CHAPTER 1

Exclusionary Rule

Evidence obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights cannot be used against the defendant in a
criminal trial. The exclusionary rule protects an individual’s right under the 4th amendment
Purpose of the exclusionary rule: To deter law enforcement misconduct

Remedy for misconduct: When law enforcement has seized evidence against an accused and chargers are brought
against an accused, if it has been done illegal or with misconduct then the remedy is for that evidence to be
suppressed or excluded.

The procedural motion that is filed when the accused believes that evidence was obtained by misconduct of an
officer is Motion to Suppress

Fruits of poisonous tree is a doctrine that says if the evidence was obtained by misconduct or obtained illegal and
should be suppressed because of the exclusionary rule, then any evidence that is obtained as a result of that initial
evidence should also be suppressed/ excluded because its fruit of the poisonous tree.
Tree is initial evidence and anything that comes off of that evidence should also be suppressed

The Fourth Amendment

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Introduction
A. Origin of the Exclusionary Rule
(EXCLUSIONARY RULE STARTED IN THE FEDERAL COURTS)
Weeks v. United States 1914
1914 Federal court seized and case before Federal Court
Rule: No item taken by a FEDERAL official from an individual’s home when no warrant has been issued
are seized are violation of the Fourth Amendment and must be excluded.

The Court held that the seizure of items from Weeks' residence directly violated his constitutional rights.
The Court also held that the government's refusal to return Weeks' possessions violated the Fourth
Amendment. To allow private documents to be seized and then held as evidence against citizens would
have meant that the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring the right to be secure against such
searches and seizures would be of no value whatsoever. This was the first application of what eventually
became known as the "exclusionary rule."

TAKEAWAY: U.S. Supreme Court excluded evidence obtained by federal officials in violation of the
Fourth Amendment but did not require exclusion of evidence gathered in a separate search by state
officials.
• “US Marshall could only have invaded the house of the accused when armed with a warrant
issued …”
• Exclusionary rule applied to Federal Officers and Federal Court

Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States 1920

Rule: While recognizing the illegality of its actions, the government seeks to copy the materials so it may avail
itself of all the information.
Physical evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and information derived from such
evidence, may not be presented at court or used by the government to help develop its case. Silverthorne
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 says that exclusionary rule means you can’t use the physical and you cannot use anything that you have
learned from the misconduct in the court of law
In 1866, shortly after the emancipation proclamation, which freed the slaves, the 14th amendment was
enacted. The 14th amendment incorporated the bill of rights.

TAKEAWAY: Knowledge gained by the Gov’t’s own wrong (violation of the Fourth Amendment)
cannot be used at all.
– “Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine” extends the exclusionary rule to make evidence
inadmissible in court if it was derived from evidence that was illegally obtained. Silverthrone
Lumber Company v. United States

B. Applicability to States
Wolf v. Colorado 1949
THEY SAID YOU CAN’T USE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN STATE COURT
Rule: The precise question for consideration is this: Does a conviction by a State court for a State offense
deny the “due process of law” required by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence that was
admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances which would have rendered it inadmissible in a
prosecution for violation of a federal law in a court of the United States because there deemed to be an
infraction of the Fourth Amendment as applied in Weeks v. United States
Basically: Does Weeks apply in State court
We hold, therefore, that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does
not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.
The Fourth Amendment does apply to the states BUT the exclusionary rule doesn’t
TAKEAWAY: Issue: Whether or not Weeks (The Exclusionary Rule) should be applied and
extended to State courts? U.S. Supreme Court concluded No.

Mapp v. Ohio 1961 (EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIED TO STATES COURTS)

Rule: The exclusionary rule was extended to the states
evidence obtained through unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in state courts
Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule “is to deter—to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive
to disregard it.”
TAKEAWAY:
– Overruled Wolf
– U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule is an “essential ingredient” of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments; thus, any evidence obtained in violation of it is inadmissible in State
court.
This was during the time of civil rights movement and so things had to change within the country.
C. Criticism
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics 1971
Rule: A plaintiff may bring a cause of action seeking money damages for a federal agent’s Fourth
Amendment violation despite the lack of a statue expressly authorizing such a lawsuit.
Violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent gives rise to a cause of action for damages resulting
from the violation.

Hudson v. Michigan 2006

Rule: The exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock and announce rule.
Violation of the knock and announce requirement does not justify exclusion of evidence found in the
subsequent search of a premise. The rule has three purposes: protection of human life and limb, protection
of property, and protection of human privacy and dignity. The knock and announce rule has never
protected one’s interest in preventing government from seeing and taking evidence described in a warrant.
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 Collins v. Virginia 2018 DEBATE
The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings. The purpose
of a grand jury is to determine whether a crime was committed and whether to charge someone in
connection with that crime. Using the exclusionary rule would interfere with that purpose. The
exclusionary rule is also meant to deter police misconduct, not provide a new constitutional right.

D. Direct Cutbacks
WHEN THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS NOT APPLICIABLE (EVIDENCE NOT EXCLUDED)

1.Balancing
United States v. Calandra 1974
Exclusionary rule is not inherent in the constitution
The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings. The purpose
of a grand jury is to determine whether a crime was committed and whether to charge someone in
connection with that crime. Using the exclusionary rule would interfere with that purpose. The
exclusionary rule is also meant to deter police misconduct, not provide a new constitutional right.

A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is
adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.

the standing requirement. Thus, standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations
where the Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search.

TAKEAWAY: “the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
… through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”
– Holding: “the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings” BUT what was
important is the court said the exclusionary rule is a manmade rule, it is not an inherent right

Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott 1998

State parole boards are not required to apply the exclusionary rule in parole-revocation hearings where evidence
is seized.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction at trial of evidence obtained in violation of a criminal
defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but it does not apply in every
proceeding.
“Recognizing these costs, we have repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to
proceedings other than criminal trials.”

TAKEAWAY: Holding: “that parole boards are not required by federal law to exclude evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”

Exclusionary rule does not apply to (Exclusionary rule not extending):

Grand Jury proceeding – U.S. v. Calandra
Civil Tax proceeding – U.S. v. Janis
Civil Deportation proceedings – INS v. Lopez-Mendoza

EVERY RULE HAS EXCEPTIONS: EXCEPTIONS TO EXCLUSIONARY RULE

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 2. Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
United States v. Leon
Evidence obtained in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a facially valid search warrant is not
subject to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, even if the warrant is later deemed defective.
The judge issued the warrant finding there was probable cause, in fact there was none
The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be
introduced at trial. The exclusionary rule, argued the majority, is not a right but a remedy justified
by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. In Leon, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed
the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished, and
people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot
deter police in a case like Leon, where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.
§ Exclusionary rule was designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges
and magistrates
§ Fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar the use in the prosecutions case
in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a
detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid

*NOTE* EXCEPTIONS TO THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION

1. Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled
by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his
reckless disregard of the truth. Franks v. Delaware. (If officer lies = exclusionary rule apples;)
2. The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly
abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York; in such circumstances,
no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant
3. Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit “so lacking
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Brown v.
Illinois
4. depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e., in failing
to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably
presume it to be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard

TAKEAWAY:
– Issue: Whether or not the exclusionary rule should be applied when evidence obtained by officers
acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by and detached and neutral magistrate
but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause?
– Holding: No. The evidence should not be excluded
• U.S. Supreme Court used balancing test: “a cost vs benefits” evaluation.
– Case also list four (4) Exceptions to the Good Faith Exception

Massachusetts v. Sheppard
The exclusionary rule does not apply if the officer conducting the allegedly unconstitutional search acted
in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant that is subsequently determined to be invalid.
Judge said he would edit the warrant, but he never did; error on the judge not the officers
The Court maintained that trial courts can use evidence seized by officers who have an "objectively
reasonable basis" for mistakenly believing they have obtained valid warrants. Upon a factual
inquiry, the Court found that "the officers in this case took every step that could reasonably be
expected of them" to secure a valid warrant. Lawmakers did not enact rules for excluding evidence
to invalidate evidence because of clerical errors by judges but to deter police from conducting
unlawful searches.

