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The security implications of nanotechnology

Margaret E. Kosal

To cite this article: Margaret E. Kosal (2010) The security implications of nanotechnology,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66:4, 58-69, DOI: 10.2968/066004006
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 DOI: 10.2968/066004006

Bulletin The security implications of

of the nanotechnology
Atomic Although nanotechnology offers much
hope, it also has dual-use potential that
Scientists must be addressed. Past attempts to
control chemical and biological weapons
are instructive but inadequate.
By Margaret E. Kosal

A
lmost 15 years ago, Adm. David Jeremiah, a for-
mer acting chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
noted that military applications of nanotechnology—the
term for a range of technologies that exploit the often
unique properties of matter at size scales generally of 100 nanome-
ters (billionths of a meter) or less in one dimension—“have even
greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically change the bal-
ance of power.”1 The suggestion that nanotechnology will enable a
new class of weapons that will alter the geopolitical landscape re-
mains to be realized. Regardless, a number of security puzzles un-
derlying the emergence of nanotechnology have implications for in-
ternational security, defense policy, and arms control regimes.
A group of experts led by Madeleine Albright recently published
their suggestions for a new NATO Strategic Concept, identifying
nanotechnology as an area of research to which allies and partners
should be “alert for potentially disruptive developments” that could
“transform the technological battlefield.”2 The experts noted that
“the most destructive periods of history tend to be those when the
means of aggression have gained the upper hand in the art of wag-
ing war.” This observation resonates with Admiral Jeremiah’s ear-
lier warning about the potential security consequences of one or
more nations using nanotechnology for offensive military applica-
tions.
Nanotechnology has potential applications across many defen-
sive and offensive weapons areas. It is not a discrete technology;
rather, in dealing with matter at the molecular scale, it spans the
fields of physics, biology, and chemistry, and it blurs boundaries be-
IT IS 6 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT
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tween electrical engineering and biomedical engineering and vir-

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tually all the disciplines in between. The technological barriers to
achieving practical technologies from nanoscale building blocks
vary significantly depending on application. Some technologies, like
targeted drug delivery, have been commercially available for a few
years; others, like molecular computing, remain largely in the do-
main of basic research. Some deployed applications—such as for
new propellants and explosives—merely take advantage of the larg-
er surface area afforded by nanomaterials; others, like quantum dots
for sensing applications, exploit fundamentally unique properties
observed at the nanoscale.
The prospect exists for nanotechnology to generate new weap-
ons and new threats across a number of technical fields and applica-
tions. Some will be nano-enabled versions of previous technologies;
others may be entirely novel. One area, in particular, is the poten-
tial for creation of new chemical and biological weapons or nano-
enabled enhancements to current chemical and biological threats.
Concurrently, nanotechnology is contributing significantly to the
development of new and improved countermeasures against cur-
rent and emerging chemical and biological threats.
Like the concerns that surrounded other technological advances
of the late 20th century, such as synthetic genomics and the cog-
nitive sciences, much of the concern regarding offensive military
applications of nanotechnology remains highly speculative. Still,
choices can be made today—and policy implemented in the near
future—that can maximize the beneficial and minimize the nega-
tive effects of nanotechnology on global security. Included in those
choices are flexible approaches to nonproliferation and counterpro-
liferation, which are important policy elements to reduce the poten-
tial risks posed by emerging technologies. Past methods for other
technologies are not adequate to deal with nanotechnology, which
is already the subject of broad international research and industrial
efforts. Any international regime must be interdisciplinary in focus,
cognizant of the multipolar post–Cold War world, and appreciative
of the roles of private funders, commercial development, and trans-
national corporations.
New and unpredicted technologies are emerging at an unprec-
edented pace around the world. Communication of those new dis-
coveries is occurring faster than ever, meaning that the unique
ownership of a piece of new technology is all but impossible. Nan-
otechnology is a prime example of an enabling and potentially
game-changing technology. Today, almost all developed countries
are vigorously pursuing nanotechnology developments with well-
funded programs in the United States, Japan, China, Russia, Israel,

