total rate total Gain (K)
(w) (kJ) (w) (kJ) (w) (kJ) (kJ)
0-600 1512 907.2 0 0 0 0 902 331
600-1200 1512 907.2 64 38 172 103 761 354
1200-1800 1512 907.2 233 140 317 190 572 371
1800-2400 1512 907.2 384 230 427 256 416 384
2400-3000 1512 907.2 508 305 506 304 294 393
3000-3600 1512 907.2 603 362 562 337 203 399

106
 Sheet of 8 Rev

From the above table, estimate the temperature of the plate to be 126°C (400K) after
1 hour.
Contact between human flesh and the plate will result in burns.
The calculation assumes no losses from the underside of plate. In practice radiative losses
may occur from the underside, and will certainly slow the rate of temperature increase.

Temperature of wall
Assume 3 mm thick stainless steel plate.
Emissivity of surface = 0.8 (assumed)
Local ambient temperature = 30°C (303K)
Assume negligible heat transfer from back of wall.
Use same method as previously in order to determine the temperature.
For vertical surface ∑ 𝑞𝑖 = 2.12 kW/m2
Heat gain = 0.8 × 2.12 = 1696 W/m2

The heat balance equation is:

1696 = 6.25 × (𝜃𝑠 − 303) + 5.67 × 10−8 × (0.8 × 𝜃𝑠 4 − 3034 )
Iteratively solving for surface temperature gives:
𝜃𝑠 = 422K (149°C)
Determine the heat required to raise temperature of wall from 303K to 422K (119K).

Mass of wall per m2 = 0.003×ρs = 24 kg (where ρs=7850 kg/m3)

Heat = 520 × 119 × 24 = 1.485 MJ/m2

Determine the length of time to heat the wall, assuming no losses:

1.485 × 106
𝑡= = 875 seconds
1696
It is therefore conceivable that with heat losses the wall may heat to 422K in slightly
more than 10 minutes. A step through procedure at 300 second intervals is used to find
the temperatures after half an hour, when a steady state is reached.

Time (s) Heat in Heat loss Heat loss Net End

(radiation) (convection) Heat Temp
rate total rate total rate total Gain (K)
(w) (kJ) (w) (kJ) (w) (kJ) (kJ)
0-300 1696 509 0 0 0 0 511 344
300-600 1696 509 157 47 256 77 387 375
600-900 1696 509 419 126 450 135 250 395
900-1200 1696 509 627 188 575 173 150 407
1200-1500 1696 509 768 230 651 195 85 414
1500-1800 1696 509 854 256 694 208 47 418

From the above table, estimate the temperature of the wall to be 149°C after half an hour.
Contact between human flesh and the wall will result in burns.
The calculation assumes no losses from the unexposed side of the wall. In practice
radiative losses may occur from the unexposed side, and will certainly slow the rate of
temperature rise.

107
 Sheet of 8 Rev

Temperature of the handrail

Assume 75 mm x 3 mm pipe forms handrail.
Emissivity of surface = 0.8 (assumed)
Local ambient temperature = 30°C (303K)

The handrail is a more complex problem than may at first appear. In addition to receiving
direct radiation from the flare, it is also, receiving reflected and reradiated radiation. The
magnitude of each component will vary in time depending on its heating rate. Whilst it
is possible to consider all the individual radiation components as they vary against time,
the approach adopted here assumes:
(1) Heating from the flare only, but over all of the circumference (conservative)
(2) Re-radiation from the handrail over all its circumference
Calculating the convection losses for the handrail requires the use of a different
convection coefficient, as it has a curved surface.
Heat Gain = 2.83 × 0.8
= 2.264 kW/m2

Heat Loss = Heat gain, assuming steady state conditions are achieved.
Convective loss equals:
𝑞𝑐 = ℎ𝑐 (𝑇𝑠 − 𝑇𝑎 )
𝑣 0.9
ℎ𝑐 = 8.9 × 0.1
𝐷𝑒 ISO 12241(2008),
40.9 Eq 29
ℎ𝑐 = 8.9 × ( )
0.0750.1
ℎ𝑐 = 40.15
Wher De (m) is the handrail outside diameter and v is the air velocity (m/s).
Radiative loss equals:
𝑞𝑟 = σ(𝜖𝑠 𝑇𝑠 4 − 𝑇𝑎 4 )
The heat balance equation is: Section 5.4
2264 = 40.15 × (𝑇𝑠 − 303) + 5.67 × 10−8 × (0.8 × 𝑇𝑠 4 − 3034 )
Iteratively solving for surface temperature gives:
𝑇𝑠 = 354K (80°C )
Determine the heat required to raise temperature of pipe from 303K to 354K (51K).

