Professional Documents
Culture Documents
D
onald T. Campbell (1916-1996; see Wikipedia entry) was an eminent psycholo-
gist, indeed all around prominent social scientist, with a doctorate from Berke-
ley, and who had a long academic and professional career, teaching stints at
Lehigh, Syracuse, Northwestern, and other high level universities and institutions, as
well as and at one time President of the American Psychological Association. Trans-
disciplinary in his themes, goals, and a quite impressive knowledge base, Campbell’s
research focused on bringing the major constructs of Darwinian evolution with what
he held as their revolutionary implications into the study of cognition, the nature of
science and how it progresses, and cultural and social evolution, all three areas ex-
hibited in what he was probably best known for, namely, helping to inaugurate what
came to be called “evolutionary epistemology”.
Evolutionary Epistemology
According to Nathalie Gontier (2006) evolutionary epistemology is derived from the
psychology and sociology of knowledge, the history and philosophy of science, cogni-
Campbell’s bsvr-grounded approach was based in part on Popper’s view that sci-
ence advances through the generation of hypotheses which are then affirmed or falsi-
fied by methodologically sound observations of the natural world as well as experi-
mentation. “Blind variation” is behind the emergence of new theories through propos-
ing conjectures. Then, selection refutes and selectively eliminates those conjectures
that are empirically falsified. Campbell added that the same logic of blind variation
and selective elimination/retention underlies all knowledge processes, not only scien-
tific ones, although Gontier emphasizes a main goal of Campbell’s evolutionary epis-
temology” was to develop a “science of science”.
The trial and error approach of bsvr in science mirrors a similar evolutionary activ-
ity in social and cultural evolution as well as in each individual’s cognitive appropria-
tion of her or his environment. .It is worth nothing that Campbell was quite open to a
great variety of means by which cognition acquires knowledge, presaging in this way
later work on multiple intelligences.
He also allowed for short cuts to bvsr vicarious selection, not necessarily more ac-
curate but more efficient (Campbell, 1959: 162). These shortcuts themselves evolved
through a process of blind-variation-and-selective-retention. And later stages part-
ly determine earlier stages of knowledge processes which Campbell (1974) termed
downward causation.
Downward Causation
As the idea of emergence has gained increasing prominence in the study of com-
plex systems, ideas closely associated with it, particularly that of downward causation,
have become subject to a great deal of inquiry, disputes, and debates. Simply put,
downward causation (also called downward determination, macro-determination and
so forth) is the claim that in a complex systems exhibiting emergence, the higher or
macro-level as the locus of emergent phenomena exerts some kind of causal influ-
ence downwards on the lower level substrates in the system from which the emer-
gent emerged. But we can appreciate that even in such a simple way of stating it, the
notion of downward causation carries with quite a bevy of problematic issues. What
do “higher” and “lower” levels refer to? What constitutes a substrate in contrast to a
macro-phenomenon? What does “downwards” in this sense mean? What constitutes
a “causal influence”? Furthermore, it is possible to hold the position of accepting at
least some form of emergence but not downward causation or only accepting down-
ward causation if the “causative” action is limited to being the work of some kinds of
constraints or of dumping the whole notion of emergence if downward causation is
legitimated by it or if the whole idea is interpreted as only figurative and not literal.
At this juncture, Campbell brought in something he believed was even more strik-
ing: the jaws of the soldier termite where the jaws are so specialized in their function
of piercing enemy termites, antler pincers, that a solider termite cannot feed herself
but requires to be fed by other worker termite. But this implied that it was the hierar-
chical level of a society which had to enter the explanatory principle since selection is
now following from such societal factors as the division of labor in the termites’ social
milieu. Indeed, this kind of phenomena seems to be a case of convergent evolution
since it has been observed in other social settings as well.
…where there is a node of selection at a higher level, the higher level laws are necessary
for a complete specification of phenomena at both the higher level and also for lower
levels.
He explicitly stated he was not pushing for autonomy of higher level only for its nec-
essary locus for an influence downward.
REFERENCES
Campbell, D.T. (1974). “Evolutionary epistemology,” in P. Schilpp (ed), The Philosophy of Karl R.
Popper, ISBN 9780875481418, pp. 412-463.
Gontier, N. (2006). “Donald Campbell,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.
utm.edu/evo-epis/#SSH5b.iii.
“Donald T. Campbell,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_T._Campbell.
“Teleonomy,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleonomy.