963702

research-article2020
PSPXXX10.1177/0146167220963702Personality and Social Psychology BulletinWice and Davidai

Empirical Research Paper

Personality and Social

Benevolent Conformity: The Influence

Psychology Bulletin
1­–13
© 2020 by the Society for Personality
of Perceived Motives on Judgments of and Social Psychology, Inc
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DOI: 10.1177/0146167220963702
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220963702
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Matthew Wice1,* and Shai Davidai2,*

Abstract
Although people often disapprove of conformity, they also dislike when others deviate from group norms. What explains this
ambivalence? We hypothesized that judgments of conformity would be affected by whether people view it as motivated by
self-interested or benevolent motives. Four studies (N = 808), using both hypothetical and real-life instances of conformity,
support this prediction. We find that people judge those who conform to gain social approval (self-interested conformity) as
weak-willed, but those who conform out of concern for their group (benevolent conformity) as competent and possessing
strong character. In addition, we predict and find that people view self-interested conformity as “fake” but benevolent
conformity as revealing one’s true self. Finally, we show that differences in perceived intentions explain how people sustain
positive self-regard while succumbing to group pressures and why people judge their own conformity more favorably than
others’ conformity. We discuss implications for encouraging and discouraging conformity.

Keywords
conformity, social judgment, attributions, self–other difference, authenticity

Received December 3, 2019; revision accepted September 14, 2020

People often see conformists as weak, timid, and lacking a
backbone. At the same time, people often praise those who
are willing to conform, toe the party line, and go along with
the group (Schachter, 1951). What explains this ambivalence
toward conformity? Why is conformity sometimes seen as a
failure to withstand social pressures and other times seen as
an honorable ability to adapt oneself to the group’s demands
and “be a team player”?
In this article, we put forth a novel theoretical frame-
work that emphasizes the importance of perceived motives
to better understand this seeming ambivalence toward
conformity. We suggest that judgments of conformity are
nuanced and sensitive to the presumed motives that under-
lie a conformist’s behavior. As such, we suggest that
understanding how people evaluate conformity requires
considering why they believe it occurred in the first place.
We argue that people draw a distinction between self-inter-
ested conformity (i.e., conforming for the benefit of one’s
status within the group) and benevolent conformity (i.e.,
conforming for the benefit of one’s fellow group members
or the group as a whole), and examine whether this distinc-
tion can explain why the same act of conformity is some-
times seen as a sign of strong character and other times as
an indication of weak character.
Perceptions of Conformity
Ever since the topic of conformity has been the subject of
scientific inquiry, research has demonstrated that people hold
a certain level of ambivalence toward it. People often encour-
age others to conform (e.g., Marques & Paez, 1994; Sampson
& Brandon, 1964; Schachter, 1951), especially when doing so
bolsters their own group identity (Marques et al., 1988), their
cultural worldviews (Greenberg et al., 1990), or their shared
sense of reality (Mannetti et al., 2010). At the same time, peo-
ple frequently discourage others from yielding to group pres-
sure (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014; Stamkou et al., 2018; van
Kleef et al., 2011, 2012), are tolerant toward slight deviations
from the majority opinion (Miller & Anderson, 1979), and
hold in high regard those who resist social influence (Cialdini
et al., 1974), exert willpower to break from accepted norms
1
SUNY New Paltz, NY, USA
2
Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
*Shared first authorship. Both authors contributed equally to the manuscript.
Corresponding Author:
Shai Davidai, Columbia Business School, Columbia University, 3022
Broadway Avenue, New York, NY 10027-6902, USA.
Email: sd3311@columbia.edu
2 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
(Stamkou et al., 2018), and “march to the beat of their own
drum” (Gino, 2018). Thus, although people like when others
conform to their group, they also value honesty, sincerity, and
autonomy (Anderson, 1968; Cottrell et al., 2007; Ryan &
Deci, 2000; Schwartz, 1992), all of which can be signaled
through resisting social influence (van Kleef et al., 2011).
This variability in judgments of conformity raises questions
regarding when an act of conformity is seen as desirable or
undesirable.
Benevolent Conformity and the Role of
Perceived Motives
We propose that focusing on the perceived motives for why
people conform can shed new light on this seeming ambiguity
in judgments of conformity. Sometimes, people yield to group
pressures out of pure self-interest. They express opinions they
don’t agree with to gain social acceptance, refrain from speak-
ing their mind to avoid social rejection, and do things they
wouldn’t otherwise do to earn others’ approval (e.g., Mead
et al., 2010; Papyrina, 2012; Wang et al., 2012). Other times,
people conform out of benevolent intentions. They say things
they don’t believe to be true so as to not offend other people,
refrain from speaking their mind to maintain group harmony,
and do things they wouldn’t otherwise do to make others feel
accepted and supported (Kim & Markus, 1999; Markus &
Kitayama, 2003; Triandis, 2001). Yet, despite these different
reasons for conforming, research has yet to examine how
perceived motives influence judgments of conformity.
On the one hand, people’s motives for conforming may
have no influence on how they are judged by their peers. Just
as people overlook others’ goals when forecasting their per-
formance (Buehler et al., 1994), discount others’ ambitions
when predicting their achievements (Helzer & Dunning,
2012), and neglect others’ intentions when evaluating their
behaviors (Kruger et al., 2006; Sezer et al., 2016), they may
pay little heed to motives when seeing others conform.
Because people typically believe that others’ actions speak
louder than their intentions (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004;
Pronin, 2008), they may disregard motives when judging
conformity.
On the other hand, people do sometimes rely on mental
states to understand others’ behavior (e.g., Heider, 1958;
Malle & Knobe, 1997) and may take intentions into consid-
eration when judging conformity. For example, people may
judge someone who changes their behavior out of self-inter-
est as dishonest and lacking in character but someone who
conforms for others’ benefit as compassionate, self-sacrificing,
and having strong character. Thus, the very meaning people
ascribe to an act of conformity may depend on their subjec-
tive construal of why it occurred in the first place (Asch,
1948; Davidai et al., 2012; Griffin & Ross, 1991), which may
help explain the prevalence of conflicting findings regarding
judgments of conformity.