Mass of pipe per m2 = 0.003×ρs = 24 kg (where ρs=7850 kg/m3)

E = 520 × 51 × 24 = 0.636 MJ/m2

108
 Sheet of 8 Rev

Time (s) Heat in Heat loss Heat loss Net End

(radiation) (convection) Heat Temp
rate total rate total rate total Gain (K)
(w) (kJ) (w) (kJ) (w) (kJ) (kJ)
0-100 2264 226.4 0 0 0 0 226 321
100-200 2264 226.4 5 0 728 73 153 333
200-300 2264 226.4 83 8 1221 122 96 341
300-400 2264 226.4 136 14 1530 153 60 346
400-500 2264 226.4 171 17 1722 172 37 349
500-600 2264 226.4 194 19 1841 184 23 351

From the table it can be seen that the final temperature is dominated by convective
cooling, and in this example, will be circa 78°C. If the ambient conditions were, say,
10°C, then this temperature would reduce to about 52°C. This temperature will be
reached in about 10 minutes. If a highly reflecting handrail were used (e.g. aluminium),
then most radiation would be reflected and it is probable that handrail will be able to be
held for short periods by an unprotected hand. (Note: this assumes clean aluminium; a
layer of fire protection or soot from the fire could greatly reduce the amount of reflected
radiation).

Conclusions
(1) Personnel can use the escape route without being harmed by radiation from the
fire.
(2) The escape route floor and vertical boundaries will be too hot to touch without
burning occurring after a short period of time.
(3) The handrail temperature is expected to be 78°C if the ambient temperature is
30°C. Contact with this handrail for more than a couple of seconds would
probably result in a burn. However, if the ambient temperature is 10°C then the
handrail temperature will be about 52°C and the handrail could be held for a long
duration without causing burns.

REFERENCES

C.1 Drysdale, A. “An introduction to fire dynamics”, John Wiley and Sons, 1985.

109
 Job No. OSH3485 Sheet of 5 Rev

Title Worked Example 2

Silwood Park, Ascot, Berks SL5 7QN Subject Heat flux variation with location relative to fire
Telephone: (01344) 636525
Fax: (01344) 636570
Made by Date
CALCULATION SHEET Client FABIG
Checked by Date

Heat flux variation with location relative to fire

This example illustrates how the heat balance equations may be applied. The example
also shows the relative importance of being able to define the extent of the fire relative
to the location of a member receiving heat flux from the fire.
This example assumes a horizontal jet fire. The characteristics of the jet are chosen to
illustrate the application of the heat balance equations.

Fire Size
The fire is assumed to provide 2500 MW. An F-factor of 0.20 is assumed. Flame length Section 4.1
is given by:
𝐿 = 2.8893 × 𝑄 0.3728

Where:

Q = 2500 MW

L is in metres

Solving gives L=54 metres, say 60 metres

Due to buoyancy, this will be curvilinear. This analysis shall assume a straight line.

The flame will be modelled as an arbitrary constant diameter cylinder. An initial estimate
of 10 metre diameter will be used to calculate the surface emissive power. It is more
common to model the flame as a solid cone, however, for mathematical simplicity this
example will use a cylinder. For this analysis it will be assumed that a member lying
inside this cylinder is fully engulfed, and therefore receiving the calculated amount of
radiation on all sides. This is conservative since surfaces facing out of the fire may
receive considerably less radiation.
Based on the diameter of the cylinder, the surface emissive power (SEP) of the flame is:

𝐹𝑠 𝑄 2500 × 103 × 0.20 2

Section 5.3
𝑆𝐸𝑃 = = = 245 kW/m
𝐴 2 × 𝜋 × 102
(60 × 𝜋 × 10 + 4 )
SEPs of this magnitude have been measured for large jet fires, but normally as local
maxima. This implies that the F-factor may be too high, or the size of fire assumed too
small. However, for the purpose of numerical simplicity a diameter of 10 m shall be
assumed acceptable.
The problem could be solved using a proprietary SEP model such as ‘Shell Researh’s
cone frustum model of radiation from flares’. However, for this example the fire will be
considered as a multi-point source model. It will be noted from the results that the multi-
point source model breaks down close to the fire.
Divide the flame into 5 discrete sources. Radiation from each source is:
2500
𝑄𝑖 = = 500 MW
5

110
 Sheet of 5 Rev

Radiation received at a surface from each point is given by:

𝐹𝑄𝑖 𝜏 cos 𝛽𝑖 Section 5.3.1

𝑞𝑖 =
4𝜋𝑟𝑖 2
Where:
ri = distance of surface from point
τ = transmisivity

𝛽𝑖 = angle between the normal to the surface and the line connecting point on surface
with radiation source
For this analysis τ is taken conservatively as 1.0.
Total radiation received at a surface from all points:
5
𝐹𝑄𝑖 𝜏 cos 𝛽𝑖
𝑞 = ∑[ ]
4𝜋𝑟𝑖 2
𝑖=1
Radiation is modelled as emanating from 5 points located 6, 18, 30, 42 and 54 metres
from one end of the cylinder. Convection is based on an assumption of ambient (20°C)
temperatures outside the cylinder and 1000°C temperatures inside it.

Heat Balance
The heat balance equations are applied to a 5 mm thick, 1 m2 flat plate, therefore
modelling the increase per m2. Convective heating and cooling are assumed as
appropriate. The temperature and heat fluxes are determined for the plate at a range of
distances from the centreline of the jet fire.
In order to determine appropriate convection coefficients it is assumed that the local gas
velocity (i.e. of the air or combination products) varies from 30 ms-1 at the jet centreline
to 5 ms-1 at a distance of 100 m. Linear variation is assumed.
The steady state temperatures and heat flux transfers are calculated at the following
distances from the centreline:
0, 2.5, 4.9, 5.1, 10, 25, 50, 100 m
The steady state temperature is determined according to the balance that
“heat in” = “heat out”. qcond is assumed to be zero since steady state conditions apply.

111
 cL distance Conv TpL (°C) Tm Convection β2.4 (°) ε qir 2.4 β1.5 (°) ε qir 1.5 ε qir 3 ∑ε qir qic qrad qconv Out of Notes
(m) Velocity Coefficient (kW/m2) (kW/m2) (kW/m2) balance
(m/s)

0 30.0 1000 90.0 0 90.0 0 ∞ 1

0.5 29.9 1000 87.1 1.9 88.8 0.4 25465 25472 2,3

2.5 29.4 1000 78.2 0.0 0.0

4.9 28.8 1060 1000 84.7 67.8 14.3 78.5 2.1 265 296 0 286 10 0 4

4.9 1300 1000 84.7 63.9 14.3 78.5 2.1 265 592 0 555 51 14 5

5.1 28.7 845 20 84.5 67.0 14.6 78.5 2.7 245 279 0 142 139 2 6

10 27.5 550 20 81.6 50.2 16.7 67.4 3.6 64 105 0 42 86 3

25 23.8 210 20 72.7 25.7 7.5 43.8 3.8 10.2 33 0 4.9 27.6 0.5

50 17.5 100 20 56.9 13.5 2.3 25.7 1.9 2.5 11 0 1.7 9.1 0.2

100 5.0 100 20 8.8 6.8 0.6 13.5 0.6 0.8 3.2 0 1.7 1.4 0.1

Notes:

1. At zero distance from a point the predicted radiative heat flux gain is ∞
2. Very high heat fluxes predicted owing to closeness to point source
3. Calculated plate temperature > fire gasses, hence convective cooling
4. Radiation from flame acting on one side, Re-Radiation (qrad) and convection (qic or qconv) act on both sides of the plate
5. Radiation from flame acting on both sides, Re-Radiation (qrad) and convection (qic or qconv) act on both sides of the plate
Sheet

6. Max. value based on SEP model i.e. Multi-point source model invalid at edge of flame
of
5
Rev

112
 Sheet of 5 Rev

Plot temperature of plate against distance from centreline.

