Gender Differences

in Committee Decision-Making:
Process and Outputs
in an Experimental Setting
Carole Kennedy, San Diego State University

ABSTRACT. Theories of gender difference suggest that women and

men are motivated by different concerns when participating in allocative
decision-making processes such as those engaged in by legislative com-
mittees. Using a game theoretic experimental design which simulates an
allocative decision-making process, this study seeks to identify how
women’s distinctiveness affects both the process and outputs of commit-
tee decision-making. In this design, participants negotiate an outcome
with other members of a group and, through majority rule, arrive at a
group decision. Following the experiment, participants complete a brief
survey instrument. The results show that women are more likely than
men to report being motivated by altruistic concerns and to have a prefer-
ence for a universalistic solution. Men are more likely than women to re-
port being motivated by self-interest and to have a preference for a
competitive solution. The increased presence of women in decision-
making groups results in a significant impact on both the process and
outputs of committee decision-making. [Article copies available for a fee
from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail ad-
dress: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.
com> © 2003 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]

INTRODUCTION

Several studies have attempted to determine if the presence of women in

legislatures makes a difference. Democratic theorists have suggested that their

Women & Politics, Vol. 25(3) 2003

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28 WOMEN & POLITICS

presence, if nothing else, reflects a commitment to representative democracy

(Amundsen 1971). Others have delved further into the qualitative differences
that may result when women are representatives in state and national legisla-
tures. Many of these studies have concentrated on gender differences in indi-
vidual-level characteristics such as legislative voting behavior and priorities
(Barrett 1995; Burrell 1994; Carroll 1991; Diamond 1977; Dodson and Carroll
1991; Dolan 1997; Frankovic 1977; Johnson and Stanwick 1978; Mezey 1994;
Thomas and Welch 1991; Welch 1985). Others have emphasized the impact of
women’s presence on aggregate-level characteristics such as legislative out-
puts (Leader 1977; Thomas 1994). In a related but distinct area of inquiry,
some studies have tried to determine what impact the presence of women has
on the actual process of “doing politics,” i.e., do women tend to pursue consen-
sual agreements, are women more diplomatic, do women exhibit distinctive
behaviors while making legislative decisions (Jewell and Whicker 1994;
Kathlene 1989; Kathlene 1994; Reingold 2000; Rosenthal 1998; Saint-
Germain 1985; Thomas 1991; Thomas 1992)?
Recent empirical work on the question of distinctive gender-related behav-
ioral differences in legislators has produced mixed findings. While Jewell and
Whicker (1994) and Rosenthal (1998) present findings which suggest that
women bring behaviors and proclivities to the decision-making process that
distinguish them from their male counterparts, Reingold’s (2000) study of leg-
islators in California and Arizona failed to find evidence of this distinction.
If politics is defined as the authoritative allocation of values and as who gets
what, when, and how (Easton 1959; Laswell 1958), it is increasingly important
to determine if female legislative behavior conforms to theories of representa-
tion and decision-making that were predicated on the motivations and behav-
iors of “political man” (Lipset 1960). This endeavor is particularly important
in light of the fact that following the 2000 elections, women comprise 22.4%
of all state legislators, 13.6% of the House of Representatives, and 13% of the
United States Senate (CAWP 2001). This paper utilizes an experimental de-
sign to explore the impact of female representation upon both the allocative
decision-making process and the distinctive outputs that result when women’s
unique concerns and motivations are represented in the process.

LITERATURE REVIEW

One promising theoretical approach to understanding the allocative deci-

sion-making process and the behavior of its participants has been the game
theoretic approach to decision-making. Game theory suggests that deci-
sion-making behavior can be understood as a series of “moves” by “players”
 Carole Kennedy 29

who seek to achieve their “goals” (Hamburger 1979; Morrow 1994). Formal
modeling of these processes illuminates the underlying assumptions that form
the basis of decision-making theories and allows for a fuller understanding of
decision-making behaviors. Interestingly, one of the assumptions of formal
modeling theory and game theory is that the gender of the participant is not
germane to understanding decision-making processes. In the preface to his
book on game theory, Henry Hamburger states, “A word of explanation is
needed about the use of pronouns. Some players turn out to be he, while others
turn out to be she. . . . This is an attempt to avoid any preconceived notions
about sex roles and has no significance in game theory” (Hamburger 1979, xi).
Similarly, in a formal modeling experimental design utilized by Miller and
Oppenheimer (1982) no distinction was made between the behavior or prefer-
ences of male and female student participants. Perhaps this is not surprising,
due to the fact that most formal/game theoretic models do not focus on prefer-
ence formation. Rather, these models take preferences as a given and then con-
centrate on explaining how individuals pursue their preferences, positing that
individuals will seek to achieve an outcome that is in accordance with their
preferences.
There is a substantial amount of experimental research regarding gender
differences within a game theoretical framework. An excellent review of this
literature is included in Orbell, Dawes and Schwartz-Shea’s study entitled
“Trust, Social Categories, and Individuals: The Case of Gender” (1994) and
includes works which found that women were more likely than men to cooper-
ate in a game (Aranoff and Tedeschi 1968; Eagly and Crowley 1986; Jones et
al. 1968; Meux 1973), works which found men more cooperative (Brown-Kruse
and Hummels 1993; Kahn, Hottes, and Davis 1971; Rappoport and Chammah
1965), and works that found no or negligible differences (Dawes, McTavish,
and Shaklee 1977; Stockard, van de Kragt, and Dodge 1988). Orbell, Dawes,
and Schwartz-Shea (1994) conducted an experiment designed to test gender
differences in defection and cooperation within the context of the prisoner’s
dilemma game. They found that while women as a group were perceived as
more likely to cooperate than men, there was no significant difference between
cooperating behaviors of men and women in the experimental setting. More
recently, work on this question has sought to determine not only individual
level analysis of sex differences in decision-making behavior, but also the in-
fluence of institutional constraints on such behavior (Schwartz-Shea 2002).
This study seeks to expand our understanding of decision-making behavior
by exploring whether or not male and female participants do indeed have dis-
tinctive preferences that influence their behaviors in a group decision-making
process. Theories of gender difference suggest that gender may be a very sa-
lient factor in understanding decision-making preferences and behaviors, al-
30 WOMEN & POLITICS

though the findings of previous experimental research are mixed. The present
project not only seeks to illuminate behavioral differences between men and
women, but also is designed to identify how gender composition of a deci-
sion-making group can be determinative not only of outcomes but of the deci-
sion-making process. Exploring the relationship between having a “critical
mass” of female participants in a decision-making group and what independ-
ent impact that factor has on group process and outcomes provides a unique
contribution to the literature on gender differences in decision-making.
Theories of gender difference suggest that sex role socialization leads
women to be more oriented to the needs of others while men are encouraged to
be more concerned with individual rights (see Belenky et al. 1986; Gilligan
1982). These gender theories of difference, when applied to an allocative deci-
sion-making process, suggest that women bring different values and motiva-
tions to the decision-making process than those traditionally associated with
politics. Hence, it is not biological sex that accounts for the differences be-
tween men and women in the political arena, but gender role socialization.
Specifically, women tend to incorporate concerns with equity and fairness
(other-orientation) while men tend to incorporate concerns with protecting in-
dividual rights and maximizing self-benefit.
Empirical studies of gender difference in legislative behavior abound with
examples of the distinctive impact that gender has on legislative outputs and
behaviors. Turning first to an assessment of the literature on distinctive out-
puts, Thomas and Welch (1991) have shown that women legislators are much
more likely to sponsor and pass bills relating to women’s and children’s issues
and are much more likely to be found on committees dealing with health and
welfare. Although gender differences in policy priorities were not found to be
large, there were significant differences. Thomas (1992) found that women in
states with above 20% female legislators gave priority to bills dealing with
women’s issues such as child care and parental leave more than did men. In her
study of the Arizona state legislature, Saint-Germain (1985) found that women
tended to sponsor more bills related to women’s concerns than did their male
counterparts and that the number of such bills increased as the proportion of
women in the legislature increased. The Thomas and Saint-Germain studies
suggest that obtaining a “critical mass” of female representation in the legisla-
ture made women more likely to prioritize women’s issues, yet they do not
suggest that a “critical mass” had a corresponding impact on male legislators.
On the other hand, a recent study of the 1990 Arizona and California state leg-
islatures did not identify any significant differences between male and female
legislators in terms of their policy preferences (Reingold 2000). These diver-
gent findings suggest the usefulness of examining the research question utiliz-
 Carole Kennedy 31

ing an experimental design, and also suggest that further empirical research is
necessary to confirm previous conflicting findings.
Other studies have attempted to assess the behavior of women and men in
legislatures and to assess if differences lead to a qualitative impact on the pro-
cess of decision-making. Several studies have suggested that, at the very least,
a perception of gender differences does exist. Johnson and Stanwick (1978)
surveyed women office holders and asked them how they compared to their
male counterparts. Respondents suggested that women spent more time on the
job and were better at dealing with people than their male counterparts. A
study of Hawaiian public officials showed that 60% of women officials sur-
veyed considered themselves more approachable and less concerned with
power as it is traditionally exercised than men. However, only 36% of their
male colleagues had the same perception of their female colleagues (Mezey
1978). In her study of female officials in Santa Clara County, California,
Flammang (1985) encountered statements from both men and women that in-
dicated that women were perceived as better at constituency service, more
honest, less likely to interrupt during meetings, more empathetic, more sensi-
tive and compassionate, more idealistic, more courteous, better listeners and
more understanding than their male counterparts. Going even further, one fe-
male council member suggested that “Male power means force and domina-
tion. Women use consensus, validation, cooperation, in a win-win direction”
(Flammang 1985, 108). More recent work has both confirmed and disconfirmed
previous findings of the distinctiveness of women’s decision-making behavior
and how it influences the conduct of political decision-making. In their 1994
study, Jewell and Whicker surveyed male and female state legislators in
twenty-two states. They found that women legislators were less likely to use a
hierarchical/command style when running party caucuses and more likely to
build consensus than their male counterparts. In addition, they found that
women leaders were more interested than their male counterparts in achieving
consensus in decision-making. Rosenthal’s examination of the differences be-
tween male and female committee chairs in state legislatures revealed that
women were more likely than men to bring an “integrative and collaborative
dimension to leadership in state legislatures” (Rosenthal 1998, 5). Integrative
leadership style refers to a preference for listening and engaging with others
and stresses the “empowerment of others, a feminist conceptualization of
power as support and cooperation rather than dominance” (Rosenthal 1998,
21). Many of the women surveyed by both Flammang and Rosenthal attributed
their distinctiveness as legislators to the socialization process they went
through as homemakers, child-rearers, and volunteers in community activities
such as the PTA and church. On the other hand, Reingold (2000) found that
32 WOMEN & POLITICS

both male and female legislators favored a consensual decision-making style

over a competitive one.

HYPOTHESES

In an attempt to explore the impact of women on decision-making processes

and outputs and the validity of the gender-neutral assumption inherent in for-
mal models of decision-making, a game-theoretic experimental design is uti-
lized to test several hypotheses. First, a test is made of the gender theory of
difference. This theory suggests that women have distinctive values and con-
cerns that inform and motivate their decision-making behavior. I expect that
women will report that they are motivated by concerns for others and that men
will demonstrate greater propensity to report being motivated by a desire to
maximize self-benefit.
My second hypothesis is that women’s distinctive values and concerns will
have an impact on the process of decision-making. I expect that women will per-
ceive themselves to be more cooperative in the decision-making process and that
men will tend to consider themselves more competitive. This will confirm previ-
ous studies based on self-reports. However, to assess the reliability of self-re-
ports, I also test a corollary hypothesis that decisions made in female majority
groups will tend to be unanimous (consensual) and decisions made in male ma-
jority groups will be split decisions (competitive). This approach allows me to
gather empirical evidence of consensus versus dissension in group outcomes to
confirm or disconfirm my respondents’ reported perceptions of the process
rather than relying completely on reported self-perceptions. This corollary hy-
pothesis also extends previous research into gender differences in game theo-
retic decision-making games to account for the possibility that as the proportion
of female membership in a group rises (“critical mass”), there will be a distinc-
tive impact on the process and outcomes of the decision-making process.
The third hypothesis is that women’s distinctive values and concerns will
have an impact on their preferences. I expect that in general women will be
more likely to prefer an equitable distribution of resources and men will be
more likely to prefer a distribution that maximizes their personal self-interest.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The experimental design utilized to test my hypotheses is the universalistic

decision-making experiment employed by Miller and Oppenheimer (1982).
They originally conducted the experiment to examine the competing hypothe-
 Carole Kennedy 33

ses of coalition bargaining models and the universalistic hypothesis. Bar-

gaining models suggest that in a committee decision-making situation, a
minimum winning coalition will form that will allow a majority of the partici-
pants to receive a large distribution of resources (hence achieving their “ratio-
nal” goal which is to maximize self-benefit) and effectively shut out the
minority from sharing in the distribution. The alternative hypothesis is the uni-
versalistic hypothesis which suggests that instead of minimum winning coali-
tions, decision-making groups will endorse the universalistic solution in which
all members benefit, albeit to a lesser degree than would have occurred for a
majority of the participants in a minimum-winning coalition. Miller and
Oppenheimer (1982) conducted their experiments by varying the value of the
universalistic solution and determined that when the value of the universalistic
solution to all members was sufficiently great (although, again, less than could
be obtained through a minimum winning coalition) the group would choose
the universalistic alternative. When the value of the universalistic solution
dropped to a certain level, the competitive solution was preferred and a mini-
mum winning coalition was formed.
The Miller and Oppenheimer (1982) experiment was not concerned with
behavioral differences among decision-makers. This study will examine the
impact of gender on the decision-making process and on the likelihood of
achieving the universalistic solution, within the framework of a game-theo-
retic experimental design.
Twelve groups of five subjects each were recruited from undergraduate sec-
tions of an introductory American government course. Their “earnings” as ex-
perimental subjects were dependent on the group choice over six alternative
outcomes. A second series of the experiment involved six groups of five sub-
jects each, recruited from undergraduate sections of an introductory compara-
tive politics course. Their “earnings” as experimental subjects were also depend-
ent on the group choice over six alternative outcomes.1 The format of the ex-
periment was identical to the Miller and Oppenheimer (1982) experiment as
follows:
Identical instructions regarding the experiment’s rules were read to each
group verbatim. The experiment allowed for the players to discuss the options
available to them for a fifteen-minute mandatory discussion period during
which they could participate as much or as little as they wished but they could
not implement a solution during the discussion period. Following the fif-
teen-minute discussion period, the group had the option of continuing discus-
sion or implementing a solution by secret ballot in which each member
indicated his/her preference on an index card and handed them to the experi-
menter. The experimenter received the cards face down to mitigate any bias
that might have led respondents to impress the experimenter with their deci-
34 WOMEN & POLITICS

sion. The experimenter tallied the “votes” and as soon as three cards were in
agreement (majority-rule), the group was informed which decision had pre-
vailed and were paid accordingly.2
Subjects were informed prior to the experiment that their participation was
voluntary and that, in the first trial, the payoff would be an index card rather
than money and, in the second trial, the payoff would be extra credit points.
The participants were randomly selected from students in the classes willing to
participate in the experiment. The sample consisted of 45 males and 45 fe-
males and the mean age of participants was twenty-two years old. Each partici-
pant was assigned a player number and was referred to only by their number
throughout the experiment. The experimenter did not know any of the student
participants and did not observe group deliberations, thereby providing stu-
dent participants with an expectation of anonymity and mitigating the experi-
menter effect on process and outcomes.3
In order to discern the motivations behind committee members’ prefer-
ences, a post-experiment questionnaire (relevant portions attached in Appen-
dix) was administered after the group decision had been reached and the
payoff distributed. The questionnaire was designed to assess the participants’
motivation in pursuing a solution, their perceptions of the group dynamic in
terms of cooperation or competitiveness, and their perceptions of their partici-
pation in the process.

FINDINGS

Women’s Distinctive Motivations

Table 1 presents the reported motivation for individuals’ decision-making be-

havior. Respondents chose one of four closed-end responses on the post-experi-
ment questionnaire. Among all participants there are significant differences
among the reported motivations of male and female participants. Twenty-eight
point nine percent of male participants reported that they were motivated by a de-
sire to maximize their personal benefit, as compared to 6.7% of female partici-
pants. Slightly more women than men reported that they wished to ensure that the
most equitable decision was reached (53.3% vs. 42.4%). The same proportion of
men and women reported that their primary motivation was to ensure that they
were not excluded from a beneficial decision (24.4%). Finally, there was a large
difference between the proportion of men and women who reported that their
primary motivation was to ensure that others were not excluded from a benefi-
cial decision (4.4% of men vs. 15.6% of women). The chi-square statistic is sig-
nificant at p ≤ .05 and supports the hypothesis that women decision-makers are
 Carole Kennedy 35

motivated by different concerns than those that motivate their male counterparts
in an allocative decision-making process. Specifically, they are less likely to
report that they pursue maximization of their personal benefit and are more
likely to be “other-oriented” or “altruistic” and pursue a decision that will not
exclude others from a beneficial decision.

Women’s Distinctive Impact on the Process of Decision-Making

Table 2 presents the mean survey responses of women in female majority

groups, men in female majority groups, men in male majority groups and
women in male majority groups. Respondents were asked to compare them-
selves to other members of the group and rate themselves as more cooperative
or more competitive than fellow group members. The expectation regarding
the responses was that women in male majority groups would be likely to char-
acterize themselves as more cooperative than fellow group members and that
men in female majority groups would be likely to see themselves as more com-
petitive than fellow group members.
Women in the minority were significantly more likely than any other group to
characterize themselves as more cooperative than fellow group members. This

TABLE 1. Reported Motivation from Post-Experiment Survey by Sex1

Motivation Male Participants Female Participants

Maximize Self-Benefit 28.9% 6.7%
(13) (3)
Risk-Averse 24.4% 24.4%
(11) (11)
Ensure Equitable Decision 42.4% 53.3%
(19) (24)
Altruistic 4.4% 15.6%
(2) (7)
N = 45 N = 45

Columns sum to 100%

χ2 = 9.6
df = 3
significant at p ⱕ .05
1Survey question was “My primary motivation for my decision was to: (choose one)”

Ensure that I maximized my personal benefit. (Maximize Self-Benefit)

Ensure that I was not excluded from a beneficial decision. (Risk-Averse)
Ensure that the most equitable decision was reached. (Ensure Equitable Decision)
Ensure that others were not excluded from a beneficial decision. (Altruistic)
36 WOMEN & POLITICS

TABLE 2. Perceived Cooperation/Competitiveness Based on Post-Experi-

ment Survey

Group Mean Value of Cooperation Score1

Men in Minority 3.13

(N = 15)
Men in Majority 3.27
(N = 30)
Women in Majority 3.30
(N = 35)
Women in Minority 4.10*
(N = 10)

1Cooperation Score is based on responses to the question: As compared to the other

members of the group I felt that I was: 1–More competitive; 5–More cooperative.
*Women in the minority perceived themselves as significantly more cooperative than any
other group.
Versus men in the minority t = 1.95
Versus men in the majority t = ⫺2.28
Versus women in the majority t = ⫺2.00

suggests that when women in the minority compared themselves to male major-
ity members of the group, they deemed themselves more cooperative. Men in
the minority were significantly more likely than women in the minority to char-
acterize themselves as more competitive. There is no significant difference in
perceived levels of cooperation between men in the majority and women in the
majority. When women comprised a minority of participants, they perceived
themselves as more cooperative than other members of their group. There were
six female minority groups that participated in the experiment. Four groups were
composed of two female members and three male members, and two groups
were composed of one female member and four male members.
In the context of my experiment, an alternative way to operationalize the
notion of “consensual” decision-making is to examine the type of group out-
comes. Several of the experimental groups made unanimous decisions with re-
gard to their preferred outcome. Table 3 presents a crosstabulation analysis of
unanimous and split decisions by group gender composition.
Although the number of cases is reduced to the number of groups participat-
ing rather than the number of individual participants (N = 18), the chi-square
statistic is significant at p ≤ .10, suggesting that female majority groups were
significantly more likely than male majority groups to arrive at a unanimous de-
 Carole Kennedy 37

TABLE 3. Observed Cooperation/Competitiveness Based on Unanimity of

Group Decisions

Group Composition
Male Majority Female Majority
Group Group
Split Decision 87.5% 50.0%
(7) (5)
Unanimous Decision 12.5% 50.0%
(1) (5)
Columns total to 100%
χ2 = 2.8
df = 1
significant at p ⱕ .10

cision. This finding provides empirical evidence not based on self-perception

that the increased presence of women in decision-making groups has the poten-
tial to “feminize” the decision-making process in the sense that a more consen-
sual process is evident in female majority as opposed to male majority groups.
This is evidence that when women are in the majority of a decision-making
group, that group is more likely to arrive at a consensual decision. This supports
previous research based upon self-reports by men and women in legislative of-
fices (Flammang 1985; Jewell and Whicker 1994; Rosenthal 1998).

Women’s Distinctive Preferences

Table 4 presents an analysis of the participants’ expressed preferences (in

the form of the solution for which they voted at the conclusion of the experi-
ment) and reveals that female participants were significantly more likely to
prefer the universalistic solution than were male participants. Just over 62% of
female participants voted for a universalistic solution as opposed to 40.0% of
male participants in the full sample. Women are significantly more likely than
men to prefer a universalistic solution even when the payoff is substantially
below what can be obtained in a competitive solution (in this case, $4.00 in-
stead of $14.25 or $13.30 or 3 points instead of 5 or 6).

Preferences as a Function of Motivation and Process

We have already seen that women were significantly more likely than men
to prefer the universalistic solution and that men and women’s motivations had
different impacts on their perceptions of their role in the process of deci-
sion-making. Finally, I expect to shed some light on how gender balance in
38 WOMEN & POLITICS

TABLE 4. Crosstabulation of Participants’ Expressed Preference by Gender

Male Participants Female Participants

Competitive Solution 60.0% 37.8%
(27) (17)
Universalistic Solution 40.0% 62.2%
(18) (28)
Columns total to 100%
χ2 = 4.45
df = 1
significant at p ⱕ .05

representation interacts with motivation and perceptions to influence out-

comes. Table 5 presents the results of probit analysis of the individuals’ ex-
pressed preference in the form of a vote cast at the conclusion of the
experiment. Each individual’s expressed preference was coded 1 for a univer-
salistic solution and 0 for a competitive solution. The independent variables of
interest included the motivation of the individual, a series of dummy variables
coded 0 and 1 for the various categorical alternatives. The independent vari-
able is the individual’s assessment of his/her level of competitiveness/cooper-
ativeness as compared to the other members of the group, and membership in a
female majority group as surrogates for the influence of the process on the out-
come. Finally, I control for the two different series by utilizing a dummy vari-
able coded 0 for the first trial of the experiment and 1 for the second trial. I
estimate the model on subsamples of men and women to determine if there is
an asymmetry of effects on expressed preferences.
As expected, there are significant differences in the models for men and
women. Surprisingly, the only variable that was significant at the p ≤ .05 level
for men was being in a female majority group. Men in a female majority group
were significantly more likely to endorse the universalistic solution than were
men in male majority groups. In the male sample, other factors that were sig-
nificant at p ≤ .10 included being motivated to ensure an equitable decision and
participating in the second trial of the experiment. Men who participated in the
second trial that involved extra credit points on an exam were slightly more
likely to endorse a universalistic solution than men who participated in the trial
involving the hypothetical distribution of a monetary payoff.
In the female subsample, both being motivated to ensure an equitable deci-
sion and being motivated by altruism are positively and significantly (p ≤ .05)
associated with a preference for a universalistic outcome, in addition to the
positive and significant relationship between being in a female majority group
and a preference for the universalistic solution. This finding suggests that
 Carole Kennedy 39

TABLE 5. Probit Analysis of Expressed Individual Preferences for a Universal-

istic Solution

Subsample of Female Subsample of Male

Participants Participants
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant1 ⫺3.22 ⫺2.47* ⫺2.13 ⫺2.48*
Female Majority Group 1.53 2.04* 1.53 2.39*
Self-Reported Motivation:
Maximize Self-Benefit ⫺2.87 ⫺.10 ⫺.51 ⫺.70
Ensure Equitable Decision 1.49 2.39* 1.19 1.78**
Altruistic 2.37 2.25* .32 .30
Competitive Self-Evaluation .28 1.18 .11 .52
Trial with Points 4.36 .35 1.23 1.94**
N = 43 N = 45
Baseline Prediction Rate: 62.79% Baseline Prediction Rate: 40.00%
Percent Correctly Predicted: 81.40% Percent Correctly Predicted: 82.22%

The dependent variable is the individual’s expressed preference, a dummy variable coded
0 = Competitive solution, 1 = Universalistic solution.
1The excluded category is Risk-Averse Motivation.

*significant at p ⱕ .05
**significant at p ⱕ .10

women as well as men are affected by a “critical mass” of women participating

in the process above and beyond their socialization experiences (represented
here by their reported motivation) which lead them to prefer a universalistic
rather than competitive solution.
Table 6 reports the predicted probabilities associated with the choice of the
universalistic solution depending upon sex and group gender composition.
There is a marked difference between the predicted probabilities for men in fe-
male majority groups and men in male majority groups. Interestingly, there is
little difference between the pattern of predicted probabilities for women in fe-
male majority and male majority groups.
None of the women who reported being motivated by self-interest chose the
universalistic solution, hence the predicted probability is very close to 0. How-
ever, men in female majority groups who reported being motivated by self-in-
terest had an 83.0% predicted probability of choosing the universalistic solution.
While this may appear counterintuitive at first, it suggests that the influence of a
female majority may have been very strong on individual male members. For
example, a man committed to maximizing self-benefit may have initially pre-
40 WOMEN & POLITICS

TABLE 6. Predicted Probabilities for an Expressed Preference for the Univer-

salistic Solution for Men and Women for Reported Motivation1

Female Majority Male Majority

Groups Groups
Reported Motivation Men Women Men Women
Maximize Self-Benefit 83.0% 0.0%2 49.4% 0.0%3
Risk-Averse 62.9% 22.9% 26.9% 4.4%
Ensure Equitable Decision 51.1% 77.6% 58.1% 42.0%
Altruistic 25.3% 89.2% 5.0% 60.9%
1The value of the variable measuring perception of one’s cooperation/competitiveness
was set to the mean for each group (men and women) for the purposes of calculating
probabilities. The mean value for men was 3.22; the mean value for women was 3.49.
2Exact percentage = 0.006%
3Exact percentage = 0.005%

ferred the competitive solution but voted for a universalistic solution in the face
of a female majority which guaranteed a universalistic solution.
If men were risk-averse in a female majority group they had a 62.9% proba-
bility associated with choosing the universalistic solution. If men were
risk-averse in a male majority group they had only a 26.9% probability associ-
ated with choosing the universalistic solution. This difference suggests that
there was a very different dynamic at work in female and male majority
groups. Men in female majority groups may have assessed the situation, com-
prehended the majority preference for the universalistic solution, and endorsed
it as a way of avoiding the risk of being left out of a beneficial decision (or per-
haps to avoid being on the losing end of a female-majority minimum-winning
coalition). Men in male majority groups who wished to avoid the risk of being
left out of a beneficial decision may have realized that the majority preference
was for a competitive solution and, hence, they were more likely to endorse a
competitive solution and form a minimum-winning coalition. Also, women in
the minority were unlikely to endorse a universalistic solution if they were
risk-averse, suggesting that there was little utility to this option in the face of a
competitive group dynamic.

CONCLUSION

Women were significantly more likely than men to prefer the universalistic
solution. Female majority groups were significantly more likely than male ma-
 Carole Kennedy 41

jority groups to arrive at a unanimous decision in favor of a universalistic solu-

tion. Women in male majority groups considered themselves more cooperative in
their decision-making behavior as compared to other members of their group.
The experimental design has confirmed what empirical field research has also
suggested; that is, that gender of participants is an important determinant of leg-
islative processes and outputs. The findings of this study support the finding of
gender differences in decision-making behavior in both experimental and em-
pirical studies (Aranoff and Tedeschi 1968; Eagly and Crowley 1986; Jewell
and Whicker 1994; Jones et al. 1968; Meux 1973; Rosenthal 1998).
One advantage of the experimental design over real-world empirical analy-
sis is that it allows one to assess the potential impact of increased numbers of
women in legislatures by allowing the manipulation of gender balances to re-
flect female majorities in a controlled setting. It also allows control over the
multiple sources of “noise” that invariably muddle analysis of real-world deci-
sion-making. Finally, the experimental design allows the exploration of mi-
cro-level processes that are difficult to discern through survey data or
observation of legislative decision-making. However, there are also draw-
backs in using the experimental design. Foremost among the drawbacks is the
question of generalization. The findings presented here do not suggest that all
men and women who occupy legislative positions will exhibit the motivations
and behavior of young adult college students. Certainly both men and women
who achieve elective office have overcome obstacles, learned skills, and de-
veloped coping mechanisms as they were socialized into politics that will af-
fect their decision-making behavior. Yet, it is interesting to note that while the
women in my sample had an average age of only twenty-two years old, consid-
erably younger than the age at which most women have experienced socializa-
tion due to homemaking and child-rearing, they exhibit the same tendencies in
decision-making that the female council members in Flammang’s study attrib-
uted to homemaking and child-rearing socialization. This finding suggests that
the locus of sex role socialization that affects women’s political decision-mak-
ing occurs much earlier in life than has been previously suggested by self-re-
ports from women in politics. These findings lend support to the notion that
gender role socialization is learned early in life (Valian 1998).
The ongoing challenge for researchers of political behavior is to develop
models of political behavior that acknowledge differences between men and
women and are designed to illuminate rather than obfuscate them. As more and
more women become active in political life, formal modeling approaches to
understanding decision-making behavior can be useful if they include assump-
tions regarding gender differences and explicitly model those differences.
42 WOMEN & POLITICS

AUTHOR NOTE
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association. The author wishes to thank Jonathan Nagler,
Barbara Sinclair, and anonymous reviewers at Women & Politics for helpful comments
and suggestions. All errors, of course, are the author’s.

NOTES
1. In each trial of the experiment each one of five participants received a handout in-
dicating what payoff would be received depending upon the solution endorsed by the
majority of participants. For example, Player 1 knew that she would receive $14.25 if
the majority endorsed solution F, $13.30 if the majority endorsed solution B or C,
$4.00 if the majority endorsed solution D, $0.75 if the majority endorsed solution A,
and nothing if the majority endorsed decision E. However, none of the players knew
what compensation was associated with competing outcomes for the other players. The
payoffs associated with different outcomes were varied among the five players in such
as way as to facilitate a test of the coalition-formation and the universalistic hypothesis,
i.e., solutions A, B, C, E, and F would result in three players receiving a payoff and two
players being left out of the distribution (the minimum-winning or competitive solu-
tion) and solution D would result in all five players receiving a payoff that was substan-
tially less than could have been achieved by three of the five through imposition of the
competitive solution (thus D represents the universalistic solution).
2. It is important to note at this juncture that, for the purposes of this experiment, the
payoff involved was not cash but a large index card on which the value of the payoff
was indicated. These payoffs were either $14.25, $13.30, $4.00, $0.75 or $0.00 in the
first trial, or extra credit points of 6, 5, 3, 1, or 0 in the second trial. The extra credit
points were to be applicable to the participants’ midterm examination in the course.
3. Decision-making groups included two groups comprised entirely of female
members, two groups comprised of four female members and one male member, six
groups composed of three female members and two male members, three groups com-
prised of two female members and three male members, three groups in which there
was a sole female member and two groups that included only male members.

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 Carole Kennedy 45

APPENDIX

Confidential Post-Experiment Questionnaire

Player #_____
Sex [ ] Female [ ] Male
Age ______
Amount of Payoff Received: _______
1) Which of the following best expresses your feelings about the outcome of the experiment?
_____ Very Satisfied
_____ Somewhat Satisfied
_____ Satisfied
_____ Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied
_____ Somewhat Dissatisfied
_____ Dissatisfied
_____ Very Dissatisfied
Additional comments:
2) Overall, how would you characterize your fellow group members?
_____ All were too competitive
_____ Some were too competitive
_____ Neither too competitive nor too cooperative
_____ Some were too cooperative
_____ All were too cooperative
3) As compared to the other members of the group, I felt that I was:
_____ More cooperative
_____ About as cooperative as the others
_____ About as competitive as the others
_____ More competitive
_____ Not sure
4) The primary basis for my ultimate decision was to: (CHOOSE ONE)
_____ Ensure that I maximized my self-benefit
_____ Ensure that the most equitable decision was reached
_____ Ensure that I was not excluded from a beneficial decision
_____ Ensure that others were not excluded from a beneficial decision