The idea that perceived intentions influence judgments of
conformity is consistent with research on judgments of rule-
breaking and deception. Although people generally dislike
rule-breakers, they show a preference for leaders who break
rules to benefit others in need (van Kleef et al., 2012).
Similarly, although lying is generally seen as negative and
undesirable, some lies are viewed more favorably than
others. For example, people view lies that benefit others
more positively than lies that benefit oneself (Erat & Gneezy,
2012; Levine & Schweitzer, 2015), and may even prefer
such benevolent lying to self-interested honesty (Levine
& Schweitzer, 2014). Given that conformity necessarily
involves deception (i.e., publicly exhibiting attitudes or
behaviors that are inconsistent with one’s privately held
beliefs), people may judge benevolent conformity that is
motivated by a concern for others more favorably than self-
interested conformity that is motivated by a concern for the
self. Thus, people may view benevolent conformity as a
noble act that benefits the group rather than the individual.
Self–Other Differences in Perceptions
of Benevolent Conformity
Focusing on the perceived motives for why people conform
can help explain how people sustain a positive self-regard
while still succumbing to group pressures. Although people
are generally motivated to think positively of themselves
(e.g., Dunning et al., 2004; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008), main-
taining positive self-regard can be difficult when people real-
ize that they have failed to act according to their privately
held beliefs and convictions. One way to resolve this diffi-
culty is by viewing one’s conformity as motivated by a
benevolent concern for other people. Thus, by reconstruing
their personal acts of conformity as motivated by a genuine
benevolence toward their groups, people may be able to
reconcile their conforming behaviors with their need for pos-
itive self-regard.
The same may not be true for perceptions of other peo-
ple’s conformity. As viewing other people conforming is not
threatening to one’s own self-regard, people may feel com-
fortable attributing others’ conformity to less honorable and
more self-focused motives. And, because people tend to
assume that other people’s behaviors are governed by self-
interest (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004; Miller, 1999), they may
attribute others’ acts of conformity (but not their own acts of
conformity) to a self-focused desire to fit in and avoid group
scrutiny. Thus, people may believe that they personally con-
form out of other-oriented motives but infer that others do so
out of a self-interested desire to fit in.
We are, of course, not the first to propose a self–other
difference in perceptions of conformity (Hornsey & Jetten,
2011; Pronin et al., 2007). Because people have more access
to their own mental states, they view their own behavior as
less susceptible to social influence than others’ behavior
Wice and Davidai
(Pronin et al., 2004). In contrast, because people do not have
the same access to others’ thoughts and feelings, they often
perceive others as more easily swayed by social pressures
and more susceptible to conformity. Notice, however, that
whereas past research focused on self–other differences in
perceived likelihood of conforming, we explore a novel self–
other difference in perceived motives for conforming. As
people acknowledge that they do, at times, conform (Pronin
et al., 2007), it is important to understand how they construe
what they believe to be their less frequent instances of con-
formity. Rather than examining whether people believe that
they conform less than others, we investigate whether they
believe that they conform for different reasons. Specifically,
we examine whether people attribute their own conformity to
benevolent intentions (e.g., I changed my behavior because
I wanted everyone else to have a good time), but others’
conformity to self-interest (e.g., She changed her behavior
because she wanted everyone to like her). Consequently, we
examine whether these differences in perceived motives
account for (i.e., mediate) differences in people’s judgments
of their and others’ conformity.
Research Overview
In four studies, we examine how perceived intentions influence
judgments of conformity. In Studies 1A and 1B, we compare
how people evaluate individuals who conform out of self-inter-
est with how they evaluate individuals who conform out of
benevolent intentions. In Study 2, we present participants with
a vignette of someone who either conforms or refuses to con-
form and examine their judgments of this person’s character.
Finally, in Study 3, we examine people’s inferences about why
they and others conform. We find that people are more prone to
attribute others’ conformity to self-interest than their own con-
formity. As a consequence, we show that differences in per-
ceived intentions affect judgments of conformity, prompting
people to believe that their own (but not others’) conformity
reveals a strength rather than a weakness of character.
For each study, we report all conditions run and measures
collected. We determined sample sizes in advance to
maximize power for detecting small-to-medium effect sizes
(0.1–0.3) and conducted analyses once data collection
was complete. The research we report follows American
Psychological Association’s (APA) ethical standards and
received Institutional Review Board’s approval. All data and
materials are available through the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/s7a5q/?view_only=e8551a04fbee4edb8ba4d5
54f4547751).
Studies 1A and 1B
Studies 1A and 1B examine the influence of perceived inten-
tions on judgments of conformity. We predicted that con-
formists would be judged favorably when they conform out
of other-focused motives (e.g., taking others’ emotions into
3
consideration or maintaining the group harmony) but unfa-
vorably when they are believed to conform out of self-
focused motives (e.g., being liked by others).
In addition, we examined in Study 1A people’s baseline
judgments of conformity (i.e., in the absence of information
regarding why it occurred). Given the widespread (but often
incorrect) assumption that people are motivated by narrow
self-interest (Critcher & Dunning, 2011; Miller, 1999), we
hypothesized that participants, by default, would assume that
conformity is self-interested and judge conformists accord-
ingly. Thus, we predicted that participants would judge a per-
son whose motives are unclear similarly to how they would
judge a conformist who is motivated by self-focus and differ-
ently from how they would judge a conformist who is moti-
vated by other-oriented motives.
Study 1A
Method
Participants. In total, 301 U.S. residents were recruited
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid
US$0.45 for their participation. Eight participants who did
not complete the prompt were excluded from analyses, leav-
ing a final sample of 293 participants (161 females, Mage =
35.61), although including these participants in the analyses
does not change the direction or significance of the results.
This sample size allows us to detect fixed-effect omnibus
effects as small as .18 with 80% power.
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of three conditions. In the baseline condi-
tion, participants described a time when someone they know
conformed to a group:
Think back to a time when someone you know (other than
yourself) adjusted their behavior to match how people in their
group were behaving. This may be a time when this person was in
a group and acted differently from how they usually act, expressed
opinions that are different from what they actually believe, spent
money on things they wouldn’t usually purchase, and so forth.
