DISCUSSION

POPPER’S EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY REVAMPED

F. MICHAEL AKEROYD

SUMMARY. In a paper entitled “Revolution in Permanence”, published in the collection

“Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems”, John Worrall (1995) severely criticised several
aspects of Karl Popper’s work before commenting that “I have no doubt that, given suffi-
cient motivation, a case could be constructed on the basis of such remarks that Popper had
a more sophisticated version of theory production......” (p. 102). Part of Worrall’s criticism
is directed at a “strawpopper”: in his “Darwinian Model” emphasising the similarities and
differences between genetic mutation, variation in animal behaviour and the gestation of
scientific theories, Popper (1975, 1981, 1994) never stated that tentative scientific conjec-
tures “while more or less random, are not completely blind.” He was referring to variation
in animal species behaviour, and about tentative scientific conjectures he said nothing,
although common sense would indicate that presumably he regarded them as being less
blind and less random. In Popper (1977, 1983), giving a summary of his “Darwinian
Model”, he repaired this omission about tentative scientific conjectures by inserting the
sentence “On a level of World 3 theory formation they are of the character of planned
gropings into the unknown.” Recent developments in the field of genetics (see for example
Raff (1996), Lewis (1999), Korn (2002)) indicate that Popper’s intuitions were along the
modern lines while Worrall’s intuitions are old fashioned. Therefore Popper’s “Darwinian
Model” remains both viable and fruitful.

Key words: evolutionary epistemology, natural selection, orthogenesis

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1973 Popper wrote a famous paper unveiling a “Darwinian Model”

of scientific progress and throwing his weight behind earlier Campbel-
lian notions of “Evolutionary Epistemology”. Around this time he also
developed such notions in his intellectual autobiography Unended Quest,
originally published as an addendum to the Schilpp volume in the Lib-
rary of Living Philosophers. Key points in this approach were analogies
between the development of new species in the biological real world and

Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35: 385–396, 2004.

© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
386 F. MICHAEL AKEROYD

the development of new scientific theories in the research world. Popper

stressed a “natural selection” approach in which newly gestated theories
“competed” for scarce resources with rival pre-existing theories in order to
demonstrate their own “fitness”. Popper (1976) also offered an explanation
for the observed phenomena of “orthogenesis”: the phenomenon that the
path of evolution seems to involve movement towards “higher” organisms.
Many biologists and philosophers insist that this is an illusion: Evolution,
like Kuhnian science, evolves in no particular direction. Popper argues,
per contra, that both biological organisms and scientific theories evolve
towards “higher” forms.
In a paper entitled “Revolution in Permanence”, published in the collec-
tion “Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems”, John Worrall (1995) severely
criticised several aspects of Karl Popper’s work before commenting that “I
have no doubt that, given sufficient motivation, a case could be construc-
ted on the basis of such remarks that Popper had a more sophisticated
version of theory production......” (p. 102). On p. 97, commenting on Pop-
per’s “Darwinian Model”, he stated: “It is unclear that this analogy can
be made to work in any even remotely precise sense”, and, after referring
to his (Worrall’s) historical case study on the events leading to Fresnel’s
production of the transverse wave theory of light, states “Nothing could
be less Darwinian”. Here, of course, Worrall means “less Darwinian in
the classical sense of Darwinism”. Worrall correctly notes that there is
tension between the classical concepts of Darwinian natural selection and
Popper’s concepts. He then concludes: “The basic message, as we saw, is
that Popper is on the side of “selection” rather than “instruction” in both
biology and in the case of theory production in science. But then certain
detailed remarks suggest that he interprets “selection” in a way that is, to
say the least, rather unorthodox. So, for example, Popper introduces an
alleged distinction between “blind” and “random” variations, and allowed
that while variations in scientific discovery are “more or less” (sic) random,
they are “not completely blind.” (p. 102).
Part of Worrall’s criticism is directed at a “strawpopper”: in his “Dar-
winian Model” emphasising the similarities and differences between ge-
netic mutation, variation in animal behaviour and the gestation of scientific
theories, Popper (1975, 1981, 1994) never stated that tentative scientific
conjectures “while more or less random, are not completely blind.” He
was referring to variation in animal species behaviour, and about tentat-
ive scientific conjectures he said nothing, although common sense would
indicate that presumably he regarded them as being less blind and less
random. In Popper (1977, 1983), giving a summary of his “Darwinian
Model”, he repaired this omission about tentative scientific conjectures
 POPPER’S EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY REVAMPED 387

