International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 80 (2022) 103221

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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr

Relationship between the organizational structure in implementing

Post-Disaster Housing reconstruction and outcome characteristics:
A study on urban dujiangyan after the Wenchuan Earthquake
Jiaoru Xi
College of Architecture, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing, China

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Many works of literature have agreed that the centralized reconstruction mechanism of China
Post-disaster housing reconstruction could guarantee an efficient reconstructive enforcement. However, many have also speculated
Centralized reconstruction mechanism that it might disrupt the involvement of the local parties during its implementation, and have ad-
Top-down approach verse effects on the affected area, especially in the field of housing. However, there is currently
Implementation process
limited knowledge on the implementation process of housing reconstruction and its effect on the
Organizational structure
affected localities. This research conducted an empirical study on Dujiangyan City after the
Outcome characteristics
Wenchuan Earthquake. It identified the organizational structure of the involved stakeholders,
evaluated the implementation outcomes of respective stakeholders, identified the characteristics
of the housing outcomes, and indicated the preferences and limitations of the participating stake-
holders. The results indicated that the Chinese top-down housing reconstruction was not in-
evitably carried out as speculated in the literature. The local government was still a leading force.
Its mobilization of local and external stakeholders significantly contributed to providing diverse
resettlement options for the affected population. However, the housing outcomes revealed an im-
balanced spatial distribution and concentrated on the new urban area. Such characteristics could
be attributed to the reconstruction plan that emphasized peri-urban development on a large scale
and the organizational method that constrained the stakeholder's participation in all urban areas.
Hence, implications are given for the betterment of housing reconstruction in China: a more com-
pact reconstruction plan that adopts cautious renovation to the original urban structure, and suf-
ficient coordination between all stakeholders in the full process of housing reconstruction.

1. Introduction
Due to dramatic climate change and urbanization, cities around the world have been facing very serious hazards more frequently
since the turn of the century [1]. In the recent decade, China has been struck by numerous earthquakes greater than Ms. 6.5, with a
great number of affected population and economic losses at a record high rate, including the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake
(Wenchuan), the 2010 Yushu Earthquake, the 2013 Lushan Earthquake, the 2014 Ludian Earthquake, and the 2017 Jiuzhaigou Earth-
quake (Table 1).
Despite the serious damages and enormous reconstruction tasks, the post-disaster reconstructions (PDRs) for these earthquakes
were all nearly finished within merely three years. For example, over 95% of the housing reconstruction tasks were completed three
years after Wenchuan, including 1908.5 thousand rural and 288.3 thousand urban housing units completed [2]. Many works in the
literature have proposed that the centralized reconstruction mechanism of China guarantees efficient reconstruction enforcement.

E-mail address: xjr@njtech.edu.cn.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2022.103221
Received 16 November 2021; Received in revised form 3 July 2022; Accepted 2 August 2022
Available online 12 August 2022
2212-4209/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
J. Xi International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 80 (2022) 103221

Table 1
Basic information of serious earthquakes struck China in recent years.

Disaster Wenchuan Earthquake Yushu Earthquake Lushan Earthquake Ludian Earthquake Jiuzhaigou Earthquake

Time 2008.05 2010.04 2013.04 2014.08 2017.08

Ms. 8.0 7.1 7.0 6.5 7.0
Death Toll 69,226 2698 196 617 25
Economic loss 845.10 billion 44.00 billion 85.17 billion 19.85 billion 22.45 billion
(yuan)
Irreparable houses 2909.0 thousand 60.2 thousand 187.7 thousand 71 thousand 416
(unit)
*Affected area E. A.: 10 counties E. A.: 1 town E. A.: 1 county E. A.: 1 county E. A. & S. A. & C. A.: 18
S. A.: 41 counties S. A.: 4 villages S. A.: 5 counties & 6 S. A.: 2 counties towns
villages
C. A.: 186 counties C. A.: 22 villages C. A.: 15 counties C. A.: 2 counties
Features of the Large scale, diversity and Tibetan area, rigid alpine Secondary disaster Poverty-stricken area UNESCO world natural
Affected complexity in affected areas region, least developed area after Wenchuan heritage site
Situation
Content of Inter- 18 provinces assisted 18 2 provinces and 4 6 cities assisted 6 appointed institutes assisted appointed institutes
Government counties in pair, in fund enterprises assisted 5 towns counties in pair, in in disaster relief and rescue, assisted in ecological
Assistance provision and full process of in pair, mainly in fund fund provision and reconstruction of educational restoration, and
implementation provision, planning and expertise dispatch and medical facilities protection of natural
construction heritage
Note*: E. A. = Extremely Affected Area; S. A. = Seriously Affected Area; C. A. = Common Affected Area; The division affected area was regulated in the overall plan of
the PDR of each earthquake.
Source: elaborated from the programmatic reconstruction plans released by the state council and the information from the official website of China Earthquake
Administration

Based on the centralized political system, instructions were passed in a top-down approach through the administrative system from
the central government to the provincial government, municipal government, and county government of the affected area [3,4]. In-
tergovernmental assistance was adopted in the PDRs of all the above earthquakes [5]. This means that under the central government's
mandate, the nonaffected governments offer assistance to the disaster-affected governments. As a result, available resources on a
large scale nationwide can be allocated to support the reconstruction of the affected area [6].
However, many works in the literature also speculated that the centralized reconstruction mechanism of China may have dis-
rupted the involvement of the local parties during its implementation. The strong role of the central government and the external gov-
ernments with higher hierarchy might deliver too strong institutional intervention to keep the local government's decision space and
engage the communities [7,8]. Hence, undesirable effects may be brought to the affected area, especially in the field of housing, as it
is closely related to the lives of inhabitants [9]. Further observation was suggested to investigate the implementation process of the
Chinese top-down housing reconstruction and its effect on the affected localities in actual circumstances. However, to the author's
knowledge, there has not yet been such research.
By employing an empirical study on a typical case of Dujiangyan City (DJY) after Wenchuan, this paper 1) identifies the stakehold-
ers involved and their organization methods to reveal the implementation process of housing reconstruction; 2) evaluates the imple-
mentation outcomes of respective stakeholders; 3) identifies the characteristics of the housing outcomes and indicates the preferences
and limitations of the participating stakeholders; and 4) proposes policy implications. The research flow is shown in Fig. 1.
The rest of this research is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the discussions of the top-down housing reconstruction after re-
cent earthquakes in China. Section 3 introduces the study methodology. Section 4 presents the results and findings of the case analysis
in detail. Section 5 discusses the results and policy implications. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and suggests future research
directions.