The self-focus condition and group-focus condition were
identical to the baseline condition, except that participants
were asked about a time in which someone conformed for a
specific motive or reason. In the self-focus condition, partici-
pants described a time when someone changed their behavior
“because they wanted to be liked by the group.” In the group-
focus condition, they described a time when someone
changed their behavior “because they cared about the feel-
ings of other people in the group.”
Next, participants evaluated the character of the person
about whom they wrote in their response (To what extent do
you feel that this person’s behavior in the group was a sign of
strength or weakness of character? 1 = sign of extremely
weak character, 4 = sign of neither weak nor strong charac-
ter, 7 = sign of extremely strong character).1
4 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)

Finally, participants indicated how much the behavior

they wrote about was motivated by self-interest (To what
extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their desire to
be liked by other members of the group? and To what extent
was this person’s behavior motivated by their concern about
being excluded from the group?; α = .673) versus benevo-
lent intentions (To what extent was this person’s behavior
motivated by their desire to maintain the harmony within the
group? and To what extent was this person’s behavior moti-
vated by their concern about the feelings of other group
members?; α = .655). Participants indicated their responses
on Likert-scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much
so) (for correlations between all variables, see Table S.1. in
the Supplemental Material).
Results. We began by assessing the effectiveness of the
manipulation. A two-way mixed analysis of variance
(ANOVA) revealed a significant Condition × Motive inter-
action, F(2, 290) = 19.96, p < .001, η2 = .121, suggesting
that the manipulation influenced the type of conformity
participants brought to mind. Participants in the self-focus
condition described an instance of conformity that was sig-
nificantly more motivated by self-focus (M = 5.81, 95%
confidence interval [CI] = [5.53, 6.09]) than by other-ori-
ented motives (M = 4.95, 95% CI = [4.67, 5.23]), F(1, 290)
= 21.63, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .58. In contrast, participants
in the group-focus condition described an instance of confor-
mity that was significantly less motivated by self-focus
(M = 4.82, 95% CI = [4.54, 5.10]) than by other-oriented
motives (M = 5.56, 95% CI = [5.27, 5.84]), F(1, 290) =
15.58, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .34. Similar to the self-focus
condition, participants in the baseline condition described
an act of conformity that was significantly more motivated
by self-focus (M = 5.23, 95% CI = [4.96, 5.50]) than by
other-oriented motives (M = 4.78, 95% CI = [4.50, 5.05]),
F(1, 290) = 6.23, p = .013, Cohen’s d =.26. Thus, unless
prompted otherwise, participants assumed that people con-
form out of self-interest rather than benevolent intentions to
benefit others.
We next examined how perceived intentions influenced
judgments of the conformist’s character. As predicted, the
conformist’s perceived motives significantly influenced
whether they were seen as possessing a strong or weak char-
acter, F(2, 290) = 14.57, p <. 001, η2 = .091 (Figure 1).
Participants viewed conforming to fit in as more revealing of
one’s weak character (M = 3.04, 95% CI = [2.70, 3.38])
than a similar act of conformity in which someone changed
their behavior out of concern for the group (M = 4.26, 95%
CI = [3.92, 4.60], p < .001, Cohen’s d = .71). In addition,
participants in the baseline condition judged conformity as
more revealing of one’s weakness of character (M = 3.23,
95% CI = [2.90, 3.56], p < .001, Cohen’s d = .58) than
participants in the group-focus condition, but practically
identical to participants in the self-focus condition (ps >
.713). Thus, when participants assumed that conformity was
Figure 1. Perceived strength of character of people who
conform out of group-focused motives (right), self-focused
motives (middle), or when motives are unclear (left).
Note. Error bars represent standard error (Study 1A).
motivated out of a self-focused desire to fit in, they viewed it
as a sign of weakness of character. In contrast, when they
assumed it was motivated by a desire to benefit one’s peers,
participants viewed conformity as reflecting a much stronger
character.
Study 1B
We ran a direct replication of Study 1A with three important
changes. First, we added a more extensive and commonly
used measure of perceived character. Specifically, we exam-
ined participants’ judgments of two distinct and fundamental
aspects of social perception—competence and warmth
(Fiske et al., 2002). Because competence and warmth repre-
sent two essential dimensions on which people judge others’
character, adding these measures allowed us to more deeply
examine how the motives that underlie why people conform
affect judgments of disparate aspects of their character. We
asked participants to describe a situation in which someone
conformed to fit in or to maintain group harmony, and to rate
this person on how warm they seem to be and on how strong-
minded and competent they are.
Second, given that baseline perceptions of conformity
were almost identical to perceptions of self-focused confor-
mity, we did not include this condition in Study 1B.
Finally, we included in Study 1B a measure of perceived
authenticity. Being authentic requires people to act accord-
ing to their personal values “as opposed to acting merely to
please others or to attain rewards” (Kernis, 2003, p. 14).
Because conformity inherently involves exhibiting attitudes
or behaviors that are inconsistent with one’s privately held
beliefs, people may view it as fake and inauthentic regardless
of why someone chooses to conform. Indeed, people dislike
when conformists pretend to be someone they are not and
applaud nonconformists for being genuine, authentic, and
Wice and Davidai
“real.” On the other hand, because people tend to believe that
the true self is fundamentally good and that morally virtuous
traits are essential parts of one’s identity (De Freitas et al.,
2018; Newman et al., 2014), they may view benevolent con-
formity (that benefits the group) as reflecting a person’s gen-
uine and true self. Thus, although conformity requires people
to change their behavior in ways that contradict their per-
sonal beliefs and convictions, people may nevertheless view
benevolent conformists as being true to their authentic self.
Method
Participants. In total, 204 U.S. residents were recruited
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid
US$0.50 for their participation. Twenty-eight participants
who did not complete the prompt were excluded from analy-
ses, leaving a final sample of 176 participants (84 females,
Mage = 35.25), although including these participants in the
analyses does not change the direction or significance of the
results. This sample size allows us to detect between-partici-
pant effects as small as .43 with 80% power.