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 TAKEAWAY:
– Issue: “Whether the officers reasonably believed that the search they conducted was authorized by
a valid warrant.” Was there an objectively reasonable basis for the officers’ mistaken belief?
– Holding: Yes. The Court found that there was. Good Faith Exception applied.
– The Court stated “it was the judge, not the police officers, who made the critical mistake.

Groh v. Ramirez 2004

A warrant that does not specifically describe the person or property to be searched or seized or incorporate
supporting documents with those descriptions is invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth requires particularity in the warrant not the supporting documents.

4 REQUIRMENETS: EXAM QUESTION

The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”
• Establishing Probable Cause
• An Officer's Oath
• Details in a Warrant Application
• Neutral and Detached Magistrate

Purpose of the warrant: We have long held, moreover, that the purpose of the particularity requirement
is not limited to the prevention of general searches. A particular warrant also “assures the individual whose
property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the
limits of his power to search.”
TAKEAWAY:
– Good Faith Exception not applied when “the warrant was so obviously deficient that [the Court]
must regard the search as “warrantless” within the meaning of our case law.”
– Outlines the four (4) requirements of warrant

THREE (3) CASES EXPAND APPLICATION OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION

Illinois v. Krull
The exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained in a search carried out pursuant to a statute
subsequently found to be unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply because the officer acted in good faith.
The officer’s reliance on the unconstitutional law was objectively reasonable when he conducted the
search. Excluding the evidence in this case would not support the policy behind the exclusionary rule to
deter police misconduct. The Court followed United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984) where police
conducted a search with a warrant that they later found out was defective.

First, the exclusionary rule was historically designed “to deter police misconduct rather than to
punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”
Second, there was “no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or
subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the
extreme sanction of exclusion.”
Third, and of greatest importance to the Court, there was no basis “for believing that exclusion of
evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge
or magistrate.”
TAKEAWAY: Officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute.

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 Arizona v. Evans 1995
The exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained in a search carried out as a result of a clerical
mistake of a court employee.
The exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained in a search carried out as a result of a clerical mistake
of a court employee. The exclusionary rule was implemented to deter police misconduct, not the misconduct of
court employees. Regardless, applying the exclusionary rule in cases of a court employee’s clerical error would
not deter either police misconduct or future clerical errors by court employees.
TAKEAWAY: Officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon reliance police record. (arrest warrant
which he relied on record of a clerk)

Herring v. United States 2009

Where police personnel act negligently, but not recklessly, and lead an officer to reasonably believe an
arrest warrant exists, the evidence obtained pursuant to that unlawful arrest remains admissible.
A criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police mistakes that lead to
unlawful searches are merely the result of isolated negligence and "not systematic error or reckless
disregard of constitutional requirements." Evidence obtained under these circumstances is admissible and
not subject to the exclusionary rule.
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice
system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.
TAKEAWAY:
• U.S. Supreme Court found that there was a Fourth Amendment violation, but the question was
should the evidence be excluded?
• No. because the error was negligent, but “not reckless or deliberate.” The rule is about deterring
misconduct thus they did not exclude the evidence
“Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine” extends the exclusionary rule to make evidence inadmissible in court
if it was derived from evidence that was illegally obtained. Silverthrone Lumber Company v. United States
E. Exceptions to Fruits of the Poisonous Doctrine
Wong Sun v. United States 1963 ATTENUATION DOCTRINE
He was free to leave and came back a few days later and gave a confession
Although evidence obtained through illegal police conduct must be excluded at trial as it is “fruit of the
poisonous tree,” the connection between the illegal police conduct and a relevant piece of evidence can become
so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, and such evidence may then be admissible.
TAKEAWAY:
• An intervening independent “act of free will” will purge the primary taint of an unlawful invasion.
• Holding: evidence is not excluded if it “becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.”

Brown v. Illinois 1975 ATTENUATION DOCTRINE

Miranada warning alone do not purge the taint of illegal arrest
His confession was fruit of the poisonous tree
How does a 4th amendment violation affect a confession’s admissibility?
Incriminating statements made following an unlawful arrest are only admissible if the statements, in light
of all relevant facts and circumstances, are “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.”
The Court held that Miranda warnings are not sufficient to remove the taint of an illegal arrest from
statements made in custody. The Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment were meant to work
together, so that even if a statement is found to be voluntary as required by the Fifth Amendment, it could
still be the result of an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment and therefore inadmissible. Because
Brown’s arrest was illegal and the statements clearly stemmed from that arrest, the Court held that the
statements were inadmissible.

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 The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession
is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered.
The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening
circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all
relevant.

TAKEAWAY: Articulates three (3) factors that must be considered when determining whether there was
a sufficient intervening event to break the causal chain.

Murray v. United States 1988 INDEPENDENT-SOURCE DOCTRINE

Illegal entry into a warehouse saw the barrels of weed, got a warrant didn’t put that in the warrant, warrant
was granted.
The independent-source doctrine does not apply if police officers were subjectively motivated to obtain a
search warrant by what they learned during an original warrantless search of the premises, even if the
warrant application does not rely on information gained during the original search.

The Court held that evidence that would be excluded under the Fourth Amendment is admissible if it
comes from an independent source. If the police obtained information unlawfully but the evidence in
question comes from an untainted source, it is still admissible. Because the officers in this case obtained
a lawful warrant without relying on the information they obtained illegally, the evidence seized in the
warranted entry can be considered to have come from an independent source and therefore not subject to
exclusion.

Looks at public interest, it says we want to deter police misconduct however we want to balance that in
the public interest of also wanting to put forth all of the evidence before a jury.
The goal is to not put the police in a worst position then they would have been without the warrant

TAKEAWAY: Holding: Evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful

search, but later obtained by a warrant based on “independent source of information and tangible
evidence” is admissible and is not excluded under the Exclusionary rule.

Nix, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary v. Williams 1984 INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply
to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered
the body even absent Williams's statements.

If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means—here the volunteers’ search—then the
deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.
Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, because the evidence would have been discovered within
a short period of time, the method in which it was obtained became irrelevant and it was still
allowed against the defendant.
TAKEAWAY:
• Holding: If by a preponderance of the evidence, it is shown that the evidence, ultimately or
inevitable would have been discovered by lawful means, then the evidence should not be excluded.
• Inevitable Discovery

Utah v. Strieff 2016 ATTENUATION DOCTRINE

The Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protections should not be
excluded from evidence when the costs of its exclusion outweighs its benefits. Exclusion is not justified
when the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovered evidence is too attenuated. To
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 determine whether the connection is attenuated, courts must examine the temporal proximity of the
discovery of the evidence to the unconstitutional conduct, the presence of intervening circumstances,
and the flagrancy of the police misconduct. Based on the analysis of those factors, when a valid warrant
is discovered after an unconstitutional investigatory stop, the connection between the unconstitutional
conduct and the discovery of evidence incident to a lawful arrest based on the warrant is sufficiently
attenuated.

Exclusionary rule applicable only…where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs
Three of these exceptions involve the causal relationship between the unconstitutional act and the discovery
of evidence.
• First, the independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful
search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source. See Murray v. United
States (1988).
• Second, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have been
discovered even without the unconstitutional source. See Nix v. Williams (1984).
• Third, and at issue here, is the attenuation doctrine: Evidence is admissible when the connection between
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening
circumstance, so that “the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would
not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” Hudson.

TAKEAWAY:
– Involves an investigative stop
– Holding: the discovery of a valid arrest warrant attenuated the connection between an unlawful
stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest. (The warrant breaks the chain.)
F. Standing
What is standing? Standing
Jones v. United States 1960 (Guest in a Home)
As a guest in the home, did he have an expectation of privacy? Yes
anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to
suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him.