2. Literature review
2.1. The top-down housing reconstruction after recent earthquakes in China
2.1.1. The critical speculations of the Wenchuan Earthquake
The Wenchuan Earthquake was the most devastating earthquake, with the largest affected area since the founding of the People's
Republic. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of dwellings and resettlement of 15 million inhabitants was mostly finished within three
years, which is a remarkable achievement that raised global attention. Many works in the literature attribute such efficiency to a
strong centralized government and an innovative measure of intergovernmental assistance [10]. In the PDR of Wenchuan, the nonaf-
fected provincial governments with higher economic capacity and administration hierarchy were mandated by the central govern-
ment to offer assistance to the disaster-affected county-level governments in a pairing system [11]. It is estimated that 84.9 billion
yuan were granted, and 3424 projects were completed by the assistance providers, while housing reconstruction was one of the prior-
ity tasks [12]. By doing so, available resources of financial, intellectual, workforce, and materials were mobilized to meet the urgent
needs of the affected populations, which is always challenging to be achieved by the affected regional government alone [6,13].
Meanwhile, many works of literature also questioned whether the Chinese centralized reconstruction mechanism might disrupt
the involvement of the local parties, neglect the needs of the communities during its implementation, and bring negative effects to the

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Fig. 1. Research flow.

affected area, especially in the field of housing. Driven by a strong central government, the assistance governments with higher execu-
tive and economic bodies override the decision-making authority of the affected government. Intensive external assistance may cause
dependency of the affected government and hamper its chance of developing the capacity to cope with disasters [14]. Moreover, the
needs and desires of the affected communities were easy to neglect during the process. In the Mary Comerio [15] comparison study of
recovery management approaches among different countries, the levels of effective community participation and the government's
role from weak to strong were indicated graphically. The housing reconstruction of Wenchuan was placed in an extreme position, sug-
gesting delivery of too strong government intervention and almost no community engagement to consider the local complexity. The
pursuit of rapid reconstruction, the eroded local authority, and the scarce engagement of the affected communities may have compro-
mised the overall construction quality for resettlement and left the local government and communities facing the question of “how to
recover from the recovery” [16–18]. Further observation was suggested to examine the effect of the top-down housing reconstruction
of China on the affected localities.
There were indeed cases raised to identify the lack of consideration of the needs of the locals. For example, Ting and Chen [17]
found that in Mianzhu City, houses were reconstructed by the assisting external province of Jiangsu and modeled after the traditional
housing style of Jiangsu to express their construction achievement, which was not suitable for the living habits of the affected locals.
Additionally, Abramson and Qi [18] proposed that in the peri-urban area of Mao County, rooms such as keeping livestock were not
provided to the households who just turned into urban identity after the reconstruction and needed such rooms to support livelihood.
However, the above arguments are based on individual cases. There has been no study focusing on one affected region, analyzing the
relationship between the full-process implementation of housing reconstruction and its influence on the construction outcomes.
Therefore, pertinent implications cannot be proposed to make improvements.

2.1.2. Relationship with the following earthquakes

The PDR of Wenchuan marked a new beginning of legislation and provided important references to deal with the catastrophic
earthquakes aftermath in China. After Wenchuan, the PDRs of the following earthquakes also featured a centralized mechanism and
top-down implementation approach. After the occurrence of Wenchuan, a series of disaster management legislation and building
codes for seismic protection were revised [19,20]. The programmatic guidelines formulated after the following serious earthquakes
(Table 1) were regulated to refer to the experiences of Wenchuan and maintained the leading force of the central government to allo-
cate resources nationwide, the instruction execution in a top-down approach, the recovery reconstruction period of three years and so
on [21–25]. In addition, intergovernmental assistance was adopted in the PDRs of all the above earthquakes.
The studies focusing on the PDRs of the following earthquakes after Wenchuan in China drastically decreased. However, if only re-
viewing the implementation contents of the intergovernmental assistance after the following earthquakes from limited literature, it
could find that this measure revealed various forms to fit in different contexts. This result indicated the potential flexibility of the Chi-
nese centralized reconstruction, and the speculated negative effect is evitable if the implementation process is well organized. Con-
crete information is shown as follows:

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The area affected by the Yushu Earthquake was the Tibetan area in the rigid alpine region. As the least developed area in China,
this area did not undergo thorough land reform. Most of the affected population held private land ownership. To cope with the spe-
cific needs of the minority and the severe nature condition for construction, two external provincial-level governments and four state-
owned construction enterprises were mandated to implement the physical construction of on-site resettlement projects for most of the
affected population from two towns and three villages [5,22].
The affected area of the Lushan Earthquake mostly overlapped with Wenchuan. The affected provincial government of Sichuan
had already acquired experience in dealing with catastrophic earthquakes, and the severity level was not as high as that in Wenchuan.
The government of Sichuan was authorized by the central government the decision-making right in programmatic planning and mo-
bilized six cities inside Sichuan Province to provide intergovernmental assistance [5,23,26].
The area affected by the Ludian Earthquake was a poverty-stricken area in Gansu Province. Because of the incapacity and inexpe-
rience of the affected provincial government, the leading force in programmatic planning returned to the central government. Consid-
ering that the range of the disaster-affected area was much smaller than the former three earthquakes (Table 1), the intergovernmen-
tal assistance was mobilized mainly from Sichuan and implemented by the dispatch of professionals and a trained workforce [24].
The Jiuzhaigou Earthquake was another earthquake that struck Sichuan Province. Similar to the Lushan Earthquake, the provin-
cial government of Sichuan was authorized by the central government as the leading force in PDR. As the epicenter is located in the
UNESCO world natural heritage site and the destruction of housing was limited, the reconstruction plan emphasized the rehabilita-
tion of ecology and natural heritage. The provincial government of Sichuan gathered nationwide professional agencies as a think-tank
to support its PDR [25].
As the PDR of Wenchuan was confronted with the most devastating damages, the largest affected area, the most complex condi-
tions of the affected areas, mobilized the largest number of external governments and fulfilled the enormous reconstruction tasks until
now. Therefore, it is a valuable case to be investigated in depth.