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two conditions. In the self-focus condition,
participants described a time when someone conformed to a
group “because they cared about being liked by other people
and didn’t want to be excluded from the group.” In the group-
focus condition, participants described a time when some-
one conformed “because they cared about other people and
didn’t want to hurt their feelings.” As a manipulation check,
participants indicated how much the person they wrote about
was motivated to conform out of self-focused concerns (To
what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their
desire to be liked by other members of the group? and To
what extent was this person’s behavior motivated by their
concern about being excluded from the group?; α = .62) ver-
sus benevolent, other-oriented concerns (To what extent was
this person’s behavior motivated by their desire to maintain
the harmony within the group? and To what extent was this
person’s behavior motivated by their concern about the feel-
ings of other group members?; α = .74).
Next, participants evaluated the conforming individual’s
character. First, participants completed the measure from Study
1A, indicating the extent to which this person has a strong ver-
sus weak character (To what extent do you feel that this per-
son’s behavior in the group was a sign of strength or weakness
of character? 1 = sign of extremely weak character, 4 = sign
of neither weak nor strong character, 7 = sign of extremely
strong character). Second, participants indicated, on 7-point
Likert-scales, how much this person’s behavior showed that
they are a warm person (a tolerant person, a warm person, a
good-natured person, and a modest person; α = .85) and how
much it showed that they are a competent person (a confident
person, a strong-minded person, a competent person, and a
persistent person; α = .83) (Fiske et al., 2002). The presenta-
tion of the two measures was counterbalanced.
5
Finally, participants indicated the extent to which con-
forming to the group revealed this person’s true, authentic
self (To what extent do you feel that this person’s behavior
reflected who they really are as a person (their true self)?)
and the extent to which it revealed their true values and mor-
als (To what extent do you feel that this person’s behavior
reflected what they believed deep inside is the right thing to
do (their values and morals)?) (1 = not at all, 7 = very much
so; α = .81) (for correlations between all variables, see Table
S.2. in the Supplemental Material).
Results. We first examined whether the manipulation was
successful in prompting participants to think about someone
who conformed out of self-focused motives versus other-
oriented, group-focused motives. As expected, participants
in the self-focus condition believed that the person they wrote
about was significantly more concerned about being liked
(M = 5.56, SD = 1.29) than about protecting other group
members’ feelings (M = 4.84, SD = 1.48), matched-pairs
t(95) = 3.82, p = .0002, d = .39. In contrast, participants in
the group-focus condition believed that the person they wrote
about was more concerned about other group members’ feel-
ing (M = 5.89, SD = 1.14) than about fitting in (M = 4.79,
SD = 1.36), matched-pairs t(79) = 5.21, p < .0001, d = .58.
The 2 × 2 interaction with condition as a between-partici-
pants factor and motive (self-focused vs. other-focused) as a
within-participants factor was significant, F(1, 174) = 41.27,
p < .0001.
Next, we examined judgments of the conformist’s charac-
ter. Replicating Study 1A, participants judged self-focused
conformity as a sign of weaker character (M = 3.31, SD =
1.68) than a similar act of benevolent conformity (M = 4.91,
SD = 1.61), t(174) = 6.41, p < .0001, d = .97. Whereas
participants in the self-focus condition believed that confor-
mity revealed weak character (as compared with the scale’s
midpoint), one-sample t(95) = 4.01, p = .0001, participants
in the group-focus condition viewed conformity as a sign of
one’s strength, not weakness, of character, one-sample t(79)
= 4.91, p < .0001. An analysis of perceived warmth and
competence exhibited a similar pattern. Participants judged
someone who conformed out of a self-focused desire to fit in
as significantly less competent (M = 3.83, SD = 1.43) and
less warm (M = 4.21, SD = 1.38) than someone who con-
formed out of concern for their group members (Mcompetence =
4.82, SD = 1.56; Mwarmth = 5.58, SD = 1.51), ts > 4.36, ps
< .0001. Thus, people who conform just to fit in and to avoid
social exclusion are seen as less competent, less warm, and
as having an overall weaker character than people who con-
form to preserve group harmony and avoid hurting others’
feelings.
Finally, we examined how a person’s motives for conform-
ing influenced their perceived authenticity. Although partici-
pants in both conditions recalled a time when someone
deliberately changed their behavior in a group, those in the
group-focus condition believed that conforming for others’
6 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
benefit is significantly more revealing of one’s true character
(M = 4.71, SD = 1.73) than those in the self-focus condition
(M = 3.50, SD = 1.70), t(174) = 4.65, p < .0001, d = .70.
Thus, instead of viewing conformity as fake and inauthentic,
participants believed that conforming out of benevolent, other-
focused motives unveils a person’s authentic self and allows
them to be true to their personal morals and values. Although
conformity necessarily involves deception, people seem to
believe that it is only “fake” when done to benefit the self.2
Study 2
Why people conform affects how they are judged by others.
Participants in Studies 1A and 1B denounced people who
conform out of self-interest, but they held in high regard
people who conform out of benevolent concern for others.
Moreover, we found that despite their failure to act according
to their privately held beliefs and convictions, benevolent
conformists are seen as less “fake” and more authentic than
conformists who are motivated by a desire to fit in. In Study
2, we examine how judgments of self-interested and benevo-
lent conformity compare with judgments of nonconformity.
Specifically, we examine how the perceived mental states of
nonconformists influence people’s judgments of them.
We predicted that people would judge conformity as a sign
of strong character when it is motivated by one’s desire to
benefit their group but not when motivated by the desire to
benefit the self. In contrast, we predicted that judgments of
nonconformity would be equally positive regardless of the
person’s motives for not conforming. According to the
Normative Conflict Model (Packer, 2008), people deviate
from their groups by either dissenting (i.e., challenging norms
they wish to change) or disengaging (i.e., distancing them-
selves from the group) (Packer & Miners, 2014). Although
people may (correctly) view dissenters as more conscientious
and collectively oriented than nonconformists who simply
disengage from the group (e.g., Packer & Chasteen, 2010;
Packer et al., 2013), it is possible that the general reverence of
nonconformity overrides such judgments. That is, people
may view anyone who breaks a group’s norms as possessing
strong character, regardless of why they refuse to conform
(e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014). Indeed, we found in a pilot study
that participants viewed someone who didn’t conform despite
the substantial personal consequences of doing so as equally
strong-willed as someone who didn’t conform despite the
consequences for the group as a whole (see Supplemental
Material). Thus, although we predicted that people would,
in general, judge nonconformity more positively than confor-
mity, we did not expect them to differentiate between self-
focused and other-focused nonconformity.
