Journal of Experimental Psychology: General Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association

2004, Vol. 133, No. 3, 415– 433 0096-3445/04/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0096-3445.133.3.415

Having the Memory of an Elephant: Long-Term Retrieval and the Use of

Analogues in Problem Solving

Zhe Chen Lei Mo

University of California, Davis, and South China Normal University
South China Normal University

Ryan Honomichl
University of California, Davis
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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The authors report 4 experiments exploring long-term analogical transfer from problem solutions in folk
tales participants heard during childhood, many years before encountering the target problems. Substan-
tial culture-specific analogical transfer was found when American and Chinese participants’ performance
was compared on isomorphs of problems solved in European versus Chinese folk tales. There was
evidence of transfer even among participants who did not report being reminded of the source tale while
solving the target problem. Comparisons of different versions of a target problem indicated that similarity
of solution tool affected accessing, mapping, and executing components of problem solving, whereas
similarity of goal object had only a moderate effect on accessing. High school students also evidenced
greater transfer than did middle school students.

Suppose an individual is faced with an insight problem that
involves discovering the quantity of glass marbles necessary to
equal the volume of a metal statue. Within this scenario, the
individual is provided with several ad hoc items, including a large
container filled with liquid, as possible tools for solving the prob-
lem. The solver might be reminded of the Eureka story regarding
Archimedes’ discovery of a solution to the problem of verifying
the authenticity of the king’s gold crown. The Archimedes story,
illustrating the principle of water displacement, could function as
a potential source analogue, even if the solver had heard it years
Zhe Chen, Department of Human and Community Development, Uni-
versity of California, Davis, and Center for Studies of Psychological
Application, South China Normal University, Guangzhou, China; Lei Mo,
Center for Studies of Psychological Application, South China Normal
University, Guangzhou, China; Ryan Honomichl, Department of Human
and Community Development, University of California, Davis.
The research was partially supported by Grant HD 19011 from the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. Data collec-
tion in China was also supported by Grant 01JAXLX001 from the Chinese
Education Ministry. We express our gratitude to Bob Siegler and
Myeong-Ho Sohn for invaluable comments on an early version of the
article. Thanks are extended to Jianfang Chang, Hongmin Chen,
Zhansheng Chen, Xinkui Chen, Ying Leng, Zhiya Liu, Chen Qu, Xuili
Tong, Ruiming Wang, Yanping Xu, and Qing Zeng at South China Normal
University and Deloris Abu-Tair, Elizabeth Fallapino, Karen Ho, Dannelle
Larsen-Rife, Denise Lew, and Ngoc Long at the University of California,
Davis, for their assistance in data collection and entry. We also thank Susan
Goetz for editing an early version of the article and Yuri Rodriguez for her
skillful creation of the figures.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Zhe
Chen, Department of Human and Community Development, University of
California, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616-8523. E-mail:
zhechen@ucdavis.edu
415
ago. Although this seems intuitively plausible, little is known
regarding the circumstances that might facilitate remembering and
utilizing such a story after a long period of delay. What difficulties
might individuals experience in solving analogous problems after
a long delay? Would the likelihood of success in using
Archimedes’ principle differ if the target problem involved a
similar (crown) or dissimilar goal object (e.g., a metal statue)
and/or a similar (a bathtub with water) or dissimilar solution tool
(e.g., container with another type of liquid)? Would these two
types of object similarity influence problem solving in different
processes and to different degrees?
When facing a novel problem, people often search for relevant
circumstances or similar scenarios from long-term memory to
solve it. Although much laboratory research has demonstrated that
people can use information from a source problem in solving
analogous problems (e.g., Bassok, 1990; Catrambone, 1996; Gick
& Holyoak, 1980; Reed, 1987; Ross, 1989), other studies have
shown that people often fail to use analogous solutions that they
are exposed to even immediately prior to being asked to solve a
target problem (e.g., Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974). It has been
suggested that individuals might experience more difficulties in
solving problems by analogy with longer delays between the
acquisition of a source analogue and the presentation of a target
problem (e.g., Barnett & Ceci, 2002). However, little is known
about whether individuals can actually retrieve and use analogues
acquired many years prior to encountering an isomorphic problem.
Because human thinking and problem solving are unquestionably
influenced by experience, it seems reasonable to assume that
individuals can use prior examples from long-term memory to
solve relevant problems. Therefore, in the present research, we
examined three issues: (a) the ability to analogize with a substan-
tial time gap, (b) factors that influence long-term transfer pro-
 416 CHEN, MO, AND HONOMICHL
cesses, and (c) developmental differences in long-term transfer
among middle school versus high school students.
Our primary goal in the present research was to explore whether
and how individuals retrieve and use analogues from long-term
memory to solve problems across contexts. Almost all laboratory
studies of analogical reasoning have involved presenting source
analogues and then observing how participants map source and
target passages or solve target problems over short delays mea-
sured in minutes (e.g., Bassok, 1990; Chen, 2002; Needham &
Begg, 1991), hours (e.g., Wharton et al., 1994), days (e.g., Ca-
trambone & Holyoak, 1989; Keane, 1987; Schunn & Dunbar,
1996), weeks (e.g., Catrambone, 2002; Gentner, Rattermann, &
Forbus, 1993; Wharton, Holyoak, & Lange, 1996), or months later
(e.g., Chen & Klahr, 1999). Virtually no studies have examined
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whether individuals are capable of using an analogue to solve a
target problem after years of delay.
It also has been typical for researchers in previous studies to
present source problems and then test target problem-solving per-
formance in the same setting (i.e., laboratory). However, in a rare
study examining transfer across context, Spencer and Weisberg
(1986) showed that participants experienced difficulty in solving a
target problem in a setting (laboratory) that was different from the
context (classroom) in which a source problem was learned. The
study demonstrated the important role of contextual similarity in
analogical transfer.
Although it is important to pinpoint the mechanisms involved in
analogical problem solving in a laboratory setting, rarely in every-
day life does a person learn a concept or solution strategy and then
apply it immediately afterward to an analogous situation in the
same setting. Real-life situations often involve transfer of knowl-
edge or strategies from one physical (location) and functional
(activity) context to another with a substantial delay. Thus, it
seems obvious that extending previous findings regarding analog-
ical transfer to more naturalistic contexts and with more extensive
time gaps between problems would have both theoretical and
practical implications. To the best of our knowledge, the only
published studies exploring analogical transfer in naturalistic sit-
uations are those of Dunbar and colleagues (e.g., Dunbar &
Blanchette, 2001). These researchers have observed the use of
analogies by leading molecular biologists and immunologists dur-
ing laboratory meetings and found that scientists often generate
analogies in solving problems during scientific discovery.
The paucity of studies examining analogical transfer over long-
term delay in less artificial contexts may be due to methodological
difficulties. In particular, it does not seem realistic or practical to
present an analogue to participants and then to test their target
problem-solving performance after years of delay. To overcome
this methodological limitation, we adopted a novel paradigm that
involved examining the target problem-solving performance of
participants who had acquired a source problem and its solution in
various cultural contexts years ago during their childhood. Another
group that had not experienced the source analogue served as a
control group. We hypothesized that differences in target problem-
solving performance between these two groups would reflect the
effects of the available source analogue on problem solving. The
effects were also measured by examining participants’ reports of
the target problem reminding them of any story or problem and the
helpfulness of what they were reminded of in solving the target
problem. Thus, with a novel approach, we were motivated to
investigate in the present research a very remote, challenging type
of transfer: long-term analogical problem solving across physical
and functional contexts. Furthermore, demonstration of the com-
mon key processes that are evident in short- and long-term transfer
would attest to the generality of the mechanisms that mediate
analogical problem solving.
The second goal of the present study was to explore how
different types of object similarity, namely, goal object and solu-
tion tool similarity, influence different transfer processes. Much
empirical and theoretical research in transfer over the past century
has focused on the effects of similarity shared between source and
target problems (e.g., Anderson, Farrell, & Sauers, 1984; Holyoak
& Koh, 1987; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997; Osgood, 1949; Reed,
1987; Ross, 1987; Salomon & Perkins, 1989; Singley & Anderson,
1989; Sternberg & Frensch, 1993; Thorndike & Woodworth,
1901). Traditionally, similarity between analogous problems has
been distinguished as either structural or superficial (e.g., Catram-
bone, 2002; Gentner, 1989; Gentner et al., 1993; Holyoak & Koh,
1987; Ross, 1989). Superficial similarity refers to objects and their
properties, story protagonists, or story lines common to both
problems, whereas structural similarity refers to the underlying
relations among the key objects shared by the source and target
problems (Catrambone, 2002; Gentner et al., 1993). Although
extensive investigation of this dichotomy has yielded fruitful find-
ings, theorists have advocated for making finer distinctions of
types of similarity and their relations to transfer performance (e.g.,
Anderson et al., 1984; Gentner et al., 1993; Klahr & Carver, 1988;
Reder & Klatzky, 1994; Reed, 1987; Ross, 1989).
Previous studies in analogical problem solving have also iden-
tified three key components involved in transfer. The first process
involves accessing a source problem. To solve an analogous prob-
lem, a problem solver needs to retrieve or be reminded of a source
analogue (e.g., Ross, 1989). Spontaneous retrieval of relevant
information from long-term memory may be especially challeng-
ing. The second process involves mapping the structural relations
between problems before the source solution can be applied to
solve the target problem (e.g., Gentner & Toupin, 1986). Mapping
the relations and corresponding objects between source and target
problems after a lengthy delay may lead to an obstacle in transfer.
A third process involves executing a solution or strategy (e.g.,
Catrambone & Holyoak, 1990; Chen, 2002; Chen & Mo, 2004;
Reed & Bolstad, 1991). Few studies have explored all three of
these components simultaneously in the same task context, as was
done in the present research.
We propose a framework for examining the relationship be-
tween different types of object similarity, problem-solving perfor-
mance, and transfer processes. Object attributes shared between
problems have been viewed as superficial similarities that contrib-
ute primarily to the accessing process in transfer. We propose that
finer distinctions between types of object similarity can be made
and that different types may influence various processes involved
in analogical problem solving. This framework is based on the
following assumptions: (a) problem goal structure is composed of
different entities or elements such as a goal, obstacle, solution, and
outcome; (b) the entities of a problem are typically associated with
objects; (c) these objects associated with the different entities may
be similar or dissimilar between analogous problems; and (d)
 LONG-TERM ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
similarities of objects associated with different elements in the
problem goal structure may have a distinct impact on performance
and processes.
In some of the studies reported here, we manipulated the
source–target similarity of goal object and solution tool and ex-
amined their impact on different transfer processes. We hypothe-
sized that similarity in goal object would influence the accessing
process. In contrast, similarity in solution tool was hypothesized to
affect not only the accessing process but also the mapping and
executing components. When a common solution tool is shared by
problems, the tool can be readily chosen to solve a problem by
mapping it to the source analogue. However, when solution tools
are similar in function but differ in object attributes, participants
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may experience difficulty in matching the source and target tools.
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The third and final goal of the present study was to examine
developmental differences in long-term analogical transfer. Very
young children display a wide variety of transfer competencies
(e.g., Brown & Kane, 1988; Chen & Siegler, 2000; Holyoak, Junn,
& Billman, 1984), but analogical problem solving is nevertheless
thought to develop in efficiency and sophistication during child-
hood (e.g., Brown, 1989; Chen & Klahr, 1999; Gentner & Toupin,
1986). Yet few studies have examined age differences in the
mastery of all three components or in long-term analogical trans-
fer. With the present research, we explored several pivotal aspects
of developmental differences in long-term analogical transfer.
More specifically, how does object similarity affect long-term
transfer at different ages? If adults are successful in solving an
insight problem over a long delay, even with a dissimilar goal
object and solution tool, would children and adolescents also be
capable of analogizing when the source problem was acquired
years ago? Furthermore, if obstacles associated with various trans-
fer processes are evident in adults, it would be important to explore
developmental differences in difficulties associated with these
processes and whether similarities in goal object and solution tool
would have comparable effects on problem solving in younger
participants. These were the main issues we addressed in the
present research.
We conjectured that college students and high school students
were more likely to solve an analogical problem after a long delay
than middle school students were. Furthermore, developmental
differences were hypothesized to reflect the difficulties that par-
ticipants experience in accomplishing each cognitive component at
different ages. Younger students, compared with older students,
were predicted to have greater difficulty in spontaneously retriev-
ing a source problem, in mapping the key objects between prob-
lems, and in implementing the solution.
In Experiment 1, we explored whether Chinese (or U.S.) par-
ticipants who had experienced a source analogue would be more
likely to solve a target problem than their peers in the United States
(or China) who lacked exposure to the analogue. In Experiment 2,
we examined the effects of similarity in goal object and solution
tool on transfer performance and processes. In Experiment 3, we
examined the accessing process without the potential interference
of problem-solving activities. In Experiment 4, we explored
whether middle school students experienced more difficulties in
solving the target problem than high school students did, especially
in the dissimilar object conditions.
417
Experiment 1
Our primary goal in this experiment was to investigate the
retrieval and use of source folk tales acquired in naturalistic
settings (e.g., reading a book or listening to a story) for solving
analogous problems in an experimental setting after a long delay.
To determine the effects of culturally specific experience on long-
term transfer across contexts, we chose folk tales from two differ-
ent cultures, China and the United States, as source analogues.
Target problems, which were isomorphic to the source tales, were
created.
One target problem described a scenario in which a chief of a
riverside village needed to find a way to measure an amount of
gold commensurate in weight to a statue without the benefit of a
conventional balance scale. This problem was designed to be
isomorphic to a well-known Chinese tale called “Weigh the Ele-
phant.” The solution involved a principle of equalizing the weights
of smaller items and a large object by compressing a boat to the
same degree (see Appendix A). Another target problem was the
cave problem, which was created to be analogous to the tale
“Hansel and Gretel” (H&G), by the Brothers Grimm, which is
commonly read or heard by children in the United States (see
Appendix A).
Although the target problems and the source analogues involved
similar solutions, they shared few contextual and superficial fea-
tures such as similar objects and characters. Chinese college stu-
dents, who had experienced the elephant tale, were predicted to be
more likely to come up with the compression solution to the statue
problem than were U.S. students, who had never heard the source
tale. Similarly, U.S. students, who had heard the H&G story, were
predicted to be more likely to solve the cave problem by suggest-
ing that a trail of small objects be created than were Chinese
students.
To assess the availability of the source analogues, we conducted
a preliminary study with 60 U.S. students and 30 Chinese students.
The Chinese students were asked to write down the elephant tale.
Despite the fact that most reported hearing the story many years
ago, they remembered the key elements of the story. Among these
30 students, 97% remembered the goal of the problem, and 93%
wrote down the correct solution. The U.S. participants were asked
to write down the gist of the H&G story and then answer the
question, “How did Hansel and Gretel find their way out of the
forest?” Seventy-three percent recalled some portion of the tale
and 52% remembered the strategy involving creating a trail of
small pebbles or bread crumbs. Despite the differences between
these two samples in recalling the source tales, these results
pointed to the availability of the source analogues and their solu-
tions, a prerequisite for examining whether and how participants
use analogy after long-term delay.
Four additional insight problems were chosen as neutral tasks,
because there were no known analogues to these problems in either
culture: the radiation problem (Duncker, 1945; Gick & Holyoak,
1980), the string problem (Maier, 1931), the water jar problem
(Luchins, 1942), and the pool problem (Gardner, 1978). These
control problems were used to test the hypothesis that performance
on insight problem solving would be equivalent between the two
cultures. These problems were selected on the basis of several
criteria: (a) They are novel to students in both cultures, (b) they are
insight problems that are similar in nature to the two target prob-
 418 CHEN, MO, AND HONOMICHL