by inserting the sentence “On a level of World 3 theory formation they

are of the character of planned gropings into the unknown.” So there is an
analogy between these “planned gropings1 into the unknown” by research
scientists and the unplanned but opportunistic movement of organisms into
new environmental niches that Popper regularly refers to in his writings but
is a factor ignored in classical accounts of Darwinism. Recent develop-
ments in the field of genetics (see for example Raff (1996), Lewis (1999),
Korn (2002)) indicate that Popper’s intuitions were along the modern lines
while Worrall’s intuitions are old fashioned. The purpose of this paper is
to highlight these developments to an audience of philosophers, as Popper
died before he could respond to any of the comments made by Worrall.

2. RECENT WORK IN GENETICS

In his recent comprehensive work Raff (1996) makes many statements and
apercus which support the position of Popper vis a vis that of Worrall. He
notes that:

The neural machinery underlying arthropod vision has changed little since the Cambrian
era (p. 88).
Metazoan body plans originated in the Cambrian (p. 174).
Body plans: developmental controls were relatively loose in the early Cambrian, but then
became fixed by internal controls (p. 180).
Regulatory genes could be recruited to stabilize the genetic pattern. It may well be that the
body plans we have before us today are the result of contingencies, selection and internal
constraints (p. 182).
Genes regulate other genes (p. 188).
Body plans are both stable and modified by additions (p. 197).
Mutational alterations occur within a system that can accommodate perturbation and still
carry out a harmonious strategy (p. 254).
Developing organisms are modular in organisation. All crucial features of modules – state,
number, location, action on other modules – are potentially changeable. Changes in these
properties results in a modified system but presents a modified structure to external selec-
tion. Changes in modular features not achieved directly by external selection nor are they
random (p. 360).

{this suggests that new organisms ‘explain’ the success of their immediate
predecessors by retaining features of their immediate predecessors just as
Popper (1981, p. 94) claims that new scientific theories must be able to
explain the success of their predecessors and (usually), when simplified,
reduce to them. Lamarckian ‘Instruction from Without’ pressures from the
environment might suggest a possession of a fifth limb could be advantage-
ous for an organism invading a new niche, but without massive changes
388 F. MICHAEL AKEROYD

in the modular nervous systems this appendage would merely be an ac-

tual liability. Worrall (1995) argues that if there is any biological analogy
between biology and scientific theory generation, then the analogy must
be Lamarckian, not Darwinian.}.
Although Raff does not mention Popper either as a philosopher or as a
creator of an evolutionary epistemological model, Raff’s description of the
organism as modular in organisation and utilising body plans resembling
those extant in the Cambrian epoch militates against the concept of biolo-
gical evolution simply following a “random walk”. Therefore Raff’s work
provides indirect support for Popper.
Raff continues by noting, as did Popper and countless others before
him, that, in the history of species:
“There is a trend towards sophisticated social behaviour, increased brain size and invasion
of niches.” (pp. 99−100).

Worrall seems to assume that, because the initial trigger for a particular
gene mutation in an organism may well possibly be a random effect, the
resultant effect on the organism’s offspring is then equally random, and
eventually species change is entirely controlled by random factors. There-
fore any analogy between natural selection in the biological world and
competition between rival scientific ideas in the academic world is entirely
misplaced. If the issue was as simple as that, then one can ask why should
there be this trend towards sophisticated social behaviour and increased
brain size of organisms in the biological world, mimicked by the tendency
to develop more sophisticated scientific theories in the academic world?
Let us see what modern biologists think.
Raff summarises his viewpoint on page 324:
“Selection is often seen as providing all the order observed in biological systems. Evol-
utionary development biologists none the less observe that variation appears to be non-
random in developing systems. It is fair to suspect that the internal organisation of the
existing system must significantly affect the evolutionary outcome because it can constrain
the range of possible phenotypes available for sorting by selection. The idea of an internal
order biasing the course of evolution has been effectively expressed by F. Jacob (1977),
who styled the evolution of complex organisms as a process of tinkering that uses existing
structures to produce solutions that are adequate, if not the best in engineering terms. The
evolution of wings in vertebrates has always involved tinkering with the existing forelimb,
not the invention of a novel kind of appendage.”

This seems to relate to Popper’s (1976) “orthogenetic theory” and also

his well-known concept of “piecemeal social engineering”. Jacob (1977)
writes:
“But it is not the biochemical novelties that generated diversification of organisms. In all
likelihood, it worked the other way around. It is the selective pressure resulting from
 POPPER’S EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY REVAMPED 389

changes in behaviour or in ecological niches that led to biochemical adjustments and

changes in molecular types.”

Korn (2002) writes (in his concluding paragraphs):

“The priority of natural or hierarchical selection also needs to be sorted out. An adaptive
value of a trait may not always be tested such as birds may be missing from a sooty
forest for days and so the dark coloration of a moth is of no importance or a strain of
inducible E. coli lact+ may pass through a thousand generations without ever encoun-
tering a condition where lactose is the sole carbon source. However, a trait always and
constantly fits into the hierarchical scheme and so is continuously tested, i.e. the effects
of extracellular melanin on metabolism and the effects of a protein inhibitor of induction
on other proteins in the bacterial cell. Hierarchical selection seems to have priority over
natural selection. Thus a gene by its trait is first tested for its compatibility at the organism
level and only secondly is it tested for its adaptive value. Even spandrels must satisfy
hierarchical demands. Hierarchical selection is on the phenotypic hierarchy, not the gene
with a new effect.
The argument presented here is that the organism is primarily a developmental system
held together by specific constraints and only secondarily is it a clonal system within which
little competition occurs not because it is clonal but because cells are integrated. This view
leads to the conclusion that natural selection acts more on the integrated aspects of traits
within the hierarchy to make an organism than on the isolated expression of traits and their
genes.” (my emphasis, FMA)

So, although there is “randomness” and “blindness” in gene mutation, the

two level hierarchical selection process postulated by Korn above shows
that at the “natural selection” level there is also an analogy between the
unplanned but systematic development of new biological species and the
“planned groping into the unknown” of new scientific theories. Popper ar-
gued in his Unended Quest that only when “preference genes” and “skill”
genes had mutated and become integrated into the genome would any ran-
dom “anatomy gene” changes then have any positive effect. As Popper
noted, a bird undergoing anatomy changes without undergoing changes in
taste and skill can be expected to be eliminated quickly by natural selec-
tion, but not the other way round. Many traits that are initially non-adaptive
are also non lethal and can remain latent, in effect “pre-adapting” an organ-
ism for a potentially new environmental niche. All the above is supported
by another author, Lewis ((1999), p. 131), who reports an experiment in
which mice can be bred to prefer alcohol tinged water to ordinary water.

3. RECENT WORK ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE WHALE

The mechanism of how a land mammal returned to an aquatic life ex-

tremely rapidly (in geological time) and rotated its pelvis to allow the tail
movements of the modern whale has puzzled biologists for a long time
390 F. MICHAEL AKEROYD

(see for example Hitching (1982)). In its intermediate form the animal’s
adaptations would apparently be neither use nor ornament. This problem
has now been solved by the work of Gingerich et al. (1983), Bajpais and
Gingerich (1998) and Thewissen et al. (1994) involving the discovery of
new intermediate fossils. Around the time of the early Eocene the shallow
seas, saline lakes and embayments of the area now in Pakistan were high
in primary plankton and secondary fish population especially herring (but
presumably too shallow for predators such as sharks). Developing mon-
soon storms strand many fish on the sandy shores. Here is the opportunity
for a local omnivorous mammal to experience changes in preference (taste)
genes, then skill genes and then finally anatomy genes in a spiral feedback
mechanism as it opportunistically invades a new niche on Popper’s (1975),
(1976) scenario. Scavenging and paddling on the seashore is later followed
by swimming and predation in rivers, lakes, shallow seas and ultimately the
deep ocean. There is no “climatic catastrophe” leading to the survival of
only a few “hopeful monsters”, which then colonise a deserted landscape.
The problem of the intermediate form capable of fully aquatic life is solved
by Thewissen et al. (1994). Ambulocetus Natans swam by moving its spine
up and down but the main propulsion came from the feet, not the tail. All
this recently discovered scientific data fits Popper’s model like a glove.