To examine our predictions, we gave participants a short
description of someone who either conformed or refused to
conform to their group. In the conformity conditions, we told
participants that the person yielded to their group because he
cared a lot about what people think about him and “just wants
everyone to like him” (self-focused conformity) or because he
cared about the group and “just wants it to be successful”
(other-focused conformity). In the nonconformity conditions,
we told participants that the person refused to conform because
he cared about his independence and “doesn’t want to cave
into peer pressure” (self-focused nonconformity) or because
he cared about the group and “doesn’t want it to make a wrong
decision” (group-focused nonconformity). We predicted that
judgments of conformity would be influenced by whether the
person conformed out of self-interest or benevolent intentions,
but that judgments of nonconformity would be relatively
immune to the person’s motives for doing so.
Method
Participants and design. In total, 205 U.S. residents were
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were
paid US$0.50 for their participation. Three participants who
did not complete two simple comprehension checks and 46
participants who completed them incorrectly were excluded
from analyses, leaving a final sample of 156 participants
(65 females, Mage = 36.92), although including these partici-
pants in the analyses does not change the direction or signifi-
cance of the results. This sample size allows us to detect
between-participant effects as small as .45 with 80% power.
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of four conditions in a 2 (decision: conformity vs.
nonconformity) × 2 (motive: self-focus vs. group-focus)
between-participant design. They began by reading a vignette
describing a graduate student preparing to cast his vote in his
university’s student senate:
John is a member of the Student Senate at his university. During
a recent meeting, members were voting on how to allocate some
of the university’s funds. Some people proposed that the funds
should be used to support the renovation of the Student Center.
In order to pass this initiative, the vote must be unanimously in
favor of the decision. John feels that the Senate could have better
uses for the funds and is leaning against the initiative. However,
he really doesn’t feel strongly about the issue one way or the
other and could go either way. He decides to wait for the day of
the vote to make up his mind. When the vote commences, John
notices that all the rest of the members of the student senate are
voting in favor of the initiative.
In the two conformity conditions, participants read that
despite his misgivings, John conformed to the group and voted
in favor of the initiative (see the appendix). In the self-focus
conformity condition, they read that John conformed because
he cares a lot about what the other group members think about
him and because he wanted to make sure he fits in. In the
group-focus conformity condition, participants read that John
conformed because he cares a lot about the group’s success
and because he knew that it won’t be able to pass the initiative
without his vote.
Wice and Davidai
In the two nonconformity conditions, participants read
that John refused to conform to the group and voted against
the initiative. In the self-focus nonconformity condition, they
read that John refused to conform because he cares a lot
about being independent and self-reliant and because he
didn’t want to cave into peer pressure. In the group-focus
nonconformity condition, participants read that John did not
conform because he wanted to do what’s best for the group
and because he was worried that the group would be making
the wrong decision by passing the initiative.
Following, participants indicated their thoughts about
John’s character using the same measures from Study 1B.
First, participants indicated how much they viewed John as
having a strong character (To what extent do you feel that
John’s decision to vote in favor of/against the initiative a sign
of strength or weakness of character? 1 = sign of extremely
weak character, 4 = sign of neither weak nor strong charac-
ter, 7 = sign of extremely strong character). Second, partici-
pants indicated, on 7-point Likert-scales, how much John’s
behavior showed that he was a warm person (a tolerant per-
son, a warm person, a good-natured person, and a modest
person; α = .84) and how much it showed that he was a
competent person (a confident person, a strong-minded per-
son, a competent person, and a persistent person; α = .91)
(for correlations between all variables, see Table S.3. in the
Supplemental Material).
Results
We began by examining participants’ overall judgments of
the conformist’s and nonconformist’s character. Not surpris-
ingly, participants viewed nonconformity as reflecting stron-
ger character (M = 5.26, 95% CI = [4.88, 5.63]) than
conformity (M = 4.03, 95% CI = [3.69, 4.36]), F(1, 155) =
23.29, p < .0001, η2 = .121. This main effect, however, was
qualified by a significant Decision × Motive interaction,
F(1, 152) = 14.08, p = .018, η2 = .030 (Figure 2).
Participants viewed a person who voted against his convic-
tions to benefit his group (i.e., a benevolent conformist) as
possessing significantly stronger character (M = 4.68, 95%
CI = [4.18, 5.17]) than someone who did so to fit in (M =
3.38, 95% CI = [2.93, 3.84]), F(1, 152) = 14.54, p = .0002,
Cohen’s d = .82. In contrast, participants viewed other-
focused nonconformity as equally revealing of strong char-
acter (M = 5.30, 95% CI = [4.79, 5.81]) as self-focused
nonconformity (M = 5.22, 95% CI = [4.67, 5.77]), F(1, 152)
= 0.043, p = .837, Cohen’s d = .050. Thus, although non-
conformity was seen as equally reflective of one’s strong
character regardless of the person’s motives, conforming to a
group was judged as substantially more revealing of one’s
character when people did so to benefit others rather than
themselves.
A similar pattern of results emerged when examining
judgments of the conformist’s/nonconformist’s competence.
7
Although participants viewed the nonconforming protago-
nists as more competent (M = 5.28, 95% CI = [4.95, 5.61])
than the conforming protagonists (M = 4.02, 95% CI =
[3.72, 4.31]), F(1, 152) = 61.16, p < .0001, η2 = .157, this
main effect was qualified by a significant Decision × Motive
interaction, F(1, 152) = 4.57, p = .034, η2 = .023.