lems, and (c) the difficulty level in generating solutions varies
among the problems.
Method
Participants. A total of 270 undergraduate students participated in this
experiment: 152 undergraduate students from either psychology or educa-
tion classes at South China Normal University, Guangzhou, China, and 118
students from psychology or human development classes at the University
of California, Davis. Although the absolute academic standards of the U.S.
university may well be higher than those of the Chinese university, these
institutions are major universities within their respective higher education
systems. Although a lower percentage of the Chinese population attends
college, this percentage has increased substantially over the past 2 decades.
Overall, the two samples appeared to be comparable for the purposes of the
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the control problems, the participants were asked to indicate if and where
they had heard of the problem before. After attempting to solve all six
problems, the participants were presented with the two target problems
again and asked whether each of the problems reminded them of any story,
event, or problem. If either or both did, they were asked to write down the
gist of what they were reminded of. The six problems were presented to
both samples in one of two orders. The order for presenting the target
problems was counterbalanced. In one order, the statue problem was
presented first and the cave problem last; in the other, the order was
reversed.
Results
Responses to each problem were scored as correct or incorrect.
The performance of 140 randomly selected participants was coded

present experiments. Approximately equal numbers of women and men in independently by two coders, and agreement on problem perfor-
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each sample participated in the study. The scores of an additional 10