Observations based on worked example:

(1) The point source model overestimates the steady state plate temperature when the
plate is within the fire.
(2) When the plate is just outside the flame, convective cooling and cooling by re-
radiation have similar heat loss effects. As the distance from the flame increases
so convective cooling becomes more significant relative to re-radiation (due to
cooling of plate and re-radiation being based on a T4 relationship)
(3) Outside the flame, steady-state temperatures rapidly drop to a level at which
structural integrity is probable. This assumes that the plate is not in the hot plume.
(4) Inside the flame, there is a significant difference in plate temperature dependent on
whether fire radiation is assumed from one side or two, i.e. calculated
temperatures and heat fluxes are largely a function of the assumptions made.
At locations outside the flame, cooling by convection is dominant, on account of the low
temperature of the ambient gasses. In actuality the temperature of the air adjacent to the
flame will also rise. The temperature is calculated at 10 metres and 25 metres assuming
the plate is in the hot plume with temperatures of 900°C and 600°C respectively. The
ambient temperature for radiation losses is assumed to be 20°C.
10 Metres
∑qir as previously = 105 kW/m2

Try TPL= 805°C

Therefore:

𝑞𝑖𝑐 = 81.6 × (900 − 805) × 2 = 15.50 kW/m2

𝑞𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 5.67 × 10−8 × 0.8 × ((805 + 273)4 − (20 + 273)4 ) × 2
𝑞𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 122.5 kW/m2

113
 Sheet of 5 Rev

The heat balance equation is therefore:

𝑞𝑖𝑟 + 𝑞𝑖𝑐 = 𝑞𝑟𝑎𝑑 (conduction = 0)
105 + 15.5 = 120.5 = 𝑞𝑏𝑎𝑙
𝑞𝑏𝑎𝑙 = 1.5 ≈ 0
Therefore equation is balanced.

25 Metres
∑qir as previously = 33 kW/m2
Try TPL= 550°C
Therefore:
𝑞𝑖𝑐 = 72.7 × (600 − 550) × 2 = 7.3 kW/m2
𝑞𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 5.67 × 10−8 × (0.8 × (550 + 273)4 − (20 + 273)4 ) × 2
𝑞𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 41 kW/m2
The heat balance equation is therefore:
𝑞ir + 𝑞ic = 𝑞rad (conduction = 0)
33 + 7.3 − 40.3 = 𝑞bal
𝑞bal ≈ 0 therefore equation is balanced.

114
 Job No. OSH3485 Sheet 1 of 5 Rev

Title Worked Example 3

Silwood Park, Ascot, Berks SL5 7QN Subject Conduction along member
Telephone: (01344) 636525
Fax: (01344) 636570
Made by Date
CALCULATION SHEET Client FABIG
Checked by Date

Heat conduction along a member

A 610 x 229UB125 (cross-sectional area A=16000 mm2) passes through an H120 fire
barrier, as illustrated below. The beam is unprotected except through the barrier. On one
side it is exposed to a 200 kW/m2 fire.
Estimate:
(1) The heat flux flowing along the member and hence through the wall
(2) The maximum temperature of the member on the non-fire side, assuming
convective cooling
(3) The approximate time taken to reach this temperature, assuming a 1.5 metre
length on the non-fire side.

Heat flux along member

An upper bound estimate of the heat flux flowing along the member can be obtained by
assuming that the temperature of the beam on the fire side of the 200 mm insulated zone
is the fire temperature, with ambient conditions (30°C) on the non-fire side.
Radiation: Section 5.4
4 4
Radiation = 𝜀𝑠 σ(ε𝑓 𝑇𝑓 − 𝑇𝑠 )
Where:
εs = Surface emmisivity
εf = Flame emmisivity
σ = Stefan–Boltzmann constant (Wm-2K-4)
Tf = Fire temperature (K)
Ts = Surface temperature (K)
Assume optically thick flames giving εf = 1.0

115
 Sheet of 5 Rev

Assume the initial temperature of the beam is 3030°C (303303K).