In order to qualify as a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure” one must have been a victim
of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at
someone else.
Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as
the basis for suppressing relevant evidence that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that he establish,
that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy. (FIRST TIME WE HEAR OF EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY)

In Jones, he could question the legality of the search because he had reasonable expectation of privacy
which a home is under the 4th amendment which is a tight that is protected.
TAKEAWAY:
– Issue: Whether an “invitee” or “guest” has standing to challenge evidence seized? YES
– In order to have ”standing”:
• Must be a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
• Must be a victim of a search or seizure
• Must be the person the search was directed to.
– Anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality, when the fruits
of the search proposed to be used against them.

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Rakas v. Illinois 1978 (Passenger in a Car)
The passenger of a car belonging to someone else does not have legitimate expectation of privacy in the
car or items found in the car that do not belong to them and thus may no challenge the search of the car or
seizure of the items as constitutional.
the “rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal rights, [which]…may be enforced by exclusion
of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure,”

TAKEAWAY:
– Holding: a defendant must show a "legitimate" expectation of privacy in the place searched in
order to having standing to challenge the search.
– Guest in Dwellings (protected) different from passenger in automobiles

Byrd v. United States (Driver of a rental Car)

They found Byrd had standing to challenge the search because he did have an expectation of privacy.
Does a driver have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car when he has the renter's permission
to drive the car but is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement?
The Court held that a driver of a rental car who has the renter's permission to drive it but is not listed as
an authorized driver on the rental agreement does have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
government searches of the vehicle.
A driver who has the permission of the lawful possessor or owner of the car has complete "dominion and
control" over the property and can rightfully exclude others from it
Expectation of privacy doesn’t necessarily mean you’re the owner of the home or car.

TAKEAWAY:
– Holding: General Rule: someone in lawful possession and control of a rental car has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it even if the rental agreement does not list them as an authorized driver.

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 CHAPTER 2
Search and Seizure – Fourth Amendment
Introduction
A. Overview
New Jersey v. T.L.O 1985
The proper standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by public school officials
High school student caught smoking in the bathroom, taken to principal office, she was searched and
found to possess marijuana.
Does the exclusionary rule apply to searches conducted by school officials in public schools?
The Court held that while the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures
applies to public school officials, they may conduct reasonable warrantless searches of students under
their authority notwithstanding the probable cause standard that would normally apply to searches under
the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable under the
circumstances.
Loco parentis - a relationship in which a person puts himself or herself in the situation of a parent
by assuming and discharging the obligations of a parent to a child

Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search.
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry:
• first, one must consider “whether the…action was justified at its inception,” Terry v. Ohio;
• second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted “was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”

B. Expectation of Privacy
GOVT AGENTS (LAW ENFORCMENENT) USING DEVICES AND ANIMALS IN ORDER TO
GATHER INFORMATION

1. Overview
Katz v. United States 1967
Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz
and could hear his conversations. A VIOLATION OF 4TH AMENDMENT
Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by
attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation
of the right to privacy of the user of the booth.
Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and
seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and
that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into
play.
"The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places"

The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Even electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous with an individual’s arrest could hardly be deemed
an “incident” of that arrest. Nor could the use of electronic surveillance without prior authorization be justified
on grounds of “hot pursuit.” And, of course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant
to the suspect’s consent. SHOULDVE GOTTEN A WARRANT
Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
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United States v. Jones 2012
GPS DEVICE PLACED ON VEHICLE
10-day issuance of warrant in DC, they placed it on the 11th day in Maryland
Did the warrantless use of a tracking device on Jones's vehicle to monitor its movements on public
streets violate Jones' Fourth Amendment rights? YES, IT DOES VIOLATE THE 4TH AMENDMENT
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an "effect" as that
term is used in the Amendment.
IT WAS CONSIDERED A SEARCH: The Government physically occupied private property for the
purpose of obtaining information.
Long term monitoring: factor to consider when talking about expectation of privacy
It was a warrantless search because they had 10 days but they did it on 11th day in Maryland instead
of D.C.
– U.S. Supreme Court held: “The Gov’t’s installation of a GPS device on target’s vehicle, and its
use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a “search.”
– “The Gov’t physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”

Florida v. Jardines 2013

Drug sniffing dogs; It was a search and it violated Jardians expectation of privacy
Is a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog a Fourth
Amendment search requiring probable cause?
The Court held that the front porch of a home is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Typically, ordinary citizens are invited to enter onto the porch, either explicitly or implicitly,
to communicate with the house's occupants. Police officers, however, cannot go beyond the scope of
that invitation. Entering a person's porch for the purposes of conducting a search requires a broader
license than the one commonly given to the general public. Without such a license, the police officers
were conducting an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
We therefore regard the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home”—what our
cases call the curtilage—as “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.”
CURTILAGE – an area immediately surrounding a home

Carpenter v. United States 2018

They didn’t have a warrant only a court order
All the information that they got was excessive which violated the expectation of privacy
Whether the government conducts a search under the fourth amendment when it accesses historical
cell phone records that provides a comprehensive chronical of the users past movement?
“a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.” Smith. That remains true “even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose.”

The question we confront today is how to apply the Fourth Amendment to a new phenomenon: the
ability to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals. Such
tracking partakes of many of the qualities of the GPS monitoring we considered in Jones. Much like
GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled.

Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third
party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.

THIS IS A SEARCH = YOU NEED A WARRANT OR SOME KIND OF EXCEPTION

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 We hold only that a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate
privacy interest in records held by a third party.
Further, even though the Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI, case-specific
exceptions may support a warrantless search of an individual’s cell-site records under certain
circumstances. “One well-recognized exception applies when “the exigencies of the situation” make
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Such exigencies include the need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect
individuals who are threatened with imminent harm, or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.

2. Area Considerations
Oliver v. United States 1984
Was this an open field or not?
A gate marked with a "No Trespassing" sign surrounded the field. Police found marijuana in the field
about a mile from Oliver's home.

Before trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky suppressed evidence
found in the search on the ground that Oliver had a reasonable expectation that his field would remain
private. This expectation triggered the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed under the open field doctrine. The
open field doctrine states that a citizen's protection from unwarranted search does not extend to open
fields.

In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy, the Court has given weight
to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, e. g.,
• the uses to which the individual has put a location…and
• our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from
government invasion.
These factors are equally relevant to determining whether the government’s intrusion upon open fields
without a warrant or probable cause violates reasonable expectations of privacy and is therefore a
search proscribed by the Amendment.

We conclude, from the text of the Fourth Amendment and from the historical and contemporary
understanding of its purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields will
remain free from warrantless intrusion by government officers.

They said he had no expectation of privacy because this was an open filed and the evidence was
admissible.

12
 United States v. Dunn 1987
Is this a part of the curtilage?
– 4 factors to determine if an area is “curtilage”
• Proximity
• Whether area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home
• The nature of the use of the area
• The steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by
The Supreme Court held that the barn and the area around it lay outside the protected area of
curtilage around Dunn’s house. The barn was separated from the house by a fence and was a
substantial distance away from the house, the officers had other data that lead them to suspect
Dunn, and Dunn did little to protect the barn from observation. Even if Dunn did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the search still did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers
never entered the barn.

• Collins v. Virginia, 138 S.Ct. 1663 (2018)

– United States Supreme Court concluded: “the automobile exception does not permit an officer
without a warrant to enter a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein.”
• Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)
– “As a general proposition, the police may see what may be seen “from a public vantage point
where [they have] a right to be.”
– No expectation of privacy in air space of 400 feet above ground.

3. Third Party
• Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)
– United States Supreme Court concluded there was no expectation of privacy in conversations made
to or in the presence of a person invited into a hotel room that was relayed to Gov’t official.
• United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
– This case was about information gained through a wiretap used on a gov’t informant.
– No expectation of privacy.
– “No interest legitimately protected by the 4th Amendment is involved” regarding conversations
between two people. It is a risk the person takes.
• United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
– United States Supreme Court concluded no expectation of privacy to the contents of bank records.
• Not the person’s private papers (it belongs to a third party: the bank)
• Subpoena duces tecum sufficient to obtain the records
• California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)
– Issue: Whether the 4th Amendment prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left
for collection outside the curtilage of a home?
– Holding: No expectation of privacy to garbage put outside the curtilage of the home.

4. Enhancement Devices
a. Public Places
• United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
– Issue: Whether the 4th Amendment prohibit law enforcement authorities from temporarily
detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained detection dog on the basis of reasonable
suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics.
– Holding: Limited detention of luggage is not prohibited under the 4th Amendment. However,
cannot exceed the bounds of a permissible investigative detention of the luggage.
– ”Cannine Sniff” is not an unreasonable search. No warrant necessary.

13
• Illinois v Cabelles, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
– Issue: Whether reasonable articulable suspicion was needed to run the drug dogs during a
legitimate traffic stop? Court said no
– Holding: “A dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than
the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the 4th
Amendment.”
–
• United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
– The U.S. Supreme Court stated, “The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper
in [the container] amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and
highways.”
– Holding: Not a “search” nor a “seizure” under the 4th Amendment.

• Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000)

– Physical manipulation of a passenger’s luggage on a bus violated his 4th Amendment rights.
– U.S. Supreme Court found that it was a search and seizure.

b. Home
• Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)
– Use of thermal-imaging device aimed at private home from a public street constitutes a “search”
under the 4th Amendment.
– Fundamental right to retreat into one’s own home and be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.
– Holding: “Where the Gov’t uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is
a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.
– Must have search warrant to use the device.

C. Standing
• Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980)
– U.S. Supreme Court held petitioner had no legitimate expectation of privacy in Cox’s purse at the
time of gov’t search, and therefore, had no standing to challenge the search.
– Court analyzed according to the Rakas test (a defendant must show a "legitimate" expectation of
privacy in the place searched in order to having standing to challenge the search.)

• Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)

– Overnight guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home, and therefore, the overnight
guest has standing to challenge an illegal search of the home.

• Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998)

– Found not to be violation of the 4th Amendment
– A temporary guest who has no previous connection to the home does not have an expectation of
privacy sufficient to trigger Fourth Amendment rights.
– people who visit someone's home for a short time do not have the same protection against
unreasonable police searches and seizures as do the residents or their overnight guests

• Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007)

– Holding: During a traffic stop, a passenger is seized as well as the driver, and therefore, has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the stop.

14
 Chapter 3
Levels of Justification

PROBABLE CAUSE
Aguilar v. Texas (officers relied on information from confidential informant)
Outlines the constitutionally requirements for obtaining a search warrant
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often-competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States. You need
the neutral and detached magistrate so that the officer is not skewed

The officers only had a suspicion not probable cause

the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded
that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the
officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed was “credible” or his information
“reliable.”

that the search warrant should not have been issued because the affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for a
finding of probable cause

Spinelli v. United States

the informant’s tip—even when corroborated to the extent indicated—was not sufficient to provide the basis for
a finding of probable cause.
It needs to be clear how the informant came to his conclusion in the affidavit for a search warrant
First, the application failed to set forth any of the “underlying circumstances” necessary to enable the magistrate
independently to judge of the validity of the informant’s conclusion that the narcotics were where he said they
were.
Second, the affiant-officers did not attempt to support their claim that their informant was “credible” or his
information “reliable.”
Information from a confidential informant must meet to requirements:
(1) Sufficient underlying circumstances to demonstrate how the informant reached his conclusion (reliability
of the info)
a. This can be proven by the informant’s involvement in the crime, or the affiant’s corroboration of
specific details of the informants information (self-verifying details)
i. There must be substantial corroboration
(2) Reliability of the informant
a. This can be shown by the informant’s track record

Illinois v. Gates 1983 CHANGED THE TEST FOR ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE
This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than
is any rigid demand that specific “tests” be satisfied by every informant’s tip.
Totality of the circumstance doesn’t just focus on the informant, it takes into consideration the other work that
the officer may have done.
Aguiliar - Spimelli “two-pronged test” directs analysis into two largely independent channels—the informant’s
“veracity” or “reliability” and his “basis of knowledge.” We conclude that it is wiser to abandon the “two-pronged
test” established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations.
Duty of Reviewing court: To find was there a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable
cause

15
Florida v. Harris 2013 DOG SNIFF
the “alert” of a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle based on the
totality of the circumstances.
§ A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when
(1) The facts available to him
(2) Would warrant a person of reasonable caution
(3) In the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present
§ The test for probable cause is not reducible to precise definition or quantification
§ Finley tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt not by a preponderance of the evidence have
no place in the probable cause decision
o This is done by looking at the totality of the circumstances
§ Evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient
reason to trust his alert
§ If a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can
presume that the dogs alert provides probable cause to search
§ A defendant, however, must have an opportunity to challenge such evidence of a dog’s reliability whether by
cross-examining the testifying officer or by introducing his own fact or expert witnesses

THE STANDARD: The question—similar to every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts
surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person
think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.

United States v. Grubbs 2006 Anticipatory Warrants

Anticipatory Warrant is a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time but
not presently certain evidence of a crime will be located at a specific place
Grubbs purchased a videotape containing child pornography from a Web site operated by an undercover postal
inspector.
for a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause,
two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs
“there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,” but also that
there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur.

Pretext and The Scope of Probable Cause (Police stops leads to probable cause to search vehicle)
Maryland v. Pringle
Whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual
A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and
cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied
ownership of the drugs and money (THE DRIVER/OWNER GAVE CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF THE
CAR)
When talking about Probable Cause:
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals
with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. We have stated, however, that “[t]he substance
of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,” and that the belief of guilt
must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized. (KNOW THIS)
§ To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual we examine the events leading up
to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause (USE FOR EXAM WRITING WHEN INTRODUCNG
PROBBLE CAUSE) (officer must be able to articulate why they believe person is about to commit crime or
may be guilty of crime) We hold that the officer had probable cause to believe that Pringle had committed the
crime of possession of a controlled substance.

16
Whren v. United States 2001 (This case is the basis of why officer can stop you for minor traffic stops that led
to bigger arrest and circumstances as long as they can articulate a traffic stop)
Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code.
That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered
admissible
The fourth amendment allows officer to use minor traffic violations as a pretext for stopping a person
Stopped man for traffic violation but in plain view saw drugs
1. The decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred
2. The constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved
3. The constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race
4. BUT THE CONSTITUTITONAL BASIS FOR OBJECTING TO INTENTIONALLY DISCRIMINATORY
APPLICATION OF LAWS IS THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, NOT THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
5. SUBJECTIVE INTENTION PLAY NO ROLE IN ORDINARY, PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

(CASE ABOUT OFFICER DISCRECTION)
She was pulled over for a seatbelt violation and he arrested her. The officer department police gave the
officer discretion whether to arrest or issue a citation for a fine only violation
whether the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor
seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. We hold that it does not.
"If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense
in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender,"

Virginia v. Moore
Driving without a license in the presence of an officer is a crime
We conclude that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable
under the Constitution, and that while States are free to regulate such arrests however, they desire, state restrictions
do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.

When officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth
Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to search the suspect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure
their own safety.

Florence v. Burlington 2012

the Fourth Amendment permit a jail to conduct a suspicion-less strip search whenever an individual is arrested,
including for minor offenses
Strip searches for inmates entering the general population of a prison do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
Court concluded that a prisoner's likelihood of possessing contraband based on the severity of the current offense
or an arrestee's criminal history is too difficult to determine effectively.

The Court held that officers who have probable cause to believe even a minor criminal offense has been
committed in their presence may arrest the offender.

17
REASONABLE SUSPICION
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco
The Supreme Court held that Camara had a constitutional right to insist that the inspector obtain a warrant before
searching his home. He also cannot be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.
If it can result in criminal charge, you need a warrant

**Terry v. Ohio**
This case established the Stop and Frisk
“Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him.”

• Guidelines, in sequence, to determine whether a stop and frisk is valid.

– The Stop
• Circumstance: The police officer must observe unusual conduct that leads him or her
reasonably to conclude, in the light of his or her experience,
– That criminal activity is about to take place or that criminal activity has just taken
place, and
– That the person with whom he or she is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous.
• Initial Police Action: In the course of investigating such behavior, the officer must
– Identify himself or herself as a police officer (it could be sirens or an intro) and
– Make reasonable inquiries.
–
• If the two foregoing requirements are satisfied in the Stop, the officer for his or her own safety and/or the
safety of others may...
– The Frisk
• Conduct a pat-down of the outer clothing.
• If a weapon is felt, confiscate it and arrest the suspect.
• Conduct a full body search after the arrest.
•
You can have a stop without a frisk BUT you can NEVER have a frisk without a stop
Stop and Frisk is kind of like a crime prevention, preventing the furtherance of crime
He would not have been doing his duty as police officer if he failed to investigate when there was a history
of criminal activity in that area

WHEN DOES A STOP IMPLICATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?

United States v. Mendenhall

Before 4th Amendment rights are implicated there must be a determination as to whether a seizure had
occurred.
As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has
been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized
and objective justification.
In view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave. See U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).

18
Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a show of authority is an objective one, not whether the
citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s words and actions
would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.

Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave,
would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled.

California v. Hodari D. (He wasn’t seized)

whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure occurs even
though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does not.
It does not remotely apply, however, to the prospect of a policeman yelling “Stop, in the name of the law!” at a
fleeing form that continues to flee. That is no seizure.
The Supreme Court held that a Fourth Amendment seizure requires some sort of physical force with lawful
authority, or submission to an assertion of authority. Hodari had not been touched when he discarded the cocaine,
and had not submitted to authority because he was still attempting to escape.

An arrest requires either physical force (as described above) or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion
of authority.

United States v. Drayton

On a bus, officer are talking to people and notice 2 men with baggy clothing (voluntary consent)
whether officers must advise bus passengers during these encounters of their right not to cooperate.
The respondents, we conclude, were not seized and their consent to the search was voluntary

REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD

United States v. Arvizu 2002 (how do we determine what is reasonable suspicion; the standard is totality
of the circumstances, and the officer must be able to articulate)
Stopped by a border patrol agent, children in the car waving like robots
Reasonable suspicion is what you need to stop someone
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, and its protections extend
to brief investigatory stops or persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest
1. Because the balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security, tilts in favor
or a standard less than probable cause in such cases, the fourth amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action
is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot
2. Reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion determinations by looking at the “totality of the
circumstances” of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for
suspecting legal wrongdoing.
a. This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well
elude an untrained person.
b. Although an officer’s reliance on a mere “ ‘hunch’ ” is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of
criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short
of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard
3. Although a series of acts may perhaps be innocent in itself, taken together the acts may warrant further
investigation

19
Illinois v. Wardlow
A person in a high crime area, sees police and starts running unprovoked
An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has
A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IS AFOOT

1. While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing
considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the fourth amendment requires at least a minimal level
of objective justification for making the stop
2. The officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of
criminal activity
3. An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a
reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime
a. However, officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining
whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation
b. The facts that a stop occurred in a “high crime area” among the relevant contextual considerations in
a Terry Analysis
4. Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion
5. Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts
do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we
cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists.
6. The determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences
about human behavior.
7. When an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has
a right to ignore the police and go about his business.
8. Any “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed
for a detention or seizure.”
9. Unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about
one’s business”; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the
fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to
stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.

Navaratte v. California 2014

911 Tip for drunk driving was enough to establish reasonable suspicion to stop (Part of cop’s job is crime
prevention)
TO MAKE A STOP A COP NEEDS REASONABLE SUSPICION
The officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. The court reasoned that the content of the
tip indicated that it came from an eyewitness victim of reckless driving, and that the officer’s corroboration of the
truck’s description, location, and direction established that the tip was reliable enough to justify a traffic stop.
Finally, the court concluded that the caller reported driving that was sufficiently dangerous to merit an
investigative stop without waiting for the officer to observe additional reckless driving himself.
Have to look at the totality of the circumstance.

20
SCOPE OF A TERRY STOP
Hibel v. Sixth Judicial Court of Nevada, Humboldt County 2004
Petitioner was arrested and convicted for refusing to identify himself during Terry Stop
The sheriff’s department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault.
Police asked him for his name 11 times.
• Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth
Amendment requirements noted in Brown.
• There’s nothing incriminating about telling the officer your name. Obtaining a suspect’s name in the
course of a Terry stop serves important government interests. Knowledge of identity may inform an officer
that a suspect is wanted for another offense or has a record of violence or mental disorder.

NOTE** If officer doesn’t have reasonable suspicion are you obligated to tell them your name?

Michigan v. Long (Terry applies to compartment of Car; Frisk a car where dangerous weapons maybe)
They did a stop and frisk, they did a protective sweep of the car
Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found by police in the passenger compartment and trunk
of the automobile that he was driving. The police searched the passenger compartment because they had
reason to believe that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers
In Terry v. Ohio (1968), we upheld the validity of a protective search for weapons in the absence of
probable cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police officer the right “to neutralize the
threat of physical harm” when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and
dangerous
– Whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence
of probable cause to arrest
– We hold that the protective search of the passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles
articulated in Terry
– The circumstances of this case clearly justified Deputies Howell and Lewis in their reasonable belief that
Long posed a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle
– The subsequent search of the car was restricted to those areas to which Long would generally have
immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. The trial court determined that the leather pouch
containing marijuana could have contained a weapon.
Nothing Terry says it can’t be extended to searching areas that are in the person immediate control
Arizona V. Gant is going to change this
–
United States v. Place (Terry applies to Bags and Luggage)
They stopped him based on reasonable suspicion, they didn’t have probable cause.
A Terry Stop is only supposed to temporary, but they kept the bag over the weekend.
whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily detaining personal
luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage
contains narcotics
We conclude that, under all of the circumstances of this case, the seizure of respondent’s luggage was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of
his luggage was inadmissible, and Place’s conviction must be reversed.

21
***Minnesota v. Dickerson***
– When police may seize contraband found during a pat down search: Whether the Fourth
Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer’s sense of touch
during a protective patdown search. He felt it but didn’t know for certain that it was contraband.
His touching and manipulation constituted a search where he needed but didn’t have probable
cause. There was no weapon on the Dickerson.

The officers pulled their squad car into the alley and ordered respondent to stop and submit to a patdown search.
The search revealed no weapons, but the officer conducting the search did take an interest in a small lump in
respondent’s nylon jacket.

Plain Touch: Terry search is limited to a cursory pat down of suspect’s outer clothing for a weapon. To remove
the object the circumstances must suggest that it is a weapon; it must be readily identifiable as such.

OFFICERS MUST HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE ITEM IS CONTRABAND BY A

PAT DOWN NOT BY MANIPULATION. IT HAS TO BE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT THAT IT IS
CONTRABAND (CAN LOOK AT IT AND SEE THIS IS CRACK)

Illinois v. Caballas 2005

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog
to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop
A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it
is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. We accept the state court’s conclusion
that the duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries
incident to such a stop.

Rodriguez v. United States 2015

whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop. We hold that a
police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s
shield against unreasonable seizures.

Arizona v. Johnson
Can they do a stop and frisk on a passenger in a vehicle during a traffic stop
1. Reasonable suspicion to make a stop
2. Ask Questions, if the answers don’t dispel the suspicion of the officer and he feels they may have
dangerous weapons he can frisk
Terry applies to the passengers
For the duration of a traffic stop, we recently confirmed, a police officer effectively seizes “everyone in the
vehicle,” the driver and all passengers.

ADMINSTRATIVE SEARCHES (Searches in limited circumstances that did not require reasonable
suspicion because government interest outweigh individual privacy) Balancing Test
SCHOOLS
Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding
Whether a 13-year-old student’s Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her
bra and underpants by school officials acting on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden prescription
and over-the-counter drugs to school
Safford prohibited its possession on school property. Reasonable suspicion that Redding was in possession of
drugs in violation of these policies, therefore, justified a search extending to any area where small pills could be
concealed. The search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

22
THE STRIP SEARCH WAS A VIOLATION “Here, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant
extending the search of Savanna to her underwear.”
They should applied the 2 Step Inquiry for school official to search student set froth in T.L.O
– First, the Court explained, the search must be “‘justified at its inception’” by the presence of “reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating
either the law or the rules of the school.”
– Second, the search must be “permissible in its scope,” which is achieved “when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex
of the student and the nature of the infraction.”

Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls 2002
Drug Testing in School
School policy requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug
testing. Because this Policy reasonably serves the School District’s important interest in detecting and preventing
drug use among its students, we hold that it is constitutional.
We hold only that Tecumseh’s Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District’s important interest
in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren.

ROADWAYS
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz
DWI Checkpoints
whether a state’s use of highway sobriety checkpoints violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. We hold that it does not.
– The governmental interest v. intrusion into an individual privacy
– Drunk drivers can kill themselves and others while driving
– 25 sec stop was a small intrusion
In sum, the balance of the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can
reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly
stopped, weighs in favor of the state program. We therefore hold that it is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond

the constitutionality of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction
of illegal narcotics. (The primary purpose was to uncover evidence and find illegal activity)
Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint program is ultimately indistinguishable from the
general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment.
You individual reasonable suspicion to make a stop if you feel criminal activity has or is about to take place
We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general
rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion.

Illinois v. Lidster 2004

We hold that the police stops were reasonable, hence, constitutional where upon a highway checkpoint police
stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run accident
The police appropriately tailored their checkpoint stops to fit important criminal investigatory needs. The
stops took place about one week after the hit-and-run accident, on the same highway near the location of
the accident, and at about the same time of night. And police used the stops to obtain information from
drivers, some of whom might well have been in the vicinity of the crime at the time it occurred. There is
significant government interest in trying to find someone who committed a crime

23
WORKPLACE (What level of proof is needed)
Skinner v. Railway Labor
Finding that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees poses a serious threat to safety, the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) has promulgated regulations that mandate blood and urine tests of employees who are
involved in certain train accidents. The FRA also has adopted regulations that do not require, but do authorize,
railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules.
We hold that the alcohol and drug tests of the FRA’s regulations are reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
Consider Government interest outweighed individual privacy
Look at the level of intrusion

Chandler v. Miller
Georgia requires candidates for designated state offices to certify that they have taken a drug test and that the test
result was negative. Whether that requirement ranks among the limited circumstances in which suspicionless
searches are warranted.
Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial—important
enough to override the individual’s acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.
Georgia has failed to show, in justification of §21-2-140, a special need of that kind.

PROBATION
Samson v. California
California law provides that every prisoner eligible for release on state parole “shall agree in writing to be subject
to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a
search warrant and with or without cause.”
Court said it does not violate the constitution
*Parole searches are necessary to promote legitimate government interest. Probationers have more of an incentive
to conceal of criminal activities

BORDERS
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (Check points searches are constitutional if justified by consent or
probable cause to search)
These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens.
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint operated by the Border Patrol away from the international
border with Mexico.
whether the Fourth Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed
checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle
contains illegal aliens
we hold that stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the
Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant.
We have held that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or probable cause to search.

United States v. Flores-Montano 2004

Customs officials seized 37 kilograms—a little more than 81 pounds—of marijuana from respondent Manuel
Flores-Montano’s gas tank at the international border.
– Expectation of privacy at the border is deprived
We conclude that the Government’s authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the
authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank. While it may be true that some searches
of property are so destructive as to require a different result, this was not one of them.
– The search of a vehicle is much different than the expectation of privacy on your person. (Price of gas)
Vehicles travel
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ARRESTS
Maryland v. King 2013
DNA database linked him to a Rape
In light of the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause respondent’s expectations of privacy were not
offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks.
Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine
booking procedure. When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and
they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s
DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
When someone is arrested there expectation of privacy is significantly reduced

25
 CHAPTER 4
WARRANTS
4th Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.

If the police has an arrest warrant for a person and wants to search the home of the person THEY NEED
TO HAVE A SEARCH WARRANT (if they have probable cause to believe some evidence of a crime is at
that location)
Arrest Warrants (warrants of people)
Chimel v. California 1969
Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment as "incident
to that arrest?"

The search was done after he was detained and arrested and not pursuant to a search warrant. They came to get
him for a burglary then wanted to search his entire house
the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court
reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect.
Rabinowitz has come to stand for the proposition, inter alia, that a warrantless search “incident to a lawful
arrest” may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the “possession” or under the “control”
of the person arrested
Area under immediate control can be searched for:
1. Remove weapons
2. Prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence
In Chimel they went far beyond places of his immediate control thus it was an unreasonable search and illegal

Maryland v. Buie (Protective Sweep)

“Protective sweep”: a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the
safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which
a person might be hiding.

Where there is reasonable belief based that an area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those at
the arrest scene the officers may engage in a limited search for the individual.
– Fourth Amendment would permit the protective sweep undertaken here if the searching officer “possessed
a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted’ the officer in believing,” that the area swept harbored
an individual posing a danger to the officer or others
– “Traditionally, the sanctity of a person’s home—his castle—requires that the police may not invade it
without a warrant except under the most exigent of circumstances. But once the police are lawfully within
the home, their conduct is measured by a standard of reasonableness.... If there is reason to believe that
the arrestee had accomplices who are still at large, something less than probable cause—reasonable
suspicion—should be sufficient to justify a limited additional intrusion to investigate the possibility of
their presence
– In determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
o Under this test, a search of the house or office is generally not reasonable without a warrant issued
on probable cause. There are other contexts, however, where the public interest is such that neither
a warrant nor probable cause is required.

26
Payton v. New York 1980
This case discusses the constitutionality of New York statutes that authorize police officers to enter a
private residence without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine felony arrest.
Absent exigent circumstances an officer must have an arrest warrant to make an arrest of the suspect in his home.
The police officer must reasonably believe that the suspect is there. This rule applies with equal force to a properly
rented hotel room during the rental period. The home may not extent to the corridors and halls of an apartment
building.

Steagald v. United States

whether, under the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement officer may legally search for the subject of an
arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant
A search warrant must be obtained to look for a suspect in the home of a third party absent exigent circumstances
or consent. The arrest warrant alone does not sufficiently protect the privacy interests of the third-party
homeowner.

Search Warrants (warrants of people)

Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v. New York
Did the search of the adult bookstore with an open-ended warrant violate the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments?
Court held that the search and seizure was invalid as the warrant did not particularly describe the things to be
seized and left it entirely to the discretion of officials conducting the search to decide which items were to be
seized. There is no basis for the notion that because a retail store invites the public to enter, it consents to wholesale
searches and seizures that do not conform to Fourth Amendment guarantees. The Town Justice was not neutral
because he was a part of the investigating

United States v. Banks KNOCK AND ANNOUCE

Officers executing a warrant to search for cocaine in respondent Banks's apartment knocked and announced their
authority. The question is whether their 15-to-20-second wait before a forcible entry satisfied the Fourth
Amendment.… We hold that it did.
The crucial fact in examining the exigency of police actions is not time to reach the door but the particular
exigency claimed. The exigency of the situation and a reasonable waiting time are determined by the facts the
police knew at the time of the impending search.
Must have articulable facts as to why they had reasonable suspicion; 15-20 seconds was reasonable to
suspect that the cocaine would be gone if they waited. Eminent disposal

Illinois v. McArthur
Police officers, with probable cause to believe that a man had hidden marijuana in his home, prevented that man
from entering the home for about two hours while they obtained a search warrant. We must decide whether those
officers violated the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that the officers acted reasonably. They did not violate the
Amendment’s requirements.
– The police officers in this case had probable cause to believe that a home contained contraband, which
was evidence of a crime. They reasonably believed that the home’s resident, if left free of any restraint,
would destroy that evidence.

Hudson v. Michigan
We decide whether violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule requires the suppression of all evidence found in
the search.
If police failed to properly knock and announce then evidence can still be admitted at trial. The purpose of
the knock and announce rule is to protect lives and prevent injury.
The exclusionary rule is not an appropriate remedy if the police failed to knock and announce
When the officer does a knock and announce they do have probable cause and do have a proper search warrant.**
27
Bailey v. United States
whether the seizure of the person was reasonable when he was stopped and detained at some distance away from
the premises to be searched when the only justification for the detention was to ensure the safety and efficacy of
the search.
The Supreme Court held that the rule from Michigan v. Summers did not apply because Bailey was not in or
immediately outside the residence being searched when he was detained. Also, none of the law enforcement
interests mentioned in Summers were served by detaining Bailey. Arrests incident to the execution of a search
warrant are lawful under the Fourth Amendment, but once an individual leaves the premises being searched, any
detention must be justified by another means.
In Summers, the Court recognized three important law enforcement interests that, taken together,
justify the detention of an occupant who is on the premises during the execution of a search warrant:
officer safety, facilitating the completion of the search, and preventing flight.
A spatial constraint defined by the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched is therefore required for
detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant.
Detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
because the limited intrusion on personal liberty is outweighed by the special law enforcement interests at
stake. Once an individual has left the immediate vicinity of a premises to be searched, however, detentions
must be justified by some other rationale.
ON FINAL APPLY SUMMERS STANDARD AND THE HOLDING IN BAILEY

Exceptions to Warrant Requirement

– Consent
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
Person was not in custody of police. Consent must be voluntary
a “consent” is a “waiver” of a person’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The argument is that
by allowing the police to conduct a search, a person “waives” whatever right he had to prevent the police from
searching.
two competing concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a “voluntary” consent—
the legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of
coercion.
We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the
basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in
fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of
fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor
to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to
establishing a voluntary consent.
Consent bypasses the need for probable cause, warrant, or neutral magistrate
Consent need to be voluntary; determine voluntary by looking at totality of the circumstance
Officers does not have to prove that the person knew they had a right to say no to the search

Illinois v. Rodriquez 1990

3rd Party Consent to Search an area
Whether a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of
the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not do so.
As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must “be
judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment… ‘warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief’” that the consenting party had authority over the premises?
Under the fourth amendment police can enter a home without a warrant if they reasonable believe the person who
consented to the search has the authority to do so.
They believed she had authority because she had a key, she had clothes there…
Minors cannot give consent
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Fernandez v. California
We therefore refuse to extend Randolph to the very different situation in this case, where consent was
provided by an abused woman well after her male partner had been removed from the apartment they
shared.
They arrested him, then went and asked the alleged victim to search and she consented.
Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit warrantless searches when the defendant has previously objected but is no
longer present and the co-tenant consents?
No. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that, although
a warrant is generally required for a search of a home, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
whether the search was reasonable. Although warrantless searches are unreasonable when two co-tenants are
present and one objects to the search, the Court has held that the same search is reasonable when the objecting
tenant leaves. In this case, because the objecting tenant was arrested and no longer present, the Court held that
the search was reasonable because the consenting tenant had the authority to allow the police into her home.

Florida v. Jimeno
whether a criminal suspect’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches is violated when,
after he gives a police officer permission to search his automobile, the officer opens a closed container found
within the car that might reasonably hold the object of the search. We find that it is not.

The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of “objective”
reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer
and the suspect?
A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container.

– Plain View
Arizona v. Hicks 1984
whether this “plain view” doctrine may be invoked when the police have less than probable cause to believe that
the item in question is evidence of a crime or is contraband.
the plain view exception allows a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or
contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be.

Under the plain view doctrine evidence can be seized by police if at the time they have probable cause to believe
that the thing is contraband. They have to have probable cause at the time of the search, at the time that they see
it, at the time of the seizure.
He moved the stereo around, looked for the serial number... that’s not plain view
It has to be immediately apparent and he must have probable cause

Ordinarily searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively

unreasonable. However, the plain view exception allows a law enforcement officer
to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered
in a place where the officer has a right to be. This means that the court will likely
find:
1. The reason the police is in the area must be justified and have
lawful right to access the item
2. The item must be in plain view; and
3. The item’s incriminating character must be immediately apparent.
(requirement for plain view and plain touch)

29
Minnesota v. Dickerson
Facts: two Minneapolis police officers stopped the respondent based on his seemingly evasive actions and the
fact that he had just left a building known for cocaine traffic. A patdown search revealed a small lump in the
respondent’s nylon jacket. The officer later testified: “I examined it with my fingers, and it slid and it felt to be a
lump of crack cocaine in cellophane.” The officer then reached into the respondent’s pocket and retrieved a small
plastic bag containing one fifth of one gram of crack cocaine.

Whether contraband detected through the sense of touch during a patdown search may be admitted into evidence.
The rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police
officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—or at least no search independent of the initial intrusion
that gave the officers their vantage point. The warrantless seizure of contraband that presents itself in this manner
is deemed justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances would often be
impracticable and would do little to promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment. The same can be said of
tactile discoveries of contraband.
If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass
makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that
already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure
would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.

Search Incident to Arrest

United States v. Robinson
Driving without license, gets stopped cop finds heroin
It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. This general exception has historically been formulated into two distinct propositions.
The first is that a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest. The second is
that a search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee.

A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment;
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a
full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment but is also
a “reasonable” search under that Amendment.

Riley v. California
whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual
who has been arrested.
To go in a cell phone officer, need a cell phone. They cannot search phone incident to arrest
Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest
is accordingly simple—get a warrant.
When a person is arrested their expectation of privacy is lessened but the cell phone doesn’t pose danger
Cell phone is not a dangerous weapon. Is no danger to officer or others.

Birchfield v. North Dakota

whether BAC laws violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches.
every State also has long had what are termed “implied consent laws.” These laws impose penalties on motorists
who refuse to undergo testing when there is sufficient reason to believe they are violating the State's drunk-driving
laws.
In the case of drunk driving there is an exigent circumstance thus a warrant is not required.
BAC can do down rather quickly.
30
 – the process of collecting a DNA sample by rubbing a swab on the inside of a person's cheek as a
“negligible” intrusion
– Second, breath tests are capable of revealing only one bit of information, the amount of alcohol in
the subject's breath
– Finally, participation in a breath test is not an experience that is likely to cause any great
enhancement in the embarrassment that is inherent in any arrest
Blood tests are a different matter. More of a process, more intrusive. For blood you need a warrant

Automobile-Search Incident to Arrest

New York v. Belton 1981
PASSANGER CARPARTMENTSS!!!!!
When the occupant of an automobile is subjected to a lawful custodial arrest, does the constitutionally permissible
scope of a search incident to his arrest include the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he was
riding?
Yes, as a search incident to arrest the officer can search the passenger compartment of a vehicle.
The search of the respondent’s jacket followed immediately upon that arrest. The jacket was located inside
the passenger compartment of the car in which the respondent had been a passenger just before he was
arrested. The jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded was “within the arrestee’s
immediate control” within the meaning of the Chimel case.

**Arizona v. Gant*** 2009 FINAL EXAM (BELTON WAS OVERRULED)

SEARCHING PASSANGER CARPARTMENTSS!!!!! Meaning where people can ride driver seat,
passengers, back seats
He was arrested for driving with a suspended license
The officers arrested Gant put him in the backseat of their vehicle and searched Gants car found cocaine.
They searched the car after arrest with no probable cause that any illegal items were in the ca.
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence
of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable
unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.
Exceptions: When they have probable cause to believe there’s some evidence they can search

Probable Cause to Search an Automobile (EXCEPTION TO WARRANT; Probable Cause)

Carroll v. United States

the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.

Chamber v. Maroney
The principal question in this case concerns the admissibility of evidence seized from an automobile, in which
petitioner was riding at the time of his arrest, after the automobile was taken to a police station and was there
thoroughly searched without a warrant.
Both Carroll and Chamber: the Court held that automobiles and other conveyances may be searched
without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or an
office, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are
entitled to seize.

IF THEY HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE THEY CAN SEARCH IT IMMEDIATELY, OR SEIZE IT TAKE
IT TO THE STATION AND SEARCH IT THERE. Only applies to vehicle
31
California v. Acevedo
This case requires us once again to consider the so-called “automobile exception” to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment and its application to the search of a closed container in the trunk
of a car.
Holding: The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to
believe contraband or evidence is contained.