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 Taiwan, India, Iran, and across Europe. The global nature of this
research means that much of the nanotechnology advancement re-
cently achieved, and that is projected for the future, will likely be
available to friends and adversaries. Technically robust analysis
that is well grounded in historical and stra-
tegic implications of prior technologies is
Past methods for other technologies are not needed today more than ever.
adequate to deal with nanotechnology, which Nano investment is big and global.
is already the subject of broad international Nanotech research is surging around the
research and industrial efforts. Any world. The United States will invest some
international regime must be interdisciplinary $1.6 billion this year in nanotechnology re-
in focus, cognizant of the multipolar post– search and development across 25 federal
Cold War world, and appreciative of the roles departments, agencies, and offices, coordi-
nated through the National Nanotechnol-
of private funders, commercial development,
ogy Initiative (NNI).3 Since the initiative
and transnational corporations.
was launched in 2001, more than $12 billion
has been invested in areas ranging from
basic research, computing, optics, electronics, alternative energy
applications, textiles, new medical treatments and diagnostics, and
defensive military applications. Although the scale of U.S. govern-
ment–funded nanotech research is impressive, the private sector in-
vestment is estimated to be three times larger.
Nanotechnology research finds many proponents within the
military. The Defense Department investment in nanoscience and
nanotechnology aims to discover and exploit the unique phenom-
ena at the nanoscale. Current research and envisioned applications
of nanotechnology cut across almost all areas of military interest:
electronics; sensors; energy and power, including photovoltaics and
solar cells; structural materials; coatings; multi-functional materials;
devices; energetics, such as explosives and propellants; detectors;
decontamination; and military medicine, including improved deliv-
ery of vaccines. In 2008, for the first time in the history of the NNI,
the Defense Department funded more nanotechnology research
($375 million, plus an additional $112 million in directed congressio-
nal additions) than any other federal agency. Subsequent years have
seen a decrease in requests and appropriating of funding for nano-
science and nanotechnology research within Defense.
Approximately half of the funding for nanoscience within De-
fense is directed toward basic research projects that aim to devel-
op understanding and control of matter at the nanoscale. Roughly
35 percent of the Defense nanoscience investment is in applied re-
search; 15 percent is in advanced technology development. The De-
fense Department funds both intramural (i.e., Defense laboratories)

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and extramural projects. Extramural projects include both tradi-
tional federal support to universities as well as major defense con-
tractors and small businesses. In addition to core programs of the
services, between $12 million and $15 million in funding is specifical-
ly directed toward small businesses through Defense’s Small Busi-
ness Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer
programs, as congressionally mandated.
The Defense Department has in recent years placed more em-
phasis on manufacturing and environmental, health, and safety as-
pects of nanotechnology. Along with the National Science Founda-
tion and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the
Defense Department is a key partner in the National Nanomanufac-
turing Network, an alliance of academic, government, and industry
partners. Defense has substantially increased funding for manufac-
turing technology for nanotechnology and nano-enabled materials,
devices, and systems, as well as producibility and sustainability of
manufacturing processes. In fiscal 2007, the Defense Department’s
nanotechnology science and technology budget did not include any
request for nanomanufacturing; in fiscal 2009, the budget request
was $13 million. While small compared to investments in other
areas, Defense has consistently invested in research toward under-
standing the environmental, health, and safety aspects of nanotech-
nology and nanomaterials. With rare exception, research areas that
have not received significant funding are the potential ethical, soci-
etal, and strategic political dimensions of nanotechnology, such as
the global security questions underlying the security implications
surrounding the emergence of nanotechnology.
Washington is not alone in focusing on the world of the very
small. Nanotechnology is a product of a globalized world; all indus-
trialized nations, and many developing ones, are pursuing it. Gov-
ernment research funding for nanotechnologies has increased sub-
stantially over the last decade, with the European Union and China
each investing more than $1 billion per year, up from less than $100
million a decade ago. In 2003–2004, the European Union committed
$3.3 billion to nanotechnology and is now estimated to be invest-
ing $1.4 billion annually.4 While officially the European Commission
does not fund defense-related research, areas of investment related
to sensors and other potential dual-use applications are within in-
vestment portfolios. Individual states within the EU have imple-
mented their own nanotechnology initiatives. Germany conducts
much of Europe’s nanoscience research and provides nearly 40 per-
cent of Europe’s nanotechnology funding.5
In 2001, the Chinese government declared nanotechnology a

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 “critical R&D priority in their Guidance for National Develop-
ment,” and China initially invested an estimated $300 million to
$400 million toward such research.6 More recent estimates place
the Chinese investment in nanotechnology at $1.5 billion–$1.8 bil-
lion per year, a figure that exceeds the U.S.
investment. The Chinese Academy of Sci-
Nanotechnology is a product of a globalized ences is ranked fourth in the world (be-
world; all industrialized nations, and many hind the University of California–Berkeley,
developing ones, are pursuing it. Government IBM, and MIT) in institutes that focus on
research funding for nanotechnologies has nanotechnology. China ranks third in num-
increased substantially over the last decade, ber of publications a year; Chinese scien-
with the European Union and China each tific publications are prolific and continue
investing more than $1 billion per year, up to grow. China also held 12 percent of the
world’s patents as of 2005.7 These high
from less than $100 million a decade ago.
rankings are indicative of China’s dedica-
tion to nanotechnology as well as to sci-
ence and technology; China plans to ex-
pand in these industries with the intent of becoming a world leader
in nanotechnology R&D.
In April 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced
plans to invest almost $1 billion in 2008–2010 as part of Moscow’s in-
tensive effort to become a nanotech leader, and in June 2007 Russia
established the state corporation Rusnano with $5 billion in initial
funding.8 Japan identified nanotechnology as a main research prior-
ity in 2001 and subsequently increased investment to more than $1
billion per year.9 South Korea and Taiwan also have robust, federal-
ly funded nanotechnology programs.10 Funding numbers on Iran are
not readily available, but the country has a nanotechnology strategy
that is similar to the U.S. program, including a federal nanotechnol-
ogy coordinating office.11
Thinking about nanotech’s potential harmful weapons ap-
plications. The intersection of nanotechnology and chemical and
biological weapons presents at least four broad areas with potential
strategic implications. These areas are: (1) nano-enabled delivery
methods, (2) novel nanotechnology-based biochemical weapons, (3)
nanoparticles and nanomaterials with toxicological or deleterious
health properties, and (4) nanotechnology-enabled evasion of medi-
cal countermeasures.12 Included in the first category are traditional
agents that may be encapsulated or subject to other nanotechnol-
ogy-enabled aerosolization, stabilization, or other aspect of weap-
onization that permits the agent to evade detection or circumvent
current physical protective measures, such as personal protective
gear-like gas masks. The broad nature of nanoscience and nano-

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technology research provides a large knowledge base and a vast
number of approaches that could be used for development of novel
nanotechnology-based weapons.
Nano-enabled materials and technologies may also be used to
evade today’s medical countermeasures. Vaccines, antivirals, and
antibiotics are the current first defense against many biological
weapons. Nanotechnology may be used for this application in two
different ways. First, nanotechnology can be an enabling tool to de-
velop a weapon that would not be affected by a known countermea-
sure. Nanotechnology may use inorganic materials to mask biologi-
cal ones in ways that are beyond the detection capabilities of most
systems. Second, nanotechnology could be used to disrupt the im-
mune system through either suppression or overstimulation and
prevent it from functioning. Compared to other possibilities, nano-
technology provides a mechanism to introduce, for instance, a bio-
regulator into cells, which could then cause a cascade of immune
responses, among other things. Certain nanoparticles can also trig-
ger an immune response. A weapon developed to disrupt the entire
immune system would not require knowledge of what countermea-
sures are in place. The delivery of interfering RNA for the altera-
tion, activation, or silencing of genes has been tried with limited
success using conventional means. Nano-enabled delivery is seen as
one possible methodology to overcome that hurdle.
Nano-carriers and capsules can be used to transport molecules
across otherwise impermeable cell membranes or the blood-brain
barrier. Nano-encapsulated materials can be designed to target cer-
tain organ or tissue types. Nano-particles have been designed to
bind to cell receptors and enter or release a chemical, protein, piece
of DNA or RNA, or other biological material to the cells. It is impor-
tant to note that unless chemically appended to the exterior surface,
in general, the agent itself must also be nano-sized. Many microbes
would be too big, but small toxins like ricin or microbe subunits—
for example, the lethal factor of B. anthracis—could be encapsu-
lated. The targeted delivery of bioagents with nanoparticles might,
in theory, increase the effectiveness and require smaller amounts
of the agent than its regular administration. Such techniques could
generally allow for the development of more potent bioweapons.
Nano-carrier and encapsulation technologies have already been
developed in the pharmaceutical industry for the efficient and tar-
geted delivery of drugs and image contrast agents and are increas-
ingly used in cosmetics, agriculture, food, paint, and other materials
applications. Quantities of such nanomaterials produced have risen
dramatically in recent years—from gram to ton quantities—and

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 large amounts of some nanomaterials are now available commer-
cially. The price of such materials, which once was a limiting factor,
has fallen in parallel to those of oligomers (the short chains of DNA
that are used in synthetic biology). Accordingly, the technology is
diffusing in industrial quantities across the
globe.
A weapon developed to disrupt the entire The science and technology capabili-
immune system would not require knowledge ties necessary to realize nanotechnology-
of what countermeasures are in place. The enabled threats can be extrapolated from
delivery of interfering RNA for the alteration, the current state of research. Preventing
activation, or silencing of genes has been or inhibiting existing national and global
tried with limited success using conventional research endeavors is difficult, if not im-
means. Nano-enabled delivery is seen as possible. For these reasons, it may be more
useful to understand the intended applica-
one possible methodology to overcome that
tions as well as their potentially malicious
hurdle.
uses to ensure development of appropri-
ate countermeasures. The ability to distin-
guish defensive nanotechnology efforts from offensive programs is
expected to pose a difficult challenge in practice.
Limiting nanotech’s potential harmful weapons applica-
tions. Limiting the potential negative uses of nanotechnology will,
compared to other technologies, require additional or complemen-
tary mechanisms. In the case of privately funded research, the level
of oversight or transparency is lower compared to that of federally
funded research in the United States, in Europe, and in some other
public sector–funded work. By comparison, one can look back 35
years ago to the dawn of the transgenic era, in which the Asilomar
Conference on Recombinant DNA led to self-regulation among the
scientific community. That group was predominantly composed of
molecular biologists and met in 1975 to propose and implement vol-
untary guidelines to reduce the perceived risks to safety from bio-
technology. Given the close community of researchers with tacit
knowledge of recombinant DNA techniques, such a situation was
possible. The emphasis at the time was very much on biosafety—
that is, protecting from accidental release and limiting harm to le-
gitimate researchers. The situation is quite different today—nano-
technology is globalized, shared with the private sector, and there is
no single technical discipline on which to focus. The design of bio-
logical sensors that use de novo single-strand DNA wrapped around
carbon nanotubes is an example of two efforts: a joint effort of elec-
trical engineers and computer scientists, and the efforts of a physics
and astronomy department research group.
In today’s political world, the emphasis is also shared between

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biosafety and biosecurity. The latter includes policies to limit po-
tential access to agents, materials, or knowledge by individuals who
do not have legitimate need or who intend to use such agents, ma-
terials, or knowledge for malicious intentions like bioterrorism.
Scientists are navigating requirements that include both safety and
security. Within the field of chemical and biological defense and
homeland security in the United States, a significant fraction of the
resources for chemical and biological defense is focused on near-
term goals. Although such near-term focus may satisfy immediate
needs and metrics, it is unlikely to adequately address an evolving
threat or provide revolutionary capabilities. A more comprehensive
strategy is to balance revolutionary approaches with near-term so-
lutions and evolutionary improvements to currently deployed sys-
tems.
International efforts. The two most relevant international arms
control treaties are the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These international
agreements apply explicitly to traditional biological and chemical
weapons. The CWC extends to nano-enabled weapons with simi-
lar purposes. In particular, Article I of the CWC contains a general
purpose criterion that prohibits the use, development, production,
stockpiling, and transfer of toxic chemicals and their precursors, as
well as munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death
or other harm through the toxic properties of any chemical agent.
The intent of the general purpose criterion was to allow the CWC
to remain relevant as new technological developments—which in-
clude any nanotechnology-enabled improvements—might arise
and, in the case of dual-use chemicals, to exempt application for
peaceful purposes from its prohibitions.
Robust international agreements primarily focus on states but
also serve to lower the risk of terrorist applications by eliminat-
ing legal routes for non-state actors to obtain agents, precursors, or
weaponization materials, and by minimizing transfers from state to
non-state actors through theft, deception, or other means.
Efforts to strengthen the international regime to control trans-
fers of dual-use materials are also important. International efforts
can be compromised by member states of the CWC and the BWC
that have not enacted domestic export control legislation and non-
member countries with weak export controls. Additionally, the
schedules of toxic chemicals and precursors covered by the CWC
have not been updated since the treaty entered into force in 1997.
The challenge inspection mechanism—the means by which states
parties to the CWC can request an investigation of a suspected trea-

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 ty violation—has not been used. The BWC lacks an inspection re-
gime.
Also important are the export control regimes, such as the Aus-
tralia Group, through which dual-use items or new materials, such
as those related to nanotechnology, can
(and have been) be more easily incorporat-
The United States should consider fostering ed. Alone, none of these international ef-
proactive international scientific cooperation forts is adequate in a globalized world.
as a means to encourage beneficial use A more secure nano-future. Reduc-
of nanotechnology. One mechanism to ing the risk from state-based misuse of
accomplish this might involve revisiting and nanotechnology for biological or chemical
reimaging Cooperative Threat Reduction for weapons will mean consideration of the
the 21st century, in which a nano-focused highly transnational nature of nanotech-
program engages not only Russia as partner, nology research and development. Tradi-
tional and innovative new approaches to
but also China, Iran, India, and Pakistan.
nonproliferation and counterproliferation
are important policy elements to reduce
the risk of misuse of nanotechnology. Although the United States
and the international community are currently attempting to limit
the threat of biotechnology, serious discussion and anticipation of
the potential future threats of nanotechnology should be initiated
now.
Greater engagement by the research community is perennial-
ly called for by pundits, policy makers, scientists, and the security
community. For example, the report by the Commission on the In-
telligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction recommends that the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity “work with the Biological Sciences Community” because the
“Intelligence Community simply does not have the in-depth tech-
nical knowledge about biological weapons that it has about nucle-
ar weapons.”13 It is unlikely that the intelligence community’s ex-
pertise on nanotechnology exceeds that of biotechnology. There is
also an urgent need for people outside of the experimental research
community (including federal and industry program managers) to
engage with individuals in the technical security studies commu-
nity.
The United States should consider fostering proactive interna-
tional scientific cooperation as a means to encourage beneficial use
of nanotechnology. One mechanism to accomplish this might in-
volve revisiting and reimaging Cooperative Threat Reduction for
the 21st century, in which a nano-focused program engages not only
Russia as partner, but also China, Iran, India, and Pakistan. Revital-
izing support for Track 2 diplomacy—between scientists—is an-

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other possible avenue. Involvement of private industry at the inter-
national level will be crucial. One model could be the regional and
global work of the International Council for the Life Sciences, in-
cluding its efforts with the Organization of the Islamic Conference’s
Standing Committee on Scientific and Technological Corporation
to promote biosecurity in the Muslim research world and in the
Middle East.14
Conclusion. Action is needed to anticipate the threat of nan-
otechnology for offensive chemical and biological weapons ap-
plications. The threat from nanotechnology varies. The required
technical knowledge and materials may exceed the capabilities of
non-state actors. On the other hand, state-based programs may not
face these limitations. The time to develop and establish policy to
neutralize potential misuses, whether by states or non-state actors,
is now, rather than when such research applications appear inevita-
ble. A better alignment of research priorities and planning guidance
for nanotechnology will be needed to innovate and protect against
newly emerging and growing threats.
Reducing risks from the misuse of nanotechnology as applied
to chemical and biological weapons means recognizing the global-
ized nature of nanotech research and development. Addressing the
threats and opportunities presented by nanotechnology and other
emerging technologies will require a strategic vision to foster rev-
olutionary science. To be effective, such a vision will encompass
truly multidisciplinary approaches and incorporate comprehensive
capability and threat analyses. Improved monitoring, cooperation,
and understanding of technical capabilities across the globe will all
aid in this effort. Attempts to limit the peaceful, investigatory ex-
ploration of science are likely to be detrimental to the interests of
international security and economic development.
The ubiquitous nature of nanotechnology—along with biotech-
nology and information and communications technologies—means
its applications are likely to be far reaching. Understanding po-
tential proliferation challenges and threats that may be wielded
through application of these technologies is critical. The develop-
ment of countermeasures to those threats is a national and interna-
tional security concern, and strong defensive capabilities are also
important as a protective measure and as a deterrent. For now, the
penultimate limitation is the infancy of the technology, but that re-
striction will not hold indefinitely. The laws of physics remain the
final regulating influence on nanotechnology. <