3. Methodology
3.1. Design of the research
3.1.1. Identification of the organizational structure
This study aims to clarify the effect of the top-down housing reconstruction on the affected locality. The top-down implementation
process of housing reconstruction is identified first by building an organizational structure framework of the involved stakeholders,
which can visualize the interactions of the involved stakeholders during this process. The stakeholders this study focused on were the
actors who addressed and implemented resettlement planning in the field of urban planning and design [27–29]. Integrated with the
actual situation of the selected case, relevant stakeholders included the central government, the external government, the local gov-
ernment, the affected communities, and developers. The full implementation process includes the transformation of the reconstruc-
tion plans and a concrete implementation of housing projects with procedures of task assignment, site selection, scheme planning and
design, construction, and inspection.
Official documents and literature were reviewed, and an empirical-based qualitative method of key informant interviews was em-
ployed to build the organizational structure framework. The interviews were semistructured, allowing for open discussion. Such tech-
niques are more suited for studies on the complex PDR process after disasters. It allows informants to explain their experiences and
perspectives and the interviewer adjust the questionnaire to dig up further crucial information through face-to-face questions and an-
swers [30]. The informants were identified as government officers and planners who understood the full housing reconstruction
process and crucial decision-making questions. Snowball sampling techniques were used to confirm the informant list. In conducting
interviews, questionnaire guidelines were prepared for the interviewer, supplemented, and adjusted during the ongoing interviews.
Crucial information was yielded from questions focused on: 1) comments on the validity of the questionnaire and proposal of infor-
mant list; 2) kinds of housing projects; 3) relevant stakeholders and their responsibilities; 4) encountered problems and measures; and
5) unpublished official documents. After interviews with three informants [the chief planner of the reconstruction planning (P1), the
director of the planning agency from the local government (L1), the contact person between agencies of the external government and
the local government (P2)], the answers to the questionnaire began to display repetition. Therefore, the first round of interviews was
stopped. The profiles of the informants are shown in Table 2. As the chronological order of the interviews differed from the logical or-
der of understanding the interview question, the sessions were voice recorded, transcribed, and coded. The recordings were recon-
firmed whenever necessary.

3.1.2. Examination of the housing outcomes

Then, to relate the housing reconstruction process to its implementation results for the affected locality, the reconstructed housing
projects are categorized by their participating stakeholders and examined to identify their implementation process's influence. A prac-
tical impact evaluation methodology was adopted to select the examination indicators. This method distinguishes between output,
outcome, and impact to outline the results chain of activity, which refers to the activity of implementing housing reconstruction in
this study. Output refers to project investment results, such as a new house. Outcome refers to the outputs used by, for example, in-
habitants resettling in the new houses. Impact refers to the performance of reconstructed communities in a long-term integration with
socio-economic factors [31,32]. In the Chinese context, both output and outcome were included within the outcome of the three-year
recovery reconstruction period under the control of government agencies. This study focused on examining the outcome of the three-
year period, taking the first step to examine the effect of reconstruction implementation. The outcome of this period specifically fea-
tured in the built living environment. Based on the literature [33,34], crucial decision-making factors in determining the built living

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Table 2
Profiles of the informants.

Affiliation Code Reason for Interview

First round: to the personnel who managed the full process of housing reconstruction
Planning Agency P1 The chief planner of the Overall Planning of Post-disaster Reconstruction of DJY
Local Government L1 Director of the Planning Bureau of DJY, responsible for the housing reconstruction in full process, the most crucial informant
Planning Agency P2 The contact person on behalf of the planning and design institutes from Shanghai, coordinated with the Planning Bureau of DJY
Second round: to the representatives of each stakeholder
Local Government L2 Deputy director pf planning bureau of DJY
Design Institute from D1 Architect of one post-disaster housing project accomplished by Shanghai
SH
Design Institute from D2 Architect of one post-disaster housing project accomplished by Shanghai
SH
Design Institute from D3 Architects of one post-disaster housing project accomplished by Shanghai
SH
Design Institute from D4 Architect of one post-disaster housing project accomplished by DJY
DJY
Community C1– Committee members on behalf of two pilot self-constructed housing projects in PDR of DJY
C2
Developer V1 Manager of one of the real estate enterprises who built commercial housing in PDR of DJY
Academic A1- Academic researchers from Sichuan University, studied in the disaster management of the affected area within Sichuan Province
A2 since Wenchuan for more than ten years

environment indicated the proper evaluation indicators, as they can attribute the outcome characteristics to its implementation
process. The second round of key informant interviews was conducted to identify the crucial decision-making factors. The concrete
information of the interviews is explained in the next paragraph. According to the interviews, quantity, location, and layout were se-
lected as the indicators because they could indicate the crucial decision-making results of task assignment, site selection, and scheme
design. According to the informants of architects (D1-D4), they used the design elements of plot ratio (development intensity), the
number of stories and arrangement of buildings (spatial form), enclosed area (accessibility), and the adoption of planned urban facili-
ties (regional center or not) to reveal their design philosophy and emphasis. The above elements were selected as the sub-indicators
for layout. The theoretical analysis framework and the research range of this study are shown in Fig. 2.
The informants in the second round are targeted to the representatives of each stakeholder, including one officer from the local
government (L2), four architects from the design institutes of the external government (D1-D3) and the local government (D4), two
community representatives (C1–C2), one developer (V1) and two academic researchers (A1-A2) (Table 2). According to the first-
round interviews, the affected communities were only involved in self-constructed housing. The two community representatives were
from the reconstruction committees of two pilot self-constructed housing projects. Due to the management of the gated community,
they were approached by showing an official introduction letter stamped by the government officer (L2). This study did not plan fur-
ther interviews with community members because of the strong relationship with the authority and the difficulty in access. Instead,
archives and literature were integrated to supplement crucial information on its implementation process and outcomes. The qualita-
tive data were obtained from the following questions: 1) comments on the organization framework and proposal of the informant list;
2) leading force and coordinators during implementation; 3) crucial decision-making questions; 4) underlying constraints, difficul-
ties, and likely measures; and 5) unpublished documents, archives, and drawings of design schemes. Quantitative data were collected
from official documents, drawings of design schemes, and literature and supplemented by on-site investigations from 5 March to
March 10, 2016 and from 12 October to October 14, 2018.