200 × 103 = 0.8 × 5.67 × 10−8 × (𝑇𝑓 4 − 3034 )
∴ 𝑇𝑓 = 14501450°𝐾 (11771177°C)
The heat flux flowing from the exposed side of the beam to the non-exposed side of the
beam can be calculated as:

𝐾𝐴 Section 5.4
𝑄= (𝑇 − 𝑇𝑎 )
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑓

𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 200 mm

𝐴 = 160 × 102 mm2

𝐾 = 45 W/m°C Section B.1.5

45 × 160 × 102
∴𝑄= × (11771177 − 3030) × 10−3 = 4128 4128 Watts
200

This is an upper bound estimate of the heat flux flowing along the member. Given a
surface area for the beam of ≈ 2.0 m2/m, it represents just 1% of the received heat flux
for a 1 metre length of member. Conduction along the member is therefore insignificant
relative to the accuracy with which the fire loading can be defined.
Note: Radiative cooling of the member on the non-fire side has been assumed to be
negligible. This is conservative.

Maximum beam temperature, non-fire side

Assume that steady-state temperature conditions have been reached.

Temperature on fire side is as before = 11771177°C

Assume conservatively that the temperature drops in proportion to the square of its
distance from the insulation, and that the beam length is L (if no convection cooling
along length, then T drops linearly with L. With convection T may be expected to drop
more than linearly. The equation will tend to set Tb higher than if a linear relationship
were used.)
Let θx be the temperature rise of the beam above ambient at distance x from the Section 5.5
insulation.
Therefore:
𝑄𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 = ℎ𝐴𝑠 𝑇𝑥
Where:

𝑄𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 is the convection heat (per unit length)

ℎ is the convective heat transfer coefficient
𝐴𝑠 is the surface area of section (per unit length)

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 Sheet of 5 Rev

Now let dQ = the heat lost from a small length dx:

𝑑𝑄 = ℎ𝐴𝑠 𝑇𝑥 𝑑𝑥
2
𝑥
𝑑𝑄 = ℎ𝐴𝑠 𝑇𝑏 [1 − [ ]] 𝑑𝑥
𝐿

Total Heat Loss:

𝐿
𝑄 = ∫ 𝑑𝑄 𝑄
0
𝐿 2
𝑥
= ℎ𝐴𝑠 𝑇𝑏 ∫ [1 − [ ]] 𝑄
0 𝐿
1
= ℎ𝐴𝑠 𝑇𝑏 𝐿
3
This must be equal to the heat conducted along the insulated part i.e.:
1 𝐾𝐴 Section 5.4
ℎ𝐴𝑠 𝑇𝑏 𝐿 = (𝑇 − 𝑇𝑏 )
3 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑓

𝐴𝑠 is the surface area of the beam per metre length = 2 m2

𝐴 is the cross-sectional area of the beam = 0.016 m2
All terms are known except h, L and 𝜃b.
Determine h as follows:
ℎ = 𝛼(𝑇𝑏 − 𝑇𝑎 )0.25 Section 5.4
Assume:
𝑇𝑏 = 100100°C (conservative assumption)
𝑇𝑎 = 3030°C
ℎ = 2.2(100 − 30)0.25 = 6.4 W/m2 K
Now determine value of 𝜃𝑏 for different values of L
1 45 × 0.016
6.4 × 2.0 × 𝑇𝑏 𝐿 = (1177 − 𝜃𝑏 )
3 0.2
4.27𝑇𝑏 𝐿 + 3.6𝑇𝑏 = 4128 4238

L 0 0.2 0.5 1.5 4.0

𝜃𝑏 11771177 952 739 424 205

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 Sheet of 5 Rev

Note that these are steady state temperatures. It may take a considerable length of time
for these temperatures to be achieved. The next section estimates the length of time for
a 1.5 m long beam.
Approximate time to reach temperature at 1.5 m
1
The average temperature of the section is 3 𝑇𝑏 .
Assuming no heat loss by convection, the section must absorb E Joules of energy:
𝐸 = 𝐶𝑠 𝑀∆𝑇 Section 5.5