Specifically, participants viewed a conformist who voted
against his own convictions for the benefit of the group as
more competent (M = 4.58, 95% CI = [4.14, 5.01]) than
someone who did so to fit in (M = 3.46, 95% CI = [3.06,
3.86]), F(1, 152) = 13.93, p = .0003, Cohen’s d = .80. In
contrast, participants viewed an other-focused nonconform-
ist (M = 5.36, 95% CI = [4.91, 5.81]) as equally competent
to a self-focused nonconformist (M = 5.20, 95% CI = [4.72,
5.69]), F(1, 152) = 0.213, p = .645, Cohen’s d = .11.
Finally, we examined the conformist’s/nonconformist’s
perceived warmth. In contrast to judgments of competence,
participants viewed the nonconforming protagonists as less
warm and tolerant (M = 4.33, 95% CI = [4.09, 4.57]) than
the conforming protagonists (M = 5.18, 95% CI = [4.96,
5.40]), F(1, 152) = 26.47, p < .0001, η2 = .148. This main
effect was not qualified by a Decision × Motive interaction,
F(1, 152) = 0.77, p = .383, η2 = .004. A series of post hoc
contrasts revealed that participants viewed an other-focused
conformist as significantly warmer (M = 5.53, 95% CI =
[5.20, 5.85]) than a self-focused conformist (M = 4.84, 95%
CI = [4.54, 5.14]), F(1, 152) = 9.64, p = .002, Cohen’s d =
.67, but an other-focused nonconformist as equally warm (M
= 4.53, 95% CI = [4.19, 4.86]) as a self-focused noncon-
formist (M = 4.13, 95% CI = [3.77, 4.49]), F(1, 152) =
2.54, p = .11, Cohen’s d = .38.
Thus, whereas judgments of a conformist’s character
were significantly influenced by whether they conformed to
benefit their group rather than themselves, judgments of a
nonconformist’s character seemed to be relatively immune to
the person’s underlying motives. When judging a conform-
ist’s behavior, participants viewed someone who voted
against his personal convictions as significantly more com-
petent, warm, and possessing strong character if they did so
to benefit their group rather than fit in. In contrast, judgments
of a nonconformist’s behavior were not affected by why the
person stood their ground and refused to yield to group
pressure.
Study 3
Judgments of conformity are influenced by why people
conform. Although people disapprove of self-focused con-
formity, they judge favorably those who conform out of
benevolent intentions to benefit other group members or the
group as a whole. And, as shown in Study 2, these favorable
judgments of benevolent conformists are not due to a general
liking of those who put their group’s interest over their per-
sonal interest. When it came to nonconformity, participants
8 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
Figure 2. Judgments of a conformist’s (left) and a nonconformist’s (right) character, based on their motives for conforming or not
conforming (Study 2).
judged a self-focused nonconformist as equally positive as a
nonconformist who was motivated by the benefit of the
group.
The influence of perceived motives on judgments of con-
formity helps explain how people maintain a positive self-
regard while succumbing to group pressure. People often fail
to act in public according to their privately held beliefs, yet
they nonetheless view themselves as having strong character.
We argue that this is achieved by focusing on the intentions
underlying one’s conformity. Because people attribute their
own acts of conformity to other-oriented motives, they can
maintain a positive self-regard while still failing to act
according to their personal beliefs and convictions. In con-
trast, because others’ conformity does not threaten people’s
self-perceptions, and because of the widespread assumption
that others are motivated by self-interest (Miller, 1999), peo-
ple may readily attribute others’ conformity (but not their
own conformity) to more self-focused and less benevolent
intentions. Consequently, we argue that these differences in
attributions mediate the difference in people’s judgments of
their and others’ conformity.
Study 3 investigates people’s judgments of their own and
others’ conformity. We examined whether people attribute
their own conformity to benevolent intentions but other peo-
ple’s conformity to more questionable, self-focused motives.
Following, we examined whether people view instances
when they conform as more revealing of strong character
than similar instances when others do so, and whether this
difference is mediated by people’s tendency to attribute more
benevolent motives to themselves relative to others. We pre-
dicted that participants would view their own conformity as
motivated by benevolent intentions and, as a result, judge it
as a strength of character. In contrast, we predicted that par-
ticipants would attribute others’ conformity to self-interest
and therefore judge them as weak-willed and lacking in
character.
Method
Participants. In total, 98 U.S. residents were recruited from
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid US$1.50
for their participation One participant who did not respond to
the prompt was removed from analyses, yielding at total of
97 participants (56 females, Mage = 34.52). This sample size
enables detection of within-participant effects as small as .14
with 80% power.
Materials and procedure. Participants described, in counter-
balanced order, a time when they and someone they know
conformed to their respective groups:
Think back to a time when you [someone you know (other than
yourself)] adjusted your [their] behavior to match how people in
your [their] group were behaving. This may be a time when you
Wice and Davidai
[they] were in a group and acted differently from how you [they]
usually act, expressed opinions that are different from what you
[they] actually believe, spent money on things you [they]
wouldn’t usually purchase, and so forth.
To examine whether the perceived intentions differed
based on the target of judgment, participants indicated how
much their/this person’s conformity was motivated by self-
focused concerns (i.e., desire for social acceptance and con-
cern about social rejection; α = .830 for self-target, α = .705
for other-target) versus benevolent, other-oriented concerns
(i.e., desire to maintain group harmony and concern about
other group members’ feelings; α = .789 for self-target, α =
.656 for other-target).
Finally, participants rated the extent to which conforming
revealed one’s strength/weakness of character (To what
extent do you feel that your/this person’s behavior in the
group was a sign of strength or weakness of character?) (for
correlations between all variables, see Table S.4. in the
Supplemental Material).
Results
As predicted, a repeated-measures factorial ANOVA revealed
a significant Target (self vs. other) × Motive (self-focused
concerns vs. other-oriented concerns) interaction, F(1, 96)
= 16.42, p < .001, η2 = .146.3 Participants attributed less
self-interest to their own conformity (M = 4.99 95% CI =
[4.64, 5.34]) than to other people’s acts of conformity (M =
5.69, 95% CI = [5.45, 5.93]), F(1, 96) = 12.60, p = .001,
dz = .36. They also believed that their own conformity was
motivated marginally more by a desire to benefit their fellow
group members (M = 5.23, 95% CI = [4.93, 5.53]) than was
the conformity of others (M = 4.91, 95% CI = [4.60, 5.22]),
F(1, 96) = 3.42, p = .067, dz = .18.4 Thus, participants
believed that other people’s conformity was motivated more
by self-interest, and less by benevolent intentions, than was
their own conformity.
Next, we examined participants’ judgments of their own
and others’ conformity. As predicted, participants rated the
times when they yielded to social pressure as more revealing
of their strong character (M = 3.99, 95% CI = [3.67, 4.31])
than similar instances when others did so (M = 3.46, 95% CI
= [3.13, 3.80]), F(1, 96) = 7.57. p = .007, dz = .32.
Finally, we examined whether the perceived difference in
motives mediated the difference in participants’ judgments
of their own and others’ conformity. We predicted that peo-
ple would view their own acts of conformity as having been
less motivated by self-interest than other people’s confor-
mity and that this difference in perceived motives would
explain the difference in judgments of one’s own versus oth-
ers’ conformity. To examine this, we ran a bootstrapping
analysis with 5,000 bootstrapped samples in the MEMORE
macro for SPSS (designed for mediation analyses for
9
within-participant designs; Montoya & Hayes, 2017), using
target (self/other) as the predictor, self-focused motives as
the mediator, and perceived strength of character as the out-
come variable. This mediation analysis revealed a signifi-
cant indirect effect of target (self/other) on judgments of
conformity via inferences of self-interest (b = .264, 95% CI
= [0.069, 0.535]). The direct effect of target on judgments
of conformity was not significant (b = .262, 95% CI =
[–0.114, 0.637], p = .170). Thus, because participants
believed that other people—but not themselves—conformed
out of self-interest, they judged others’ acts of conformity as
revealing of their lack of character.
General Discussion
People are seemingly ambivalent about conformity. Whereas
they quickly reject those who deviate from group norms,
they also aspire to stand out from the group and hold in high-
esteem individuals who break from accepted norms or tra-
ditions. In four studies, we explored this ambivalence by
focusing on people’s perceived intentions for conforming.
We found that judgments of conformity depend on why peo-
ple believe it occurred in the first place. Whereas participants
judged favorably conformists who changed their behavior
for others’ benefit, they viewed conformity that was moti-
vated by a desire to fit in unfavorably (Studies 1 and 2).
Moreover, despite the fact that conformity inherently
involves concealing one’s true attitudes and privately held
beliefs, participants viewed benevolent conformity as less
fake and more genuine than self-interested conformity
(Study 1B). This was not due to a general preference for peo-
ple who put their group’s interest over their personal interest.
Whereas participants differentiated between self-focused
and other-focused conformity, they judged a nonconformist
who acted for their personal benefit as positively as a non-
conformist who acted for the benefit of their group (Study 2).
Finally, because participants attributed their own, but not
others’, conformity to benevolent intentions (Study 3), they
saw it as more revealing of strong character. In contrast,
because participants’ attributions for why other people yield
to social pressures were not as charitable, they viewed oth-
ers’ conformity as a sign of weak character.
Although people differentiate between benevolent and
self-interested conformity, our research provides insight
into why they are nevertheless quite suspicious about people
who conform. We found that people typically assume that
conformity is motivated by self-focused motives, leading
them to look down on those who yield to social pressures.
Participants assumed, by default, that people conform out of
self-interest (Study 1A) and believed that others are more
motivated by self-interest than by a desire to benefit their
fellow group members (Study 3). Thus, we find that under-
lying judgments of conformity is often an assumption of
self-interest (Miller, 1999).
10
Theoretical Implications and Future Directions
Highlighting the role of intentions in judgments of confor-
mity advances the field’s understanding of when people con-
demn conformity and when they applaud it. For instance, to
the extent that people believe their ingroup members have
more noble intentions than outgroup members, we would
expect them to view conformity more favorably when enacted
by member of their own group. This difference in judgment
may even be exhibited in the words people use to talk about
conformity, describing outgroup members as “mindless con-
formists” but ingroup members as “showing solidarity.”
Future research could explore these and other factors that
influence people’s perceived intentions for conformity.
More generally, our findings advance the field’s under-
standing of social perceptions of any instance when a per-
son’s private beliefs are at odds with their public behavior.
Just as outright lying erodes trust only when motivated by
self-interest (Levine & Schweitzer, 2015), perceived inten-
tions may play a fundamental role in judgments of any deceit-
ful or misleading behavior. For instance, how people judge
someone who masks their true feelings in public may depend
on why they think the person is doing so in the first place.
Whereas an overly cheerful salesperson may seem self-inter-
ested and fake, people may view someone who masks their
emotions for others’ benefit as benevolent and authentic.
Indeed, as shown in Study 1B, conformists are seen as inau-
thentic only when they conform out of a desire to fit in and
avoid social exclusion. Future research can examine how
much judgments of benevolent and self-interested conformity
reflect a more general pattern in social judgment.
Future research would also benefit from examining the
divergence between how conformists and nonconformists
view themselves and how others view them. According to
the Normative Conflict Model, the decision to either dissent
or disengage from one’s group is affected by how personally
identified people feel with their group (Packer, 2008; see
also Leigh & Melwani, 2019). Therefore, it would stand to
reason that judgments of nonconformists would be affected
by whether they deviate from their groups out of other-ori-
ented or self-oriented concerns. However, unlike judgments
of conformity, we found that judgments of nonconformity
were not affected by the person’s motives. Thus, although
people seem to pay close attention to others’ motives for con-
forming, they may be much less attuned to the motives
underlying why people refuse to conform.
Of course, there are different types of conformity, and
future research could examine how people judge each type.
Although conformity is typically thought of as a public dis-
play of behavior that is at odds with one’s privately held
beliefs (i.e., normative social influence; Asch, 1952), it can
also involve a change in people’s personally held beliefs
(i.e., informational social influence; Sherif, 1936). However,
people can only infer others’ mental states from their observ-
able behaviors, making it difficult to detect instances of
informational social influence outside of the lab. Given the
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
difficulty of distinguishing between people who internalize
their group’s attitudes and people whose attitudes are merely
aligned with their group, we focused on judgments of norma-
tive social influence. Examining judgments of benevolent
conformity that involves internalization of the group’s beliefs
may be similarly fruitful.
Finally, it is important to note that we recruited partici-
pants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk—a sample which
tends to be more diverse than traditional samples in psycho-
logical research (Buhrmester et al., 2011) but which may still
differ from the general population. Although there is no rea-
son to believe that participants from this sample are unique
in how they view conformity, future research may benefit
from examining perceptions of conformity among other pop-
ulations and research samples.
Implications for Encouraging and Discouraging
Conformity
The willingness to uphold social norms constitutes a funda-
mental aspect of human cooperation, and societies have
developed various ways to ensure adherence to group norms
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Gouldner, 1960; Tomasello &
Vaish, 2013). Nevertheless, people often hope that breaking
social norms would gain them reverence and respect. Populist
politicians try to rally the support of their base by promising
to “shake things up” rather than adhere to time-tested rules of
civility and propriety, provocateurs hope to gain recognition
by breaking social norms, rebellious teenagers wish to
impress their friends by putting themselves at harm’s way,
and so forth.
Although nonconformity may help people achieve these
goals, our research suggests an alternative route to gaining
recognition that does not require breaking norms: benevolent
conformity. Fostering an environment in which people feel
free to adhere to social norms out of sincere regard for others
may help discourage unconstructive acts of going against the
grain. Furthermore, encouraging such acts of benevolent
conformity could be extremely instrumental in helping soci-
ety deal with complex social issues, such as global health
crises which call for extensive and rapid behavioral changes
(e.g., the COVID-19 global pandemic; Van Bavel et al.,
2020). Thus, when nonconformity poses concrete risks for
others’ well-being, encouraging people to engage in benevo-
lent conformity may help quickly disseminate new social
norms. As a consequence, reverence may arise from uphold-
ing (rather than abandoning) social norms, motivating people
to conform not for their own sake but for the sake of their
fellow group members.
This is not to say that admiring benevolent conformists is
always good. Blind admiration for benevolent conformity
may lead people to passively endorse behaviors with which
they don’t necessarily agree. As some nonconformity surely
contributes to creativity and innovation (Gino, 2018), and
given that collectively minded nonconformists often bring
Wice and Davidai 11

about positive change (Packer, 2008; Spreitzer & Sonenshein,
2004), admiring certain levels of nonconformity can be valu-
able. Nevertheless, social structures may be seriously jeopar-
dized when self-interested nonconformists are admired for
breaking social norms just for the sake of standing out.
Conclusion
Although people often conform to their friends, colleagues,
and family members, they are also quite ambivalent about
doing so. People often praise the virtue of “paving one’s own
path,” but they also applaud others for “being a team player”
and not “sticking out like a sore thumb.” Focusing on peo-
ple’s intentions for conforming helps explain this seeming
ambivalence. Although people who conform out of benevo-
lent intentions are typically applauded, the same is not true
for those who conform out of a self-focused desire to fit in.
Society, it seems, neither approves nor disapproves of those
who do as others do. When it comes to conformity, intentions
matter.

Appendix
Vignettes Used in Study 2.

Conformity Self-focus
Fitting in with everyone else is especially important to John, and he is concerned about how the other
members of the Student Senate will feel about him if he votes against the initiative. John cares a lot
about what people think about him and just wants everyone to like him. Because John wants everyone
to like him, he decides to vote like everyone else to make sure he fits in. So, despite his misgivings,
John ends up voting in favor of the initiative.
Group-focus The Student Senate is especially important to John, and he is concerned that the Senate won’t be able
to pass the initiative without his vote. John cares a lot about the goals of the Student Senate and just
wants it to be successful. Because John wants the Senate to be successful, he decides to vote like
everyone else to make sure the vote is passed. So, despite his misgivings, John ends up voting in favor
of the initiative.
Nonconformity Self-focus Self-reliance is especially important to John, and he is concerned that voting in favor of the initiative
would go against his personal beliefs. John cares a lot about his independence and doesn’t want to cave
into peer pressure. Because John doesn’t want to cave into peer pressure, he decides to make up his
own mind and to vote according to his own views and beliefs. So, because of his misgivings, John ends
up voting against the initiative.
Group-focus The Student Senate is especially important to John, and he is concerned that the Senate will be making
a wrong decision by passing the initiative. John cares a lot about the goals of the Student Senate and
doesn’t want it to make a wrong decision. Because John doesn’t want the Senate to make the wrong
decision, he decides to make up his own mind and to vote according to what he thinks is best for the
Senate. So, because of his misgivings, John ends up voting against the initiative.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This
research was supported, in part, by an SPSP Small Research Grant
awarded to the first author.
ORCID iD
Shai Davidai https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2603-2217
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material is available online with this article.
Notes
1. In Studies 1A and 3, we also asked participants to indicate
how much this person’s behavior was desirable or undesirable
(To what extent was this person’s behavior in the group desir-
able or undesirable? 1= extremely undesirable, 4 = neither
desirable nor undesirable, 7 = extremely desirable). The analy-
ses using this measure of desirability as the dependent variable
yielded very similar results. We report these analyses in the
Supplemental Material.
2. In the Supplemental Material, we report the results of two explor-
atory mediation analyses that examine the relationship between
motives for conforming, perceptions of character, and perceived
authenticity. These analyses revealed significant indirect effects of
motives on perceived authenticity through strength of character,
warmth, and competence. Because people view benevolent con-
formists as tolerant and good-natured individuals who have strong
moral character, they believe that conforming for the sake of one’s
group reveals what people are really like “deep down inside.”
3. Order of presentation did not interact with any of the main
effects, which were sustained even with order included in the
analyses.
4. Another way of looking at attributed motives is examining partici-
pants’ beliefs about what motivates them and others to conform.
Whereas participants viewed other people’s conformity as reflect-
ing more self-focused than benevolent intentions (M = 5.69 vs. M
= 4.91), F(1, 96) = 21.33, p < .001, dz = .47, they believed that
their own conformity was equally motivated by self- and other-
focused motives (M = 4.99 vs. M = 5.23), p = .241.
12
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