Fig. 2. The theoretical analysis framework and the research range of this study.

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3.2. Study area

In this study, housing reconstruction in the urban area is targeted. As housing is heavily concentrated in cities, housing loss is par-
ticularly serious in urban areas [35]. In addition, urban housing reconstruction contains a more complex organizational form and con-
cerns the interests of more stakeholders during the process [36]. Moreover, houses in rural areas in China are mainly arranged in low
rises. Because of collective land ownership, authority was transferred to the affected inhabitants relatively quickly after providing
technical guidance and fund support.
The urban area of DJY after Wenchuan is selected as the study area. Its reconstruction experience is officially considered a stan-
dard case of PDR success after extraordinary earthquakes in China [37]. After Wenchuan, DJY was classified as one of the ten Ex-
tremely Affected Counties. Among the Extremely Affected Counties with a population of over 0.5 million, it faced the highest degree
of damage, with 461 hm2 of housing collapsed and 4126 hm2 damaged to different degrees [38]. It received assistance from Shanghai
City (SH), the most developed area of China, under the policy of intergovernmental assistance. Taking a chance on PDR, which
brought in external resources nationwide, DJY has developed into a central county in the Chengdu economic circle since its three
years of reconstruction. The PDR of DJY showcases the ideology behind the centralized reconstruction mechanism of China.

4. Results
First, this section identifies the implementation process of the stakeholders involved in the housing reconstruction of DJY. It iden-
tified the organizational framework for the formulation of reconstruction plans; then, it identified the organizational framework for
implementing four types of housing projects. Second, the selected indicators are used to examine the outcomes of the four types of
housing projects. The characteristics that resulted from stakeholder involvement are identified, while the explanations are stated dur-
ing the analysis.

4.1. Organizational structure of stakeholders involved in the implementation of housing reconstruction

4.1.1. Planning of housing reconstruction in DJY
Reconstruction plans are the foundation of reconstruction implementation and reveal the decision-making balance among author-
ities. The framework of the planning formulation is identified in Fig. 3. The central government acted immediately after the disaster,
directly took leadership in disaster rescue and relief, and formulated several programmatic regulations. Intergovernmental assistance
was initiated in this period, mandating SH to offer assistance to DJY. Based on the above programmatic regulations, related institutes
from the provincial government of Sichuan Province and the municipal government of Chengdu City formulated the “Overall Plan of
PDR of Wenchuan” and Nine Special Plans1 as programmatic plans. Based on the above programmatic plans, the planning institute
from SH and the planning bureau of DJY co-formulated the Overall Plan of PDR of DJY (the Overall Plan) as the practical planning for
implementing concrete reconstruction projects.
The above plans confirmed the strategy of urban development, resettlement methods, and resettlement period, which were crucial
principles for implementing housing reconstruction in DJY.
• The strategy of urban development
Proposed in the “Urban System Plan of PDR after Wenchuan” among the “Nine Special Plans”, downtown DJY was assigned as one
of the clustering towns among the common towns and relocated towns [3,39], as shown in Fig. 4. Considering its environmental and
resource capacity and economic conditions, DJY is located in a suitable construction area with low hazard risk, adjacent to the capital
city of Chengdu. Therefore, recovery reconstruction of the existing area and the development of the new urban area were considered
during its PDR.
The Overall Plan proposed an alleviated population pressure in the Old Town and a ring-shaped development downtown toward
the direction of Chengdu. Located at the northwest corner of the city is a third-century irrigation waterwork inscribed as World Her-
itage District by UNESCO. The 2.53 km2 surrounding the Old Town was planned as a historical park containing tourism services for
world heritage. Before the disaster, the Old Town had concentrated buildings constructed in the 1980s with low anti-seismic capacity
and an overdensity population. The damage assessment showed that over 80% of irreparable houses were concentrated in this area,
and many were without property titles [40]. Integrated with the demand for downtown development, it planned a transfer of the af-
fected inhabitants outside the Old Town to alleviate its population pressure from 140 thousand to 70 thousand by the end of 2010.
The Existing Urban Area and New Develop Area would accommodate the affected inhabitants transferred from the Old Town and the
population attracted after urban development. As a result, the population was expected to increase from 90 thousand to 200 thousand
by 2010 [41]. The above two areas form the New Ring Region, with new regional centers in the north, the middle, and the south, to
support the extended urban structure. A schematic diagram of the planned urban structure is shown in Fig. 5.
• Methods of resettlement
Based on the principles mentioned above, on-site resettlement was carried out for the inhabitants who hadn't acquired property ti-
tles or whose livelihood depended on their houses, and relocation resettlement was carried out for all the other affected inhabitants
[42,43].

1 The Nine Special Plans are the “Urban System Plan”, the “Infrastructure Construction Plan”, the “Market Service System Plan”, the “Rural Construction Plan”, the

“Public Facility Construction Plan”, the “Disaster prevention and Mitigation Plan and Ecological Environment Plan”, the “Urban-Rural Housing Construction Plan”, the
“Productivity Distribution and Industrial Adjustment Plan”, and the “Land Use Plan in Reconstruction”.

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Fig. 3. Framework of reconstruction planning. Source: elaborated from Urban-Rural Construction Department of Sichuan Province [39] and the first round of
interviews

Fig. 4. Geographical conditions of DJY, the diagram shows the 18 counties which received intergovernment assistance in the PDR after Wenchuan. Source: elaborated
from Yin et al. [3] and Urban-Rural Construction Department of Sichuan Province [39].

• Resettlement period
The state and intergovernments provided nonrepayable grants for reconstruction in the disaster-affected area for three years. In
DJY, the Overall Plan proposed that resettlement would be mostly finished within three years by the end of 2010.