Where:
Cs = specific heat of steel (520 J/kg°C)
M = Mass of section length = 125 × 1.5 = 187.5 kg
∆𝜃 = temperature rise = 424/3 = 141141°C
Therefore:
𝐸 = 520 × 187.5 × 141141 = 13.8 13.76 × 106 𝐽

Assuming the heat transfer rate from (1), the time taken to reach this temperature is:
13.7613.8 × 106
𝑡= = 3333 3333 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
41284128
However, as the temperature the rises, so the heat transfer reduces and convective losses
increase. In order to obtain the variation in temperature against time, it is proposed to
numerically work through the problem. The assumption to assist this is that 𝜃𝑏 is always
3 times the average member temperature. The equations and coefficients of parts (1) and
(2) of this example are used.
Note that the end of the member in this analysis is always assumed to be at ambient
temperature. In practice it would rise. In such circumstances convective cooling would
increase and the amount of energy required to heat the member would also increase. Both
would increase the time taken to reach a given temperature.
By taking the fire temperature as 1177-301177°=114730°C, ambient can be taken as =
0°C.
Time (s) Start Heat transfer Heat loss Net Total Ave.
𝑇𝑏 (Conduction) (convection) Heat Heat Temp
(°C) rate total rate total Gain (kJ) (°C)
(W) (kJ) (W) (kJ) (kJ)
0-500 0 4128 2064 0 0 2064 2064 21
500-1000 64 3900 1950 610 305 1645 3709 38
1000-2000 114 3717 3717 1096 1096 2622 6331 65
2000-3000 195 3427 3427 1870 1870 1557 7888 81
3000-4000 243 3255 3255 2330 2330 925 8813 90
4000-5000 271 3152 3152 2603 2603 549 9362 96
5000-6000 288 3091 3091 2765 2765 326 9688 99
6000-7000 298 3055 3055 2862 2862 194 9881 101
7000-8000 304 3034 3034 2919 2919 115 9996 103
8000-9000 308 3021 3021 2953 2953 68 10065 103
9000-10000 310 3013 3013 2973 2973 41 10105 104
10000-11000 311 3009 3009 2985 2985 24 10129 104
11000-12000 312 3006 3006 2992 2992 14 10144 104
12000-13000 312 3005 3005 2996 2996 8 10152 104
13000-14000 312 3004 3004 2999 2999 5 10157 104
14000-15000 313 3003 3003 3000 3000 3 10160 104

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 Sheet of 5 Rev

Observations from example

1. Just 1% of the received heat flux from the fire is transmitted by conduction along
the member, i.e. the cooling effect of conduction is negligible.
2. Due to the low rate of conduction, the maximum temperature of the beam on the
non-fire side is considerably lower than that on the fire side of the barrier. Assuming
the beam has reasonable length or connects into a suitable heat sink (larger
member), the temperature on the non-fire side is unlikely to rise above 400°C, i.e.
the member remains structurally sound.
3. The example assumed an arbitrary temperature profile along the length of beam on
the non-fire side. An x2 relationship was chosen in order to maximise the
temperature at the beginning of the beam and minimise heat losses by convection.
The end of the beam was assumed to be at ambient temperature. These are
considered to be conservative assumptions.
4. It takes about 45 minutes for the peak temperature of the beam on the non-fire side
to reach 50% of its ultimate maximum. It takes a further 55 minutes to reach 90%
of ultimate maximum, i.e. heating gets progressively slower. It is estimated that it
takes 6 hours for the beam to approach ultimate temperature.
5. The example is based on a number of simplifying assumptions. However, these
enable the problem to be quantified and it then becomes possible to quickly
determine approximate heating rates.

119
 Job No. OSH3485 Sheet 1 of 2 Rev

Title Worked Example 4

Design of a steel beam in fire using the critical

Silwood Park, Ascot, Berks SL5 7QN Subject
Telephone: (01344) 636525 temperature method
Fax: (01344) 636570
Made by Date
CALCULATION SHEET Client FABIG
Checked by Date

Design of a steel beam in fire using the critical

temperature method
Find the critical temperature of a 533  210  122 UB, grade S275 structural steel beam
of span 7.5 m. The beam spacing is 7.5 m. Assume the beam is heated in such a way
that it is subject to a uniform temperature distribution.

Actions at normal temperatures

Characteristic floor loading is as follows
Permanent actions: Gk = 5.0 kN m-2 (including self-weight)
Variable actions:
Imposed loading in ‘office area’: Qk,1 = 3.3 kN m-2
No other variable actions are considered.
Design actions for normal temperature design:
G = 1.35 and Q = 1.5
Design bending moment
wL 2 (1.35  5.0  1.5  3.3 )  7.5  7.5 2 EN 1990,
M Ed  
8 8 Section 8.2.2
MEd = 617 kNm

Design resistance at normal temperatures

Bending resistance, MRd = 847 kN m SCI Eurocode
Blue Book
(Ref [C2])
(Note that fy = 265 N mm-2 because tf > 16 mm) EN 10025-2

Actions in fire
The effect of actions at the fire limit state can be calculated from effect of actions at
normal temperatures:
Efi,d = fi Ed Section 8.2.3
Q
1   1,1 k,1
Gk   1,1Qk,1 Gk
fi = 
 G Gk   Q,1Qk,1 Q
 G   Q,1 k,1
Gk
1,1 = 0.5 for Category B Office Area
Qk ,1 3.3
  0.66 
Gk 5.0
1  0.5(0.66)
 fi = = 0.57
1.35  1.5(0.66)
 Efi,d = 0.57  617 = 352 kNm

120
 Sheet of 2 Rev

Design resistance in fire

 1 
 a,cr = 39.19 ln  1 + 482 Section 9.2
 0.9674o
3.833

Efi,d
The degree of utilisation, o, at time t = 0 is o = Section 9.2
Rfi,d,0
Classify cross-section at elevated temperature using modified value of 
235 235
  0.85   0.80 Section 9.1
fy 265
For web, cw/tw=37.5, Class1 limit is 72 = 72×0.80 = 57.6 SCI Eurocode
 web is still Class 1 Blue Book
[Ref C2]
For flange, cf/tf=4.08, Class 1 limit is 9 = 9 × 0.80 = 7.20
 flange is still Class 1
For a Class 1 beam with a uniform temperature distribution, supporting a steel plate
Rfi,d,0 = Mfi,,Rd = ky, [ M0/ M,fi] MRd Section 9.6.1
At time t = 0,  = 20oC, ky, = 1.00
M0 = 1.00 and M.fi = 1.00 Table 8.2
 Mfi,,Rd = 1.00 [1.00/1.00]  847= 847 kN m
Efi,d 352
Therefore o =   0.42
M fi, t,Rd 847

 1  Section 9.2
 a,cr = 39.19 ln   1 + 482 = 612oC
 0.9674  0.423.833

For the given loading, the beam is expected to fail once it reaches a temperature of 612o.
REFERENCES

C.2 Design of building design: Design data, SCI P363, ISBN: 978-1-85942-186-4,
2013.

121
 Job No. OSH3485 Sheet 1 of 3 Rev

Title Worked Example 5

Design of a steel column in fire using the reduced
Silwood Park, Ascot, Berks SL5 7QN Subject
Telephone: (01344) 636525 resistance method
Fax: (01344) 636570
Made by Date
CALCULATION SHEET Client FABIG
Checked by Date

Design of a steel column in fire using the reduced

resistance method
Find the temperature at which a 203  203  60 grade S355 structural steel column will
fail. The length of the column is 4.25 m. Assume the column is heated in such a way
that it is subject to a uniform temperature.

Actions at normal temperatures

Characteristic actions:
Permanent actions: Gk = 327 kN (including self weight)
Variable actions:
Imposed loading (in ‘office area’): Qk = 220 kN
No other variable actions are considered.
Design actions for normal temperature design:
G = 1.35 and Q = 1.5
NEd = 1.35  327 + 1.5  220 = 771 kN EN 1990, Eq
Section 8.2.2

Design resistance at normal temperatures

Section is Class 1 when subject to compression SCI Eurocode
A = 7640 mm2 iz = 52.0 mm2 (moment of gyration about minor axis) Blue Book
(Ref [C2])
M0 = M1 = 1.00 Table 8.2
Resistance of cross-section to uniform compression:
Nc,Rd = A fy /M0 EN 1993-1-1 cl
6.2.4
= 7640  355 = 2710 kN > NEd  OK
Buckling resistance of the compression member:
Nb,Rd =  A f y  M1 EN 1993-1-1 cl
6.3.1.1
 = 
0.5 1     0.2   2  EN 1993-1-1 cl
6.3.1.2
1
 =  1 EN 1993-1-1 cl
   2
λ 2