Exigent Circumstances
“[L]aw enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant
1. to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or
2. to protect an occupant from imminent injury.”
3. Hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect (dependent on the magnitude of what they did)
4. To prevent the destruction of evidence

Welsh v. Wisconsin
whether, and if so under what circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a
warrantless night entry of a person’s home in order to arrest him for a nonjailable traffic offense.

Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to
demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all
warrantless home entries. When the government’s interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption
of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only
with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate.

Absent exigent circumstances, the Court ruled, a warrantless nighttime entry into the home of an individual to
arrest him for a civil, non-jailable traffic offense was prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual
in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that application of the exigent-circumstances exception
in the context of a home entry was rarely appropriate when there was probable cause to believe that only a minor
offense had been committed.
Because the sanctity of the home…. an important factor to be considered when determining whether any
exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.

Birgham City Utah v. Stuart

whether police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing
that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. We conclude that they may.
Exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies
(1) Where police have probable cause; and
(2) Where a reasonable person would believe that the entry was necessary
(3) To prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons
§ Under this standard, the potential harm need not be as serious as that required to invoke the emergency aid
exception
§ Standard for exigent circumstances is an objective one !!!
§ Considering the circumstances as they would have been objectively examined by a prudent and trained police
officer
§ Under the emergency doctrine, a search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize
evidence
§ Law enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto private property to fight a fire and investigate
its cause to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence or to engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect

32
§ Warrants are generally required to search a persons home or his person unless the exigencies of the
situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively
reasonable under the fourth amendment
§ One exigency is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.
o The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be
otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency
o Law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance
to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury
§ An action is reasonable under the fourth amendment regardless of the individual officers state of mind as long
as the circumstances, viewed objectively justify the action
§ The officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant

Michigan v. Fisher EMERGENCY AID

One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or
threatened with such injury.
requires only “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that “a person within [the house] is in need of
immediate aid….”
The role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order

Kentucky v. King
It is well established that “exigent circumstances,” including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence,
permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant
we consider whether this rule applies when police, by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their
presence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence.
warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed

Mitchell v. Wisconsin
when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally
permits a blood test without a warrant.
we hold, the exigent-circumstances rule almost always permits a blood test without a warrant
– exigency exists when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing
health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application (no
time to get warrant)
If they’re awake, they can do a breath test or field sobriety test. If they’re awake to get blood you need
warrant

33
 CHAPTER 5
INTERROGATION
5th Amendment: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
– You have a right to remain silent and not make statements against yourself
–
Voluntariness
Brown v. State of Mississippi
The only evidence they had was a coerced confession. He beat the man during the interrogation
Whether convictions, which rest solely upon confessions shown to have been extorted by officers of the state by
brutality and violence, are consistent with the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
Confessions through the infliction of violence is impermissible and unconstitutional. “When a confession is
challenged as involuntary is sought to be used against a criminal defendant at his trial… the prosecution must
prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary

Rodgers v. Richmond
Threatening to call his wife was permissible
The question for the court to decide was whether this conduct induced the defendant to make an involuntary and
hence untrue statement.”
Governments can use untrue statements as a tactic to get you to confess.

Movement Away from Voluntariness Standard

Massiah v. United States
Once your indicated and you have an attorney, you cannot be questioned without the Prescence of your attorney
We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at
his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after
he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel
we hold is that the defendant’s own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances
here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.

Escobedo v. Illinois (This is Pre Miranda)

whether, under the circumstances, the refusal by the police to honor petitioner’s request to consult with his lawyer
during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of “the Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution.
We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and
its purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here,
the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.

No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will
become aware of, and exercise, these rights. (Are criminal justice system and constitution should not be based on
law enforcement being fearful of someone talking to their lawyer)
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody(MEANING THEY
CANT LEAVE), the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent
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Miranda (MIRANDA DOES NOT APPLY TO PEOPLE THAT ARE NOT IN CUSTODY)
***Miranda v. Arizona***
Issue: we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial
police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

Purpose of Miranda: We granted certiorari in these cases in order further to explore some facets of the problems,
thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow

1. Must be custody (CAN’T LEAVE)

**Miranda is a merger of the 5th and 6th Amendments through a court constitutional document. **

Miranda v. Arizona
(Admissibility of a statement)
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the def unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
– exculpatory (it proves that person is innocence; excludes them from crime)
– inculpatory (evidenced that includes you in the crime)

By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. (THIS IS WHAT TRIGGERS
MIRANDA)
Example: traffic stop on side of the road where officer has some reasonable
suspicion (person is not free to leave)
Miranda Warnings
1. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
2. that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
3. that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.

The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
*Once a person has invoked their right to counsel the government must scrupulously honor
that request. They cannot try to manipulate you to change your mind

If the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to
be questioned.
Right to remain silent: if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent

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The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary functions as
well.
1. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can
mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness.
2. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is
reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in
court.
3. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully
accurate statement to the police and
4. that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial.

If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes
to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.

Difference between confessions and admissions:

Confession: Is saying you did whatever you are accused of; I shot JR
Admission: Is a person saying I was there, you got no argument. I do own a gun but never
quite saying I shot JR
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course,
admissible in evidence
Holding: we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized

Florida v. Powell
the Court held that an individual must be “clearly informed,” prior to custodial questioning, that he has, among
other rights, “the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” The
question presented in this case is whether advice that a suspect has “the right to talk to a lawyer before answering
any of [the law enforcement officers’] questions,” and that he can invoke this right “at any time…during th[e]
interview,” satisfies Miranda. We hold that it does.
Court said we decline to declare its precise formulation necessary to meet Miranda’s requirements.

Berkemer v. McCarty
We hold therefore that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural
safeguards enunciated in Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or
for which he was arrested.

Request for Counsel

Edwards v. Arizona
Once a person has invoked the right to have counsel present that remains. The only way that is waived is if the
suspect initiates the interrogation. (example Wong sun they all were free and he went back to the station
voluntarily)
It must be clear to the officer that you are not talking anymore and you are requesting a lawyer

Maryland v. Shatzer
Does Edwards v. Arizona prohibit the re-interrogation of a suspect, who has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights
to counsel and to remain silent, after a substantial amount of time has elapsed between the invocation of rights
and the subsequent interrogation? NO
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals of Maryland, holding that because Mr. Shatzer experienced a
break in Miranda custody lasting more than two weeks between the first and second attempts at
interrogation, Edwards does not mandate suppression of his 2006 statements.
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Miranda and the Exclusionary Rule
New York v. Quarles
Quarles was charged in the New York trial court with criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court suppressed
the gun in question, and a statement made by respondent, because the statement was obtained by police before
they read respondent his “Miranda rights.”
We conclude that under the circumstances involved in this case, overriding considerations of public safety justify
the officer’s failure to provide Miranda warnings before he asked questions devoted to locating the abandoned
weapon.
We hold that on these facts there is a “public safety” exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings
be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that
exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.
Concerned with their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain
incriminating evidence from the suspect.
The court will allow for police to ask a limited amount of questions to secure scene. The nature of
circumstances will be determined by where the police are trying to conduct the investigation; is it
on a scene that is safe or a highly volatile scene.

Miranda Reconsidered
Dickerson v. United States, 2000
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §3501, which in essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of such statements
should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made.
Congress tried to make voluntariness the standard again

Holding: We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by
an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its
progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state
and federal courts.

We conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.

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 Crim Pro Final Exam

Total of 150 points

50 points for participation and midterm

Part 1 – 2 Essay Question each worth 50 points

DON’T NEED TO RESTATE THE 4TH , 5TH, or 6TH Amendment in Rule Section
Format: IRAC or CRAC

Part 2 – Short Answer, T/F briefly explain your answer, M/C worth 50 points

Midterm
Terry v. Ohio – applicable for the stop and frisk and seizure of the gun
Minnesota v. Dickerson – applicable for seizure of the marijuana

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