4.1.2. Implementation of housing projects

The organizational framework of the four types of housing projects is identified in Fig. 6.
1) Self-Constructed Housing
The inhabitants without the property title or whose livelihood depended on their houses were qualified to be resettled on-site. The
DJY government granted qualified households with the on-site resettlement willingness to establish community committees to man-

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Fig. 5. Schematic diagram of the urban structure of DJY in the reconstruction plan. Source: elaborated from the Overall Plan and Li et al. [41].

Fig. 6. Framework of organizational structure. Source: elaborated from the first round of interviews

age the implementation of self-constructed housing. Design units and inspection units were committed by the DJY government. The
community committees were authorized with voting power for the design schemes and the commitment rights of construction units.
Only the schemes voted by more than two-thirds of the committee members can be constructed. The fund for construction came from
a bank loan by mortgaging the future property of the self-constructed housing unit.
2) Post-Disaster Housing (PDH)
Relocation resettlement was carried out by providing PDH, which resettled all the affected inhabitants who were not qualified for
self-constructed housing. Inhabitants swop their property of damaged house for a unit of PDH with an area of 70 m2; excess area re-

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quired payment to the DJY government at the cost price. The full-process implementation and funding of PDH were held responsible
by the DJY and the SH government. The external government of SH also held autonomy in deciding construction quantity and site se-
lection. When the SH government accomplished the projects, they were handed over to the DJY government for distribution.
3) Commercial Housing
During the implementation of PDH, the DJY government released a document entitled “The Methods to Utilize Market to Realize
Resettlement” in May 2009 [44]. Its express purpose was to supply more options for the relocated inhabitants, speed up resettlement
progress, and increase employment in the real estate industry and government revenue. The DJY government mobilized local devel-
opers into housing reconstruction by releasing preferential policies such as tax relief. Inhabitants can select these commercial housing
for resettlement. The property of the damaged house was taken back by the DJY government. In return, the government paid the in-
habitants 140,000 yuan, equating to the average cost price of a PDH unit of 70 m.2 Inhabitants paid the extra cost at a price negoti-
ated with the developers.
4) Cash Settlement
Cash settlement was another supplement provided by the DJY government. The inhabitants who were unsatisfied with any of the
three types of tangible projects could give up their original housing property to the DJY government. In return, the DJY government
paid them 140,000-yuan cash and terminated the resettlement issue.

4.2. Outcome characteristics of housing projects

4.2.1. Quantity in progress
The characteristics of the quantities and progress of different types of housing projects are identified in Figs. 7 and 8. This section
presents the analysis in chronological order to explain the reasons for the residual housing units after distribution found during the
quantity data examination.
1) Estimation of the reconstruction quantity
The construction quantity of housing units was estimated at 37,000, nearly equal to the irreparable units reported in the damage
assessment. However, to realize social fairness, one household that owned multiple irreparable units was still qualified for one recon-
structed housing unit. Therefore, the construction number was, in fact, larger than the number of qualified households. According to
informants L1 and P1, the overestimate was considered within tolerance and adopted to accommodate the potential inhabitants at-
tracted by urban development.
2) Self-Constructed Housing
Immediately after the release of the Overall Plan, the implementation of the self-constructed housing started. The qualified house-
holds with the on-site resettlement willingness registered to the DJY government established a self-construct committee and at last ac-
complished 5529 units, accounting for up to 13.6% of the reconstructed housing units.
According to informants L1 and L2, acquiring the consensus on design schemes from the committees was troublesome and time-
consuming. It cost more than two years for all the committees to agree on their design schemes. Its implementation took the longest
time among all types of housing projects (Fig. 8). Even so, some innovative design schemes proposed by the design institutes could not
finish revisions within the regulated reconstruction period. As a result, these buildings were restored to their original forms before the
disaster [45].
3) Construction plan of PDH
The initial plan of the construction quantity of PDH was the estimation quantity excluding the self-constructed units. Its imple-
mentation was divided into two phases according to different emergency degrees. Phase I aimed to provide housing units as soon as
possible, which was started in October 2008. When the urgent demand for housing provision was eased by the construction of Phase I,
Phase II started in April 2009, aiming to improve the living environment.
During the decision-making process, the government of SH decided to undertake three PDH projects and accomplished the con-
struction of 3249 units in Phase I, accounting for up to 26.0% of all PDH units in this phase, and to undertake one project in Phase II
and accomplished 2400 units, accounting for up to 12.7% in the second phase. The SH government emphasized quantity provision in
the first phase more than in the second phase. The DJY government undertook the implementation of the remaining 25,795 PDH
units.
4) Supplementary Commercial Housing & Cash Settlement
As depicted in Section 4.1.2, the resettlement methods of commercial housing and cash settlement were supplemented later dur-
ing the construction of the PDH.
According to informants L2 and V1, the involved commercial housing projects were those whose land-use rights had already been
acquired, and the government approved the use function of dwelling. Therefore, their construction was able to be started quickly to

2 For instance, quantities of PDH units were unoccupied and many public facilities seldom used in Jiegu Town after 2010 Yushu Earthquake, Lingguan Town after

2013 Lushan Earthquake, and Longtoushan Town after 2014 Ludian Earthquake at least.

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Fig. 7. Quantities of housing projects by type, unit: household. Source: elaborated from the official documents of the construction plan and the second round of
interviews