0. 5
6.3.1.2

A fy Lcr
z =  Section 9.5
N cr iz 1

1  93.9 where   235/ f y

1  93.9 235/ 355 = 76.4

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 Sheet of 3 Rev

4250
z = 1.07
52.0  76.4
For 203  203  60 UC, use buckling curve c for buckling about the minor axis where EN 1993-1-1
imperfection factor  = 0.49 Tables 6.1 and
6.2
 = 
0.5 1  0.49z  0.2  z
2
  0.5(1  0.49(1.07  0.2) 1.07 )  1.29
2

1 1

   
= = 0.5
= 0.50
2 0.5
   2  λz 1.29  1.292  1.072
Nb,Rd =  A fy /M1 = 0.50  7640  355 / 1.0
= 1360 kN > NEd  OK

Actions in fire
Effect of actions at the fire limit state can be calculated from effect of actions at normal
temperatures
Efi,d = fi Ed Section 8.5
Qk,1
1   1,1
Gk   1,1Qk,1 Gk
fi = 
 G Gk   Q,1Qk,1 Q
 G   Q,1 k,1
Gk
1,1 = 0.5 for Category B Office Area Table 8.1
Qk ,1 220
  0.673 
Gk 327
1  0.5(0.673)
 fi = = 0.566
1.35  1.5(0.673)
 Efi,d = 0.566  771 = 436 kN

Design resistance in fire

Buckling resistance in fire
235 Section 9.1
Classify cross-section at elevated temperature using modified ε = 0.85 = 0.692
fy
For web: SCI Eurocode
cw/tw=17.1, Class 1 limit is 33=33×0.692 = 22.8 Blue Book (Ref
[C2])
 web is still Class 1
For flange@
cf/tf = 6.2, Class 2 limit is 10=10×0.692 = 6.9,
 flange is Class 2
Find the temperature at which the reduced buckling resistance at elevated temperature
equals the fire loading, i.e. when
Nb,fi,t,Rd = χfi A ky,θ fy/ γMfi = 436 kN Section 9.5
γMfi = 1.0
Assume buckling length in fire = 4.25 m
z = 1.07 as for room temperature design

123
 Sheet of 3 Rev

The non-dimensional slenderness at a given steel temperature,  is given by:

z,θ  z ky,θ / kE,θ 0.5 Section 9.5

The parameters χfi ,ky,θand kE,θ are temperature-dependent.

Five steps are required to calculate Nb,fi,t,Rd for a given temperature:
Look up the reduction factors ky,θ and kE,θ Appendix B
z, θ  z k y,θ / k E, θ  0.5
Calculate Section 9.5

Calculate

z, θ  0. 5 1  z, θ  z, θ 2 
  0.65 235/ f y
and
Calculate
1
 z,fi 
 z ,  z,2θ  z,2θ
Calculate Nb,fi,t,Rd = χfi A ky,θ fy/γMfi
For a temperature of 500C:
1. ky,θ = 0.78 and kE,θ = 0.60
z, θ  1.070.78 / 0.600.5
2. = 1.22

3.

  0.65 235/ 355  0.529 and z,θ  0.5 1  0.5291.22  1.22 = 1.57
2

1
 fi 
1.57  1.572  1.222
4. = 0.39
5. Nb,fi,t,Rd = 0.39  7640  0.78  355/1.0=825 kN
The expressions were put into a spreadsheet in order to estimate the temperature at
which Nb,fi,t,Rd = 436 kN (see below)
C ky,  kE,  z,θ z,  z,fi Nb,fi,t,Rd kN
500 0.78 0.6 1.22 1.57 0.39 825
600 0.47 0.31 1.32 1.72 0.36 453
606 0.456 0.299 1.32 1.72 0.35 438
608 0.451 0.296 1.33 1.74 0.35 436

For the given loading, the column is expected to fail at 608C.

124