Professional Documents
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ICING
Table of Contents
Module 17
Icing
Session plan
Module no 17
Duration 40 minutes
Learning On completion of this module the student will be aware of the serious hazards
Objectives presented by icing and the importance of vigilance and compliance with deice and
anti-ice procedures.
Student None
prerequisites
Icing
Slide – Header slide
Slide – Icing
Aircraft contamination with frost, ice, snow or slush is a major threat to aviation safety.
Various scenarios may unfold, depending on the degree of contamination:
Longer take-off roll to lift-off.
Failure to lift-off.
Lift-off, but no climb capability.
Climb, but then loss of control.
Engine power loss or failure.
Slide – Icing
Let’s consider the effects of contamination on various critical aircraft surfaces, and the
risks associated with that contamination.
During take-off and climb-out, your aircraft is at a low altitude, high angle of attack, near
maximum thrust, and at high drag with gear and flaps/slats out. This challenges, but is
well within your clean aircraft’s flight envelope. Adding even a thin layer of frost,
particularly at the wing leading edge, however, can push you closer to the edge of the
envelope. For too many pilots, contamination has pushed them over the edge.
Aerodynamic effects
Wing
Even small amounts of frozen contaminants (frost, ice, snow and slush) can change the
shape and therefore air flow over aircraft surfaces.
Contamination on the wing can reduce performance by increasing drag and reducing lift.
This means the stall angle will decrease, probably so that the aircraft experiences stall
onset symptoms before the stall warning device (horn or stick shaker) activates.
The disruption in air flow will also alter the flight characteristics, and can lead to a roll
upset or pitch upset.
Many recent mid-size jets have supercritical wing designs that are especially susceptible to
the effects of upper wing contamination by even very small amounts of ice accumulation.
Tail
The lower surface of the horizontal tailplane is as aerodynamically critical as the upper
surface of the wing. Contamination near the leading edge of the tailplane’s lower surface
can cause a pitch upset. Contamination in tail-elevator gap can restrict ability to
manoeuvre the aircraft.
Engines
Frozen contaminants blocking engine inlets can cause a power loss or engine failure
during take-off. Frozen contaminants blocking the intake manifolds or filters may affect
engine performance as well.
Instrument effects
Frozen contaminants can also interfere with your airspeed, altitude and AOA instruments
and cause erroneous displays. If these readings are in question, reject the take-off.
Make sure that your aircraft’s critical surfaces are clean prior to beginning the take-off roll.
Each contamination situation is unique – how thick, how rough, how and where it is
distributed all play a role in the effect it may have. Contamination may:
Reduce maximum lift available at rotation.
Decrease the stall angle, possibly without triggering the stall warning
system.
Reduce the rate of climb.
Lead to a roll or pitch upset.
Flame out the engines.
Break off and get ingested into the engine.
Cause faulty and confusing airspeed, altitude, AOA or engine
indications.
Keep your aircraft clean. Don’ think twice, de-ice.
Frost
Hoar frost appears as a thin, uniform deposit of ice with a fine, white, crystalline texture. It
will need to be removed prior to flight, but will not reform. Active frost is similar to hoar
frost, but continuously reforms. Active frost can only be removed with de/anti-icing fluids.
Hoar frost and active frost form under the same conditions. Expect frost to form on your
aircraft if temperatures are cold enough and there is sufficient moisture. Specifically:
The aircraft skin temperature is below freezing.
The air temperature is close to the dew point temperature (within 3°C
or 5°F).
The dew point is below freezing.
And either one of these conditions is/was present:
A cloudless sky with calm winds.
A warm front bringing warm, moist air.
Freezing precipitation
If you are savvy enough to anticipate ground icing conditions, you can take steps to protect
your aircraft, and/or plan ahead for your de/anti-icing needs.
If freezing precipitation (snow, freezing fog, freezing rain, freezing drizzle or ice pellets) can
stick to your aircraft, and your aircraft is not certified for flight in known icing, you should
delay departure.
Information regarding freezing precipitation can be found in the METAR or TAF. Don’t be
tricked into complacency by reported rain or drizzle at near freezing temperatures, as this,
too could stick to your aircraft.
Snow (SN)
Snow, snow grains (SG) and snow pellets (GS) are readily forecasted. Depending on the
moisture content of the snow and temperature/condition of your aircraft skin, it may or
may not stick to the aircraft. To anticipate the go/delay/no-go decision, or which anti-icing
fluid to use, you need to know the snowfall intensity.
Detecting contamination
Weather reports can be used to help you anticipate frozen contamination on the ground
and in the air. If in-flight icing conditions are anticipated, but your aircraft is not certified
for flight in icing, delay departure. When you do the pre-flight walk-round, only a thorough
visual and tactile inspection of the aircraft will tell you if you actually have contamination,
even if you took preventative measures.