Fig. 8. Implementation progress of housing projects by type. Source: elaborated from the second round of interviews

catch up with the reconstruction schedule and accomplished simultaneously with the PDH (by May 2010). Ultimately, there were
8408 commercial housing units constructed by the eligible developers, accounting for up to 20.6% of all the reconstructed housing
units.
In China, permeant resettlement after the disaster was mainly realized by providing tangible projects with ownership, as in many
other developing countries [46]. The cash settlement method was the only intangible program in DJY to support inhabitants to reset-
tle by themselves and resettle the fewest affected households (624 households, accounting for up to 1.9% of the resettled inhabitants).
5) Adjustment, distribution, and the residual units
The supplementary commercial housing and cash settlement split the original PDH-oriented inhabitants and intensified the situa-
tion where there were more construction units than resettled households. Therefore, in May 2009, since the construction of the PDH
in Phase II had not yet been started, the DJY government canceled four projects and managed to reduce the construction quantity.
From May to October 2010, all the PDH units were distributed to the relocated inhabitants by the DJY government through six lot-
teries. Together with the residual commercial housing, there were 7968 units left, accounting for up to 19.5% of the overall construc-
tion quantity. The DJY government released documents encouraging the increased population to purchase the residual housing stock
[47]. However, there was also an overestimation of population growth. The Overall Plan predicted that the urbanization rate of DJY
would reach 64% by the end of 2010, when the reconstruction was finished. However, when 2010 arrived, the actual urbanization
rate was 48.2%, far less than the predicted value [48]. The problem of residual housing stock continuously existed and caused the real
estate market's inflation. In March 2015, the DJY government released documents appealing to slow down real estate development
before reducing housing stocks [49]. The target rate of urbanization of 64% was nearly reached in 2019, with 60.2%, eight years after
completing the PDR [50].

4.2.2. Location
Characteristics in the locations of the tangible housing projects are identified in Figs. 9 and 10 and interpreted as follows.
1) Self-Constructed Housing

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Fig. 9. Locations of housing projects by type. Source: elaborated from the Overall Plan, the project lists from Chen et al. [40], informant L2 and V1, and search in
Google Map

There were two kinds of affected households qualified for self-constructed housing. The first kind, whose house was distributed by
their working unit as welfare, held shared ownership and could not exchange the original property for a PDH unit. The second kind,
whose livelihood depended on their living place, used their houses to run a small business. In Fig. 9, the strip-shaped buildings along
the streets primarily belonged to this kind. As a result, 5529 households of the above two kinds resettled on-site, remaining in or near
the Old Town.
2) PDH
Regarding the major approach for relocation resettlement, PDH was required by the Overall Plan to include two factors: the trans-
fer of the population away from the overdense Old Town and the possibility for urban development. Under these circumstances, avail-

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Fig. 10. Proportion of housing projects in different urban areas by type, the constructed units of self-constructed housing equals to its resettled households; the distri-
bution of the resettled households in the commercial housing is not recorded, this figure only shows the statistics of its construction units; after six lotteries, the reset-
tled households by PDH were nearly averagely distributed in the constructed units, with 83.9% of the inhabitants located in the urban fringe. Source: the figures
were based on the statistics of Fig. 9 and calculated in ArcGIS 10.2.

able lands for residential purposes in the Existing Urban Area and urban fringe were two major options for site selection. Available
land in the Existing Urban Area was mainly acquired by local developers; the urban fringe was originally farmland. As an external act-
ing party and fully responsible for project implementation, the SH government was more willing to develop the peri-urban area.
Therefore, all of its PDH projects were located in the urban fringe. While the DJY government had fewer barriers to acquiring land use
from the local parties, its PDH projects are located with 1.1% in the Old Town, 16.6% in the Existing Urban Area, and 82.3% in the
New Develop Area (Fig. 10). The four PDH projects in the Existing Urban Area were canceled (Fig. 9). The above indicated that peri-
urban development was also the emphasis for the local government in PDR.
3) Commercial Housing
As mentioned above, the developers who acquired land with approved use rights and use functions were available to become in-
volved. According to informant V1, this land commonly possessed potential land value. They were prepared to be developed before
the disaster occurred. Ten projects restart their development by taking the preferential policies in PDR. As shown in Fig. 9, one of
them is located near the Old Town (QCW), six are located along the riverside (QC, HF, FL, XYS, LX, TY), and two are located close to
the new regional center in the north (LK, CBS).

4.2.3. Layout
The characteristics in the layouts of the tangible housing projects are identified in Figs. 11 and 12 and interpreted as follows.
1) Self-Constructed Housing
Managed by the community committees, self-constructed housing had the smallest site area, with low-rise buildings of 6–7 stories
(Fig. 11). Many of the houses were arranged in blocks. As the sunlight standard in DJY is not as strict as in other areas, a block with
rooms oriented in four directions is a special housing form in DJY. This form is popular because it benefits from molding a friendly
courtyard and an increased quantity of units. The plot ratios of the self-constructed housing projects were 1.52 on average, spanning
from 1.2 to 1.7 (Fig. 12). The average plot ratio value is close to the original residential area [40]. This shows that the affected com-
munities voted for the design schemes that could sustain a familiar living environment like that before the disaster.
2) PDH
The spatial forms of PDH differed in the two implementation phases.
To realize the efficiency of quantity provision in Phase I, all PDH projects were arranged in rows. Such a layout saved time for plan
arrangement because the revision of one volume does not affect the others. All the PDHs implemented by SH were built in high-rise
buildings with the highest average plot ratio (2.07) among all the projects in this phase, providing more units at one site to serve the
purpose of the first phase.
To improve the living environment in Phase II, all the PDH projects were arranged in blocks to achieve a friendly courtyard. Fur-
thermore, the design idea of “a smaller enclosed block” was proposed by the design institute from SH and adopted by the DJY govern-
ment in some of its PDH projects. As in China, a gated community is the usual form of residential community for security reasons. A
large, enclosed housing site is negative for the continuity of public space and the transportation system. The new design idea was to
separate one large site into several smaller enclosed blocks to decrease the negative influences. Three of the PDH projects (MZ6, YF4,
GQ2) by DJY fulfilled this idea, with the average enclosed area (22,719 m2) much lower than that in Phase I (56,660 m2). The only
PDH project (YJQ) implemented by SH in Phase II fulfilled this idea even further. Its enclosed area was 11,224 m2, very close to the
self-constructed housing (Fig. 12), which was similar to the traditional spatial structure in DJY. Furthermore, it was planned as a re-
gional center in the north to provide multiple public facilities, including the library, the culture center, the worker's center, etc., as
shown in Figs. 5 and 11. It was oriented as a pilot project in the PDR of DJY.
3) Commercial Housing
To pursue profit, the commercial housing projects were designed in two forms. One was a high-rise community with a high plot ra-
tio value (the maximum value was 2.07) to achieve a greater quantity of units at one site. The other was low-rise garden housing with

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Fig. 11. Layouts of housing projects by type. Source: elaborated from the design scheme drawings from informant D1-D4, V1, Chen et al. [40], Lu [45], Zou and Yin
[51], supplemented by searching in Google Map and on-site investigations.