Earning a doctoral degree in chemistry for work on biomimetic nano-

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structured materials, Kosal is currently an assistant professor in the
Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute
of Technology. Prior to joining Georgia Tech, Kosal was science and
technology adviser within the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense,
during which time she served as part of the interagency Nonprolifera-
tion and Arms Control Technology Working Group, as representa-
tive to the group charged with leading the National Nanotechnology
Initiative, and in the NATO Nanotechnology for Defense Working
Group. In 2000, she co-founded a sensor company, where she led re-
search on biological, chemical, and explosive detection. Kosal is the
author of Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense,
which explores scenarios and strategies involving the benefits and po-
tential proliferation threats of nanotechnology and other emerging sci-
ences for global security.

Notes

1. David E. Jeremiah, “Nanotechnology and Global Security,” paper given at

Fourth Foresight Conference on Molecular Nanotechnology, Palo Alto, Calif., No-
vember 9, 1995, available at http://www.zyvex.com/nanotech/nano4/jeremiahPa-
per.html. For more on the definition of nanotechnology, see Committee to Review
the National Nanotechnology Initiative/National Research Council, A Matter of
Size: Triennial Review of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (Washington, D.C.:
National Academies Press, 2006).
2. “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement—Analysis of the Group
of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO,” May 17, 2010, p. 15, available at
http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf.
3. “Research and Development Leading to a Revolution in Technology and In-
dustry: Supplement to the President’s FY2010 Budget,” National Nanotechnology
Initiative, May 2009.
4. European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Towards a Euro-
pean Strategy for Nanotechnology (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of
the European Communities Center for Nanotechnology in Society, 2004), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/pdf/nano_com_en_new.pdf.
5. Michael Berger, “German Nanotechnology Risk Research Strategy,” Nanowerk
LLC, May 29, 2008,
http://www.nanowerk.com/spotlight/spotid=5865.php.
6. The quotation about a “critical R&D” is from Ping Zhou and Loet Leydesdorff,
“The Emergence of China as a Leading Nation in Science,” Research Policy, vol. 35,
no. 1, pp. 83–104 (2006). On China’s initial investment: Chunli Bai, “Ascent of Nano-
science in China,” Science, vol. 309, no. 5731, pp. 61–63 (2005), available at http://
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/309/5731/61; and Richard P. Appelbaum
et al., “From Cheap Labor to High-tech Leadership: Will China’s Investment in
Nanotechnology Pay Off?” paper prepared for “Constituting Globalization: Ac-
tors, Arenas, and Outcomes,” Conference of the Society for the Advancement of
Socio-Economics, Trier, Germany, June 30–July 2, 2006, available at http://www.
cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/workshop/Appelbaum%20et%20al_SASE%202006_China%20

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists | WWW.THEBULLETIN.ORG j u ly /a u g u st 2 0 1 0 68

nanotech_27%20June%2006.pdf.
7. Lerwen Liu and Li-De Zhang, “Nanotechnology in China—Now and in the Fu-
ture,” Nanotechnology Law and Business, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 397–404 (2005).
8. Adam Stulberg and Margaret E. Kosal, “Russia,” in David Guston, ed., Encyclo-
pedia of Nanoscience and Society (Sage Reference, 2010).
9. “The 2nd Science &Technology Basic Plan (FY2001–FY2005),” Government of
Japan, March 30, 2001, unofficial version available at http://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/
english/basic/2nd-BasicPlan_01-05.html.
10. Kavitha Hariharan, “Governments Lead the Charge for Nano’s Development
in Asia,” Small Times, July 22, 2005.
11. Iranian Nanotechnology Initiative Council, available at http://nano.ir/en/;
“President Calls for Setting up of National Nanotechnology Organ,” Islamic Repub-
lic News Agency, July 15, 2006.
12. Margaret E. Kosal, Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense (New
York: Springer Academic Publishers, 2009).
13. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regard-
ing Weapons of Mass Destruction, “Report to the President of the United States,”
March 31, 2005, p. 36, see also pp. 504, 511, and 529, available at http://govinfo.library.
unt.edu/wmd/report/index.html.
14. International Council for the Life Sciences, available at http://www.iclschar-
ter.org.

Margaret E. Kosal, “The security implications of nanotechnology,” Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, July/August 2010, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 58-69.

DOI: 10.2968/066004006

Copyright © 2010 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. All Rights Reserved.

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