As part of the walk-round, look very closely at your aircraft. If it’s snowing or raining, an icy
wing can look like a wet wing. Run your hand across the surface to help identify whether
the contamination is frozen or not. Touch will also help determine if a layer of water has
frozen to form a light ice sheet on top, or conceals a layer of ice at the aircraft surface.
Look deep inside the intakes, where snow and ice can be hidden from view. If you have a
high wing, or high engine intake, use steps or other access equipment to make an
adequate inspection.
Pay particular attention to the critical surfaces including the leading edge and top of the
wing, the horizontal tail, and propeller or engine inlet and fan blades. The best inspection
tools are your eyes and hands.
Anticipate ground icing conditions anytime there is precipitation or high humidity, and the
temperature is expected to fall near or below freezing. Use all the resources available to
you – internet, flight service briefer, airport personnel or local news – to be able to
determine these ground icing factors.
Expect frost anytime there is a clear, calm night with temperatures falling to the freezing
mark. If ground icing conditions are forecast during your ground stay, arrange to protect
your aircraft to spare the de-icing expense.
If you have a quick turn-around scheduled or refuel with cold fuel, anticipate cold-soak
effects. Plan for an anti-icing application and account for the abbreviated holdover time.
If active ground icing conditions are forecast or present during your scheduled departure
time, determine whether or not you can de/anti-ice and go, or delay the flight until
conditions improve.
Specifically, if freezing precipitation, heavy snow or ice pellets are forecast or present,
make alternative arrangements for a delayed departure. Alert your passengers and parties
at the destination. Remind them that it is better to arrive late than the potential
alternative.
Fluid failure
Freezing precipitation and active frost continually add moisture to the fluid, thereby
reducing the fluid strength. At some point, the fluid will ‘fail’ – that is, it will no longer be
able to absorb and melt the moisture.
To help yourself identify failure, take a good look at your wing/representative surface when
the fluid is first applied. Usually, failed fluids are readily recognised when they transition
from a glossy to a dull, opaque appearance. However, in freezing rain or freezing drizzle,
there is only a subtle change in appearance. In these conditions, the surface will still
appear glossy following fluid failure. A tactile check is usually required to tell the
difference.
Looking at the wing from the flight deck to check for fluid failure is difficult in many aircraft
types, particularly in high or swept wing configurations where the flight deck windows are
far from the wing. Dusk/night or heavy precipitation can interfere with your ability to
determine the condition of the fluid. Regardless, you must be able to recognise fluid failure
on the wing or representative surface.
Use only fluid type(s) approved for your aircraft.
Do not use a thickened fluid (Type II, III or IV) on your aircraft without
the aircraft manufacturer’s approval.
Using fluids not approved to SAE standards can generate risk.
It is acceptable to use Kilfrost RDF on smaller aircraft.
De/anti-icing fluids do not guarantee unlimited protection; they can fail in active
precipitation or active frost. De/anti-icing fluids are effective, but must be stored, handled
and applied properly.
De-icing operations
Cleaning your aircraft of frost, snow, ice and other frozen contaminants is a vital step that
may not always be easy to accomplish. You may feel pressured by others, or even yourself,
to skip this de-icing step to arrive on time (“gethomeitis”) or keep costs down. Yielding to
these pressures and departing with contaminants on your wing may cost you your life. A
little advanced planning and dedication to keeping your aircraft clean, can help you
proactively deal with these situations.
If there is snow or other freezing precipitation during your planned departure time, and
either your aircraft is not certified for flight in icing conditions, then you should not depart.
There is no need to de-ice until you can depart.
Prevention
If you anticipate ground icing conditions prior to your intended departure, you can take
steps to prevent contamination from adhering to your aircraft. Prevention is probably the
cheapest and most time-efficient method.
Hangaring your aircraft will protect it from frost and precipitation. If you cannot secure
hangar space, consider relocating the aircraft to a near-by airport where hangar space is
available.
Beware of water already on the aircraft if it is pulled into an unheated hangar. Try to
remove the water before it has the chance to freeze and become much more difficult to
remove.
Other options to protect your aircraft include wing covers or even tarps or blankets. Such
covers may not completely protect against all contamination, however, so be sure to
carefully inspect the wings and remove any contamination.
Taxi
Be especially cautious of prop or jet wash that can or blow slush onto control surfaces,
and taxiing through deep slush or puddles. Slush may splash onto your landing gear or
control surfaces and freeze.
If you suspect contamination on your aircraft’s critical surfaces, conduct an external
inspection, or just taxi back to de-ice again.
Go/no-go decision
Immediately prior to departure, make sure your wings are still clean, i.e.
Your aircraft has not been exposed to freezing precipitation.
Active frost conditions are not present, or you applied de/anti-icing fluid
and it has not failed.
You did not taxi through deep slush or puddles.
And you were not splashed by another aircraft.
If you are unsure, taxi back or conduct an external check. ATC may allow you to conduct
this check without taxiing back.
If you are good to go, and the runway conditions support a safe departure, then complete
your normal take-off procedures and depart.