Fig. 12. Quartiles of the plot ratio and the enclosed area of housing projects by type.
Note*: the four projects of PDH-SH were put together as one group. The lowest value belongs to the only PDH-SH in phase II. It is clear that the plot ratio of the three
PDH-SH in phase I ranks the top.
Source: the figures were based on the statistics of Fig. 11 and calculated in ArcGIS 10.2 and IBM SPSS Statistics. 25.

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J. Xi International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 80 (2022) 103221

a low plot ratio value (the minimum value was 0.98) to accomplish an upgraded residential environment. Compared with the PDH
unit, mostly to meet the basic dwelling needs, the commercial housing provided alternative dwelling options for the affected inhabi-
tants.

5. Discussion
5.1. Preferences and limitations of the stakeholders involved in housing reconstruction
By integrating the implementation process and the outcome characteristics, the research clarified that the housing outcomes in
DJY featured an imbalanced distribution in the city with certain spatial characteristics; this feature indicated the preferences and lim-
itations of the participating stakeholders.

5.1.1. Communities
The implementation of self-constructed housing in DJY was an attempt to engage the community to participate, different from the
speculation in the literature that “barely considered” under the Chinese centralized reconstruction mechanism [15,16]. It revealed a
possible method to supplement a bottom-up approach to the top-down housing reconstruction in China. As the affected community
committees voted for the housing schemes that could sustain a familiar living environment such as that before the disaster, the self-
constructed housing was accomplished as low-rise buildings with a low plot ratio and smaller enclosed sites (Figs. 11 and 12).
However, the engagement of the communities was constrained. The resettlement by self-constructed housing was limited to a
small proportion of people (Fig. 7) whose qualifications (irregular property title and needs for livelihood) were decided by the local
government. The communication between the community committees and the design institutes was compressed by the regulated re-
construction period, and some innovative design schemes could not be implemented. The rest of the affected population was planned
to be relocated. Although the local government provided supplementary resettlement alternatives of commercial housing and cash
settlement, most relocated inhabitants resettled in the PDH and were located in the urban fringe (Fig. 10).

5.1.2. Developers
Developer involvement in implementing commercial housing provided alternative resettlement options for the relocated inhabi-
tants. To start construction quickly to catch up with the reconstruction schedule, the developers who acquired land with approved use
rights and use functions were available to become involved. These projects were located in the sites with potential high land value
(near the Old Town, along the river, or close to the new regional center) (Fig. 9). They were arranged with polarized plot ratios, with
the high value for achieving a large quantity at one site and the low value for accomplishing an upgraded residential environment
(Figs. 11 and 12).
However, the involvement of the developers was limited to restarting their original projects. The motivation of their activities re-
mained in the pursuit of market value based on the high speed of urban and economic development before the disaster occurrence. As
a result, the capacities of the developers in providing construction labor and techniques [52,53] were not leveraged to share the gov-
ernment's workloads. Moreover, their extra provision of housing units intensified the overcapacity of the housing estate and caused
long-term impacts (Section 4.2.1).

5.1.3. External government

The external government of SH exhibited effectiveness in achieving pilot projects and fulfilled the two periodical implementation
goals better than the projects of the DJY government. In Phase I, the PDH by SH was arranged in rows with the highest plot ratios
compared to all of the other projects to provide units efficiently. In Phase II, to improve the living environment, the PDH by SH was
accomplished as a pilot project. Arranged in blocks, it had the smallest enclosed area of all the other PDH projects, provided multiple
public services, and acted as the regional center in the north (Figs. 5 and 11 and 12). The design idea of a “smaller enclosed area” pro-
posed by the design institute from SH provided important expertise in housing reconstruction. It was even written into the design
code in 2018, profoundly affecting the follow-up design of residential communities [54].
However, when deciding on the assistance projects, the external government of SH revealed the privilege of authority with a
higher administration hierarchy over the affected government. Guided by the reconstruction plan, which emphasized urban develop-
ment, SH decided to locate all of its PDH projects in the urban fringe (Fig. 9) and implemented them in an independent responsibility
(Fig. 6). The full implementation process in the “white slate” condition with fewer restrictions was more feasible for the external actor
of SH to concentrate investment, quickly enforce projects, and achieve pilot projects. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of the urban
center is always the most complicated task, as such areas confront more serious damages due to the high density of population and ac-
tivities, possible ownership disputes, and complex local social networks [55,56]. However, the advanced capabilities of the external
government of SH were limited in the peri-urban development that did not touch the traditional Old Town and the Existing Urban
Area.

5.1.4. Local government

Not to the extreme extent as the literature speculated, that driven under the superiority of the central government and assisted by
a higher-level external government, the local government would lose authority and rely on external forces [7,8,14]. In DJY, the local
government was still the leading force, the organizer, and the implementer in housing reconstruction. It committed a planning insti-
tute and co-formulated the reconstruction plan, authorized and guided the qualified communities for self-construction, supplemented
the resettlement projects of commercial housing and cash settlement, coordinated with the government of SH, organized and adjusted

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the construction of the PDH, implemented over half of the PDH units, and managed the distribution to the affected inhabitants (Figs.
6–7, Figs. 9 and 10).
However, the engagement of the communities, developers, and the external government was insufficient. They communicated
with the DJY government and implemented assigned projects separately. Their capacity disadvantages and the independent project
management resulted in imbalanced participation in space. Moreover, the lack of mutual coordination between the stakeholders was
also linked to the ineffective adjustment of PDH by the local government alone to deal with the unexpected residual construction
units in great amounts during the dynamic implementation process.

5.2. Implications
As the above preferences and limitations could be attributed to the reconstruction plan and the organizational method of the
stakeholders in summary, policy implications are proposed regarding the above two points.

