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MICHAEL RUSEt
University of Guelph
In recent years Sir Karl Popper has been turning his attention more and
more towards philosophical problems arising from biology, particularly evo
tionary biology. Popper suggests that perhaps neo-Darwinian evolutiona
theory is better categorized as a metaphysical research program than a
a scientific theory. In this paper it is argued that Popper can draw hi
conclusions only because he is abysmally ignorant of the current status o
biological thought and that Popper's criticisms of biology are without for
and his suggestions for its improvement are without need. Also it is suggeste
that Popper's desire to see scientific theory growth as being in some sens
evolutionary may have led him astray about biology. And conversely it
suggested that since his claims about biology are not well taken his analy
of theory growth may well bear reexamination.
Although Sir Karl Popper has not yet given us a full length
philosophical treatment of evolutionary biology, enough of his general
position has been sketched to make possible a preliminary evaluation.
There are at least two reasons why such an evaluation seems
worthwhile. First, a number of biologists are taking seriously Popper's
views on science generally and biology in particular. (See, for example,
[1], [17]). Secondly, Popper has labelled his overall epistemology
"evolutionary," and has drawn a very strong analogy between what
he takes to be biological evolution and the evolution of scientific
knowledge (if indeed they are not for him part and parcel of the
same thing). "The theory of knowledge which I wish to propose
is a largely Darwinian theory of the growth of knowledge" ([19],
p. 261). Hence, such an evaluation of Popper's work, one which
concentrates primarily on his views on biology rather than on his
wider position about the growth of knowledge, is the aim of this
paper. In the concluding section however, I shall make some brief
remarks about the implications of the biological discussion for Popper's
more general position.
638
II
'In [19], Popper again somewhat paradoxically asserts: "There are no Darwinian
laws of evolution" (p. 267). In [26] I consider the place in Darwin's theory of laws,
which I think Popper would allow; and I do the same in [23], [24], [25], for modern
evolutionary theory. A valuable discussion of these problems, with a slightly different
emphasis, is [7].
III
2Popper sees the evolutionist making another claim, about variability, but this is
irrelevant to his present argument.
4Discussions of speciation usually cover the presumed events if and when isolated
groups again come into contact. For brevity these will be ignored here.
IV
SCuriously, given his belief that selection is tautological, Popper does allow that
finding out what are adaptations and why is an empirical matter.
6In an above mentioned passage which influenced my analysis (and which is I trust
zaptured by my analysis), Lewontin writes:"Evolution is the necessary consequence
of three observations about the world. . . . They are: (I) There is phenotypic variation,
the members of a species do not all look and act alike. (2) There is a correlation
between parents and offsrping. ... (3) Different phenotypes leave different numers
of offspring in remote generations. . . . These are three contingent statements,all
of which are true about at least some part of the biological world.... There is
nothing tautological here" ([12], pp. 41-2, his italics).
Incidentally, in my reply to Popper I ignore the way Popper has blurred "adaptation"
with being "adapted"-an organism can have an adaptation like the eye and still
be ill-adapted to its environment. I ignore also the way Popper speaks only of inter
specific selection and ignores intra specific selection.
VI
7In [22] and [25], I discuss in detail the problems of testing evolutionary theory.
See also [36].
VII
8Popper allows for genes with mixed functions. I wonder how few these are. See
[3].
VIII
But the fact of the matter is that tentative knowledge solutions are
frequently fairly large (saltationary) and often designed-think, for
example, of Darwin's solution to the organic origins' problem. Could
it be that (mistakenly) Popper is reading features of the evolution
of knowledge into the evolution of organisms, and that it is for this
reason that he wants to supplement biological evolutionary theory
in the ways he suggests?
But even if my surmises are correct and my criticisms of Popper's
views about biological evolutionary theory are well-taken, what then
does this all imply? In particular, what does it imply about Popper's
philosophical theory about scientific theory growth? In one sense,
not a great deal. Darwinians do not have a monopoly on the word
"evolution"; hence nothing I have argued can properly stop Popper
characterizing his views as evolutionary. Nor has anything here proven
his general philosophical theory mistaken, although this is not neces-
sarily to say that it is true. However, I suggest my arguments do
show one most important thing. No longer ought Popper claim close
ties between his philosophical evolutionary theory and biological
evolutionary theory, or feel that somehow some of the legitimacy
of the latter rubs off on the former. The relationship between the
two theories is at best one of weak analogy. In important respects,
Popperian scientific theory evolution and neo-Darwinian biological
evolution are different.
REFERENCES.