4. WORRALL’ S EXEMPLAR : THE FRESNEL EPISODE

Worrall (1995) claims that the history behind the development of Fres-
nel’s theory of optical diffraction in 1818 support his theory of scientific
progress and rebut Popper’s. As is well known, Fresnel was working with
the Wave Theory of light as opposed to Newton’s Corpuscular Theory,
and the Wave Theory presupposed the existence of a luminiferous ether
in space to allow transmission of the light waves. It seemed natural to
assume that the ether was a highly attenuated fluid and hence the light
waves are longitudinal. However Arago and Fresnel found, by their famous
“Two Slit” experiment, experimental results that were incompatible with
the longitudinal wave hypothesis. As Worrall remarks, one option was to
abandon the Wave Theory but, given the previous success of this approach,
a more sensible option was to assume that the wave theory was correct
and that the light waves were not longitudinal. Background knowledge
suggested that the only other option was to assume that the waves were in
fact transverse, and mathematical constructs deduced from some rather ad
hoc assumptions relating to wave motion in solids were found to “predict”
the novel experimental results. Again, as Worrall remarks, the apparently
revolutionary concept of treating the ether as an attenuated solid was not
 POPPER’S EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY REVAMPED 391

so revolutionary in practise since the theoretical apparatus associated with

treating waves in fluids was well tested. He claims that if there is a bio-
logical analogy, it is with discredited Lamarckian “Instruction from the
outside environment” rather than Darwinian “Instruction from within the
genome”.
There is an episode in the discipline of chemistry where a scientist
adopted the Worrallian approach: Richard Kirwan in his reaction to the ex-
perimental difficulties faced by the phlogiston theory in 1780. I am not sure
that Worrall will be happy with this example: Kirwan in 1789 conceded
defeat to another scientist who had been proceeding in non-Worrallian
manner, groping in the dark. This scientist was Antoine Lavoisier and the
entire episode is analysed in Akeroyd (2003).
Once it was discovered that the atmosphere consisted of the three gases
oxygen, nitrogen and “fixed air” (carbon dioxide) and that metal oxides
weighed more than the parent metal, the old Stahlian phlogiston theory
was refuted as an overall theoretical system. Kirwan chose to retain the
conceptual framework of the phlogiston theory and abandoned two of the
auxiliary hypotheses: Lavoisier chose to abandon the phlogiston theory
and make the newly discovered element oxygen the basis of a new theory
of combustion and also the basis of a new theory of acidity. In analogy
with Fresnel treating the ether as a solid, and importing concepts from
a related discipline into the old, Kirwan retained the concept that metals
were more complex than calces but incorporated hydrogen (phlogiston in
a concrete state) and oxygen into his system, i.e. he borrowed them from
Lavoisier. Because Lavoisier was building up a really revolutionary system
where everything had to worked out from scratch (including a famous new
nomenclature) it is obvious that he had to work piecemeal and tentatively,
with many false starts, i.e. with what Popper describes as “planned grop-
ing”. Lavoisier’s ideas evolved from around 1775 to around 1789 but some
would argue that his system was not fully satisfactory until as late as 1799,
when the characterisation of carbon monoxide was announced. This gas,
both inflammable yet a product of the combustion of carbon, had caused
conceptual problems for Lavoisier’s Theory.

5. DID FRESNEL ACTUALLY FOLLOW A LAMARCKIAN STRATEGY ?

When one makes a detailed study of Fresnel’s career and the development
of his theory one finds it a less than convincing example of careful “de-
duction from the phenomena” or “Lamarckian Instruction from without”.
Fresnel was trained as an engineer but then became a self-taught researcher
on Optics. Without being aware of the work of Young and ignorant of the
392 F. MICHAEL AKEROYD

corpuscular theory’s “explanation” of polarisation he developed a semi-

rational predilection for the wave theory of light and, like most pioneers,
assumed that any theoretical difficulties would be overcome by his own
future efforts. It seems odd that if “Instruction from without” was respons-
ible the rest of the scientific world (apart from Young) failed to follow
suit. Silliman (1972) in his biography charts how Fresnel’s ideas matured
1815–18.
Fresnel’s 1815 paper possessed “indiscriminate use of the terms ‘rays’,
‘vibrations’, ‘inflection’, ‘diffraction’ that bespoke a residue of corpuscular
influences and was systematic of a lack of precision in his formulation.”
Worrall (1989) admits that there changes in formulation between Fresnel’s
(1815) memoir and his much more comprehensive (1818) prize winning
paper. Fresnel (1815) contained an ad hoc hypothesis that light rays turned
aside by the diffracter lost half a wave length. Otherwise there was an inex-
plicable reversal of bright bands occurring where dark ones were predicted
and vice versa. Silliman comments: “Spurred on by a desire to eliminate
the ad hoc hypothesis, Fresnel undertook to reconstruct his theory on a
new basis. The discovery of polarisation of light by reflection probably
stimulated adoption of the transverse wave hypothesis” (and the concom-
itant assumption that the ether behaved like was an attenuated solid), since
transverse waves cannot be transmitted in a fluid (except at the interface of
two immiscible fluids where surface tension and gravity interact).
However, treating the ether as a solid meant that there were conceptual
problems when considering the well-known movements of the planets in
the solar system. Many scientists felt that this hypothesis was ridiculous,
and Fresnel (1818) in his prize-winning essay omitted any reference to it.
The published Fresnel theory was therefore not so ‘carefully deduced from
the phenomena’ as Worrall suggests. Jed Buchwald (1981) writes:
“Two reasons in particular why there was resistance Fresnel. He gave firstly no theory of
polarisation and the old objection to the wave theory in this area – that waves had to be
symmetrical about the ray – still stood. Secondly, Fresnel’s memoir was only superficially
founded on the dynamics of the wave propagating medium. In his prize winning memoir
on diffraction, Fresnel used an expression for the force on an ether particle in order to
calculate the wave velocity. However he did not at this time deduce the expression from
the ether’s properties; he simply assumed it. Indeed, Fresnel did not describe the ether’s
properties in detail. Consequently, he had not as yet provided a firm physical alternative to
the optical corpuscle.”

Between 1821 and 1826 Fresnel addressed both these problems, and, aided
by the mathematical formulae developed by Navier and Cauchy, physicists
started to become convinced by 1830. However, as Silliman remarks, in a
final classic paper Fresnel presented the law of double refraction as a de-
duction from the general properties of an elastic fluid. Silliman comments:
 POPPER’S EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY REVAMPED 393

“That this obscured the actual route of discovery is unimportant.”

But it is important. If Worrall reads this original classic paper and then
uses it to launch an attack on Popper’s model, claiming that Fresnel used
systematic deductive processes without any conjecturing, then the com-
munity of philosophers could be misled. Fresnel’s methodology looks like
a perfect example of Popperean ‘planned groping’ to me. He revived an
old, discarded theory and introduced a new assumption: the light wave
pulses travelled at regular intervals. He then proceeded quickly to per-
forming experimental work, using the successes and failures as feedback
to generate more theory, rather than carefully deducing a complete system
based on an initial series of axioms.
So, analogous to an organism invading a new niche, Fresnel’s theory
evolved with stubborn initial preferences, false starts, and competition with
rivals. As Popper wrote in 1934 (translated into English in 1959):
“every [scientific] discovery contains an ‘irrational element’ or a ‘creative intuition’, in
Bergson’s sense”. (Popper, 1959).

In his (1975) paper on Evolutionary Epistemology Popper mentions the

problems new ideas face with dogmatic attitudes from older, established
scientists. Although on the side of the innovators, Popper comments that a
“limited amount” of dogmatism is good for new scientific theories since it
forces them to compete and “show their mettle”. However, in Note 13 of
Worrall (1995), Worrall counters:
“This, incidentally, is why Popper’s concession that ‘dogmatism’ may occasionally have
some value is off-beam. There is never any need for ‘dogmatism’, only a need for good
ideas about which parts of particular parts of large theoretical systems need to be amended
in view of experimental difficulties.”

However the evidence given above supports Popper’s position. For another
historical example see Olby’s (1976) biography of the Nobel Prize winning
chemist Hermann Staudinger.

6. C ONCLUSION

Worrall (1995, p. 97) claims:

“it is surely abundantly clear that it is not generally by “random variation”, even against a
fixed background, that scientists produce a multitude of theories which are then let out into
the critical jungle to see if they survive.”

He then goes on to note that the occasional “random conjecture” resorted

to by scientists is both unusual and very much scraping the heuristic barrel.
394 F. MICHAEL AKEROYD

But Popper never stated that scientists regularly develop their theories by
using the method of random conjectures. The passage Worrall cites without
paraphrasing refers to the “more or less random fashion” (“at least partly
random” is another label used by Popper in this cited passage) involved in
the origin of tentative trials in genetic adaptation, adaptive behaviour and
scientific discovery. There are certainly arbitrary factors involved in the
way new scientific conjectures eventually rise to scientific respectability
and later success. Why should scientist A perceive a conceptual problem
and experiment with a new hypothesis when the rest of the field are happy
with the current model? Surely this is analogous to the offspring of an
animal experiencing a genetically induced change in taste and consequent
dissatisfaction with the usual diet of the species. Scientist A may then sud-
denly receive a substantial inheritance that allows departure from academia
and the funding of a private laboratory in order to pursue the conjecture.
Also scientist B may devise and pursue a hypothesis H* which he be-
lieves to be inferior to already devised hypothesis H, because of the lack of
available apparatus to currently pursue H. Further work may well indicate
that H* is (surprisingly) more fruitful than H. Some scientists possess a
genetic predilection to pursue any new speculative idea, whist others have a
predilection to support the orthodox theory. Other scientists, ambitious for
Nobel prizes, devise potential rivals to the current theory simply because a
conformist approach is less likely to be successful. Others may prefer the
less risky approach to achieve more modest career goals. Both sets of sci-
entists are making rational decisions which are modified by a factor which
possesses a “random” or a “pseudo-random” or “arbitrary” component.
As Popper remarked earlier, an animal experiencing changes in anatomy
genes without concomitant changes in skills genes and preference genes
could be expected to be rapidly eliminated by natural selection, but not the
other way round. By analogy, a new idea speculatively generated to solve
a particular empirical problem may be discarded by the originator simply
because it is conceptually “ugly” or conflicts with existing metaphysical
assumptions or whatever. If the originator has, in their mind, some built in
psychological pressure to be attracted to and also pursue this new idea (at
least temporarily), then Popper’s analogy holds. As a new species begins to
diverge from the parent stock its population will rise because of inbreeding
and also interbreeding with the parent stock. If the preference genes are
strong enough, there will be a source of new individuals from the original
stock as well as the innovative stock. This is analogous to the well-known
situation when initially sceptical scientists are converted to a new idea after
it has been seen to have had some empirical success, and join the ranks of
the innovatory camp.
 POPPER’S EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY REVAMPED 395

Although I concede that Popper has been slightly sloppy in his use of
the term “more or less”, sometimes implying “at least partly” and on other
occasions implying “largely”, he was painting an impressionistic picture
on a broad canvas and it seems uncharitable to seize on a minor infelicity
of speech and consequently misunderstand the overall message. Coupled
with the fact that modern biologists consider that random genetic muta-
tions have first to be integrated into the structure for further development
to take place, this shows that Popper was right in also claiming a backward
analogy in his model:
“On the scientific level, discoveries are revolutionary and creative. Indeed, a certain cre-
ativity must be attributed to all levels, even to the genetic level: new trials, leading to new
environments and thus to new selection pressures, create new and revolutionary results
at all levels, even though there are strong conservative tendencies built into the various
mechanisms of instruction.”

A related argument against Popper’s model has been offered: the phe-
nomenon of simultaneous scientific discovery (more accurately simultan-
eous apparent discovery) suggests a Lamarckian rather than a Darwinian
biological analogy. But this phenomenon merely infers that different people
experiencing similar problems react in a similar way. The well-known fact
that the marsupial wolf and the mammalian wolf ended up appearing very
similar merely means that their ancestors faced similar problems in similar
niches and they must have (by chance) experienced similar changes in
preference genes.
In short, Worrall (1995) overestimates the negative impact of his own
critique and underestimates the viability of Popper’s “Darwinian Model”
of scientific progress. Popper’s so-called “unorthodox” interpretation of
“selection” circa 1970 is rapidly becoming the new orthodoxy, thus giving
his “Darwinian Model” fresh impetus and vitality.

NOTE

1 Ironically the word “groping” is used by Worrall’s hero Duhem (1954) to describe sci-

entific progress from Copernicus to Newton. Maybe Worrall believes “real science” only
began with Newton.

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