5.2.1. Toward a more compact reconstruction plan

Barakat [57] proposed that reconstruction programs that aim to fulfill additional social, political, or economic goals may influence
the approach to housing reconstruction. The reconstruction plan of DJY emphasized urban development on a large scale by the
chance of PDR. As the guidance for housing reconstruction, it rationalized the adoption of the organizational method of the partici-
pating stakeholders, which contributed to an effective fulfillment of this planning target. However, the Overall Plan seriously overes-
timated the urbanization potential of DJY. Its urbanization progress was eight years later than predicted. As a historical city, the ur-
ban structure of DJY has been drastically extended after the three years of reconstruction. The renovation of the traditional Old Town
and the land used in the Existing Urban Area with more serious damages, interest disputes, and complicated local affairs revealed less
resource provision than the development of the new urban area in prioritization. Moreover, most quake-prone areas in China have de-
velopment conditions far poorer than DJY. However, the problem of allocating excessive resources to develop new urban areas still
existed in the PDRs of the earthquakes after Wenchuan, even in poverty-stricken areas.2
This study recommends a compact reconstruction plan to adopt cautious renovation to the original urban structure for the PDRs of
later earthquakes in China. It suggests changing from the government-oriented view into the community-oriented view to interpret
the concept of “development”. Rather than focusing on the “development of the urban land”, it requires focusing on the “development
of the benefits of the affected communities” to improve the physical living environment, enhance the social relationship, revitalize
livelihood, and strengthen capacities in disaster risk reduction [58,59].

5.2.2. To strengthen the coordination between all stakeholders in the full process of housing reconstruction
Realizing a compact reconstruction further implies establishing a platform for all the participating stakeholders to communicate
and coordinate during the full housing reconstruction process. A theoretical organizational structure for implementing housing recon-
struction in China is proposed in Fig. 13. The external government needs to withdraw from the full responsible process of assignment
and implementation of housing projects and participate by mobilizing specific institutes, professionals, and trained workforce in-
stead, to leverage the advances in economy, technology, expertise, and management without eroding the decision space of the local
authority. The local government needs to design multilayer support policies to engage the external and local actors (including the lo-
cal developers) working for community-oriented reconstruction goals. All relevant stakeholders need to determine an effective coor-
dination method to leverage capacities and complement disadvantages in the complex existing urban context and contribute to the
flexibility to deal with the problems that occurred during the dynamic reconstruction process. Their appeals and insights require thor-
ough communication during the full process of housing reconstruction, including the decision-making of the reconstruction plan, the
confirmation of participating qualifications, the assignment of reconstruction tasks, and the implementation of different projects
which can meet various resettlement demands of the affected inhabitants.

Fig. 13. A theoretical organizational structure of implementing housing reconstruction in China.

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6. Conclusion
Many previous works of literature have proposed that the centralized reconstruction mechanism of China could guarantee effi-
cient reconstructive enforcement. However, many also speculated that the strong role of the central government and the external as-
sistance government might override the local decision-making right, exclude community participation during the implementation
process and bring negative effects to the affected area, especially in housing. Therefore, further observation is required to examine the
implementation process of the Chinese top-down housing reconstruction and its effects on the affected localities. To the author's
knowledge, this is the first work of such examination.
This paper conducted an empirical study on a typical clustering town after Wenchuan. Integrating the information from official
documents, literature, key informant interviews, and on-site investigations, this paper identified the organizational structure of the
involved stakeholders, examined the implementation outcomes of the respective stakeholders, indicated the preferences and limita-
tions of the participating stakeholders, and proposed policy implications.
The case of DJY indicated that the Chinese top-down housing reconstruction was not inevitably carried out as speculated in the lit-
erature. The local government still played a leading force, mobilizing the local stakeholders, organizing the external stakeholders, and
providing diverse resettlement options and living environments for the affected inhabitants. However, these reconstruction projects
revealed an imbalanced spatial distribution and concentrated on the new urban area. The above characteristics could be attributed to
the reconstruction plan and the organizational method of the stakeholders. The reconstruction plan of DJY emphasized urban devel-
opment on a large scale by the chance of PDR. The participating stakeholders were mobilized separately and responsible for imple-
menting assigned projects. This organizational method assured quick project establishment and concentrative investment to fulfill the
planning goals effectively. On the other hand, the separate implementation constrained their involvement in the urban space by their
capacity limitations and made mutual coordination difficult to deal with the unexpected results during the dynamic reconstruction
process. The potential degree of urbanization was overestimated in the reconstruction plan of DJY and many other affected cities in
China. However, the existing urban area with more serious damages, interest disputes, and complicated local affairs revealed less re-
source provision than the development of the new urban area in prioritization.
According to the above, the following policy implications are proposed:
1) It suggests a more compact reconstruction plan to adopt cautious renovation to the original urban structure for the PDRs of later
earthquakes in China. When setting planning goals, it requires viewing from the community perspective to interpret the concept
of “development” after PDR. More attention needs to be paid to the “development of the benefits of the affected communities” to
improve the physical living environment, enhance the social relationship, revitalize livelihood, and strengthen capacities in
disaster risk reduction.
2) To realize a compact reconstruction, coordination and communication between all stakeholders must be strengthened. The
external government needs to withdraw from the full responsible process of housing reconstruction and participate by
mobilizing specific institutes, professionals, and trained workforce instead to leverage the advances in economy, technology,
expertise, and management without eroding the decision space of the local authority. The local government needs to design
multilayer support policies to engage the communities, the local and external actors working for community-oriented
reconstruction goals. All the relevant stakeholders need to identify an effective coordination method that can leverage their
capacities in the complex existing urban context and enhance the flexibility to deal with unexpected problems during the
dynamic reconstruction process.
Concerning future research perspectives, this study elicits the effect of the implementation process on the reconstruction “out-
comes” in the results chain, which was until the completion of resettlement, almost three years after the disaster. It will be valuable to
examine the “impacts” of the housing reconstruction on the affected populations ten years after the event, which requires integrating
multiple economic and social factors, as illustrated in Fig. 2.

Funding
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (52008204) and the Ministry of Education of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation (19YJCZH191).

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability
Data will be made available on request.

Acknowledgment
The author would like to express gratitude to Pro. Onoda Yasuaki (Tohoku University), Pro. Wang Jiangbo (Nanjing Tech Univer-
sity) and the editors and reviewers for their thoughtful comments and constructive suggestions on improving the quality of the paper.

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