mance and reminding was 96% on average, ranging from 93% to
participants in the United States and 12 in China were excluded because
they reported hearing of one or more of the control problems before
98% among the six problems.
participating in the experiment. Participants received course credit for Accurate identification of a source analogue to the target prob-
completing the experiment. lem (i.e., the cave or statue problem) was scored as 1. In the cave
Materials. The materials consisted of six insight problems involving problem, participants were given credit if they reported being
different types of solutions with varying levels of complexity. Two of these reminded of H&G or a story involving dropping bread crumbs or
problems, the statue and cave problems, were target tasks. The other other small objects to make a trail to follow home. In the statue
four problems were control tasks because there are no known relevant problem, reminding credit was given if a participant mentioned
source analogues in either culture. The target problems are provided in aspects of the original elephant tale. Agreement between the two
Appendix B. observers was 94% and 99% for the cave and statue problems,
The statue problem described a scenario in which a chief of a village by
respectively. Preliminary analyses revealed no gender differences
a river needed to use the weight of a stone statue to approximate the
amount of gold coins that he must collect in taxes from a neighboring
in any measure (all ps ⬎ .20). Data were analyzed to address the
village. Because a conventional balance scale was not available, the chief issues of whether Chinese and U.S. students solve the statue and
faced a problem of matching the weights of the statue and the gold coins. cave problems differently and whether they solve the control
The correct solution involved putting the statue in a tub (which was problems similarly. All reported effects are significant beyond the
mentioned in the problem) and placing it in the river to show how much the .05 level, unless otherwise noted.
tub was compressed in the water. Then, after the statue was removed, gold Performance on the statue problem. As Figure 1 shows, 69%
coins were placed in the tub until the water reached the same level. Using of Chinese students and 8% of U.S. students successfully solved
a boat instead of a tub was also considered appropriate. This problem was the statue problem, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 270) ⫽ 120.83. It is worth noting
designed to be isomorphic to the elephant tale.
that the U.S. sample contained 16 Chinese American students, 1 of
The cave problem described a scenario in which a treasure hunter needed
to travel into a cave and then find his way out again, without the benefit of
a map or compass. Successful solution of the problem required the solver
to note that the man could leave a trail of small objects, such as pebbles or
sand, while traveling through the cave and then follow this trail out to exit.
This problem was designed to be isomorphic to elements of the H&G tale,
in which a brother and sister tried to find their way out of a forest by
creating a trail with pebbles and bread crumbs. Again, few contextual and
superficial features were shared by the target problem and source tale.
Four control problems were adopted from some classic insight problems,
including the radiation problem, the string problem, the water jar problem,
and the pool problem. The radiation problem involved using a number of
less intense rays from different directions to converge on a tumor such that
the rays effectively destroy the tumor without damaging the surrounding
healthy tissue. The string problem involved grabbing two strings hanging
apart from the ceiling by tying an available object to one string and
swinging it. The water jar problem involved creating an accurate equation
of measurement using three available containers to achieve a desired
amount of water. The pool problem involved devising a procedure to
engineer a bridge to a platform in the middle of a pool filled with water
given only a small number of flat boards but no nails, glue, or rope.
Procedure. Participants in all groups were given a booklet, which
included a consent form, the insight problems, and space to write down
solutions. The instructions, which were read aloud to the participants,
asked them to read the six problems and generate written solutions for
each. For each problem, participants were given 5 min to read the story Figure 1. Percentages of U.S. and Chinese participants solving the target
problem and then write down one or more solutions. After solving each of tasks (the cave and statue problems) and control problems in Experiment 1.
 LONG-TERM ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
whom (6%) solved the statue problem, indicating that there were
no differences in solving the problem between Chinese American
and the rest of the U.S. sample.
The problem-solving performance was consistent with re-
sponses to the reminding questions. A chi-square analysis indi-
cated that Chinese students (67%) were more likely to report being
reminded of the elephant tale than were U.S. students (1%), ␹2(1,
N ⫽ 270) ⫽ 121.61. Note that in the U.S. sample, 1 student who
was reminded of the elephant tale was a Chinese American who
learned about the tale during his childhood in China.
The two left bars of Figure 2 reveal that Chinese students who
were reminded of the elephant tale outperformed those who were
not. To determine the relation between reminding and problem-
solving performance, we performed a chi-square analysis, which
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indicated that more students who were reminded of the elephant
tale successfully solved the problem (88%) than did those who
were not (31%), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 152) ⫽ 51.09.
Performance on the cave problem. Figure 1 shows that 75% of
American students and 25% of Chinese students successfully
solved the cave problem, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 270) ⫽ 65.60. Consistent with
the problem-solving performance, a chi-square analysis revealed
that U.S. students (37%) were also more likely than Chinese
students (7%) to be reminded of the H&G tale, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 270) ⫽
36.98. Note that although no Chinese participants specifically
reported the H&G tale, 7% mentioned a Chinese story involving a
trail of grain being created to guide the way out of a village.
To examine the relation between reminding and problem-
solving performance, we performed a chi-square analysis, which
indicated that students who were reminded of the source analogue
successfully were more likely to solve the cave problem (89%)
than were those who were not (66%), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 118) ⫽ 7.32. The
two right bars of Figure 2 illustrate this relation.
Figure 2. Target problem-solving performances of participants who did
or did not report being reminded of the source analogue in Experiment 1.
419
Performance on the control problems. The four control prob-
lems varied in difficulty level. As Figure 1 depicts, participants in
both the Chinese and the U.S. samples were more likely to solve
the string and water jar problems than the pool and radiation
problems. The problem-solving patterns between the U.S. and
Chinese students were nearly identical. A chi-square analysis
performed on each problem revealed no significant differences
between the two samples (all ps ⬎ .10). A t test performed on the
mean number of control problems solved by each sample also
revealed no significant differences (0.92 out of 4 problems for
Chinese students and 1.02 out of 4 problems for U.S. students),
t(268) ⫽ 1.07, p ⫽ .29.
Discussion
The results illustrate that U.S. participants were more likely to
be reminded of the H&G story and to solve the cave problem than
Chinese students were. In contrast, Chinese participants outper-
formed U.S. students in solving the statue problem and in being
reminded of the elephant tale. Within each sample, those who were
reminded of the source tale were better in solving the target
problem than were those who were not reminded. The equivalent
performance in solving the control problems between cultures in
turn indicates that the performance differences in solving the target
problems were not due to the cultural differences in general ability
to solve insight problems. Instead, the mirror pattern of perfor-
mance on the statue and cave problems between the two samples
provides clear and compelling evidence that participants are capa-
ble of drawing on culturally specific experience in solving analo-
gous problems.
The results also suggest both explicit and implicit retrieval and
use of remote analogy in solving problems. Two thirds of Chinese
and over one third of U.S. participants explicitly reported that the
target problem reminded them of the source tale. They were
consciously aware of the relevance between the source analogue
and the target problem. Yet even those who were not aware of the
source analogue in one culture were more likely to solve the target
problem than were their peers in the other culture, where the
analogue was not available. Sixty-six percent of U.S. students who
were not reminded of the H&G story solved the cave problem,
compared with 25% of Chinese students. Likewise, Chinese stu-
dents who were not reminded of the elephant tale outperformed
U.S. students in solving the statue problem (31% vs. 8%, respec-
tively). These results suggest that source analogues also influence
problem solving in an implicit way.
It is important to note that the elephant analogy for Chinese
participants and the H&G analogy for U.S. students are not en-
tirely comparable. First, the elephant tale seems to be better known
in Chinese culture than the H&G story is in U.S. culture. Second,
the solution is the single most important component of the elephant
tale, whereas the solution in the H&G story is much less central.
Third, the H&G tale is substantially longer than the elephant tale.
The structural components in the elephant tale and the statue
problem are more parallel than are those in the H&G tale and the
cave problem. Last, the solution in the elephant tale involves a
procedure that is more complex, whereas the H&G solution in-
volves a more straightforward, one-step action. Given the differ-
ences in the levels of availability, accessibility, and applicability
between these two analogies, it was not surprising that the likeli-
 420 CHEN, MO, AND HONOMICHL
hood of being reminded of the source analogue and the perfor-
mance in solving these two target problems were somewhat dif-
ferent. Despite the differences in these two analogies, this
experiment nevertheless reveals parallel effects of source tales on
analogical transfer in both cultures.
Experiment 2
The goal of this experiment was to explore the effects of
different types of object similarity on long-term analogical transfer
processes. Given that the elephant tale appeared to be a more
effective analogue for exploring transfer, only this source tale was
adopted in the remaining experiments. Several versions of target
problems were created, all sharing the same goal structure (rela-
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tions among the objects) and solution with the elephant tale. Two
types of object similarity were manipulated without altering either
the goal structure or the story theme across different versions of
the target problem. The manipulation resulted in four types of
relations between the source and target problems: similar goal
object–similar solution tool (SG-ST), similar goal object–
dissimilar solution tool (SG-DT), dissimilar goal object–similar
solution tool (DG-ST), and dissimilar goal object– dissimilar so-
lution tool (DG-DT).
Unlike Experiment 1, where participants were asked to generate
possible solutions freely, the present paradigm involved partici-
pants reading a target problem and then viewing a set of illustrated
objects that could potentially be used to solve the problem. After
attempting to solve the problem, participants were asked to answer
several posttask questions to indicate what the target problem
reminded them of, and, if it did remind them of something, they
were to indicate how helpful this memory was in solving the target
problem. Finally, Chinese participants were asked explicitly to
write down the elephant tale. Participants’ problem-solving per-
formance was observed and the processes involved in analogical
transfer were examined. The accessing component was assessed by
whether participants reported being reminded of the tale. The
mapping process was measured by participants’ selection of both
the goal object and the solution tool during problem solving.
Finally, the executing component was measured by the partici-
pants’ accurate use of the weight compression and equivalence
principles with the solution tool.
It was predicted that Chinese participants in the SG-ST condi-
tion would outperform their peers in other conditions, especially in
the DG-DT condition. The two types of object similarity were also
hypothesized to differentially impact the accessing, mapping, and
executing processes. In contrast, no differences were predicted
across the four conditions for participants in the United States.
Method
Participants. A total of 256 university students participated in this
experiment: 117 undergraduate students from either psychology or educa-
tion classes at South China Normal University and 139 students from
psychology or human development classes at the University of California,
Davis. Each group was composed of approximately equal numbers of men
and women. Participating students received course credit for completing
the experiment.
Design and materials. Instead of using different source stories, we
manipulated the target problems to create four versions that were all
analogous to the original elephant tale. Each target problem described a
team of scientists on an exploration site who needed to figure out the
weight of a large object (either an elephant or an asteroid) but did not have
access to a scale large enough. After the presentation of the story, a set of
illustrated items as potential objects for solving the problem was shown,
including logs, boxes, rocks, trees, tools, rope, and buckets, that could be
chosen in combination with a solution tool (either a boat or a spring
platform) that could be used to weigh the goal object. The items were
intentionally created with proper proportions so that the elephant or aster-
oid would appear to fit in the boat or on the spring platform in the pictures
(see Appendix C). Across conditions, the illustrated items were exactly the
same, except for the solution tool, which was required for successfully
solving the problem. Thus, the target problems differed from the original
Chinese tale in several superficial features (e.g., scientists vs. emperor) and
story line but were similar or dissimilar in either the goal object (elephant
vs. asteroid) and/or the solution tool necessary to weigh the goal object
(boat vs. spring platform). Although the spring platform differs in appear-
ance from the source solution tool, a boat, both can serve as compression
devices and thus share the same function. The asteroid differs from the
source goal object, an elephant, yet both represent a large object to be
weighed.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four condi-
tions: SG-ST, SG-DT, DG-ST, and DG-DT. All groups were given a
booklet including a consent form, the story text and illustrations, blank
space in which to write down their solutions, and a page containing
posttask questions. Chinese participants were also given a blank page for
free recall of the Chinese tale at the end of the experiment.
Participants were read aloud instructions that explained that they were
being asked to read a story and solve a problem with a pencil and paper.
Participants were first given 80 s to read the story problem. After reading
the story problem, they were instructed to view the illustrated items and
then to use any as they wished to help them solve the problem. Participants
were given 5 min to write down any appropriate solutions. They could
come up with more than one solution with any items illustrated. After
generating solutions, participants were asked to turn to the next page in the
packet and complete the posttask questions.
A series of questions was designed to assess when or if participants had
heard about the elephant tale in the past and whether they were aware of its
relevance to the target problem. Specifically, participants were asked to
answer the following questions: (a) if the target problem reminded them of
any story and/or event they had heard of or read before and, if so, what they
were reminded of; (b) on a scale of 1 (not helpful at all) to 5 (extremely
helpful), how helpful the story or event they were reminded of was in
generating a solution to the target problem; (c) when they had first heard
about the story or event that they were reminded of (10 years, 5 years, 3
years, or 1 year ago); and (d) when they heard about it last (10 years, 5
years, 3 years, or 1 year ago). Last, the Chinese participants were asked to
write down their recollection of the elephant tale with at least 100 Chinese
characters on a blank sheet.
Measures. There were five dependent measures.
1. The first measure involved recollection of the source tale. Availability
of the source analogue was assessed by Chinese participants’ recall of the
elephant tale at the end of the experiment. Source story recall was mea-
sured with a 3-point scale: 2 points were awarded for reporting both the
goal and the solution, 1 point for either, and 0 points for neither. Perfor-
mance of 50 randomly selected participants was scored independently by
two observers, and agreement was 99%.
2. The second measure involved accessing the source story. When asked
what previous stories or problems, if any, they were reminded of by the
target problem, participants’ indication of the elephant tale was considered
to reflect the retrieval of the source story and scored as 1 point.
3. The third measure involved mapping the key objects between prob-
lems. Participants’ mapping of the key objects was measured by their use
of both the goal object and the solution tool during their target problem
solving, regardless of whether the problem was ultimately solved. Because
 LONG-TERM ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
almost all the participants mentioned the goal object, this measure mainly
reflected participants’ selection of the solution tool to map onto the source
solution tool when they attempted to solve the problem.
4. The fourth measure involved executing the solution. Participants’
execution of the solution was assessed with two aspects: strategies and
solution score. Three main problem-solving strategies were identified. The
first approach was the division strategy, which involved cutting or breaking
the goal object into pieces and then weighing the pieces separately. The
second was the balance strategy, which involved the weight equivalence
concept, such as balancing the goal object with a set of smaller items so the
total weight of the smaller items would be the same as the weight of the
goal object. This strategy was not considered an ideal approach because it
did not involve a reasonably accurate balancing method (e.g., putting the
asteroid on one end of a log or spring and a set of smaller objects on the
other). It also often involved selecting items that were not in the illustrated
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set (e.g., a pulley system). The third approach was the compression
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strategy, which involved an effective way to measure the degree of com-
pression of the boat or spring platform. This approach could lead to an
effective and complete solution, but it might also involve an incomplete
solution (e.g., simply putting the goal object on the boat or spring and
estimating the weight by observing how far it compressed). A score of 1
was assigned when a participant used one of these strategies, regardless of
whether the problem was ultimately solved.
In addition to these three strategies, some Chinese participants in the two
dissimilar solution tool conditions (the spring platform versions) cited a
boat as a solution tool, even though it was not among the possible solution
items (creating the boat strategy). The use of this approach was considered
to reflect negative transfer, because it interfered with the selection of the
appropriate solution tool.
The second measure of the execution component involved a 3-point
solution scale. A score of 2 was assigned when a complete and accurate
solution was generated: that is, using the boat (in the boat versions) or
using the spring platform (in the spring versions) as a compression tool to
equalize the weight of the elephant or asteroid and smaller objects and then
weighing the smaller objects separately. A score of 1 was assigned when
the solution was correct only at a general level but was neither complete
nor precise, such as generating an idea of equalizing the weight of the goal
object with the summed weights of smaller objects without specifying how
or with an inaccurate procedure (e.g., using the log as a balancing board).
Participants who did not come up with any appropriate solution received a
score of 0. Problem-solving performance of 80 randomly selected partic-
ipants (from both China and the United States) was scored independently
by two observers, and agreement between the two observers was 97%.
5. The fifth measure involved evaluating the usefulness of the source
story. The participants were asked to indicate how much the source
analogue had helped them solve the target problem on a scale of 1 (not
helpful at all) to 5 (extremely helpful). The data were relevant only to those
who reported the elephant tale.
It is important to note that the actual order of assessing the participants’
problem-solving activities does not correspond to the order in which these
five measures are presented. As described in the Procedure section, par-
ticipants were first asked to attempt to solve the target problem before
being asked to report any potentially relevant source stories, to evaluate the
usefulness of the reported source analogue, and to recall the source tale.
For theoretical reasons, data analyses are presented in the order of recall-
ing, accessing, mapping, executing, and evaluating, which is the sequence
in which these processes were hypothesized to occur.
Results
Preliminary analyses revealed no gender differences in any
measure (all ps ⬎ .30). The results are reported in five sections. All
reported effects are significant beyond the .05 level, unless other-
wise noted.
421
Recalling the source story. Figure 3A shows the recall scores
for Chinese participants in the four conditions. A one-way analysis
of variance (ANOVA) revealed no differences across conditions,
F(1, 113) ⫽ 0.59. These results, consistent with the preliminary
survey of 30 participants who were asked to recall the source story
without attempting to solve the target problem, indicated that the
majority of Chinese college students remembered the source tale
even many years after learning it. Participants in the United States
were not asked to recall the Chinese tale.
Accessing the source story. Figure 3B shows Chinese partic-
ipants’ accessing scores across conditions. An overall chi-square
analysis revealed significant differences across condition, ␹2(3,
N ⫽ 117) ⫽ 12.71. Planned paired comparisons revealed that
participants in the DG-DT condition were less likely to access the
source story than were those in the SG-ST, SG-DT, and DG-ST
conditions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 60) ⫽ 7.68, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 59) ⫽ 5.19, and ␹2(1,
N ⫽ 58) ⫽ 4.92, respectively.
The participants who accessed the source analogue reported that
they first learned about the source story 9.4 years ago on average
and the last time they heard about the story was 7.4 years ago. No
differences between conditions were found. Note that these num-
bers do not precisely reflect the time elapsed because the scale
involved indicating the interval of over 1, 3, 5, or 10 years. None
of the participants in the United States reported being reminded of
the elephant tale.
Mapping the tools. Figure 3C shows differences in Chinese
participants’ use of both the goal object (either the elephant or the
asteroid) and the solution tool (either the boat or the spring) across
conditions. Given that most participants mentioned the goal object,
the mapping measure mainly reflected whether the solution tool
was used in their solution attempts. A chi-square analysis revealed
that Chinese participants were more likely to use the solution tool
than were participants in the United States, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 256) ⫽
26.38. An overall chi-square analysis revealed significant differ-
ences across conditions in the Chinese sample, ␹2(3, N ⫽
117) ⫽ 15.78. Planned paired comparisons revealed that par-
ticipants in the SG-ST condition were more likely to use the
solution tool than were those in the DG-DT and SG-DT con-
ditions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 60) ⫽ 13.42 and ␹2(1, N ⫽ 59) ⫽ 8.04,
respectively. The DG-ST condition also differed from the
DG-DT condition, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 58) ⫽ 5.90, suggesting that a
common solution tool facilitated mapping when participants
attempted to solve the target problem.
In contrast, an overall chi-square analysis revealed no signifi-
cant differences across conditions in the U.S. sample, ␹2(3, N ⫽
139) ⫽ 3.97, p ⫽ .26. Presumably because U.S. participants were
less likely to use the ineffective division strategy (i.e., cut the
object into pieces and then weigh them separately) for an animate
object (elephant) than for an inanimate object (asteroid), their
performance in selecting the solution tool was somewhat better in
the similar goal object (elephant) conditions than in the different
goal object (asteroid) conditions.
Executing the solution. Figure 4 reveals the percentage of
participants using the division, balance, and compression strategies
in each condition. Participants in the United States were more
likely to use the division strategy than Chinese participants were.
The analyses were focused on the use of the appropriate approach,
the compression strategy. An overall chi-square analysis revealed
significant differences across condition in Chinese participants,
 422 CHEN, MO, AND HONOMICHL
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Figure 3. U.S. and Chinese participants’ performance in recalling the source tale (A), accessing the analogue (B),
mapping the key objects (C), executing the source solution (D), and evaluating the helpfulness of the analogue (E) in
Experiment 2. SG-ST ⫽ similar goal object, similar solution tool; SG-DT ⫽ similar goal object, dissimilar solution
tool; DG-ST ⫽ dissimilar goal object, similar solution tool; DG-DT ⫽ dissimilar goal object, dissimilar solution tool.

␹2(3, N ⫽ 117) ⫽ 19.57. Planned paired comparisons revealed that ␹2(1, N ⫽ 57) ⫽ 4.51 and ␹2(1, N ⫽ 58) ⫽ 4.08, respectively. In
participants in the SG-ST condition were more likely to use this contrast, a substantially lower percentage of participants in the
strategy than were those in the DG-ST condition, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 58) ⫽ United States used this strategy, and an overall chi-square analysis
4.47, which differed from the SG-DT and DG-DT conditions, revealed no significant differences across conditions.
 LONG-TERM ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 423
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Figure 4. Participants’ problem-solving strategies (division [A], balance [B], and compression [C]) used in
Experiment 2. SG-ST ⫽ similar goal object, similar solution tool; SG-DT ⫽ similar goal object, dissimilar solution
tool; DG-ST ⫽ dissimilar goal object, similar solution tool; DG-DT ⫽ dissimilar goal object, dissimilar solution tool.

In addition, 14% and 7% of the Chinese participants used the ative transfer occurred when solution tools differed in attributes
creating the boat strategy (which was considered incorrect because between problems.
a boat was not in the list of possible tools) in the SG-DT and Participants’ problem-solving performance across conditions
DG-DT conditions, respectively. These results suggested that neg- was examined (see Figure 3D). To determine if there were differ-
 424 CHEN, MO, AND HONOMICHL
ences in the performance scores between the two populations and
across conditions, we performed a 2 (population: China vs. United
States) ⫻ 4 (condition) between-subject ANOVA. This analysis
revealed significant main effects for population, F(1, 248) ⫽
118.16, MSE ⫽ 51.64, ␩2 ⫽ .32, and for condition, F(3, 248) ⫽
8.96, MSE ⫽ 3.91, ␩2 ⫽ .10. The interaction between population
and condition was also significant, F(3, 248) ⫽ 6.37, MSE ⫽ 2.79,
␩2 ⫽ .07. Fisher’s protected least significant difference (PLSD)
revealed that Chinese participants’ performance in the SG-ST
condition was better than that in the SG-DT, DG-ST ( p ⫽ .057),
and DG-DT conditions. Performance in the DG-ST condition was
also better than that in the SG-DT and DG-DT conditions. In
contrast, no differences were found in U.S. participants’ perfor-
mance among conditions, F(3, 135) ⫽ 1.17, p ⫽ .33.
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Evaluating the helpfulness of the source story. A one-way
ANOVA was performed to determine whether Chinese partici-
pants in the four conditions rated the helpfulness of the source
story differently. The analysis revealed an effect for condition,
F(3, 95) ⫽ 4.23, MSE ⫽ 5.16, ␩2 ⫽ .12. Fisher’s PLSD showed
that helpfulness was rated lower in the DG-DT condition than in
the SG-ST and DG-ST conditions, respectively.
Discussion
The results illustrate differential effects of goal object and
solution tool similarity in transfer processes. First, although most
Chinese participants reported spontaneously retrieving the source
story even when the key objects differed between the problems,
receiving either a common goal object or a common solution tool
led to a higher proportion of participants successfully accessing the
source story. Second, goal object similarity did not play an im-
portant role in mapping the entities between the problems. In
contrast, solution tool commonality enhanced the selection of the
solution tool in the target that could be readily mapped onto the
corresponding item in the source problem. Finally, having a
common solution tool facilitated the executing process; having
a common goal object did not. Given the different object attributes,
participants might not have readily realized the functional similar-
ity in the solution tools between problems and thus failed to
implement the solution strategy acquired from the source problem.
In sum, a common goal object did not seem to play a critical role
in postretrieval components, whereas a similar solution tool influ-
enced all the key transfer processes and greatly improved
performance.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 2, the accessing component was measured after
the participants attempted to solve the target problem; therefore, it
is possible that their problem-solving activities might have af-
fected their reports concerning what they were reminded of when
reading the target story. Experiment 3 was designed to allow us to
examine the accessing component without the possible influence
of the problem-solving activities and performance.
Method
A total of 127 Chinese undergraduate students who did not participant in
any other experiments were assigned to one of the four target problem
conditions. Instead of solving the problem, the participants were asked,
“Did this problem remind you of any story or event that you have heard of
before?”
Results
The accessing measure was the same as that used in Experiment
2. (Unless otherwise noted, all reported effects are significant
beyond the .05 level.) One hundred percent (33 out of 33), 97% (28
out of 29), 97% (34 out of 35), and 80% (24 out of 30) of the
participants in the SG-ST, SG-DT, DG-ST, and DG-DT condi-
tions, respectively, reported the source tale. An overall chi-square
analysis revealed significant differences across condition, ␹2(3,
N ⫽ 127) ⫽ 12.86. Planned paired comparisons revealed that
participants in the DG-DT condition were less likely to retrieve the
source story than those in the SG-ST, SG-DT, and DG-ST condi-
tions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 63) ⫽ 7.29, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 59) ⫽ 3.86, and ␹2(1, N ⫽
65) ⫽ 4.94, respectively.
Discussion
If participants’ accessing reports had been influenced by the
target problem-solving activities, the pattern of accessing across
the four conditions would have been different from that in Exper-
iment 2. Although the overall performance in accessing the source
tale appeared to be slightly better, the effects of condition on
accessing were similar to those observed in Experiment 2. The
majority of the participants were reminded of the elephant tale
when reading the target problem, even when the target and source
problems shared little object similarity. Adding a key common
object, either the goal object or the solution tool, significantly
facilitated reminding.
Experiment 4
The first three experiments demonstrated access to and use of
remote analogy in solving problems across contexts. The results
also point to various obstacles to transfer, specifically dissimilar-
ities between the key objects in the source tale versus the target
problem. Experiment 4 was designed to address developmental
differences and examine possible difficulties that younger students
might experience, especially when the source and target problems
do not share key objects. Previous studies have demonstrated that
younger children are less likely to solve an analogous target
problem than older children are (e.g., DeLoache, Miller, & Pier-
routsakos, 1998; Goswami, 1996; Holyoak et al., 1984; Siegler,
1989). Yet relatively little is known concerning age differences in
various transfer components involved in long-term analogical
problem solving. Middle school and high school students from
China participated in Experiment 4, which had a design similar to
that of Experiment 2. It was predicted that middle school students
were more likely to experience difficulties associated with transfer
processes than high school students were.
Method
Participants. A total of 222 seventh (mean age ⫽ 13.1 years) and tenth
grade students (mean age ⫽ 16.3 years) from local schools in southern
China were included in the study.
Design, materials, and procedure. The design and materials were
identical to those in Experiment 2. The procedure was also similar to that
 LONG-TERM ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
in Experiment 2, except that the middle and high school students were
given 160 s (instead of 80 s) to read the target story and view the illustrated
objects before they attempted to solve the problem. Also, the students were
given 8 (instead of 5) min to write down their solutions.
Results
Recalling. Figure 5A shows students’ memory of the source
problem. (All reported effects are significant beyond the .05 level,
unless otherwise noted.) A 2 (grade level) ⫻ 4 (condition)
ANOVA revealed no main effects for grade level, F(1, 212) ⫽
0.001, p ⫽ .98, or condition, F(3, 212) ⫽ 0.13, p ⫽ .94. The
interaction was also not significant, F(3, 212) ⫽ 1.53, p ⫽ .21,
suggesting that both age groups remembered the source story
equally well.
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Accessing. Figure 5B shows the percentages of participants in
each grade who were reminded of the source problem. A chi-
square test revealed that 10th graders (85%) were more likely to
access the source story than were 7th graders (68%), ␹2(1, N ⫽
222) ⫽ 8.38. Overall chi-square tests across conditions were
performed in separate grades and revealed differences across con-
ditions for 10th grade, ␹2(3, N ⫽ 106) ⫽ 8.79, and for 7th grade,
␹2(3, N ⫽ 115) ⫽ 8.54. Planned paired comparisons revealed that
for the 10th grade sample, participants in the DG-DT condition
were less likely to access the source problem than were those in the
DG-ST, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 52) ⫽ 4.39; SG-DT, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 55) ⫽ 5.26; and
SG-ST conditions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 55) ⫽ 3.56, p ⫽ .059. For the 7th
grade sample, fewer participants accessed the source story in the
DG-DT condition than in the SG-ST condition, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 57) ⫽
8.59. No other significant differences in accessing were found
among the four conditions.
Mapping. The percentages of participants mapping the key
items in each grade are presented in Figure 5C. A chi-square test
revealed that 10th graders (73%) were more likely to map the
items than were 7th graders (61%), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 222) ⫽ 3.61, p ⫽
.058. An overall chi-square test revealed differences across con-
ditions for 10th grade participants, ␹2(3, N ⫽ 107) ⫽ 19.90.
Planned paired comparisons revealed that participants in the
SG-ST condition outperformed those in the SG-DT and DG-DT
conditions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 55) ⫽ 8.59 and ␹2(1, N ⫽ 56) ⫽ 12.60,
respectively. Students in the DG-ST condition also did better than
those in the SG-DT and DG-DT conditions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 51) ⫽ 7.03
and ␹2(1, N ⫽ 52) ⫽ 10.53, respectively. For 7th grade partici-
pants, an overall chi-square test also revealed differences across
conditions, ␹2(3, N ⫽ 115) ⫽ 26.50. Planned paired comparisons
revealed differences between the SG-ST condition and the SG-DT,
␹2(1, N ⫽ 59) ⫽ 17.36; DG-ST, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 63) ⫽ 8.21; and
DG-DT conditions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 57) ⫽ 24.08. Differences between
the DG-ST and DG-DT conditions were also significant, ␹2(1, N ⫽
56) ⫽ 5.83.
Executing. Participants’ strategies were assessed. The percent-
ages of participants using the compression strategy in each grade
are presented in Figure 6C. A chi-square test revealed no grade
effects between 7th grade (58%) and 10th grade (66%). An overall
chi-square test revealed differences across conditions for 10th
grade, ␹2(3, N ⫽ 107) ⫽ 18.68. Planned paired comparisons
revealed that more participants in the SG-ST condition used this
strategy than did participants in the SG-DT and DG-DT condi-
tions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 55) ⫽ 10.89 and ␹2(1, N ⫽ 56) ⫽ 11.79,
respectively. Also, more students in the DG-ST condition used the
425
compression strategy than did participants in the SG-DT and
DG-DT conditions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 51) ⫽ 6.89 and ␹2(1, N ⫽ 52) ⫽
7.59, respectively. An overall chi-square test for 7th grade partic-
ipants revealed differences across conditions, ␹2(3, N ⫽ 115) ⫽
39.73. Planned paired comparisons revealed significant differ-
ences between the SG-ST condition and the SG-DT, ␹2(1, N ⫽
59) ⫽ 27.08; DG-ST, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 63) ⫽ 9.27; and DG-DT
conditions, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 57) ⫽ 32.73. The differences between the
DG-ST and DG-DT conditions were also significant, ␹2(1, N ⫽
56) ⫽ 10.60.
In addition, 9% (7% and 11% in the SG-DT and DG-DT
conditions, respectively) of the 10th graders and 25% (30% and
20% in the SG-DT and DG-DT conditions, respectively) of the 7th
graders used the creating the boat strategy, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 222) ⫽ 4.84.
These results suggested that younger students were more likely to
use a tool that no longer existed in the target problem and, thus,
they were more susceptible to negative transfer.
Participants’ solution performance in each grade level across
conditions was shown in Figure 5D. A 2 (grade level) ⫻ 4
(condition) between-subject ANOVA was performed. This analy-
sis revealed significant main effects for grade, F(1, 214) ⫽ 8.65,
MSE ⫽ 5.23, ␩2 ⫽ .04, and for condition, F(3, 214) ⫽ 21.20,
MSE ⫽ 12.80, ␩2 ⫽ .23; however, no significant interaction was
found, F(3, 214) ⫽ 1.86, MSE ⫽ 1.13, ␩2 ⫽ .03, p ⫽ .14. Fisher’s
PLSD revealed that 10th graders’ performance in the SG-ST
condition was better than that in the SG-DT and DG-DT condi-
tions. Performance in the DG-ST condition was also better than
that in the SG-DT and DG-DT conditions. Similarly, 7th graders’
performance in the SG-ST condition was better than that in the
SG-DT, DG-ST, and DG-DT conditions. Performance in the
DG-ST condition was also better than that in the SG-DT and
DG-DT conditions.
To examine the relation between accessing and problem-solving
performance, we performed a t test for both grades combined in the
DG-DT condition, where both accessing and executing appeared to
be most difficult. Students who accessed the source analogue
solved the problem more effectively (earning an average score of
1.07 out of a possible score of 3.00) than did those who did not
(mean score ⫽ 0.32), t(51) ⫽ 3.45.
Evaluating. A 2 (grade level) ⫻ 4 (condition) ANOVA was
performed. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for
condition, F(3, 156) ⫽ 4.45, MSE ⫽ 5.50, ␩2 ⫽ .08, but not for
grade, F(1, 156) ⫽ 1.03, MSE ⫽ 1.28, ␩2 ⫽ .01. An interaction
was also marginally significant, F(3, 156) ⫽ 2.27, MSE ⫽ 2.81,
␩2 ⫽ .04, p ⫽ .082. Fisher’s PLSD revealed that 10th graders in
the SG-ST condition gave a higher rating to the helpfulness of the
source story than did 10th graders in the SG-DT and DG-DT
conditions. The helpfulness rating in the DG-ST condition was
also higher than that in the SG-DT and DG-DT conditions. In
contrast, 7th graders’ rating was not different across conditions,
ps ⬎ .10.
Discussion
Both middle and high school students had little difficulty in
recalling the source story. The pattern of accessing the source
analogue across the four conditions in high school students was
similar to that in college students: Dissimilarity in both goal object
and solution tool hindered the accessing process. Furthermore,
 426 CHEN, MO, AND HONOMICHL
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Figure 5. High school and middle school students’ performance in recalling the source tale (A), accessing the
analogue (B), mapping the key objects (C), executing the source solution (D), and evaluating the helpfulness of
the analogue (E) in Experiment 4. SG-ST ⫽ similar goal object, similar solution tool; SG-DT ⫽ similar goal
object, dissimilar solution tool; DG-ST ⫽ dissimilar goal object, similar solution tool; DG-DT ⫽ dissimilar goal
object, dissimilar solution tool.
 LONG-TERM ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 427
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Figure 6. Participants’ problem-solving strategies (division [A], balance [B], and compression [C]) used in
Experiment 4. SG-ST ⫽ similar goal object, similar solution tool; SG-DT ⫽ similar goal object, dissimilar solution
tool; DG-ST ⫽ dissimilar goal object, similar solution tool; DG-DT ⫽ dissimilar goal object, dissimilar solution tool.

middle school students in the DG-DT condition were less likely to object and a common solution tool. However, they were less likely
be reminded of the source story than were those in the SG-ST to access the source story, to map the key objects, and to execute
condition. Middle school students performed as well as high the solution when one or both objects were different between the
school students when the problems shared both a common goal problems.
 428 CHEN, MO, AND HONOMICHL
General Discussion
Summary of Results
1. U.S. college students were more likely to solve the cave
problem than Chinese students were, given the availability of the
H&G tale in American culture. Likewise, Chinese students out-
performed U.S. students in solving the statue problem because of
their experience with the elephant tale, indicating that participants
were capable of spontaneously retrieving and using an analogue
acquired as long as 10 years ago to solve a target problem.
2. Chinese college students in the conditions with at least one
similar object were more likely to solve the target problem than
those in the DG-DT condition were, suggesting that object simi-
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larity facilitated long-term analogical transfer. U.S. participants
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did not differ in problem-solving performance across conditions.
3. Chinese college students were more likely to access the
source analogue when the target problem involved either a com-
mon goal object or a common solution tool. Yet even in the
DG-DT condition, over two thirds of the participants spontane-
ously accessed the source story. Thus, common structural relations
seem to play a role in analogue retrieval; however, any additional
object similarity also facilitated the accessing process.
4. When the solution tool in the target problem was similar to
that in the source story, participants were more likely to map it
onto the source tool and execute the solution successfully com-
pared with those in the dissimilar solution tool conditions. In
contrast, a similar goal object did not play a significant role in
postaccessing processes. Therefore, the impact of solution tool
commonality was more robust than that of goal object similarity.
5. Middle school students were less likely to solve the target
problem than high school students were. Middle school students
were more likely than high school students to experience difficul-
ties in accessing the source problem, in mapping the key objects
between the problems, and in executing the source solution, espe-
cially in the dissimilar solution tool conditions.
Long-Term Transfer
The distance of transfer between a source and target problem
can be determined in a number of aspects. Barnett and Ceci (2002)
recently proposed a taxonomy of the dimensions involved in
transfer distance. They suggest that time interval and contextual
similarity between source acquisition and target test are critical
dimensions and that the exploration of long-term analogical prob-
lem solving across contexts has important theoretical and educa-
tional implications. There is little doubt that accessibility and
applicability of information in long-term memory decrease over
time and that degree of transfer depends on the time lapse between
the original learning and the solving of the target problem and on
the degree of semantic and contextual similarity between prob-
lems. However, theorizing and modeling in analogical problem
solving have been almost entirely based on experimental results of
short-term transfer within the same contexts.
The present research provides compelling evidence for remote
transfer in that the source and target problems shared few semantic
and contextual features. Even with a significant time gap between
source and target problems, solvers can be reminded of a source
analogue and use it effectively when encountering an isomorphic
problem in a different context. Although the best performance
occurs when common objects are shared between problems, the
analogous target problem need not share key object attributes with
the source analogue in long-term memory.
The lack of efficient transfer found in previous laboratory stud-
ies (e.g., Perkins & Grotzer, 1997; Reed et al., 1974) and the robust
use of remote analogy evident in the present research seems to
present a paradox. Yet, as Dunbar (2001) has pointed out, struc-
tural analogies are a frequent rather than a rare phenomenon when
reasoning is investigated in naturalistic environments. For exam-
ple, Dunbar and Blanchette (2001) found that scientists often use
structural features and higher order relations in analogizing during
the discovery process. Source analogues may well be encoded in a
rich way in various cultural settings, as in the context of scientific
discovery, so that the acquired information is more durable, ac-
cessible, and applicable.
These experiments also point to both explicit (or conscious) and
implicit (or unconscious) retrieval and use of source analogues
after a substantial delay. Prior work suggests that analogues may
be used in problem solving either explicitly (e.g., Gentner &
Forbus, 1991; Gick & Holyoak, 1980) or implicitly (e.g., Reed,
Willis, & Guarino, 1994; Schunn & Dunbar, 1996; also see dis-
cussion in Markman & Gentner, in press). One might speculate
that when source information is presented immediately prior to the
problem-solving task, participants would be likely to be aware of
the relevance of the source to the target. After increasingly longer
delays, participants might be less likely to explicitly retrieve and
use the source information. Although the present research does not
examine the relationship between distance of transfer and con-
sciousness or contrast short-term and long-term transfer, it never-
theless demonstrates that even after a delay of years, participants
can be aware of the relevance of a remote source tale, the simi-
larities between problems, and the helpfulness of the source ana-
logue. Evidence of the implicit use of the source analogue comes
from the findings that participants who did not report being re-
minded of the source tale outperformed their peers in the culture in
which the source analogue was unavailable (Experiment 1). Fur-
ther exploration of factors that influence explicit and implicit use
of analogy may prove to be a fruitful avenue for investigating the
mechanisms of long-term analogical transfer.
Processes of Analogical Problem Solving
We propose a conceptual model that specifies how different
types of object similarity influence the ways individuals access
source analogues, map entities between problems, and execute an
acquired source solution.
Accessing source information. The initial process of analogi-
cal transfer involves searching for relevant experience, such as
similar events, instances, or stories, in long-term memory at the
appropriate time. One accessing cue involves object reminding.
The presence of common object attributes between problems in-
creases the likelihood of retrieving a source analogue. Previous
work with short-term analogical transfer has yielded consistent
findings concerning the effects of superficial similarity on acces-
sibility (e.g., Catrambone, 2002; Gentner et al., 1993; Wharton et
al., 1994). In the present study, sharing either goal object or
solution tool alone proved sufficient to increase the accessibility of
the source tale, suggesting that both play similar roles in remind-
ing. The present results suggest that memories contain object-
 LONG-TERM ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
specific information of a story or problem situation and, thus,
object cues in a target problem may trigger the retrieval of a source
analogue.
Another avenue of accessing relevant experience involves struc-
tural reminding. Models of artificial intelligence and case-based
reasoning view the process of human memory retrieval as typically
driven by higher order causal or goal structures (e.g., Hammond,
Seifert, & Gray, 1991; Kolodner, 1993; Schank, 1982), implying
that individuals are capable of accessing knowledge in long-term
memory on the basis of higher order structural similarity. Over two
thirds of Chinese participants retrieved the elephant tale from
long-term memory, even when the target shared no common object
attributes with the source. These findings extend previous work by
demonstrating that common goal structures can play a central role
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in guiding the memory accessing involved in long-term analogical
transfer and that individuals can spontaneously access a source
analogue that shares little superficial similarity with the target.
Mapping structural elements between problems. Previous
work on the mapping process has typically involved participants’
making soundness evaluations. Mapping of problems has been
found to be guided by the common relational structures when
rating the soundness of an analogy (e.g., Clement & Gentner,
1991; Gentner et al., 1993). In the present research, mapping was
assessed by the participants’ choice of the goal object and solution
tool during problem solving. In analogical problem solving, the
selection of the corresponding target objects ultimately reflects the
mapping of the structures between problems. After the relevant
source story or event is retrieved, the common structural relations
of the entities or objects associated with the entities between the
problems serve as guides for matching the problems (e.g., Bassok,
1990; Gentner & Markman, 1997). The present results further
demonstrate that different types of object similarity play distinc-
tive roles in transfer. Although solution tool similarity played a
critical role in the mapping process, goal object commonality did
not appear to influence how the key elements are mapped between
problems.
Once a source analogue has been retrieved, solvers need to
match the corresponding elements or objects between problems.
When source and target problems share common object attributes,
the objects may be mapped readily. However, when corresponding
objects share only functional relations but differ in object at-
tributes, the mapping between problem elements becomes less
direct, and the corresponding objects would be less likely to be
selected to map onto the source problem. Furthermore, mapping
between the goal objects may be more or less automatic because
solving the problem requires operating on the object to achieve the
goal, regardless of whether similar object attributes are shared. In
contrast, mapping the solution tools between problems becomes a
more effortful and challenging process. When the solution tools
share no object attributes, the common functions of the tools may
not be immediately apparent, and thus the different attributes of the
solution tools decrease the likelihood of correct selection from
among a set of possible tools.
Executing a learned solution. The accessing of an analogue
and mapping of the corresponding elements between problem
structures do not ensure successful execution of a solution re-
trieved from long-term memory. Previous studies have shown that
when the source and target problems share only a solution princi-
ple but differ in specific procedures, solvers are more likely to
429
experience an obstacle in implementing a source problem’s solu-
tion (e.g., Chen, 2002; Reed & Bolstad, 1991; Ross, 1989). The
present results further reveal that participants can also suffer from
an execution deficiency when the solution tool for solving the
target problem differs in attributes from that used for solving the
source problem. The execution difficulty might also have been due
to some participants’ persistence in using the creating the boat
strategy, reflecting the occurrence of what Luchins (1942) referred
to as “mental set,” a form of negative transfer.
The likely reason why only the solution tool is associated with
both mapping and executing components is that the solution tool
serves as a crucial part of the causal path, whereas the goal object
is arbitrary. Although any object can be weighed with compres-
sion, only objects that can be compressed may serve as a solution
tool. Furthermore, the goal object is automatically selected, but
there are alternatives from which a solution tool can be chosen and
utilized to generate a solution procedure.
This conceptual model addresses the observation that individu-
als often experience difficulty in long-term analogical transfer and
that participants, especially younger children, often fail to solve
problems by remote analogy. This model also addresses questions
of why some analogues are more difficult to use in problem
solving than others and why similarity in some objects is more
useful. The generality and significance of the present object sim-
ilarity framework seems to depend on the assumption that problem
solving typically involves selecting and using appropriate tools.
Numerous examples come from early Gestalt research, such as
Köhler’s (1927) reaching problem, Maier’s (1931) two string
problem, Duncker’s (1945) candle problem, and Luchins’s (1942)
water jar problem, as well as more recent work involving proba-
bility and physics problems (Bassok, 1990; Catrambone, 1998;
Reed, 1989; Ross, 1989).
It is noteworthy that although these components are hypothe-
sized to be completed one by one in the order of accessing,
mapping, and executing, the operation of the components does not
have to be always perfectly serial. An individual might choose the
tub as a tool for weighing the statue (mapping and executing)
before actually realizing the analogous relation to the source tale
(accessing). Furthermore, the retrieval and use of analogous source
information do not have to be conscious. Individuals might access
a source tale and use the analogous solution without being aware
of the relevance between the source and target problems.
Developmental Differences
Age differences in various processes associated with long-term
transfer were also evident in this study. Previous studies of chil-
dren’s analogical reasoning have typically focused on demonstrat-
ing the importance of a single component to the overall process
involved in short-term transfer (e.g., Chen, 1996; Daehler & Chen,
1993; Holyoak et al., 1984; Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996). In the
present study, we explored the contributions of all three key
components on a single task of long-term analogical problem
solving. The present results are consistent with Gentner’s rela-
tional shift concept, which posits that development in analogical
reasoning involves a shift from reliance more on superficial sim-
ilarity (e.g., object correspondences) to the mapping of relational
structure (Gentner, 1989). Results also extend previous develop-
mental work, further indicating that age differences are associated
 430 CHEN, MO, AND HONOMICHL
with all the key processes; failure in any of the components can
disrupt problem solving. Despite the availability of the source tale
in long-term memory, some young participants failed to come up
with an appropriate solution because of their inability to access the
source story from long-term memory when they encountered the
target problem. Others failed because of difficulties in mapping the
entities of the source story onto the target problem, thus failing to
choose a novel tool that matched the boat in function but not in
attributes. Yet others failed to execute the acquired analogous
solution because they used the selected tool inaccurately.
Despite the fact that high school students had heard of the
source analogue in the more distant past, they nevertheless were
more likely to access and use it to solve a target problem than
middle school students were. A likely explanation for this result,
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
consistent with Piaget and Inhelder’s (1969) notion of reconstruc-
tive memory, involves an enrichment process in the quality of
representation following the original exposure to the source infor-
mation, with new experiences being incorporated into the child’s
representation of the analogue. With age and experience, the
representation of the source analogue may become increasingly
rich, accessible, and applicable.
Methodological Implications
An important feature of this series of experiments was that the
source story was introduced in naturalistic settings, such as reading
from a book or listening to a story, many years before the partic-
ipants took part in the present research, in which one of several
target problems was presented. The source analogue acquisition
and target problem solving took place in different physical and
functional contexts and at different points in time. Thus, partici-
pants would not readily expect the links between the target prob-
lem and a particular experience, making it possible to examine the
retrieval and use of the source analogue after a substantial delay.
A second feature of the present research involved examining the
major transfer processes independently but within the same task
context. The first process was accessing. Unlike prior work that
involved presenting a set of source stories and subsequently asking
participants to choose which story that they were reminded of
when reading a target story (e.g., Gentner et al., 1993; Wharton et
al., 1996), we asked participants to provide information about any
story or event they were reminded of. The fact that no prior source
information was provided by the experimenters helped prevent a
potential problem of directed reminding or forced accessing
(Wharton et al., 1996), in which participants might be guided to
attend to a particular set of stories or problem situations that they
read minutes or days earlier. Instead, in the present study, we
examined free reminding, which involves retrieval of the most
relevant information from long-term memory.
It is also important to note that problem-solving performance
might not be a precise and reliable measure of retrieval of source
information, mainly because solvers may have been reminded of a
prior source analogue but nevertheless failed to solve the problem
(see Catrambone, 2002). Yet, as Hammond et al. (1991) have
pointed out, it is important to observe the processes in the same
problem-solving tasks to assess them accurately. We attempted to
measure the accessing process separately, apart from mapping and
executing processes, to examine their unique contributions to
long-term analogical transfer in the same task context. Therefore,
this paradigm may have allowed more accurate and reliable as-
sessment of memory retrieval as a component of the overall
long-term transfer process.
Likewise, the mapping process was assessed in the same
problem-solving context, but it was separated from the final exe-
cution process. Successful mapping of the elements between prob-
lems was measured by the correct selection of the key objects,
namely, the goal object and the solution tool. Other typical mea-
sures of mapping, such as a soundness rating of the relations
between stories or events (e.g., Gentner, 1989; Gentner et al.,
1993), might have altered other cognitive processes that we in-
tended to examine in the problem-solving context. We believe that
the proper selection of these key items reflects the participants’
attempt to match these items with the corresponding items in the
source story.
It is worth noting that although recent studies have revealed that
ways of thinking may be associated with general social systems,
cultural values, and cultural practices (e.g., Nisbett, Peng, Choi, &
Norenzayan, 2001), our present findings indicate that differences
in strategies and cognitive performance may also be traceable to
specific cultural experiences (e.g., events or stories). The present
unique approach may not be limited to the study of long-term
analogical problem solving and may prove to be a fruitful avenue
for the investigation of other aspects of higher order cognition
across cultural contexts. This paradigm may be adapted to the
exploration of how specific cultural experience influences cogni-
tive processes involved in memory, conceptual understanding,
knowledge representation, similarity comparison, reasoning, and
human learning in general.
Conclusions
The present results demonstrate that long-term analogy is a
powerful tool for problem solving and transfer. The findings
provide much needed and robust evidence that individuals are
capable of solving problems by remote analogy with an extensive
delay after the acquisition of source information. The present
research further suggests that representations of stories or prob-
lems in long-term memory appear to contain both abstract struc-
tures and specific object features and that human memory is
sensitive to both types of information. Given the nature of these
representations, object similarity plays a critical role in long-term
analogical transfer. When different types of object similarity fulfill
different structural roles in source and target problems, different
processes involved in transfer may be affected. Although the
accessing process was found to be constrained largely by com-
monality in both goal object and solution tool, only similarity in
solution tool influenced the mapping and executing processes. This
distinction of object similarity type in the processes of analogical
transfer thus further confirms the multifaceted nature of similarity.
The results also reveal developmental differences in remote
transfer. Age differences in analogical transfer are not due to the
deficiency associated with one single cognitive component. The
lower scores of middle school students were partially due to the
difficulty experienced in accessing the source story, in mapping
the key components between problems, and in implementing the
solution by using the tool correctly and effectively. Perhaps with
age, the more mature cognitive system and richer knowledge base
improve the efficiency in these three components.
 LONG-TERM ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING
It is evident that overall relations between source and target
problems are multidimensional, involving various types of simi-
larity, and that the cognitive activities associated with analogical
transfer are multicomponential. A comprehensive theory or com-
putational model of analogical problem solving needs to take the
different roles of object similarities into consideration, to identify
key processes revealed in the same task context, and to incorporate
findings evident in transfer over long-term delays across contexts.
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Appendix A
Source Analogues for Experiment 1
A Standard Version of the “Weigh the Elephant” Tale
Long ago in China, there lived a powerful emperor. Every year, the
rulers of the surrounding countries had to give him jewelry, gold, cloth
materials, and animals as presents. One day, a ruler of a southern country
presented him with an elephant as a gift. The emperor was delighted to see
the elephant and asked the ruler what the weight of the elephant was. The
ruler was embarrassed because even the biggest scale he owned was too
small to weigh the huge elephant. The emperor’s youngest son, named
Chao Chong, came up with an idea: “You could find a boat, put the
elephant in it, and mark the new water level on the boat. Then, you could
take the elephant out of the boat and put smaller stones into the boat until
the water level reaches the same mark. Then, you could weigh those stones
separately with a small scale. When you add up all the weights, you would
know how heavy the elephant is.” Everyone was surprised and impressed
by the boy’s solution.
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Gist of the “Hansel and Gretel” Tale
A woodsman and his wife were very poor and could not afford to feed
themselves and their two small children, Hansel and Gretel. As a solution,
the wife suggested that they lead the children out into the deep forest and
leave them there. So the next day they took them out to the forest to chop
wood. Hansel, with his pockets full of pebbles, dropped one at regular
intervals to mark a path back home. Later, while the children napped, the
parents returned home without them. That night, the children followed the
trail of pebbles that Hansel had left behind all the way home. When they
arrived home, the parents acted happy at their return but immediately
planned to take them back into the forest again the next day. Hansel, aware
of the plan, wanted to go outside that night to get more pebbles. However,
the wife locked both of the children in their room before he could do so.
The next morning, she gave both children a piece of bread for lunch.
Instead of saving the bread to eat, Hansel tore pieces off and left them on
the trail to mark the way home. . . .
 LONG-TERM ANALOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING 433

Appendix B

The Target Problems Used in Experiment 1

The Statue Problem
In a village by a river, the chief of a tribe had the responsibility of taking
care of the tribe’s sacred stone statue. It was the chief ’s custom every year
to go down river to the next village to collect taxes. To assess the amount
of taxes, the chief would ask for the statue’s weight in gold coins. His
method of measuring this amount was to put the statue in a large tub at one
end of a hanging balance scale and hook the other end of the scale to
another large tub. This second tub was filled with gold coins until the scale
balanced the weight of the statue. During a recent trip to collect taxes, the
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
scale? Write down any ideas that you think might be appropriate. Any idea
is valid.
The Cave Problem
A treasure hunter is going to explore a cave up on a hill near a beach. He
suspected there might be many paths inside the cave so he was afraid that
he might get lost. Obviously, he did not have a map of the cave; all that he
had with him were some common items such as a flashlight and a bag.
What could he do to make sure he did not get lost trying to get back out of

chief forgot to bring his balance scale. Now the chief has a problem: How the cave later? Please write down any ways in which the treasure hunter
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

can he figure out how much gold to take to match the statue’s weight might be able to get out safely. Write down any ideas that you think might
without the benefit of a balance scale, a pulley system, or a conventional be appropriate. Any idea is valid.

Appendix C

An Example of the Target Stories Used in Experiments 2, 3, and 4

Dissimilar Goal Object, Dissimilar Solution Tool: Asteroid and
Spring Target Problem
A group of geologists were traveling through a rainforest, on their way
to an excavation site, when they discovered a very large, strange-looking
rock. None of them were sure, but they thought that perhaps the rock was
an asteroid that had fallen down from outer space thousands of years ago.
To gather relevant information about the asteroid, the team needed to
measure its size and weight. The tape measure that they had allowed them
to measure the asteroid’s height and length. However, the scale that they
had brought could only measure up to 300 pounds of weight. Thus, the
scale was obviously too small to weigh the asteroid. They looked around
in a nearby village to see what resources they had to weigh the asteroid.
How could they solve the problem?

Figure C1. The resources available to solve the asteroid and spring target problem.

Received May 12, 2003

Revision received February 14, 2004
Accepted February 20, 2004 䡲