In summary
If your aircraft is contaminated, de-ice it. Use a heated hangar,
mechanical/thermal means or fluids to clean the critical surfaces. If
slush or other contamination has stuck to your aircraft prior to
departure, remove it.
If you cannot ensure a clean aircraft, delay until you can. The accident
database is filled with pilots of small and large aircraft who attempted
to take-off with frost, snow and ice still on their aircraft.
Encourage all crew and ground staff to be aware of the hazard of
ground icing.
De-ice or delay – your life depends on it.
Flight background
3rd Jan 2002 - N90AG was based at Dekalb Peachtree Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, USA. The
crew came on duty at 0900hrs (0400 local time) in preparation for a planned flight to the
UK. An additional company pilot, not qualified on the C604 and not forming part of the
flight crew, was on board as a transatlantic observer.
The aircraft made two schedule stops at Fort Myers and West Palm Beach to pick up two
passengers. After an uneventful flight, N90AG arrived at Birmingham Airport UK at
2039hrs, local time.
The aircraft parked on the Western Apron while at Birmingham. There was no precipitation
while the aircraft was on the ground at Birmingham. Over the night of 3rd January 2002
the air temperature remained below zero, with a minimum temperature of minus 9°C at
0550hrs.
The two pilots and the observer spent the night at a local hotel. Records indicated that
they checked in at approximately 2115hrs and had a meal and some alcohol between
2144hrs and 2315hrs, before retiring to bed. The handling pilot for the return to the USA
made a phone call home at 0200hrs.
Pre-flight preparation
The handling pilot and observer arrived at the aircraft at 1040hrs. The APU was started at
1050hrs. The Commander arrived at the aircraft at 1100hrs. At different times, each of
the two crew members was seen to carry out an independent external inspection of the
aircraft. During the morning, various witnesses had seen frost/ice on the wing surfaces of
N90AG. Other aircraft had been de-iced during the morning, with associated reports of
severe to moderate ice accumulation. The following are transcripts from the CVR:
Commander: “Got a (???) frost on the leading edge, on there, did you all look at it?
Following ATC clearance, engine start was at 1156hrs and was cleared to taxi at 1201hrs.
During the taxi to Runway 15, the crew carried out the Pre-Take-off Checklist, briefed the
takeoff and safety speeds and briefed the airfield departure procedure. When the anti-ice
checklist item was reached the handling pilot stated that “We may need it right after
takeoff”.
Clearance to line up and wait was granted at 1206hrs, and the aircraft was cleared for
takeoff at 1207hrs. During the take-off roll, the sound of the nose wheel rolling over the
runway centreline could be heard, which prompted the commander to tell the handling
pilot to “get off that centreline”.
The pilots cross-checked their airspeed indications when the instruments started to
register, and at 100 kt, the takeoff speeds (V1, VR, V2) were called. There were no audio
warnings activated until shortly after takeoff when the automatic voice “Bank Angle”
sounded, this occurred within two seconds of the end of the recording. The sound of the
sick-shaker was just audible during the last crew speech, also within two seconds of the
end of the recording.
The accident
The takeoff appeared normal up to lift-off. Rotation was started at about 146kt, with
elevator position being increased to 8°, in the aircraft nose up sense, resulting in an initial
pitch rate of around 4°/second. Lift-off occurred 2 seconds later, at about 153kt and with
a pitch attitude of about 8° nose-up. Once airborne, the elevator position was reduced to
3° aircraft nose-up whilst the pitch rate increased to about 5°/second.
Immediately after lift-off, the aircraft started to bank to the left. The rate of bank increased
rapidly and 2 seconds after lift-off, the bank angle had reached 50°. At that point, the
heading had diverged about 10° to the left. Opposite aileron, followed closely by right
rudder, was applied within 1 second and were maintained until the end of the recording.
As the bank angle continued to increase, progressively more aircraft nose-up elevator was
applied. Stick-shaker operation initiated 3.5 seconds after lift-off and the recorders ceased
2 seconds later. The aircraft struck the ground, inverted, adjacent to the runway. The last
recorded aircraft attitude was approximately 111° left bank and 13° nose-down pitch.
The Captain
The commander had a total of 10,000 flight hours with 800 on type, he had worked for
Epps Air Service Inc since 1968 and was the current Director of Flight Operations. He was
designated Pilot in Command for this flight. He would normally have occupied the left seat.
The company Flight Ops Manual permitted a qualified Second in Command to occupy this
seat at the Commanders discretion.
Handling pilot
The handling pilot had a total of 20,000 flight hours with 800 on type, he was one of the
four company Captain’s qualified on the Challenger 604. He had worked for Epps Air
Service Inc since 1968.
Slide – Questions
References
1) NTSB Aircraft Accident Brief. NTSB/AAB-06/03
Crash During Takeoff in Icing Conditions Canadair, Ltd., CL-600-2A12,
N873G Montrose, Colorado November 28, 2004
WWW
2) NASA Icing Branch Education Homepage
http://icebox-esn.grc.nasa.gov/education/index.html